Introduction

A. The Regalian Doctrine

a. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land.

PACIFICO M. VALIAO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. 170757

Facts:
Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental. A year after, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed a Motion to Dismiss the said
application which was supported by the Office of the Solicitor General.

RTC:
The court denied the Motion to Dismiss by the oppositors and grants the application of the petitioner in the titling of the said lot.

CA:
The CA reverse the decision of the RTC and ruled that the classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of
the executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification; the lands remain as unclassified until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Issue:
Whether or not lot no. 2372 of the ilog cadastre is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and the alleged
possession of the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to sustain their claim for prescription

Ruling:
The court held that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State and the burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable
or disposable.

In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land
of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

Secretary of the DENR v Yap

G.R. 172775

**********There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decisionof
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The
second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

Facts:

GR no. 167707

On April of 1976, the DENR approved the National reservation survey of Boracay which identified several lots as being occupied by
named persons.

On November of 1978, Pres. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), then later on approves PTA Circ. 3-82 to implement the said proclamation.

Yap, together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the said
proclamation prevented them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
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purposes. Moreover, they contend that they or through their predecessor-in-interest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject land since time immemorial and they were paying their realty tax.

Further, the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of men, classified as a tourist zone, therefore, susceptible
of private ownership. Invoking Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they have the right to have the lots
registered under their names.

The republic, through OSG, opposed the petition of the respondents’ claiming that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public
domain. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD 705 or the revised forestry code, as amended, it is not susceptible of private ownership.

The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial confirmation of title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Since the
Island has not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they have cannot ripen into ownership.

RTC: It upheld respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.

OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, they appealed it to the CA.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.

OSG moved for reconsideration, but, it was also denied. They appeled to the SC.

GR no. 173775

However, during the pendency of the case (GR no. 167707) Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of
forest land and 628.96 ha or agricultural land. On august of 2006, Sacay, Gelito and other land owners filed a petition for nullification
of PP1064. They contend that the said proclamation infringes their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay, also, they have been
occupying the lot since time immemorial.

Nonetheless, the OSG argued that they don’t have vested rights over the property because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
ursuant to PD 705. Therefore, they are neither alienable nor disposable lands.

*****On November of 2006, the court ordered the consolidation of both cases as they involve the same issues on land classification of
Boracay Island.*****

Issue:

Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a
right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Appying this law, all
unclassified lands, including that of the Boracay Island is considered as Public forest. Nonetheless, PD No. 705 respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the
1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, there was neither a proclamation, EO, Administrative action, report statute nor a certificate presented in court.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay Island making internationally known ad some called it their home.
However, the SC expressed that they are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. Thus, saying “Ito and batas, ito ang dapat
umiral.”

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FERNANDA ARBIAS vs THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 173808

Facts:

On 12 March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling to petitioner, married to Jimmy Arbias
(Jimmy), a parcel of unregistered land situated at Poblacion, Estancia, Iloilo, and identified as Cadastral Lot No. 287 of the Estancia
Cadastre (subject property), for the sum of P33,000.00. According to the Deed, the subject property was residential and consisted of
600 square meters, more or less.

Three years thereafter, on 17 June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Application for Registration of Title over the subject
property. On 3 September 1996, the RTC transmitted the application with all the attached documents and evidences to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner had already complied with all the requirements precedent to the publication.

Subsequently, the RTC ordered that its initial hearing on 17 February 1999. On 6 January 1999, the respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Notice of Appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of
Iloilo City to appear on its behalf before the RTC.

At the hearing on 23 July 1999 before the RTC, petitioner took the witness stand where she identified documentary exhibits and
testified as to her purchase of the subject property, as well as her acts of ownership and possession over the same. The owners of the
lots adjoining the subject property who attended the hearing were Hector Tiples, who opposed the supposed area of the subject
property; and Pablo Garin, who declared that he had no objection thereto.

When its turn to present evidence came, respondent, represented by the City Prosecutor, manifested that it had no evidence to
contradict petitioner’s application for registration. It merely reiterated its objection that the area of the subject property, as stated in
the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and the Tax Declarations covering the property, was only 600 square meters, while the area
stated in the Cadastral Survey was 717 square meters.

Issue:

Whether or not the public respondent court of appeals erred in not holding that the lot in question ceases (sic) to be public
land in view of petitioner’s and that of her predecessor’s-in-interest possession en concepto de dueno for more than thirty
(30) years.

Held:

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states the requirements necessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
to be issued. In accordance with said provision, persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.

In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must
consider the same as still inalienable public domain.

The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the petitioner’s application for registration is also irrelevant. The
burden of proof imposed by law on petitioner does not shift. Indeed, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on
the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he
must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. Furthermore, the court has the
bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive
and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to register

The Survey Plan and Technical Description of the subject property submitted by petitioner merely plot the location, area and
boundaries thereof. Although they help in establishing the identity of the property sought to be registered, they are completely

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ineffectual in proving that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the subject property in the concept of an
owner for the necessary period.

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. DENR

G.R. No. 161881

Facts:

Nicasio Alcantara is a lessee under Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) which he claimed to be
subsisting since 1983 issued by DENR with an area of nine hundred twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land located at Sitio
Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. In which the land is claimed as ancestral land of indigenous B’laan and
Maguindanaoans since time immemorial and that only after World War II that Christian settlers started occupying the area.

On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes, filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the
land to the indigenous communities. Alcantara questions the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the
DENR who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. Despite opposition, Alcantara was able to renew
FLGLA No. 542 in 1993 for another 25 years, or until December 31, 2018.

On October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to
recognize and promote all the rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the
framework of the Constitution. Later, COSLAP rendered its decision in favor of the complainant indigenous people and recommended
to DENR to cancel Alcantara’s renewed FLGLA No. 542 and declare the area as ancestral lands of the B’laans. Alcantara filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the decision of the COSLAP, but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the COSLAP, ruling
that the issues and arguments it raised had all been addressed squarely in the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838 which
upheld the COSLAP's decision and which had long become final and executory.

Issue(s):

Whether petitioner, based on his alleged residual rights, may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No. 542
on December 31, 2018;

Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing the COSLAP's decision.

Ruling:

The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made final
finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and that it was made in violation of prevailing laws. It was likewise declared that
FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated
agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups
occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of
the indigenous cultural group concerned. Petitioner’s alleged "residual right" has no legal basis and contradicts his admission that
FLGLA No. 542 has been declared invalid by the Court in its decision in G.R. No. 145838. Petitioner has had no residue of any right
and no entitlement to the land, from the very beginning.

The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent DENR officials in their implementation of the
COSLAP decision, FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of
natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine.Like timber or mining
licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled,
amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires.Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a
contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or
privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the

4
police power of the State.Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as
such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance.

BUENAVENTURA VS. REPUBLIC

GR NO. 186865 March 2, 2007

Facts:

The subject property in dispute was acquired by Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) even before World
War II. In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale, the subject property to their children, among whom
are herein petitioners, Angelita and Preciosa. Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the
RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property, where they alleged that "they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the
said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period
provided for by law." They also presented and identified various documents supporting their claim. On 29 October 2001, the court a
quo issued an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject property. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic appealed
to the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners’ own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and disposable
because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. Likewise, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the
Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property in dispute is a public land.

Held:

NO. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be
rebutted by the applicant’s presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable and disposable.

The certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources verified that the subject parcel of land is “alienable
and disposable land of the public domain”. The said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject
property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

GR.NO. 163766, June 22, 2006

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Facts:

On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.
for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Candy
Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of it’s alleged title over the lot.

The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public
use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the

Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated
and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so, whether
respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove it’s ownership over the property.

Ruling:

The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove
that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate
against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant
from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

i. Effect of the Regalian Doctrine: All lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right
to an asserted ownership of land. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of the
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.

REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN

GR. NO. 157485

Facts:

On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola (Superintendent of
ANCF) for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their
ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074
of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659
which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. The MCTC ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over
the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.

6
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan and the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the
MCTC Judgment. Petitioner Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review and the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding respondents’ claim to supposed “private rights” over subject
land despite the DENR certification that it is classified as timberland.

Ruling:

The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960. It must be
noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree.

The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed
property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. In Heirs ofMalabanan vs Republic, the members of this
Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to
do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. The SC grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss the civil case for
lack of merit.

B. The Regalian Doctrine does not negate Native Title: Ancestral lands and domains; time-immemorial possession.

a. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not deemed part of the lands of the public domain but are private lands
belonging to indigenous cultural communities or indigenous people who have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claims of ownership, based on NATIVE TITLE, since TIME IMMEMORIAL. The rights of the ICC/IP’s
may be acquired in 2 modes:
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(a) by NATIVE TITLE over both ancestral lands and domains, or

(b) by TORRENS TITLE under the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.

b. Basis of Native Title

c.

CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

41 Phil 935

Facts:

Don Mateo Carino, an Igorot, sought to register with the land registration court a parcel of land in the Province of Benguet. He
claimed that the said land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial. His grandfather had lived upon it,
and had maintained fences around the property for holding of cattle. Furthermore, his father had cultivated some parts of the land. And
that he inherited it in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had been issued from the Spanish Crown.

In 1901, Carino obtained possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The American colonial government, however,
ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land
registration court.

In 1904, the land registration court granted Carino’s application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the CFI of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed
Carino’s application. The Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s decision by applying the Valenton ruling. Carino took the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court. On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian Doctrine and contended that Carino failed
to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period
of time. Carino, on the other hand, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed
part of the public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Ruling:

No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since
time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

d. Private land titles existed irrespective of any royal grant

1. CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

G.R. No. 135385

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa in their capacity as citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8371
which is also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) on the ground that it amounts to the unlawful deprivation
of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership
of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on their
native title. After the deep-seated deliberation, the members of the court voted as follows: Seven Justices have voted to dismiss the
petition while the other 7 Justices ruled in favor of the petition. They failed to come up with the necessary majority instead the votes
were equally divided. Both parties initiated a redeliberation but nothing happened since the voting remained the same. As a result, in
virtue of Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the petitioned was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine negates native title

Ruling:

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The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. The Congress in its
wisdom did not intend to have clashing of laws. In this case, it also resolved the question on whether the existence of native title to
land is considered as an exception to the theory of Regalian. It has been clearly elucidated by the Supreme Court that the Doctrine of
native title is not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. The Regalian Doctrine and the Doctrine of the Native Title can exist side by
side. The possession per se since time immemorial has ripened to ownership. By having this IPRA, it serves as a way that removed the
barriers when it comes to the idea of reconciling the Regalian Doctrine and Doctrine of Native Title such as for this instance wherein
it is impossible to own land in Baguio or in the whole Cordillera Administrative Region under PD 1529 since lands which are beyond
18 % slope cannot be titled but this problem was cured. On the other hand, the NCIP does not give title but it merely facilitates the
recognition of ancestral lands. It is a recognition of something that is already present. Moreover, registration may spawn if ownership
of land is not acquired or proven by the seven modes of acquiring ownership.

2. History of public land disposition

SECRETARY OF DENR VS. YAP

G.R. NO. 167707

Facts:

The DENR identified several lots in Boracay as being claimed by named persons. President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas as tourist zones and marine reserves under
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Respondents-claimants alleged that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. The
Office of the Solicitor General countered that Boracay Island was unclassified land of the public domain which formed part of the
“public forest”
.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No. 1801 has posed any legal impediment to the titling of lands in Boracay Islands.

Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. 1801 was not a legal impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial
were part of a forest reserve.

Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological
balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability. Thus the islands remain as public domain which is governed by the Regalian
doctrine.

9
i. But: University Land Awarded to Indigenous People voided

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR NO. 184869

Facts:

This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation appropriating state university property to be allocated to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities.

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. In 1958 President
Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school
site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after forty-five years (January 7, 2003) issued Presidential Proclamation 310. Said proclamation
takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan,
Maramag, Bukidnon.

CMU subsequently filed a petition to declare the presidential proclamation as unconstitutional.

RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. More so, the RTC posited that the ultimate
owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is constitutional.

Ruling:

No. Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is unconstitutional for being contrary to law and public policy.

CMU is a school established to promote agriculture and industry; as such the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future
programs of expansion is justified. When President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476 exempting from sale or settlement and
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares is for the promotion of
the school’s agriculture and industry.

Through the years the CMU lands were used to support the expanding activities of the school in the fields of agricultural technology
and scientific research. It is in Bukidnon that it was built, so that there are enough resources and wide open spaces. These are needed
fro an agricultural educational institution to grow, and for the furtherance of development and training of future farmers of Mindanao.

The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a
gross misinterpretation of law.

10
Indeed ,the education of the youth and agrarian reform are among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs.
In this case, neither have to be compromised. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the
CMU land reservation which can be allocated to qualified beneficiaries.

The decision in this case is of optimum significance. This ruling concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research
facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP). State
colleges and universities like the CMU are the country’s conduit towards scientific and technological advancement in the field of
agriculture, which is apparently an important field in our society.

Still, the proclamation of President Arroyo is immaterial, for the lands in dispute ceased to be alienable public lands from the time
President Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture.Thus, the petition of
the CMU asking for the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 310 is granted.

C. The Problem of Registration and the Present Challenge

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 179987April 29, 2009

Facts:

On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite, covering a parcel of
land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 sq. meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than 30 years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence
presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
“verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under project no. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On December 3, 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the

11
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

Issues:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?

Ruling:

The Petition is denied.

In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION

A. Essence of Registration, in general

a. CHING VS. MALAYA

153 SCRA 412

Facts:

The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and
Araceli Alvarado had forced their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same
despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the petitioners’ case that they were the owners of the said property, having
acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and

12
registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The private respondents, in their answer, had
challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance.

The municipal court, affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to
vacate the disputed property. The respondents argued, as the basic question was one of ownership and not of mere possession, the
municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint.

On appeal, this decision was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the
case as it involved a question of ownership.

Issue:

Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land.

Ruling:

Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership cases. But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not an
ownership case. The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial before the
Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession. The
parties just showed evidence of ownership so as to prove possession and this will not divest the Municipal Court of its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the land is registered under Ching’s name in the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. The land was actually sold
to him by Alvarado’s father in 1978. No protest was ever filed against the Deed of Sale since 1978. Alvarado only filed an annulment
case (which is a separate case) when the ejectment case was filed. With a strong evidence to back Ching’s claim, the Municipal
Court’s decision was reinstated by the Supreme Court.

b. Purpose of Registration

CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M.SALEEBY

G.R.No. L-8936 October 2,1915

Facts:

The plaintiffs, Consuelo and Mauro, and the defendant, Saleeby, are owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila. Between the said lots was a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On the 2nd day of March, 1906, the
plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition
the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Subsequently, the defendant
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. On December 13,1912, the plaintiffs discovered
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the
defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
However, the lower without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for
the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant
was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it.

13
Issue:

Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons?

What is the purpose of registration?

Ruling:

The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the
law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has
been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.

In case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is
the rule between original parties.

c. REGISTRATION IS NOT A MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

VAGILIDAD V. VAGILIDAD
G.R. No. 161136. November 16, 2006

Facts:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253) situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique was owned by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, Zoilo died. Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of Zoilo,
sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253, measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Loreto.
Zoilo’s children Loreto, Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva, in view of their father’s death, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to Loreto. On January 29, 1987,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT
No. T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was issued in the name of LORETO alone.
On July 31, 1987, Gabino Jr., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the Surrender of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253 against
LORETO, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 87-731-A. The parties however seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement
without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued an Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the archives. Gabino
Jr. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto as per Tax Declaration No. 1038 where the property was specified as Lot
No. 1253-B. Gabino Jr. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On
the same date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt-described property was also executed by Loreto in favor
of Wilfredo.
On February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was registered. Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No.
16694, was issued in favor of Wilfredo pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita
obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P150,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the
said loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 186876. Subsequently, the real estate mortgage
was cancelled under Entry No. 191053 as per inscription dated November 17, 1992 in TCT No. 18023.
Subsequently, Wilfredo obtained another loan from Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P200,000.00 and
mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No.
196268. The said loan was paid and, consequently, the mortgage was cancelled as Entry No. 202500.
Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they already bought it to from the former owner who sold the
same to Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said property. They raised that
defendant Wilfredo requested Gabino Jr. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in defendant Wilfredo’s name for loaning
purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They added that, pursuant to the
mentioned agreement, plaintiff Gabino Jr., without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, Dorothy, executed the Deed of Sale
dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant Wilfredo receiving nothing as payment therefor.

14
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Are the petitioners correct in their contention that since the subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was only approved on January 19, 1987,
the appellate court can not presume that the aliquot part of Loreto was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B?

Ruling:

No. The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render
the sale a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-
owned property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as
it is legally possible to do so.

In the case at bar, the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino, Jr. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of
sale, Loreto had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604
square meters to Gabino, Jr. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only
his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Be that as it may, the co-heirs of Loreto waived all their
rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of Loreto in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They
declared that they have previously received their respective shares from the other estate of their parents Zoilo and Purificacion. The
rights of Gabino, JR. as owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by Loreto to
Wilfredo in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from Gabino, Jr. upon the issuance of the
title to the subject property in the name of Wilfredo. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged
incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by Wilfredo because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.

i. Distinguish “title” from a Certificate of Title

DINAH C. CASTILLOvsANTONIO M. ESCUTIN

G.R. No. 171056 March 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. Moratilla. Racquel, her mother, Urbana Kalaw and sister, Perla Moratilla, co-owned Lot
13713, 15,000 square-meter, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.

When the petitioner verified the property, she found out that the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for
conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713, to residential, commercial, and recreational uses was approved
and the property was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot 13713. Before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713
was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation. She
immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty.

Petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then issued Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned
5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.

When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes, she was shocked to that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-
A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 1-B, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac. The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale
of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty.

15
In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, it did not
express the desire of Summit Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. There were
also missing information in the said Deed.

Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376,
the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional
Trial Court of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit
Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square
meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts
among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately
bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and identified as
Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering the same was never cancelled;
and the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No.
181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order dated 3 January 2001, the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-
0376 and directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the same terms and
condition as in its original form.

Petitioner cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property, purportedly without legal
personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac,
yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was
not Yagin, but Orense, who, through a letter dated 27 June 2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the
issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in
the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.

Petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT
No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.

Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105,648 square meters, specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of
Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had
every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title
over the same. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioner’s, which
was based on a mere tax declaration.

Issue:

Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property.

Ruling:

As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers
and even petitioner herself. The Court ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or
ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square
meter property from Raquel who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court
of Appeals aptly observed that, "curiously, as to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and
her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained
utterly silent."

A title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It
is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other
hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an
Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued
subsequent to the original registration.

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d. Advantages of the Torrens System of Registration
e. Effects of Registration, In General

i. PNB vs CA

153 SCRA 435

Facts:

Montemayor mortgaged to PNB three lots covered by Torrens Certificate of Title to guarantee the loan granted by PNB to Jaramilla,
Bacani and Vitug. Since Jaramilla, Bacani and Vitug failed to pay their loans, the lots were foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Certificate of sale was then issued to PNB for being the highest bidder.

It was then found that the subject properties used as guarantees for mortgage were conjugal properties of spouses Montemayor and
Vitug. The heirs of Vitug with his first wife question the validity of the mortgage and pray for the declaration of the public auction as
void.

Issue:

Is the Torrens Certificate of Title conclusive?

Ruling:

Yes. The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry. A Torrens title concludes all controversy over
ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration.The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of
title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering
said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.

ii. Limitations:
 Merely confirms pre-existing right; not a means of acquiring ownership

SPOUSES ANTONIO BORNALES and FLORENDA DIAZ BORNALES vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75336 October 18, 1988

Facts:

Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. Sixto and Isabel whose
marriage was not blessed with any child lived separately since 1920. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited extramaritally with Placida
Dumolong with whom he had a son by the name of Renito Dumolong and other children.

In November 1977 Placida filed a petition for reconstitution of title over the lot. Reconstitution was granted in a decision. In March
1978, a "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property” and the sale of said lot for P6,000.00 to spouses Carlito
Patanao and Minda Dumolong and to spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong, was executed by Renito Dumolong and by
Isabel Marquez Dumolong whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the document.

About three months later, the spouses sold the lot for P40,000.00 to petitioner-spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz Bornales
through a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Alleging forgery of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property", private respondent Isabel Marquez filed an
action for reconveyance and damages against Placida Dumolong, Renito Dumolong, spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong,
spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreto Dumolong, and spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against all the defendants including the petitioners herein who were
expressly declared purchasers in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong and plaintiff
Isabel Marquez and that the Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was a forgery through the machinations of
the defaulted defendants. The appellate court affirmed the appealed decision.The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any
defect in the title of their vendors.

Issue:
17
May Bornales invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title?

Ruling:

No. The chain of events starting from the reconstitution of the original certificates of title to the execution of the deed of absolute sale
in favor of the petitioners reveals a clear scheme to dispossess the private respondent of her share in the property subject of this
controversy.

Having been the cultivators of the land, petitioners were aware that the private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto Dumolong and
was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter. They should have not bought the land from Placida, considering their knowledge of
the fact that Placida could not have own any portion of the land.

Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud,
petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest therein.
The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferor's title. If at all, the petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then had.

 Protection is not Absolute

VIAJAR vs.COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 405

Facts:

The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan comprosing of an area 154,267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of
Title. Rosendo H. Te,sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000 with the confirmation of Ana Te.. A Torrens
title was later issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.Later Viajar found out that the propert was in possession
of Ladrido and demanded for its return but latter refused.
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F.
Viajar. Defendant Ladrido died and substituted by his wife and children.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the
time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819
square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters, which
was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and
that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.The lower court rendered its judgment in favour of
the defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo

Contention of the Petitioners:

Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the
riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the
petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will
defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

Issue:

Whether the land registered protected from ownership by accretion in accordance with article 457

Ruling:

No. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55.Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).

18
  Does not make holder true owner of all property described therein

CORONEL v IAC

155 SCRA 270

Facts:

Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered under his name against the
private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato
Ocampo before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Coronel alleged that at the time he purchased the parcel of land, the
defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will". Despite demands to vacate the premises, the defendants
refused to.

The defendants denied Coronel allegations. They contended that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of
brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of
Bernabela Lontoc. The Merlan brothers never sold their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody. It was actually their other co-heirs
who sold their undivided portions, hence plaintiff’s ownership is fraudulent, void, and without effect. The Merlans have always been
in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years.

The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring them as the absolute owners of the remaining 1 1/3 of the 2/8 portion
pertaining to the late Bernabela Lontoc

Issue:

Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true owner of all the property

Ruling:

No, the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily the owner of all property.

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands
illegally included.

Lontoc’s property was survived by three sets of heirs. 1) Bernardino Merlan; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan; and 3) Daniel Anuat
and Paz Anuat.

Bernardino Merlan sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. However, Ignacio sold
his interest to Mariano Manalo, which Coronel also bought later on. The deed of sale was registered in the name of petitioner Rodolfo
Coronel.

The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share, what their co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot;
and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner
Rodolfo Coronel.

Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over
the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents was mistakenly
included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano Manalo. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private
respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest.

 Not conclusive evidence of ownership over illegally included areas

GOLLOY vs. CA 173 SCRA 26
GR No. 47491, May 4, 1989
19
Facts:

Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41, 545-sq.m parcel of land for more than 20 years. On the other hand, the Southwest
portion of the petitioner’s land is bounded by the respondents’ land.The respondents subdivided their land among themselves and
placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the petitioner’s land. Hence, petitioner filed an action to quit title. In the per-trail,
the parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the disputed area to determine the true and correct boundaries of
their parcels. Subsequently, the surveyor submitted a report wherein there are overlapping on the boundaries of the 2 lands and that the
overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey.
Wherefore, he submitted a report that respondents' land, prevails over petitioner's land, since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.It is hardly persuasive that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga,
believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, however, no such objection was made. These facts could only be
construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the
concept of an owner, for almost 50 years when the property was registered, up to when the respondents placed 2 monuments inside his
land, the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches.

 The registration of lands of the public domain under the torrens system, by itself cannot cover public lands into
private lands

HACIENDA BIGAA, INC.vs. EPIFANIO V. CHAVEZ

G.R. No. 174160 April 20, 2010

Facts:

The lots under consideration in this litigation were originally covered by TCT No. 722, owned by Ayala y Ciaand/or Alfonso, Jacobo
and Enrique Zobel, with an area of 9,652.583 hectares, known as Hacienda Calatagan. Ayala and/or the Zobels expanded TCT No.
722 to cover an additional 2,000 hectares of land consisting of beach, foreshore and bay areas, and navigable waters (excess areas),
making it appear that these excess areas are part of Hacienda Calatagan's TCT No. 722. The hacienda, including such excess areas,
was later subdivided and was sold to third parties.Among the buyers or transferees of the expanded and subdivided areas was
20
Hacienda Bigaa, which caused the issuance of titles under its name covering the purchased subdivided areas. On the other hand, the
Republic, through the Bureau of Fisheries, leased out portions of the same lands to qualified applicants in whose favor fishpond
permits were issued. This event gave rise to ownership and/or possessory disputes between the owners of Hacienda Calatagan and
their privies and/or successors-in-interest, and the Republic or fishpond permittees. Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for
the recovery of the areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT No. 722.In those previous cases,the Supreme Court declared
that the excess areas of TCT No. 722 are unregisterable lands of the public domain such that any title covering these excess areas are
necessarily void;that the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be mere usurpers of public domain areas;and all subdivision titles issued
to them or their privies and covering these areas were invalidated; the wrongfully registered public domain areas reverted to the
Republic.
In this petition,Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. alleged that on April 29,1996,Chavez, by force entered the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's
properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 44695 and 56120, built a house on the property, and occupied the lots
without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa.The case of forcible entry filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
MTC,and affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Between the petitioner and the respondent,who has the better right of possession of the disputed lots?

Ruling:

The antecedent cases which were both ruled in favor of the Republic and its lessees or permittees laid to rest the issues of ownership
and of possession oover the subject lands. The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system cannot convert
public lands into private lands.The Republic, as the rightful owner of the expanded areas – portions of the public domain – has the
right to place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the fishpond lots. The certificate of title which
Hacienda Bigaa have, does not in fact support their claim of ownership over the lands in dispute. Since the transfer of lands by the
Ayalas and Zobels to Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. is void, the latter has no better right over the subject land than the defendant. For that
reason,there can be no valid cause for the ejectment of Epifanio Chavez by Hacienda Bigaa, Inc.. Thus, the case for forcible entry
should be dismissed.

B. Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529

a. Spanish Title

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUNOZ

G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

Facts:

Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO) was claiming to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land
located in municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose Del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban,
province of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 as incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. Piadeco
applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered
the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the
Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement
with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the
Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious
validity of the title in his opinion, stating “Private ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also
with clear identity of the land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title.

Issue:

Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

Ruling:

21
No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative
Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations “deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable
timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same
end.” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A
rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”

C. Nature of Judicial Proceedings

a. Sec. 2, PD 1529

i. In Rem Proceedings

Ching vs. Malaya

Facts:

The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment, filed before MTC, that the private respondents had forced their way into
the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands
were based on the petitioners' case that they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The
private respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to them by right of
inheritance. The MTC ruled in favor of Ching. Alvarado appealed before the RTC and Judge Asuncion held that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because the issue between the two parties was not a mere possession case. The two parties actually adduced
evidence of ownership: i.e. Deed of Sale presented by Ching & inheritance claims by Alvarado. Judge Asuncion ruled that MTCs have
no jurisdiction over ownership cases.

Issue:

Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

The MTC has jurisdiction. The pertinent provisions of that law read as follows:

Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. -In all civil actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two (now Rule
57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the
justice of the peace (now municipal judge) and the judge of a municipal court (now city court) shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction. In forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have original
jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the
property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention.

The mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary
jurisdiction. This has to be so, for "were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this
kind of actions depend upon the defendant in all cases.

The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court
would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical possession.

22
Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is declared in a great number of cases
that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on appeal will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone.

There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears during the trial that, by the nature of the evidence presented, the issue of
possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and
the action should be dismissed.

In the case at bar, the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the property in question did not, as claimed, have
the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. As permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff
in an ejectment case may introduce such evidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession and the amount of
damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. The petitioners were only trying to prove their right to possession
and damages by establishing their right of ownership.

 But petitions for cancellation of entries are classified as proceedings quasi-in-rem

Zenaida ACOSTA vs. Trinidad SALAZAR AND ANICETA SALAZAR

G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009

Facts:

On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the
back of OCT No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. The Salazars
claim that two of the entries annotated in the title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of
Tarlac to support the entries; and that TCT No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a
certification issued by the RD. On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the
cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No respondent was impleaded in the said petition.

Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles
issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted.
Later, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of the affected property be ordered to appear before
the court to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled.

On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the court’s order issued
on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply with the said court order would remove the basis for many other
transfer certificates of title and would result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof. On this
basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission.
After the Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the orders. Threatened with
contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn,
issued a resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTC’s orders.

Then herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property – twenty-seven (27) titleholders
in all – filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989. In their comment, the oppositors contended, among others, that they
had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction
over issues of ownership.

Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg,
Lucio Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter,
Macaraegs) maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is
not a direct, but a collateral, attack against a property covered by a Torrens certificate.

The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the Salazars. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the action taken by the Salazars regarding the cancellation of the subsequent titles and tax declarations is valid.

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the
petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the
proceedings of the case. Yet, although the action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for
want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action. Thus, the orders issued by the
lower court never acquired finality. More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system. To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the
simple expediency of filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens
23
system was adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of the title,
except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Rarely will the
court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless there is compelling reason to do so
and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with law. Furthermore, the court also noted that for 30 years the
Salazars never contested the ownership of the said property in any court, nor the transfer of the portions of the property to the
petitioners. Hence, the Supreme court granted the petition and the appellate courts decision was set aside, and the case was reinstated
to the RTC.

ii. Distinguished from In Personam Proceedings

D. Court of Competent Jurisdiction

a. Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land registration proceedings and over all petitions filed after original
registration of titles

i. The Regional Trial Court, acting as a Land Registration Court now has authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with authority is the power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions

ANTONIO TALUSAN vs. HERMINIGILDO TAYAG

G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners bought a condominium unit covered by Title No. 651, from Elias Imperial on December 7, 1981. The sale was
purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not been registered with the Register of Deeds. Petitioners have been in
actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from its former owners
Due to non-payment of delinquent real estate taxes, Juan D. Hernandez, City Treasurer of Baguio City, sold the property at a public
auction to bidder Tayag (respondent) who caused the ownership of said property consolidated under his name as per decision of the
trial court .Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the proceedings
and noncompliance with statutory requirements. The Complaint was dismissed for the reason that a previous judgment by Branch 6 of
the same court under LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R in 1987 in1987 had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of
Respondent Tayag and also upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would amount to
passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to the principle of “conclusiveness of judgment.”

Issue:

Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to resolve the said issue?

Ruling

Yes, Land Registration courts can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as thos invoking substantial
issues. The court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original regisgtration but alson on all petitions filed after
the original registration of title. Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. This Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court.

24
 ii. To avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. v ANGELA V. MADAYAG

G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
Facts:

On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City. On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of
the respondent’s survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Petitioner then
manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its
formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as
Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission
on August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970.
These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the
others are still in the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas.
Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence. The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved
by the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions
arising from an application for registration.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appelas committed manifest errorr in holding that the Lower Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings and archiving the case.

Ruling:
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s
limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.It may, therefore, hear and determine
all questions that arise from a petition for registration.In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title.An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by law. But the RTC need
not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is
already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan
vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish
the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.Should the
court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of the
application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529

b. But First Level Courts may be delegated to hear and decide cadastral and land registration proceedings

c. Scope of Jurisdiction

i. The RTC has jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein

ii. Hence, the CA or the LRA has no jurisdiction to cancel a certificate of title

Manotok v. Barque
G.R. No. 162335 &162605 December 18, 2008

25
Facts:

On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office,
which were destroyed as a consequence. Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title)
issued in the name of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support
of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax
declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property. Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition
thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et. al. They further alleged that the Barque title was
spurious.

On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barque
title.The Barques’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques
appealed to the LRA.

The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of
documents other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in the Manotoks’ title.

Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques’ petition for review was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks’ petition for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.

On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the Barques’ petition and affirming
the LRA Resolution.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the
Barques and the Manotoks.

Ruling:

It could not pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree.

Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in
the appellate review of the LRA’s administrative proceeding.There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction
is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of
Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be
able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory
authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.

Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner. Nowhere in the aforecited
provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that
confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to
ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

d. Duty of Clerks of Courts in Land Registration Cases

E. Discontinuance of Pre-Existing Systems of Registration

a. Sec. 3, PD 1529
b. Spanish Titles Inadmissible as Evidence

PEDRO R. SANTIAGO vs. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

G. R. No. 156888 November 20, 2006

Facts:
26
Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under a certificate of title denominated as Titulo de
Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. Said parcels of land were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50
years. By virtue of the contract Santiago is occupying the land. The petitioners further alleged that defendant having no authority to
possess the land, defendant is still claiming possessory rights over said property. And in fact defendant is using the two parcels of land
for commercial and other purposes. To comply with her contractual commitments, Rodriguez now desires to recover possession of the
property from the defendant.

Lately, Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should vacate the property because said defendant would need the same
for its own use. SBMA further alleged in its counter statement of facts that, Liwanag Santiago (wife of Pedro Santiago) only availed of
the housing units as a privilege for her being an employee of SBMA. However, since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA
concluded and has not been renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence
thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were asked to vacate and return possession of the subject
housing unit.

Issue:

Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of lands?

Ruling:

It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to
be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until
16 August 1976. If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.

The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29
April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of
their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. And, without legal or equitable title to the subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo
and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to
that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can
maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.

c. Presidential Decree No. 892

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN vs.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103727 December 1, 1996

Facts:

The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons
and the Government itself.The petitioners contend on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated
April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands, thus affecting in general lands extending from
Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bayin the north and Tayabas Bay in the
south.Considering the vastness of the land claim, many suits have been filed all for the purpose of owning the lands.

Issue:

WON the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the properties involved.

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. While the petitioners contend that the lands are subject of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the
“Titulo Propriedad Numero 4136”, It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which took effect on February 16. 1976 the syte of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd
thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity of the said decree. In this case the

27
heirs have no legal claim over the said lands because PD 892 invaldates any claim of title and must be first registered under the
Torrens system of titling.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM

A. Sections 4-13, PD 1529

B. Land Registration Authority
a. Functions of the Authority
b. Functions of the Administrator
C. The Register of Deeds
a. General Functions
i. Preparation of an index system of all registered owners
b. Ministerial character of duty to register instrument

BARANDA V. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

Facts:

This case involves two cases (G.R. No. 64432 and G.R. No. 6204) over the same parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by OCT No. 6406. This is the subject of the dispute between petitioner Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, and respondents Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao. OCT No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was
issued in the names of the petitioner. However, the respondents refused to honor it on the ground that they also have a TCT numbered
T-25772 over the same lot. The court resolved that TCT No. T-25772 was acquired fraudulently, and declared it null and void. It held
the validity of Title No. T-106098 to which, the court also ordered the writ of possession to the petitioners be carried out. However, a
notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was
carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This prompted the petitioners to file for a new
petition directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued.

Issues:

1. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

2. Whether the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title.

Ruling:

1. No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay
the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432. Lis pendens has been conceived to
protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. SC have
once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is
pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance,
where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the
continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant.

2. No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... .
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree.

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in
nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land.
i. No need for notice and hearing

LEDESMA v. VILLASENOR

13 SCRA 494

Facts:

Felix Villaseñor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Eusebio Villaseñor, filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of the same province from
registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos.
2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the
deed of sale was fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to

28
maintain the status quo. The vendee, Ledesma, who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant, intervened in the case. On October
3, 1960 the court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition.

Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be
ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in the petition was that Civil Case No. 5662 had been
dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had been dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for
registration. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio
Villaseñor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the court ordered the
cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones, also in his name.

Villaseñor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this appeal upon their denial.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant
or to furnish him copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. 5662 and not in the cadastral
proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being
contested as fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the
Register of Deeds had improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have been a suit for mandamus.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in issuing the orders of lifting the injunction and the dismissal of the petition without notice to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant.

Ruling:

We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it. To be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in
Civil Case No. 5662 was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to the registration of the deed of
sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected from the
order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds
was concerned, his duty under the circumstances — if the document was on its face registrable — being administrative and
ministerial. The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in the cadastral
proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, considering that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought therein by
appellant was precisely to prevent registration. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or
not mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that the court a quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and
hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's
attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet
final.

It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law, to register an instrument which in his
opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. The former does not contemplate notice to
and hearings of interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences
of a court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands
and at the same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant.

iii. Determination of the validity of an instrument belongs to the courts

ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

22 SCRA 1152

Facts:

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province
of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and
to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. The Register of Deeds refused to register the land contending that it is a conjugal
property and needs the consent of the other spouse. So the petitioner filed to the CFI of Agusan a petition for mandamus to compel the
29
register of deeds. In its answer, the respondent contends that the petitioner did not extract all remedies before going to court since he
can appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Lad Registration.

The lower court held that mandamus cannot lie because that exist that adequate remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not a case can be directly filed to the court without appealing first to the Commissioner of Land Registration?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal by the lower court is correct and provides that "where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

c. When Register of Deeds may deny registration of voluntary instruments

AURELIO BALBIN v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

Facts:

Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Register of Deeds Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate
of title and a deed if donation intervivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. Cornelio Balbin(registered owner)
appeared to have donated the 2/3 of the subject land. On the other hand, the RoD denied the petition for annotation “legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law”.

It shows that there was an annotation in the memorandum of encumbrance on the Original Certificate of Title of 3 separate sales
executed by the registered owner, Cornelio, in favor of Florention, Juana Gabayan and Roberto Bravo. The said persons received their
co-owners duplicate CT’s. The petitioners failed to present the 3 co-owner’s copies of CT’s, which is why the RoD denied said
annotation. Thus, the petitioners referred the matter to the LRC, who on the other hand upheld the decision of the RoD.

Issue:

W/N the LRC is correct in denying request for annotation?

Ruling

Yes. Pursuant to sec. 55 of Act 496, there should only be one duplicate of the title in question( the registered owner himself).
However, if there are duplicates than that of originally issues, it must contain identical entries of transaction affecting the land covered
by the said title. Thus, if different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens system would
cease to be reliable.

In the case at bar, there were several copies of the same title in existence, there integrity might be affected if it was annotated in once
copy and not on the others..
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia
Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the
conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact
that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share, not to say more than what remained of such share
after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

30
 i. Register of Deeds may refuse to register a private instrument
ii. Duty of the Register of Deeds when in doubt
GALLARDO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
155 SCRA 248

Facts:

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva de Agana,
the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,
Laguna consisting of 81,300x square meters, more or less, initially covered by an Original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on
April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the
aforesaid land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the
late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favour of the petitioners. Subsequently, the OCT was
cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by TCT NO. RT-6293 (No. 23350) on
January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva
executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Registered of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of
this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court
suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filling a complaint for Quieting of the Title and
Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deedd of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus, petitioners file a notice of appeal to the IAC. However, the IAC, on May
22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.

Ruling:

No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed “before the judge of a court of record
or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgement substantially in from
next hereinafter stated” was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not
lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the land Registration
Act, Act 496 “Deed of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when
made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though
made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.”

It is therefore evident that Exhibit “E” in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the
contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit.
No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.

LAND, IN GENERAL
A. Land Classification. Sec. 3, 1987 Phil Constitution

a.

31
(1) CRUZ V. DENR SECRETARY
GR No. 135385 December 6, 2000

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules), brought suit on September 29, 1998 for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers. Respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, defended the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. The
respondents filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated comment on October 19, 1998. The Solicitor General however is of the
view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part. A group of intervenors, Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al) join the NCIP on November 10, 1998 in defending the constitutionality of IPRA. Likewise, the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) prays the petition be dismissed asserting that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State
has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. Also, the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution. The parties and intervenors, after oral argument heard on April 13, 1999 filed their respective memoranda which
reiterate their arguments.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether some provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules are unconstitutional that it violates the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution;

2. Whether the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands violates the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. Whether Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998 characterizing the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The votes were equal (7 to 7) as to dismiss or grant the petition and pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.

Concurring Opinion(s):

PUNO, J.: The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These
differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is
mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of
society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine
culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our
legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history.
The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino
people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of
continuing democratization, it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and
affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

KAPUNAN, J. contradicts the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous
peoples.The enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or
ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous
cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first,
petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral
domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by
the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO.With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral
domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third,
investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and the application of
customary law,violate the due process clause of the Constitution.Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is
composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of
delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to
do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples
32
for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse
by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of
the NCIP.Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is
allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains."

Separate Opinion(s):

MENDOZA, J. says thatpetitioners do not complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a
right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."

PANGANIBAN, J. concedes that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential
rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law. Panganiban disagrees to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to
the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of this
Court - the Constitution of the Philippines. Social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its
wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the
Constitution must be respected.

(2) SECRETARY OF THE DENR V. YAP

GR No. 167707 October 8, 2008

Facts:

On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.

Issue:

Whether the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Ruling:

No. The petitions were denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.

33
b. Friar lands. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successor in interest may not claim
successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial as this contravenes the historical fact that the
Government of the Philippine Islands bought the friar lands not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society
and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only “actual settlers and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government were given preference to lease, purchase or acquire their holdings in disregard of the settlement and occupation
of persons before the government acquired the lands.

CANETE V. GENUINO ICE CO. INC.,

GR No. 154080 January 22, 2008

Facts:

Petitioners filed a complaint and an amended complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs for being
spurious, fictitious and issued under mysterious circumstances considering that the holders thereof and their predecessors-in-interest
were never in actual, adverse, and physical possession of the property rendering them ineligible to acquire title under the Friar Lands
Act. They also seek to annul OCT No. 614 from which the foregoing TCTs originated of were derived. The amended complaint
alleged that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest are among those in actual, adverse, peaceful, and continuous possession in
the concept of owner of unregistered parcels of land in Sitio Mabilog, Quezon City. And that the real property in question is a portion
of the friar land known as the “Piedad Estate”, which is intended for distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to
the Friar Lands Act.

Respondent, sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest, that no relief may be granted as a matter of law, and that petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
The motion to dismiss was denied. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the petition and dismissed
the amended complain of the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the certiorari and dismissing the complaint

Ruling:

No. The complaint and amended complaint failed to state the “ultimate fact” which are essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
of action. The plaintiffs gave only an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits, and the allegations
are mere conclusions of law also, the allegations of fraud are not specific and were not substantiated.

The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles are derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in
previous cases (Pinlac). It has been found that OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical
background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been
disposed of. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system which means that all lots therein are titled. Also, as held in
the Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the Friar Land Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual
settlers and occupants at the time said land were acquired by the government. Also, the plaintiffs did not pray to be declared owners of
the subject property-despite their alleged adverse possession-but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof, conceding to
the State’s ownership of the property. Being so, they are not real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining a suit for
cancellation of the subject titles. Their interest is mere expectancy based on the probability that the government would give them
preference as buyers or lessees of the subject lands. On real-parties in interest may file for the cancellation of title of property and not
one whose interest is based on mere expectancy.
REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

A. Non-registrable Properties

a. Properties of public dominion

REPUBLIC V. CA
131 SCRA 532

Facts:

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco
are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

34
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.

The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application. and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions
to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to
the respondent Court of Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

Issue:

Whether the registration of the lots valid.

Ruling:

No, the registration of the lots is not valid.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and
Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. The only valid
conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

i. Properties of public dominion are reserved for public purposes. (Article 420, Civil Code)

ii. Properties of public dominion are held by the State by regalia right, are res publicae and incapable of private
appropriation.

REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
169 SCRA 466

Facts:

In 1951, the defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land in Laguna. The Republic, however,
opposed the application on the ground that the applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly,
continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be part
of the public domain. It appears that barrio folks also opposed the application. In a case, promulgated in 1956, defendants were
declared owners of lots 1, and lot 2 was declared public land. In a civil case they filed in 1966, they prayed for the eviction of the
barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. Judgment was rendered in 1968, ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the
premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein.

Issue:

Whether the property in question a foreshore or a part and parcel of the public domain

Ruling:

35
Properties of public dominion, held by the State by regalian right, are res publicae and incapable of private appropriation. Laguna de
Bay is a lake. And under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, the natural bed or basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters when
at their highest ordinary depth,and in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. Otherwise, where the rise in water level is
due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or
basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and
land capable of registration as private property. A foreshore land, on other hand, is a strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

This case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

iii. A public market & public plaza are properties of public dominion.

MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V. ZAPANTA

133 SCRA 820

Facts:

The Municipality of Antipolo, for more than 50 years now, has considered the disputed property, described below, to be public land
subject to Antipolo’s use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is indication to
the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 “up to today.” Gradually,
additional public structures were built thereon, like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police
Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the
land.

On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before
the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court). One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for
registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was “Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño”,
and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of
the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were approved by the
Registration Court on 26 February 1980. Antipolo took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on
Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.

On May 22, 1981, Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named “Heirs of Joaquin
Avendaño”, and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their
Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case was
dismissed. Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which
Antipolo claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the Avendaño heirs to dismiss on the ground the Antipolo had not filed its Brief
within the reglementary period, the appeal was dismissed on August 23, 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal, Antipolo had
submitted its Appellant’s Brief. Antipolo filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

36
Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.

Ruling:

The claim of the Avendaño heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property from
them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. They
forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. The fact that the disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Antipolo had also declared the disputed property as its own in Tax
Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.

Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of Antipolo, its
Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at
any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by Antipolo for its annulment by reason of res judicata.

It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendaño heirs must also be held to be null and void.

MARTINEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974

Facts:

The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both
parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer
certificate of title.

The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After
the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor,
who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.

On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and the
Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's decision, original certificate of title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued
to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.

These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first
issued on November 9, 1925.

Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who
hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No. 15856.

To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, by then composed
of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa,
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of Public Works and Communications, respectively, as members.

While Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the Honorable Florencio Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the
strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To Prohibit, Remove
and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal
Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties
For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes.

Contention of Private Defendant:

In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this case is illegal on the ground that the said respondent
Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power, which he does not possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two
lawful decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I, and even annulling thereby, the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the land;. In
not sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no cause of action because the property in dispute is a public river and in
holding that the said claim has no basis in fact and in law;

37
CA

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a
public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-
appellants as being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-
appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within one (1) year from the
entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no
longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this
Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily makes
the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: "liens, claims or
rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the
Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry."

When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works & Communications under Republic
Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable creek or river included therein, has
been definitely settled and is no longer open to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA
557; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works & Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).

Ruling:

The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan
Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and
2 appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides
by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river
that has been covered with water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been affirmed
by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river
which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.

NAVERA V. QUICHO

5 SCRA 45

Facts:

On January 24, 1961 the municipality of Ligao filed for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Godofredo
Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral
survey of Ligao.

Consequently, Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted
under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration.

The municipality of Ligao alleged that the land amounting to 123 sq. m. is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A, for said portion of
land is part of a street in the municipality. Thus, the municipality prays for the correction in the certificate of title, with a view to
excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein.

The trial court affirmed the petition of the municipality. The ruling of the trial court is founded on the principle that, if a person
obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered, he does not by
virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included therein. Hence, this petition by Navera.

Issue:

Whether the 123 sq. m. of land is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A, which title is granted to Navera.

Ruling:

Even if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera
street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law
any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion
correct. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered
does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein. But this theory only holds true if there
is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to
the issue of fact involved.

In the present case unanimity among the parties is lacking. Thus, petition is affirmed, the order of the respondent court is set aside.

38
 iv. Ropponggi property in Tokyo, Japan is a property of public dominion.

LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797

Facts:

The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy
Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe
Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property consists of
the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until
the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.

During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1
building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst
opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government.

2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine law.

Ruling:

1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1)
there is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities
of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined;
and (2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the
need to determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists.

39
 v. Land already registered as patrimonial property of the State.

REPUBLIC V. CA
83 SCRA 453

Facts:

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco
are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.

The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions
to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to
the respondent Court of Appeals.

On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.

Issue:

Whether the registration of the lots valid.

Ruling:

No, the registration of the lots is not valid.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and
Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void. The only valid
conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

vi. Streets or public highways.

NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 454

Facts:

On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No.
496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot
No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.
40
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section
112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. He contends that, under said
section, the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree, or one which will not
prejudice such rights, or one which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can authorize the correction of any error or mistake
which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. Here the petition will have such effect, for it will involve
the correction of the technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in question, segregating therefrom the portion
alleged to have been erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registration. This
cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title.

It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was
ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by
depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. m. which was erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. Hence, the municipality prays for the correction of such error
in the technical description of the lot, as well as in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m.
erroneously included therein.

The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary
period. The courts based its decision on the rationale that “It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens
System are deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. Among the burdens on the land registered
which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39, is "any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation
canal or lateral thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System
which includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the
owner of the land illegally included therein.

Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a
clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition seeks to
direct the register of deeds to make the necessary correction in the technical description in order that the portion erroneously included
may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. In effect, therefore, the petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error
but the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to respondent.

Issue:

Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct.

Ruling:

The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to
petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section
112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien
or encumbrance, is in our opinion correct. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land
which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein.2
But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle
only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.

41
 vii. Lots forming part of the public dominion.

CASIANO AMPOLOQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. L-46800-01. April 29, 1994

Facts:

Respondent Salvador Zartiga claimed ownership over nine (9) lots which a total area of more or less 289.9920 hectares. He claimed
that he had been the absolute owner and possessor of said parcels of land, having bought the same from Datu Julian Bagobo under a
deed executed in 1927, but that petitioners had occupied certain portions of the nine (9) lots, about forty-nine (49) hectares of the 285
hectares, without his knowledge and consent.Petitioners, on the other hand, denied private respondent's ownership and alleged that the
land in question is public land; that neither private respondent nor his predecessor-in-interest had occupied the property.The Director
of Lands intervened, asserting the property subject matter of Civil Case No. 670 to be "public agricultural land, owned by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.The Municipality of Bansalan, on its part, filed an opposition to the petition on the
ground that the nine (9) parcels of land included in the petition for registration were reserved for townsite of, and actually occupied by,
the Municipality of Bansalan. Evidence was introduced to the effect that about 10,000 people inhabited the poblacion of Bansalan and
that approximately 500 buildings, private and government-owned, as well as schools, markets, religious, commercial and residential
structures, and other constructions, including municipal roads and other infrastructures, already stood in place within the disputed
area.
The trial court and Court of appeals ruled in favour of Zartiga and awarded him the Lots No. 2326, 2325, 2342, 2343, 2344 and 2416.

Issue:

Are the disputed lands form part of the public domain?

Ruling:

Evidently, the litigated area was forestal land. The fact that Datu Julian Bagobo and the other occupants had to make kaingin in order
to clear the lots is certainly indicative of the forestal nature of the same. Datu Julian Bagobo and his predecessors who claimed
possession over the area did not and could not have acquired ownership over the said land considering that the same was then
inalienable and non- disposable. It remained so for many years. In fact, it was only on February 4, 1956 when the contested portions of
the public domain were declared and classified as alienable and disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-480 issued by the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.The picture becomes clear enough. Respondent Zartiga knew that he could not
directly acquire the lots since they were part of the public domain. So, he had to get access to the land indirectly. He also realized that
the indirect way was Datu Julian Bagobo who claimed possession over the area. He had to clothe the datu with a color of ownership so
that the latter could subsequently transfer the land to him. Respondent accomplished this in a haphazard manner — by railroading the
issuance of a tax declaration to the uneducated datu and manipulating the alleged sale within the same day. This explains why there
could not be sufficient and concrete evidence of the alleged deed of sale, why the contested lots could never be accurately identified
(boundaries were not uniformly identified) and why private respondent never raised a hand when the townsite of Bansalan was being
developed.

b. Waters are properties of public dominion.

i. Portions of territorial waters.

REPUBLIC V. AYALA y SIA

14 SCRA 259

Facts:

In an amended complaint filed against Ayala Y Cia et al., the plaintiff sought the annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the
defendant over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. The defendant company caused the survey and preparation of a
composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from 9,652.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT No. 722) to 12,000 hectares,
by taking or including therein lands of public dominion. Thus, plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of such areas in excess
of those covered by TCT No. 722, and for which fishpond permits were already issued in favor of bona fide applicants. Miguel
Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries over the areas supposedly outside the
boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, were allowed to intervene in the case and make demand for recovery of possession of said areas,
and claim for damages for the deprivation of possession thereof allegedly by the illegal acts of defendants.

The defendants contended that the excess was insignificant in nature and attributable to the inaccuracy of the magnetic survey that was
used in the preparation of the plan upon which OCT No. 20 was based.

42
After trial, the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550 issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182,
as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private property
covered by TCT No. 722. This ruling was based upon the finding that the disputed areas form part of the navigable water, or are
portions of the sea, beach and foreshores of the bay.

Issue:

Whether the areas in dispute are territorial waters of the public domain.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.

The areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or
of the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion
in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant.

In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by
the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters,
the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the
public dominion.

ii. Navigable rivers; Definition of river; components.

HILARIO V. CITY OF MANILA

19 SCRA 931

Facts:

The subject of the petition is a lot situated on the Western side of San Mateo River. To prevent the river from entering the lot, a dike
was built on the northern side of the river. In 1937, flood occurred and the river destroyed the dike, left its original bed and meandered
into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of land. In 1945, the US Army conducted excavations in the
lenticular strip which stands between the old river bed and the new course. The US Army has paid for such activities. In 1947, the
sand and gravel plant was turned over to the respondents. The respondents continued the activities carried out by the US army. The
petitioner then filed the case praying that the excavation, bulldozing and extraction activities be restrained.

Issue:

Is a newly formed riverbank in a private estate considered property of public dominion?

Ruling:

Yes. A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. Since a river is but one
compound concept, it should have only one nature. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component
elements be of the same nature also.

iii. Non-registrability of navigable rivers

43
REPUBLIC V. SIOSON
9 SCRA 533

Facts:

The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San
Roque, Paombong, Bulacan, of which the claimed to be the owners in fee simple.

The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient title to the said parcel of land, the same not having been a acquired either by
composicion title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;(b)
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly, continuously, publicly, adversely and
under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894; (e) that the said parcel of land sought to be registered is a part of the public
domain and as such belong to the Republic of the Philippines.

The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favor of the spouses. However, no adjudication was made with
respect to Lot 4.

The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not decree the registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.

The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands, instead of filing a brief to answer that of the appellants, filed in the Court of
Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 4 be decreed in the name of the appellants. The Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of the appellants.

The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of
registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The parcel
of land referred to in the petition is Lot No. 4. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein respondents, then
applicants, by intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the respondents and the land inspector.

The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. Respondents alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any actual
fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an accretion to a titled parcel of land; that the present petition for
review under the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper, unwarranted and illegal; and that the Solicitor General is deemed to
be in estoppel to make allegations in the present petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the a pleading entitled
"Comments" recommending that the registration of the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the then
applicants-appellants be decreed in their names.

Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the Philippines
has appealed.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual
and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents.

Ruling:

There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.

Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the name
of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land
Registration Act.

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514

Facts:

The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters there from
in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When Benedicto del
Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the
latter's share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel
on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors. Sometime before 1966, private
oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was no definite
commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement,
private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the
former in 1966. 4Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective
sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The Court of First
Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.

Issue:

44
Whether the applicant private respondent has registrable title to the land.

Ruling:

Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public
lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private
ownership, and are reserved for public purposes.

The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not
a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
the property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant
has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

iv. Not subject to acquisitive prescription.

MATEO V. MORENO
28 SCRA 796

Facts:

In 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a letter-complaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking
that the Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds,
be ordered reopened and restored to its original condition.

The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant
to RA No. 2056. Subsequently, the Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public
navigable stream.

Moreover, the Secretary ordered Mateo, who had acquired the property inside which the creek is situated, to remove the dikes and
dams constructed therein within 30 days from notice; otherwise they would be removed at his expense.

Issue:

Whether or the body of water is private property or constitutes a navigable stream or river of the public domain and subject to
acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

The absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by a certificate of title does not preclude a subsequent
investigation and determination of its existence nor make it private property of the title holder.

It is true that Jacobo who was then the owner from whom Mateo subsequently bought the property, was able to get her free patent
application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character of
the Sapang Cabay.

Moreover, the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications should be respected in the absence of
illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence; and that the ownership of a
navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not subject to acquisitive prescription.

45
 v. Man-made alluvial deposits are not registrable.

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514

Facts:

Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of
land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. On
24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1,
33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.).On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892. The lower court rendered a decision granting the application
on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709. The Republic appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost.Hence, the petition for
certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA. The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the
New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river
bed of the Meycauayan River.Thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual
and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. The private respondents contended that the accretion was without human
intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

Issue:

Whether the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents’ fishponds, entitling them to the ownership thereof.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The following are the three requisites that need to occur before an accretion is said to have
taken place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Evidence shows the addition to the said property was artificial and man-
made. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it.Moreover,the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted
between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
permanently formed allegedly on 1939. Said areas existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of
the Meycauayan river in 1951. The accretion claimed is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation.The lots sought to be registered were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property

46
of the public domain .They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as
private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

iv. Creek, defined.

MANECLANG V. IAC
161 SCRA 469

Facts:

Petitioners. filed for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the four parcels of land belonging to them situated in
Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the
titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of the property in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

Ruling:

Creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain. It
is not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive prescription because such is as public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
System in the name of any individual. Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond.

Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void.

The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public policy.

vii. Lakes are of public dominion.

REPUBLIC V. REYES
155 SCRA 313

Facts:

Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land
designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for Lot No.1and Lot No.2 situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. The said
free patent applications were approved on June 14, 1956. Free Patent Titles were then issued to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio
and Urbano C. Lara. These patents were transcribed and registered on June 21, 1956 the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration
Book for the Province of Rizal.

The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands conducted and investigation and it was discovered that the parcels of
land patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were actually under water and form
part of the Laguna de Bay. Eusebio and Lara expressly agreed to have their patents and certificates of title cancelled. Complaints were
also filed against them before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The lower court then rendered separate decisions declaring null and void
Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles and for failure of
defendants to move for reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and executory.

Issue:

Whether lakes can be registered under the Torrens System.

Ruling:

That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of
Laguna de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued due to
misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso

47
facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title. A certificate of
title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent
secured through fraud. Likewise, the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere possession of land does not
itself divest the land of its public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character
of the land to private.

c. Forests or timberlands, public forests or forest reserves.

DIRECTOR OF LANDSvs. AQUINO

G.R. No. 31688 December 17, 1990

FACTS: A 70-hectare lime rich land in Bucay, Abra is claimed by the private respondents Abra Industiral Corporation (AIC) as their
own since they and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying the said land for forty-nine years. They have also complied
with all the requirements for registering the said land. On the other hand, the petitioners opposed the application of AIC since the
highly mineralized parcels of land are within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and are not yet reclassified as alienable and
disposable lands pursuant to the Public Land Law. The lower court approved the registration of the said parcels of land, but the
Director of Lands thru the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that although the land may be
reclassified by the Bureau of Mines as a mineral land, it has not yet been excluded from the Cordillera Forest Reserve pursuant to Sec.
1826 of R.A. No. 3092. Therefore, the lands applied for are still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935
Constitution. Private respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration prayed for, but the lower court denied it saying that the
Bureau of Mines and Bureau of Forestry should also be parties to the case, but further contended that motion of intervention by said
bureaus are not proper in land registration cases. Then the petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of appeals but were denied since it
was filed out of time. Meanwhile, registration of AIC’s applied lands were issued.After a year from the issuance, the Solicitor General
thru the lower court filed for a petition for review of the said decrees. They alleged there was fraud in the application of AIC, since
they only showed 24 hectares but actually included 46 hectares of the said forest reserve. But the lower court ruled that the judicial
error was not synonymous with actual fraud. Without waiting for the decision, the petitioners filed to the Supreme Court a petition for
review for certiorari under R.A. No. 5440.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the application of registration of the said lands, notwithstanding the fact that they are
within the forest zone.

Ruling:

The Supreme court ruled in favor of the petitioners, citing a long line of cases, with mention of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz where it
was held that forest lands and forests reserves are not alienable, however long a person was in possession thereof, as it is premised in
the Regalian doctrine which is enshrined in our constitution. It is the President who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain upon recommendation of the proper department head. In the case, AIC was not able to prove that the lands they claimed were
alienable and disposable or that the lands were no longer part of the forest reserve.Hence, the decision of the lower court was reversed
and set aside.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTY V. MUNOZ

48
23 SCRA 184

Facts:

Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of
Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare of land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in
1894 under the Spanish regime.

In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadeco’s certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in
the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of
Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of
Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate.

Issue:

Whether Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

Ruling:

No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative
Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations “deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable
timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same
end.” Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A
rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”

REPUBLIC V. CA
154 SCRA 476

Facts:

In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration
of the land, which the latter claimed to be in their possession and occupation openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously since
1915. The Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and the Director of Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that the
said portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district foresters. The
CFI granted the application, which was also affirmed by the CA. The government’s failure to show that the disputed land is more
valuable for forest purposes is one of the reasons for the CA’s ruling. It also noted the failure to prove that trees are thriving in the
land.

Issue:

Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports and testimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for
registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since 1915, the
court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz (23 SCRA 1184),where it stated that possession of forest lands, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

In its decision, the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126
SCRA 69, 75), where it ruled, ―A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.

Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified into
alienable and disposable agricultural land, before private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public
agricultural lands can acquire it.

REPUBLIC V. ANIMAS
56 SCRA 499

Facts:

49
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966,
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February
3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.

On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July
20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-
2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.

On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the
land in question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber
land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in
question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700
to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol
was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private
respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.

Issue:

Whether the area is a part of the forest zone

Ruling:

Yes, it is.

After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable
public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a
person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public
lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse
of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold
that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would
be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. Considering that it is the state is seeking the
cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked
against the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a
petition filed in court by the Solicitor General. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707,
May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state
(Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription. Even
granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land
covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public
Land Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as
may be just and equitable in the premises.

50
 i. Forest land, defined.

HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

126 SCRA 69

Facts:

There are two petitions in this case. The Court of Appeals declared the disputed property as forest land. These two petitions have their
genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703
square meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of
Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same
time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is
entitled to have said lot registered in his name. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to
Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective
appeals with the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are,
as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square
meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that
these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director
of Forestry

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must
have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to
certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within
the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the
testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by
the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and
remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in
the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown "‘open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application;’

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of
thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in

"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain’,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and
applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court
stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the
way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final
judgment;

51
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the
exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had
been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could
still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as
the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the
Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the
public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties
over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with
Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove
swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

Issue:

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained

Ruling:

Yes, it should be sustained.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered
by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must
have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for
a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a
previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
ii. Inclusion of a forest land in tile nullifies the title.

REPUBLIC V. SPS. MAXIMO

135 SCRA 156

Facts:

The Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1,
allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less
200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a
Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal
Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land. The decision became final and executory. A decree and an origina l
certificate of title were issued. More than eight years later, the Republic filed with court an amended petition to annul the decision,
decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest.
Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares.
The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. After hearing the judge denied the petition and ruled in favor of the
spouses.

Issue:

Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens System

Ruling:

No, the said land cannot be registered. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. The spouses have not shown that a
title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a
different land was covered thereby. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Tesalona’s tax declarations
stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.

52
The court said that possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

iii. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.

LAND BANK V. REPUBLIC

543 SCRA 453

Facts:

A parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 41,276 square meters was issued to Angelito C. Bugayong with OCT no. P-2823 (the
mother title came from the Sales Patent No.4576) in 1969. The land was subdivided into four lots with a new TCT in the name of
Bugayong and sold all his lots to different persons. He sold one particular lot to the spouses Du. They then then subdivided the lot into
two, in which they sold one lot to the spouses Dayola and registered the other lot in the name of Lourdes Farms Inc. (which is the
subject of the case). Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged the land to Landbank on April 14, 1980.

The Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation upon a formal petition and found out that the Land of Bugayong with Sales Patent
no.4576 was classified within the forest zone on August 6, 1923 and was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981
through an Administrative order. The Bureau resolved that the sales patent was illegally issued and the OCT was improperly issued by
the Director of Lands at that time. Now, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, through the office of the
Sol. Gen. filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao to cancel the titles that were issued to Bugayong and the other owners and
mortgagors of the land and the reversion of the land into the mass of public domain. LBP claimed that it is a mortgagee in good faith
and for value. It prayed that should the TCT issued to Lourdes Farms, Inc. be annulled by the court, Lourdes Farms, Inc. should be
ordered to pay its outstanding obligations to LBP or to provide a new collateral security.

Issue:

1. Whether a forest land is capable of private appropriation.

2. Whether or not LBP have the Mortgage Right and Interest over the land for being a purchaser in good faith.

Ruling:

1. No. Forest lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.

2. No. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral
lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.
The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit subalit ito ang mananaig.

53
 iv. Forest lands are not registrable. Requirements for exemption.

DIAZ V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181502; February 2, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia, filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance on August 12, 1976. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26
years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 in 1955. Thus, it was
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.

The CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision dated July 1, 1981.

The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated February 26, 1992, penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI.

The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s
right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative value,and
inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA. Subsequently,
however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to
draft and finalize the same.

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689
hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement. On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s favor.

However, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The
OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.

Issue:

Whether or the land within the military reservation is registrable.

Ruling:

54
SC ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res
judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for
petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest,
could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any
occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and
until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

d. Mangrove swamps are comprised within the public forests.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY V. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

Facts:

Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in
the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40
years. He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial,
the application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then
came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal and
held that It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot
convert it into private property. It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the
public forests of the Philippines.

i. Mangrove lands are neither timber nor mineral lands.

TONGSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL

55
G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977

Facts:

As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom and
converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt factory, selling salts and the firewood. After his death, his son Arturo
took possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until 1910. May of 1917, Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao
evidenced by a private instrument.
Deogracias on the other hand sold 5 parcels of land to Santiago Bermejo one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral Lot No.
855. The sale is evidenced by the public instrument. During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land, cut trees
for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon his death in 1951, his children took possession of this parcel of land and
when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz, LOT 855 appeared in the Revised
Inventory of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo. When Macario Bermejo took possession of the land in 1953 he converted it
into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due to lack of funds, the construction of the fishpond was not
completed. On May 30, 1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased
the land to Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Capiz.

The possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period of not less than fifty years.

Issue:

Whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905,
asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as part of the timber
domain which is not disposable.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may
have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in
the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry
as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment," 9 What is
even more persuasive as to the correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that in the Garchitorena decision, this Court,
through Justice Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative opinions on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the Revised Administrative Code, was equally explicit:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of
Congress ... It could be said, therefore, that even on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be
characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court is not without support in the applicable
authorities.

In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally
mangrove swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and
sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into public
land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain." Based on such a finding which must be
accorded due weight and is control the sole question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision arrived at by the lower court is not
open to any valid objection.

56
 e. Foreshore lands.

REPUBLIC vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988

Facts:

In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision dated
August 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for
which OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1
and 2 covered by OCT No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by TCT No.
3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto Castillo, in 1960, Amanda
Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result
of which OCT No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al.
The Republic of the Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to
defendants, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.

Ruling:

Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable. Accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the
public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public
use. The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of
land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.

i. Foreshore, land defined.

REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989

Facts:

On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in
possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. Republic claims that the decree and title rendered and issued in LRC Case is
concerned, are void ab initio. The trial court ruled that the parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines,and hence, available for disposition and registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties in question are foreshore lands or part and parcel of the public domain.

Ruling:

The Supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court. The parcel of land is a foreshore land so it is not registerable. It defines a
foreshore land as that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. If the
submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters. The Court
cannot make a ruling because the case is not a trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
disposition, hence the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-43105 AUGUST 31, 1984

Facts:

The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio.
After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained

57
permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and
instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to
register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and
they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration.The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant
appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their
respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land
is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the
subject of registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land.

Ruling:

The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not
a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.

ii. Land covered by the sea at high tide not due to abnormal conditions, are part of the shore
and therefore public land.

CAGAMPANG V. MORANO
G.R. No. L-25738. March 14, 1968

Facts:

The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted by Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano
Morano, a parcel of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte. Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in
possession of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960 defendant, through strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the land
and refused to vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff; wherefore, the latter sought to have possession restored to him, to collect a rental
of P3.00 a month, plus P5,000.00 damages and costs. The defendant's answer pleaded occupancy by virtue of a foreshore "grant from
proper authorities".

At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that the lot in question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest ordinary
tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest tide during the months of May, June and July or during the months when the
highest tide of the year will occur.

Issue:

Whether or not lands covered by the sea at high tide not due to abnormal conditions are part of the shore and therefore public land.

Ruling:

At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was covered by the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June and, July.
This finding makes it clear that the land was part of the shore, and was, therefore, public land belonging to the State, conformably to
Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866:

Art. 1. — The following are part of the national domain open to public use: (3) The Shores. By shore is understood that space covered
and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where
the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms and tempests. By
Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shores are declared property of the public domain.

As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal conditions,
the land is obviously part of the shore and public property. Hence, legal possession thereof appertains to the national government or its
grantees.

58
 iii. Seashore, foreshore land and portions of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered.

DIZON V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965

Facts:

These are separate appeals instituted by Antonino Dizon, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-20300-01) and the Republic of the Philippines, et al.
(G.R. Nos. L-20355-56), from a single decision of the Court of Appeals.
Hacienda Calatagan is owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel. In 1938, the Hacienda constructed a pier, called "Santiago Landing," to
be used by the Hacienda sugar mill but when it ceased its operation the owners converted the pier into a fishpond dike and built
additional dikes which were converted into a fishpond. In 1949, the Zobels ordered the subdivision of the Hacienda which was
approved by the Director of Lands, and the Register of Deeds issued a title in the name of Jacobo Zobel and the latter sold to Antonio
Dizon Lot 49 with 37 hectares. On May 24, 1952, Miguel Tolentino and his daughter filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application
for ordinary fishpond permit or lease for Lot 49 and Lot 1.

The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of Fisheries, claiming the properties to be private land but were
dismissed by the Director of Fisheries. On October 1, 1954, the protestants filed an action in the CFI of Manila to restrain the Director
of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits but the court dismissed this petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedy. On
appeal to this Court, the decision of the lower court was sustained. Protestants then filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Hence the Dizons filed Civil Case in the CFI of Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1.

The Republic of the Philippines intervenes in view of the finding that the lots were part of the foreshore area before their conversion.
The CFI of Batangas promulgated a joint decision making the finding that the subdivision plan was prepared in disregard of the
technical description. In its decision the appellate court adopted the findings of the lower court but the CA awarded to applicants
Tolentinos damages in the amount of P200.00 per hectare. Appellants were thus declared entitled to retention of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the Lots in question are part of the seashore or foreshore area.

Ruling:

It is noteworthy in connection with the appeal of plaintiffs, that they do not contest the existence of the pier that was used by the
hacienda owners in the loading of their manufactured sugar to vessels. The fact that said pier jutted out 600 meters to the sea indicates
that the area over which such cemented structure spanned was part of the sea or at least foreshore land. And, plaintiffs were not able to
disprove the testimonial evidence that the fishponds in question were constructed by enclosing the areas with dikes, using the pier as
one of the ends of the fishponds. It is clear that the areas thus enclosed and converted into fishponds were really part of the foreshore.
This, and the fact that the subdivision plan was found to have been prepared not in accordance with the technical descriptions in but in
disregard of it, support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the Court of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of
the territorial waters and belong to the State. And, it is an elementary principle that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a
Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land thus covered is not capable of registration.

On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants, the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be upheld. There is no showing that
plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value. As such title-holders, they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of
their certificates.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988

Facts:

In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision dated
August 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for
which OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1
and 2 covered by OCT No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by TCT No.
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3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto Castillo, in 1960, Amanda
Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result
of which OCT No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al.
The Republic of the Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to
defendants, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.

Ruling:

One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has
long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant

Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while
accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the
government to be no longer needed for public use. But such distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion
shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising
filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.

The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land
does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.

CANTOJA V. LIM
G.R. No. 168386 March 29, 2010

Facts:

Respondent Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed an application for a Foreshore Lease Contract over the foreshore area located in Makar, General
Santos City in 1989. The Lease contract was executed on November 23, 1990 and would expire on October 21, 2015. Five years after,
petitioner Harry Lim filed a protest questioning the grant of FLA to Cantoja since according to him, Cantoja has committed fraud and
misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja’s) property.To prove this
allegation, Lim presented a TCT over a lot which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease. Upon ocular inspection, during which
petitioner failed to appear despite notice, a Special Investigator found that Cantoja was in actual possession of the foreshore area
which was utilized as “dock-board of the Cantoja’s Fishing Business. It was ascertained that no portion has been occupied or
possessed by any other person or persons, nor was there any adverse claimant thereof. Like the DENR Secretary, the Office of the
President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the petitioner’s titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could
not be subject of a valid patent or title.

Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that Cantoja committed
misrepresentation amounting to fraud in his application for lease when he declared in his application that his lot adjoins that of the
foreshore area sought to be leased.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract granted to Cantoja covering the foreshore area?

Ruling:

No. It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshore area leased to Cantoja, Thus, prior to
Cantoja’s foreshore lease application in1989 and the grant of the foreshore lease contract on November 23, 1990; respondent already
owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch plan submitted by the Geodetic Engineer clearly shows that respondent’s
property is in between the foreshore land and Cantoja’s property. Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent
is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, “when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established of special industries, or for the coast guard service,” shall be
declared by the Government “to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.”

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore
land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea. The reason for that preferential right is the same as the
justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions
which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the
encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.

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In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the riparian or littoral owner in his application for the
foreshore lease. Under stipulation no. 15 of the Foreshore Lease Agreement, any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the
applicant is a ground for cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement.

f. Previously titles lands.

LAHORA V. DAYANGHIRANG, JR.

G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971

Facts:

Spouses Lahora and Toribia Moralizon filed a petition for the registration of the nine parcels of land located in Davao. One-half of the
said land was acquired by Toribia through inheritance and the other half was by purchase and open, continuous, exclusive and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner. Said petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr., who alleged that the subject lands
belong to him and his wife. The Director of Lands also opposed the petition of Lahora spouses because applicants or their
predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of land sought to be registered, nor have they been in open,
continuous, and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years.The said lot has been previously registered and titled, said parcel of
land can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding.The lower court contends that patent issued to oppositor's wife
was procured by fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual occupants of the land, were not notified of the application for patent
therefor and of its adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since they were the actual occupants of the property, the government
could not have awarded it to oppositor's wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the original certificate of title subsequently
obtained by her, were null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land can be re-registered under Torrens title even if it was already recorded in the issuance of public land
patent.

Ruling:

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier.
Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of
title (OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Having become registered land under Act 496,
for all legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same would lead to
the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in
the name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most
valued characteristic of Torrens titles, would be torn away.

In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case; and that a
second decree for the same land would be null and void. Of course, if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the
registration proceedings, the situation would be different. If there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic
fraud, the action for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year period had elapsed. Thereafter, the proper party to

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bring the action would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act — the owner and grantor, and not another applicant
or claimant. Furthermore, the relief provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the aggrieved party, not in another
registration, for land already registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of another registration, but in an appropriate
action such as one for reconveyance or reversion, or for damages in case the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

g. Mineral Lands.
Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Sec. 2, CA 141

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V. DUMYUNG

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands filed three Civil Cases for the annulment of Free Patents and of Original
Certificates of Title, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and information furnished by the defendants.
The lands embraced in the patents and titles comprise a total area of 58.4169 hectares, and situated in the Municipal District of
Mankayan, Mountain Province.

The defendants alleged that they are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872. It was stipulated therein that a member of the
national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right to said land.

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention in the three civil cases, which were
granted.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company alleged that the portion of the titled land is within its ordinary timber license No. 140-’62 and
that another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims.

The defendants in the three civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The
proceedings on the three civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the
ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the
Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defense and dismissed the three criminal cases for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.
Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the three civil cases on the ground that the extinction of the penal action carries
with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist.

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing the three Civil Cases.

The court of appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court. As such intervenor filed this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands.

(2) Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872.

Ruling:

(1) Yes, the lands in question are considered mineral lands.

(2) No, because the lands are not alienable and disposable. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the
National Cultural Minorities; that they have continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public
Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the

62
intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free
patents thereon.

It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral
lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. Thus,
the order of the trial court is set aside.

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN
193 scra 71

Facts:

The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law,
Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camote,
casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the
taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony,
applicant submitted tax declarations both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and
improvement therein. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax declarations is dated Feb. 8, 1949. The said tax
declarations show that they cancel tax declaration No. 439 dated Feb. 10, 1947 which was presented by the Oppositor Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh. 14 was paid by applicant in 1947. Applicant has also
submitted Exh. `C’, which indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property receipts of the municipality of Itogon
where the property is located were burned and destroyed during the last world war. The Atok Big Wedge Mining Company came in
also as oppositor claiming that the land in question is within its mineral claims - Sally, Evelyn and Ethel Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, all showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims were maintained from
1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from 1946 to 1967 for Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral claims were recorded in
the mining recorder’s office; Sally and Evelyn on Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18, 1921.” Petitioner’s presentation of evidence
proving registration of the mining claims of petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at the latest, notably
about sixteen (16) years before private respondent declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before
private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed the court a quo. And so it ruled in favor of
petitioner as oppositor in the land registration proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:

“The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the applicant declared the land for taxation purposes based on his
documentary exhibits. So the evidence of the applicant cannot prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company. The foregoing facts show that the mining company had established its rights long before applicant asserted
ownership over the land. The perfection of mining claims over the mineral lands involved, segregated them from the public domain
and the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the locator.”
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of the applicant, ruling that the applicant possessed the land in the
concept of an owner.

Issue:

Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested on petitioner after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining
claim in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Ruling:

The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty
(30) years. The court a quo made the following factual findings based on the testimony of private respondent: The land applied for is
almost 90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces newly planted to palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others
planted to vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and fruit trees such as mangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants,
avocados and citrus - all fruit bearing.

We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that “a reading of tsn. would rather persuade that applicant had shown quite well that
subject property had been in continuous and adverse possession, first, of his predecessor-in-interest, Dongail and, after the death of the
latter, himself, years before, that is, long before the outbreak of the last war.”
We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in their proper historical perspectives, that the process of
recording mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The recording of
a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the
claim. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in
just anyone who records a mining claim. In fact, this strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to
possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of any or all other persons whose claims are subsequent
to the original mining locator. Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom, notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the land is not
mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Equally borne out by the records is the fact that
petitioner has indeed applied for a mining lease under P.D. No. 1214. For that reason, it has, in effect, waived its right to secure a
patent and it shall have been governed, if private respondent’s claim of adverse and open possession of the subject land for more than
30 years were not established, by P.D. No. 463 in its activities respecting its mining lease.

63
 h. Watershed.

TANV.DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

Facts:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest
land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine
Government.

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees
and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline.

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the
most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry
that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes for Olongapo, Zambales.

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and recommendations of
the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation
under certain conditions. To award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging operations
therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and
protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.

The Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised
should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much
thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector.

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on
April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed
motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, who succeeded Secretary Cesar M.
Fortich in office, issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which states that the Director of
Forestry is authorized to grant new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and
be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each which takes effect immediately.

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing Secretary Benjamin
M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he immediately promulgate on December 19, 1963 General Memorandum Order No. 60,
revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber
licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963.

Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting
Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6,
1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
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On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge
Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of
Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing
forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio.

Tan as the petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license
without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to
property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts.

Issue:

Whether the cancellation of the timber license of Tan void ab initio?

Ruling:

We fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without authority
by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio.

In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the
petitioner contained 6,420 hectares. The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not
state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states,
attached sketch and technical description,' gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commercial
and operable.

In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6,
1964 .The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on
December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964,
and said license is therefore void ab initio .

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date
the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not
the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license.

i. Grazing Lands.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. RIVAS

G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986

Facts:

On March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to
Domingo Bunagan a possessory information title for a tract of land,called Nottab, Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885
mentions Bunagan as having obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan or a gratuitous adjustment title
as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title.

The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows
that two persons, the brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles in its
disposition. The evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and

65
later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope
Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.

Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing land, and consequently, was
inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land were void.

Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two parcels of land located at Sitio
Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered by Plan Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area
of 1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101 covering fifteen lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7 hectares.

Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre
undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should the registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to
Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall cash advances

The trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the
claims of Pascua and Cavaco.

The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the application of Lope and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No.
13, which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief.

The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest reservation;
(2) in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their predecessors have not been in the open, continuous, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land and that their possession was not in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding
that Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not finding that the 1960 decision in favor of Cavaco is not res
judicata.

On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land was already private in the hands of Domingo Bunagans (2) that
portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. Pascua)
respectively; (3) that the pasture lease agreements did not convert private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles
were authentic and valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the disputed land is non-registrable property.

Ruling:

The decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V.
Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed

The disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of
Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land
Classification, containing an area of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2-
Rep.). It cannot be appropriated by private persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.

Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February 13, 1967. It is intended for "wood
production watershed soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh. 1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was made prior to
the instant 1968 application for registration.

The application for the possessory information title was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio determination derecho que el
Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica"

Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable).

Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership

j. Military Reservations.

66
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973

Facts:

On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No. 1of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a
petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a
total area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December
14, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly
opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City.
This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted
by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he believes
that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay.

It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a
duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his
decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came
within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private
rights."

Issue:

Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?

Ruling:

Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject
matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within
the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the
operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public
lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an earlier case of decisive significance was
referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening
under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly
held: "The defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration portions of a
legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the
Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "

This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931."

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS

179 SCRA 522

Facts:

Lot No. 1736 is a 233.6883-hectare agricultural land in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the
late Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application No. 1206 but was rejected upon knowledge that the land was
classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America, embodied
in Proc. No. 10 of the Governor-General of the Philippines.
Upon Vicente’s death, his sons, Victorino (the father of Arturo) and Pablo possessed the property that was subsequently turned over to
Arturo. Thereafter, Arturo sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara.
The land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement.
Thirty-nine (39) persons filed their Opposition to the petition for registration filed by Arturo and Guillermo contending that they have
been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No. 1736 for more than thirty (30) years and have
introduced improvements thereon; that the applicants have never been in possession of the property; and that Arturo could not have
inherited the land from his grandfather, because the children of Vicente are still living.
The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging that the applicants do not possess sufficient title to the land.
The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants ordering its registration in their names.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court.

67
In a resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in
question as public land way back in 1930 does not bar the present application for registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title
under Act 496 of the same parcel of land.

Issue:

Whether the applicants had registrable title over Lot 1736.

Ruling:

None. While the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents, the chronology of events clearly negates compliance by private respondents with the 30-year possession requirement.
The intervening period commencing from the promulgation of Proc. No. 10 in 1925 declaring the land in question as part of the U.S.
Military Reservation until 1953 when the land was deemed reverted back to the public domain disturbed private respondents,
possession over the land in question because during this interregnum, no amount of time in whatever nature of possession could have
ripen such possession into private ownership, the land having been segregate as part of a military reservation.
This circumstance considered, private respondents' claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession over the land in
question should be counted only from 1953. Considering that the application for registration was filed in 1965, the 30-year
requirement had not been met at the time the action for registration was filed that would add up to only fourteen (14) years.
When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the land in question was still classified as within the U. S.
Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. The decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not
constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in
question since the same would nevertheless have been denied because during the pendency of the cadastral case, said land was not
alienable nor disposable and this was shown by the denial of the lease application filed then by private respondents' predecessor-in-
interest.

k. Nature of Reclaimed Lands.

CHAVEZ V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007

Facts:

President Cory Aquino, on 1988, issued Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161 directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Among the agencies tasked for the implementation of such plan is
respondent. NHA was ordered to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb
scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects.” Respondent then formulated the “Smokey Mountain Development Plan
and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10” and submitted it to the President for approval.

The Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law (BOT) being enacted, the role of the private sector was recognized in national development.
NHA then entered into a joint venture agreement with R-II Builders Inc. (RBI). Part of the profit of the developer RBI as provided for
in the JVA is to own 40 hectares of the reclaimed area.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against respondents raising constitutional issues. He alleges that RBI cannot acquire the reclaimed
foreshore and submerged areas as these are inalienable public lands beyond the commerce of man

Issue:

Whether RBI can validly acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas?

Ruling:

Yes. It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. In a ruling involving PEA “alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands.

NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter. The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by
law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred
to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to
Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.

68
 i. CHAVEZ V. PEA
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

Facts:

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority
(PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to
PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
"the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the
name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution
No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in
Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force
to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality
of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under
an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain
as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution
dated June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue:

Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution.

69
Ruling:

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming
part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute
that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the
public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not.
Thus, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that
these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain.

Thus, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified
as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Clearly, the Amended JVA
violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
"object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the
beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.

l. Other Kinds of Reservations.

i. Medical center site

REPUBLIC V. CA

G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

Facts:

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent
(Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). The property
applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands,
through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00
per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction
sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the
scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone
bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the
land at P100.50 per hectare. Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land
70
awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by
the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown
in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified as
Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.

On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and
settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On
November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area
after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had
already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director
of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having
an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in
the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. On August 11, 1956,
President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the following October 9,
President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes
under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied
for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center
claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the
ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by
the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion
on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512,
situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health. The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo,
excepted from this judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On July 5, 1974, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the
Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether the appeal of the petitioner meritorious

Ruling:

We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.

Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-
B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable
appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that
"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration
Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350,
the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances,
and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to
the Center. Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president
to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. section 64 (e) of the
Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for
service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law. the land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law."
Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit. It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there
be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the
rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. Nor could
respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch
as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application
for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against
which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.

71
 ii. Baguio Townsite Reservation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESV. MARCOS

G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

Facts:

Prior to Civil Reservation Case No. 1, a military reservation known as the U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots
140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre was set aside pursuant to Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910, issued by the then
President William Howard Taft of the United States. After independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the
Philippines all claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their relinquishment being formalized by an
agreement of December 6, 1956.

On May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, sought the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, praying for the issuance in
their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre). On September 11, 1965,
respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition, alleging she has the right to register it.
On October 7, 1967, Judge Marcos decided the case in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos.

The Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the decision dated October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.

The Pirasos claimed: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the Republic of the Philippines although it was formerly
reserved and placed under the control of the Navy Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during
the American regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139, and was subsequently released or turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but
the same has not been reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines."

Issue:
Whether the Baguio Courts can reopen judicial proceedings involving Civil Case No. 1?

Ruling:
No, the Baguio Courts cannot reopen.

Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to
parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other
conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of
cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the
United States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have been
the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.

The respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No.
931. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a
person to seek reopening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government ...
." Included in the petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval
reservation of the Government of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence Section D, Baguio naval
reservation, heretofore reserved for naval purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this
reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that the lot in
question should be a naval reservation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS

G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973

Facts:

On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No. 1of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a
petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a
total area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December
14, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly
opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City.
This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted
by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he believes
that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay.

It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a

72
duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his
decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came
within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private
rights."

Issue:

Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?

Ruling:

Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject
matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within
the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the
operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public
lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an earlier case of decisive significance was
referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening
under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly
held: "The defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration portions of a
legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the
Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "

This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of
jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FAÑGONIL

G.R. No. L-57112 November 29, 1984

Facts:

In 1912, a petition was filed regarding the Baguio Townsite Reservation (Case No.211).The purpose of the case was to determine
what portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation were private and registerable under Act No. 496. Once so determined, no further
registration proceeding would be allowed. In 1915, the court required all persons claiming lots inside the reservation to file within six
months from the date of the notice petitions for the registration of their titles under Act No. 496. In 1922, Judge C. M. Villareal held
that all lands within the Reservation are public lands with the exception of (1) lands reserved for specified public uses and (2) lands
claimed and adjudicated as private property. He ruled that claims for private lands by all persons not presented for registration within
the period fixed were barred forever. The 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public
domain, are not registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case, the Baguio Court of First Instance "has no
Jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and the Public Land Law, covering any lot within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation. After more than half a century from the 1922 decision declaring the townsite public domain, or during
the years 1972 to 1976, petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio applications for the registration of lots inside the
Baguio Townsite Reservation. They alleged that in case the lots are not registerable under Act No. 496, then section 48 (b) and (c) of
the Public Land Law should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in possession of the lots for more than thirty
years.

The Director of Lands opposed the applications, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription and res judicata. The trial judge
held that section 48 cannot be invoked by the applicants because it applies only to disposable agricultural lands situated outside the
reservation. He concedes that lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation may not be acquired by long possession for over thirty
years subsequent to Case No. 211. However, the judge refused to dismiss the applications because presentation of satisfactory
evidence in a regular hearing as to the presence or absence of complete service of notice is needed, in order to determine whether res
judicata applies.

Issue:

Whether applications for the registration of lands could prosper in the absence of complete service of notice of the reservation
received by the respondents.

Ruling:

Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 627, the law governing military reservations, contemplate notification to two classes of persons, namely,
(1) those who are living upon or in visible possession of any part of the military reservation and (2) persons who are not living upon or

73
in visible possession but are absentees. As to those who are living upon or in visible possession of the lands, service is not complete,
and the six-month period does not begin to run until the notice is served upon them personally. Their right relative to the period within
which they must respond are determined by the date of the personal service. In the case at bar, the fact is that the notice in Case No.
211 was issued on July 22, 1915. The clerk of court certified that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any part of the
reservation were personally served with notice of the reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that the certificate of the clerk of
court is "conclusive proof of service". Contrary to the opinion of Judge Fangonil, applications for the registration of lands could not be
made because such would reopen Case No. 211. It would give way to baseless litigations intended to be foreclosed by that 1912 case.
The eight applicants do not base their applications under Act No. 496 on any purchase or grant from the State or on possession since
time immemorial. That is why Act No. 496 cannot apply to them. Moreover, they are not "Igorot claimants". The trial court erred in
requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice required under Act No. 627. Such evidence cannot be produced at this time
because the court record of Case No. 211 was completely destroyed during the last war. The applicants have the burden of proving
that their predecessors were living upon or in visible possession of the lands in 1915 and were not served any notice. The Solicitor
General is correct that after Case No. 211, it has always been necessary to issue Presidential proclamations for the disposition of
portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. The period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from securing relief
due to the alleged lack of personal notice to their predecessors.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANGALANG

G.R. No. L-58822 April 8, 1988

Facts:

The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from their father, known as old man Kiang (one name) who in
turn inherited the same from his parents Quebec and Cawane, who were in continuous possession of the land since the Spanish
times. Kiang had it surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and filed an application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Benquet,
Mountain Province, rendered a decision declaring as public lands all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with
the exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property. Among those declared
public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang which was dismissed by the court in said decision. After 31 years, the
respondent Kiangs filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet an application for registration under Act No. 496, as
amended, of the parcels of land in question. The respondent court presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos rendered a decision
adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of the respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor General, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet, docketed as Civil Case No. 3168, for the
annulment of the decision of Judge Pio R. Marcos.

Issue:

Whether or not the court which awarded title do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

Ruling:

The decision of land registration court in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 declared all lands comprised within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation as public lands, with the exception of lands "reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated
private property." Outside of those lands specifically excepted from the effects of the decision, all lands within the limits of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer registrable under the Land Registration Act. It is clear, therefore, that the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet, presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Land Registration Case and to render a decision awarding title to the land in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The
decision of Judge Marcos was null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HEIRS OF DICMAN V. CARIÑO

G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006

Facts:

The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cariño. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed
by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of
Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the land on
which the buildings were situated. The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of
land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City. On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument
entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cariño. On January 10, 1938, Sioco
Cariño sold the subject land to his son, Guzman Cariño.

On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cariño filed a Free Patent Application over the land in question. The application was given due course,
but Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. The
petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. Guzman Cariño opposed the petition insofar as he insisted
ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed an opposition.

On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-
el Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order
to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.

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Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 628 “excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as
‘Igorot Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the
Public Land Act.”

Issue:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 628 reserved the subject land from Igorot claims?

Ruling:

Segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims and prohibiting encumbrance or alienation therein for 15 years from the grant of the
patent is not applicable where vested interest are affected. The executive issuance can only go as far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Proclamation No. 628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960
had the effect of “segregating” and “reserving” certain Igorot claims identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the
“Heirs of Dicman,” and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of
patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private
respondent. The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested
rights.

Proceedings for registration of land

A.Judicial Registration

a.Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

i. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,applicatns for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain,second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES

G.R. NO. 199310

Facts:

Respondent Remman Ent. Inc. applied for a judicial confirmation of title with the RTC of Taguig. Said application is comprised of
two parcels of land also located in Taguig. On Dec. 31, 2001, RTC found that the application for registration was sufficient in form
and substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was published in the Official Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the City Hall of Taguig.

May 30,2002, only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor to the said application. LLDA avers that the
subject lands are not alienable and disposable. Likewise, the Republic of the Philippines also opposed said registration since they
claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Each party presented their respective witnesses. Respondents also presented documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel
of lands, it also included certifications by the DENR that the said lands are alienable and disposable. On the other hand, LLDA
pointed out that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglamentary elevation of
12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. The engineer for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of
the subject parcel of lands, it was found out that the elevations of the lots were less thatn 12.50 m, which the engineer for the
respondents rebutted.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.

Ruling:

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to present incontrovertible evidence to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable

Furthermore, sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. They have presented certification from a proper government agency
but failed to obtain an approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of public domain is released as alienable and disposable. The
original approved document signed by the DENR Secretary must also be presented, and should be attested by the legal custodian of
75
the official records. In addition, the second requisite was not also satisfied, as the respondents only started paying taxes for the said
properties in 2002 which is contrary to their claim that their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of said lots in 1943.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June
12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration was denied.

ii.Public Land Act: Two requisites for judicial confirmation of title. The two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, name;y: (1) open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

NATIONAL COLLEGES OF FISHERIES (ANCF) VS HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN

G.R. NO. 157485

Facts:

Respondent heirs instituted a complaint against the National College of fisheries (ANCF) in Kalibo, aklan), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of
the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of
land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. the respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel
of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin
acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale, and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana
plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.

Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To
prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074
of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, for educational purposes of ANCF and
that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent
heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to
an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected. The RTC affirmed the MCTC’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin acquired private rights by virtue of their possession to the disputed property so as to
entitle them for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Ruling:

The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.

76
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 ; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and
disposable prior to said date.

On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to
do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant
the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 ( 4390) for lack of merit.

iii.Land registration, confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete title, open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession. The possession contemplated by section 48(b) of CA no. 141 is actual, not fictional or constructive. In
Carlos vs Republic of the Philippines, the court explained the character of the required possession as follows: the law speaks of
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the word open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of actual possession of the
property at the time of the filing of the application is required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in
concept of owner, the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession is a conclusion of law not an allegation of facts. Possession
is open when it is patent, visible, apparent and notorious xxx continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent
or occasional; exclusive when exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to own use and benefit and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or people in the neighborhood.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS CRESENCIA STA. TERESA RAMOS

G.R. No. 179181

Facts:

At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land – Lot 1 with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an
area of 760 square meters- covered by amended Plan PSU-223919 property), both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan,
Taguig, Rizal. On September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as a
land registration court, an application for registration of title (application) of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141
(the Public Land Act). On October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1,832
square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the property during the Spanish time; and
that since then, it has been in open, public, continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner. It added that to the
77
best of its knowledge and belief, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any claim, legal
or equitable, on the property.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition to the
RCAM's application. She alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously
possessed and occupied from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted documents,
among others, to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue:

Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for
confirmation and registration of imperfect title.
Ruling:
Neither RCAM nor Cresencia is entitled to the benefitsof C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title,.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the
Philippines, the Court explained the character of the required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement, the RCAM had to show that it performed specific
overt acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the
time of the filing of the application is required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the
RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law,not an allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when
[the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's]
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood."
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described
above. The various documents that it submitted, as well as the bare assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
required in cases of this nature. We elaborate below on these points.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application, we also find insufficient the evidence
that Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141.
Like the RCAM, Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary
findings of the RTC and confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient, which we do not, confirmation and registration of
title over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving
that the property is alienable and disposable.

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b. Ordinary Land Registration Proceeding

i. Who may apply?

 A private corporation may nor hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.
The rule does not apply where at the time of the corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as
when it was possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the letter to
registration.

REPUBLIC VS IAC AND ACME

G.R. NO. 73002

Facts:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of
the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan.Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within
the public domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.Ownership and
possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela. Donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

Issues:

1. Whether or not the land is already a private land.

2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:

1. YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient. It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and
transferable title On October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

 Private corporation as applicant

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO

G.R. No. L-57461

Facts:

Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on
December 4, 1979. On August 17, 1976, applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad who
in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December
28, 1970. Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The
property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.

79
On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent.
The Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to
land. After comments were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner
Director of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No. L-73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does
not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.

As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental
circumstance, "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in no wise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their
title confirmed; only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which
was validly acquired.

SUSI VS RAZON

G.R.NO. 24066

Facts:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in
the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground
that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d)
sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands
denied each allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in
accordance with law.After trial, the CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring Susi entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto that
:the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to
Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land
in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same.
September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of
the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in
question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public,
without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the CFI of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land, after considering the evidence introduced at the
trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint. Having failed in her
attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase
thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands
overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. On August 31, 1921, the register of deeds issued the
proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua,
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this
action.

Issue:

Whether or not the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession.

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Ruling:

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on
December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is
beyond the reach of memory. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO

G.R. NO. 180067

Facts:

On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Eraño G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for
Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and
consisted of 4,201 square meters.

Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth and technical description of subject lot, the Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate, Tax Declaration, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.

The Republic, through the OSG appeared and filed an Opposition to INC’s application.

In February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who
was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC
in1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.

Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.In 1959,
Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on January 8, 1959.

The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with. The MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of
the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. It noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of
INC, were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot.

CA affirmed the lower court decision.

Issue:

May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12,
1945.

Ruling:

It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government,
and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared
alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed
by INC.

The period of possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as
alienable and disposable.

The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot,
but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupation––from Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC––had been in the concept of

81
owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property.
These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses.

ii. When land sold under pacto de retro

iii. Land grants affected through presidential proclamation

REPUBLIC VS CA

73 SCRA 146

Facts:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at
their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities
may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their
jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for
the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning
on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

Issue:

Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is
within the commerce of man.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land”
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. The duty
of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage
thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the subject matter of
Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

iv. A public land sales applicant cannot be a proper party to file original registration of the same land covered by his sales
application.

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PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUCTRIAL COMPANY VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. L-25914

Facts:

On April of 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. (Palawan Company) Filed a sales application over a parcel
of public land located in Aborlan, Palawan which was given due course by the Bureau of Lands. On December of 1930, the Palawan
Company requested the director of Land to reduce the area applied for because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and
claimed by others. Subsequently, it issued a letter advising Palawan Company to recommend to the Sec. Of Agriculture and
Commerce an appraisal of P18.00/ha.

After 4 years, the Director of Lands issued a notice of auction setting the date of bidding for Feb. 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa,
however, it did not take place as the applicant requested for postponement. Subsequently, the applicant prayed that its Sales
Application be not cancelled, in view of the Director of lands that it be cancelled for lack of interest of the said company.

Momentarily, it was again set to be sold at a public bidding but was again postponed because the company asked for reappraisal of the
value given by the Director of lands. Since the time, the applicant took possession of the land and improved portion thereof, planting
coconuts and other crops. Thus, he asked this court that the land be declared in favour of him as he was in an open, continous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Issue:

Whether or not a sales applicant can file a registration of the same land covered by his sales application.

Ruling:

No.The appellant’s possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded
because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefore by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant manifestly
acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to
which the application was submitted. The trial court was, therefore, justified in concluding that applicant possession was not that of an
owner, as required by law.

Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:In the mind of the Court, the possession and occupation by the applicant company of the
land sought to be registered, is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the present law on this matter (Subsection [b],
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will be many instances
where the government will be defrauded. If confirmation or registration of title can be done, as it is being done now by the applicant
company, a possessor and occupant of a public agricultural land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who has applied for
the purchase of the same will just sit on his right, making the application pending for more than 30 years while he possesses and
occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the corresponding taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a
lapse of 30 years, will abandon his sales application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or registration of title.
Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators when they passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their intention,
our legislators would have been a party to an act of defrauding our government ... .

Exception: Successor who acquired by prescription a land previously subject to free patent application of his predecessor-in-
interest may file registration.

DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA

205 SCRA 486

Facts:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the
title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor
General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.

Ruling:

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YES. Petition was granted.The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial
hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive
seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.

v. A mortgagee or his successor in interest cannot be proper applicants as failure to redeem by the mortgagor does not
automatically vest ownership over the land.

REYES VS SIERRA

G.R. No. L-28658

Facts:

Vicente Reyes filed on January 3, 1961 an application for registration of his title to a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal covered
by Plan Psu-189753 of the Bureau of Lands which he acquired by inheritance from his father. An opposition was filed by the Director
of Lands, Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together with Alejandra, Felimon, Aurelio, Apolonio, Constancio, Cirilo, all surnamed
Sierra and Antonia Santos. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true and rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of
his title, provided that the title to be issued shall be subject to a public easement of right of-way over a 2.00 meter-wide strip of the
land along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and improvement.

Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was originally owned by Basilia Beltran's parents, and upon their death in
1894, Basilia inherited the property. On April 19, 1926, Basilia Beltran, a widow, borrowed from applicant's father, Vicente Reyes, Sr.
the amount of P100.00 and secured the loan with the piece of land in question. Applicant, in seeking the registration of the land, relied
on his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same from Basilia Beltran. Oppositors contended that the words
"isinangla," "na ipananagutan sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso," "Kahit isangla o ipagbili," etc., manifest that the document
should be treated as a mortgage, antichresis, or pactum commission and not as an absolute sale or pacto de retro sale.

Issue:

Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale

Ruling:

The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-in-interest is a mere mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is
retained by Basilia Beltran, the mortgagor. The mortgagee, however, may recover the loan, although the mortgage document
evidencing the loan was non-registrable being a purely private instrument. Failure of mortgagor to redeem the property does not
84
automatically vest ownership of the property to the mortgagee, which would grant the latter the right to appropriate the thing
mortgaged or dispose of it. The act of applicant in registering the property in his own name upon mortgagor's failure to redeem the
property would amount to a pactum commissorium which is against good morals and public policy.

Meanwhile, oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the applicant- appellee within ninety (90) days from the finality of decision, the
debt in the amount of P100.00 plus interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from April 19, 1926 until paid.

vi. An antichretic creditor cannot acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor.

RAMIREZ VS C.A.

144 SCRA 292

Facts:

On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of
Riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. The petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no cop y or
record of the same was available. Thereafter, the court ordered the issuance of OCT No. 2273 in the petitioners’ names. On March 30,
1960, the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. They alleged, among others,
that in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question
by way of antichresis and that for this reason, Tax Declaration No. 8777 was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. 9522
and 2385 issued in the names of the petitioners. In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition,
they based their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly
found accidentally in March 1960. After trial, the court found that the deeds of sale were spurious, and that the respondents took
possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the
payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five
years and that the petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land taxes thereon. Finding the claims of
the herein respondents sustained by the evidence, it ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal in the names of herein petitioners and the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names of
herein respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor.

Ruling:

NO. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate court and was correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals
stated:...The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently suppressed the
facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice field in question and that they possess the said rice field merely as
antichretic creditors as security for the loan of P400.00; that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment
when they declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no other person had any claim or interest in the said land.' These we
believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.

In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form required by the Land Registration Act, the applicants alleged
that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any
other person having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.' This allegation
is false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants are not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are
in possession thereof only as antichretic creditors.

85
vii. Applicants who were previously denied claims of ownership in reivindicatory actions cannot file for registration of same
land involved.

KIDPALOS VS BAGUIO MINING

14 SCRA 913

Facts:

The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos Valenciano, Waldo Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and
Ipang Lebos Vda. de Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos. 457, 458, 460, 463 and 549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain
parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet, Mountain Province; to annul the
declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs;
and to recover damages from the Company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode
patent applications of The Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question demolished at the latter's
expense. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930,
asked for dismissal of the action and damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al., had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership
and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter rendered judgment, on
July 31, 1958, finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it
formed part of the Public domain.
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases.
Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the applications.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its
motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then
directly appealed to this Supreme Court. It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present registration
proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that the parties are the same. Neither is it disputable that the causes
of action in both cases are identical, since in both the appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the land in
dispute, allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While the former cases were reivindicatory in character and the
ones presently before us are land registration proceedings, such difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res
judicata.

Issue:

Whether or not once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the
same subject matter and cause of action.

Ruling:

The appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed.

The substance of res judicata, without which multiplicity of actions will be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that — Under this rule,
if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Or, as stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
... . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and adjudicated as to causes of action: Whitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326.
The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is compulsive on the parties as to all points directly involved in it and necessarily
determined. When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in
accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done The estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but
extend to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or the groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason
back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could
have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.

86
viii. Only the Government through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person
to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.

BALAIS-MABANAG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. NO. 153142

Facts:

On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel and other Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that
they received from respondent Ramona through her mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz, the sum of P50,000.00 as down
payment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their “inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.”
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price
ofP1,580,000.00. So the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down payment of P50,000.00 in the bank in
trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On February 22, 1985, Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in her
own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the Coronels. On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision ordering defendant to
execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale and the plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as the
counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are dismissed. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the
petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied hence they appealed the CA judgment to SC but affirmed the CA decision.

Acting on the respondents’ motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of execution but the petitioner and the Coronels filed
their motion to stay execution and supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Upon failure to comply with
the writ of execution, the RTC approved the respondents’motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and ordered
the RTC of Quezon City to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in lieu of the defendants. So the petitioner and
Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s orders but the CA dismissed the petition but they presented
their MR in the CA. Ultimately, the CA denied the MR. The petitioner thus appealed to the Court, which denied her petition for
review for being filed out of time and denied the MR. Thereafter, the respondents moved in the RTC for the resolution of their
pending motion. After the RTC granted the respondents’ pending motion on July 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a MR against such
order, but the RTC denied her motion on September 23, 1999.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of
indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit. In the complaint dated February 22, 1985, respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she
was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The
petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff,
despite the petitioner’s opportunity to do so.

Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing the
directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of
absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines.
The petitioner’s move was outrightly unwarranted. The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised
to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the
finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision.

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c. Grounds for application: Manner of acquisition of land

i. Prove mode of acquisition: (1) Prescription: in the acquisition of public domain lands, prescription sets in upon concurrence
of (i) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable, and (ii) an express government manifestation that the property is
patrimonial property or no longer used for public service or development.

MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC

G.R. NO. 179987

Facts:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty years. The application was raffled to
the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco, Jr. to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting
documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both

Ruling:

No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

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(2) Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens Title. There must be a separate action for the registration thereof.

CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO

G.R. NO. 178411

Facts:

Respondents claim to be absolute owners of A 406 square meters parcel of land located in Parañaque City covered by Tax
Declarations in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930.
From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring
possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987,
Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez
passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access
road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded
to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a
reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the State may build on the land in question

Ruling:

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-
cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands
contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such
lands. Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot
be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the
State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

GRANDE VS COURT OF APPEALS

5 SCRA 524

Facts:

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Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at Isabela by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez).When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River). After many years a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River. In 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of
about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added
to the registered area. Petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet
title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that they and their predecessors-in-interest,
were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under
claim of ownership. In their answer, respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents have acquired the alluvial property through prescription.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of
the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is
conclusive as to them and cannot be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the
possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

ii. Character of land as Alienable and Disposable is determined at the time of the application.

REPUBLIC vs. DILOY

GR NO. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)

Facts:

As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for taxation purposes under his name. He was then
succeeded by his son, Eusebio Leaban, who also filed for taxation purposes in his name from the period covering the years 1951-
1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban’s daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared
the same for taxation purposes under her name. On 15 June 1979, the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her
daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy filed an Applicationfor Registration of Title over the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic, filed an Oppositionto the Application for Registration
of Title.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos
as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse
possession of the subject property.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent, granting her application for registration over the subject
property.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsiderationarguing that the respondent failed to prove her possession as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied.Subsequently, the Republic appealed the Decision of
the MCTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title.

Held:

No. It is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for
Registration of Title over the same was filed by the respondent. However, the subject property became alienable and disposable only
on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in
the counting of the 30-year possession requirement.

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 The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979, when the
same was conveyed to her by her mother. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-
interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property
had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation.
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen into
ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not
apply thereto.
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject property, the
respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-period possession
requirement.
Petition is granted.

iii. Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant application

REPUBLIC vs. DE PORKAN

June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88

Facts:

Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired
said lots though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30years.
An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary
Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546. Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction,
amendment or cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No.
1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal
machinations. The Solicitor General sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance, the SG stated that
the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands
under the Public Land Act. Hence, the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied
and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin. After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of the
titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in
dispute could not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy
and swampy, certified as such as more suitable for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act.

Issue:

Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a
certificate of title.

Held:

Yes. As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a
grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession for more
than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of
the said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the
Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”. By legal fiction, the land ceases to be public
and thus becomes a private land.

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iv. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation.

CHARLES L. ONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008

Facts:

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely,
Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-
owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30)
years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed
to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and
merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892;
and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers and orders the registration of the said
parcel of land stating that evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant for
registration. The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has
been religiously paid. The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant and her predecessors-in-
interest over the same parcel of land has been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the
instant application for registration on July 1, 1999.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. In
reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the
duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of
the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the
earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land
prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the
filing of the application.

Issue:

Whether possession is sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain.

Held:

Pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. As held in
Republic v. Alconaba: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

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d. Form and Contents of Application
i. Waiver of lack of verification

JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR. vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL. ANSELMO IRENEA,
ARTURO DE LA CRUZ, DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO, CIPRIANO SEQUILLO, PEDRO
TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO DE DIOS, ET AL

G.R. No. L-16761

Facts:

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956
by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed
written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All persons, except the abovementioned
oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. Of
the oppositors, 28 filed written but unverified opposition. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their
case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for applicants called the
Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued an order on January 13,
1959 dismissing the unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated
November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have appealed from both orders.

Issue:

Whether he unverified opposition is sufficient

Held:

Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the
first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of
verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect.
The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities,
formal defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party.

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 ii. When the applicant is a non-resident; additional requirements
iii. When 2 or more parcels of land applied for; additional requirements
iv. When land borders on road; additional requirements
v. Requirement of additional facts

e. Where to file
Delegated jurisdiction of First Level Courts
f. What to file
g. Ocular inspection may be mad
h. Amendments. Need publication and notice is changes are substantial.
i. As to parties. An amendment due to change of name of applicant does not require publication.

DIRECTOR OF LANDSV.IAC
G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993

Facts:

Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area
consists of 187,288 sq. m., more or less. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, Act 496, as amended. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application
alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land
for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a
private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11,
Article 14. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land
and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn. In an amended
application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta.
Despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the
subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision of the lower court was
affirmed on 12 December1985. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in granting registration in favor of private respondent.

Held:

We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to
the name of J. Antonio AranetaInc., was a mere attempt to evade disqualification.
Our Constitution, whether the 1973 or 1987, prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such prohibition, respondent amended its application to conform with the mandates of
the law.
However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of republication of an amended application for registration is
a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish. Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in
the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for.
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, nor Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, requires republication and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and
reasonable terms. On the other hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or
increase in the area of the land applied for.

ii. As to the land applied for

iii. Amendment due to the inclusion of additional land requires publication. Reasons.

BENIN vs TUASON

57 SCRA 531

Facts:

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The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands located in Laloma, Caloocan,
Rizal, inherited from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who
inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels
of land openly,adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio
Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the
Bureau of Lands in 1933, Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands
for taxation purposes in 1940under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War,
or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were ordered
summonedbypublication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff has a valid claim over the disputed property.

Held:

If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the
original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included
land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.

B. Publication, Service and Posting of Notices

a. Notice of Initial Hearing
b. When and How Initially Set
c. How given
i. Publication. Must be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation as a
requirement of due process.

Purpose and Effects of Publication

VICTOR BENIN, et al. vs. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

Facts:

The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the parcels of agricultural lands; that they inherited said parcels of
land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors
in interest had possessed these parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during

95
the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said
parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of
the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through
their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing
equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as
well as the improvements, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from
their lessees.
The plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands
had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa
Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, the defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged that before the decision was handed down in the application for registration by the defendants, the area,
boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were
made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC
No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6,
1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa
Estate and Diliman Estate); and that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration
Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication.
In its answer, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each
case.
After trial, the lower court, among others, concluded that the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio,
having been rendered without jurisdiction and the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land
described in their respective complaints.
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. appealed from the decision. It contends that the trial court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court
lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that the amendment to the original plan was not
published.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No.
7681.

Held:

The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the
original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included
land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.
When the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as
published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10
square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1
has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.

REPUBLIC v FLORENCIA MARASIGAN

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

Facts:

The private respondent, claims to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a
petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the
owner's duplicate copy. She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of" the petition but she, however, did
not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution. From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of
the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and
registered in the name of Epifania Alcano. The original copy of said title which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds

96
of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on
August 12, 1977.
The Regional Trial Court however granted the reconstitution filed by the private respondent.
Petitioner appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals because the trial court erred in acquiring jurisdiction over the instant
petition for reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of tct no. t-66062 without the requisite service of notice of
hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by section 13 of republic act no. 26. The CA affirmed the
Trial Court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition

Held:

No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the
requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice.
This is to accord primacy to the official publication.
The Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium,
namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.

A defective publication deprives the court of jurisdiction.

POvs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-27443 July 19, 1971 / 40 SCRA 37

Facts:

Judgment was rendered on March 11, 1964, granting the petition of Juanita Po for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. On April
15, 1966, she filed a motion to be allowed to take the requisite oath of allegiance, after the notice and hearing prescribed by law. On
November 14, 1966, the court issued, the appealed order allowing her to take said oath and directing the issuance, in her favor, of the
corresponding certificate of naturalization.
However, the motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain appellee's
petition for naturalization because the petition was not published in accordance with law.
In the case at bar, the appellee's "petition" for naturalization that was not published, but a "notice" summarizing the allegations of said
pleading. The publication of such notice is insufficient to vest, in the trial court, jurisdiction to hear and decide this case. Besides, said
notice was published in the "Nueva Era," and the records do not show that this newspaper is of general circulation in Surigao del
Norte, the province in which the appellee resides.

Issue:

Whether the defect in the publication of the petition deprives the court of jurisdiction.

Held:

Sec. 9 of Com. Act No. 473 requires that the "petition" for naturalization be published "in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides.
Since the appellee’s petition for naturalization has not been published, which is in violation of Sec. 9 of said Act, the trial
court had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear said petition, much less to grant the same.

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Instances of defective publication
a) Different description

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED

FEWKES vs. NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ ,et al.

G.R. No. L-29075 June 10, 1971

Facts:

On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, filed in CFI of Albay,an application for registration of two lots,referred to as
Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D), with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and
Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated Bulusan, Libon, Albay. Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue
print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the
tax declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in
favor of applicant. After the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction, based
on the finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract of land which was described in the plan
attached to the application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the
registration proceeding. Hence,this appeal.The appellant contended that since the description of the bigger parcel of which the
properties sought to be registered formed part was already published, then there was no need for further publication of the aforesaid
small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration court.

Issue:

Whether the exact description of the land sought to be registered must be published in order to confer jurisdiction to the court over the
res.

Held:

The notice of the hearing must be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining
owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, and shall be published in the
Official Gazette for two consecutive times. Publication of the notice of hearing is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases. It is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication
and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Moreover, such notice and publication of the hearing enables all
persons concerned having any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for
registration thereof is not to be granted. In the case at bar, what was sought to be registered was not the big parcel of land (Lot No.
1383, Pls-764-D or Lot No. 21), but the certain portions thereof (Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B). Therefore, it is the technical description
of these 2 smaller lots that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified
thereof. The lower court could not merely direct the amendment of the application, instead of issuing an order of dismissal. This is
because it is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication in the newspapers
and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of new notifications and advertisements making
known to everyone the said alterations and amendments.

b) Actual publication was after the hearing

REPUBLIC vs COURT OF APPEALS

236 SCRA 442

Facts:

Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo
City, from one Cristeta Dazo BeleN. At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. The
spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City.

98
This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. The
court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question. At the outset, petitioner submits that
private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed
to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belongs to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus,
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would
the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

Issue:

Whether the application for registration of title is void on the ground of foreign nationality.

Held:

NO. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question,
said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of
transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance
with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite
period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA vs.THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MALABON, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 170

Facts:

On March 17, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-3899 in the name of Salome
Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of Deeds (Atty. Francisco Romero) at the Glovic Bldg. in Caloocan
City for registration. It could not be given due course because the original of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry of Deeds was
missing. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on
April 12, 1988 in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original of TCT No. R-3899 under
Rep. Act No. 26. The petition was given due course on April 22, 1988. The court directed that a copy of its order giving due course to
the petition and setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 be published in two (2) consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided
in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26. At the hearing on August 17, 1988, for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional requirement
of publication of the notice of the hearing of the petition, the petitioner submitted the following exhibits:
a) a certification dated August 10, 1988, of the Director of the National Printing Office certifying that the order dated April
22, 1988 was included in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30,1988 issues of the Official Gazette (Exh. B);
b) the sheriffs certificate of posting (Exh. D); and
c) the registry return receipts for the copies of the notices which were sent to the Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the National Land Title's and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo
At the continuation of the hearing on November 3, 1988, the petitioner caused to be marked as Exhibit G the certificate of publication
issued by the Director of the National Printing Office stating that the order of the court dated April 22, 1988 was published in Volume
84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was released for
circulation on October 3, 1988.
The Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Malabon dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of the petition was
not published in the Official Gazette "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which had been set on
August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of the Official Gazette were actually released for circulation on October 3, 1988, or
forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled hearing of the petition.

Issue:

99
Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear
and determine the petition.

Held:

The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that
such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date
set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the
court of jurisdiction. And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case
and all its aspects.

ii. Mailing. Persons and officials to whom notice is given by mailing

iii. Posting
d. How notice proven
C. Opposition
a. Who may file opposition
i. Oppositor need not be named in the notice of initial hearing

ELIGIO T. LEYVAvs . COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ and MANUELA JANDOC

G.R. No. 71939 January 25, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Leyva had an alleged Compromise Agreement with private respondent Jandoc. Said agreement was entails that spouses
Leyva will withdraw their opposition to the land registration case filed by Jandoc, if the latter will transfer a ownership over a parcel
of land belonging to Jandoc. The agreement was purpotedly executed in 1963 but was only notarized in 1972.
On the other hand, private respondent Laiz executed an agreement of sale with Jandoc in 1959 involving the same parcel of
land. Laiz was able to acquire transfer of ownership and possession of the said land by virtue of a case he filed for specific perfomance
against Jandoc.
The RTC ruling was then affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner or private respondent has a preferred right of ownership over the land in question.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which are the following:
1. The Compromise Agreement was null and void for being undated and belatedly notarized.
2. In the registration proceedings, Laiz was mentioned as an adverse possessor but not Leyva.
3. The agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc is valid, and also supported by an earnest money given by Laiz.
4. Due execution of the agreement was witnessed by three credible witnesses.
5. It has been established that the subject was lot was occupied by Laiz since 1954, and was given TCT over the said lot by
virtue of specific performance.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement of Sale prevails over the alleged Compromise Agreement. The
reliance of Leyva on his expert witnesses was not able to overcome the testimonies given by the three witnesses. As held in our
jurisprudence, "the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be
mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to inherent infirmities." In any event, it is well established that the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge credibility of
witnesses.”
It is evident that what petitioner seeks from Supreme Court a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
findings of the trial court. Indeed, it has long been established to the point of being elementary, that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in certain instances which have no application here. Petition was
denied.

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 ii. Oppositor need not show title; but must appear to have an interest

DE CASTRO VS MARCOS

26 SCRA 644

Facts:

The case commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a
cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant to Republic Act 931, where the registration in his name of 15,922
square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio was sought for.
Petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters allegedly included in the 15,922 square
meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition. It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands
Township Sales Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill
Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. The lot was awarded in her favor. She also paid the full purchase price of the land.
Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. A trial was made and the case was submitted for decision. However Akia lodged a
motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his (Akia's) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst others,
was that petitioner lacked personality to sue. The motion was granted by respondent judge on the grounds that mere applicants of
public land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands.
But de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not a mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner
thereof. Because, she was an awardee who had paid to the government, in full, the sales value of the land she applied for but
respondent judge refused reconsideration, on the ground of a "Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of stating that on
October 15, 1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner. Other Motions filed by de Castro were all
denied.

Issue:

Whether De Castro have the personality or legal standing to oppose the application for registration of Akia.

Ruling:

Petitioner De Castro has legal standing before the cadastral court. Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed
down by the specific conditions therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government." The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find
that all conditions herein established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any
provisional or permanent disposition by the government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held upon her own township sales
application. Of course, the award up to now has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition
imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by
respondent Akia as to the land. an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that
were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands."

iii. A mere foreshore lessee of a public land cannot be an oppositor

ELIGIO T. LEYVA and EUFEMIA L. LEYVA vs. MANUELA JANDOC and HON. JOSE S. BORROMEO, Judge of Court
of First Instance of Cotabato

101
G.R. No. L-16965 February 28, 1962

Facts:

On September 10, 1958, Manuela Jandoc applied, in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, for the registration of three (3) parcels of
land situated in Dadiangas, General Santos, Cotabato, and more particularly known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-12647. Eligio
T. Leyva objected thereto on December 10, 1958, with respect to a portion of said land of about one (1) hectare which he claimed to
have adversely possessed in good faith and under legal title since 1937. On or about December 17, 1958 his wife Eufemia L. Leyva
filed another opposition alleging that she and her husband had occupied a portion of the land in question, which they had acquired
from the defunct "NARRA", and that both had similarly occupied as owners since 1937, another portion of said land of about 88
meters by 6.66 meters, "with their improvements ... made in good faith." Later, other oppositions were filed, also, including one by the
Bureau of Lands, which claimed the land applied for as part of the public domain.
After declaring in default all those who had not objected to the petition for registration, the court proceeded with the hearing
of the case on the merits, which covered a period of several days. A reconsideration of the court's ruling was subsequently denied.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Issue:

Whether a mere foreshore lessee can be an oppositor.

Held:

We find no merit in this pretense.

The Court of Appeals did not err, much less, commit an abuse of discretion, in holding that petitioners' interest.
... being merely that of foreshore lessees, can therefore be amply protected by the provincial fiscal who represents the
Government, with the collaboration of their counsel. This being so, their presence in court is not indispensable. Upon the other
hand, their active independent intervention may not even result in confusion of the evidence for the Government.
From the point of view of the end result of the registration proceedings, the interest of the petitioners is likewise amply protected.
If the land applied for is finally adjudged to be private property, the right of the petitioners as foreshore lessees either
automatically terminates or would depend entirely at the pleasure of the private party to whom the land is adjudged. If, on the
other hand, the land is ultimately declared part of the public domain, their right as foreshore lessees would have suffered no
impairment.
The Court of Appeals rejected such pretense for the following reasons: .
While the right claimed by the petitioners herein seemed at first blush to be directly opposed to the adjudication of ownership to
the applicant, it developed in the proceedings that their right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely
subordinate to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the
public domain. In such case, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests
as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it. It is well-settled that the interests of the Government cannot be
represented by private persons.
We are fully in agreement with the foregoing view. It may not be amiss to add, also, that this being an action in rem, there is no reason
why claims which do not partake of the nature of real rights or rights in rem should be settled therein.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

iv. Homesteader, purchaser of friar land and all persons who claim to be in possession prior to issuance of their titles or
awards to public lands

De Castro v. Marcos and Akia

26 SCRA 644

Facts:

Rufino Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings,
pursuant to Republic Act 931. Respondent Akia there sought the registration in his name of 15,922 square meters of land situated in
the City of Baguio. On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters
allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition below. It appears that petitioner
Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square
meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she
paid a fee of P150.00 on October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at which petitioner de Castro was the
highest bidder. On December 17, 1955, the lot was awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square meter, or a total of P4,300.00.
Petitioner fully paid the purchase price which, with interests, amounted to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed, had been paying taxes
on the lot.On August 16, 1965, petitioner's motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted by the court below.

Issues

1. Whether the question of jurisdiction is meritorious

2. Whether petitioner Virginia L. de Castro has legal standing in the proceedings.

102
3. Whether the plight of petitioner has effect on the case?

Ruling:

The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the reopening of the cadastral case below is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was instituted under Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953. The foregoing provision
establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is publication
mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court of First
Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General." About two years back, we held in
a case, that under Republic Act 931, it is unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as
said Act [931] only required service thereof to the Solicitor General."The Court held that the authority of the cadastral court over the
reopening proceedings below is not impaired by failure of publication. In an early case, this Court declared that mere citizens could
have no interest in public land. Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions
therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "onlywith respect to such of said parcels of land as have not
been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." The statute made
it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent
disposition by the government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.The Court ruled that petitioner has legal standing
before the cadastral court.

3. Respondent judge should have taken all these facts into consideration. While petitioner's plea for reconsideration before the Bureau
of Lands was pending, appeal by petitioner from respondent judge's order would have been futile. For, there was then nothing definite
on which to base her appeal. So, there was really nothing to do but to wait. Upon the other hand, respondent judge should have taken
stock of the fact that petitioner was at an obvious disadvantage.

The writ of certiorari is hereby granted; the orders of December 4, 1965, February 1, 1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the
opposition filed by petitioner Virginia L. de Castro in the matter of the petition for reopening of judicial proceedings by respondent
Rufito Akia (Civil Res. Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I), are hereby annulled; and
the respondent judge or whoever may take his place is hereby directed to reinstate petitioner's opposition aforesaid and to decide the
case on the merits.

v. The failure of the government to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right to appeal a
decision adjudicating the land as private property

HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C.

REGALADO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 168155 February 15, 2007

Facts:

Marina Regalado filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The application was published on November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same,
citing as grounds the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the
property and for another reason that the inevitable absence of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of
her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London.
The motion to withdraw the application was granted.

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On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on a
technical ground. Subsequently, Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC.
Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration alleging, inter alia, that she had "by herself or through
her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and
disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier"; and that she acquired the land "by virtue
of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor in her favor.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15, 1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which it
referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation
No. 1967 dated May 14, 1980. While the case is pending, Marina died as a result, her eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land
registration case in their behalf. Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by the National Housing Authority without
prejudice to the other land subject of the petition. In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived 30,239 square meters of the
property to the NHA.

Issue:

Whether Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of
ownership to validly register said land?

Held:

Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain." This they failed to discharge.
In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is not
proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for more
than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her
favor.
In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona
fide claim of ownership fails.

vi. Resolution/Disposition of buildings and improvements on the land subject of registration, if there is no opposition

Fernandez vs Aboratigue

36 SCRA 476

Facts:

Ana P. Fernandez is the owner of a parcel of land where the father of defendant Feliza Aboratigue, was during his lifetime employed
as guard at one of the gates to the property, and as such was allowed to plant fruit trees in a small portion in the immediate vicinity;
and that after his death the said defendant, together with her husband Restituto Bacnan, were allowed to stay therein, but that later on
they claimed to be the owners of the said portion. In their answer to the complaint the defendants alleged, as basis of their claim of
ownership, continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed area, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest since
the year 1901. On January 28, 1959 the Court denied the motion and on the basis of the facts stipulated rendered judgment or the
plaintiff, declaring her to be the owner of the disputed property and ordering the defendants to vacate the same, with right to
reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon, they being builders in good faith.

Issue:

Whether a mere claim can defeat a registered title.

Held:

No,It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a registered title. Furthermore, the "claim" here is only noted on the survey plan, and
such notation cannot prevail over the actual decree of registration as reproduced in the certificate. All claims of third persons to the
property must be asserted in the registration proceedings. If any claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from
the property applied for, and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate of title subsequently issued to the applicant. If
it is included, the claim is deemed adversely resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree within one year
from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The rule is that the owner of buildings and improvements should claim them during the proceedings for registration and the fact of
ownership, if upheld by the court, must be noted on the face of the certificate. There is no such notation here in favor of the appellants.
However, inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed area have been acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to
the appellants' predecessor-in-interest, and the lower court's decision allowing them to recover the value of the improvements is not

104
now in question, this right of the appellants must be upheld. The trial court has left the determination of such value to mutual
agreement between the parties. This disposition should be modified in the sense that if they fail to agree, the matter should be
submitted to the said court for hearing and adjudication.

b. Contents
i. Names and addresses of adjoining owners

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BACAS et al..

G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013

Facts:

The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of land together with all the
improvements found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City with Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C.
Record No. 1612. They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their application the names and addresses of
the adjoining owners, as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by
their mere tolerance.
The director of the Bureau of Lands, registered its written opposition and on On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by
the Bacases, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision holding that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years. No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the
decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding
certificate of title over the subject property
The LRC’s decision in both applications for registration the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and
the Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT
No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the
Republic against the Bacases.
The Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so,
it was no longer disposable and subject to registration. The RTC dismissed the complaints of the Republic they ruled that the
respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for registration.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, the appeal
on the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed.

Held:

The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud.
It can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in question. With respect to the
Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the
validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a
judgment decreeing registration is null and void.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.

105
c. Partial Opposition
i. Sufficiency of unverified opposition

MILLER vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

Facts:

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956
by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr. After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of
Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions.
All persons, except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957. On July 24, 1958 applicants started
presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. Of the oppositors, 28 filed written but
unverified opposition. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case. On August 27, 1958 the
private oppositors presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the
lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same. The private oppositors offered to
verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified
opposition, without pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18, 1959.

Issue:

The sufficiency of unverified opposition.

Ruling:

Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the
first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of
verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect. The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection
is generally a waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of
the adverse party.

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d. Affirmative Relief in Opposition

D. Order of Default
a. General Default
b. Special Default
c. Distinctions between General and Special Default
d. Effects of Default
i. “entered against the whole world” hence all persons are bound by the order of default

CACHERO VS. MARZAN

196 SCRA 601 1991

Facts:

The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the respondents for recovery of possession and ownership of 2
parcels of land in Barrio Basca, Aringay, LaUnion. The lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioners owners of the subject
land. The judgment became final and executory. About 7 years later the Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the Torrens
Act of the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of the Cadastral Survey and another parcel of land (50,412 square
meters) identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca Aringay, La Union.
Subsequently, Atty. Yaranon filed oppositions in said case in behalf of the respondents Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was
substituted by hischildren.The judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses finding that the spouses and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in continuous and notorious possession of subject lots for more than 60 years in concept of owners except for a one-
hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from
his late father, Simeon Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been religiously paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as
owners thereof. The respondents thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for reconsiderationon the ground that the Court had
no jurisdiction over the case and that the subject lands, which have been the subject of cadastral proceedings, showed that neither the
Cacheros nor their predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The Cacheros opposed the motion and argued that
by the time the motion for reconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already become final. The motion
was denied. About 7 months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed
a"
petition for review of judgment and/or decree
." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated as Lot No. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that
they have been in continuous possession thereof since then. They also alleged that the petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them
notice of their application for registration and that in the earlier cadastral survey, Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 had been declared
public land for lack of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they
had file cadastral answer. The petition prayed for the re-opening, review and setting aside of the judgment and for the accord to them
of an opportunity to prove their asserted contentions. The petition for review was denied. The Registration Court ruled that the
according to the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, there was no decree of registration issued as
regards the subject lots. It also ruled that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part. Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova
subsequently died and were substituted by their heirs. These Genova heirs filed an amended petition which was also denied by the
Registration Court. Then, they appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the Supreme Court, holding that the
former had no appellate jurisdiction over the matter. The CA also declared that the Genovas are third persons who came into the case.

Issue:

WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the Registration Proceedings.

Held:

NO, the cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak of the Pacific war. It had been abandoned and had not been
continued or resumed after the war, thus, it had ceased to exist. Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings under the Cadastral Act
cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more than twenty years later by
the Cacheros. A cadastral proceeding which had long discontinued and abandoned, and which had resulted in no judgment or final
order affecting the lands involved in a subsequent registration act under Act496, cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the latter
proceedings. There being no final adjudication in the cadastral proceeding, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata.
Moreover, the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued in Land Reg. Case No. N-824, a proceeding undoubtedly in
rem in character. That default order was entered "against the whole world," with the exception only of the parties who had appeared
and filed pleadings in the registration case.

107
 ii. All allegations are deemed confessed

BASILISA S. ESCONDE vs.HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN

G.R. No. L-67583 July 31, 1987

Facts:

Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now
covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.
Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde, as they have been
occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista.
Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession
against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyance against Delfin which was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that
(1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order,
delivered possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession
which was granted.
The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the premises he was again
barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again,
granted.
Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The
second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out
the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of
possession served or to issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.

Issue:

1. Whether petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata; and

2. Whether petitioner's motion to admit amended complaint and for issuance of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is
proper.

Ruling:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969.
Hence, the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property Registration Decree) having taken effect
only on Jan. 23, 1979.
Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is
completely rebutted by private respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one of those cited to
appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by
his signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her husband was reported one of the adjoining
owners present. There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of
the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact,
the records show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of title that a portion of the land was being occupied
by petitioner sometime in September 1967, by breaking the stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent. However, petitioner
and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land registration proceedings, opted not to appear.
Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole
world. The failure of the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of
hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for registration will bar her from filing this action."

108
e. Remedy of a defaulted interested person
f. It is improper to declare a person in default simply because he failed to appear at the pre-trial after filing an opposition.
Remedy is the special civil action of certiorari not an appeal.

Director of Lands vs. Santiago

G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the
respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the
respondent corporation’s application for registration. On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent
Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the
Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the
Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp
without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge
Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to
appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as
required by law. On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general
default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant before the clerk of
court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was
excusable,a nd that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.

Issue:

WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions:

1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;

109
Held:

The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the
Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET
ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporation’s
application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable
under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The
Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation
that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.

First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending
sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants,
they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The
private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital fact)

More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public
Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject lands…were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein, through its
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The
respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the
subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was
done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.

The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the
issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to
declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default
against the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his
opposition or answer.

The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean
that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than
illogical, unwarranted, and unjust

Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the
respondent Judge should have received the applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The
oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government’s claim.

The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment. “The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in court and given
them an even chance to face their opponents.

The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which would only prolong the litigation
unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on the records before it.

In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications
to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans submitted by the
private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioner’s opposition to the application were so casually
ignored.

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER vs. JUDGE AMADOR T.
VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO
ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila

[G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975]

Facts:

110
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico, filed against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his
personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging first, for the return of ten (10)
certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as legal
counsel for the corporation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that
the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his
permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and
defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section
I of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the stock certificates the same are in
the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the
plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the parties nor their respective counsels appeared in
court. While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet presented to the court the
required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a petition to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been
served with summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of January 11, 1974, or after a lapse of seven (7) months
from the service of summons, defendants had not filed their answer to the complaint. The court granted the petitionand, consequently,
it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment in favor of Catolico. Defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration but Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for reconsideration.
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before the court because the defendants had not filed
yet their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy, Catolico filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging
that said judgment had already become final and executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the
proceedings to afford them an opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the
prejudice". Thence, the court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Defendants’ filed their notice of appeal. On July 22,
Pio R. Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a
letter to respondent Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to hold in
abeyance the execution and garnishment for the reasons that defendants were not given a chance to have their day in court in the
motion for immediate execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's decision and order of
immediate execution.

Issue:

Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in
default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default.
The motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such declaration was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of
default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact
that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said
date, their counsel had not yet received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss. There may be cases
where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the
pertinent rules violated." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution,
they were, therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits, in their absence, without due
notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. Consequently, the order of default, the judgment and the order of
execution are patent nullities.

111
g. Motion to dismiss grounded on res judicata is allowed in land registration cases. Rules of Court apply in a suppletory
character whenever applicable or convenient.

VALISNO vs. PLAN

143 SCRA 502

Facts:

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation
purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba
claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs
of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of
possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan
provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any
compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Contrasting the evidence of the
respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land
position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared
by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before
the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the
SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner should be granted.

RULING:

The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows
its application in land registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may
sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the
counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the defendantbecomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in
the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion to dismiss the same. The
respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the
case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the
application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. The employment of two different actions
does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice.
Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no
significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC
should decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both
parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition.

E. Hearing
a. Speedy Hearing
b. Rules of procedure applicable
i. Order of trial
c. Burden of proof falls on applicant

Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

Facts:

On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

112
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.

Issue:

Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Held:

NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE

G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

Facts:

On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then CFI of Pangasinan, an application for registration in her favor of a
parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she
nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether the land applied for has been in the possession of her respondent’s predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years and
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in the proceedings

Held:

No. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty years period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The
bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty years
found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.

LARAGAN VS CA

G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

Facts:

On 14 October 1968, the herein petitioners filed an application with the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of
land with an area of 221,667 sq. m., more or less, situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela. The applicants alleged that they
acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have
been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. The Land Registration Commission issued a notice of initial hearing. On 7 July
1969, the Solicitor General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands, alleging that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared
public land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their
opposition to the application claiming that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land applied for, with an area
of 16 hectares of their deceased parents and which has been in their possession for more than 30 years.
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration
in the names of the applicants. The oppositors appealed to the CA. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of

113
the trial court, but excluded the southern portion of the land applied for, the appellate court declaring such excluded portion to be
public land, and part of the public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and oppositors to prove registrable title over the
same. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in question as public land.
.
Held:

The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his
failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other
oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their
imperfect title over the land in question. Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from
declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the registration of their
title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that the land pertains to the
state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name
simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny
registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of
the land which he seeks to register.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

d. Quantum of Evidence required – Competent, clear and persuasive

REPUBLIC vs SAYO

Facts:

The respondent spouses filed an original application for registration of a tract of land having an area of 33,950 hectares. Oppositions
were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others. The case dragged on for
about twenty (20) years. The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to
their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on 1981, the respondent Judge approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;
neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement; as
counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an
opportunity to take part therein; that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take
immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land is public land,
but it is not.

Issue:

Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration

Held:

Yes. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence
of evidence of title required of the private respondents
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that
compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land
subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented
nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof
114
 of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little
extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove
the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library.
But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of
the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious
document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and
set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may
be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled and set aside.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the
title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.

Issue:

Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
is mandatory.

Held:

YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.The Supreme
Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative.

Judgment

a. Partial Judgment

b. Judgment confirms title

i. Duty of land reg. officials to renderreport may extend even after finality of judgment but not yet beyond one year
from entry of decree

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 77770

Facts:

Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among those
involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor.

On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.

On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued
in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order
of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands
during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final
and executory.

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 After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.

Issue:

Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.

Ruling:

Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the
decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in
that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This
being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.

Petition denied.

c. In whose name registration may be made; land may be “dealt with”.

MENDOZA VS. CA
84 scra 76

Facts:

In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During
pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was
admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.

The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title
issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its
earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz – who was not a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.

Issue:

Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a “third party”.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz
pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the
registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land
has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title.

“SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the
register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The
interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the
register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the
parties, shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of registration
issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. . . .

A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the
instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.

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d. Only claimed property or portion can be adjudged

JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
26 DECEMBER 1984, 133 SCRA 718

Facts:

Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. De Vera’s nephew (Salvador Estrada)
took over as administrator of De Vera’s estate. Prior to the widow’s death, she made an inventory showing that De Vera’s property
(located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera
indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada
sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an
owner of the land since 1921; that they’ve been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.

Issue:

Whether the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate.

Ruling:

No. The inclusion of Juliana’s land in De Vera’s title was erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed
to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Vera’s lifetime; that when de Vera
registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latter’s land was erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow, in her inventory before she died, attested that de Vera’s portion of land is
only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only
portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana
(portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Vera’s estate.

117
e. Where portions of land subject of a land registration case are covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales
patent, the court cannot simply invalidate them; subject of separate litigation.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VSTHE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-17696

Facts:

On November 19, 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural
land with an area of 5 hectares, situated in Barrio Callang Municipality of Gamu, Province of Isabela. In accordance with the
application, which was given number 8706, the land was advertised for sale to the highest bidder and on February 15, 1928 was duly
awarded to the applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land Act On January 19, 1950, Tolentino having
complied with the legal requirements as to actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of the area applied for as well as the
payment of the purchase price, the Director of Lands signed the corresponding order for the issuance of a patent in his favor. Upon
investigation, however, the applicant discovered that a portion of the land covered by his application with an area of 2.3506 hectares,
specifically that portion identified as Lot No. 8091 Pls-62, had been applied for as a homestead by the herein defendant Braulio
Cosme on March 22, 1949 and that Homestead Patent No. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on the following
August 19, pursuant to which he obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-880 from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Isabela on November 10, 1949. The homestead settlement application had been filed with the now defunct National Land
Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation No. 610 promulgated in 1940, under which certain areas of public
agricultural land in Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes, and it was upon recommendation of that office that the patent was
issued by the Director of Lands.

Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands, an investigation was conducted by the District Land Officer for
Isabela, and when it was verified that the land covered by the homestead patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in
1928, the Director of Lands filed the present action on November 27, 1953, for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the
original certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme.

Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued on November 10, 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No V-
19 the land in question came under the operation of the Land Registration Act as provided in Section 122 thereof, and that upon the
expiration of one year from the date of its issuance, the said title became incontrovertible.

Issue:

Whether the court can invalidate the lands covered by titles based on homestead,free or sales patent.

Ruling:

No. Where a portion of a land subject of a land registration case are covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the
court cannot simply invalidate them.

A certificate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain
conditions and restriction.As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of
Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the
consequent reversion of the land to the Government.On the other hand certificate of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of
one (1) year, becomes incontrovertible.The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due registration and issuance of a
certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in contemplation of Act
496,in view of its nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one obtained on the same date
through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter.7

A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the patent to a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long
as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 22; Ramoso
vs. Obligado, 70 Phil. 86 and others), and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of
the issuance thereof, ... a certificate of title, be it original or a duplicate, may only be ordered cancelled under special
circumstances, and one of them is when the title is void. And a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a
person applies for the registration of a land in his name although he knows that the property belongs to another.

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 f. Finality of Judgment

i. Now 15 days counted from receipt of the notice of judgment.

ii. As to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from the receipt of the decision by the solicitor general who
represents the government in all registration proceeding.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO

G.R. No. L-60413

Facts:

Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original application for registration of 33,950 hectares tract of land but was
opposed by the government including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua . The land was formerly part of Santiago, Isabela, but had been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
Then, an order of general default was entered against the whole world except the oppositors.
After about 20 years, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Sandoval, but out of
this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.
The respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The applicants for registration presented a mere photocopy of a certification of the National Library stating that the property
in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property. But, that Spanish
document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and
obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership.

Issues:

Whether the Registration Court correctly rendered decision based from the
compromise agreement of the parties.
Whether informacion posesoria is a prima facie evidence of possession.

Ruling:

The compromise agreement and the judgment approving it is declared null and void.
The decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties but such included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions
of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any
part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally
unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any
substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights
and interests over the land.
Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, informacion posesoria was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two
conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession
of the land for 20 years; but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent.

iii.Execution pending appeal is not allowed

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS et.al. VS HON. SALVADOR C. REYES

G.R. No. L-27594

Facts:

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On February 24, 1964, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla,
sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of land, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of
Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the
applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said
land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the
President.
The applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the
property subject matter of the application. The motion was granted by the lower court.
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved for military purposes under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested
with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities.
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the
Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter
and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her
death sometime in 1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to
be registered in favor of:
(a) Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, a Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at
Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos and
(b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.

The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said
decision to the Supreme Court.
By an order, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain
orders and pleadings, within ten days from receipt of the order. On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed
and copies served upon the appellees.
Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion for
the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a
decree of registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government.
On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C.
Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo,
and two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the
appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15,
1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was
forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.
As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration, the petitioners instituted
before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to nullify the order
dated March 11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto and Original Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds for
the province of Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

Whether the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

Ruling:

The appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole
decision.
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous
consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed
on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory,
and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

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 iv. Court retains control of the case for 1 year, notwithstanding lapse of 15 days from the receipt of judgment.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 77770

Facts:

Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among those
involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor.

On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.

On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued
in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order
of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands
during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final
and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.

Issue:

Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.

Ruling:

Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the
decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in
that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This
being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.

Petition denied.

v. Hence, the case may still be reopended and the decision set aside when granted

CAYANAN V. DE LOS SANTOS

21 SCRA 1348

Facts:

The title of appellee De Los Santos to Lot 56 of Porac Cadastre was confirmed by Judge Santos of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.

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 In the same year, there was a petition for review for the said lot. It was alleged that said lot was registered in the name of appellee De
los Santos through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission of facts. It was stated further that a simulated Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent appellee, Felix Camaya.

It prayed further for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the
Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan, however it was denied.

Issue:

Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted

Ruling:

Yes, it may.
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the
period of one year filed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

B.Decree of Registration

a. Issued pursuant to an order of the court upon finality of the judgment preparation and issuance of decree.

b. When and by whom issued

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR

G.R. No. L-22110.

FACTS:

On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the latter.On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-in-
interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the
latter.

However, the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and
uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long before the World
War II, and have introduced improvements thereon. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied and
that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as
public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On June 13, 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a
decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already
become final and executory. Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and
"against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree."

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of the order is proper.

RULING:

In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners' alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to
or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the
petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July
1, 1963 when the decree in question was issued. The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the
original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of
the period for perfecting an appeal.

There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment
is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of
a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue

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the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered
to be registered.

i. Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of judgment

EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA,et al. VS. ANGEL ALBANO,et al.

G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988

Facts:

On July 31, 1941, CFI Ilocos Norte rendered a decision in Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino.One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. However, the decree of
registration was only issued on October 14, 1955; and it was only on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title was issued
in Delfina Aquino's name.On August 11, 1970, Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca,the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual,
brought suit in the same Court of First Instance praying that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, and that title be
adjudicated in their favor. Barroga's and Padaca's complaint was denied by the court. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance ordered
execution of the judgment on December 6, 1973. On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of
Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. A writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. The
plaintiffs appealed. The motion was thereafter denied by the court by Order dated September 22, 1975. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Court could still issue orders despite lapse of long period of time from entry of judgment.

Held:

The judgment of the cadastral court was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties
thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding as well as their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date
of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe. The appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite
the lapse of many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case
or their successors-in-interest.

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c. Finality and incontrovertibility of decree; significance of the decree

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED VS.COURT OF APPEALS

5 SCRA 240

Facts:

Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) is claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral
court in favor of his father. Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as
evidenced by an OCT issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30
years. Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the
defendants. The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding the lot was part of the OCT in the name of the
spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos. The cadastral court declared the lot a
public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original
Certificate of Title. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and, therefore,
the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name of
Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot. While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain,
the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, Plaintiffs interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals.. Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession.

Ruling:

A decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be
issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the
corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land. The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner
upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having
been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the
land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.

As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over
Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no
imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the
issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could
not be acquired by adverse possession.

i. When considered final

ii. When not considered final

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. BUSUEGO

12 SCRA 678

Facts:

Teodora Busuego applied for a decree of registration of the Lot No. 2497, Gapan Cadastre. A decree of registration was issued in
favor of the applicant. Within one year from the issuance of the decree, the spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo filed in the
same proceeding, a petition for the setting aside of said decree and the cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder, on the ground
that the decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth,
petitioners, through their predecessor-in-interest, were owners of one-half thereof, having acquired the same by purchase from
Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate petition, Antonio and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased brother of Teodora,

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also prayed for the same relief on the allegation that their father was an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497,
having acquired the same by descent from their father, Severino Busuego.

The court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited, it has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the decreed issued in favor of the respondent Busuego is final.

RULING:

It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another.

... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the
period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered
continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and
Reynes(49 Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).

In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of
Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree.

 Review of Decree, when allowed

ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN
NAMED TERESA MALABANAN
G.R. NO. 173289, FEBRUARY 17, 2010

Facts:

On March 1998, respomdents filed with the RTC of Tagaytay a complaint for Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction against
the petitioner, Eland Phil. Inc. Respondents contended that they are the owners, in fee simple, of a parcel of land which was already
registered by the petitioner, in fact was already awarded an OCT for it.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case alleging that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause of action and that the respondents
are not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. After a series of several motions and delays (postponements), the
RTC granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the respondents on August 1999. The lower court nullified the title held by
the petiotioners, and was ordered to be cancelled including the tax declaration covering the subject land.
The petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on February 2006, but was dismissed by the said court.

Issue:

Whether a summary judgment is the proper remedy in quieting of title.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that a summary judgment, as provided under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment
is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine.Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that summary judgment covers any action
with the exemption of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or legal separation.

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In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They
merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer
Ad Cautelam.

This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs’ cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is
based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings

Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is
that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,

Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by
petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In the present case, the petitioner was able to
point out the genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.

Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.

Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein.

It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on
the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid

As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the date
of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the registration court. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review.

The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of
registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.

A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not
affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners
acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in
these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith.

Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is error for the
court to deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the
petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation.

The Supreme court granted the petitioners review and reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court.

iii. Effect of finality of Decree

BOLANOS VS JM TUASON & CO.

37 SCRA 223, 1971

Facts:

J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appealed the order dated September 9, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X in LRC Rec.
No. 7581, Quirino Bolaños, et als., petitioners, versus J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al., respondents, which granted the petition of
Quirino Bolanos and ordered herein respondents-appellants (J.M. Tuason & co. ) their agents and all persons acting for the in their
behalf as well as all other from disturbing the physical possession of Bolanos of the parcel of land comprising of 13.26 hectares and
included in the area covered by TCT Nos. 37677 & 37686. The petition of Bolanos not to be disturbed in their physical possession
was upon the ground that in the three other civil cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said
court has rendered a decision, still pending appeal, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the two above-
mentioned titles have been derived null and void, principally for want of jurisdiction of the court that issued said original title on
account of defects in the publication of the notices of the proceedings for their registration.
In a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for the recovery of the possession of said land (Tuason vs. Bolaños, 93
Phil. 106), wherein appellees Bolanos had alleged among their defenses that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or
error and without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication to" said appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the
questioned titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant (now appellee Bolaños) to be without any right to the
land in question and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant) Tuason."

Issue:

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Whether or not the land registration court has jurisdiction to hear and to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the
original registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of possession has already been issued?

Ruling:

No. The appealed order of September 9, 1965 is declared to have been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo and it is
hereby declared null and void and set aside.
Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a corresponding decree has been issued, the only matter of possession of the
land involved that remains within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of possession,
if one should be needed. No provision of the Land Registration Act (Act 496). Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in
the said law empowering the land registration court to issue post or after-registration orders refers exclusively to amendments and
alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at all.

d. Enforcement of the Decree; Period for enforcement

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR

G.R. No. L-22110. September 28, 1968

FACTS:

On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the latter. On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-in-
interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the
latter. However, the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open
and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long before the World
War II, and have introduced improvements thereon. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied and
that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as
public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless."On June 13, 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree
in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the land registration case had already become final
and executory. Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons
who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of the order is proper.

RULING:

In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners' alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to
or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the
petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July
1, 1963 when the decree in question was issued. The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the
original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree. Furthermore, there is no
provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the
127
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the
clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONRDAY FARMS, INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ET AL.

161 SCRA 56

Facts:

Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3)
different entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Dev’t. and Financing Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty).
Thus, Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc.
(Macondray) for the declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the ground that the same was issued by a court
not sitting as a land registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge had no authority since the records which was
made basis of the title was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution;

In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes Court which issued its title was performing a purely ministerial
duty, and that it was Carpo’s title that was null for having been issued despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded
through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title covering the same subject properties;

In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al. being the source of its own title, praying therefor for the
reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties. However, the same was dismissed for QCDF’s lack of interest in
prosecuting the case;

On January 20, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment annulling Realty’s and QCDF’s titles to the property in favor of Carpo. The
same was appealed before the High Court by Realty, but the latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of
the merits; and

The CA in turn set aside the trial court’s decision and issued a new one in favor of Realty. However, the case was subjected to the
reorganization of the Judiciary, from which resulted a re-raffling of the case and later on, a reversal of the prior decision through
Carpo’s MR. Further, the change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices assigned to the case.

Issues:

1.Whether the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with jurisdiction to try and render a decision of final resolution for
the Court;

2. Whether a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the case;

3.Whether Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s , since Realty’s title was issued when the records relative thereto was
undergoing reconstitution;

4. Whether Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value; and

5. Whether QCDF was properly impleaded to the case.

Ruling:

1. Yes.“ A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class.
For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions. Justice Bidin was
reassigned from the Fourth

Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the
same class of divisions to which they were appointed. Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third
Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal bounds”

2. Yes. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be
reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme
Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have different
procedural requirements. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471
questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only
questions of law. However, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal. " It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as an appeal,
and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello
L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35). x x x Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be
passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners
brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of certiorari;

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3. No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action
but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the
Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the
basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final (See Government v.
Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De
Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of
Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of
this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of
registration.”;

4. No. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the
presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. x x x Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the
original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970.
However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the
Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13,
1970, that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the Original
Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. x x x Thus, at the time
of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value.
Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest;

5. Yes. Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally
defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the
factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.** To rule on
QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims over the property. After an, QCDFC
was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as testimonial
evidence. It was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.

e. The mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on May 3,1917. That is the reckoning date of
registration of the title. It may be also be acknowledged as appears on the title that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance od
the decree of registration on April 17, 1917 although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title when the title took
effect. OCT No. 994 is void and inexistent.

MANOTOK VS. BARQUE

G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605

Facts:

Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the
British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
The subject parcel “Lot No. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of
title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988
which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an
area of 342,945 square meters  GRANTED  TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the
name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s
duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
MANOTOK opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2
parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a
similar area of 342,945 square meters.
In 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED.  Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was
denied  They appealed to the LRA  LRA Reversed.
LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT
cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques
appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject
property.
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In 2002 and 2003  2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to
reconstitute the Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing” TCT No. 210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.December 12, 2005, SC
First Division  affirmed both decisions of the CA.  Manotoks filed MR  Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached.  Denied in June 2006 Resolution.
Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed
multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion
for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments).  Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in
intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No.
823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to
be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok
Title should be reverted to the state
Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
In 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CA’s Amended Decisions
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid
alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the
Maotoks should be annulled.
CA’s findings  None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands Act”. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual
allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants
revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks - Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land, built their houses and
buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques - Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans - The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the property
but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.

ISSUE:

Who has the better right over Lot No. 823?

Ruling:

Manotok Appeal denied

Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or
Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the
Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from
the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words “Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources”, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the
Secretary’s approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RD’s task in issuing the TCT in the Manotoks
name. The Manotoks contend that “we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department
Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok.” FURTHER, the
Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official duty, Department
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on
record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretary’s signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed
signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the
requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had
fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15 of the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, “the conveyance
executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject
only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of
friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from
Sections 11, 12 and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15, in relation to Section 18.

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 Re: Manotoks, could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the
Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no
moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of
Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only
copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As
to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as “DILAPIDATED” without
stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name
of registered owner.

Re: Manahans, No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or
National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by
Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his
successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION VS.CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 123346

Facts:

The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turnencompasses 1,342 hectares of
the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities withinMetropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty,
Inc. and Manotok EstateCorporatio
n (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLT’s claim was anchored on TransferCertificate of Title derived from
Estelita Hipolito. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson’s title,the proximate source of
CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derivedit from several
awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise tracedas its primary source OCT No. 994.The
trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.

Issue:

Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid.

Ruling:

It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—

that the properties they purport to coverwere " originally registered on 19
April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds ofRizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be
proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 hadactually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it
did not.The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking itshould establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that theland sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action
to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiffmust rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim.Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action
forannulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of theiroriginal complaints
before the trial court.As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds
on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of
inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into theOriginal Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when thetitle took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received
by theRegister of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917here is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the
certificate of title; the entryof the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is
madeby the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It wasstressed that what stands
as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made bythe registrar of deeds in the registry.Moreover, it is
only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title isto take effect.Hence, any title that traces
its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title isinexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific
reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubton the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This
error alone is, in fact, sufficient toinvalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the
datesappearing on their respective titles.The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on
remand.In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to makefurther
determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presentedat the proceedings before it.

The Piedad Estate is patrimonial property of the government, hence State property without prejudice to
reversion proceedings.

MANOTOK VS HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,

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G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605
AUGUST 24, 2010

Facts:

Lot No. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26,
1904. The Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the Government under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 and was
placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the
1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court
en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.
The Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511 covering the lot No 823.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc resolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division
and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA
and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks’ title.
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation
by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to
present evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
Issue:

Whether the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.

Ruling:

Yes, the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed
of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks’ predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.

“Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. Exhibits 33 and 34-OSG-LMB contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured
from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51-A) which likewise
lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides:
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis supplied.)

C. Post-Judgment incidents

a. Writ of Possession

i. The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration case but also against any one adversely
occupying the land during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree.

Vencilao vs. Vano

182 SCRA 491

Facts:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of land in question.
1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the subject parcel of land, which resulted in
an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the property, a reconveyance of property was filed against them by Vencila et al.,
asserting that:
a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance – and in OCEN possession for 30 years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan Reyes’ estate
2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owners/heirs of the land. After her death, a TCT was
issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial
court against petitioners.
3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who
refused to vacate the land and sign the Sheriff’s return.
The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance stating that the other parties had no cause of action and that they
were barred by prior judgement already.

132
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the same order, and then reversed itself partially (some cases were
dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners). The parties whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.
These petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their
names don’t appear in the amended application for registration. They argue that they have occupied the parcels of land for more than
30 years which began long before the application for registration and that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.

Issue/s:

-Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for reconveyance

-Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against them considering that the petitioners were not the defeated parties in the
registration case
Held:
1. No. Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings. A final judgment is
conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties and their successors-in-interest as long as the ff. requisites are present:
a. The former judgment must be final
b. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter and of the parties
c. The judgment was based on the merits
d. There is identity of parties, subj matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions (Land registration and action for
reconveyance)

2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against
anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance
of the final decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily
carries with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be obtained through writ of possession).
On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were not guilty. Contempt only applies when after the sheriff dispossess or
eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property. It was the sheriff’s and not the petitioners’ fault that there was delivery of
possession was unsuccessful.

ii. When unavailable. The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land after the issuance of the decree and who was
not a party in the case. He can only be proceeded against in a separate action for ejectment for reivindicatory action.

133
Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399
G.R. No. L-58438 & G.R. No. L-60423

FACTS:

Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa, represented by Silvestre Bellosillo, petitioners in G.R. No. 60423, filed a complaint
against defendants Edilberto Bernas, Baldonera Bulquirin and Teofilo Berano for recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare parcel of
land of the Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restore the plaintiffs to the possession of the land
in dispute. The motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction having been denied, the plaintiffs subsequently filed another
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that the same is paramount for the prevention of the estate represented by
Lot 3382, otherwise it will be dissipated and the plaintiffs as heirs might have nothing to inherit, while the defendants have not shown
any definite title or right over the estate as they had first claimed that they were lessees then later, tenants, which are two incompatible
and divergent sources of right.

On August 28, 1981, Judge Pelayo Nuevo granted the writ of possession applied for by plaintiffs after pre-trial and hearing of the
motion for the issuance of said writ. A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants but the same was not acted upon due to the
retirement of Judge Nuevo. Hence, the defendants filed the petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the sala vacated by Judge Nuevo was
filled through the appointment of Judge Oscar Leviste. While the petition assailing the order granting the writ of possession was
pending before this Court, Judge Leviste, on December 8, 1981, acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants
(Bernas) on September 12, 1981 and issued an order declaring null and void the writ of possession issued by former Judge Nuevo. In a
subsequent order dated April 20, 1982, the same Judge also ordered the defendants to be place in possession of the property in
question, Lot 3382. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed, this time by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Nuevo and Judge Leviste erred in granting the writ of possession filed by the parties.

Ruling:

The Court held that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought have been in possession of the land for at least ten years,
and they entered into possession apparently after the issuance of the final decree, and none of them had been a party in the registration
proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A person who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in
registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by a mere motion and that regardless of any
tittle or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court
in proper independent proceedings. In the case at bar, the defendants-petitioners had been in possession of the lot since 1960 under an
alleged lease contract and were not a party to the original registration case of the same way back in 1930. This notwithstanding, the
writ was issued after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the issuance of the writ only and not after final adjudication of the rights
of the parties over the lot in controversy. Therefore, it was a patent error on the part of respondent Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned
writ. The rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the property, claiming the right of possession, the owner of the
registered property or his successors in interest cannot dispossess such persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. The remedy
is to resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action, as the case
may be." The act of Judge Leviste issuing the orders constituted disrespect and disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
He should have waited for this Court's decision before acting on said motion for reconsideration and issuing the said orders.

iii. When issued as a matter of course

LUCERO V. LOOT
G.R. No. L-16995

Facts:

Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property (based on a final decree in a land registration proceeding).
Although the other party filed a motion to quash the writ, this was granted by CFI Iloilo’s Judge Fernan.

The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion was not
under oath. The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two motions for reconsideration were also denied. The writ of possession
prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero.

The Loots went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law.

Ruling:
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Yes, the order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated on a land registration case in 1938, which became
a final decree on October 29, 1941.
After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the
registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. This
automatic process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to
commence another action to secure possession.

Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession.The writ may be issued not only against the
person who has been defeated in a registration case, but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion of the land.
Even fraud shall not be a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession, which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the land.
As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing. These must be raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise, the
parties contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the opportunity to question the correctness of the findings.

iv. Against whom issued.

EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA AND SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, VS.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER
HUSBAND, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL
ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, AND PEDRO ALBANO, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF SALA I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. L-43445 JANUARY 20, 1988

Facts:

On July of 1941, a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino. However, the decree of
registration was not issued except until after 14yrs and only after 24 yrs had passed that an OCT was issued in favour of the latter.

On august of 1970(after the decree has been issued but before title), the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual (oppositors to the
cadastral proceeding) brought a suit againsts the children of Delfina Aquino, the appellees.

The appellants argued that they had been in possession of the said land since 1941 an rayed that a new title be made out in their
names. Parenthetically, it shows that the Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4sq.m. portion of adjoining land which belongs to Cesar
Castro. Subsequently, Castro filed a complaint of intervention to recover the said land.

A judgemtn has been rendered awarding the 4sw.m. portion of overlapped land to Castro and dismissing the complaint filed by the
Barroga’s and Padaca’s. Thereafter, at the instance of defendant Angel Albano, et. Al (heirs of Delfina Aquino), the court ordered
executon of judgemtn. However, the Barroga and Padaca’s moved to quash said writ, stating that there was nothing to execute since
the verdict was simply one of dismissing the complaint. The matter apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears
in the record. However, the record shows that on August of 1975 the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of
Angel albano et. Al. for a writ of possesson to the said land and was issued.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of judgment

Ruling:

On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that:

135
(1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or
his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;"

(2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding
and who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process therein but had not
appeared nor answered); and

(3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of
judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.

"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the
original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that
neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. to the
following effect:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of
the period for perfecting an appeal. ...

... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the
clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.

v. Until when available

JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-16995, OCTOBER 28, 1968

Facts:

The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero stating that the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued
the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner.
There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered,
it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner. This was
opposed to by oppositors Loot contending that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under
oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable. The court didn’t see any merit in the same. Consequently, a writ of
possession was issued.

Issue:

Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law.

Ruling:

A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in
a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings. The issuance
of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying
said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it
is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by the successful claimant.

If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of

the possession of the land to the successful litigant, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that the
latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of execution would be ineffective.

136
vi. A person who took possession of a parcel of land after final adjudication of the same in registration proceedings cannot be
summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by mere motion.

b. Writ of Demolirion

JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-16995 OCTOBER 28, 1968

Facts:

The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This was
opposed to by oppositors Loot, but the court didn’t see any merit in the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed three
times, however it was all denied. Then an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not there is prescription with regard to the issuance of a writ of possession.

Ruling::

Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if
nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of
the registered owner.

In Demorar v. Ibañez it was decided that: ".. a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings
... The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings.
Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be
subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked
for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact, in a 1948 decision, it was held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have
instituted, more than one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of First Instance
attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the
registered owners."

Moreover, in Marcelo vs Mencias it was held that “If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of
the possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering
that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of execution would be ineffective”.

137
i. Aspects of Writ of Posession and Demolition

ii. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession and may be issued by a special order of the court.

EMILLANO GAWARAN, MAGDALENA GAWARAN ET AL, VS. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, HON. ALEJANDRO C. SILAPAN,
[G.R. NO. L-72721 JUNE 16, 1988]

Facts:

Petitioners oppose the application for registration and confirmation of title over Lot 2, PSU-173975 situated in Digman, Bacoor,
Cavite, on which petitioners had their residential house and a "camarin." The trial court awarded the lot to the petitioners. The
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court and confirmed the ownership of said Lot
No. 2 in the names of private respondents. On motion of private respondents, the respondent Regional Trial Court, on March 19, 1985,
issued the questioned writ of possession with the complimentary directive for the oppositors to dismantle and remove their building
and/or structure from Lot No. 2 under pain of demolition and to vacate the premises in favor of private respondents within thirty (30)
days. The petitioners appealed but the petition was dismissed, and an order for the issuance of a decree in favor of private respondents
was issued.

Issue:

Whether or not the court is correct in issuing the writ of possession with a special order of demolition.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the respondent appellate court committed no reversible error in holding that the writ of possession issued
by the trial court and it is a necessary consequence of the adjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title. In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name
necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. Hence, a writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case, but also against any one unlawfully
and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. It is
the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful party.

138
c. In lieu of demolition, award of damages proper

AYALA CORPORATION vs. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

294 SCRA 48
FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (AYALA) is the owner of the Ayala estate located in Makati City. The said estate was originally a raw
land which was subdivided for sale into different lots devoted for residential, commercial and industrial purposes.
On March 20, 1984, Karamfil Import-Export Company Ltd. (KARAMFIL) bought from AYALA a piece of land identified as Lot 26,
Block 2 consisting of 1,188 square meters, located at what is now known as H.V. de la Costa Street, Salcedo Village, Makati
City. The said land is now the subject of this case. The transaction was documented in a Deed of Sale of even date, which provides,
among others, that the vendee would comply with certain special conditions and restrictions on the use or occupancy of the land.
On February 18, 1988, KARAMFIL sold the lot to Palmcrest Development and Realty Corporation (PALMCREST) under a Deed of
Absolute Sale of even date. AYALA gave its written conformity to the sale but reflecting in its approval the same special
conditions/restrictions as in the previous sale.
PALMCREST in turn sold the lot to Ray Burton Development Corporation (RBDC), now respondent, on April 11, 1988, with the
agreement that AYALA retains possession of the Owner’s Duplicate copy of the title until a building is erected on said parcel of land
in accordance with the requirements and/or restrictions of AYALA. As in the KARAMFIL-PALMCREST transaction, AYALA gave
its conformity to the sale, subject to RBDC’s compliance with the special conditions/restrictions which were annotated in the deed of
sale.
Sometime in June of 1989, RBDC submitted to AYALA for approval a set of architectural plans for the construction of a 5-
storey office building on the subject lot. The building was to be known as “Trafalgar Tower” but later renamed “Trafalgar Plaza.”
Since the building was well within the 42-meter height restriction, AYALA approved the architectural plans.
Early in June of 1990, RBDC made another set of building plans for “Trafalgar Plaza” and submitted the same for approval, this time
to the Building Official of the Makati City Engineer’s Office, not to AYALA. In these plans, the building was to be 26-storey high, or
a height of 98.60 meters, with a total gross floor area of 28,600 square meters. After having obtained the necessary building permits
from the City Engineer’s Office, RBDC began to construct “Trafalgar Plaza” in accordance with these new plans.
ISSUE:
Whether or not award of damages is proper, in lieu of demolition.
RULING:
YES.
In sum, there is more than ample evidence on record pinpointing RBDC’s violation of the applicable FAR restrictions in the
Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDRs) when it constructed the 27-storey Trafalgar Plaza. The prayer of petitioner is
that judgment be rendered, among others, ordering Ray Burton to comply with its contractual obligations in the construction of
‘Trafalgar Plaza’ by removing or demolishing the portions of areas thereof constructed beyond or in excess of the approved height, as
shown by the building plans submitted to, and approved by, Ayala, including any other portion of the building constructed not in
accordance with the said building plans.However, the record reveals that construction of Trafalgar Plaza began in 1990, and a
certificate of completion thereof was issued by the Makati City Engineer’s Office per ocular inspection on November 7, 1996.
Apparently Trafalgar Plaza has been fully built, and we assume, is now fully tenanted. The alternative prayers of petitioner under the
CRDRs, i.e., the demolition of excessively built space or to permanently restrict the use thereof, are no longer feasible.Thus, we
perforce instead rule that RBDC may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligations – the payment of
damages. Ray Burton Development Corporation acted in bad faith in constructing Trafalgar Plaza in excess of the applicable
restrictions upon a double submission of plans and exercising deceit upon both AYALA and the Makati Engineer's Office, and thus by
way of example and correction, should be held liable to pay AYALA exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00.
CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Basic concepts
139
 a. Nature of Proceedings

VDA.DE BARROGA VS ALBANO

G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988

Facts:

In Cadastral Proceeding of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in
default. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the
appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and
it was only after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was
issued in Delfina Aquino's name. On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in
Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in
the same Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. Said appellants
alleged that they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof;
and they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them,
and that a new title be made out in their names. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's
complaint.

Issue:

What is the nature of the cadastral proceedings.

Ruling:

The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot
No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership
over the property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had
been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the
title to the thing." It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto,and
particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had
intervened therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity

b. Jurisdiction not limited to adjudicating ownership to claimants; if there are no claimants, land is declared public

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, JUDGE, CFI,
BATAAN, BRANCH I, AND THELMA TANALEGA

G.R. No. L-35779

Facts:

G.R. No. L-35778:

On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1)
parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less. On July 7,
140
1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan. On
July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land
applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation. Records show that in the
hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for,
having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that
about 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon;
that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was
continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.

G.R. No. L-35779:

On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance
of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506
square meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre,
covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively. At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant
Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner
since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner
since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed
the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now
respondents herein.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act
496 and that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been
subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

Ruling:

The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order. In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any
interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return
day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2)
Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the
lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need
state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known,
during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall
set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their
last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence
of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to
substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective
claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision
had already become final and conclusive.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same
issues already determined by final judgment. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the
entire area in question during the period required by law.

WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be,
as they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO
ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 81401

Facts:

141
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942
while Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, Jose,
Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo,
Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose
died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners. On October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. In
1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and claimed them as owner thereof. On August 2, 1950, the spouses
executed another deed of donation inter vivos, disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. On January 12, 1972, Virginia,
together with her children, filed with the cadastral court an application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
and 8131. Pedro and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them was
entitled to one-third thereof.

The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law on intestate succession. Virginia
and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership.

Ruling:

We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. It is not amiss to state
likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court
commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to
defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be
unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.

The evidence for Virginia et al. does not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in
1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of
enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not
controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The fact finally that Virginia,
et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had
made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we cannot validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by
way of prescription.

The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes

irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of
ingratitude.

i. No jurisdiction to adjudicate lands already covered by a certificate of title. BUT, the jurisdiction of a court in cadastral cases
over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands. AND
resolve overlapping claims.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91797

Facts:

Widora filed LRC Case before the respondent (trial) court an application for registration of title of a parcel of land alleging that the
parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. However petitioner Ortigas filed
a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case. The respondent court issued an order
directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of
titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case for hearing. This motion to dismiss was denied.
Respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment
of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders and ordered to dismiss the land registration case. On November 27, 1989, respondent
court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed granting the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas
& Company Limited Partnership. WIDORA argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and
77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which
is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds of
Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the validity of the TCT NOs. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a
supporting decree of registration.

Held:
142
 Yes. The unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the land
included in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and conform with, the technical description found in OCT
351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That function is properly lodged with
the office of the trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits. It is
before the land registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in
its favor.Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the
subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la
Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of
land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null
and void.

PAMINTUAN VS SAN AGUSTIN

G.R. No. L-17943

Facts:
On April 19, 1917, lot No. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino Pamintuan, the petitioner herein, by the CFI of Pampanga, and that
certificate of title No. 540 covering the said lot was thereupon issued to him in June, 1918. Cadastral case No. 132 was instituted.
Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of the cadastral case, and the CFI in a decision dated April 29, 1919,
awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes, Maria, Mercedes, Rose and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of
title No. 540. Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the adjudication of the land until the clerk of the CFI of Pampanga required
him to surrender his certificate of title for cancellation. He then presented a motion to the court asking that the decision of the court in
the cadastral case be set aside and that the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.
Issue:
Whether or not the court exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to decree in a cadastral case land already decreed in another land
registration case.

Held:
The court exceeded its jurisdiction. Cadastral proceedings are authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259. What is understood by
"settlement and adjudication" is very clearly indicated in section 11 of the Act: SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any
convinient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing
and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in
the Court of Land Registration, and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the
same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated by the
court and decrees awarded in favor of the person entitle to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall
be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons, which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on
application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of
said Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act,
and to the titles and certificate of title granted or issued hereunder.In cadastral case, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided, such corrections, do not
impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.

GABRIEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-26348

Facts:
In 1916, the subject land located in Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742, with an area of 2,729,712
square meters was subsequently amended because it was found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of
Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu-
9742 was amended with an area of 2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The OCT No. 1264 issued in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced area. A cadastral survey was also made and the land of Gabriel,
covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433 square meters, or a further reduction by
339,847 square meters. No new certificate of title was issued. Accordingly the partition of the estate of Gabriel by his heirs was based
on plan Psu-9742 Amd. instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square meters.

Issue:
Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform
to the correct area.

Held:
In cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. In this case, the lower court merely corrected the error in the
technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557
of the Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description thereof.

i. Limitations: On right of claimant; and on the power of the court to order reopening of proceedings.

CITY OF BAGUlO vs. MARCOS

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 G.R. No. L-26100

Facts:
In 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, in the
CFI of Baguio, as to the parcel of land he claims. The subject land was among those declared public lands by final decision rendered
in the November 13, 1922 case. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners
Francisco Joaquin, Sr., Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. They claimed themselves
as farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favour. On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise
opposed the reopening.

Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes

Held:
The title of RA 931 authorizes the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act.
The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. There thus
appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. RA 931 claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those
parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act.
B. Order for speedy settlement and adjudication
C. Petition for Registration
D. Answer
a. Who may file answer; Form and contents of answer; When to file answer.
b. When motion to dismiss is proper; applicability of Rules of Court.

i. Motion to dismiss proper if cadastral proceedings involve land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public
land patent; applicability of Rules of Court.

JOSE O. DURAN vs. BERNABE OLIVIA

G.R. No. L-16589

Facts:

An application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots was filed by Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran .On April
20, 1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. Four years after, the
oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots
respectively claimed by them. The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do
not appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application
even though the lots subject matter thereof are already covered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the
oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the application with respect to particular lots upon mere assertion that these lots are covered by
certificates of title based merely upon the granted public land patents is correct.

Ruling:

Yes, the motion to dismiss is proper in cadastral proceedings which involve land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
public land patent.The appellants’ claim that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering private
land is null and void as well as the claim that the lower court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration
proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by certificates of title are without merit. The primary and fundamental
purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated
in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead
patent once registered under the Land Registration Act cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued
thereon is null and void. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new title which the
cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to make
correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned
by two or more co-owners. As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes

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indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the
same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents.

ii. Motion to dismiss proper on the ground of res judicata; applicable to cadastral and ordinary land registration
proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines vs CA

99 SCRA 651

FACTS:

Petitioner relates Supreme Court’s decision in Valdehueza v. Republic and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v.
Republic. In Valdehueza v. Republic, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of expropriation of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City,
and ruled that therein petitioners, Francisca Valdehueza, et al., were not entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand
its fair market value. In Yu v. Republic, the Court of Appeals annulled the subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca
Valdehueza, respondents, Ramon Yu, and held that the latter were not purchasers in good faith. The parties did not appeal the
decision and so, judgment became final and executory. Respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated
property. Republic of thePhilippines, denied respondents’ right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUES:

Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to reversion of the expropriated property?

RULING:

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In
the present case, the first three elements are present. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Considering that the sale on which
respondents based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have no
legal personality to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the
complaint evidently states no cause of action. Consequently, the second issue is now mooted and made academic by our
determination of res judicata in this case.

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 E. Hearing

F. Judgment
a. How and when appeal taken.

HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD L. DIOCTON vs.THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A.

MONSANTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the HEIRS
OF ISABEL YBOA, represented by Tito V. Tizon

FACTS:

The lot is contested by petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada, on and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa. Said predecessors-in-
interest had filed their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in June, 1932. Labrada had already been in continuous
possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when he filed his answer in 1932; and that he continued his possession until
1943 when he died. His son succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his demise, Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the
possession of said land until he himself died in 1976; and possession of the property in issue was passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who
until the present are still in possession. None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in possession of any portion of the questioned lot. Petitioners
had moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct Court of First Instance of Samar. The conflicting parties presented
both their oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the lot. Respondent regional trial court rendered its
decision in favor of respondents-claimants. An appeal was filed by the petitioners. After a month respondents-claimants filed their
motion for the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a record on
appeal. Respondent court granted respondents' motion. The decree for the registration was accordingly ordered by respondent court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a record on appeal.

RULING:

Petitioners' appeal must be given due course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were
prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. The Court provided for specific exceptions with respect
to "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court," wherein multiple appeals at different stages of
the case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b)
determination of the lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in
whole or in part, of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) the
settlement of the accounts of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person or the administration of a trustee or
guardian; and (f) the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since the original record has to remain with
the probate court in connection with the other various pending matters, a party appealing from a specific order is required to file the
corresponding record on appeal. Petition is granted. Dispensing with briefs or memoranda, judgment is rendered (a) setting aside the
questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling any
certificate of title which may have been issued to respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court to give due course to
petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records of the case
pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary evidence.

b. Effect of decision or judgment.

FIDEL SILVESTRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RUFINO DIMSON

Facts:
Both private petitioner Fidel Silvestre and petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources seek the reversal of the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent Rufino Dimson declaring null and void Homestead Patent No. 72493 and Original Certificate of Title No. 292, granted by
petitioner Secretary in favor of petitioner Fidel Silvestre and instead rendered judgment in favor od Dimson.

In 1956, Petitioner Silvestre filed for a homestead application for a parcel of land he has been occupying since 1927 in Hermosa,
Bataan. In December 1956, he was issued a Torrens title. He began paying realty taxes thereon in 1957.

In 1959, Respondent Dimson filed for an adverse claim over the same parcel of land. Claiming that the land could not be the subject of
homestead patent as it was already a private property even before World War II. Dimson, who also owns the lots adjoining
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 the disputed property, argued that the land was actually adjudicated to spouses Batungbakal through a cadastral proceeding; that in
1927, Batungbakal, through a “Compromiso de Venta” conveyed ownership to Dimson; that Dimson has paid realty taxes; and that
title was never issued in his name because of the outbreak of war.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “Compromiso de Venta” entered into by Batungbakal and Dimson conveyed ownership to Dimson.

Held:
The alleged execution in 1927 of the Escritura of “Compromiso de Venta” in favor of Dimson by the Batungbakal spouses was not
tantamount to “possession”. First of all, there was only an allegation that a Compromiso was established. But even if there actually
was a Compromiso, Dimson should have made actual possession. If Dimson had been in possession, then he could have first asserted
his alleged ownership and possession and waited for Silvestre to controvert his possession and seek recovery of the land, instead of
belatedly suing to annul Silvestre’s Torrens title and to recover actual damages.

This is further bolstered by the fact that Dimson started paying taxes on the land only in 1958 apparently in preparation for his suit
contrary to his allegation in his complaint that he had allegedly paid all the real estate taxes thereon before World War II, considering
that no evidence was presented by him to prove his allegation.
Dimson also failed to show that the Batungbakal spouses his predecessors-in-interest were the actual owner of the disputed land. He
said that Batungbakal acquired the property through a cadastral proceeding but he never showed any proof of such decree granting
Batungbakal title over the disputed land.

In this regard, assuming that there was a transaction between Dimson and Batungbakal, the property could not have been conveyed in
favor of Dimson due to the fact that Batungbakal was not the owner of the land in dispute.

Petition granted.

c. When judgment declares land applied for is public land.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANDRES REYES, MARIANO V. AGCAOILI and DELFIN FL.
BATACAN.

Facts:

The land in dispute is Lot No. 1736, a large tract of agricultural land in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been occupied
since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant, Vicente Rodriguez, who, filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which was
rejected upon investigation that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation.Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez
in 1924, possession of the property was taken over by his three sons, the two waived their share in favor of petitioner Arturo
Rodriguez. Thereafter, Arturo sold two-thirds portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara.In 1953, the land in
question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement.In 1965,
Arturo Rodriguez together with Reyes and Alcantara filed a petition for registration of their title to Lot No. 1736 on the ground of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for more than 30 years. Thirty-nine persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed
their Opposition to the petition for registration contending, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession
of portions of Lot No. 1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced improvements thereon.The Director of Lands likewise filed
his opposition alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the land applied for, as
they have not been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application. The trial court ruled in favor of the applicants. Canaria filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Director of Lands filed for a motion to dismiss or for reconsideration alleging that the present petition for registration was
intended to reopen Cadastral Case No. 15, L.R.C. Record No. 1021, wherein a cadastral court already declared Lot 1736 as public
land; and that a decision in a cadastral case constitutes res judicata. The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their

147
 title. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court but subsequently reversed its decision upon motion by respondents contending that
the cadastral case constitutes res judicata.

Issue:

Whether or not the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper cadastral proceeding declaring that the lot in question as public
land constitute res judicata, as such, a bar to the present application by subsequent possessors for registration of title or confirmation
of imperfect title over the same parcel of land.

Held:

Res Judicata does not apply. When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the land in question was
still classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. On this basis, the
Court finds that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land
registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in question since the same would nevertheless have been
denied because during the pendency of the cadastral case, said land was not alienable nor disposable as was shown by the denial of the
lease application filed then by private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. A decision in cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public
land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel
of land is public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land,
provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public land remains alienable and disposable. But while the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the
registration proceedings instituted by private respondents in 1965, the chronology of events in the case at bar clearly negates
compliance by private respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession requirement. As such there is not claim for an imperfect
title. Petition granted.

d. Effect of failure to appeal.

DE LA MERCED V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claims ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral
court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named
defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956. Defendants asserted their ownership over
said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931
and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.

1.) By virtue of the final decision dated December 26, 1923, Santos'
title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;
2.) The same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and
directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos.
Although no such certificate was actually issued;
3.) On December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result
of which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on
October 10, 1931;
4.) Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land which
included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
5.) That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.

Respondents predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931
in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931, contending
that the decision of December 26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no decree
issued pursuant thereto.

Issue:
What is the effect of failure to appeal the decision of a cadastral court proceeding within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy
of the decision?

Held:
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies. In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in
the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished. (But in the other way, the land had become private land.)With
respect to the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abural, said:-After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of
one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief
of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is
taken from the decision. The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted
"for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land." The judgment in a cadastral survey,
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 including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of
title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief
Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical
description.As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of
the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating
ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as
of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud.Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner
upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal
having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition
of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary. As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering
the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicatingownership to him of
the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of
ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree.

e.Court’s power to set aside judgment and readjudicate land.

CAYANAN VS. DE LOS SANTOS

21 SCRA 1348

FACTS:

On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding
alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August
8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent, Felix L.
Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of
the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now
appellant Cayanan and others.

This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case,
as admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be
favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with section
38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and
that Felix L. Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a
simple petition, like the one at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?

HELD:

The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been held that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after
hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."

"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38
of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree."

As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:

Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in
the cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
after the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."

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Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with
the law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."

Valmonte v. Nable,: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Within this period of one year the decree may
be reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set aside and the land adjudicated to another party. As long as the final
decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."

Capio v. Capio,: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party."

FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA VS.NARCISO DE GUZMAN, ET AL.

Facts:
Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, by virtue of a donation which he failed to accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil
Code but was dismissed.

After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another action against the same defendants for ejectment. This second action
was dismissed, on the ground that the title to the tract of land from which he sought to eject the defendants might well be litigated in
the cadastral case then pending in the same court which included the tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by both the plaintiff
and the defendants, the court of first instance being of the opinion that, should title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the
name of the plaintiff, the latter could bring an action against the defendants for damages. From this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did
not appeal.

The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court for ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous cases ,
or their successors-in-interest, including new or additional defendants who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case, which lie
within the area of the tract of land claimed by the plaintiff, and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the tract of land from
which he had sought defendants' ejectment in the two previous cases; for the possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by
the defendants; for the recovery of damages from each and every one of the defendants, amounting all in all to P40,000 and costs; and
for general relief.

Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its dismissal, on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action; and (2)
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. On 18 June 1946, acting upon the motion to dismiss
filed by the defendants, the trial court sustained the second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without costs.

Issue:

Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages

Ruling:
No. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages, for its power is confined to the determination as to whether the
claimants are really entitled to the lost, as alleged in their answers; and, after finding that they are, to the confirmation of their title to,
and registration of, the lots in their name. In the present action for ejectment, not only does the plaintiff seek to have a judicial
pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also to recover
damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may
issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff. Where there is a case
for ejectment between parties who, one against the other, claim the same parcel of land or lot in a cadastral case, it has been customary
or the practice of courts to hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is
litigated and to render a decision in both cases in its double role, as court of first instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court
of limited jurisdiction.

Medina vs Valdellon

Facts:

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The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises
Bernal, who are the plaintiffs in this case, are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an
assessed value of P800.00.The defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs and were allowed to remain in the premises and to
construct their residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand. On
demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question. Because of said
defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation; the reasonable
value of the use of the premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its commercial value; and prayed that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to
the plaintiffs. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint because another case pending between the same parties over the
same property, namely Land Registration Case. The plaintiffs moved for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages.

Ruling:

No. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration court has a limited and special
jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration,
and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership.

G. Decree in Cadastral Registration Proceedings

a. When adjudication in cadastral case becomes final

CAYANAN V.DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. L-21150

Facts:

On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding
alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August
8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent,
appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of
petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.

This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case,
as admitted by the petitioners, even [if] the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be
favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. [Camaya] in accordance with
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for
value and that Felix L. [Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action
and not in a simple petition, like the one at bar."

Issue:

When will adjudication in cadastral case becomes final?

Ruling:
"It may be stated that we find had no case squarely ruling on this particular point. The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded
by Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that the petition must be
filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that
acts on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case
does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final
decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree
and adjudicate the land to another."

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Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and
granted the said decree."

H. Reopening of Decree no longer allowed. Courts are without jurisdiction or authority to reopen a cadastral proceeding
since December 31, 1968.

REPUBLIC V. ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-35512

Facts:

The parties in this case contest the ownership of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Valencia, Ormoc City. Herein petitioners maintain
that the land is public land by virtue of a 1940 cadastral court decision. Private respondents meanwhile take the opposite view
claiming the land as their own based on their purchase thereof from the original claimant, Apolonia Parrilla, and its subsequent
adjudication in their favor in 1972.

On October 31, 1940, a decision was rendered by the Cadastral Court declaring Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land.
Thirty-two years later, more specifically on January 12,1972, Felipe Adolfo and Francisca Padilla, hereinafter referred to as the
SPOUSES, filed a petition docketed as Cadastral Case No. 34, GLRO Rec. No. 1789 seeking to "re-open the October 31, 1940
decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act No. 931, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2061 and further amended by Rep. Act No.
6236" [Petition, Annex "B," Rollo, p. 9]. The SPOUSES, claiming to be the owners of Lot No. 8423 by virtue of having purchased the
same in 1948 as evidenced by a Deed of Quitclaim and Confirmation dated August 28, 1969, likewise allege that due to the excusable
negligence, accident or mistake of the previous claimant and her counsel, the land was declared public land; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the land and have declared the same for
purposes of taxation in their name(s); that Lot No. 8423 has not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise disposed of
either provisionally or permanently by the government or its entity; and that up to the filing of the petition, they and their predecessor-
in-interest have not applied for any homestead, free patent, lease or sale, over the parcel of land under Public Land Act No. 141.
Despite the opposition of the Director of Lands respondent Judge granted the SPOUSES' petition on May 9, 1972. Hence, Lot No.
8423 was adjudicated in their favor.

The Republic and the Director of Lands now assail that decision by way of appeal by certiorari.

Issue:

Is the petitioners' stance that the lower court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition to re-open the cadastral
proceedings is premised on their argument that spouses' petition is barred by the expiration of the period for re-opening of cadastral
proceedings under Rep. Act No. 931 correct?

Ruling:

Yes. The argument of the petitioners is impressed with merit. Rep. Act No. 931 section 1 provides:
All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the
time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty year next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years after the date on which this Act shall take
effect, to petition for a re-opening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and
fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government . . .

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This law took effect on June 20, 1953, hence, the period for reopening cadastral proceedings expired on June 20, 1958. However, Rep.
Act No. 2061 section 2 extended this period until December 31, 1968, after which there had been no further extension. [Republic v.
Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35780, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 220].

In the case at bar, the SPOUSES filed their petition more than three years after the lapse of the reglementary period required by the
law. The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction when he entertained SPOUSES' petition to re-open the
decision of the cadastral court.

Transactions pending original registration

A.
B. Land may be registered in favor of a total stranger.

MENDOZA VS CA, 84 SCRA 67

Facts:

Petitioner filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. During the pendency of the
application, petitioner sold the subject land to the private respondents, subject to usufructuary rights of the petitioner. The land
registration court issued a decision ordering the registration of subject land in favor of private respondents. The decision of the land
registration court became final and a decree was issued confirming title in the name of private respondents. An original certificate of
title was then issued to the private respondents.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration praying for the setting aside of the decision of the land registration court and
the cancellation of the OCT issued in favor of private respondents on the ground of failure of the respondents to pay the purchase
price.

The land registration court decided in favor of the petitioner on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of
the lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the application for registration.

The CA reversed the decision of the Land registration court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of title in favor of private respondents, who were neither applicants nor oppositors, was proper?

Ruling:

Yes.

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Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration
proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the
interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.

The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been
conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings.

The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.

Certificate of Title

A. Preparation of Certificate of Title

a. Statement of personal circumstances
b. Entry of Original Certificate of Title
c. The Owner’s Certificate of Title
d. Registration Book
e. Transfer of Certificate of Title
i. Co-owned land: All co-owner’s duplicates must be surrendered

BALBIN VS RD
28 SCRA 12

Facts:

Petitioners presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title and an instrument entitled
"Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated, one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in the OCT, appears to have donated inter-vivos an
undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners.

The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law” as it appears that
previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land
earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The final part of the annotations stated that three co-owner's
duplicate certificates of title have been issued in favor or 3 buyers.

The commissioner of land registration upheld the decision of the register of deeds.

Issue:

Whether the decision of the Register of Deeds in refusing the request for annotation of donation proper?

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 55 obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner
himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register
of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration.

It is essential that all the duplicate copies of the title be presented before annotations are entered. There being several copies of the
same title in existence, in the case at bar, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an
outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a

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duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones,
affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole
system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

ii. Previous adjudication

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

83 SCRA 453

Facts:

Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots.
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will. Republic further alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and Company"; that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni; that
TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it.
Respondent de Ocampo averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation dated
November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. Respondent Anglo intervened having allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de
Ocampo.
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools initiated a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo. On
appeal, the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint.
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same two parcels of land. On May 2, 1961, Republic,
represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the CFI of Negros Occidental for the recovery of
possession of the subject lots.
After a joint trial of the cases, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint and adjudged the registration of the subject two lots
in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo.
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13, 1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However,
Republic later filed with the trial court, a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding. The trial
court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof.
September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary
Injunction. Republic contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower
court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in his name and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree
again the registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same
lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company.
The trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition against Republic. From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. Hence, an appeal by certiorari was filed by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919.

Ruling:

The trial court made an express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo, acknowledged before
one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial book and the Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise
issued a certification, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never declared in the name of Mosquera. His later certification states
that the said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands
records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and Company.
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void.
If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the
decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view

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of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots
Nos. 817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on
its merits Republic's appeal.

iii. Defective title v unblemished title

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105027 April 22, 1994

Facts:

The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated.
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the subject properties, three civil suits for quieting of title were
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the OCT in B.E. San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana Food
Corporation's title emanated from an OCT issued more than thirty-nine years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original
certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession
in concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two
parcels. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's
titled property is described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's property is situated in Barrio Niog.
Plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of
Juan Cuenca.

The respondent court decided in favor of the private respondent, B.E. San Diego, Inc. It rejected petitioners' titles because the
appellees (petitioners) titles state that the properties are located in the barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are
situated in the Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, it found the titles of private respondent unblemished by any defect. Petitioners assail the Decision in this petition
for review on certiorari as having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower
court to uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent.

Ruling:

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We find no compelling reason to reverse this ruling. The defects appearing on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too glaring to
escape the naked eye.
The title of the appellant's predecessors-in-interest showed that the land acquired by the appellant and for which title was issued in the
appellant's name was described in said title as being located in Barrio Niog, while the appellees' title described the property covered
by their title as located in Barrio Talaba. But appellees claim a parcel of land that is located in Barrio Niog. These two barrios of the
town of Bacoor, Cavite, are located poles apart and were never one and the same town in the history of the province. The appellees are
claiming property not located in the barrio as described in the technical description.
With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the sanctity given to torrens title.
In pointing out the discrepancies in petitioners' titles, the respondent court was simply stressing that these titles cannot be upheld
against the unblemished titles of the private respondent.

The petition for review is DISMISSED there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court.

iv. Overlapping Titles

Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp vs. Eridanus Dev’t Inc.

GR No. 152445 July 4, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square meter lot, covered by TCT. Respondent ERIDANUS is the
registered owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT. The foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in
Barangay Valencia, Quezon City, and constitute the subject matter of the present controversy.

On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to enjoin CAMBRIDGE from pursuing the planned subdivision and
development of its property, which ERIDANUS claims encroached upon its own.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE OVERLAP AND ENCROACHMENT OF PETITIONER’S
PROPERTY ON RESPONDENTS’ PROPERTIES.

Ruling:

The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of
the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to
determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.

The appellate court, however, found that there is an encroachment, and the cause thereof may be traced to a change in the technical
description of the petitioner’s title (which was derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November 10, 1920
Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the CAMBRIDGE property from “S.21’deg.56’55”E” in TCT 578 to “N.25
deg. 07’W” in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of respondents’ properties. This has not been sufficiently shown by
respondents’ evidence to be the cause of the overlap. Respondents’ key witness Nerit does not believe that the CAMBRIDGE title was
a derivative of TCT 578, because there is nothing in the title thereof which indicates that it was derived from the latter; he was
ambivalent, if not ambiguous, and definitely far from categorical, in this respect. State surveyor De Lara’s testimony and Report –
inconclusive and incomplete as it is – does not help or indicate any. Likewise, a thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has
no similar boundary and bearings with the CAMBRIDGE title. Finally, the CAMBRIDGE title explicitly declares that it is derived
from TCT No. 363717/T-1823, and not TCT 578.

Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE title is a derivative of TCT 578, the conclusion that a change in
the technical description of the former – as compared to that of the latter – is the reason for the overlap, simply does not follow. The
appellate court is in clear error.
Finally, we agree with the trial court’s observation that the continuous presence of the old adobe wall diminishes the case for the
respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall became an ungainly sight for respondents. Previous owners of what now constitutes the
respondents’ respective lots did not complain of its presence. The wall appears to have been built in the 1960s, and yet the Madrigals
(SUSANA title owners) did not complain about it; if they did, Nerit would have known and testified to the same since he was
responsible for the subdivision of the lot. Only respondents complain about it now. In one overlapping of boundaries case, the Court
held that a land owner may not now claim that his property has been encroached upon when his predecessor did not register any
objections at the time the monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached area; nor did the latter make any move to question
the placement of said monuments at the time. In every land dispute, the aim of the courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain
inviolate the Torrens system of land registration, as well as to uphold the law; a resolution of the parties’ dispute is merely a necessary

157
consequence. Taking this to mind, we cannot grant the respondents’ prayer without violating the very principles of the Torrens
system. They have failed to lay the proper foundation for their claim of overlap. This is precisely the reason why the trial court
should have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the parties: so
that a thorough investigation, study and analysis of the parties’ titles could be made in order to provide, in a comprehensive report, the
necessary information that will guide it in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the determination of the case to a
consideration of the parties’ more often than not self-serving evidence.

C. Effect of Issuance of Title

a. Certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; neither can it be used to perpetuate fraud

PAGADUAN v OCUMA
GR No. 176308 May 8, 2009

Facts:

The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that originally belonged to Nicolas Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of Title
(C.T.) No. 14. The big parcel of land was the subject of two separate lines of dispositions. The first line of dispositions began with the
sale by Cleto to Antonio Cereso on May 11, 1925. Cereso in turn sold the land to the siblings with the surname Antipolo on September
23, 1943. The Antipolos sold the property to Agaton Pagaduan, father of petitioners, on March 24, 1961. All the dispositions in this
line were not registered and did not result in the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the purchasers.
On November 26, 1961, Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral deed of sale where she sold the northern portion with an area of 32,325
square meters to respondents for P1,500.00 and the southern portion consisting of 8,754 square meters to Agaton Pagaduan for
P500.00. Later, on June 5, 1962, Eugenia executed another deed of sale, this time conveying the entire parcel of land, including the
southern portion, in respondent’s favor.
On July 26, 1989, petitioners instituted a complaint for reconveyance of the southern portion with an area of 8,754 square meters, with
damages, against respondents before the RTC of Olongapo City.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the southern portion in the name of respondents had created an implied trust
in favor of Agaton Pagaduan, petitioners, however, failed to show that they had taken possession of the said portion. Hence, the
appellate court concluded that prescription had set in, thereby precluding petitioners’ recovery of the disputed portion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual fraud is committed

RULING:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The property in question did not come from the petitioners.
In fact that property came from Eugenia Reyes. The title of the Ocumas can be traced back from Eugenia Reyes to Ruperta Asuncion
to the original owner Nicolas Cleto. Thus, if the respondents are holding the property in trust for anyone, it would be Eugenia Reyes
and not the petitioners. In the instant case, none of the elements of actual or constructive fraud exists. The respondents did not deceive

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Agaton Pagaduan to induce the latter to part with the ownership or deliver the possession of the property to them. Moreover, no
fiduciary relations existed between the two parties.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence
thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton Pagaduan and a second sale by Eugenia Reyes to the respondents. For a
second buyer like the respondents to successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil Code, it must possess good
faith from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same. Respondents sorely failed to meet this requirement of good
faith since they had actual knowledge of Eugenia’s prior sale of the southern portion property to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to
good faith. This cannot be denied by respondents since in the same deed of sale that Eugenia sold them the northern portion to the
respondents for P1,500.00, Eugenia also sold the southern portion of the land to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.

b. Registration as an operative act bringing the land

ROXAS vs.DINGLASAN
G.R. No. L-27234 May 30, 1969

Facts:

Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Lipa City. On June 11, 1959, she sold it to Francisca Mojica and
Victoria Dinglasan with different sizes in areas. Long before and at the time of the sales, Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan
were in possession of the Lot. The vendor's Certificate of Title No. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it was in the
possession of another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.

Pedro Dinglasan, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125 in the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-10392 issued in his name by falsifying a public document of conveyance. He subsequently mortgaged the lot
to Leonora T. Roxas as security for a loan. Roxas, instituted the instant foreclosure suit against him for his failure to pay his
obligation.

Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since they allege that they are the true owners.

The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. The Court of
Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law.

Issue:

Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners of the land

Ruling:

No, they are not the true owners.

The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land, their action to vindicate ownership must fail because such
action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. As pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the
land because their deeds of sale were not registered.

Egao v CA
174 SCRA 484

Facts:

The respondents claim that they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto
Marfori. The respondents also introduced improvements; they as well paid the taxes of the property. However, the petitioners illegally
occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by
the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. The CA reversed the decision on grounds
that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the
respondents. The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth
141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thrufree patent or homestead patent.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve the rights of the respondents over the land in
dispute

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Ruling:

The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by
law on Free Patent. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the OCT is still registered under the name of the
petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to
make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the
property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.

c. Notice to the world

PEOPLE vs. REYES

175 SCRA 597

Facts:

The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land, registered in their names. Both are now deceased. They were
survived by the following children.

However, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds that the subject property had already been
transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines". They further
allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed by their parents.The deed
of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signature of their parents
were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married.

Issue:

Whether or not the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds.

Ruling:

The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.

It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was executed by some of his heirs, the
registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary
relationship between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the Register of Deeds.

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d. Conclusive evidence of ownership

CHING vs. CA
181 SCRA 9

Facts:

A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title
correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land.

By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued. Consequently, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and was granted.

13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property
and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was
directed by the trial court. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation.

The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his
estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.

Ruling:

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the
thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a
parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing.

Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person.

Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

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HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998

Facts:

On November 20, 1986, an action for reconveyance with damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents involving a
parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area of 3,277 square meters. Petitioners assert that the subject
land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale
executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the
property. However, on October 1986, private respondents obtained a Torrens Title over the said land. The Madrids denied having
executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. During the trial, petitioners
were unable to present the original deed of sale since. Instead, they presented a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of
the deed of sale. The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since
been introducing several improvements on the land.

Issue:

Whether the Certificates of Title issued to private respondents should be given more weight than the long possession of the subject
lands by the petitioners.

Ruling:

No. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them because their title to the property is registered
under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. Such principles, while admittedly correct, are subject to certain
exceptions. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership,especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCT’s only in October 1986,
twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their
ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
respective names.

CABRERA v CA
267 SCRA 339

Facts:

In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual by Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the
same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian, was sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of
Sale.In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over the said property.In 1972,
the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly took
possession of it. In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian and Felicidad Cabrera. On
April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer
recover the portion of land occupied by the past due to laches. The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal on the
justification that the defendant’s action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription and that
the action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community
property.

Issue:

Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.

Ruling:

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Yes. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community
property, and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed
Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not
disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right.

AVILA vs. TAPUCAR

G.R. No. L-45947 August 27, 1991

Facts:

In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a 1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land which was inherited by
private respondents in 1965, as successors-in-interest. In 1960, petitioner Avila bought under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land ,a 4,371 square meter parcel of land which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor. On
November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent Application for alot which has a total area of 6.9027 hectares in its
entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner
Magdalena Avila. They filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas
raised the defense of having purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the
Bahans be enjoined and ordered to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until
the termination of the case. In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent was approved and the free patent was issued , and
on the same date an Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.

Issue:

Whether the free patent and original certificate of title which were erroneously issued and vested ownership of lands in favor of the
Bahans is proper.

Ruling:

No.The free patent issued to the Bahans is erroneous because it embraced and comprised portions of lands belonging to the Avilas. The
subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the latter owners thereof. A
cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims to it and have never asserted
any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title issued under thecircumstances to such persons would be declared void
subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. Land registration is a proceeding
in remand binds the whole world. However, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not
necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens
system,which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the
said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included. Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he
actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.

e. A certificate of title is conclusive as to

a. the ownership of the registrant

TAN vs BANTEGUI
GR No. 154027 October 24, 2005

Facts:

Bantegui acquired the property sometime in 1954 and rented it to spouses Caedos who resided therein until 1994. In 1970, she left for
the United States of America. She returned to the Philippines in January 1988 and executed her special power of attorneymaking
Guadalupe B. Bautista (Bautista for brevity) her representative, after which, she went back to the United States. For failure of
Bantegui to pay taxes, said property was at public auction held on November 21, 1984, to the spouses Capistranos. Since the property
was not redeemed within the one (1) year redemption period, title to said property was consolidated to the Capistranos. The property
was later sold on June 20, 1988 by the Capistranos to spouses Pereyra. These transfers were unknown to Bantegui and the Caedos.
Said property was again sold by the Pereyras to the spouses Tan. Bantegui, thru her sister Guadalupe Bautista, and joined by the
spouses Caedo[,] filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. After the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, petitioners appealed to the CA.

Issue:

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Whether or not the auction sale was valid.

Ruling:

The tax sale did not conform to the requirements prescribed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 464, otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code.The auction sale of real property for the collection of delinquent taxes is in personam, not in rem. Although
sufficient in proceedings in rem like land registration, mere notice by publication will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in
personam. “[P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in
personam.” It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -- the registered owner of the
property -- in order to protect the latter’s interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication, an auction sale is
void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer. A certificate of title under the Torrens system serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears on it. While it is true that Transfer Certificates of Title
have already been issued in the names of the subsequent purchasers, they should nonetheless be invalidated. Considering the failure to
abide by the mandatory requirements of a proceeding in personam, no better title than that of the original owner can be assumed by the
transferees.

Besides, the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title applies only when the issue involved is the validity of the original and
not of the transfer. Subsequent titles issued to the prejudice of the rightful owner will produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod
nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That which is a nullity produces no effect.

b. the identity of the land

DEMASIADO vs VELASCO
71 SCRA 105

Facts:

Plaintiff bought the land in question through pacto de retro sale from his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado which vendor a retro could
repurchase within ten years after the first five years from the date of the document. That said vendor a retro subsequently executed a
deed of definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff Melquiades Demasiado and his wife Jovita Pareja It is admitted that both
deeds of sale though contained in a public document have not been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. From the evidence
of the plaintiff, it has been established that plaintiff's claim to the land in question is premised on two unregistered documents. This
shows that when said document was executed parties already knew that lot 5169 has been titled and it would have been easy for
parties to inquire from the office of the Register of Deeds as to whether this land is titled or not. Based on the evidence presented by
plaintiff and defendants, the plaintiff has not even proved his clear right over the whole lot. Deeds of Sale could not be superior to the
existing valid original certificate of title.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff has clear right over the disputed lot.

Ruling:

Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the certificate of title covering registered land "shall be received as
evidence in all courts of the Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein (principally, the Identity of the
owner of the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in the Act itself. And there is no pretense that appellant comes under
any of the exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of the Act. What appellant tries to point out, however, is that the trial court admitted the
certificate of title invoked by appellee without the same being properly Identified. According to appellant, although the trial court did
rule that said certificate "should be admitted", it did not actually rule that "they are hereby admitted." We believe such argument is
unavailing, considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate, "the owner's copy of Original certificate of Title No. 61801 is
admissible", was precisely made after originally sustaining appellant's counsel's objection to its admission, which must be deemed to
be clearly even if not categorically, a reconsideration and reversal of its earlier ruling rejecting the same.

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 c. its location

DAVID ODSIGUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

233 SCRA 626

Facts:

Armando Angeles, owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4050 and situated at Lagundi, Morong, Rizal.
Since 1972, David Odsigue has been in possession of the land by the tolerance of the owner of the original owner Platon Espiritu
Santo. In 1989, Espiritu Santo died and was succeeded by his heirs, among whom was Armando Angeles. On January 10, 1991,
Angeles, as co-owner and assignee of the other heirs, sent a letter of demand to David Odsigue to vacate the premises. The letter was
delivered to the Odsigue by the Barangay Captain of Lagundi, Fernando Austria, who, in a sworn affidavit, stated that he tried to
deliver the letter to petitioner but petitioner had refused to receive it.
On February 8, 1991, private respondent brought this suit for unlawful detainer in the MTC. The MTC rendered a decision ordering
the petitioner to vacate the premises. On appeal the RTC and, later, the CA, affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but his motion was denied by the appellate court, which found no new matters which would warrant a reversal of its
decision. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the property sought to be recovered has been properly identified.

Ruling:

A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location. The subject of these
proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed
within its boundaries. Private respondent's title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise,
the certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding
at Barangay Lagundi.

f. General incidents

BUDLONG vs. PONDOC

79 SCRA 24

Facts:

On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their two-
thirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's personal services to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in the same
instrument.
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on October 27, 1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the said
lot. The title shows that the lot is owned by the following co-owners: Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco Garrote 1/6,

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and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.the donee, Andrea Budlong did not intervene in the cadastral proceeding. She was not substituted for
the donors in that proceeding.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any descendants in 1935 and 1937. Francisco Garrote left Bohol thirty years before
1966 and had never returned to that province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died and was survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio,
Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote
Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot. She declared it for tax purposes in her name. She planted the lot to coconuts,
bamboos, bananas and a mango tree. Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of donation. The register of deeds in a letter
dated April 1, 1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718.
Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the said lot. She was allowed to sue as a
pauper. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of
the lot extinguished her rights under the deed of donation.

Issue:

Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because her name does not appear in the certificate of title

Ruling:

Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents
attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act No. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent,
or the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other way any other
rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the
amendments hereof".
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND
1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and incidents as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, it is
subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The rights and liabilities which are created by law and are made
applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to registered land, except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of the
owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c) to the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants, will
other cotenants except as otherwise expressly provoked in Act No. 496.
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No. 5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors, Isabela
Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be
the co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does
not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land
G. ATTRIBUTES

i. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE

Section 47, PD 1529 Registered land not subject to prescription. –No title to registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH

G.R. 157573

FACTS:

Petitioner Elinel Caña is a former pastor assigned in the respondents affiliate Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). The disputed
property consists of a lot and a church, covered by a transfer certificate in the name of the respondent Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines.

Petitioner was permitted by the respondents to occupy the disputed property for the worship services of MCEC. On Dec. 1997, the petitioners
revoked the the petitioners license and was verbally ordered to vacate the premises which the petitioner refused to do, even after a demand letter
later being served.

As a result, respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner, who in turn filed an answer with counterclaim in the same MTC. The said
court dismissed the parties suit and counterclaim for some technicalities. An appeal to the RTC was also futile, as the RTC affirmed the decision
of the MTC.

A review was then filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals, who also dismissed the same for the case being insufficient in form and
substance. Thereafter, the respondents complied by attaching sufficient and relevant documents to its suit.
Then the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and ordered said petitioner to vacate said property. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by
the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not said petitioner has lawful title to the disputed property.

RULING: The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the petitioner’s contention that in all its pleadings, the respondents never disputed
petitioner’s claim that MCEC was the one who purchased the disputed property. Records show that the respondents have consistently asserted

166
their ownership over the said land, with the evidence of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title. The evidence presented by
the petitioner, which consisted mainly of affidavits of its members of the board, was found to be self-serving and unsubstantiated.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

In fine, petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove his right to remain in possession of the disputed property. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that an ejectment case against the petitioner was proper.

NATALIA REALTY CORP. VS. VALDEZ

173 SCRA 534

FACTS:

Petitioner-plaintiff Corporation filed a complaint against respondents, alleging that defendants unlawfully occupied portions of the
parcels of land belonging to and registered in its name. Petitioner prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the same land belonging
to the former and to pay the reasonable compensation and financial reliefs.

Defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Their motion was
denied on a holding that the grounds therefore are not concrete.

On October 1983, plaintiff Corporation moved for a summary judgment on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court. Claiming that there is no genuine issue averred in the defendants complaint, and are mere pretended denials and flimsy
defences.

On December 1983, the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only
"conclusions that because they have been in actual possession for over 30 years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be
respected of such occupancy and as such the complaints should be dismissed.

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court for absence of a valid issue raised by
defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a factual controversy in these consolidated cases.

RULING:
None. The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the trial court is proper and valid. The very allegations of the defendants
prove that no valid issue has been tendered by them, They relied mainly on two points, the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff
and their supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they are entitled to
the benefit of clarification.

The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) are indefeasible
after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. A petition for review of the decree must be presented
within one year after its entry. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons. The certificates of title of Appellee Corporation were issued more than thirty years ago

Also, there is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they
acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.

Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged base on their claim applying Presidential Deree no. 2 purportedly making them
and their successors owners of said land, the present case does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action
required is a direct, and not a collateral, attack. Petition was granted.

Protection is only in favor of registered owners.

But ownership may be lost through laches.

LUCAS VS. GAMPONIA

100 PHIL 277

FACTS:
By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action
in the name of Domingo Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916
and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. On March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before
the registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof
and enjoyed its fruits. Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez.
Roque Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21, 1940 to Andres Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and
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enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the time he sold it to Defendant Andres
Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he bought it to date.
Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was made only
11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further held that since the
land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant Andres Gamponia.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the possession of the land by the Defendant and his predecessors
in interest for a period of 37 years
RULING:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the
action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of
prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the
equitable defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue
of his and his predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years, the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the Defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee’s inaction and neglect, been
converted into a stale demand.
In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., (96 Phil., 622) we held that the equitable defense of laches requires four elements:(1) conduct
on the part of the Defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
Defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
Defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; (4) injury or prejudice to the Defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at bar. .
“The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but
the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court of
equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the
intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one
from the consequences of his own neglect.” (Penn Mutual Life Inc. Co., et al., vs. City of Austin et al., U. S. 962.)
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and one is hereby entered absolving the Defendant from the action.

RIGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE

JM TUASON VS CA

93 SCRA 146

FACTS:

It is not disputed that this case originated as an action for recovery of possession (ejectment) instituted by the plaintiff (petitioner)
corporation against the private respondent Guillermo Renosa. Respondent's defense to the action for ejectment was that he bought the
disputed portion of land from a certain Capt. Faustino C. Cruz, for the sum of P3,600.00; that said Faustino C. Cruz acquired the said
portion from 3,000 square meters of land acquired by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case Nos. Q-135, Q-139, Q-177 and
Q-186 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch; and that all in all Faustino C. Cruz sold to respondent 360 square
meters of the 3,000 square meters allegedly allocated to the former in the compromise agreement.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner in the ejectment case on the grounds that petitioner is the registered owner of the
questioned land; that as owner, petitioner is entitled to possession as an attribute of ownership. Respondent Court of Appeals in
reversing the trial court's decision based its stand on its firm belief that the compromise agreement between the petitioner and the
"Deudors" created a valid right in favor of Capt. Cruz to possess the property in question; that this valid right of possession was
transmitted to private respondent Reñosa when Cruz sold a portion of that land in 1956, to Reñosa.
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ISSUE: Whether private respondent Reñosas predecessor-interest in the disputed property namely, Capt. Cruz, acquired a valid right
to own and possess said land a right that he could have legally transferred to private respondent Reñosa which was also to entitle the
latter to a better right to possession against the admitted registered owner of the land.

RULING: Taking into consideration the fundamental principle in law applicable to the circumstances of this case that mere
possession of whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens Title to real property, and that
registered real property under the Torrens system cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. The petitioner who is the registered
owner of the disputed land has a right to possess and recover the same, as against private respondent Reñosa who merely claims a
right to possess from his predecessor-in-interest Capt. Cruz who likewise never acquired any right to possess the disputed property.
Both Capt. Cruz and respondent Reñosa cannot be considered exactly as possessors in good faith because both of them knew at the
time they entered into possession that petitioner was the registered owner of the disputed land.
Capt. Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because as beneficiary of the compromise agreement he should be in a
position to know that there were suspensive conditions attached to his possible acquisition of the disputed property and that if the
conditions were not fulfilled, his right as beneficiary would never arise. Aside from the compromise agreement as the only basis of
Capt. Cruz' alleged right to the property in question, he and respondent Reñosa were never able to prove transfer to ownership of the
same from petitioner to Capt. Cruz, thus strengthening the obvious fact that the suspensive conditions imposed in the compromise
agreement were never fulfilled and hence petitioner never transferred title to the reserved properties in favor of the beneficiaries
therein. As registered owner of the land and in the absence of any equal or better right on the part of respondent Reñosa to possess the
disputed land, petitioner is entitled to possession and initiated the correct action when it brought a case to recover possession of the
same.

WHEN LACHES IS UNAVAILING

DABLO VS CA

226 SCRA 618

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title with recovery of possession and ownership. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that
Hilariona Fortaleza Dablo is the surviving spouse of Mariano Dablo who died in 1936, while Maria and Juanito, both surnamed Dablo
are their legitimate children; that plaintiffs inherited from Mariano Dablo a parcel of unirrigated riceland in Zambales. This parcel of
land is covered by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Hrs. of Mariano Dablo; it was issued in the name of the heirs of Mariano
Dablo on and was transcribed in the Registry Book of the Resister of Deeds of Zambales. Mariano Dablo had been in peaceful,
continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the property as owner thereof since 1911 until his death when the plaintiffs
succeeded in the possession of the property, until the defendants illegally entered and occupied it in 1946. Regional trial court declared
that the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question.

RULING:

SC held that the private respondents are the true and rightful owners of the western portion of the land in dispute.However, the remedy
granted by respondent Court of Appeals, that is, the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No P-3593, does not appear to be
proper and apt.

Neither would prescription aid the cause of private respondents, not only because the acquisitive prescription of 10 years of possession
provided under Article 1134 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has not yet transpired (private respondents entered the eastern portion
in 1969 while the complaint to quiet title was filed on April 1, 1975), but also because ownership of registered land under the Torrens
System is imprescriptible (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389 [1979]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 146 [1979]).

Nor will laches bolster the claim of ownership of private respondents over this eastern portion. An action by the registered owner to
recover possession based on a Torrens title is not barred by laches.

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ii. INDEFEASIBLE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE

MELGAR VS PAGAYON

21 SCRA

FACTS:

A parcel of land was originally owned by Basilia Paccial, who sold it to one Palomino subject to the right of repurchase within a
period of three years. The period expired without such a right being exercised. Petitioner acquired the rights and interests. Earlier on
January 30, 1925, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment decreeing the registration in the above lot in favor of vendor
Basilia Paccial noted that it was encumbered to the Palomillo "for the sum of TEN PESOS (P10.00). The original certificate of title
was issued in the name of Basilia Paccial with the foregoing encumbrances and conditions annotated thereon. Salvador Pagayon, the
predecessor-in-interest of the other respondents in this proceeding acquired the property for the sum of P2,000.00. The Deed of Sale
was registered, and the next day Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Salvador Pagayon which cancelled the Original
Certificate of Title in favor of Paccial.

Issue:

Whether or not the vendee is the owner of the land.

Ruling:

The conclusiveness of a decree of registration has been stressed. As former Chief Justice Arellano so emphatically stated: "[It] shall
remain in full force and effect forever.” No other conclusion would do in the opinion of former Chief Justice Araullo as "Section 38 of
Act No. 498 . . . is very plain and conclusive..The Torrens title then "issued after the necessary judicial proceedings [possesses] an
absolute and conclusive character. "The effects of the decree of registration cease to exist when the title is transferred to a successor."
The interests of the Philippines will best be served by a strict adherence to the provision of the Land Registration Law."
If it were otherwise, much of the stability that it is the purpose of the Torrens system to maintain would be a thing of the past. The
incontestable and absolute character of the Torrens title.

At the risk of stating what is obvious, We say that land registration proceedings under Act 496 are in rem and that such proceedings,
as well as the title issued as a result thereof, are binding and conclusive upon the whole world.
This has to be the rule, for if even after the ownership of a property has been decreed by a land registration court in favor of a
particular person and title issued may still be annulled, alleged, changed, altered or modified after the lapse of the one year period
fixed by the legal provision mentioned above, the object of the Torrens system, namely, to guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to
the property, would be defeated. In the instant case the above doctrine should apply with more reason, considering the fact that the
property has passed from the hands of the original registered owner into those of clearly innocent third parties."

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A title over a property is evidence of ownership. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157573

FACTS:

A dispute over the possession of a land claimed by a church against its former pastor sparked the commencement of this case in the trial
court. The disputed property,consisting of a church lot and building, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 96813, registered in the name
of Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines (respondent), a corporation existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. Elinel Caña
(petitioner) is its former pastor assigned to its affiliate, Malabon Evangelical Free Church, which petitioner refers to
as Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC).

Respondent permitted petitioner to occupy the disputed property wherein MCEC maintained worship services. However, on December 1, 1997,
respondent revoked petitioner's license and verbally demanded that petitioner vacate the disputed property but the latter refused to obey. Hence,
respondent sought the services of a counsel who wrote a formal demand letter dated December 17, 1997 requiring petitioner to vacate the
disputed premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to respondent. Petitioner ignored the demand letter.

Issue: WoN mere possession of the said property defeats a Torrens Title

Ruing:

No, Respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.

Having failed to overcome herein respondent’s right of possession over the disputed property, petitioner cannot insist that his
continued occupation thereof is lawful. One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the property the
moment he is required to leave (Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640). This is consistent with the principle that “a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.”
(Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525)

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Instances when defense of indefeasibility is NOT available:

1. The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. As such, a title issued based on void documents does not run against
the State and its subdivisions.

EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 151424

FACTS: Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a Deed
of Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain Medina who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously entering a false
record in the records of the Land Registration Commission. Eventually, the true owners of the said land, the de Leons, discovered that
another title was fraudulently issued to Medina over the same parcel of land. De Leon was able to have the said title annulled as well
as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by virtue of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT was validly revoked

RULING: Yes, the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens Title does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null
and void. The Director of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent over privately owned land.

2. Principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and void. The Director
of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent over privately owned land. Although OCT No. P-30187 was merely
collaterally attacked, it was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it was based was null and void.

DE GUZMAN VS AGBALA

G.R. No. 163566

FACTS:
The subject parcels of land were inherited by Carmen, who died single, without any compulsory heir. Said land was the subject of a
deed of donation in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz. According to Madelene, she was present when all the signatories
thereon, including the notary public, signed the document. From that time on, she received the rentals of the properties covered by the
donation. Carmen even informed her tenants that Madelene would inherit the properties upon her death. The respondent then filed a
civil case against Madelene praying that the deed of donation be nullified, as well as the subsequent transfers to other parties of the
properties covered by the spurious donation.
An amended complaint was filed on September 15, 1988 to include the transferees of the properties including petitioner
spouses Raymundo and Perla de Guzman, who were the transferees of the land.
Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake. This was confirmed by the handwriting expert of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Rogelio Azores.
The RTC, in its decision, declared the deed of donation in favor of Madelene null and void ab initio. Such decision was
affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. P-30187 was correctly nullified

RULING:
Yes. Although OCT No. P-30187 was merely collaterally attacked; it was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it
was based was null and void ab initio. The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are
null and void. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral,
attack. OCT No. P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of Lands
without authority. The petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it was not as it was private land
previously owned by Carmen who inherited it from her parents. This finding was affirmed by the CA.

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 3. Purchase from one who procured title by Fraud

BORNALES VS. IAC

166 SCRA 512

FACTS:

In 1927, Spouses Sixto and Isabel Dumolong were awarded a parcel of land. Their marriage, however was not blessed by a child.
Sixto then had an extramarital affair and he cohabited with Placida who even used Sixto’s surname. Placida and Sixto begot children.

The petitioner, on the other hand, is Sixto’s tenant. In March 1978, Placida and her children executed a Deed of extrajudicial
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. They were able to acquire the supposed thumbmark of Isabel. But apparently, Isabel never
affixed her thumbmark and that the same was not within her knowledge.

In November 1978, Placida registered the Deed and a Torrens title was issued in their name. Three months thereafter, Placida and her
children sold the land to Bornales. Isabel assailed the sale. Isabel argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by Placida et al was
through fraud. Bornales countered he was not aware of the fraudulent nature of the prior transactions, but since a Torrens was issued
he should be considered as a buyer in good faith, hence entitled to some right.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title

RULING:
No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of
fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith. Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor’s title. If at all, the petitioners
only acquire the right which their vendors then had.

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A title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

HEIRS OF TIRO VS PES

G.R. No. 170528

FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children
of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the disputed land
since time immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995.
But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name of
respondent. The petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation
of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was
issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo,
the registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent argued that
petitioners’ action for quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription. The RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners’
complaint. The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title
in the name of the vendor.The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal and MR but were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers
no valid title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

RULING: Petitioners’ arguments are unfounded.Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good
faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that would impair or
erode public confidence in the torrens system of land registration. Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the
source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

4. Land covered by previous valid title.

5. Patent and Certificate issued over private land.

AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

181 SCRA 46

FACTS:

On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed a case in the CFI of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the
parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners. But petitioners alleged
that they became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties. While
the above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses
Agpoon with the CFI of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. Petitioners
alleged that the land in question belongs to them and that it was only on April 13, 1971, when respondent spouses filed a complaint
against them, that they found out that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No.
23263, pursuant to which OCT. 2370 was issued in the latter's name. And the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto
are null and void since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public
land grant. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of the land
in question.

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On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid CFI of Pangasinan, acting on the motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and
spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case
of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no
cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the complaint although the facts and circumstances set forth in the
complaint show that the land in question was private land under Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

RULING:
The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its dismissal order is not controlling. It is true that by filing the
application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the
name of his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in
interest was the absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or
insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's
privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's
Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of
the public domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real
was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land covered by it without interruption
during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25,1880). We may well presume that
Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the land as part of the public
domain.
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action against private respondents. Petitioners in their complaint
alleged that the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes; that they are the real and lawful
owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the law then in force; that since the said area was a private
land, the same could not have been the subject matter of an application for free patent; and that all these facts were known to the
private respondents and their predecessor in interest.The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a
patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a private land, the patent and
certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.

6. A certificate of title issue on the basis of a free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be
cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

MARTINEZ VS CA

G.R. No. 170409

FACTS:

Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa
Martinez Emitaño, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that
sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of
Celedoniaand under that name applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the
corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an application for land
registration over the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to file the instant complaint.

The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in
their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s titles. Before the Court of Appeals, She
argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.

Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since
petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuance

RULING:

No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the
facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.

Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law
may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where fraud
attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.

7. Illegally included area.

CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA

132 SCRA 718

FACTS:

Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera, were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof
in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera died. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. De
Vera’s nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Vera’s estate. Prior to the widow’s death, she made an inventory
showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that
the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m.
being occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an
owner of the land since 1921; that they’ve been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate

RULING:

No. The inclusion of Juliana’s land in De Vera’s title was erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed to
have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Vera’s lifetime; that when de Vera
registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latter’s land was erroneously included.

176
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow, in her inventory before she died, attested that de Vera’s portion of land is
only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only
portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana
(portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Vera’s estate.

In the case at bar, the principle of indefeasibility applies only in the claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on the
illegally included area.

8. The rule on incontrovertibility and indefeasibility is equally applicable to title acquired through homestead or free
patents.

IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE

208 PHIL 441

FACTS:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni
Cristo, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent court upheld the primacy of
the respondent bank’s title and ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: “which of the two
titles is superior, an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial proceedings?”.

The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name
the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla
who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in question under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI
of Nueva Ecija . The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the respondent Court denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land
registration proceedings.

Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her
predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private land and
ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No. 3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner attacks the
validity of the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent bank’s predecessor, Emilio Libunao.

In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title
that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor, is recorded and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of
said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible
like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding."

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 Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA 676) Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted
in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said
patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of
Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent.

iii. NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK

Section 48, PD 1529 Certificate not subject to collateral attack. –A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The Doctrine of non-collateral attack of a decree or title, 7 SCRA 504.

A certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.

HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE

G.R. No. 173891

FACTS:

Amparo E. Cañosa (respondent Cañosa) filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the reconstitution of
the original Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169395 of the Register of Deeds of the same city. The trial court had ex
parte presentation of evidence before the branch clerk of court. Convinced that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with
and finding merit in the petition, the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original and owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
169395.

Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial court’s decision. According to petitioners, their
parents, spouses Luciano P. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista, are the registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from
Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters more or less and was covered by TCT No. 27997. Furthermore,
they alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of the property. A fired razed Quezon City Hall, the records
destroyed was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title,
TCT No. RT-97223, in September 1994.

Petitioners claimed that when respondent Cañosa filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 169395. They insisted that the
petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements found in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as it
failed to state specifically the boundaries of the property subject of the petition as well as the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property. Petitioners considered these circumstances as extrinsic fraud. Cañosa alleged that there was no fraud and
that the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication had been complied with.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right to be notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any
right to file the petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:

Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395 will have
no effect on their property, the latter being different from, and not even a part of the property covered by the reconstituted title. One
having no right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus
petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.

Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed their petition after it concluded, on the basis of its simple
comparison of petitioners’ and respondent’s TCTs, that the properties covered by the two titles are entirely
different. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should have conducted a trial and received evidence; and having failed to do so,
its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed but was also arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due process. Supreme
Court does not agree.

The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment outright. In fact, it required respondent Cañosa to
file her answer, and even allowed the filing of an amended answer─proof that it was predisposed to consider the arguments of
both parties before it even decided to finally dismiss the petition. Mere filing of a petition for annulment of judgment does not
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guarantee the holding of trial or reception of evidence. A petition for annulment of judgment may in fact be dismissed outright
if it has no prima facie merit. With more reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition even without a hearing if it
finds that based on the averments in the petition and the responsive pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment is not
warranted.

TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO

G.R. No. 152007

FACTS:

On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and
all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the subject
property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain
Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in 1967; that said Deed of
Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, did not sign the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors,
Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Hence,
Petitioners, pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the restoration
of the previous title in their names, plus damages.

Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale,
and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon.

On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the
questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court, ruling that petitioners are barred from filing their petition due to laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid.

RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. Their action calls for the
determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve.

It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap.
Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution.

More so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere
allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden.

A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or
not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed,
altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale
commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate
of title. Petition was denied.

NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ

173 SCRA 534

FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly
unlawfully occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners transfer certificates. The respondents file a consolidated
answer moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that there is no valid issue raised by the respondents, but only
conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the subject lands for more than 30 years. They were then ordered to vacate the
lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed an appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the disputed land?

RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance
with the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the
lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether
or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. The said titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30
years ago.

Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a
certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

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Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of
lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.

Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential.

There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they
acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA

201 SCRA 165

FACTS:

On August 27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora) filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land. It
alleged that the parcel of land has an area of 156 hectares, more or less; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of
Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954.

Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said
portions of Lot 8. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among
others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already registered under the
Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas, holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their
face show that they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; Ortigas then filed a motion for
reconsideration praying the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over
the application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.

Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the
annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
land registration case,the trial court then rendered the decision in favor to Ortigas.

ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a collateral attack?

RULING:

Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied
for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while
the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156
hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to
ascertain the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the
basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the
land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the
parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and
is null and void.

Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title
cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Also, no correction of certificate of title
shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered. While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct
the certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law.

While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land
already covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious
controversy as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin of the questioned
TCTs evidently appear to be different from what is stated therein. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed parcels of land are
properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand, and as the parties admit, the TCTs do not show that they
are actually derivatives of OCT 351.

The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by
the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this Court
held that the "simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all
the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands
illegally included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." As it is in this case, a certificate of title cannot be
considered conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

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Cancellation of title to be filed in the same court where decree was entered.

ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA

114 SCRA 748

FACTS;

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo.

In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No.
N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of
Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square meters.

By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961.

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng.
Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration
issued on January 3, 1966.

Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint).

The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo
ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its cancellation.

The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of
Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon knowing,
Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void
for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980.

ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?

RULING:

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel of land is a
real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after
the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the lower court
insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was
lost through death.

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal,
sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI
Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the
summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-
parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).

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The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name—after one year
from the date of the decree—is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

A void title is subject to collateral attack.

FERRER VS. BAUTISTA

231 SCRA 748

FACTS:

Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership
by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in
question. On the other hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by
virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued
on 24 January 1966 .

On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to
"Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated
Civil Case No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to
cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.

Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free
Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral attack.

RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which
has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from
fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being
limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned.

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it
was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply
when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is susceptible to
direct, as well as to collateral attack.

iv. QUIETS TITLE. Section 31, PD 1529

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC

157 SCRA 380

FACTS:

On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco,
Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio
Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit ,herein private respondents, as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling
Muli." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under
Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents
for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan
Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of
P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent
have remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.

On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the name of
the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National
Grains Authority (NGA).

On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case,
for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.

The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale.
The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the
Provincial Sheriff.

On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of
the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the
petitioner on July 16, 1974.
A month after, the private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in
question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay
the NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of
sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment and claimed ownership of the property in question and has no intention of
disposing of the same. The private respondents are in possession of subject property were asked by the NGA to vacate it but the
former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the
case was dismissed.

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On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch
III, San Pablo City, against the NGA and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of
the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said
property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and conditions as the court may find just,
fair and equitable under the premises.

In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the
property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena Magcamit has
already prescribed.

After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in
question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National
Grains Authority.

The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered
its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the rightful owner of the disputed land.

RULING:

Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better
right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily
binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.

It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is
not allowed.

The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge
of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded
owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is
an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for
value in the public auction sale.

D, STATUTORY LIENS AFFECTING TITLE

Section 44, PD 1529- Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from
all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:

First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law
required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of
record.

Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before
that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.

Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have
been determined.

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Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, pursuant to, Presidential No. 27 or any
other law or regulations on agrarian reform.

a. Sec. 44, PD 1529 is an exclusive enumeration.

ROJAS ET AL VS TAGAYTAY CITY

60 OG 6

Petitioners Zosimo Rojas, et al., claiming to be the registered owners of Lot No. 1, Psu-103916-Amd. originally decreed in their favor
in Case No. 398, G.L.R.O. Record No. 53546, have filed this original petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite dated December 2, 1957, denying their petition to set aside the decision of June 30, 1957 rendered in another
and subsequent Land Registration Case No. 323, G.L.R.O. Record No. 12440 decreeing, for the second time, the registration of the
same Lot No. 1, this time in favor of the City of Tagaytay. At the instance of herein petitioners, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court on January 24, 1958, restraining the respondent Judge from taking further cognizance of the aforementioned
registration case No. 323 until further orders from this Court.

The City of Tagaytay sought original registration of this parcel of land, allegedly acquired by purchase from Zosimo Rojas, either
under Act. No. 496 or pursuant to Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act. No. 141, said applicant and its predecessors-in-interest having
been in actual possession of the land since 1894. No copy of the deed of sale was attached to the application, allegedly because it was
either lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation.

As nobody appeared at the hearing to oppose the application, an order of general default was entered by the court against the whole
world, and the applicant was allowed to adduce its evidence.

On June 30, 1957, the court decreed registration of said Lot No. 1 plan Psu-103916-Amd. in the name of the City of Tagaytay, free
from any liens and encumbrances, and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title upon the finality of said decision.

On July 15, 1957, Zosimo Rojas, supposed vendor of the lot in question, together with his present co-petitioners, Manuel, Bernardo,
Deomedes, Felisa and Soledad, all surnamed Rojas, filed in the same proceeding a petition to set aside the decision of the court in so
far as said Lot No. 1, Psu-103916-Amd was concerned; to lift the order of general default as far as it affected them because as
adjoining owners cited in the application, no actual notice was served them as requires in Section 32 of Act 496, as amended; and
praying that they be allowed to file their opposition to the registration of the aforesaid lot for the reason, among others, that said Lot.
No. 1 was part of a bigger parcel of land already decreed in a previous land registration case (Case No. 398, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 53546)
and covered by an original certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 29) issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite in their names since December
5, 1940.

The lower court denied this petition by order of December 2, 1957; hence, the filing of the instant action by the Rojas brothers for the
purpose already stated above

Issue:

Is the granting of OCT includes Lot No. 1?

Ruling:

Applicant-respondent also alleges that even granting that Original Certificate of Title No. 29 includes Lot No. 1, such registration did
not confer ownership upon the petitioners, at least insofar as that portion occupied by the City Hall of Tagaytay is concerned, it being
contended that such building and the land whereon it was erected are properties for public use and, hence are outside the scope and
efficacy of the Torrens title acquired by petitioners, pursuant to Section 39 of Act 496.

The aforementioned Section 39 of the Land Registration Act reads:

SEC. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all incumbrances except those
noted on said certificate, and any of the following incumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution which the statutes of the Philippine Islands can not
require to appear of record in the registry.
Second. Taxes within two years after the same become due and payable.
Third.Any public highway, way, private way established by law.or any Government, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.

The aforequoted provision specifically enumerates the only cases that may limit the registered owners absolute title over the property:
(1) liens, claims or rights existing or arising under the laws or the Constitution and which the statutes do not require their annotation or
appearance in the registry; (2) taxes within 2 years after they become due and payable;(3) encumbrance or lien duly annotated in the
certificate of title; and (4)any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof existing on the property even if not annotated in the certificate. It is clear therefrom that even if we concede, for the sake of
argument, that a municipal building or city hall and the land whereon it is erected may be considered as properties for public use,
under the well-accepted principle of inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius, respondent cannot validly invoke the provision of law quoted
above.

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This decision is limited only to the action of the trial court, sitting as land registration court, decreeing for the second time, the
registration of Lot No. 1 of subdivision plan Psu-103916-Amd. infavor of respondent City of Tagaytay, a lot already previously
decreed by a competent court in favor of the petitioners, which action, Supreme Court held, is null and void.

b. Certificate of Title is subject to servitudes. Exception.

DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL

64 OG 19

FACTS:

On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to the Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
situated in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands
Agency. On February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate
was among the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine
Commission.

Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation proceedings, the government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal road,
passing through Lot No. 638. A claim for compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when World
War II broke out.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. In 1951 her heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots.

On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida Samson, became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos.
On February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for
reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this
Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7,
1963 the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was
already sub judice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled to compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.

RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that
RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638 was subject to the Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way and other
public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 and Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim for
compensation is barred by prescription and laches.

The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no
authority for the Government to take private lands covered by said Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20 and
21 state:

SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation
works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and
water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon
them. And the Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable
contribution or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works, the assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of
benefits received, and each purchaser under this Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given,
shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject
to the right of way of such irrigation canals, ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see fit to
construct.

SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public
servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference to
the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.

SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts of
said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale, lease, or
other disposition under this Act.

Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any
water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It also
subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the friar lands
subject to public servitudes also imposed on other lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil Governor, upon
resolution of the Philippine Commission, the authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as non-alienable and reserve the
same for public use. Needless to say, the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude contemplated in Sections 19
and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable by the Civil Governor prior to
sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.

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E. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS THAT RUN WITH THE LAND

a. Nature of Restrictive Covenants

ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC.

G.R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000

FACTS:

Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka, Marikina,
Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners contained a
Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as easement of two meters in front, second storey expansion to be placed above the
back of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building, and the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6
meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house. Petitioners, despite repeated warnings
from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly
above the original front wall. Respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses
Fajardo and directed them to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The spouses filed
petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.

Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions of the covenant.

HELD:

The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the use
of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights but it can
also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true
easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements,
which is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing
an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the
building to be erected are crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may also be
aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally might have intended the
stipulations to be.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is
intended. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has neither right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the
restriction has been imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots, only
if he retains part of the land. There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished
ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not the
homeowners' association, confirmed by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

F. SPLITTING OR CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE

Section 49, PD 1529 Splitting or consolidation of titles. –A registered owner of several distinct parcels of land embraced in and
covered by a certificate of title desiring in lieu thereof separate certificates, each containing one or more parcels, may file a
written request for that purpose with the Register of Deeds concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender of the owner’s
duplicate, shall cancel it together with its original and issue in lieu thereof separate certificates as desired. A registered owner
of several distinct parcels of land covered by separate certificates of title desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificate for
the whole land, or several certificates for the different parcels thereof, may also file a written request with the Register of
Deeds concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicates, shall cancel them together with their originals
and issue in lieu thereof one or separate certificates as desired.

G. SUBDIVISION AND CONSOLIDATION PLANS

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Section 50, PD 1529 Subdivision and consolidation plans.—Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do
not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under PD No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land
Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and
waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.

If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of
Lands together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owner’s duplicate certificate of title is
presented for registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of said plan, register the same
in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds
shall annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that
except by way of donation in favor of the national government, province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be enclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered
owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated,

A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with
the Land Registration Commission, a consolidation plan on which shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were before,
and as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificates and the receipt of
consolidation plan duty approved by the Commision, the Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding
certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.

The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification, or amendment in the contents of any certificate of title, or
of any decree or plan, including the technical descriptions therein, covering any real property registered under the Torrens
system, nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would result in the
enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title.

a. Simple Subdivisions.
Section 50, PD 1529

b. Complex Subdivisions
PD 957

REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION

A. APPEAL
a. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.
i. As against the government.

REPUBLIC VS SAYO
191 SCRA 71

FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land. The land
was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of
Republic Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default
was thereafter entered against the whole world except the oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a
compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500
hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were
assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also mutually waived and
renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved
the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. The Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as
being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?

HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel
of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor
General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and
void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.

188
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.

REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the
Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and
title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos
opposed the petition. The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground that the order had
allegedly long become final and unappealable so the Government was estopped thru the registration made by its agents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order?

RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus non-
registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by its
own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil.
975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.

ii. Despite the pendency of the appeal, the court retains jurisdiction until expiration of one year from the issuance of
the decree of registration.

GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 503

FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al – her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et al’s favor. The decision became final and
executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration
over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of
land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted
by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverio’s recommendation. Gomez
et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and executory,
the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter
of course.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the lower court’s initial ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had become final and executory.

HELD:
Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The
Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

HENCE, the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted.

CAYANAN VS. DE LOS SANTOS

21 SCRA 1348

FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio
Santos, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same
proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and
through intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on
August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent,
Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of
petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being
the case, as admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same
cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance
with section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not

189
 for value and that Felix L. Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action
and not in a simple petition, like the one at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?

HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been
held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of
one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may
be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."

"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38
of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
1.) Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in
the cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
after the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."

2.) Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with
the law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."

3.) Valmonte v. Nable,: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Within this period of one year the decree may
be reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set aside and the land adjudicated to another party. As long as the final
decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."

4.) Capio v. Capio,: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party."

b. Requirements

Republic vs. Estenzo

158 SCRA 282
FACTS:
On 11 November 1961, the Land Tenure Administration, representing the Republic, initiated and prosecuted expropriation proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the acquisition of some 591.0654 hectares of private agricultural lands situated in San Isidro,
Leyte, and owned by respondents Espeletas, Martinezes and Pachecos, for resale to tenants, pursuant to Republic Act No.
1400.chanroblesv

On 14 June 1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning the said land for P411,995.78. 1 The Republic, having already paid
the partial sum of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to pay the balance of P205,145.78, plus the further sum of P20,000.00 for a
farmhouse, copra drier and warehouses, or a total of P225,145.78. This was supplemented by an amendatory order providing for
payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14 June 1962 on the unpaid balance. Implementing orders, the last of which was dated 28
July 1962, were thereafter successively issued.chanroblesi

190
Came 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143,150.00 still remained unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof. Respondents-
landowners then filed a motion in the lower court imploring the latter to (1) annul its amended decision of 24 August 1962 on the
ground that its basis - the compromise agreement - was secured through fraud; and (2) resuscitate its original decision of 14 June
1962.chanroblesvanrob

The Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction. Before
the Supreme Court could rule on the petition, however, the parties entered anew into another compromise agreement. The Republic,
now represented by the Land Authority, covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of P143,150.00 plus 6% per
annum interest from 24 August 1962. Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any and all further claims against
the former which had been recognized and ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in the event (of) full
payment of said compromise price . . . on or before said date,"
The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31 August 1964,
P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the interest, or a total of P102,271.63 only. This precipitated the filing of respondents-
landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the Sheriff of the City of
Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28 July 1962. nroblesvirtualaw
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised in
its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November 1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority
violates Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No. 992, otherwise known as the Revised Budget Act, because the money garnished
was appropriated by Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies
under the administration of . . . (the) Authority, pursuant to the provision of R. A. 3844, (and) to cover salaries of personnel, travelling,
supplies and materials and other administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not funds for the payment of expropriated estates. This
was opposed by respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure
and/or payment by the government official charged with custody of such funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through
garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution," as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrob
HELD:
The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section 154
(3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted on 8 August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3)
provides that -
Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic
undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with interest on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution could
be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be predicated on the second compromise, and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvir

and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not made full payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24 August
1962, on or before 31 August 1964. Such default, however, only entitled respondents to demand execution on the basis of the
compromise approved by this Court.chanroblesblesvirtual

The lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control over the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was
already shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26 April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the
original award made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court could do under the circumstances was to enforce the amended decision
of 24 August 1962. Instead of a motion for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the proper move for respondents-landowners
would have been to file a separate and independent civil action to set aside, by annulment or rescission, both the first compromise
agreement and the amended decision embodying the same.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualaw
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, and the respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further
proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be
sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice.

c. When not deemed perfected.

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR

25 SCRA 316

Facts:
Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots in questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of these
lots in favor of the Benuvar.
A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1
from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they have been
in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time
191
immemorial, long before the second world war.
For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the petition. However, in its later order the court reconsidered and granted
the petition.
The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond,"
but withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become
final." The herein petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to give due course
to their appeal. This petition was finally dismissed.
De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot 1. The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not final
and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel received the
same "Con mi excepcion” making the execution of the said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent court.
Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in
the land registration case had already become final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen from the
notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi copia. Con mi excepcion.”
Ruling:
This contention is without merit.
Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The
certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate, dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the
Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the
reconstituted decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal.
An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes
final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the decision.
The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938 regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an agreement
between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the finality of the
decision, because the segregation adverted to refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be accomplished
anytime after the decision became final and executory.

d. Effect of failure to appeal.

NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)

FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of
Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated
as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in
the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the
court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the
original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and
pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of
Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said land to Arturo
Nieto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?

HELD:
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 The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered
therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including the Government.As a general rule, registration of title
under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the
date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to
perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title
issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title
would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.

e. Execution pending appeal not allowed in registration proceedings.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES

68 SCRA 177

FACTS:
Alipio Alinsurin, later substituted by Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, sought to register under Act 496,
a parcel of land indisputably included within the area reserved for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated
December 19, 1955. Applicant claimed that his predecessors acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during
the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895. The application was opposed by the Government. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3 portion
of the land in favor of the corporation, subject to the rights of one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation submitted in court, and (b) 1/3
portion to Roman Tamayo. Within the extended period, the Government filed the corresponding record on appeal, copy of which was
duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. Pending approval of the Record on Appeal, and on motion of the corporation and
of Tamayo, the lower court directed the issuance of a registration decree of the entire parcel applied for, 1/3 pro-indiviso in favor of
Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation, and declared that as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision had become
final, but as to the share of the corporation, the registration shall be subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Hence, the Government
instituted this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus and the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the lower court from issuing a writ of possession, the corporation and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the
property, and the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the land until the government shall have filed a notice
of lis pendens. During the pendency of the appeal in the registration case, a certain Honofre A.Andrada and others filed with the Court
of First Instance a complaint against the corporation and Tamayo for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question. The trial court
assumed jurisdiction over, and decided, the case in favor of Andrada. Pursuant thereto, but in violation of the Supreme Court's
injunction (in L-27594), the corporation executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of the land registration, and the trial court
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title and to issue new titles to Andrada, et al., "free from all liens and
encumbrances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable?

HELD:
The court held that:
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL; FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH NOTICE OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF
APPEAL, IF APPELLEE WAS SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL. — The failure of appellants to serve a copy of
their notice of appeal to the counsel for one of the several appellees is not fatal to the appeal,where admittedly, he was served with a
copy of the original, as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice of appeal is embodied. Such failure cannot
impair the right of appeal, especially if the substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired and the appeal taken was from the
entire decision which is not severable.
2. LAND REGISTRATION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
— Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration proceedings. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
3.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. — A
Torrens Title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final, the judgment being on appeal, is a nullity, as it is violative of the

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explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act, which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the
title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of deeds concerned issues the corresponding
certificate of title.
4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS ERRONEOUS.— The lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded
its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

B. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL/MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

a. What rule governs? Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court
i. Grounds. Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court
ii. Failure of party’s counsel to attend trial for lack of advance notice is an accident but not failure to attend due to
forgetfulness.

TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963

FACTS:
On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor
Mangoba and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former.
Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also
interposed separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor their
counsel appeared, so that the trial court received Talavera’s evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was rendered in
favour of Talavera.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated that
the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza which was
evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2, 1958, however,
one day ahead of the date, the trial court denied said motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the motion for new
trial, the court a quo deprive him of his day in court.

RULING:
Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not, motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the
reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case, however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained
and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new trial, accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical certificate,
were presented. Said motion for new trial could well be considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since it contained
allegations purporting to show the presence of good defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more appropriately had the
lower court given appellant the chance to present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that payments had been made by
appellant to appellee, which were duly received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits consideration. After all, court
litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct liability of defendant-appellant to
appellee. A trial, by which both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way to find out such truth. A denial of this
chance, would be too technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of legitimate grievances, should not be barred by
technicalities (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v. Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial
court resolved the motion for new trial, one day before the date set for its hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the
documents (receipts of payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract appellant's claim. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and another entered, remanding the case to the court of origin, for the reception of
appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

iii. Failure to hire new counsel is not excusable.

ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961

FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for recovery of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas
Francisco. Only Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither Francisco
not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence, evidence was presented by the plaintiff’s. On August 23, 1956 a judgment has
been redndered in favour of the Antonio’s. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956, praying that the decision
dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside, alleging that their failure to appear during the hearing of the case was due to accident, mistake

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and excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to
the trial before he has the opportunity to open the same). This, however, was denied by the court. Francisco appealed to the CA,
denied. Appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the
appellant herein, to be heard.

RULING:
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the Rules of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could
have guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel did not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform
his routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his calendar. On this point, the learned trial judge commented:
Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto, the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not
excusable in view of his admission that he received the registry notice from the court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly registered
and that its envelope shows it came from the court which made the envelope and its contents so important that he should have
immediately opened the same and not just put it aside, that he misplaced the same is also indicative of his recklessness (See Gonzales
vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb. 29, 1956). Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all the time from March 24, 1956,
until the date of the trial on Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court about the nature of the registered notice
that was sent to him on March 24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a diligent counsel should do as required by
ordinary prudence. All he had to do was examine the records of this case. This Court noted that since it reconvened June 18, 1956,
counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week if not everyday. He had therefore, ample
opportunity to verify the nature of the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced upon his receipt thereof on
March 24, 1956. Little need be added to these observations of the trial court, except to state that lawyers should always be vigilant and
alert, in order to properly safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Upon the lawyers specially devolve the duty to evaluate the
urgency and importance of registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their trade.

b. Requisites for invoking newly-discovered evidence as a ground for new trial.

PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ

207 SCRA 632 (1992)

FACTS:
In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in
Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion
during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9, 1991). While standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of liquor,
who was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein), stood beside him. Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor of
Soliven, passed by, proceeding towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa. Appellant, who appeared drunk followed the girl but
Soliven did not mind. Instead, he went home.
Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard the cry of Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor,
Merly. When he went out of the house, he learned that Merly was raped and her dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6,
tsn, id.). Prior to Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of
the dead body of the victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There, the Mayor was informed that a man walking
suspiciously has [sic] just left the place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and overtook the man. The man was identified
as appellant and he was found with dirty clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained with blood. He also bore scratches on his
neck and arms. When asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant
only answered that on his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field. Because of his unsatisfactory explanation,
the police arrested him on that same morning on suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).
Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the
early dawn of March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay. Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to appellant,
who was among the four men inside the cell, as the person he saw. The victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten
years old while the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by
one Andoy Versoza, his landlord, to cook and prepare food for the latter's visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said date, he, together
with his two aunts, went around the plaza and watched some shows until midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another
bottle of beer until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled about the plaza for two hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile
near the highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go home, he

195
decided to walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay.
He vehemently denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he
was arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated
by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Nor is
the non-presentation of the victim's companions of any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it was never established that
the two companions were with the victim when she was on her way home or when she was raped and killed. It was duly established
that, after obtaining permission from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her cousin and her mother's sister-in-
law, and that immediately before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was following persons."Accordingly, her two
companions, who were not eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing of the victim. In any event, the prosecution
has the prerogative to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own assessment of their necessity. Every
objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for
objection shall become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived. Moreover, the bloodstains on the pants of the
accused were testified to by Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of scratches on his neck
and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused. Taken together with the other circumstances present here, this fact serves to
buttress the prosecution's case.

ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed. 31 In this case, the place
where the accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten meters away from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay
Pogomboa). 33 Furthermore, the place where he was questioned by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police
authorities is twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the victim was found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility
of the accused's presence at the crime scene, which is necessary is order that the defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-
year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a beast in
man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what he did in prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than
what he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y
Laoang.

C. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

D. PETITION FOR REVIEW/PETITION FOR REOPENING OF THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION. Section 32, PD 1529

a. Who may avail of the remedy? Section 32, PD 1529

i. Aggrieved parties in either ordinary or cadastral land registration proceedings may avail of the remedy.

GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San
Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo
Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court
issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from
Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in
possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the
court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under
Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does not apply to a cadastral proceeding.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).

HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and
certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.

ii. Defaulted party may avail of the remedy.

RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)

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FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2, L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with
the Court of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20
November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating
Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee Orellana. Petitioners-appellants filed a petition to annul the judgment and/or
review the decree of registration, alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to the respondent; that respondent, "by means of fraud,
made the court to believe that he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by means of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to
dismiss the petition. The court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that petitioners-appellants had no personality to
file their petition because they did not file an answer and were declared in default and that they should have first secured the lifting of
the order of general default, with respect to themselves, before they filed their petition for review.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496 need not be an original claimant in a cadastral
proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect to himself

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496, as amended, need not be an original
claimant in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect to himself. The aim of the
law in giving aggrieved parties, victimized by registration proceedings of their estate in land by means of fraud, the opportunity to
review the decree would be defeated if such parties would be limited to those who had filed their opposition to the petition for
registration or to first require them to procure the lifting of the order of general default before they could file a petition for review. The
essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the petitioner has a real or
dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance
of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The provision does not require that the
petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an answer and because fraud might intervene precisely to prevent a person from filing
an answer.

iii. Those entitled to a review of the decree are those who were deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the
original registration case.

CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)

FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance, Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the
registration of Lots 1 and 2, situated in the Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan, and more particularly bounded and described in the
technical descriptions (Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant spouses, Pedro C. Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On
September 20, 1965, the court ordered the issuance of the Decree, followed three months later by writ of possession in favor of the
spouses.Within a year from the issuance of this decree of registration, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a petition
for review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in petitioner’s taking advantage
of the insanity of respondent-ward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and between the petitioner and said
respondent-ward, and in petitioner’s instituting the land registration proceedings while said ward was confined at the National
Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not applicable because
respondent had opportunity to oppose the registration proceedings but abandoned his opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court

197
because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of fraud. It
rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the re-opening of the land registration proceedings.

RULING:
NO.Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity
to oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition.Under Section 38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review of the decree of
registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and not those
who were not denied for their day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening the decree of registration.
Thus, where an oppositor, through counsel, announced his opposition to the registration of the land involved but later abandoned the
same, he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day in court to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496;
and a petition for review of a decree of registration will be denied where the petitioner had notice of the original proceeding but failed
to substantiate his claim.

iv. A homestead applicant may avail of the remedy.

CRUZ vs. NAVARRO

54 SCRA 109 (1973)

FACTS:
Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II, Pasig) an
application for registration (under Act 496) of five (5) parcels of land with an aggregate area of four and one-half hectares, more or
less, situated in the municipality of Antipolo, province of Rizal. Under date of August 1, 1966, the respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro
issued a notice of initial hearing.On December 1, 1966, no oppositor having appeared, the court a quo, after a hearing ex parte,
declared the respondent spouses the owners of the five parcels of land. On January 3, 1967 the court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration.
On March 20, 1967 the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of Decree of Registration" in the court below alleging, among
others, that actually, petitioners ROSA CRUZ, CELEDONIA CABRERA, and LEONCIA CABRERA are the absolute owners and
possessors of, and/or the person having an irrevocable vested interest in, aforementioned Lots 1, 2 and 3 for the reason that lots form a
part of respective petitioner's Lot, Plan Psu-136628, which was originally a public land but to which said petitioners had perfected a
homestead right long before respondents secured aforementioned decrees and certificates of title, their homestead applications thereof
having been duly approved by the Bureau of lands and they having fully complied with all requirements for the acquisition of a
homestead and possessed and cultivated the same as their respective private property. On April 24, 1967, acting on the petition, but
without receiving any evidence in the premises, the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "the Court ... finds the petition for
review to be without sufficient merit and therefore DENIES the same." The petitioners then filed a "Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration" of the mentioned order, but this was denied on May 25, 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners has legal personality, as homestead applicants, to file this petition for review.

RULING:
YES.In Mesina vs. Pineda vda. de Sonza, the Supreme Court, citing Susi vs. Razon, held that once a homestead applicant has
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant, he acquires "not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government.”
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these words:
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead application (sec.
14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director
of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or before the land became the subject of cadastral proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately,
there was some delay in the ministerial act of in suing the patent and the same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had
adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to a
patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
It is the Court’s view that the petitioners have amply alleged below such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in question
sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality to question, independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of the grant of
title over the said properties to the private respondents.

v. A person who does not claim the land to be his private property but admits that such land is public cannot avail of
the remedy.

BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)

FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual occupants and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public
agricultural land designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at Bo. Langka, Lupon, Davao province, and that on October 12, 1965,
one Ramon Ombay, late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia Ombay had filed a free patent application for the land; that sometime on
September 11, 1964, one Rafael S. Yap had clandestinely filed a sales application for the very same parcel of land, which was
favorably by the land inspector of the Bureau of Lands who certified in the records the findings of his investigation as to the absence

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of any claimants of the land; and that as a result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the bureau personnel, Yap was
issued, the sales patent in December, 1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. P-18131 on February 11, 1966.
Petitioners prayed of respondent court that it annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the petition.

RULING:
A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an interest therein, in which case within one year from entry of the
decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse party.
But here, the land is not claimed to be private property of petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a part of the
alienable and disposable public land awarded under sales patent to Yap. Accordingly, since petitioner and his co-petitioners make no
claim of their application for a free patent to the land having been approved nor a patent their favor having been awarded, they had no
valid cause of action to file an action for annulment of Yap's patent and for cancellation of the title issued to Yap by virtue thereof.
Their claim based on alleged fraudulent issuance of title to the public land in favor of Yap should be addressed in proper
administrative proceedings to the Director of Lands, who if he finds the claim substantiated, may then take the necessary steps towards
the reversion of the land, to the public domain, and petitioners may then press for favorable action on their application and the award
of the land to the tenant. The mere reversion of the land to the State would not entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them,
which is beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied.

b. Where to file.

BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)

FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of 37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was
called for hearing on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an order of general default was entered. On the same date, however,
Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition
to the application, thereto attached, be admitted. Prior to October 1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's
counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was his
death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant herein, be substituted as party-oppositor. Although this motion was denied
on October 31 of the following year, appellant appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid. On February 16, 1959,
the court rendered judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688 in favor of appellees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having
filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that its order denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor
therein has deprived him of his day in court.

RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215
is res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action, being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot
prosper because it was filed more than one year from the date of the issuance of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as
provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal from said order.

c. When to file? 1 year from issuance of decree by LRA.

d. Essential Requisites.

WALSTROM V. MAPA JR.

181 SCRA 431

FACTS:
Cacao Dianson, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, filed for Free-patent application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365.
Josefa Mapa, predecessor-in-interest of respondent, filed for miscellaneous sales application. The lot was awarded to Josefa in 1934.In
1956, Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of Josefa of a camarin in “Portion A” of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Mapa countered
claiming that such area was awarded to her in public bidding.Bureau of Lands Investigator then investigated and found that Cacao
sold the land to a certain Agripino Farol. Agripino Farol also transferred the rights and interests to herein petitioner Walstrom.The
regional land director rendered a decision in favor of Mapa, excluding Portion A from Lot 1 of Psu-153657. The Director of Lands
reversed the decision. Mapa appealed with DANR but the appeal was dismissed. Upon reconsideration, however, the DANR Secretary
reinstated the order of the regional land director.Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was denied for being filed out of time.
Subsequent motions for reconsideration were also denied and the writ of execution in favor of Mapa was granted. Original Title issued
in the name of Mapa pursuant to miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971.In 1972, Wastrom filed with CFI Baguio-Benguet for
judicial relief as the prescriptive period is about to lapse but such petition was denied on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC?

RULING:

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 No. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five
essential requisites, to wit:
(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof;
(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the
piece of property in controversy. The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary, the
petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not have a real right over portion "A". The third element, the
records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title.

i.Actual or extrinsic fraud defined; differentiated from intrinsic fraud.

STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. RUIZ

30 SCRA 318 (1969)

FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro Cabasbas, owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815.
Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No. 4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose
A. de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a
compromise agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were
declared to be the registered owners of the western portion of the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per
Original Certificate of Title No. 615, the land subject of the petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968,
Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of the compromise agreement with the allegation that it was obtained
through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946 when
in fact it took place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead Law. Alleging res judicata, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the case. However, Judge Ruiz refused to dismiss the case asserting that the sale of a parcel of land was made on
September 14, 1944 in violation of the five-year period within which a transfer of a homestead patent is prohibited.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the judgment null?

RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no
end to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the
judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination
however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a
party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence.Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a
judgment. Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of
forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

ii.Specific instances of actual or extrinsic fraud.

RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)

FACTS:
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses filed an application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. An order of
general default was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or
record of the same was available.On March 30, 1960, the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the
ground of fraud. After trial, the court found that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents took possession of the
land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of P400.00 by way of antichresis.The trial court then ordered the reconveyance of the property. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Was there an actual or extrinsic fraud?

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RULING:
Yes. The averments in the petition for review of the decree of registration constitute specific and not mere general allegations
of actual and extrinsic fraud.The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land. They
positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This is clear misrepresentation. The omission and concealment,
knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud, when such
omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

e. A petition for reopening of the decree of registration is different from an action for reconveyance.

HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC.

G. R. No . 1 7 0 7 5 0 . April 7, 2009

FACTS:
In October 1997, filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and
Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents.Petitioners claimed in their Complaints
that they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were
forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and that the subject properties from which they were forcibly evicted were
not covered by respondents’ certificates of title.Respondents moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1)
prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. The trial court determined that the subject properties were already
registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the
said properties.The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration
and reconveyance of the subject properties.

RULING:
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a decree of registration may be reopened when a person is
deprived of land or an interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation obtained by actual fraud.On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.In both
instances, the land of which a person was deprived should be the same land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, which is not the case herein, if the Court considers the allegations in petitioners’ Complaints.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of respondents’ TCTs in their Complaints, there is nothing else in the said
Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are either petitions for reopening and review of the decree of registration under
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code.Instead, petitioners’ Complaints may be said to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria, an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of the subject properties, from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents.IN VIEW
OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

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 E. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

a. Legal Basis. Third paragraph Section 53 and 96, PD 1529

b. Requisites of an action for reconveyance.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO

[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)

FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the
acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau
of Lands.While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of
Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCT’s were then issued
in the name of Tanjuatco.Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages.Tanjuatco argued that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it was Cuevas who was alleged to have
defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between
Cuevas and NRSI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance.

RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title
is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.To warrant
a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in
the name of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but
within four years from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the
presence of these requisites.

c. Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name.

ALEGRIA VS DIRLONG, GR. NO. 161317, 16 JULY 2008

558 SCRA 459 (2008)

FACTS:
On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent
over the properties. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa
(spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon and spouses Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997, an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of the sale of Lot No.
3658 and Lot No. 3660.
Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith when they bought the properties as they were fully aware that
petitioners were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating and claiming portions of the properties. The petition for
reconveyance was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners, although occupants
of the properties, have no legal personality to assail the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon as well as the sale of the properties to
spouses Ybiosa.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may question the validity of the sale and ask for reconveyance of the properties.

RULING:

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 In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a free patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with
personality to file an action for reconveyance.Citing Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, the Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the
judgment in such suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.

i.Action for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of
Republic of the Philippines.

ii.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title were respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name to its rightful owner to one with a better right.

Daclag v Macahilig
G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008

FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which
she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made
therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was
issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The RTC
rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership;
and for this purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT
of which respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners.
An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia
in 1984, the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year
prescriptive period.

d. Reconveyance does not aim to reopen the proceedings but only to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to
the rightful owner.

BAUTISTA-BORJA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 136197 December 10, 2008

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 FACTS:
By petitioner’s claim, respondents, through fraud and deception, convinced her to take possession and cultivate parcels of
land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown to her, however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue
of Deeds of Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact which
she came to know about only in 1994.Petitioner thus filed a complaint before the RTC for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale and/or
Partition of Properties. The trial court held that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed as actions for reconveyance based on
implied trust prescribe in 10 years, and that laches had set in.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can still file an action for reconveyance

RULING:
Yes, the petitioner can.If the trial court finds that the deed of sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contract’s
nullity is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number of cases that an action for reconveyance of property based on a void
contract does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds that the deed of sale is merely voidable, then the action would have
already prescribed.”At all events, since the complaint on its face does not indicate that the action has prescribed, an allegation of
prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has
already prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits
and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.

e. When brought.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO

[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)

FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the
acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau
of Lands.While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of
Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCT’s were then issued
in the name of Tanjuatco.Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages.Tanjuatco argued that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it was Cuevas who was alleged to have
defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between
Cuevas and NRSI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance.

RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title
is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.To warrant
a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in
the name of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but
within four years from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the
presence of these requisites.

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. CA

149 SCRA 32 (1987)

FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a
portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the purpose of high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision.
However, in 1963, she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel of land, was used by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On
1963, respondent wrote the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and requesting
delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its alleged ownership of the
subject lot, having bought it from Simeona Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which dates
back to more than 30 years.

RULING:
It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which
is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma Leuenberger.Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in

204
 the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.

f. Purpose of an action for reconveyance.

RODRIGUEZ vs TORENA
79 SCRA 356 (1987)

FACTS:
Valentina Quiñones,the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 39,043
square meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017. The land was brought for registration before a cadastral court in 1922 and a
certificate of title was issued on August 7, 1950. After its issuance,the certificate of title was delivered to the petitioner by Atty. Suazo,
the respondents’ counsel in the cadastral case. On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a
complaint for ejectment and damages against the petitioner, alleging that they are pro-indiviso registered owners of the land and that
the petitioner illegally, maliciously, and by means of force and intimidation, entered the land in question and occupied approximately
27,500 square meters thereof.The petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentina Quiñones had already sold their rights over the land as
early as 1941 and 1950 either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus making him the rightful and legal owner of
approximately 27,899 square meters thereof; that he had been in the peaceful, continuous and public possession of the same; that there
was no lien, encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on the certificate of title so that the series of sales made in his favor, although
not registered and annotated thereon, are valid and binding between the parties, the said land not having passed to a third person.

ISSUE:
Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to
compel reconveyance of the property in question.

HELD:
A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens system is not barred from bringing
an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim
or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured
the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

g. Objective of the action.

ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)

FACTS:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and
now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession
against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as they have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the
opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch presided
over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash which
was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that
(1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to
motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered possession to Delfin however he
was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted. The sheriff turned over
the possession to the representative of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the premises he was again barred by the petitioner.
Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again, granted. Subsequently, the
writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The second resolve the
issue, a temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of
possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto
issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy.

RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the
Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in
question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but
only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil
action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.

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 Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in
the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar
conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a
rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but
if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy."An
action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.

h. Statutory basis of the action. Section 96, PD 1529

i. When to file the action.

DACLAG V MACAHILIG
G.R. NO. 159578 JULY 28, 2008

FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which
she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made
therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was
issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The RTC
rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership;
and for this purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT
of which respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners.
An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia
in 1984, the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year
prescriptive period.

i.An action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of
sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity which does not prescribe.

SANTOS VS HEIRS OF DOMINGALUSTRE, GR. NO. 151016, 6 AUGUST 2008,561 SCRA 120 (2008)

FACTS:
Dominga Lustre, who died on October 15, 1989, owned a residential lot. On September 20, 1974, Dominga Lustre mortgaged
the lot to spouses Santos and later sold it to the latter. Subsequently, Santos executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property to their
son. In April 14, 1994, Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with the RTC, Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages [6] against the son. The complaint alleged
that the spouses Santos simulated the Deed of Sale dated May 16, 1976 by forging Dominga Lustre’s signature.A lleging that the
plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCTs had long prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss. The RTC denied it. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA declared that
an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title does not exist prescribes.

RULING:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is
virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. [37] Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud
becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of
the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it
would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

j. Form of pleading.

CABRERA vs CA

206
163 SCRA 214 (1988)

FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land with an area of 4,080 square meters situated in Cainta, Rizal. It was
originally owned by the spouses Diego and Patricia Gonzaga, who acquired it in 1921, presumably with conjugal funds.Both are now
dead, survived by the private respondents, their grandchildren by their deceased children. The petitioners claim the property by virtue
of an alleged sale in their favor, the private respondents by right of succession.The records show that the tax declaration on the land
had since 1921 been in the name of the spouses Gonzagauntil 1944, when it was made in the name of Eliseo Gonzaga, one of their
children. In 1953, the tax declaration was again changed, this time in the name of Joaquin Cabrera. In 1970, the private respondents
filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the court of first instance of Rizal, claiming that the latter had no
right to the property. The petitioners, in their answer, invoked a sale made to them by Eliseo Gonzaga, who had previously purchased
the land from his parents, adding that they had been in possession of the property since 1944. Both parties adverted in their respective
pleadings to the petitioners' application for registration of the land under the Torrens system which was then pending in another
court. The petitioners claimed it was justified by their right of ownership while the private respondents contended it was a fraudulent
act that did not bind them.The trial court sustained the plaintiffs, herein respondents, after finding that their evidence remained
unrebutted, and declared them to be the owners of the disputed property. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower
court.

ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?

RULING:
An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed,
why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he can sue for reconveyance. The private respondents filed their
complaint because they were unwilling to recognize the registration proceedings for lack of compliance with the notification
requirements. They did not have to await its termination. As it happened, providentially, the registration was granted during the trial of
the plaintiffs' complaint for recovery of the property. Hence, their pending action could conveniently and properly be deemed an
action for reconveyance, filed within the one-year reglementary period prescribed by the Land Registration Act.And there were valid
grounds. The private respondents were able to establish that the transfer of the land had been made under fraudulent circumstances to
their detriment as the hereditary owners of the property. They also submitted that they had not received notice of the registration
proceedings and that no notice thereof had been posted on the subject land as required by law. These grounds were not controverted at
the trial.

k. Grounds for Reconveyance

i. Fraud.

ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)

FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of 2,273 sq. m was registered under the name of private respondent Ramon V. Delfin.On
February 13, 1978 private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde
.On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the representative of the private respondent. However, when
private respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent
asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa
Esconde for contempt of court.On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the
failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent. Petitioner then filed at Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have
filed a civil action for reconveyance. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for reconveyance because plaintiff's cause of action is
barred by res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in the name of another, for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. A
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System is not barred from bringing an action,
after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport
to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.In the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper
remedy because there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it
established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could
be claimed had long expired.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties.

HUANG vs CA
G.R. No. 198525, 13 September 1994

207
FACTS:
In 1965 Dolores Sandoval purchased two adjacent lots in Makati, but being advised by her sister-in-law Milagros that it is not
possible to acquire two lots in only one name, she registered the other lot in the name of her brother Ricardo. Then Dolores
constructed her house in the lot she bought, thereafter her brother also asked permission if he could construct a house on the lot
registered under his name, to which Dolores agreed to. Ricardo was also given permission to mortgage said lot in order to secure a
loan from SSS, and to be used on his construction of his house. In March 1968, Dolores was able to obtain a deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage over the property with the Huangs. In 1980, Dolores sought the help of the barangay to compel the spouses
Ricardo and Milagros to execute the necessary request to the SSS for the approval of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, as
well as for the release in her favor of the owner's duplicate certificate of title in its possession so that the deed could be duly annotated
on the title and/or a new certificate of title issued in her name. But no amicable settlement was reached. But on that same year, spouses
Ricardo and Milagros also filed a complaint against spouses Dolores and Aniceto for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale and
quieting of title.
The trial court consolidating the cases, ruled in favor of the Sandovals. It was shown that Dolores was the one who bought both the
lots, and even paid for the construction of a swimming pool and fencing of the subject lots. The petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals who also affirmed the lower courts decision.Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient ground for reconveyance of ownership to spouses Dolores and Aniceto?

RULING:
The Supreme Court noted that it was not possible for Ricardo to have bought or constructed such improvements on the
disputed lot on his earnings alone, as it was shown to be substantially insufficient. The Court agreed with the lower courts findings
that it was Dolores who bought said lots and made improvements on it. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was not impressed with the
contention of the petitioners that they were not aware that what they were signing was deed of absolute sale, from the evidence it was
shown that spouses voluntarily signed and read the contents of said document. Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property
which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of
another. Trust is either express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trust comes
into being by operation of law. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty
to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the
property arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a fiduciary duty, or
through the wrongful disposition of another's property. On the other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be
made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or holding
the property should have the beneficial interest in the property.
In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the purchase of
Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of title were placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was
advised that the subdivision owner prohibited the acquisition of two (2) lots by a single individual. Guided by the foregoing
definitions, we are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and respondent court that a resulting trust was created.
Ricardo became the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the
New Civil Code which provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the property. A resulting trust arises because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself.
Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that the 10-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens
certificate of title. This rule applies only to the remedy of reconveyance which has its basis on Sec. 53, par. 3, P.D. No. 1529.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties, a situation which does not obtain in this case. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the RTC, thereby dismissing the
petition.

ii. Implied or Constructive Trust. Possible defenses. Prescription and laches.

VILLAGONZALO VS IAC
167 SCRA 535 (1988)

FACTS:
In an action for reconveyance, RTC Leyte ordered the cancellation of transfer certificate title in the name of private
respondent Cecilia Villagonzalo. Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC), said decision of lower court was reversed.
The appellate court found out that the private respondent was able to loan an amount to her father in order that he can acquire
said land. Furthermore, the CA found the petitioners cause has already prescribed. The appellate court held that the issuance of
transfer certificate of title to the private respondent was already a notice of ownership to the whole world, thereby repudiating any
fiduciary or trust relationship involved. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal holdings that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date when adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the

208
property. Due to the inaction of the petitioners, the private respondent was made secure over her ownership on the subject land, and
thereafter spent time and money in introducing improvements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the land in the private respondents’ name was not a repudiation of the implied trust created
between her and their father.

RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court. An action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an
implied trust shall prescribe after ten years, since it is an action based upon an obligation created by law, and there can be no doubt as
to its prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten years is counted from the date adverse title to the property is
asserted by the possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title, which consequently was a repudiation of the
implied trust for the purpose of the statute of limitations, took place when trasfer certificate of title was issued in the name of private
respondent.
There is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961, private respondent refused to give any share in the produce of the
land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the property in her own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one Ramon
Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or retaliatory legal action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that an action to enforce an
implied trust may be barred not only by prescription but also by laches, in which case repudiation is not even required. Whether the
trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches. Petitioners were, therefore, correctly faulted for their
unjustified inaction. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

When prescription does not apply.

ALZONA vs CAPUNITAN
G.R. No. L-10228 (February 28, 1962)

FACTS:
The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in the Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto
Alomia and Cepriana Almendras, both deceased; they were survived survived by three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio Alomia and
Crispina Alomia.Arcadio Alomia married Ildefonsa Almeda but they did not have any children. When both Arcadio and his wife
Ildefonsa died, they were survived only by the two sisters of Ildefonsa namely Marciana and Narcisa and also by the nephews and
nieces of Arcadio. Narcisa is the mother of herein defendant Gregoria Capunitan married to Manuel Reyes.Eulogio Alomia, other
hand, is the father of plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria Alomia while Crispina Alomia is the mother of plaintiff Cornelio Alzona.Of the
three children of Sps. Perfecto and Cepriana Alomia, it was Arcadio and wife Ildefonsa who purchased and possessed the lands
originally claimed by their parents and was able to acquire title to two of the four lots in question. When Arcadio died, his widow
Ildefonsa, sold the lands in question to her niece Gregoria Capunitan (defendant) daughter of Narcisa Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-
appellants and in whose name new certificate of title was issued in 1928.
After Ildefonsa's death, plaintiffs herein instituted an action in the CFI of Laguna on October 11, 1929 for the recovery of the
lots; the case was set six times for hearing during 1930. The case was dismissed because of the non-appearance of the parties and their
attorneys. On January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same counsel filed another action for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210, 2968
and 2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for postponement from 1931 to 1936,nothing was done hence on August 31, 1936, the
court dismissed the case. The lower court found that the dismissal of these two cases was not due to an amicable settlement because of
defendant's recognition of plaintiffs' rights or to a promise to reconvey one-half of the property to them.

ISSUE/S: Whether the right of the appellees to ask for reconveyance of their ½ share of the land is already barred by prescription.

HELD:
The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust upon the defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared that
Ildefonsa held in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the plaintiffs; on which condition, the defendants had full knowledge. The sale
made by Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not void or inexistent contract, action on which is imprescriptible (Art. 1450,
N.C.C.). It is voidable, at most, and as such is valid until revoked within the time prescribed by law for its revocation, and that is
undoubtedly the reason why the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the appellees had the right to ask for a reconveyance of their
share, unless the action is barred by prescription". The prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust, is now a settled question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years.The cause of action of the plaintiffs against the
defendants accrued in 1928 when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots from Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being
for recovery of title to and possession of real property, the same should be brought within ten (10) years from 1928, or up to 1938
(Sec. 40, Act 190). But after the dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936, the plaintiffs-appellants went into a long swoon
only to wake up when they filed the present action on November 28, 1949 (according to the lower court) or January 28, 1950
(according to appellants). In the first case, 13 years had elapsed and in the second, 14 years. In either case, the action has long
prescribed.
Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendants-appellees being third persons, and having repudiated the trust and
expressed claim of ownership over litigated properties, by themselves and by their predecessors-in-interest, they have also acquired
the said properties by the law of prescription (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126; Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil.
642).

209
ALMARZAvs. ARGUELLES
G.R. No. L-49250 December 21, 1987

FACTS:
Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, situated in Cabatuan, Iloilo, originally belonged to respondents' predecessor-in-
interest, Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a 7,300 square meters portion thereof to petitioner and her husband, the late Leon
Almarza, who since then had been in continuous, peaceful, open and adverse possession thereof.The document evidencing the sale
between the parties was lost during the war, but sometime thereafter, the late Laura Pancrudo, mother of private respondents Asuncion
and Gilda Arguelles, executed an affidavit acknowledging the sale of said portion to petitioner and her husband. On the basis of said
affidavit, the Provincial Assessor issued a new tax declaration, beginning in the year 1945 to Leon Almarza, annotating at the back
thereof the aforementioned affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax declaration, covering the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815
sold to petitioner and her husband was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On the other hand, a new tax declaration, Tax Declaration No.
3909 was issued by the Provincial Assessor in the name of Romualdo Grana for the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815, described
therein as Lot No. 5815-A.
Sometime prior to July, 1950, Josefa Malote, mother of private respondents Gil and Balbina Pancrudo, filed for and in behalf
of her children and the late Laura Pancrudo an answer in Cadastral Case No. 78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321. In support of her claim
over Lot No. 5815, she presented in evidence Tax Declaration No. 3909 covering only a portion thereof designated therein as Lot No.
5815-A and a land tax receipt dated March 30, 1950 showing payment of the real estate tax for a portion only of Lot No. 5815 known
and described in the Tax Declaration as Lot No. 5815-A. On July 25, 1950, the cadastral court declared Gil and Balbina Pancrudo
owner of one-half undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and the late Laura Pancrudo as owner of the other undivided half share. Pursuant
to a decree of title, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-134, covering the entire Lot 5815 was issued in the name of said adjudicatees on
May 29, 1951. On November 1, 1951, Laura Pancrudo died, leaving private respondents Asuncion Arguelles and Gilda Arguelles
as her only children and legal successors-in-interest. On April 20, 1977, the said heirs instituted before the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo a case against petitioner for recovery of the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 in her possession and for damages. Basis of
the action was OCT No. 0-134 issued on May 29, 1951. Petitioner, in turn, interposed a counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed
portion of Lot No. 5815 in her favor. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents on the ground that petitioner's action
for reconveyance had prescribed more than ten years having elapsed from the issuance of said certificate of title.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner’s action for reconveyance has prescribed.
Whether or not laches have already set in against private respondents
right to assert their ownership over the subject land.

HELD:
We held that prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, which is, in effect, an action to quiet title against
the plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question. The reason, We explained, is "that as lawful possessor and owner of
the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of 48 years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her title."Private respondents obtained OCT No. 0-134 on
May 29,1951. Their action was instituted only on April 20, 1977, or after a lapse of twenty-six [26] years. The neglect or failure of
private respondents to assert their alleged right under the certificate of title for such unreasonable length of time makes them guilty of
laches.' They should now be held either to have abandoned or waived whatever right they may have under said certificate of title.
Private respondents ordered to cause the segregation of the disputed portion of 7,300 square meters from Lot No. 5815 of the
Cabatuan Cadastr and to reconvey the same to said petitioner. After the segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo is hereby ordered to cancel OCT No. 0-134 in the names of Balbina, Gil and Laura, all surnamed Pancrudo, and
thereafter to issue a new certificate of title covering said 7,300 square meter portion in favor of petitioner and another certificate of
title in favor of private respondents covering the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815.

iii. Express Trust.

TAMAYO VS CALLEJO

210
G.R. NO. L-25563 JULY 28, 1972

FACTS:
This action, initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was brought by Aurelio Callejo, originally against Mariano
Tamayo only, and, later, against his brother Marcos Tamayo, also, for the reconveyance of the northern portion of a parcel of land
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2612, in the names of said brothers. In due course, said court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The latter appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered a decision the
dispositive part. In 1940, Mariano Tamayo sold the land to Estacio, whose surveyor went to the land in 1952 to segregate it; that same
year Callejo registered his adverse claim to the land. Tamayo pleaded the statute of limitations as defense, but the court found that in
1918, when they had the land registered in their name, Mariano Tamayo, on his behalf and that of his brother, executed a public
document acknowledging that his deceased parents had sold a parcel of the land to Domantay.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the respondent Aurelio Callejo's cause of action, if any, had already
prescribed.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the decision rendered by the trial court.

RULING:
Tamayo argues that if the erroneous inclusion in his certificate of title of the parcel of land formerly sold by his parents to
Fernando Domantay created, by operation of law, an implied trust, the corresponding action for reconveyance of said parcel
prescribed ten (10) years from the accrual of the cause of action, on November 15, 1915, when OCT No. 2612 was issued, or long
before the institution of this case on June 25, 1952. The express recognition by Mariano Tamayo — on his behalf and that of his
brother Marcos Tamayo — of the previous sale, made by their parents, to Fernando Domantay had the effect of imparting to the
aforementioned trust the — nature of an express trust — it having been created by the will of the parties, "no particular words" being
"required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" — which express trust is a "continuing
and subsisting" trust, not subject to the statute of limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of prescription begins
to run only from the time of the repudiation.
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals did not err in overruling the plea of prescription. Also, petitioner questions the
right of Callejo to demand a reconveyance, insofar as it may affect the portion of 70,000 square meters sold by him to Proceso Estacio,
upon the ground that the latter is a purchaser in good faith for value. This is, however, a defense not available to petitioner herein,
aside from the fact that he has not even pleaded it in the trial court or otherwise raised it either in that court or in the Court of Appeals.
We note that the dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals declares that the land in question is "declared reconveyed" to
said respondent. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed made without a survey defining with precision the metes and bounds
of the area to be segregated for herein respondent, Aurelio Callejo. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the court of origin for
the preparation of a subdivision plan of the portion thus to be segregated and the judicial approval of such plan, and only after such
approval has become final and executory may the reconveyance be either made or deemed effected. SO MODIFIED, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this instance against petitioner Mariano
Tamayo. It is so ordered.

iv. Void Contract.

CASTILLO VS HEIRS OF MADRIGAL

G.R. NO. 62650. JUNE 27 (1991)

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 in
CA-G.R. No. 66849-R entitled "Spouses Mariano Castillo, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal, Et Al.,
Defendants-Appellees. On December 17, 1979, petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in
representation of the heirs of Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Manila for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages against private respondents
heirs of Vicente Madrigal and/or Susana Realty, Inc. and public respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Manila. On February 4,
1980, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; and (b) the cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations. On March 25, 1980, the trial court dismissed the complaint (pp. 120-126, Rollo). On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed in toto on August 5, 1982. Hence. the present petition.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioners’ action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and or reconveyance with damages is
subject to prescription
2.) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against private respondents.

RULING:

211
 Both courts ruled incorrectly. It is evident in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of the complaint, supra, that petitioners sought the
declaration of the inexistence of the deed of sale because of the absence of their consent. Thus, following the provision of Article 1410
of the Civil Code, this kind of action is imprescriptible. The action for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the
alleged void contract of sale. This pronouncement is certainly far from novel. We have encountered similar situations in the past
which We resolved in the same manner. One of these is the case of Baranda, Et Al., v. Baranda, Et Al., G.R. No. 73275, May 20,
1987, 150 SCRA 59, 73
However, there should be no debate that the action for damages against private respondents has already prescribed. In accordance
with Article 1144 of the Civil Code, 4 it should have been brought within ten (10) years from the date of the sale to Vicente Madrigal
and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72066 in his name on July 12, 1943, if against the heirs of Vicente Madrigal; or
within ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36280 in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. on
May 12, 1954, if against the firm.
Notwithstanding the discussion on the imprescriptibility of petitioners’ action for annulment of contract and transfer
certificate of title and/or reconveyance, the dismissal of their complaint by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action was correct. It was also Our ruling in the Baranda case, supra, (and in other previous cases) that only
as long as the property is still in the name of the person who caused the wrongful registration and has not passed to an innocent third
person for value will an action lie to compel that person to reconvey the property to the real owner. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification regarding the
issue on prescription.SO ORDERED.

F. ACTION FOR DAMAGES

a. Section 32, PD 1529
b. Against whom filed.

CHING VS CA
181 SCRA 9

FACTS:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of
Title correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land. By virtue of a sale to Ching
Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued. Consequently, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a petition for
administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and was granted. 13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed
by private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on
possession. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court. The summons and the complaint
were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.

ISUUE:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man
or his estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.

RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and
actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to
recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing. Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires "notice to all parties in interest."
Since ChingLeng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching
Leng.

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G. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE ASSURANCE FUND
a. Section 93 and 94 PD 1529
b. Who may file. Section 95, PD 1529

H. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE ASSURANCE FUND

a. Requisites.

I. REVERSION
a. Who institutes. The action is instituted by the government through the Solicitor General.
b. Grounds for Reversion.
i. In all cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the Constitution. Section 95, Chapter XII, Eo No. 292
ii. Where lands of the public domain are fraudulently obtained.

c. Improperly filed reversion suit.

YUJUICO vs REPUBLIC
GR. NO. 168861, 26 OCTOBER 2007

FACTS:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land located in
Parañaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI).The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of Castro. The Director of
Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a
decree of registration became final, and a Decree was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). An Original Certificate of
Title was issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro
was cancelled and a TCT was issued in Yujuico’s name over Lot1 while another TCT was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner
Augusto Carpio. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or
the acquisition of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of
land along the Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA
undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification
survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by
the PEA to the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal
of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages. Respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it
could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico
and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and states that after 28
years without being contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. On appeal, reversed the decision of
the lower court asserting that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their
inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private individuals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Government for reversion is proper?

HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on
the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands
Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding ‘… the same no longer forms part of Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot
be reached by water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report based on ocular inspections literally overturned the

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findings and recommendations of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C.
Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on projections in the
cadastral map or table surveys.
The recognition of petitioners’ legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal
acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that: “Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by
PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA
automatically becomes a member thereof.” Section 26, Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” The admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the
nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondent’s claim that the disputed land is
underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively precludes the
relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners’ lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Parañaque RTC.
Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of
the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already
precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.

J. CANCELLATION SUITS
K. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
a. What rule governs.
b. When brought. Rule 74, Rules of Court.
c. A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within 4 years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

GALICIA VS MANLIQUEZ
GR. NO. 155785, 13 April 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their predecessor, Juan, was the true and lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in Romblon. Such
land is declared in the name of Juan under various tax declarations. They alleged that after years of possession of said land, Juan was
driven away from the property through force by the heirs of Inez Ramirez and one of whom is defendant. Petitioners alleged that
because of poverty and lack of knowledge, Juan was not able to assert his right over the property but he informed his children that
they owned the land and that the continuous possession of the property by defendant has further deprived herein petitioners of their
right over the same.Defendants denied the allegations of petitioners in their complaint asserting that Juan was not the owner and never
took possession of the disputed lot. They also contended that the subject property was part of a larger parcel of land which was
acquired by Ines, predecessor-in-interest of defendant from a certain Juan Galicha who is a different person from Juan Galicia.
During the scheduled pre-trial conference, none of the defendants appeared. They filed a motion for postponement of the
pre-trial conference but it was belatedly received by the trial court. As a consequence, defendants were declared in default. Herein
petitioners, as plaintiffs, were then allowed to present evidence ex parte. On December 2, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioners declaring the plaintiffs as the true and absolute owner of the property, affirming and confirming the validity and
legality of plaintiffs’ ownership over the property and ordering defendants to vacate the land.
On December 1997, the RTC received a Motion for Leave of Court to intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention
filed by the compulsory heirs of Ines, among whom are herein respondents. They contended that the subject parcel of land forms part
of the estate of Ines which is yet to be partitioned among them; an intestate proceeding is presently pending in the RTC
of Odiongan, Romblon, the outcome of Civil Case, one way or the other, would adversely affect their interest; their rights would be
better protected in the said civil case; and their intervention would not unduly delay, or in any way prejudice the rights of the original
parties. The RTC denied the said motion to intervene on the ground that it has already rendered judgment and under Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court, the motion to intervene should have been filed before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
Defendants filed an appeal with the CA but CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of the defendants-
appellants to file their brief within the extended period granted by the appellate court. Subsequently, the trial court issued a writ of
execution dated March 3, 2000. On May 23, 2000, herein respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA
anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over their persons and property and on extrinsic fraud. On January 14, 2002, the CA
granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have lost such ownership by extinctive prescription because respondents and their predecessors
had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the subject lot for more than 40 years?

HELD:

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 As to the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or “stale demands” ordains that the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or
bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
In the present case, the CA found no evidence to show when respondents acquired knowledge of the complaint that
petitioners filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court finds that herein respondents' right to due process is the overriding consideration
in allowing them to intervene in Civil Case No. OD-306. Petitioners also fault herein respondents for their failure to avail of other
remedies before filing a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Petitioners cited the remedies enumerated by the RTC in its
Order of December 23, 1997. However, the Court notes that the remedies enumerated therein refer to those available to a party who
has been declared in default. In the present case, herein respondents could not have been declared in default, and thus could not have
availed of these remedies, because they never became parties to Civil Case No. OD-306.

L. QUIETING OF TITLE. Articles 476 to 481, Civil Code of the Philippines

M. CRIMINAL ACTION. (1) Article 312 ( Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property); and (2) Article 313
(Altering boundaries or landmarks).

PROCEEDINGS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION: VOLUNTARY DEALINGS

A. Voluntary and Involuntary Registration:

a. Distinctions between Voluntary and Involuntary registration

REBECCA LEVIN VS. JOAQUIN V. BASS 91 PHIL 420 (1952)

FACTS:

Rebecca Levin, widow, 65 y/o, illiterate & knew only how to sign her nameowner of a lot with 2 houses (No. 326 & No. 328)
located at San Rafael St., Manila.

At the end of Dec. 1943 respondent Bass called Levin at her house at No. 328representing himself to be a real estate broker
& asked if Levin wanted to sell her lot & house at No. 326 adjoining her residence w/c was at that time occupied &rented by Japanese
civilians, officers & employees of Pacific Mining & 2 rooms privately rented by Angelita Martinez Levin refused several times to the
offer until she gave in as Bass told her that with the proceeds of the sale, Levin can purchase another property at Antonio Rivera St.
w/c she will be gaining a better profit for renting it out & w/o the fear that the other house might just beappropriated by the Japanese
& she’ll be getting nothing in return Levin w/ her houseboy went twice to Antonio Rivera St. to check the property that Bass told her
she will be purchasing from the proceeds of the sale on the house & lot on No. 326 but they were not able to enter the second floor as
Bass told them that the owner is gone to Pampanga.

Relying on the presentation of Bass, Levin accepted the offer.Levin, Dr. Manlapaz & Angelita Martinez were conversing at
her house when Bass came & ask her to sign several documents which according to Bass were only Authority to Sell the property (no
copy was left to Levin).

Bass handed Levin Php 10K saying that it was the partial payment of the property w/c was sold to a Japanese & asked her to
give him the Torrens Title of the House & Lot --- w/c title was in the possession of Agricultural &Industrial Bank due to a mortgage
in the amount of Php 2k --- 2k was deducted from 10K & they went to the Bank to pay the debt & get the title --- remaining 8kwas
also taken by Bass as purported initial payment for the property at Antonio Rivera St. (w/ receipt but only 6k was in the receiptLevin
did not realized the difference in the amount).Bass gave Levin the rentals on the building at Antonio Rivera St. in order for Levin to
believe that she already owned that property.

Due to suspicions, Levin sought the help of Dr. Manlapaz regarding the property until they found out that the documents
Levin signed were

Deed of Absolute sale to one Estaquio – Php 30K for No. 326 house & lot ---w/c was later on sold to Bass for Php 65Kb.

Deed of Sale to Bass – Php 65K for No. 3289.

The Title of Levin was then cancelled & issued a new one in the name of Bass.
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 Bass mortgaged the property to Co Chin Leng to secure payment of PHP 70Kw/c was duly annotated in the title in
consideration of PHP 200K, Bass sold the No. 328 property to Mintu (PHP90K paid upon execution of the document & PHP 10K will
be paid upon the cancellation or removal of the notice of lis pendens & the balance of PHP 100Kto be paid to his bank after securing
the release of the mortgage to Co ChinLeng.

Deed of Sale & owner’s duplicate COT were presented to

the RD for registration with full payment of the fees

ISSUE:
Whether or not the entry in the day book of a deed of sale w/c was presented & filed at the RD &full payment of the
registration fees constitute a complete act of registration w/c operates to convey and affect the land.

HELD: Yes. Voluntary Registration

If the owner’s Duplicate Certificate be not surrendered & presented or if no payment ofregistration fees be made w/in 15 days, entry in
the book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey & affect the land sold.

Innocent purchaser for value having done the required steps in the registration, the sale in then presumed to be valid in both properties.

b. Effects of voluntary and involuntary registration

GARCIA VS CA, 95 SCRA 389 (1980)

FACTS:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons for the same lot, or
subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were
issued to replace the original title.

A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a
bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented for registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the
back of the OCT. Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT and that consequently, that title was
apparently not cancelled.

As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910 (“Lapus Title”) was issued to Lapus. Upon his death, the two
lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, who had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-
respondents. Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands even before 1910 of more than 70 years.

In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in land registration cases, alleging
that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court
adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235 (“Rivera Title”) was issued to the Riveras. Lots
5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in
their behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to Antonio Munoz. Munoz mortgaged
lot B to Associated Banking Corp.On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine National
Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two banks foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the
mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the title.
Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.

Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the land, had her adverse claims registered on the titles of lots 5
and 7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs issued to the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision.
Garcia and PNB appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles derived from it.

HELD:Yes. Lapus title prevails.

RULING:

Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or
ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another
title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so
considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never
possessed the same.

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 The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is
preferred in right) is followed in land resgistration matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of sale in favor of Lapus and the titles
issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter of public record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been
properly recorded, such record is a constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the
rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption cannot
be overcome by proof of innocence and good faith otherwise the very purpose of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The
bank should have made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot mortgaged.

B. Necessity and effects of registration in general

a. Entry in the primary book produces the effect of registration

b. There is effective registration once the registrant has fulfiiled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. BASA, Jr.

GR No. 149121. April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Spouses Basa loaned from NHA secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties. Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite
repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriff’s
Office in Quezon City. After notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest
bidder. On April 16, 1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owner’s duplicate copies of the
titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a
fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11, 1988. On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents
having redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership over the foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand
of NHA. NHA moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of possession, respondents, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention.Respondents theorized that the
instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in the custody of the civil registrar. Since the
sheriff’s certificate was only inscribed on the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, and not on the certificate of title in the possession
of the Register of Deeds, then there was no effective registration and the one-year redemption period had not even begun to run. Thus,
respondents asked the RTC, among others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the respondents to redeem the
mortgaged properties. NHA maintained that respondents’ right of redemption had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate
of sale was inscribed on their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991. RTC issued an Order admitting the
Petition in Intervention and treating the same as the petition to set aside sale. NHA filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the period of
redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly
kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by fire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale in the primary entry book of the register of deeds and on the
owner’s duplicate title is sufficient compliance with the requirement of law on registration.

HELD:

The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes
of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. NHA followed the
procedure in order to have its sheriff’s certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of title. It was not NHA’s fault
that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the custody of
the Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no reconstituted titles
available during the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as July
15, 1988. NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered,
the redemption period accruing to respondents commenced therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is reckoned
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.

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 c. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect land in so far as third persons are concerned

REPUBLIC VS RAVELO

FACTS:

On February 16, 1989, the Director of Lands issued Sales Patent No. 12458 covering the subject lot to respondent Ravelo. She was
subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4517 registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City.
The petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of title against Ravelo on November 6, 1992. The petitioner alleged that the
issuance of the patent by the Director of Lands violated DENR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20. This A.O. mandates that
applications for sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional office that has jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the
Director of Lands in Manila.
On March 24, 1994, a notice of lis pendens (indicating the pendency of the petitioner’s complaint) was inscribed as Entry No.
7219 on Ravelo’s OCT No. P-4517.

In a separate development, one Antonio Chieng filed on December 13, 1989 a collection suit against Ravelo, which suit led
to a judgment against Ravelo and the issuance of a writ of execution.
The Notice of Levy was registered with the Register of Deeds on March 17, 1993.

In the auction sale that followed, Wilson Chieng, Antonio Chieng’s son, won as highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
issued to Chieng and the sale was registered with the Olongapo Registry of Deeds on May 25, 1993.
The respondent-spouses Redondos subsequently bought the subject lot from Chieng. The parties first signed an agreement
for the purchase of the subject lot on May 11, 1993, and upon payment of the agreed purchase price, executed on December 20, 1993 a
deed of absolute sale.

On September 23, 1994, the final deed of sale covering the subject lot in favor of Chieng was inscribed as Entry No. 2419 on
OCT No. P-4517.
On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7209 covering the subject lot was issued to Chieng. Entry No.
7219 (the petitioner’s complaint for cancellation and reversion) was carried at the back of Chieng’s TCT No. T-7209.

Chieng and the Redondos entered into another deed of sale in the Redondos’ favor on November 21, 1994. This deed was
inscribed as Entry No. 7554 at the back of TCT T-7209 on December 20, 1994. On the same day, TCT No. T-7261 covering the
subject lot was issued to the Redondos.

RTC decided in the petitioner’s favor and cancelled Ravelo’s Sales Patent No. 12458 and OCT No. P-4517, Chieng’s TCT
No. T-7209, and the Redondos’ TCT No. T-7261.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in
good faith. The appellate court also declared the Redondos’ TCT No. T-7261 valid.
The appellate court ruled that the Redondos were buyers in good faith because they and Chieng entered their agreement for
the purchase of the subject lot on May 11, 1993 and executed their Deed of Sale on December 20, 1993, prior to the annotation of the
notice of lis pendens on March 24, 1994, and prior as well to any awareness by the Redondos of the existence of any flaw in the
vendor’s title.

ISSUE:

Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value

HELD:

May 11, 1993 agreement was not registered nor annotated in OCT No. P-4517 because it was technically a side agreement relating to
but not directly affecting the registered property, and was thus enforceable only between the parties – Chieng and the
Redondos. Thus, the government cannot be effectively put on notice of the May 11, 1993 agreement when it registered its notice of lis
pendens on March 24, 1994.

Thus, bereft of registration, any sale or transaction involving registered land operates only as a contract between the parties and
shall not affect or bind the registered property.

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 d. Constructive notice is also created upon registration of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land. It must be noted that computation of the
prescriptive period of any cause of action starts from the date when the cause of action accrues.

AFP-MBA VS SANTIAGO

G.R. No, 147559, June 2008

FACTS:

A Notice of Levy on Attachment on Real Property was issued in Civil Case No. Q-92-11198 entitled “The Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., Plaintiff, vs. Eurotrust Capital Corporation, Elsa B. Reyes, Rene
M. Reyes, Celedonio N. Reyes, Digna Blanca, Fernando C. Francisco, Ma. Cristina C. Cornista, EBR Realty Corporation and
B.E. Ritz Mansion International Corporation, Defendants, Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City”, levying all the
rights, claims, shares, interests and participation of EBR Realty Corporation in the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. PT-79252.

On September 14, 1994, the Notice of Levy was presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig
City. The Notice was entered in the Primary Entry Book under Entry No. PT-1305. However, it was not annotated on TCT
No. PT-79252 because the original copy of said title on file in the Registry of Deeds was not available at that
time. Aniana Estremadura, the employee who examined the notice of levy, kept the said document in the meantime “hoping
some later days said title may be found” as “at the time we were yet in turmoil or in disarray having just transferred from our
old office.”

On September 20, 1994 or six days after the presentation of the Notice of Levy, a Deed of Absolute Sale, executed
by EBR Realty Corporation in favor of Ines B. Santiago involving the same parcel of land covered by TCT No. PT-97252
was presented for registration and entered under Entry No. PT-1653.
The deed of sale was examined by the same employee who examined the notice of levy, but she failed to notice that
the title subject of the sale was the same title which was the subject of the notice of levy earlier presented. Unaware of the
previous presentation of the notice of levy, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. PT-94912 in the name of vendee Ines B.
Santiago on the basis of the deed of sale. It was only after the Register of Deeds had already acted on the said deed of sale
that Aniana Estremadura informed him of the presentation of the notice of levy.

Nevertheless, when the Register of Deeds discovered the error he immediately sent a letter to Ms. Ines B. Santiago
requesting her to surrender the documents, particularly the deed of sale and owner’s duplicate of TCT No. PT-94912 so that
he can take appropriate rectification or correction. Ms. Santiago refused to surrender the documents and owner’s duplicate of
said title.
The LRA is of the opinion that the subject Notice of Levy cannot be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912, except by order of the
court.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. It declared that to allow the inscription of the controversial levy on attachment upon
the title of respondent Santiago will be tantamount to prematurely declaring her as a buyer in bad faith of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether the notice of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912.

HELD:

The notice of levy on attachment in favor of petitioner may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912.

The entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primary entry book or day book of the Registry of Deeds on September 14,
1994 is sufficient notice to all persons, including the respondent, that the land is already subject to an attachment. The earlier
registration of the notice of levy on attachment already binds the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The fact that the deed of
absolute sale was dated February 24, 1994 is of no moment with regard to third persons.

The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Constructive
notice is also created upon registration of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land.

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 Superiority and preference in rights are given to the registration of the levy on attachment; although the notice of attachment
has not been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of the Register of Deeds produces all the effects which
the law gives to its registration or inscription.

e. It is only the act of registering the instrument in the RD for the province or city where the land lies which is the
operative act that conveys ownership or affects the land insofar as 3 rd persons are concerned.

SOSTENES CAMPILLO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513

FACTS:

Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos.
Santos however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which means that the land was still under de Vera’s name.

On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo obtained a judgment for sum of money. De Vera’s 3 parcels
of land, including those sold to Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and he was able to have
the lands be registered under his name.

ISSUE:

Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a
public auction and have it registered under his name.

HELD: Campillo has the right over the said properties.

RULING:

It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or
execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Santos purchase of the two parcels
of land may be valid but it is not enforceable against third persons for he failed to have it registered.

Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the
sale.
“The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in
all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies.”

The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the
certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

f. The act of registration creates constructive notice to the whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument
or court writ or process.

HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC 152 SCRA 253

FACTS:

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 Marron filed a case in court to compel Bazaar to execute a registrable deed of absolute sale in her favour. The court held that
Bazaar shall execute the said deed and to surrender the owner’s copy of the certificate of title. The decision became final and executor
but Bazaar refused to surrender the owner’s copy so the court executed the deed in behalf of Bazaar and a lis pendens is annotated in
the title of Bazaar. Later, it appears that the said land was again sold to Marasigan and a certificate of title was issued in her name.
Marron files in court questioning the title of Marasigan and asking it to be cancelled. The CFI dismissed it contending that the case is
premature since there is a pending relief filed by Bazaar. The IAC ruled that Marron is entitled to the land by virtue of the lis pendens
annotated at the back of the title.

ISSUE: Who has the better right of the property in question.

HELD:

The court held that the Marron has the better right. There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired
the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before
the filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world.
Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides:

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. — Every conveyance ... affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in
the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons
from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property
(T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice oflis pendens which the private
respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's title.

C. Formal and procedural requisites for registration in general

D. Nature of primary entry book

a. Date of mailing by registered mail is the date of filing for purposes of registration.

MINGOA VS LRC 200 SCRA 78

FACTS:

A deed of donation of several parcels of land was executed by petitioner in favor of his children on July 15, 1987. The deed
was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Romblon for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in the
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under Entry No. 181. Said Register of Deeds suspended
registration of the donation until the petitioner has secured the proper clearances from the Department of Agrarian Reform on the
ground that under Section 6 of Republic Act 6657, any disposition of private agricultural lands made prior to June 15, 1988, when the
Act took effect, must be registered within three (3) months from said date or on before September 13, 1988 to be valid.

The matter was elevated by petitioner en consulta with the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority LTA. On
November 27,1990 the LTA Administrator issued a resolution sustaining the stand of the Register of Deeds that unless the proper
clearances from the Department of Agrarian Reform are secured, the deed of donation may not be registered.

Hence this petition for certiorari whereby petitioner contends that Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court should apply in a
suppletory manner in that the date of the mailing should be considered the date of filing of the document in the office of the Register
of Deeds.

ISSUE:

What date would be followed in cases the case was delivered thru registered mail.

HELD:

The Court finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an instrument to the Register of Deeds for purposes of registration
should be considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the Register of Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds which shall be regarded as the date of its registration.

Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by registered mail to the Register of Deeds on September 9,
1988, said date is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the instrument, although the instrument was actually received
by said office only on September 20, 1988.

SEC. 1. Filing with the court, defined.—The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them personally with the clerk of the court or by sending them by registered mail. In
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the first case, the clerk shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions,
pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall
be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case.

The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the motion, pleading, or any other papers, which may include
instruments as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or registry
receipt.

E. Registration of Deeds of sale of conveyance and transfers

a. Registration requirements

b. Effects of registration

i. Registration of voluntary instruments of sale of land is the operative effect that transmits or transfers
title.

CANDIDA VILLALUZ, ET ALVS.JUAN NEME and FELICISIMA VILLAFRANCA

FACTS:

Maria Rocabo died intestate leaving a parcel of land granted her under Homestead Patent and was covered by an OCT. She
had 6 children, three of which is alive namely, Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria Villaluz, the remaining 3 were dead leaving their children
as representatives to their supposed shares.

After approval of her application but before granting the patent, Maria Rocabo donated a portion of the said land to Maria
and Patricia with two notarial deeds of Donation. Thus, the donation was accepted by the donee and took actual possession of their
respective portions. Maria cultivated and improved the said land; however, she and her sister Patricia forgot to present the deed of
Donations to the Bureau of Lands.

Subsequently, the patent was granted and an OCT was issued in the name of Rocabo. Because Sinforosa who had custody of
the title would not surrender it to the donee, unless given a portion, On September of 1939, Sinforosa, Maria and Patricia executed an
extrajudicial portion among themselves without the consent of their nephew and nieces.

By virtue thereof, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued under their name upon having representations that they were
only the heirs of the Deceased, Rocabo.

The 3 sister sold the land to Ramona Pajarillo wife of Adriano Mago and Angela wife of Juan Neme. On August of 1953, the
heirs of Adriano and Ramona sold their undivided interest to Juan Neme who sold the same to Villafranca.

Thereafter, the nieces of the 3 sisters came to know that the land that was being administered by their aunts were already cold
and in possession of the Defendants. Petitioner filed a complaint for partition and recovery of their respective shares. It also appears
that the deed of Sale of the land in favour of defendant had not been registered and recorded under CA 141 and Land Registration
Law.

The Lower Court dismissed the case. Thus, elevated to the SC.

HELD:

The deed of Extrajudicial partition was fraudulent and vicious, the same having been executed among the three sisters
without including their co-heirs who has no knowledge of and consent to the same. Under the time-honored principle of Nemo dat
quod non habet, the three sisters could not have sold what did not belong to them.

Section 4, Rule 74 refers only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased by the heirs who make such
partition among themselves in good faith, believing that they are the only heirs with the right to success. The heirs who participated in
the extrajudicial settlement were possessing the property as administrators or trustees and in behalf of the other co-heirs who were
excluded, Such co-heirs have the right to vindicate their inheritance regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, the 2 year limitation is not
applicable to those who had not taken part in the settlement or who had no knowledge of the same.

ii. When a portion is sold and the sale is annotated in the owner-seller’s title, the buyer becomes the owner
of the portion as of the registration of the sale despite title being in the name of the owner-seller.
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PURIFICACION ALARCON and ROSAURO ALARCON VS.
HONORABLE ABDULWAHID BIDIN

FACTS:

The property involved is located in Malugatay, Zamboanga covered by an OCT in the names of Roberto Alarcon and
Guillerma Trinidad.

Roberto (father of herein petitioners) leased the property to Esteban Sergas which was duly recorded in the OCT. After 3 yrs,
Roberto sold a portion of his undivided share to Esteban Sergas which was entered in the title and cancelling the lease. Denying the
genuineness of the "Escrituras de Venta" under oath, and alleging that the thumbmark in the Deed of Sale in favor of Esteban Sergas is
not Roberto Alarcon's nor is he "Alberto" Alarcon, and that the document in favor of Adela Alvarez was neither signed by Roberto,
petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed suit for recovery of what they allege is their portion of cadastral lot 3178 on October 23, 1978.

On July of 1928, Roberto sold another portion of his share to Adela Alvarez who sold the same to Domingo Rojas Francisco.
Private respondents move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is barred by laches. However, petitioners opposed o the
ground that no prescription can lie against their father’s recorded title.

The RTC judge dismissed the complaint as it is barred by laches and denied reconsideration.

HELD:

Petitioners' allegation that their deceased father, Roberto Alarcon, never sold the land in litigation is refuted by the "Escrituras de
Venta" which he had executed, one in favor of Esteban Sergas, and the other in favor of Adela Alvarez. The denial by petitioners of
the genuineness of the deeds is overcome by the fact that from the date of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1926, the latter had taken
possession of the property and has been in adverse possession under claim of ownership ever since, followed by his successors-in-
interest, the private respondents surnamed Sergas. Similarly, the other vendee, Adela Alvarez, also took possession from the date of
sale in her favor in 1928 until she sold her portion in 1954 to private respondent Domingo Rojas Francisco, who has also been in
uninterrupted possession since said date. Noteworthy also is the fact that from the dates of the sales in 1926 and 1928, respectively, up
to the time of his death in 1960, or approximately at least 32, and at the most 34 years, the vendor Roberto Alarcon took no steps to
rescind the sales nor reivindicate the property. And as far as petitioners are concerned, more than 50 years had elapsed since the
execution of the deeds of sale in 1926 and 1928 and the date they instituted suit for recovery of possession in 1978. Clearly, their
passivity and inaction and, before them, that of their father, constituted laches. As held by respondent Judge, their cause of action must
be considered barred for it has been converted into a stale demand. And, although, as petitioners claim, the defense of laches is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss there would be no point to continue litigating this case in view of the finding that petitioners are guilty
thereof.

True, land registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, as petitioners correctly
contend. The protection given by law is in favor of registered owners. As it is, although title to the disputed property is still in the
name of Roberto Alarcon, it has been subjected to the registration in 1963 of the sale made by him to Esteban Sergas. Technically,
therefore, the latter became the owner in 1963 of the portion of the land sold to him. It may also be stated that if petitioners' cause of
action in seeking the nullification of the sales is predicated on fraud, the same has prescribed for not having been brought within four
years from the inscription of the deed of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1963.

iii. Rule extends to sale of real estate as a result of foreclosure or execution sale.

SOSTENES CAMPILLO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513

FACTS:

Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos.
Santos however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which means that the land was still under de Vera’s name.

On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo obtained a judgment for sum of money. De Vera’s 3 parcels
of land, including those sold to Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and he was able to have
the lands be registered under his name.

ISSUE: Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased
it at a public auction and have it registered under his name?

HELD:

Campillo has the right over the said properties. It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a
result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date

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of its registration. Santos purchase of the two parcels of land may be valid but it is not enforceable against third persons for he failed
to have it registered.

Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the
sale.

“The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in
all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies.”

The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the
certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

c. Rule that buyer is not required to go beyond the certificate of title; purchaser in good faith.

i. The purchaser is only charged with notice of the burdens in the property which are noted on the face of
the title.

ABELARDO IBARRA, CELESTE IBARRA VS. FAUSTINO IBARRA, SR.

FACTS:

Spouses Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales bought on installment basis two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot No.
5 (the lot on which they later erected a house of strong materials) and Lot No. 6. from the San Juan Subdivision. On 19 December
1951, Filomena Morales died, as a consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 45070 and 46235, were issued by the Register of
Deeds of Manila solely in the name of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. as widower.

In a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 6 August 1971, Faustino Ibarra, Sr. conveyed the two (2) lots, including the house on Lot
No. 5 which belonged to the dissolved but undistributed conjugal partnership of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales, for the
price of P40,000.00 to spouses Alfredo de la Rosa and Concesa P. de Regla. On 29 September 1971, petitioners herein, claiming to be
the legitimate children of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and the deceased Filomena Morales, filed on action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying, among others, for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 105276 and 105277. The lower courts upheld in toto the sale executed by defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. in favor of spouses de la
Rosa and de Regla.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale and the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and 105277 be
nullified.

HELD:

Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, was sold
by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the
Court held that the purchaser acquired a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this
rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He
is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To
require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system.

ii. But mere registration is not enough, good faith must concur.

MARIA P. VDA. DE JOMOCVS.THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The subject lot in Cagayan de Oro City forms part of the estate of the late Pantaleon Jomoc. Because it was fictitiously sold
and transferred to third persons, petitioner Maria P. Vda. Jomoc, as administratrix of the estate and in behalf of all the heirs, filed suit
to recover the property before the trial court of Misamis Oriental. The case was decided in favor of Jomoc and was appealed by
Mariano So and one Gaw Sur Cheng to the Court of Appeals. While pending the appeal, Jomoc executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale of Land with private respondent for P300,000.00. The document was not yet signed by all the parties nor
notarized but in the meantime, Maura So had made partial payments amounting to P49,000.00. Mariano So, agreed to settle the case
by executing a Deed of Reconveyance of the land in favor of the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc. On February 28, 1983, the heirs of Jomoc

224
executed another extra-judicial settlement with absolute sale in favor of intervenors Lim Leong Kang and Lim Pue filing. Later,
Maura So demanded from the Jomoc family the execution of a final deed of conveyance.

Maria So sued petitioners-heirs for specific performance to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registrable deed of
sale over the lot. Maura So had backed out from the transaction that the Jomocs executed the other extrajudicial settlement with sale of
registered land in favor of the spouses Lim for a consideration of P200,000.00 part of which amount was allegedly intended to be
returned to Maura So as reimbursement. The lower court, finding that there was no sufficient evidence to show complainant-
respondents' withdrawal from the sale, concluded that: (1) the case is one of double sale; (2) the spouses-intervenors are registrants in
bad faith who registered their questioned deed of sale long after the notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 8983 was recorded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent sale to petitioner spouses Lim is null and void.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly ruled that the spouses Lim do not have a better right. They purchased
the land with full knowledge of a previous sale to private respondent and without requiring from the vendors-heirs any proof' of the
prior vendee's revocation of her purchase. They should have exercised extra caution in their purchase especially if at the time of the
sale, the land was still covered by TCT No. 19648 bearing the name of Mariano So and was not yet registered in the name of
petitioners- heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc, although it had been reconveyed to said heirs. Not having done this, petitioners spouses Lim
cannot be said to be buyers in good faith. When they registered the sale on April 27, 1983 after having been charged with notice of lis
pendens annotated as early as February 28, 1983 (the same date of their purchase), they did so in bad faith or on the belief that a
registration may improve their position being subsequent buyers of the same lot. Under Article 1544, mere registration is not enough
to acquire new title. Good faith must concur. The ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
in the Registry of Property.

iii. Good faith purchase is availed of only in cases involving registered lands.
iv. A buyer responding to a newspaper advertisement is in good faith.

SPS. JUANITO R. VILLAMIL and LYDIA M. VILLAMIL VS.

LAZARO CRUZ VILLAROSA

FACTS:

Spouses Juanito and Lydia Villamil (petitioners) represented by their son and attorney-in-fact, Winfred Villamil, filed a
complaint for annulment of title, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages, and injunction against the Spouses Mateo and
Purificacion Tolentino (Spouses Tolentino), Lazaro Villarosa (Villarosa) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the RTC of
Quezon City.

The complaint alleged that petitioners were the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Siska Subdivision, Tandang
Sora, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 223611; that Juanito Villamil Jr. asked permission from his
parents, petitioners herein, to construct a residential house on the subject lot in April 1986; that in the first week of May 1987,
petitioners visited the lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a certain Villarosa; that petitioners proceeded to
the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify their title; that they discovered a Deed of Sale dated 16 July 1979 which they purportedly
executed in favor of Cipriano Paterno (Paterno) as the vendee; that they later found out that the TCT in their names was cancelled and
a new one, TCT No. 351553, was issued in the name of Paterno; that a Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor
of the Spouses Tolentino, and; that on the basis of said document, TCT No. 351553 was cancelled and in its place TCT No. 351673
was issued in the name of the Spouses Tolentino. Three months later, the Spouses Tolentino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Villarosa for the sum of P276,000.00. TCT No. 354675 was issued in place of TCT No. 351673.

Spouses Villamil asserted that the Deed of Sale in favor of Paterno is a falsified document because they did not participate in
its execution and notarization. They also assailed the Deed of Assignment in favor of the Spouses Tolentino as having been falsified
because the alleged assignor is a fictitious person. Finally, they averred that the Deed of Sale between Spouses Tolentino and Villarosa
is void considering that the former did not have any right to sell the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Tolentino are buyers in good faith; and Villarosa, the present registered owner, is a buyer in good
faith.

HELD:
The court declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa.

In the instant case, there were no traces of bad faith on Villarosa’s part in acquiring the subject property by purchase.
Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper advertisement for the sale of a parcel of land with an unfinished structure located in Tierra
Pura, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. He contacted the number specified in the advertisement and was able to talk to a certain lady
named Annabelle who introduced him to the owner, Mateo Tolentino. When he visited the site, he inquired from Mateo Tolentino
about the unfinished structure and was informed that the latter allegedly ran out of money and eventually lost interest in pursuing the
construction because of his old age. Villarosa was then given a copy of the title. He went to the Register of Deeds and was able to
verify the authenticity of the title. He also found out that the property was mortgaged under the name of Mario Villamor, who turned
225
out to be the employer of Tolentino. Upon reaching an agreement on the price of P276,000.00, Villarosa redeemed the title from
Express Financing Company. Thereafter, the property was released from mortgage and a deed of sale was executed. Villarosa then
secured the transfer of title in his name.

Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already been transferred from the name of the
owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will
acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title.

Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate
of title. When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than
what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. He examined the transferor’s title, which was then under the name of Spouses
Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino.

d. Exceptions to the above rule; instances when buyers can go beyond the title

i. When there exists important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go
beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it; prime property transferred with
unusual haste.

EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a Deed
of Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain Medina who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously entering a false
record in the records of the Land Registration Commission. Eventually, the true owners of the said land, the de Leons, discovered that
another title was fraudulently issued to Medina over the same parcel of land. De Leon was able to have the said title annulled as well
as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by virtue of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eagle Realty is an innocent purchaser.

HELD:
No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of
proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving the ordinary presumption of good faith.

Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its Answer, petitioner merely alleged that it is an innocent purchaser for value
since it acquired the land from Pilarita Reyes for P1,200,000.00, without notice of any defect in her title and after verifying the
genuineness of the title in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the LRC. However, petitioner did not present any proof that would
substantiate this allegation nor did it present any evidence to show that it took other steps to verify the authenticity of its predecessor's
title.

Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be
considered a purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there
exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the present title and to
investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.

Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business. A corporation engaged in the buying and selling of
real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the property
subject of its business transaction. Similar to investment and financing corporations, it cannot simply rely on an examination of a
Torrens certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its condition is not apparent in the document.

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 ii. Failure to make the necessary inquiries as facts may warrant.

EGAO VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989

FACTS:

Private respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao, who claimed themselves as the legitimate owners and possessors of
two parcels of land situated in Bukidnon, filed a verified complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and
Ownership against petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. Allegedly, sometime in June 1983, herein petitioners occupied illegally
portions of the land, which they bought from Marfori. Petitioners, however, asserted that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the
subject parcels of land and that he and his family have been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possession thereof even
before the issuance to him of the free patent; that the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against alienation under CA
No. 141; and that the instant case was the fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and is part of respondents' scheme to grab said
parcel of land from the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deeds of Sale executed between the purchasers and the petitioners is valid.

HELD:
No. Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five year period are null and void. No title passed from
the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein respondents.
Moreover, respondents are not innocent purchasers for value. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and
closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making any further
investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers
for value have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title.

iii. Presence of strong indications to impel closer inquiry as dictated by common sense.

FRANCISCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-30162 August 31, 1987

FACTS:
Nicolasa Resurreccion, the owner in fee simple of a three parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, sold Lots Numbered 3 and
9 to one Agustin Esguerra. On March 16, 1926, Esguerra sold the same two parcels to the spouses, Pedro Francisco and Francisca
Tolentino. The spouses registered the sale under Act No. 3344, and declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of Pedro
Francisco. Afterwards, the property was declared in the name of their son, Candido Francisco, the petitioner, who continued in
possession of the property after his parents’ demise. Three years later, Resurreccion executed another deed of sale dated conveying all
the three parcels of land covered by her title, in favor of a certain Felisa Afable, who registered the sale under the Torrens Act and
obtained title in her own name. Thirty-one years afterwards, Afable sold the property to the persons now private respondents. Espiritus
asked Francisco to vacate lots Numbered 3 and 9, which the latter was occupying and on which was in fact standing a house that he
had constructed. As might be expected, Candido refused. The Espiritus thereupon sued him for recovery of title and possession in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.

ISSUE:Whether or not under the admitted facts, the Espiritus are buyers in good faith, and therefore entitled to the full protection of
the Torrens Act.

HELD:
No. There were sufficient strong indications to impel a closer inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two
smaller lots embraced in the purchase on the part of Casimiro Espiritu and his co-vendees. That inquiry is in truth dictated by common
sense, expected of a man of ordinary prudence. Had that inquiry been made, the adverse claim of Candido Francisco over the two
small lots would have immediately come to light, and the controversy would have died a-borning.
The Espiritus’ failure to undertake such an inquiry precludes their successful invocation of the character of purchasers in
good faith. The buyer, who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of
another, is a buyer in bad faith, such knowledge being equivalent to registration.

iv. Purchase of land not from registered owner but from someone whose name is only annotated as a buyer
at the back of the owner’s copy of the title.

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QUIÑIANO vs CA 39 SCRA 221, May 31, 1971

FACTS:

The original owners of the disputed parcels located in Pangasinan were the spouses Fabiano Sarmiento and Tomasa de
Guzman obtained a "titulo real de composicion gratuita". The spouses had two children.

One of them was Joaquina, the mother of the principal petitioner, Marta Quinano. In 1932, there was an extra-judicial
partition adjudicating such lots to Jose and Marta Quinano filed an application for a free patent in 1941 in order to acquire the same
and she was successful. She was likewise able to take possession during the early part of the Japanese Occupation.

It was not until a complaint for reconveyance with damages was filed with private respondents as plaintiffs wherein they
alleged that the free patent was obtained by Quinano without their knowledge and they learned that she had sold Lots 6 and 8 as well
as three-fourths of Lot 5 to a certain Felix Capito; on December 7, 1946, she sold the remaining one-fourth of Lot 5 to Antero
Sanchez, with the former in turn having transferred his rights to now petitioner Celedonio Fermin without such vendees, however,
obtaining any certificate of title in their names. were sustained in the lower court decision as to Lots 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 11.

Their action was dismissed as to Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8. Their action was dismissed
as to Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8 and elevated the matter to the CA and it decreed a reconveyance
in their favor as well as ordering the receiver appointed "to deliver these properties unto the plaintiffs as well as the net harvest during
his receivership.” Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in its judgment sustaining an action for reconveyance of three parcels of land in favor of
private respondents.

HELD:
The law was correctly applied. In a 1953 decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of
the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the
decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages." In the language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon,: "A different view would
encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." It would indeed be a signal failing of any
legal system if under the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is
entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the
perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions from the SC, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against. So it has been before and so it should continue to be. The decision
of the respondent court is affirmed.

v. A purchaser of a land whose title contains a notice of lis pendens is a purchaser in bad faith.

PNB VS CA 98 SCRA 207 (1980)

FACTS:

At the cadastral proceedings during the adjudication of the conjugal property of spouses Iñigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver, the
Cadastral Court rendered a decision and a decree of registration of the lot was issued. Thereafter, a corresponding title in the name of
the spouses Iñigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver was likewise issued and in the Registry Books of the RD of Ilocos Norte. Before the issuance
of the said original certificate however, Iñigo Bitanga died. On October 20, 1936, Rosa Ver mortgaged the entire property in favor of
the PNB. In the meantime, Rosa Ver had defaulted in the fulfillment of her obligation with the Manila Trading Company so the said
company levied upon her share in the lot in question and had the attachment annotated on the title. Rosa Ver's interest in the lot
afterwards sold at public auction, at which the MTCom was the highest bidder and the deed of sale in favor of the MTCom was
annotated on the title.

Because Rosa Ver failed to settle her obligation with thePNB, the latter sold at public auction the whole lot and PNB
emerged as the highest bidder. After the period of redemption had expired, the PNB consolidated its title over it but it was not
annotated upon the owner's duplicate certificate of title. Later, the PNB presented a petition before the trial court asking that the
owner's certificate of title No. 7683 be declared null and void, and a new certificate of title be issued in its name. The trial court
favored them. Later, the PNB sold the property in question to Felizardo Reyes. On November 16, 1960, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors finding and holding that: (a) The lot in question is a conjugal partnership property,
one-half of which must go to the heirs of the late Iñigo Bitanga; (b) The other half goes to Rosa Ver as her share; (c) That Felizardo
Reyes is not a purchaser of a registered land for value and in good faith, and (d) Since the issuance of TCT No. 3944 in favor of the
PNB, and Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 3944, in favor of Felizardo Reyes were without legal basis, they are declared nun
and void and cancelled.On appeal by PNB and Felizardo Reyes to the CA, respondent Court affirmed the judgment appealed from
except letter (d) thereof and ordered the RD to issue another certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs and intervenors.

ISSUE: Whether or notThe CA erred in holding that the mortgage deed is valid and existing only with respect to the one-half portion
of the lot in question allegedly belonging to the mortgagor Rosa Ver as her share in the conjugal partnership with her husband Iñigo
Bitanga.

HELD:
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 The SC fullyagree with the trial court and the respondent Court and affirm the holding that "what the Philippine National
Bank had acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was simply one-half (½) of the entire property, for this was all she had in
her power to convey — the other half being, as it still is, the lawful share of the plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their father,
Iñigo Bitanga. Nemo date quod non habet — One cannot give what is not his. There is no dispute that the document of mortgage
executed by Rosa Ver was in accordance with the formalities required by law and that was register in the day book of the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Norte within a month after its execution. What is here contested is whether Rosa Ver could, as she did in fact, m the
entire Lot 9068 to petitioner PNB. In other words, the issue refers to the intrinsic vanity of the mortgage, as distinguished from its
formal sufficiency.

Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code), one of the essential requisites to the contract of pledge and
mortgage is that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493, New Civil
Code (Art. 399, Old Civil Code), each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. And also applying the law in force at
the time of Inigo Bitanga's death in 1935, Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse, cannot take part legally in the sharing of the estate left by her
deceased husband (one-half (½) of Lot 9068) with respect to which she only had usufructuary rights. "The usufructuary not being an
owner, cannot alienate or dispose of the objects included in the usufruct. Thus, he cannot ... mortgage or pledge the thing.

Therefore this court reject PNB's contention that the mortgage constituted by Rosa Ver in its favor on October 20, 1936 is
valid and covers the entire property known as Lot 9068. And a purchaser of a land whose title contains a notice of lispendens is a
purchaser in bad faith.

vi. A statement that buyers purchased land “with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of their
vendors” is enough proof of their bad faith.

BERNALES vs IAC

FACTS:

The lot in question was a public land which was cadastrally surveyed. Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio Siagan
whose mother is Cagaoay Camiling and Augusto Siagan whose mother is Dagaoan Sawadan. Both sons of Henry Siagan and their
successors-in-interest are the contending parties in this case, claiming ownership of the land in question.

Petitioners claim that Dagaoan Sawadan acquired ownership over subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession since time immemorial. Augusto Siagan inherited Lot 1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 16, 1967 that he inherited the same from his late grandmother, sold the lot in question to the Pasimio spouses and
registered said instrument. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought
the same for the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the actual occupants-tenants. Said tenants are now the petitioners herein.
Elpidio Siagan applied in September, 1967 for Free Patent over said lot on 1968. Subsequently, the original certificate of title covering
said lot, was issued in the name of Elpidio Siagan.On May 5, 1973, or after the lapse of five (5) years, Elpidio Siagan sold it to the
spouses Cadiam, and the TCT was issued in their names.

Following their purchase, said spouses took possession of the land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners on
1974, forcibly dispossessed them uprooting the plants of said couple who then brought a criminal complaint for theft of rice plants
against the petitioners. This led to the referral of the criminal charge to the Court of Agrarian Relations but because petitioners
claimed ownership in their answer before the CAR, spouses Cadiam filed a civil action for recovery of ownership of the same lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a
Transfer Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have evidently a better right than herein petitioners

As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed and who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the
time of the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the Court of Appeals, innocent purchasers for value and above all considerations, are
entitled to the protection of the law.

Petitioners admitted that the land in dispute was originally public land. According to them it became private land because of
the long possession of Dagaoan Sawadan. They allege that she had been in possession since 1908 and that she brought said lot to the
marriage which as will be noted was allegedly also in 1908 giving credence to the fact that said lot was formerly owned, occupied and
possessed by Henry Siagan since time immemorial, as agreed and stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference. Under the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that whether Lot 1494 descended from Henry Siagan as claimed by private
respondents or from Dagaoan Sawadan, the mother of Augusto Siagan as claimed by the petitioners, it is undeniable that Augusto
229
Siagan had already quit-claimed, ceded and conveyed whatever rights or interest he had over said lot in favor of Elpidio Siagan.
Petition for review on certiorari is denied.

vii. A buyer who purchases land with full knowledge of a previous sale to another person cannot be
considered in good faith notwithstanding that the second sale was registered.

VDA. DE JOMOC VS CA

FACTS:

The lot in question was a public land which was cadastrally surveyed. Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio Siagan
whose mother is Cagaoay Camiling and Augusto Siagan whose mother is Dagaoan Sawadan. Both sons of Henry Siagan and their
successors-in-interest are the contending parties in this case, claiming ownership of the land in question.

Petitioners claim that Dagaoan Sawadan acquired ownership over subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession since time immemorial. Augusto Siagan inherited Lot 1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 16, 1967 that he inherited the same from his late grandmother, sold the lot in question to the Pasimio spouses and
registered said instrument. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought
the same for the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the actual occupants-tenants. Said tenants are now the petitioners herein.
Elpidio Siagan applied in September, 1967 for Free Patent over said lot on 1968. Subsequently, the original certificate of title covering
said lot, was issued in the name of Elpidio Siagan.On May 5, 1973, or after the lapse of five (5) years, Elpidio Siagan sold it to the
spouses Cadiam, and the TCT was issued in their names.

Following their purchase, said spouses took possession of the land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners on
1974, forcibly dispossessed them uprooting the plants of said couple who then brought a criminal complaint for theft of rice plants
against the petitioners. This led to the referral of the criminal charge to the Court of Agrarian Relations but because petitioners
claimed ownership in their answer before the CAR, spouses Cadiam filed a civil action for recovery of ownership of the same lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a
Transfer Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have evidently a better right than herein petitioners

As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed and who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the
time of the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the Court of Appeals, innocent purchasers for value and above all considerations, are
entitled to the protection of the law.

Petitioners admitted that the land in dispute was originally public land. According to them it became private land because of
the long possession of Dagaoan Sawadan. They allege that she had been in possession since 1908 and that she brought said lot to the
marriage which as will be noted was allegedly also in 1908 giving credence to the fact that said lot was formerly owned, occupied and
possessed by Henry Siagan since time immemorial, as agreed and stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference. Under the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that whether Lot 1494 descended from Henry Siagan as claimed by private
respondents or from Dagaoan Sawadan, the mother of Augusto Siagan as claimed by the petitioners, it is undeniable that Augusto
Siagan had already quit-claimed, ceded and conveyed whatever rights or interest he had over said lot in favor of Elpidio Siagan.
Petition for review on certiorari is denied.

e. Double sales

First sale registered in good faith prevails

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO MANGAWANG, ET AL.

FACTS:
Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land situated
at Balanga, Bataan. Cadastral court issued a decree of registration of the land in favor of Amposta.

230
 Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho. Santos-Camacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to the latter. Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(now Development Bank of the Philippines), and having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land was sold at public auction to
said bank as the highest bidder. The period of redemption having elapsed without Camacho being able to redeem the property, a final
deed of sale was executed in favor of the bank, and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in its name.

Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang. Vendees paid the balance of the purchase price,
and an absolute deed of sale was executed in their favor. Mangawang brothers took possession thereof, and upon learning of this
transfer, the Development Bank of the Philippines, filed an action to recover its possession and damages. Court rendered decision
awarding the land to the Mangawang brothers. Seasonably, the bank appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Who of the two buyers should be considered as the rightful owner of the land.

HELD:

It can also be treated as one of double sale, where a person sells the same land to two different persons who are unaware
of the flaw that lies in its title, and where the law adjudicates the property to the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his
name in the registry of property

And applying the principle of double sale, Supreme court cannot conclude that the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant
whose predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property much ahead in point of time than the appellees. Verily, the title
acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective, contrary to the finding of the court a quo.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES VS IAC

FACTS:

Two parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3)
different entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Dev’t. and Financing Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty).
Thus,Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc.
(Macondray) for the declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the ground that the same was issued by a court
not sitting as a land registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge had no authority since the records which was
made basis of the title was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution.

In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the ReyesCourt which issued its title was performing a purely
ministerial duty and that it was Carpo’s title that was null for having been issued
despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title
covering the same subject properties. In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al.being the source of its own
title, praying therefor for the reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties.

However, the same was dismissed for QCDF’s lack of interest in prosecuting the case. On January 20, 1981, the trial court
rendered judgment annulling Realty’s and QCDF’s titles to the property in favor of Carpo. The same was appealed before the High
Court by Realty, but the latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of the merits. The CA in turn set aside
the trial court’s decision and issued a new one in favor of Realty. However, the case was subjected to the reorganization of the
Judiciary, from which resulted a re-raffling of the case and later on, a reversal of the prior decision through
Carpo’s Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices assigned to the case

ISSUE: Whether or not Carpo’s title is valid as against Realty’s and QCDF”s, since Realty’s title was issued when the records relative
thereto was undergoing reconstitution.

HELD:

No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No.657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only
had to go back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the Court of
First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. The records were destroyed at that stage of the casewhen an that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the
basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final.

231
In case of double sale of land in good faith, ownership, passes to the buyer who first registered sale in the RD.

SOSTENES CAMPILLOVS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS

G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984

FACTS:

On February 27, 1961, Tomas de Vera and his wife Felisa Serafico sold two parcels of land to Simplicio Santos. Said sale
was however never presented for registration in the office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering the
property.

On January 27, 1962, petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against Tomas de Vera. The
Petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, pursuant thereto, the City Sheriff levied on three parcels of land in
the name of Tomas de Vera, including the two parcels of land which the latter previously sold to Simplicio Santos.

On June 26, 1962, notice of the sale of said lots was issued by the Sheriff and published in the "Daily Record" and La Nueva
Era."

On July 25, 1962, the three parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of petitioner who was issued the
corresponding certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the City Sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over
the three parcels of land levied and sold on execution.

Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of the previous sale to him by Tomas de Vera, Simplicio
Santos filed an action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final deed of sale in favor of petitioner Campillo.

Herein petitioner, alleged that he is an innocent purchaser for value and that the supposed previous sale could not be preferred
over the levy and sale at public action because it was not registered.

The RTC upheld the validity of the levy and sale at public auction. On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent,
the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court.

The appellate court said that the subject lots could not be legally levied upon to satisfy the judgment debt of the de Veras in
favor of petitioner because at the time of the execution sale, the judgment debtor, having previously sold said properties, was no
longer the owner thereof.

ISSUE: Whether who has a better right or title to the herein disputed two parcels of land — Simplicio Santos who earlier purchased
them in a private sale but failed to register his sale, or petitioner Sostenes Campillo who subsequently purchased them at an execution
sale and obtained a certificate of title.

HELD: In case of double sale of land in good faith, ownership of the land passes to the buyer who first registered sale in the Register
of Deeds.

RULING:

It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or
execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of its registration.

While it may be true in the case of Leyson vs. Tanada, that purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that the rule
of caveat emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not
incumbent on him to place the purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered land
is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property and he is merely charged with notice of the burdens
on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title.

Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and
interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to
preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

Petition granted.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESVS. LAZARO MANGAWANG

G.R. No. L-18861 June 30, 1964

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FACTS:

Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land situated at
Balanga, Bataan. Pending action on his application, cadastral proceedings were instituted by the government in said municipality
wherein Amposta filed an answer praying for the adjudication of the same land in his favor.

On March 8, 1920, the cadastral court rendered decision awarding the land to Amposta. Since no advice on this matter was
given either to the Bureau of Lands or to the Governor General, the latter, issued in favor of Amposta Homestead Patent covering the
same land, and Original Certificate of Title was issued to him by the Governor-General.

On December 20, 1922, the cadastral court issued a decree of registration of the land in favor of Amposta pursuant to the
decision rendered in the cadastral case.

On November 24, 1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho surrendering to him Original Certificate of Title, thus a
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to Camacho.

On November 18, 1946, Santos-Camacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which another Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued to the latter. On April 28, 1948, Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of
the Philippines and having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land was sold at public auction to said bank as the highest bidder.

Meanwhile, or on June 11, 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang. In
connection with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the vendees the title that was issued to him in the cadastral case, which was
later substituted by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the vendees.

Upon learning of this transfer, the Development Bank of the Philippines, commenced the present action against them to
recover its possession and damages.

Appellees contend that their right over the property in litigation should be restored because the certificate of title they are
holding is derived from that issued pursuant to a decision rendered by a cadastral court, while the title being held by appellant was
merely based on the title issued in an administrative proceeding, upon the theory that a judicial title is deemed preferred to one issued
administratively.

ISSUES: Whether the petitioner bank or respondent Mangawang is considered the rightful owner of the land herein in dispute.

HELD: DBP is the rightful owner of the land in dispute.

RULING:

Amposta first sold the land to Santos Camacho on November 24, 1941, who registered it in his name on the same date. Seven
years thereafter, Amposta again sold the land to the Mangawang brother, who also registered it in their name on the same date. Since
both purchasers apparently have acted in good faith, as there is nothing in the evidence to show that they did otherwise, the sale made
by Amposta to Santos Camacho is the valid one considering that when Amposta sold the same land to the Mangawang brothers he had
nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to them is one issued covering the same property. In legal contemplation,
therefore, Amposta sold a property he no longer owned, and hence the transaction is legally ineffective.

On the other hand, the case under consideration can also be viewed under a different angle. It can also be treated as one of
double sale, where a person sells the same land to two different persons who are unaware of the flaw that lies in its title, and where the
law adjudicates the property to the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the registry of property.And applying
this principle, the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant whose predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property
much ahead in point of time than the appellees. Verily, the title acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective.

Petition granted.

i. As between parties

GATIOANVS.GAFFUD ET AL 27 SCRA 706

FACTS:

The land in question was originally registered in the name of Rufina Permison under Original Certificate of Title No. L-3432,
dated December 18, 1935 on the basis of a free patent. In the year 1948, Permison sold it to Sibreno Novesteras, who in turn,
conveyed it to appellee Encarnacion Gatioan on April 1, 1949. Through the initiative of appellee, the said Original Certificate of Title
No. L-3432 in the name of Rufina Permison was cancelled on June 3, 1949 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1212
was issued in favor of Gatioan.
233
 On June 12, 1950, Gatioan obtained a loan in the amount of P900.00 from the Philippine National Bank, and as security
therefor, mortgaged the land described in TCT No. T-1212. After payment, using the same land and title as collateral, he acquired
another loan in the sum of P1,100.00 from the same bank on May 3, 1954, and a third loan on July 18, 1957, — P2,800,00.

In the meantime, on January 23, 1956, spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan procured a free patent covering the
identical parcel of land described in TCT No. T-1212 of Gatioan, on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-6038 was
issued in their favor. On May 15, 1956 and January 8, 1957, they also obtained two loans from the Bank in the sum of P1,400.00 and
P300.00, respectively, and as collateral for both, they mortgaged the said land covered by OCT No. P-6038.

On May 16, 1962, because of the existence of OCT No. P-6038 in the name of spouses Gaffud and Logan, containing an
annotation of the aforementioned consolidated mortgage in favor of the Bank, and the annotation on TCT No. T-1212 of the mortgage
encumbrance covering the already paid loan of P2,800.00 to the Gatioan, which appellant Bank refused to have cancelled, Gatioan
filed the complaint for quieting of title in this case.

The lower court declared null and void ab initio the patent and certificate of title No. P-6038 issued in the name of the
defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan and ordered also its cancellation. Declaring the real estate mortgage executed by
the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan in favor of the Bank, recorded on OCT P-6038 null and void and
unenforceable as against the herein plaintiff, and ordering its cancellation, without prejudice of the Bank's right to collect from the said
spouses;

The Bank appealed, insisting that the lower court should have declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith and for value
as regards the mortgages executed in its favor by said spouses and duly annotated on their abovementioned OCT P-6038 and that
consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be carried over to and considered as encumbrances on the land covered by TCT
No. T-1212 of Gatioan which, as already stated, is the identical land covered by OCT P-6038 of the Gaffuds.

ISSUE: Who has the better right of title in case of double sale through a free patent application?

HELD:

We find no merit, whatsoever, in this contention, because the point raised was already passed upon by this Court in no
uncertain terms in Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, way back on October 2, 1915 and in subsequent cases of similar nature.We
unhesitatingly affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank grants a loan on the security of land, it first undertakes a careful
examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physical and on-the-spot investigation of the land itself offered as security.
Undoubtedly, had herein appellant Bank taken such a step which is demanded by the most ordinary prudence, it would have easily
discovered the flaw in the title of the defendant spouses; and if it did not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be held
to be guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in question. In either case, appellant Bank cannot be considered as a
mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law.

Under the circumstances, the bank had absolutely no excuse for approving the application of the defendant spouses and
giving the loans in question. To appellant, therefore, fittingly applies the following pronouncement of this Court:

One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of, title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired
title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to
one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had be acted
with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation..... (Dayao v. Diez,
supra; citing the case of Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery. Co., 37 Phil; 644.)

In any event, again, the following ruling of this Court in the recent case of De Villa v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968,
applies to appellant:

We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title around issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the
person who rely on the second certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors, should
resort to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who should be
permitted to resort secure in their title. (Citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590)

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DE VILLA VS. TRINIDAD, 22 SCRA 1167

FACTS:

Cesario Fabricante owned 5,724,415 square meters of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50, who mortgaged
the same in April 18, 1944 to De Villa for a loan to whom he surrendered his duplicate certificate, and with whom it remained until it
was lost.

On November 3, 1945, Cesario Fabricante petitioned the CFI for the issuance of a new duplicate of TCT No. 50 upon the
alleged ground that his duplicate was lost. Felix de Villa, the mortgage creditor was not notified.

November 27, 1945, Fabricante sold the land to Eustaquio Palma who in turn mortgaged the same property in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). When Palma failed to pay the loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially, and
possessed it as DBP is the highest bidder,

On October 11, 1951, Palma assigned his right of redemption to Anacleto Trinidad who then took possession of the land.

Meanwhile, De Villa, having lost the duplicate of TCT No. 50 surrendered to him by Fabricante and learning that the original
was lost in the Register of Deeds, filed before the CFI on June 12, 1948 a petition to reconstitute the same in favor of Cesario
Fabricante with the annotation of the mortgage in his favor.

When Fabricante failed to redeem the land, De Villa foreclosed the mortgage and bought the land in public auction as highest
bidder. On January 30, 1961, De Villa secured TCT No. 3347 in his name and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-29 (50) was
cancelled.

On January 26, 1962, De Villa filed the present complaint in the CFI against Anacleto Trinidad for declaration of ownership,
recovery of the land.

The CFI found that the mortgage in De Villa's favor had been annotated at the back of both the original and the duplicate of
TCT No. 50; that TCT No. RT-29(50), the reconstituted title from which De Villa derived TCT No. 3347, covers Lot No. 9, Plan PSU
1185, and originated from OCT No. 183, issued on January 30, 1920, while the duplicate title issued to Fabricante on which Palma's
TCT No. 12 was based, as well as the TCT No. 1115 of DBP, covers Lot No. 2, Plan PSU 11885, and originated from OCT No. 34,
issued on November 25, 1920; that the two title certificates were issued covering the same land and the rule is that the earlier in date
— Original Certificate of Title No. 183 — prevails; that the heirs of Trinidad acquired only whatever right DBP had acquired; that the
stigma of Fabricante's bad faith extended to Palma and to DBP; that there was no prescription, for plaintiff's action was not one for
recovery of title or possession but for a judicial determination of ownership — as to which of them, both with valid certificates of title,
really owns the land. Accordingly, it stated in the dispositive portion:

ISSUE: Who has the better right of ownership in case of successive registrations where two certificates of title were issued over the
same land in the name of different persons who were both in good faith in their acquisition?

HELD:

Upon a misrepresentation, Cesario Fabricante was able to obtain a duplicate certificate. The order granting such certificate
expressly stated that the original of the title was still kept in the office of the Register of Deeds and ordered the issuance of a new
duplicate covering the land as described in the petition.

Unfortunately, the new duplicate issued is not in the records. However, its contents may be known from Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 12 issued in favor of Eustaquio Palma which was based on Fabricante's newly-issued duplicate certificate. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12 covers and describes 5,724,415 square meters of land, designated as Lot No. 2, Plan PSU 11885 surveyed
on October 29 to November 11, 1917 and is indicated to originate from Original Certificate of Title No. 34, Decree No. 89686,
registered on November 25, 1920. Upon the other hand, the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-29(50) on which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3347 was based, also describes the same 5,724,415 square meters of land but designated it as Lot No. 9, Plan
PSU 11885 surveyed also on October 29 to November 11, 1917, but said certificate is shown to originate from Original Certificate of
Title No. 183, Decree No. 89686, registered on January 30, 1920. While it is possible that a mistake could have been made with regard
to the lot numbers, it is unlikely that a mistake as to origin of the titles and their dates of registration could also have been made. This
is undoubtedly a case where two certificates of title were issued over the same land in the name of different persons who were both in
good faith in their acquisition. There having been two titles, it is understandable that the original upon which Fabricante's newly-
issued duplicate certificate was based did not contain the mortgage annotation in favor of De Villa.

We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in
part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate
is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second
certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than
molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who should be permitted to rest secure in their title. Consequently, since
Original Certificate of Title No. 183 was registered on January 30, 1920, De Villa's claim which is based on said title should prevail,
as against Trinidad's whose original title was registered on November 25, 1920. And from the point of equity, this is the proper
solution, considering that unlike the titles of Palma and the DBP, De Villa's title was never tainted with fraud.

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BERGADO VS. CA, 173 SCRA 497

FACTS:

The property subject of this case is claimed by both the petitioners and the Republic of the Philippines under two separate
deeds of sale executed by the same vendor.

Disputed are some 5,900 square meters of land forming part of a lot situated in Pangasinan and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 16545 in the name of Alejandro Trinidad and Aniceta Soriano. It was inherited by Marciana Trinidad, their
sole heir. She transferred it by virtue of an Escritura de Compraventa dated May 3, 1928, to Pedro Bergado and Justina Galinato, the
petitioners' parents. She then conveyed it again, this time through a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1947, to the Parent-Teacher
Association of the Urdaneta Community High. School.

The petitioners claim the property by right of inheritance from their parents. The Republic says the land was donated to it on
July 26, 1977, by the said PTA.

The Republic was sustained by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, the petitioners appealed.

In rejecting their appeal, the respondent court held that the petitioners had slept on whatever right they might have had and
were now barred by prescription and laches from asserting it. Moreover, their alleged right, such as it was, was inferior to the title
asserted by the Republic to the property in question.

The petitioners contend that the Republic was itself barred from putting up the defenses of prescription and laches because
these had not been pleaded earlier and that the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals have erred and so should be reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not good faith in registration of land essential.

HELD:

Yes. When real property is the subject matter of a double sale, the purchaser who first registers it in the registry becomes the
owner thereof under the provision of Article 1473 of the Civil Code, but this legal provision should not be understood in an absolute
sense, nor does it constitute a ground to sustain the demurrer, because the rights conferred by said article upon one of the two of
purchasers of the same real property who has registered his title in the registry of deeds, do not come into being if the registration is
not made in good faith.

The inscription of the Escritura de Compraventa in 1964 produced no legal effect because it was made in bad faith. Ownership
should therefore vest in the respondent Republic of the Philippines because it was first in possession of the property in good faith. If
any recourse is still available to the petitioners, it definitely is not against the Republic of the Philippines. Their claim for satisfaction
on which we do not rule at this time may be addressed only to Marciana Trinidad who, for reasons still to be discovered, sold the same
land once, and then once again, to separate purchasers.

F. Forged deed may be the root of a valid title

A title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value

HEIRS OF TIRO VS. PES

GR. No. 170528, August 26, 2008.

FACTS:

Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the
children of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the disputed
land since time immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in
1995.
But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the
name of respondent.

The petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of
Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was
issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.

Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses
Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent argued that
petitioners’ action for quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription.

236
 The RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners’ complaint. The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for
value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of the vendor. The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal and
MR but were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers no valid
title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

HELD:

A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.

A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard
the rights of innocent third persons, for that would impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land registration.
Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

In the present case, the certificates of title of Pacific Rehouse Corporation and the Spouses Velayo were clean and appeared
valid on their face, and there was nothing therein which should have put the respondent on its guard of some defect in the previous
registered owners’ title to the disputed property.

i. Remedy of the owner.

ii. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.

VICENTE RAÑESES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-68747 July 13, 1990

FACTS:

The proceedings at bar originated from two actions instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte by the
spouses Vicente Rañeses and Zenaida Buena against Antonino Lamadrid. They were docketed as Civil Cases Numbered 2113 and
2313.

Involved in Civil Case No. 2113 is a parcel of land with an area of about 11.7174 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-5616 in the name of Vicente Rañeses The complaint alleged that Antonino Lamadrid had intruded into a 6 hectare area of
this land, had occupied it for some years, and had refused to vacate it despite repeated demands; it therefore prayed for judgment
ousting Lamadrid from the property and commanding him to pay damages. In his answer, Lamadrid claimed that he had been in
continuous, open and public occupation in concept of owner, of the area in question since 1942 (about 30 years prior to the filing of
the complaint); that the Rañeses' title, acquired from a free patentee, Eustaquio Asido, was null and void on account of fraud on the
part of the Rañeses and Asido their "dummy," and that he (Lamadrid) should therefore be declared the owner of the land, entitled to a
conveyance thereof from the Rañeses and recovery of damages from the latter.

Involved in Civil Case No. 2313 is another parcel of agricultural land situated in Mahawanhawan, Pinagtambangan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, known as Lot 2000-B of the Labor Cadastre, measuring 8.7092 hectares, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6098 in the name of Zenaida Buena. The complaint averred that Lamadrid and his wife also intruded into
this property without any right whatsoever, forcibly occupying about two and a half (2 1/2) hectares thereof, and have since refused to
leave the premises despite demands. The complaint thus prayed for judgment directing the defendants' ouster and their payment of
damages by way of attorney's fees.

The cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties, after which judgment was rendered on May 22, 1979, disposing as
follows:

In Civil Case No. 2113.Declaring the plaintiff Vicente Raneses the owner of the property in question; ordering the defendant
(Lamadrid) to vacate the same, and to pay the costs;

In Civil Case No. 2313.Declaring the sale in favor of Zenaida Buena Raneses by Isabelo Cuevas, Exhibit E, genuine and
valid; declaring plaintiffs the owner of the portion in question consisting of the two-fifths (2/5) of the land originally belonging to
Isabelo Cuevas; ordering the defendants to vacate the same and to pay the costs. 7

The intermediate Appellate Court pronounced the Rañeses to be vendees in bad faith, and their deed of sale, Exhibit E, a
forgery.The Appellate Court moreover ruled that its "own close examination, verification and analysis of the questioned and standard

237
signatures" impelled it to the same conclusion as that presented by the NBI handwriting expert, Arcadio Ramos, i.e., that the
questioned signature were a forgery, a conclusion strengthened by "suspicious circumstances" attendant on "the preparation, execution
and ratification of the questioned document of sale.

ISSUE: whether or not a forged deed will affect the title.

HELD:

In any case, the principle that a forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title is firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence. Clearly militates against according any primacy to the claim of the Rañeses over that of respondent Lamadrid, whose
own instrument of acquisition has not been shown to be affected by any such defect.

iii. But if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for
value, the forged deed may be the root of a valid title.

SPOUSES VALENTIN SOLIVEL VS.THE HONORABLE MARCELINO M. FRANCISCO

G.R. No. L-51450 February 10, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioners, the spouses Valentin Solivel and Petra Mente (hereinafter called the Solivels), are an old couple residing in
Davao City. They are the registered owners, under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-10985 and T-10986 of the Registry of Deeds
of Davao del Sur, of two parcels of land located in the Municipality of Digos in said Province with a combined area of twenty seven
(27) hectares, more or less. The portion covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10985 is the subject of this case.

On or about May 25, 1972, following a number of previous visits to said owners, Federico Tompong, a practicing lawyer,
and Isaias Ngoho obtained the former's agreement to sell their property to a certain Espinosa of Masbate for P60,000.00. Giving the
Solivels a partial payment of P10,000.00 allegedly coming from Espinosa,Tompong and Ngoho persuaded the Solivels to give them
the certificates of title to the property, for which they issued a receipt, and promised that the sale would be consummated and the
balance of P50,000.00 paid within six (6) months, failing which the partial payment would be forfeited in the Solivels' favor and their
certificates of title returned to them.

Tompong and Ngoho never returned to make good their promise. They could not in fact be located until some months later
when they were arrested by Philippine Constabulary on complaint of a certain Atty. Hilario Mapayo to whom, it appeared, they had
sold a portion of the Solivels' property.

Following their arrest, Tompong and Ngoho were confronted by Valentin Solivel and his son, Rafael, at the PC Headquarters
in Davao City. That confrontation brought to light the existence of the following documents purportedly executed by either or both of
the Solivels.

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 1) a deed of sale dated May 24, 1972 ratified by Tompong as notary public selling a 40,000 square-meter portion of
the Solivels' property to Atty. Hilario Mapayo for the price of P30,000.00 ;

2) a power of attorney dated May 24, 1972, ratified also by Tompong as notary public, constituting Isaias Ngoho the
attorney-in-fact of Valentin Solivel to receive from Atty. Hilario Mapayo partial payment of P15,000.00 in two
installments ;

3) a power of attorney dated September 7, 1972 ratified also by Tompong as notary public, authorizing Isaias Ngoho
to sell the Solivels' property in question as said owners' attorney-in-fact ;

The Trial Court found that the power-of-attorney (Exhibit C) ostensibly empowering Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property as
said owners' attorney-in-fact was a forgery — and thus, albeit not expressly but by necessary implication, that the deed of sale
executed by Ngoho in favor of Cagas on the strength of said instrument was also falsified — and that the Solivels' claims against
Tompong and Ngoho had been sufficiently established.

However, said Court also held that Cagas was an innocent purchaser for value, decided that he had acquired valid title to the
property in question by virtue of the sale,and was entitled to its possession and enjoyment, and gave the Solivels only the sop of an
award against the elusive defendants Tompong and Ngoho of the price paid by Cagas for the property (P19,000.00) plus interest, and
of damages, including attorney's fees, in the amount of P8,500.00

ISSUE: Whether or not a forged deed or document may be the root of a valid title

RULING:

Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger

If the certificate of title has already been transferred from the mane of true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indictaed by the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the forged deed or
document may be the root of a valid title.

iv. Same rule applies if the certificate has been transferred to the name of the forger.

TENIO-OBSEQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994

FACTS:

On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint in the court aquo against herein petitioners Consorcia Tenio
and her husband, Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and ownership, alleging that
sometime in 1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00; that to guaranty the loan they delivered to the latter the
original certificate of title to the land; that in the meantime, they continued to cultivate the same and, at the end of the harvest season,
they gave two-thirds (2/3) of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the
knowledge and consent of herein private respondents, prepared a document of sale and through misrepresentation and other
manipulations made it appear that private respondents sold the land to them.

This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said certificate of title as Entry No. 16007. By virtue thereof, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1181 in the name of Eufronio Alimpoos was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1360 was
correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-
Obsequio. On September 22, 1970, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421 was issued in her name. It was allegedly only in 1982,
when Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), that he learned that the land was already titled in the name of another.

ISSUE: Whether or not a forged document of sale give rise to a valid title.

HELD:

Yes. The court has held that a fraudulent or forged document of sale may give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger and while it remained as such, the land
was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.

239
 v. Reason: the vendee has the right to rely on the correctness of the certificate of title.

DURAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985

FACTS:

Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which she had purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the
Philippines in June 1854. A Deed of Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circe’s mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe mortgaged the
same property to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to know about the mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of
Caloocan informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties. She failed to get an
answer from the RD. So she returned to the Philippines in May 1966.

Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and foreclosure proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco.
Circe claims that the sale in favor of her mother is a forgery saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was in the US. Fe
alleges that the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the mortgage made by Fe is valid.

ISSUE: Whether Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and for value.

HELD:

Yes. Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that
the person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. The mortgagee has the right to
rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of the said certificate. The fraudulent and forged
document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to
the name indicated by the forger.

vi. Exception: rule on double sale does not apply if the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of
title covering the same property.

TORRES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-63046 June 21, 1990

FACTS:

The land erected with a building (TCT No. 53628 issued in his name) is owned by Torres. He was and still in possession of
the realties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title, and paying the real estate taxes, and collecting rentals from
tenants occupying the building.

Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the
duplicate copy of TCT No. 53628 was lost, obtained another copy of the certificate. He forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties
in his favor. He mortgaged the same to Rosario Mota, wife of Ernesto Cue, and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned her credit to
the spouses Cue.

Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No. 86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No.
133.

Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Fernandez filed Civil Case No. 75643 against the spouses Cue for the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary injunction.

The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence of ownership of the subject immovable which was affirmed by
the CA.

Prior to the CA’s decision, Fernandez failed to comply with his obligation under the amicable settlement and the Cues were
granted a writ of execution. The subject realties were then levied upon and sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was the highest
bidder.

240
 The redemption period for the property having lapsed without Fernandez nor Torres redeeming the properties, Mota was
issued the title.

Torres filed a complaint to restrain Mota from collecting rentals and for the declaration as void TCT No. 105953.

The trial court declared that Mota’s title is void but CA reversed it.

ISSUE: Whether a forged sale may be the root of a valid title.

HELD:
Yes, except if the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same property.

The claim of indefeasibility under the Torrens land title system would be correct if previous valid title to the same parcel of
land did not exist. The petitioner had a valid title. It never parted with it; it never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's duplicate
of the transfer certificate of title, it could not be charged with negligence in the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or with any
act which could have brought about the issuance of another certificate upon which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely.
If the respondent's contention as to indefeasibility of his title should be upheld, then registered owners without the least fault on their
part could be divested of their title and deprived of their property. Such disastrous results which would shake and destroy the stability
of land titles had not been foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system.
Fernandez perpetrated the fraud by making false representations in his petition and the title issued to him being the product of fraud
could not vest him valid and legal title to the parcel of land in litigation. As he had no title to the parcel of land, in the same way that a
thief does not own or have title to the stolen goods, he could not transmit title which he did not have nor possess.

To hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because no
certificate of title covering the realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued.

vii. Remedies of victim or person prejudiced.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 66715 September 18, 1990

FACTS:

Leticia de la Vina-Sepe executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB, San Carlos Branch, over a lot registered in her name
under TCT No. T-31913 to secure the payment of a sugar crop loan of P3,400. Leticia, acting as attorney-in-fact for her brother-in-
law, private respondent, executed an amended real estate mortgage to include his (Alcedo's) Lot No. 1626 as additional collateral for
Sepe's increased loan of P16,500. Sepe and Alcedo verbally agreed to split 50-50 the proceeds of the loan but failing to receive his
one-half share from her, Alcedo wrote a letter to the PNB, revoking the SPA he had given to Leticia Sepe to mortgage his lot.

The PNB Branch Manager assured Alcedo that the bank would exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe's forthcoming sugar crop
loan.
On the same day, PNB advised Sepe in writing to replace Lot No. 1402 with collateral of equal or higher value. Despite such
advice, Sepe still obtained an additional loan on the security of Alcedo's property as collateral. Alcedo requested Sepe to pay her
accounts to forestall foreclosure proceedings against his property, but to no avail.

Alcedo sued Sepe and PNB for collection and injunction with damages. While pending, Alcedo's land was sold to PNB as the
highest bidder in the sale to which he filed an annulment of it and reconveyance of the land to him free from liens and encumbrances,
with damages.

Alcedo withdrew his action to collect his one-half from the proceeds of the sugar crop loans obtained by Sepe. PNB alleged
that it had no knowledge of the agreement between Mrs. Sepe and Alcedo to split the crop loan proceeds between them.
The trial court favored Alcedo, declaring the public auction sale and the certificate of sale as null and void, which decision
was affirmed by IAC.

ISSUE: Whether PNB validly foreclosed the real estate mortgage despite notice of the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney.

HELD:

PNB committed error in foreclosing the property of Alcedo despite the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against its own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid
the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. It has been applied by this Court wherever and
whenever the special circumstances of a case so demands.

In the case at bar, since PNB had promised to exclude Alcedo's property as collateral for Sepe's 1971-72 sugar crop loan, it
should have released the property to Alcedo. The mortgage which Sepe gave to the bank on Alcedo's lot as collateral for her 1971-72
241
sugar crop loan was null and void for having been already disauthorized by Alcedo. Since Alcedo's property secured
only P13,100.00 of Sepe's 1970-71 sugar crop loan of P16,500.00 (because P3,400 was secured by Sepe's own property), Alcedo's
property may be held to answer for only the unpaid balance, if any, of Sepe's 1970-71 loan, but not the 1971-72 crop loan.

While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the revocation of Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his
property should appear in a public instrument. Nevertheless, a revocation embodied in a private writing is valid and binding between
the parties.

The PNB acted with bad faith in proceeding against Alcedo's property to satisfy Sepe's unpaid 1971-72 sugar crop loan. The
extrajudicial foreclosure being null and void ab initio, the certificate of sale which the Sheriff delivered to PNB as the highest bidder
at the sale is also null and void.

The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

F. Mortgages and Leases

a. Nature of Mortgage

i. Legal Basis; Mortgage. A mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows the property ─whoever its owner may be.
If the mortgagor sells the property, the buyer must respect the mortgage, if registered or if he knows its existence.

LIGON V CA
244 SCRA 693

Facts:
By virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale, the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), sold to Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) two parcels of
lot. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property
within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to comply with this undertaking, prompting INK to file a case. In its answer, IDP alleges that it was INK which failed to
comply as it did not pay full price within the specific period agreed upon. IDP now prays for the rescission of the sale.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the relief sought by INK. Later on, INK filed a motion against herein petitioner as the
mortgagee of the property, seeking for the surrender of the certificate of title by the later for the registration of the Absolute Deed of
Sale with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed an opposition alleging that the ownership of the subject property is still in question. The trial court rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to surrender the certificate of title for the registration of the sale and the annotation of the mortgage to the new TCT
to be issued in favor of INK. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale prejudicial to the rights of the mortgagee.

Ruling:
No. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer
certificates of title.
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted. It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the property whoever its owner may
be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent
purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage
until discharged follows the property.

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 ii. Mortgages are effective only from the time of registration

iii. Despite lack of registration, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties

iv. Procedure for registration

v. The subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s title will not nullify the mortgage.

GONZALES V IAC
157 SCRA 587

Facts:
Asuncion and Dioscoro Buensuceco were the original owners of a lot but due to tax delinquency, the lot was sold at public auction in
favor of the province of Ilo-ilo. The daughter of the spouses, Hortencia, discovered that the title of the land is still in the name of her
parents. She paid the taxes and was issued a deed of repurchase. The title was reconstituted and issued in the name of Asuncion. It was
then sold to spouses Panzo. The spouses Panzo mortgaged the property with Rural Bank of Pavia. Due to failure to pay, the property
was foreclosed and a deed was executed in favor of Rural Bank.
Petitioner, as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Matias Yusay, thereafter filed for the cancellation of the title
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Yusay. She alleges that the property was originally mortgaged to Yusay by
spouses Buensuceco and was later sold orally to the same. It is also alleged that the property is in possession of Yusay as evidenced by
the presence of tenant Daguino. Defendant bank alleges good faith.

Issue:
Whether the subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s certificate of title nullifies the mortgage?

Ruling:
No.
Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent
declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of the bank, which had acted in good faith.
Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the
mortgagors obtained their title thereto thru fraud.

b. Governing Laws and Rules On Mortgage

i. Mortgage, its nature

ii. Mortgage may be constituted only on immovables and/or alienable real rights imposed upon movables;
requisites of mortgagor.

iii. Characteristics of a mortgage:

(1) All-embracing
A mortgage can be constituted on the building only

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs.HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, FERNANDO MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE
G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, Plaintiffs-spouses executed in favor of
defendant a deed of Real Estate Mortgage on the 2-storey semi-concrete residential building with warehouse and on the right of
occupancy on the lot where the building was erected. The Real Estate Mortgagewas registered with the Registry of Deeds of Zambales
on November 23, 1971.
On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs secured an additional loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, plaintiffs executed in favor
of Prudential Bank another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged. The second deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was likewise registered.
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 on the land was issued on April 24, 1972, on the basis of which OCT No. 2554 was
issued in the name of private respondent Fernando Magcale on May 15, 1972.
For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank after it became due, and upon application of said defendant,
the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties
mortgaged to defendant as the highest bidder in a public auction sale conducted. The auction sale was held despite written request
from plaintiffs to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale.
Respondent Court declared the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage as null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.

243
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of
"building" separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable
property."
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon,
buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a
real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the
land.

It is without question that the original mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent and before the
government was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Under the foregoing considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by
private respondent on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a
valid mortgage.

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City is hereby MODIFIED.

(2) Inseparable

(3) Indivisible

But indivisibility cannot apply after complete foreclosue

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. 46898-99. November 28, 1989

FACTS:
Respondent spouses mortgaged six parcels of land to PNB to secure the payment of a loan. Two of the six parcels of land are
covered by free patent titles while the other four are untitled and covered only by tax declarations.
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity, PNB, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and purchased the same at public auction. The certificate of sale
was duly registered with the Register of Deeds.

After the one-year redemption period expired without respondent spouses having exercised their right or redemption,
petitioner executed and registered an affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the six parcels of land and new titles were issued in
its name.

Jose Barrameda, then the manager of petitioner’s Sorsogon Branch, sent a letter to respondent spouses informing them of the
consolidation of title and inviting them to repurchase the lands not later than June 15, 1971. Respondent spouses replied requesting
petitioner to extend the period of repurchase to November 5, 1971. On December 19, 1971, petitioner sent another letter to respondent
spouses reminding them of the projected repurchase and informing them that petitioner would take actual possession of the lands
unless the repurchase would be effected on or before November 30, 1971.

On May 9, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract to sell the six parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong. Petitioner informed
respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter dated May 31, 1972.

On July 12, 1972, respondent spouses instituted a civil case for legal redemption of the six parcels of land.
Petitioner filed its answer conceding to respondent spouses the right to repurchase the two parcels of land covered by free
patent titles, but refused the redemption of the other four lots covered by tax declarations.
After trial on the merits, the lower court held that respondent spouses are entitled to redeem the six parcels of land on the
theory of "indivisibility of mortgage".
Acting on petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of said decision, the lower court issued its challenged resolution
modifying the ratio decidendi of its decision by ruling that the applicability of the doctrine of "indivisibility of mortgage" was deemed
to have been waived by petitioner when it agreed to the redemption of the two titled lots, and holding that the period of redemption for
the four untitled parcels of land is one year, not five years. However, it allowed the redemption of said four lots for reasons of equity.

A direct appeal by certiorari was made to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the theory of "indivisibility of mortgage" applies.

RULING:
The situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the
aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually
intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the
indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing.
Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since,
with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure.

244
 Indivisibility does not apply where the several heirs as Art. 2089 presupposes several heirs of the debtor or the
creditor.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45710 October 3, 1985

FACTS:
On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank, upon favorable recommendation of its legal department, approved the loan application for
P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over his 100-
hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan, and covered by TCT No. T-305, and which mortgage was annotated on the said
title the next day. The approved loan application called for a lump sum P80,000.00 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments for a
period of 3 years, with 12% annual interest. It was required that Sulpicio M. Tolentino shall use the loan proceeds solely as an
additional capital to develop his other property into a subdivision.
On May 22, 1965, a mere P17,000.00 partial release of the P80,000.00 loan was made by the Bank; and Sulpicio M. Tolentino and his
wife Edita Tolentino signed a promissory note for P17,000.00 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of
execution of the contract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.00 (p. 64, rec.). An advance interest for the P80,000.00 loan covering a
6-month period amounting to P4,800.00 was deducted from the partial release of P17,000.00. But this pre-deducted interest was
refunded to Sulpicio M. Tolentino on July 23, 1965, after being informed by the Bank that there was no fund yet available for the
release of the P63,000.00 balance (p. 47, rec.). The Bank, thru its vice-president and treasurer, promised repeatedly the release of the
P63,000.00 balance (p. 113, rec.).
On June 14, 1968, the Monetary Board, after finding thatIsland Savings Bank failed to put up the required capital to restore its
solvency, issued Resolution No. 967 which prohibited Island Savings Bank from doing business in the Philippines and instructed the
Acting Superintendent of Banks to take charge of the assets of Island Savings Bank (pp. 48-49, rec).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sulpicio M. Tolentino's liability to pay the P17,000.00 subsists, can his real estate mortgage be foreclosed to satisfy
said amount?

RULING:
Article 2089 provides:
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the
debtor or creditor.
Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the
pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who have received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to
the prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid.
The rule of indivisibility of the mortgage as outlined by Article 2089 above-quoted presupposes several heirs of the debtor or
creditor which does not obtain in this case. Hence, the rule of indivisibility of a mortgage cannot apply
The fact that when Sulpicio M. 'Tolentino executed his real estate mortgage, no consideration was then in existence, as there was no
debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for lack of
consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage
(Bonnevie vs. C.A., 125 SCRA 122 [1983]).
The decision is therefore modified:
IN CASE SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO FAILS TO PAY, HIS REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE COVERING 21.25 HECTARES
SHALL BE FORECLOSED TO SATISFY HIS TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS

Debtor cannot ask for the release of a portion if the entire loan secured by the several lots is not yet paid.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. 46898-99. November 28, 1989

FACTS:
The records show that on August 30, 1966, respondent spouses mortgaged six (6) parcels of land located at Cantilla, Sorsogon to
petitioner bank (PNB) to secure the payment of a loan of P10,000.00. Two (2) of the six (6) parcels of land are covered by free patent
titles while the other four (4) are untitled and covered only by tax declarations.

For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity, petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at
public auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale, interest and

On May 9, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract to sell the six (6) parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong for P27,000.00, with
P5,400.00 as down payment upon the execution of the contract. Petitioner informed respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter
dated May 31, 1972.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its aforesaid decision of May 11, 1976 holding that respondent spouses are entitled
to redeem the six (6) parcels of land on the theory of "indivisibility of mortgage" and dismissing the petition in Special Proceeding No.
2679 to declare the respondent spouses in contempt of court.

245
Petitioner, however, denies such right to redeem in the case of the four (4) untitled parcels due to the failure of private respondents to
effect the redemption within the period of one (1) year after the auction sale. This contention is premised on the theory that private
respondents had only one (1) year from the foreclosure sale to redeem the untitled properties, pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, and Section 20 of the PNB charter, Republic Act No. 4300, as amended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the debtor could ask for the release of the portion even if the entire loan secured by several lots is not yet paid

RULING:
No.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the
several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment
was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any
portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus, secured has been
fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who
has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely
satisfied.

That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the
aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended
for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness
and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said
doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure.

iv. Doctrine of innocent purchaser for value applies to an innocent mortgagee for value

RURAL BANK OF SARIAYA, INC. vs YACON

175 SCRA 62 1989

FACTS:
In October 1976, plaintiffs entrusted their owner's copy of their TCT No. T-38632 covering the land in question to their nephew,
defendant Florentino Alcantara, whom they approached for the purpose of obtaining a bigger loan from a bank in Manila with the land
as collateral. After a few days, Alcantara returned to plaintiffs' house and he brought with him plaintiffs to the house of one Gregorio
Cordero, wherein Alcantara introduced to plaintiffs Aniano Tantuco, Efren Rocha and Cordero who told plaintiffs that they have
prepared the latter's application for a real estate mortgage. These people convinced plaintiffs to papers as a requirement for securing a
loan from the Bank in said Manila.

Without understanding the contents thereof as plaintiffs do not understand English, the language in which the documents were written
and having trust and confidence in their nephew, Alcantara, plaintiffs signed the prepared documents in their belief that they were
indeed applications for a loan. The defendants assured plaintiffs that they would be notified as soon as the loan would be ready for
release.

In April 1977, plaintiffs discovered that their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 38632 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142490 had been issued in favor of defendant Luis Parco Plaintiffs also found that the papers they
were made to sign in Cordero's house included a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Alcantara with authority to negotiate, to
mortgage and to sell' the property.
Defendant Parco was able to transfer the title covering the land in his name and he was able to mortgage the land in favor of the
defendant Rural Bank of Sariaya, Inc., for a loan of P 24,500.00.

The RTC rendered judgment nullifying the special power of attorney and deed of real estate mortgage hereinbefore mentioned, and
cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142490 and restoring the validity and legal effect of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
38632. Petitioner bank and its co-defendant Luis Parco seasonably appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, but said appeal
resulted in the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when the land is mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value has the
right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title.

RULING:
No, the innocent mortgagee has to investigate with full diligence on the validity of the certificate of title.

There is no ground to reject or deviate from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In cases heretofore decided
by this Court, We took judicial notice of the common practice of banks, before approving a loan, to send a representative to the
premises of the land offered as collateral and duly investigate who are the true owners thereof. Failure to do so was considered as
constitutive of negligence on the part of the banks. This is in keeping with the bank's responsibility to exercise care and prudence in
dealing even with registered land, more than in the case of private individuals. The finding that the petitioner bank failed to make
adequate inquiries with the person in possession of the land had adequate evidentiary support. The testimony of the bank inspector,

246
Ricardo Aro, Jr., that he went to the land together with an assistant inspector does not bespeak the diligent verification required in the
circumstances. As earlier stated, the prudent practice is to investigate who are the true owners of the properties sought to be
mortgaged. What appears to have been done in the present case is that petitioner merely went through the motions of sending a
representative to the premises. When the inspector found nobody on the land on the date of inspection, he only counted the coconut
trees, without bothering to look for the person in possession of the same. He further testified that he did not bother to find out who
was in actual possession of the property when he went to the premises, relying on the fact that the vice-president of the bank had
already talked to Luis Parco. Petitioner is, therefore, not in a position to assail the finding that Luis Parco never took possession of the
land in question and that the respondents continuously and openly possessed the land without any disturbance.

UNCHUAN vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 78775 May 31, 1988

FACTS:
On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a parcel of land located in
Cagayan De Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976,
petitioner Unchuan, claiming to be the owner of one-half of the mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an adverse
claim.

On March 18, 1985, Faustino Neri, Jr. caused to be annotated on the title a Notice of Lis Pendens, which, however, was subsequently
cancelled after he executed a release of claim on January 30, 1986.

On May 14, 1986, the bank filed a petition for the cancellation of the annotations on its title and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Named respondents were Unchuan and Faustino Neri, Jr. Unchuan filed an opposition to the petition. In his affirmative
and special defenses, Unchuan again raised his claim of ownership to the 1/2 portion of the lot in question.
Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent setting the hearing for August 19, 1986, but due to the failure of
Unchuan's counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for September 2, 1986. The hearing set for September 2, 1986 had to be reset
again for September 23,1986 upon motion of counsel for Unchuan. Finally, on September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as scheduled
and the case was submitted for resolution upon agreement of the parties. However, on September 25, 1986, Unchuan filed a
manifestation praying for the dismissal/suspension of the petition for writ of possession on the ground that he had filed an action for
quieting of title on the property, Attached to the manifestation was a copy of Unchuan's complaint in Civil Case No. 10770 for
"Quieting of Title, Ownership, Annulment of Deed of Mortgage, Foreclosure Proceedings and TCT No. 43346."

On October 3, 1986 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank. Unchuan brought
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether a decision should be in favor of Unchuan

RULING:
No, the case is not in favor of Unchuan.

Once the estate mortgaged is extrajudicially sold, and it is not redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and independent
action is necessary to obtain possession of the property.

It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question the summary nature of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of September
23, 1986, his counsel agreed to submit the case for resolution, even as on said date, all that he had submitted for consideration of the
court was his Opposition to the Petition of Philippine Banking Corporation. He is now estopped from questioning the procedure
adopted by the trial collaborated.
Moreover, there is nothing objectionable in the summary disposition of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court had
sanctioned summary proceedings to determine the nature of the possession of third-party claimants.

On the basis of the record of the case, the trial judge ruled in favor of Philippine Banking Corporation. This Tribunal has carefully
gone over the record, and is convinced that there is sufficient basis warranting the issuance of a writ of possession.
The land involved is a Torrens-title property. It is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only
has to rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which annotated on the title, for registration is the
operative act that binds the property.
Unchuan claims that he purchased one-half (1/2) of the property "long before November 3, 1976." However, other than his bare
allegation, the only proof he presented in court is a handwritten receipt for the payment of his contribution to realty taxes allegedly
signed by Flora Jaldon. He has not bothered to prove the authenticity of the private writing, though. The alleged receipt does not even
sufficiently identify the land subject of the sale to Unchuan to be the same land mortgaged and then sold to Philippine Banking
Corporation. Also, for a transaction as important as the sale of a registered parcel of land; Unchuan has not even kept a record of
precisely when he bought the property, except that it was "long before November 3, 1976," which incidentally is the day when Flora
Jaldon mortgaged the property to Philippine Banking Corporation. Moreover, the sale was merely a verbal agreement; hence, it could
not be registered. All that Unchuan did was to file a belated adverse claim on December 10, 1976, after the property had been
mortgaged to Philippine Banking Corporation. Note however, that since the filing of the adverse claim, Unchuan has done nothing to
prosecute his claim of ownership over onehalf of the property. He has not, for instance, compelled Jaldon to execute the property
instrument so that the sale could be registered (Assuming that the land was indeed sold to him) and the proper title issued in his name.
In fact, the mortgage to the bank had been foreclosed, and a new title had been issued in the name of Philippine Banking Corporation,
but all the Unchuan did was file an adverse claim.

247
 v. Prescriptive Period to bring an action on mortgaged deed.

B & I REALTY CO., INC., vs. CASPE

G.R. No. 146972. January 29, 2008 / 543 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Venegas, the owner of a parcel of land delivered the title and executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Datuin for
purposes of the latter to obtain a loan with the RCBC. However, Venegas learned of Datuin's fraudulent scheme when she sold the lot
to the respondents in a deed of conditional sale. Venegas instituted a complaint against Datuin for recovery of property and
nullification with damages.
Thereafter, spouses Venegas, respondents and Datuin entered into a compromise agreement whereby the Venegases agreed to sell and
transfer the property to respondents with the condition that the respondents would assume and settle Datuin's mortgage debt to
petitioner.
As provided for in the agreement, Datuin executed a deed of absolute sale over the property covered in favor of respondents. On
February 12, 1976, the respondents started paying their assumed mortgage obligation to petitioner.
However, on August 27, 1980, Venegas brought a new action before the for annulment of the transfer of the property to
Datuin and the declaration of nullity of all transactions including the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, as well as the
cancellation of the conditional deed of sale to respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents waive the defense of prescription.

RULING:
Although the deed of real estate mortgage and the promissory note executed by Datuin expressly declared that the date of
maturity of the loan was May 14, 1974 or one year after the real estate mortgage was entered into between Datuin and petitioner, the
same could not be the reckoning point for purposes of counting the prescriptive period of the mortgage. This is because Datuin and
respondents executed a deed of absolute sale on October 30, 1975 whereby the latter acknowledged and assumed the mortgage
obligation of the former in favor of petitioner. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the written acknowledgment and assumption of
the mortgage obligation by respondents had the effect of interrupting the prescriptive period of the mortgage action.
We have held in a number of cases that the computation of the prescriptive period of any cause of action (the same as
prescription of actions) starts from the date when the cause of action accrues. 20 Here, petitioner's cause of action accrued from the time
respondents stopped paying the mortgage debt they assumed from Datuin, in accordance with Article 1151 of the Civil Code
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of obligations to pay principal
with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of the interest.

vi. Procedure for registration of court orders, processes, documents or instruments related to the foreclosure of
mortgage, whether judicial or extrajudicial

vii. Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage

Guiding principles on judicial foreclosure of mortgage

RURAL BANK vs. CA, SERRANO and CUEME

101 SCRA 5 (1980)

FACTS:
The trial court rendered a decision, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff bank within a period of "not less than 90 days nor more
than 100 days from" the receipt of the decision with twelve percent interest per.

In case of nonpayment within that period, the trial court, in order to satisfy that obligation, ordered the sheriff to sell at public auction
the mortgaged lot. Consequently, the Serrano spouses did not pay their mortgage debt. A writ of execution was issued. The mortgaged
lot was sold to the bank as the only bidder. There being no redemption within the one-year period.

But it was allegedly revealed that the land had already been sold to Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the redemption price
amounting to would not produce any legal effect.

The bank further disclosed that there is pending in the trial court a case for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of the said lot and the
release of the mortgage which was instituted by the Serrano spouses, as mortgagors, against the bank and the Mejos spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court and the CA erred in not giving due course to the bank's appeal.

RULING:
The SC ruled that the trial court and the CA acted correctly in refusing to give due course to the bank's appeal not only because the
order sought to be appealed is in interlocutory but also because in the present posture of the case it is imperative that the trial court

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should consolidate the foreclosure case with the other case filed by the Serrano spouses. Note that the latter case is also pending in the
sala of respondent Judge.

Under section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the confirmation by the court of the auction sale that would divest the Serrano
spouses of their rights to the mortgaged lot and that would vest such rights in the bank as purchaser at the auction sale.

In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been confirmed but the statutory one-year period for redemption expired and
the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as the only bidder at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court should give the
purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank to accept the redemption price tendered by the mortgagors.

There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure unless the mortgagee is a banking institution
Banks and other financial institutions are cautioned to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals before
accepting mortgage, for their business is affected with public interest

viii. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may
foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the mortgaged property to satisfy his credit.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS JESUS and ANACORITA DOYON
G.R. No. 167238. March 25, 2009

FACTS:
Jesus and Anacorita Doyon obtained several loans amounting to P10 million from petitioner Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loans, respondents mortgaged their real estate properties as well as the motor vehicles of JD
Bus Lines. Due to their inability to fully pay their obligations upon maturity,respondents requested petitioner to restructure their past
due loans. Petitioner agreed. Hence, respondents signed three promissory notes on June 29, 1994.Respondents still failed to pay the
quarterly installments on the promissory notes. Thus, petitioner demanded the payment of the total value of their loans from
respondents. Respondents, however, ignored petitioner and adamantly refused to pay their loans.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
in 1995. To forestall the foreclosure proceedings, respondents immediately filed an action for their nullification in the RTC of Ormoc
City, Branch 35 claiming that they had already paid the principal amount of their loans (or P10 million) to petitioner.

Petitioner withdrew the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and thereafter moved for the dismissal of Civil Case. The RTC
granted the motion and the case is considered dismissed with prejudice.

Weeks later, petitioner demanded from respondents the payment of their outstanding obligations which had by then ballooned to more
than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored petitioner.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of respondents’ real and chattel mortgages with the DBP special sheriff in
Makati10 and subsequently took constructive possession of the foreclosed properties.

Respondents Doyon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and the DBP special sheriff in the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch
35. According to respondents, by withdrawing the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and moving for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3314-O, petitioner led them to believe that it would no longer seek the satisfaction of its claims. Petitioner therefore acted contrary
to Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel mortgages anew.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DBP has the legal right to foreclose on the real property and the chattel mortgage?

RULING:
Since respondents neither assailed the due execution of the June 29, 1994 promissory notes nor presented proof of payment thereof,
their obligation remained outstanding. Upon default, by prior mutual agreement, petitioner had the right to foreclose on the real and
chattel mortgages securing their loans.

The promissory notes uniformly stated that failure to pay an installment (or interest) on the due date was an event of
default. Respondents were therefore in default when they failed to pay the quarterly amortizations on the designated due dates.

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the
mortgage for the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property to satisfy his credit.

ix. Right of Redemption in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage

GOROSPE vs. UCPB

193 SCRA 546

The right to redeem may be transferred or assigned by the owner

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MATILDA GOROSPE and MARIANO GOROSPE vs. DOLORES M. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-30079 January 30, 1976

FACTS:
In 1958, Caridad J. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a parcel of duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant
Dolores M. Santos. This was done in order to secure her indebtedness to Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Said deed was validly
registered and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos was issued.

But in 1959, Torento again executed a second mortgage, with the consent of Santos, over the same property in favor of plaintiffs to
secure a debt in the amount of 6000 Php. Said deed was not registered.

In 1960, the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and was put in auction, where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount
3500 Php. Said sale was then annotated at the TCT of the subject lot. Afterwhich, Santos filed for the recovery of the deficiency
resulting from the price paid for the property and its value at the public auction. The court then issued a writ of attachment over the
properties of Torento, who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the subject property particularly her statutory right of
redemption.

On March 1961, the Sheriff, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed property, issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees as successors in interest of Torrento over the foreclosed property. The Certificate of Redemption was registered a
on March 13, 1961 with Register of deeds, and the corresponding entry and annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.

Defendant-appellant, in her answer, denied that Matilda J. Gorospe had validly redeemed the

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or assigned by the owner?

RULING:
As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. Viola, the term "successor-in-interest' includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his
statutory right of redemption; or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption; or
one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of the property
sold;. or the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her. There
is no question, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee Matilda J. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J. Torrento and as
such could exercise the right to redeem the property at any time within the period provided by law.

In the case at bar, registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the purchaser at public auction was e only on October 20, 1960.
Appellee Matilda J. Gorospe had, therefore, a period of one year from that date within which to exercise the right of redemption
assigned to her by Caridad J. Torrento. The redemption having been made on March 10, 1961, it is evident that the same had been
timely made.

The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered Santos to deliver the owner’s certificate of TCT to the Gorospes.

One-year period to redeem is counted from the date of registration of the sheriff’s sale, not from the date of
auction sale

GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, and ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO
PONCE
G.R. No. 70987 September 29, 1988

FACTS:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as
security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of the lot were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title.

Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in Court of First Instance of
Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots were levied upon on and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of
P517,485.41.

On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento.
By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and TCT’S were replaced in Sarmiento's
name.

Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots. Judgment was
rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, directed the sale at public auction of the 4 mortgaged
lots to satisfy the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners exercised their equity of redemption on time?

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RULING:
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
"when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even
after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of
the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure-after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale-which right
may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of
Property.

It is Sarmiento's position, that the "17 June 1987 confirmation of the sale of the two lots could not have cut off ... (his) equity of
redemption;" in fact, "Ponce himself, in his 'Urgent Motion' dated 1 June 1987, precisely prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession 'subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio M. Sarmiento' thereby recognizing Sarmiento's equity of redemption
beyond confirmation date," He also argues that he had not been informed of the time when his right of redemption would be cut-off,
because he "never received a copy of any Motion for Confirmation, much less notice of hearing thereon in violation of his right to due
process;" that to hold otherwise would "render nugatory the decision of the Court of Appeals and this ... Court on the issue;" and that
he is entitled to a reasonable time, e.g., a year, for the exercise of his equity of redemption.

The Supreme Court held that the equity of redemption claimed and invoked by Sarmiento over the subject properties, lapsed and
ceased to exist without having been properly exercised from the date of issuance by the Trial Court of the Order confirming the
sheriff’s sale of said properties in favor of the private respondent.

Option to exercise the right to redeem is personal to the mortgagor, hence may be waived.

TOLENTINO vs. CA
106 SCRA 513, 1981

FACTS:

Ceferino de la Cruz, the owner of a homestead land, died in 1960; his heirs sold the land to the Tolentino spouses in 1962. In
1967, the de la Cruzes filed an action with the Court of First Instance in Davao to repurchase the land, since the law allows a five
year period for repurchase of homestead lots. They said they had tried to repurchase the land several times extrajudicially, but the
Tolentinos refused.

By that time, however, the Tolentinos had taken two mortgages on the land. When the first mortgage with BPI fell due, the
land was auctioned, with BPI as the highest bidder. In 1969, it was registered to BPI. Vicenta Tolentino went to BPI with a check
for P16,000, trying to redeem the land. She was told that it was sold a year ago, when the court decision became final in favor of
Dela Cruzes. However, the Tolentinos were told they could still redeem two other lots they had mortgaged with BPI after paying
P75,995.07, the balance of the loan after the de la Cruzes had paid P16,000 for the homestead lot.

Instead of redeeming the two other lots, Vicenta consigned payment to the court, giving a crossed PNB check for P91,995.07,
for the redemption of the three lots, including the homestead lot. However, she ordered payment stopped on the check the
following day, upon advice of counsel and to protect her rights, she said. She said this was to prevent BPI from encashing the
check without returning all the foreclosed properties. Then she filed a redemption case against BPI, imputing bad faith for failing
to return all the foreclosed properties.

The complaint was dismissed.

Issue:
In the case of a mortgage, is consignation necessary or is tender of payment enough? May a check be used for tender of
payment and if so, when is the obligation extinguished? When the check is filled out or when it is encashed?

Ratio:
The court ruled that Art. 1249 does not apply in this case because the Tolentino’s debt was extinguished when the property
was foreclosed and sold to satisfy the debt. What remained was their right to redeem said properties, which is not an obligation
but a privilege. Once they exercise the right to redeem, they would then have an obligation to pay, but that obligation would be
extinguished only when the check is encashed.

Since the formal offer to redeem was made during the period of redemption prescribed by law, the Tolentinos may redeem
the two other properties mortgaged to BPI within 30 days from entry of judgment, plus 1% per month interest up to the time of
redemption, together with taxes or assessments BPI may have paid after purchase.

They were not allowed to redeem the homestead lot because the decision of the lower court was already final and there was
no finding of grave abuse of jurisdiction that would justify a reversal of the decision.

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 A mortgagee is deemed to have waived the statutory period of redemption when he accepts redemption price
after one year from date of expiration of redemption period

RAMIREZ vs CA
219 SCRA 598

FACTS
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifaciofiled an application for registration of a
parcel of riceland in Rizal. In their application for registration, they alleged that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is
nomortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land and that they hadacquired it by purchase from certain
Gregoria Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lot and no copy or
recordof the same was available.The Court found, however, that the applicants are not the owners of the land sought tobe
registered. They were ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS- mere holders placed inpossession of the land by its owners as security for
loan. The applicants were foundguilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they declared that noother person
had any claim or interest in the said land.

ISSUE
Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription?

HELD
No.The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owners, but mere HOLDERS placed in possession of land by its
owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion. The court, from other cases like Trillana v.
Manansala, Valencia v. Acala and Barretto v. Barretto, held that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription
the land surrendered to him by the debtor.

Mortgagor may still execute another mortgage contract during the redemption period; reasons.

MANUEL D. MEDIDA and TEOTIMO ABELLANA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and
PASCUALA DOLINO
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992

FACTS:
Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of redemption over thesubject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho,
purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to
Teotimo Abellana,President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings and LoanAssociation, Inc.), to obtain a
loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application and the subject lot was offered as security.
Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino
paying the same, petitioner association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The land was sold at a publicauction to
CSB being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which wasalso registered. No redemption was being
effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property wascancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.Sps. Dolino then filed a
case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of sale issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale was inviolation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the validity of the loan and the
realestate mortgage, but annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to complywith the notice requirement of Act
3135. Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,assailing the validity of the
mortgage executed between them and City Savings Bank, amongothers. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents declaring the
said mortgage as void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extrajudicially foreclosed and sold ata corresponding foreclosure sale, may
validly execute a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of a third party during the period of redemption.

RULING:
It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was executed byrespondent spouses during the period of
redemption. During the said period it cannot be said thatthe mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the rule
up to now is theright of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemptionhas expired without the
right being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgageforeclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration
of the redemption periodand the conveyance of the master deed.The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during
the redemption period andhas the free disposal of his property, there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the CivilCode for the
constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would createan inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor
would be deprived of the opportunity, which may be his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another
mortgage.

x. Procedure after foreclosure of prior mortgage

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991

FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7, 1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan and docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of

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encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses Archimedes J.
Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real estate mortgages.For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan
obligation with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by
the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3,
1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.

On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an
opposition to the petition contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the new and
consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy over to the new title certificates issued in
purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.

b.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the summary amendment of certificates of title whenever
interest annotated has "terminated and ceased".

RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the
purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of
Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar features,
we had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136,
the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the
annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land.

It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et al. vs. Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or
encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered, and the
lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the
mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if
bound by the posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates
of title to be issued to her, as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal."

Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles, is already without force and effect consider
that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented. Properties
levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10) years during which the judgment can be enforced
by action.

xi. WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. LOZADA

GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI the Unit No. 402 of Cluster 1 of the Project. Six months later,
PPGI executed two Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI in the
combined maximum amount of P37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project, including Unit No. 402.
When PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, CBC filed with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the
Makati City RTC a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.

A year following the public auction sale of the foreclosed properties held on 11 September 1998, spouses Lozada executed a
Notice of Adverse Claim dated 13 September 1999 as regards Unit No. 402, which she registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City. Said Notice of Adverse Claim was subsequently annotated on CCT No. 69096 when it was issued in the name of CBC.

On 27 July 2001, CBC filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner [CBC] and
against Erlinda [sic] Lozada.

On 31 August 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex Parte Petition of CBC, and decreeing that a writ of possession
issue in favor of the China Banking Corporation.

29 October 2001, the spouses Lozada filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order against the Makati City RTC, Sheriff, CBC, and PPGI.

RULING OF THE CA:

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 The CA ruled in favor of the spouses Lozada, maintaining that the possession of the spouses Lozada of Unit No. 402
constituted an effective obstacle barring the Makati City RTC from issuing a writ to place CBC in possession of the same.

CONTENTION OF SPOUSES LOZADA:

The writ of possession in favor of CBC deprived them of the opportunity to defend their title and right to possess; or simply,
that it denied them due process.

ISSUE:

Whether the writ of possession may be granted and issued by the RTC ex parte or without notice to other parties.

HELD:

The purchaser at the public auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.

The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing provision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:

The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex
parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens
title; and upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to
issue the order for a writ of possession.

Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed
property during the 12-month period for redemption.

In the case of Nera,the procedure under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking
possession of the foreclosed property he bought at the public auction sale after the redemption period has expired without
redemption having been made.

Rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed property at the public auction sale upon the consolidation of his
title when no timely redemption of the property was made, to wit:

1. the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period
of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a
bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if
the property is not redeemed.

Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

2. The purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an ex parte
petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However,
while this is the general rule, the exception and its basis were summarized by the Court in Roxas v. Buan, thus:

In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, possession of the property may be awarded to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale during the pendency of the period of redemption or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a
separate and independent action

Under Section 33 of Rule 39, which reads:

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no redemption be
made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance
and possession of the property;…

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor.

In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the
said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte.

While CBC invokes the general rule in the Petition at bar, the spouses Lozada assert the exception.

The spouses Lozada aver that they are holding Unit No. 402 adversely to the debtor/mortgagor PPGI, and that their
possession is sufficient obstacle to the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession in favor of CBC.

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 They cannot assert that said right of possession is adverse or contrary to that of PPGI when they have no independent right of
possession other than what they acquired from PPGI.

The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third
party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The spouses Lozada cannot claim
that their right of possession over Unit No. 402 is analogous to any of these.

It must be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to sell,
which, at the moment of its execution, did not yet transfer possession, much less, title to Unit No. 402 from PPGI to the spouses
Lozada. When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage on Unit No. 402 in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to
the property still resided in PPGI.

a.) mandatory and ministerial duty of the Makati City RTC to grant the ex parte petition of CBC and order the issuance of a
writ of possession in the latter’s favor over Unit No. 402.

b.) mandatory and ministerial for the Clerk of Court to comply with the Makati City RTC order by issuing the writ of
possession,

c.) mandatory and ministerial for the Sheriff to implement the writ by first issuing a notice to vacate to the occupants of Unit
No. 402.

He is entitled to the possession following the consolidation of ownership in his name.

BPI vs. TARAMPI

GR No. 174988, December 10, 2008

FACTS:
In 1995, spouses Homobono and Luzdeldia Tarampi (respondents) obtained loans from Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) in the
total amount of P19,000,000, which were secured by four sets of real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located at Tandang Sora,
Quezon City, with an area of 796 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 122627 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.

Respondents defaulted on their obligation, prompting petitioner to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. At the auction sale
on February 8, 1999, the mortgaged property was sold to petitioner as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereupon issued to
petitioner which was registered and annotated on the TCT.As the redemption period expired without respondents redeeming the
mortgages, petitioner, through its Vice-President Jocelyn C. Sta. Ana, executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. TCT No. 122627 was
thus cancelled and TCT No. N-216396 was in its stead issued in the name of petitioner on July 27, 2000.

Petitioner thereafter filed for Writ of Possessionover the property including all the improvements thereon, docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-13412(00), which was raffled to Branch 105 of the RTC of Quezon City.Where it was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the case for annulment of mortgages.

HELD:
No, It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond
required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.

A mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession after extrajudicial foreclosure even before the expiration of the
period of redemption

VELOSO vs. IAC

205 SCRA 227

FACTS:
The property involved was a house and lot belonging to the petitioner spouses, Romeo F. Veloso and Delia M. Veloso. Their
ownership was evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 136559 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. By deeds executed on
October 3, and 16, 1978, they constituted a mortgage over the property as security for a loan in the sum of P200,000.00 given by State
Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) to Globe Engineering Corporation, a firm of which Romeo F. Veloso was the President and General
Manager.About four months later, Globe Engineering Corporation asked SIHI for an additional loan. The request was turned down.
Instead SIHI demanded that the former pay its original loan in accordance with the terms of the contract and its current statement of
accounts. No payment having been made, SIHI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by the Sheriff of Quezon City
pursuant to the mortgage deeds. The public auction sale was held on December 4, 1980, after due publication and notice. The highest
bid for the property, P303,069.79, was submitted by SIHI. Consequently, the Sheriff executed a certificate of sale in SIHI's favor,

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conveying the property to it. After the expiry of the redemption period, ownership over the property was consolidated in SIHI and a
new title, No. 285806, was issued to it.

The one-year period for redemption of the foreclosed property lapsed, as aforestated, with neither the Velosos nor Globe Engineering
Corporation making any attempt to redeem the property. All that was done, as the record shows, was the transmission by Globe
Engineering Corporation, prior to foreclosure, of a request for review and correction of SIHI's statement of account, and when the
request was rejected and it became evident that foreclosure was forthcoming, the institution by the Velosos on December 2, 1980, 1 of
an action in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 136559, 2 praying for the nullification or reformation of
the mortgage contracts. The complaint was amended within a month to implead Globe Engineering Corporation as additional co-
plaintiff and to include a prayer for the annulment of the sheriff's extra-judical foreclosure sale.

ISSUE:
WON the pendency of that action bar the issuance of a writ of possession to mortgagee who hasacquired it as highest bidder in the
subsequent public auction sale

HELD:
NO,The pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the
meantime, extrajudically foreclosed the mortgaged property and acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction sale.
The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the
law and declaring it to be the court's ministerial duty to uphold the mortgagee's right to possession even during the redemption
period. 4 The petitioners have simply failed to demonstrate with any degree of persuasiveness why the clear provisions of law and the
jurisprudence in application thereof should not be equally controlling in the case at bar.

Nature of a writ of possession in Foreclosure Proceedings

LAM VS. METROPOLITAN BANK

G.R.No.178881, February 18, 2008

FACTS:
Alexander and Julie Lam, petitioners, obtained a loan of P2M from Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, respondent. To secure its
payment, petitioners executed a deed of REM over their property in Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-115893. After that, they were
also granted additional loans and signed several amendments to the REM.

However, petitioners failed to pay the loans and so respondent instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding with the Office of the
Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Davao, which was granted by the latter. A Sheriff's sale was held and as the sole bidder,
the property was awarded to the respondent. A Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of respondent and it was registered
with the RD.

Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the 1-yr redemption period.

Accordingly, a Final Certificate of Sale in favor of the respondent was executed by the Sheriff. Respondent consolidated its title to the
subject property, thus, TCT No. T-115893 was cancelled and TCT No. T-327605in the name of the respondent was issued.

Respondent demanded that petitioners turn over the possession of the property but the latter refused to do so. Due to that, respondent
filed a complaint for the issuance of Writ of Possession with the RTC of Davao City. Petitioners in their answer, denied the material
allegation in the complaint, that respondent's complaint did not allege its capacity to sue and be sued, that there was no showing that
the officer who signed the verification and certification was duly authorized to represent the respondent and that they deny obtaining a
loan of P3.9M. During the pre-trial conference, the RTC directed the parties to proceed to mediation but the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement and so the case was referred back to the RTC for the continuation of the pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial
conference, respondent manifested and moved that the complaint for writ of possession should be heard ex parte.

RTC rendered a decision that the case will be heard ex parte and that the defendant (petitioners) should not be allowed to participate in
the case as an adverse party as if the same is an ordinary civil action. On January 23, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint for the
specific performance and annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage with the RTC. Subsequently, February 11, 2004, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order regarding the hearing of the issuance of Writ of Possession in ex parte.

RTC granted petitioners' motion for reconsideration, reversing its decision and allowing petitioners to participate in the proceedings,
RTC declared that respondent was estopped from demanding a resolution ex parte, after allowing petitioners to participate in the
proceedings. RTC added that under equitable circumstances, the duty of the court to issue a writ of possession ceased to be ministerial
and that the existence of these equitable circumstances can only be determined in the adversarial proceedings. The respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.

Respondent then went to the CA , CA reversed the RTC decision. It rendered a decision that petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is ex parte and that RTC mistakenly opined that it was prudent to consolidate the hearing of the issuance of writ of
possession with that of the civil case for annulment of the foreclosure sale. As to CA, the rule on the consolidation of actions in a civil
procedure covers only civil actions, thus, it cannot be consolidated with an ex parte petition. It further held that any question regarding
the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners
filed for a motion for reconsideration, but CA denied it.

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ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of a writ of possession should be heard ex parte?

RULING:
Yes. The court quote with approval the following disquisition of the CA: The respondent judge’s line of reasoning in declaring ex
parte petition as an adversarial proceeding is simply puerile. The fact that the Spouses Lam were allowed to actively participate in the
proceedings for the said case, by filing an Answer and going through pre-trial and mediation, was a glaring procedural anomaly that
the court a quo had inexcusably abetted. The court cannot allow the erring court a quo to use that same aberration as an excuse for a
continuing defiance of the law and jurisprudence that defines a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession as a non-litigious ex
parte proceeding that does not require the participation of the mortgagor.

A mortgagee becomes the absolute owner after expiration of the period of redemption without the mortgagor
exercising right to redeem; possession may be demanded after consolidation of ownership; issuance of writ of
possession

F. DAVID ENTERPRISES v. INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA (IBAA)

G.R. No. 78714.

FACTS:
For alleged non-payment of obligations secured by a real estate mortgage executed by Francisco and Norma David in its
favor, IBAA instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. An auction sale was held and the mortgaged property was sold to IBAA
as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered. No redemption was not having been effected by the mortgagors,
ownership of the land was consolidated in IBAA and a new certificate of title was issued in its name. IBAA filed a petition for a writ
of possession over the said lot was filed by IBAA and such was subsequently granted. David spouses filed a petition to prohibit the
foreclosure sale on the ground that the real transaction between the parties was not a real estate mortgage but a trust receipt agreement.
The second is where the mortgagors were seeking the cancellation of IBAA’s transfer certificate of title on the ground of the nullity of
the foreclosure sale. In this latter case, a preliminary injunction order against IBAA dealing with or entering into the possession of the
subject lot although the writ itself had not yet been granted because the petitioner’s bond was still awaiting approval.
Judge Felipe Kalalo recalled the writ of possession and dismissed the LRC. This prompted IBAA to file a motion for
reconsideration where it argued that since the petitioner’s bond had not yet been approved in the Case the injunction order issued
therein should be regarded only as a temporary restraining order which should be deemed to have expired after twenty days from
issuance under BP No. 224 but the motion was denied on the ground that the movant had earlier recognized the validity of the
injunction order.
Judge Pedro Laggui issued an indemnity bond in the writ of preliminary injunction and the the complaint itself was dismissed on the
ground that the foreclosure sale had been validly held because the order issued in the case to restrain the said sale had been served
tardily on the provincial sheriff.
IBAA filed a second motion for reconsideration in the LRC arguing that in view of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6565 and
the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, there was no more reason for not issuing the writ of possession. This
motion was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to
redeem?

HELD:
Yes, A mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to redeem;
possesion may be demanded after consolidation of ownership; writ of possession. There is no longer any legal bar for the issuance of a
subsequent writ of possession which petitioner is rightfully entitled to. Legal technicalities should be brushed aside to pave the way
for the dispensation of substantial justice.
Accordingly, we agree that the second motion for reconsideration filed by IBAA should have been considered a new
application for a writ of possession although it was not correctly captioned as such. It is the text and purpose and not the designation
of a pleading that should control 6 lest a mere technicality deprive a party of a substantial right because of a fastidious obsession with
formality. A contrary rule would forever deprive IBAA of the means to possess and enjoy the property it had acquired in the
foreclosure sale.
The new application for a writ of possession should have been granted, especially since the reason for the withdrawal of the
earlier writ had already disappeared with the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 6565.
The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is clearly unassailable. It is founded on its right of ownership. As
the purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale, and to which the respective titles thereto have already been issued, petitioner’s
right over the property has become absolute, vesting upon him the right of possession over an enjoyment of the property which the

257
Court must aid in effecting its delivery. After such delivery, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. As we said in
Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico, the deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to have and to hold the purchased property. This means, that
the purchaser is entitled to go immediately upon the real property, and this it is the Sheriff’s inescapable duty to place him in such
possession.

The purchaser at public auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession
thereof in accordance with Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. LOZADA

GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008

FACTS:
The spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI, the developer of Makati Prime City Condominium Townhomes
Project. PPGI agreed to sell to the spouses Lozada a unit.
6 months later, PPGI, executed 2 Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to
PPGI. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project, including the unit sold to the spouses.
Thereafter, PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, the former filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure. The
public auction sale took place and the CBC was the highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale of the foreclosed properties was
subsequently issued in favor of CBC. Consequently, the Writ of possession were issued in favor of the petitioner. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Possession may be granted in favor of the petitioner.

RULING:
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser at the
public auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended
Strictly, Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property
during the 12-month period for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond,
the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the purchaser’s favor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it
at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The
buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance
with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of
title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

It is ministerial for the court to issue the writ of possession.

SUENO VS. LBP

GR No. 174711, September 17, 2008
FACTS:

Sueno obtained loans from LBP. The loans were secured by Real Estate Mortgages over two parcels of land. However,
Sueno failed to pay her debt so the LBP filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of said properties at a public
auction. LBP was the highest bidder in the auction sale.

Before the expiration of the one-year period for the redemption of the subject properties, Sueno wrote LBP a letter requesting
a six-month extension of her period to redeem. LBP denied and informed her that she needed to post an initial amount so that LBP
would not consolidate the titles to the subject properties in its name. Partial payment was made by the petitioner, but filed to pay the
balance despite warnings from the respondent. Thereafter, writ of possession of the subject properties was issued in favor of LBP.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession

RULING:

Under the provision of Sec. 33, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court and Sec. 7 of Act 3135, as amended, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of
such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession.

258
 A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is
settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the
period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond
required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.

JOVEN VS. CA
212 SCRA 700

FACTS: Joven, the petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she mortgaged in favor of the DBP. Upon the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were sold at public auction to DBP as the
biggest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the certificate of title on November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to
Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985. On January 30, 1986,
Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative, Fernando Lasala, the other private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of
the mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the private respondents. Later, when her application for
preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a complaint against the
private respondents for forcible entry with a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction.
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. This
resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals,
which sustained the assailed decision.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
ejectment case and that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises for occupying the same without
judicial authorization.
ISSUE: whether or not the petition has merit
HELD: The petition has merit:
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal
ground that a question of ownership was involved therein.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the case for annulment of
the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of ownership, was already being litigated in the Regional Trial
Court. Even so, the municipal court could, pending final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of
possession over the subject properties in the ejectment case.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer except where the question of ownership is involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered
by the plaintiff exceed P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint.
the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner.

SPS. VACA VS. CA

GR No. 109672, July 14, 1994

Facts:
Private respondent Associated Bank filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of property
covered by TCT No. 254504. The property, consisting of a 953-square meter lot and a residential house erected on it, situated at
Quezon City. Private respondent alleged that for failure of petitioners Eduardo Vaca and Ma. Luisita Pilar to pay their mortgage
obligation to private respondent, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged property was sold on October 30,
1990 to private respondent as the highest bidder; that the one-year period to redeem having expired, TCT No. 254504 was cancelled
and TCT No. 52593 in private respondent's name was issued in lieu thereof; and that despite demands, petitioners refused to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.chanroblesvirtualaw
Petitioner spouses filed an opposition alleging that there was a pending action in another court which the petitioners had filed for the
annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure.chanroblesvirtualaw
The RTC denied private respondent's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, and denied private respondent's motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtua
On certiorari the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and ordered the RTC to issue the writ of possession. Hence this petition.
Issue:ch
-whether or not the action for annulment of the mortgage
constitutes a prejudicial question in LRC for issuance of a writ of possession and that it was error for the Court of Appeals to order the
RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of the mortgagee.
259
-whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the one-year period to redeem has expired is
subject to certain exceptions.hanroblesvirtualawlibrar
Held: Petitioners' contention has no merit. The question raised in this case has already been settled in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of
Appeals, in which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance
of the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the
mortgagee.blesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners cited the cases of Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Barican v.Intermediate Appellate Court, where deferment
was ordered of the issuance of the writ of possession notwithstanding the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. The deferment,
however, was due to the circumstances of the property which had been sold to third parties who assumed the indebtedness of the
mortgagor and took possession of the property earlier so that at the time of the hearing on the petition for a writ of possession, the
original debtor was no longer in possession. Under these circumstances, it was held that the obligation of the court to issue the writ of
possession had ceased to be ministerial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar
None of these equitable circumstances is present herein to justify making an exception to the rule that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure, after the period of redemption, is a ministerial function of the court. In this
case, there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within one year from registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Private respondent thus acquired the absolute right, as purchaser, to the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Act No. 3135, sec.
7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar

EXCEPTIONS:

i. When third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor

VICTOR CLAPANO vs. HON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS

G.R. Nos. L-51574-77 September 30, 1984

FACTS:
The spouses Conrado Crisostomo and Thelma Gallaza mortgaged three (3) parcels of land, one a coconut plantation located at
Maasim, and the other two parcels situated at General Santos City, with respondent Philippine National Bank, General Santos City
Branch (PNB for brevity), as security for a loan. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the properties were sold at public
auction to the PNB as the highest bidder. After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, PNB took possession of the same.
On October 8, 1974, the PNB appointed Matilde Abejeron as caretaker.
On October 21, 1975, the PNB executed a Deed of Promise to Sell said land in favor of respondent Princessita Jabido-Maulit. When
the vendee, Princessita, tried to take physical possession of the land, petitioners Fernando Abellon and his wife Conchita Abellon (the
Abellons, for short) claiming to be the tenants of the former owner, Conrado Crisostomo, and to have planted most of the coconuts in
said land, refused to give up possession.
On September 17, 1976, respondents PNB and Princessita filed with the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, an "Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession. As the Writ was not fully satisfied because of the refusal of the Abellons and their
workers to leave the subject property, private respondents moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere refusal of the defeated party to surrender the property to the winning party upon the order of the sheriff does
constitute contempt.

RULING:
Petitioners were successful in obtaining an Order upholding their tenancy status and enjoining the defendants therein from depriving
them of their possession and cultivation of the subject property. Even under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, made
applicable in extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act No. 3135, the possession of property is given to a
purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." In this
case, the subject land was being possessed and cultivated by the Abellons as third parties, whose status as tenants was recognized in
CAR Case No. 44. Petitioners-spouses are protected by Presidential Decree No. 1038, which provides that no tenant tiller of private
agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn, including but not limited to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, mongo
durian and other permanent crops shall be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farm holding unless for causes provided by
law and directed by a final decision or order of the court. Sale of the land is not included as one of the just causes for removal of
tenants.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION(CBC) vs. SPOUSES TOBIAS L. LOZADA and ERLINA P. LOZADA
G.R. No. 164919

FACTS:
On 25 June 1995, the spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI a two-bedroom residential unit with an area of 42.90
square meters, covered by CCT No. 34898, for the total price of P1,444,014.04. About six months later, PPGI executed two Deeds of
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined maximum amount
ofP37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project. When PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite
repeated demands, CBC filed with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Makati City RTC a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the real estate. The public auction sale took place at which CBC was the highest bidder, offering the amount
of P30,000,000.00 for the foreclosed properties.

260
On 15 May 2001 to Erlina, CBC notified her that it had already consolidated its title and ownership over the unit which she presently
occupied, and requested her to vacate and surrender the said property, including the appurtenant keys, to its duly authorized
representative within 15 days from receipt of the letter.The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on 25 March 2004 ruling
in favor of the spouses Lozada. According to the appellate court, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was not mandatory and
ministerial on the part of the Makati City RTC, and the court a quo should have afforded the spouses Lozada a hearing, considering
that (1) the Unit was no longer in the possession of the original debtor/mortgagor PPGI, but was already being enjoyed by the
spouses Lozada; (2) the Makati City RTC was aware that the Unit was already in the possession of the spouses Lozada because it was
so stated in the ex parte petition of CBC, as well as the Notice of Adverse Claim presented by CBC as evidence before the trial court;
(3) the spouses Lozada , under Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 957, had the right to continue paying for the Unit to CBC, the
purchaser thereof at the foreclosure sale, still in accordance with the tenor of the Contract to Sell; and (4) the spouses Lozada had a
perfect cause of action for the annulment of the mortgage constituted by PPGI in favor of CBC since PPGI failed to comply with the
requirement in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, to notify the installment buyer of the
condominium unit of the mortgage constituted thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that the respondents were holding the subject property adversely to the judgment
debtor thus the issuance of the writ of possession was improper and unwarranted.

RULING:
The purchaser in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an exparte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However, while this is the general
rule, as in all general rules, there is an exception.

Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a
hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the
foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by
the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third
party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor.The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant
or usufructuary. The co-owner,agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely
the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. The spouses Lozada cannot
claim that their right of possession over the Unit is analogous to any of these.

It is true that in the case presently before this Court, PPGI executed in favor of the spouses Lozada the Contract to Sell covering the
Unit before it constituted in favor of CBC the real estate mortgages on 51 Project units including spoueses Lozada’s unit. Nonetheless,
it must be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to sell, which,
at the moment of its execution, did not yet transfer possession, much less, title to the from PPGI to the spouses Lozada. When PPGI
constituted the real estate mortgage on the Unit in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to the property still resided in
PPGI. And when PPGI subsequently ceded possession of the Unit, upon its completion, to the spouses Lozada, such right was already
burdened by the terms and conditions of the mortgage constituted thereon. By merely stepping into the shoes of PPGI, the
spouses Lozada’s right of possession to the Unit cannot be less or more than PPGI’s.

The Court already made a determination that the spouses Lozada possessed the Unit as the successors or transferees of PPGI. Still, the
spouses Lozada only acquired the right of possession of PPGI; hence, their possession can never be adverse or contrary to that of
PPGI. The spouses Lozada, having succeeded PPGI in the possession of the Unit, cannot be considered a third party holding the said
property adversely to PPGI, the defaulting debtor/mortgagor.

ii. Where the price is unjustifiably higher than the real amout of the obligation

CESAR SULITvs. COURT OF APPEALS and ILUMINADA CAYCO

G.R. No. 119247. February 17, 1997

FACTS:
On 9 June 1992 Iluminada Cayco executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over Lot 2630 which is located in Caloocan City and
covered by TCT No. (23211) 11591 in favor of Cesar Sulit to secure a loan of P4 Million. Upon Cayco’s failure to pay said loan
within the stipulated period, Sulit resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage as authorized in the contract. Hence, in a public
auction the lot was sold to the mortgagee, who submitted a winning bid of P7 Million. On 13 December 1993 Sulit petitioned the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City for the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. On 17 January 1994 the RTC Judge issued
a decision in favor of Cesar Sulit, upon his posting of an indemnity bond in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand
(P120,000.00) Pesos.

The governing law thus explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption
period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of
property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms
directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.

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The rule is, however, not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded
to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure “unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession over
the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person entitled thereto.
Secondarily, it calls for a resolution of the further consequences of such non-payment of the full amount for which the property was
sold to him pursuant to his bid.

RULING:
Now, in forced sales, low prices are generally offered and the mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff’s sale, unless
shocking to the conscience, has been held insufficient to set aside a sale. This is because no disadvantage is caused to the
mortgagor. On the contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he possesses the right of redemption. When
there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgment debtor may reacquire the property or sell his
right to redeem, and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale.

The case at bar, in the sense that instead of an inadequacy in price, there is due in favor of private respondent, as mortgagor, a surplus
from the proceeds of the sale equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt, which excess is indisputably a substantial
amount. Nevertheless, it is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession
should also not issue in this case.

The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor’s obligation is an act of payment, not
payment by dation; hence, it is the mortgagee’s duty to return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee
who exercises the power of sale contained in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund, and, being bound to apply it properly,
is liable to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to do so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a trustee in a
purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns the unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner
of the equity of redemption.

The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a foreclosure sale is based on the theory that the lesser the
price the easier it will be for the owner to effect the redemption. The same thing cannot be said where the amount of the bid is in
excess of the total mortgage debt. The reason is that in case the mortgagor decides to exercise his right of redemption, Section 30 of
Rule 39 provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the amount of the purchase price, plus one per cent monthly
interest up to the time of the redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.

We cannot simply ignore the importance of surplus proceeds because by their very nature, surplus money arising from a sale of land
under a decree of foreclosure stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein. They are
constructively, at least, real property and belong to the mortgagor or his assigns. Inevitably, the right of a mortgagor to the surplus
proceeds is a substantial right which must prevail over rules of technicality.

xii. where the trial court had already granted the wit of possession sought by the buyer at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, a petition to consolidate said case with the case pending before another court for Declaration
of Nullity of Contracts/Discharge of Mortgage, Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sales and
Reconveyance had become moot and academic.

LEONG vs. TANGUANGCO

G.R. No. 154632, March 14, 2008

FACTS:
On February 5, 1999, respondent Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Hermosa Bank) filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. The petition alleged that on
November 28, 1997 Hermosa Bank purchased at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale three parcels of land together with improvements
therein; that the Certificate of Sale of Realty issued to it was duly registered and annotated with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on
December 17, 1997; that twelve (12) months from the date of registration of the sale had already elapsed and neither petitioners nor
any person entitled thereto had exercised their right of redemption; that upon the expiration of the period, Hermosa Bank caused the
consolidation of ownership over said parcels and secured under its name; and that having consolidated its ownership thereon, it is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of possession.

Petitioners filed an Opposition with Urgent Motion to Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings and Motion for Consolidation. Petitioners
claimed that Alfonso only agreed to sign the documents upon the insistent prodding of the bank’s president, Benjamin J. Cruz, that
they were needed for purposes only of the Bangko Sentral’s audit of Hermosa Bank; in truth, the documents were required to cover up
the loan of spouses Rene and Remedios Dado and Sierra Madre Development Corporation, who are the real debtors of the bank.

Petitioners moved to reconsider the Order but reconsideration was denied; hence, on August 12, 1999, they filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The following day,
however, the Cavite RTC issued the writ of possession in favor of Hermosa Bank.

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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the petition under Rule 65 by the CA based on it being moot and academic is patently erroneous;

2. Whether or not the issues as to the validity of the real estate mortgage contracts, loan agreements, promissory notes, extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale of petitioners’ properties must first be resolved in the civil case pending in the Las Piñas RTC since the
question of whether respondent Hermosa Bank is entitled to a writ of possession in the LRC case is dependent thereon.

RULING:
As the CA correctly found, the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite had already granted the writ of possession sought by Hermosa. Hence, the
petition to consolidate the case before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite with the case pending before the RTC of Las Piñas, had become
moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

xiii. Remedy of the mortgagor is to question the sale and move for the cancellation of the writ of possession.

DE RAMOS vs. CA
213 SCRA 207

FACTS:
Private respondents mortgaged their 230 square meter residential lot located in Modern Village, Paciano Rizal, Calamba, Laguna and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-35475 in the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to the Luzon Development
Bank (hereinafter, the Bank) as security for a loan of P10,000.00 which is evidenced by a promissory note. There being default in the
payment of the installments on due dates despite several written demands, the Bank applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. In a public auction on 30 July 1981, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna sold the mortgaged property to the Bank, the lone
bidder therein, for P23,808.29.
On 26 July 1983, the Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba,
Laguna which was docketed as SLRC Case No. III-83-C. In its Order dated 24 June 1985, the trial court granted the petition, ordered
the issuance of a writ of possession and directed the Provincial Sheriff or any of his deputies to place the Bank in possession of the
property, the writ of possession was issued on 1 July 1985. During the pendency of the petition for a writ of possession, or specifically
on 3 September 1983, the Bank sold to the herein petitioners the property in question under a Deed of Conditional Sale for P35,000.00
payable in installments. After the said balance having been paid, the Bank executed in the petitioners favor a Deed of Absolute Sale on
November 1983 which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 13 November 1983.

The Demamays neither moved for a reconsideration of nor appealed from the aforesaid 24 June 1985 Order. Instead, on 5 July 1985,
Estelita Demamay filed a complaint "To Set Aside the Sale of Mortgaged Property and Subsequent Transactions Pertinent Thereto and
Cancel Writ of Possession Issued Thereon" which was docketed as Civil Case No. 894-85-C.

Then, seven (7) months later, or more specifically, on 8 August 1986, Estelita Demamay, now joined by her husband Flavio, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sales and Reconveyance of Real Property with Damages against the bank and herein petitioners with the
RTC of Calamba, Laguna; the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1031-86-C 11 and was raffled off to Branch 34 of the said
court. In its Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, the Bank interposed Special and
Affirmative Defenses, among which are (a) res judicata, the issues involved having already been raised and resolved by Branches 37
and 36 of the court, and (b) Branch 34 of the RTC has no jurisdiction to annul the final orders of the two (2) aforementioned branches
of the court in SLRC No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 849-85-C, respectively. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 1031-86-C on
the ground that it is barred by res judicata because of the final orders dated 24 June 1985 in SLRC No. 111-133-C, and 3 January 1986
in Civil Case No. 894-85-C.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Orders are adjudications on the merits of the causes of action and the issues involved.

RULING:
The principle of res judicata applies in this case. There being clearly identical parties and identity of rights asserted in all three (3)
cases — the focal issue in this case having been fully adjudicated in the aforecited cases — this case must be dismissed."

The essential requisites of res judicata are (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two
cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of action.

The parties do not dispute the fact that Branches 37 and 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna had jurisdiction over
SLRC No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 894-85-C, respectively, that their Orders which were pleaded as a bar to Civil Case No. 1031-
86-C are firm and final; and that the principal parties, causes of action and issues involved in the latter are identical to those in the first
two (2) cases.

After having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in SLRC No. 111-83-C, testifying therein and offering documentary evidence to
resist the petition for a writ of possession and to obtain affirmative relief such as the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and
all incidents thereto including, necessarily, the sale at the public auction, Demamay cannot now be heard to challenge the jurisdiction
of the said court and to suggest, in order to escape from the effects of the finality of the Order, that all that had transpired in the said
case was an exercise in futility. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent

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and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Put differently, it is not proper for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. That order was, undoubtedly, an adjudication on the merits of Demamay’s claim and cause of
action.

If the court in Civil Case No. 894-85-C finally decreed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, it was because the Order of 24
June 1985 in SLRC No. 111-83-C was already final; the court could not, therefore, annul it. the authority to annul the same is vested
in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) pursuant to Section 9(2) of B.P. No. 129. The message the court
wanted to convey was that the Order of 24 June 1985 constituted a prior final judgment which barred Civil Case No. 894-85-C.

The 3 January 1986 Order in Civil Case No. 894-85-C was, by itself, an adjudication on the merits of the Demamay spouses’ claim
because it declared them no longer entitled to the right upon which their claims are based. A judgment is deemed to be rendered upon
the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact
or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.

xiv. The order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession is final which can only be questioned on
appeal

SAN FERNANDO RURALBANK, INC. Vs. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS

DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION and DOMINIC G. AQUINO
G.R. No. 168088. April 3, 2007

FACTS:
Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC) was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Fernando,
Pampanga (now San Fernando City). Respondent PODC secured two loans from petitioner and Masantol Rural Bank, Inc.
(MRBI). The loans were evidenced by separate promissory notes executed by Federico R. Mendoza and Anastacio E. de Vera. To
secure payment of the loans, respondent PODC executed a real estate mortgage over the subject lot in favor of the creditor banks. The
contract provided that in case of failure or refusal of the mortgagor to pay the obligation secured thereby, the real estate mortgage may
be extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.

Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and daughter of Federico Mendoza), together with her husband Aristedes Garbes, secured
aP950,000.00 loan from petitioner on March 27, 1992. The loan was to mature after 180 days or on September 23, 1992. Mendoza
signed as co-borrower in the promissory note executed by the spouses. The spouses also executed a chattel mortgage over their
personal property as security for the payment of their loan account. Upon respondent PODC’s failure to pay its loan to petitioner, the
latter filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of possession
during the redemption period.

On May 11, 2002, petitioner, through Eliza Garbes (with the authority of petitioner’s board of directors), executed a notarized deed of
assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to redeem the property. On May 30, 2002, respondent Aquino
remitted Cashier’s Check No. to the Ex-OfficioSheriff as redemption money for the property for which he was issued Receipt
dated May 31, 2002. On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession in the RTC of
Pampanga. On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC No. 890 issued an Order granting the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ
of possession, on a bond equivalent to the market value of the property. It ruled that petitioner, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale,
was entitled to a writ of possession.

The appellate court ruled that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory
and not final; hence, it may be questioned only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal. The CA
cited the ruling of this Court in City of Manila v. Serrano. The CA further held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted the application of petitioner for a writ of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it sanctioned the Respondents’ resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final order and not an interlocutory order of the RTC.

RULING:
The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was merely
interlocutory. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters and which do not touch on the merits of the case or put
an end to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question an
improvident interlocutory order. On the other hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or terminates the particular

264
proceedings or action leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is one that finally disposes
of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court. The remedy to question a final order is appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The remedy of respondents was to appeal to the CA by filing their notice of appeal within the period therefor. Even if the trial court
erred in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not
by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ cannot be legally used for any other purpose.

Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.

b. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
i. Not an equitable mortgage in this case:

DIONISIA DORADO VDA. DE DELFIN vs. SALVADOR D. DELLOTA and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
GUMERSINDO DELEÑA,
G.R. No. 143697 January 28, 2008

FACTS:
The late Dionisia Dorado Delfin, herein petitioner, represented by her heirs, was the registered owner of Lot No. 1213
situated in Panitan, Capiz with an area of 143,935 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RP-1124 (14972). On
June 16, 1929, Dionisia executed an "Escritura De Venta Con Pacto de Retro" over a 50,000-square meter portion of Lot No. 1213 in
favor of spouses Ildefonso Dellota and Patricia Delfin. However, Dionisia failed to exercise her right of redemption. On June 9, 1949,
Dionisia sold another portion of Lot No. 1213 consisting of 50,000 square meters to Gumersindo Deleña (respondent herein
represented by his estate), as evidenced by a notarized "Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption," thus, leaving an unsold area of more
than 43,000 square meters. Dionisia never redeemed this 50,000-square meter portion from Gumersindo. Records show that Salvador
Dellota (also a respondent represented by his heirs) leased this area from Gumersindo. On October 12, 1956, Dionisia executed a
"Deed of and Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador over a 90,000-square meter portion of Lot No. 1213, without specifying whether
it included the 50,000-square portion sold (with right of redemption) to Gumersindo.
On June 8, 1964, Dionisia filed with the then Court of First Instance, Branch 2, Roxas City, a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2760.
Impleaded as defendant was respondent Salvador D. Dellota, represented by his wife Genoveva D. Dellota and their children.
The trial court ruled Dionisia to redeem the 40,000 meter portion of Lot 2123 and declared the ownership 50,000 portion also
of the same lot in the name of Gumersindo Delena. On appeal by Dionisia, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption entered into by Dionisia and Gumersindo is an equitable mortgage.

RULING:
An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or form, or words, or other requisites demanded by
a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible
or contrary to law.The essential requisites of an equitable mortgage are: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale,
(2) but their intention is to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.

Powers of Attorney and Trust

Mindanao Development Authority v. CA

133 SCRA 429, 1982

FACTS:

Respondent Francisco Ang Bansing was the owner of a big tract of land situated in Barrio Panacan Davao City. Ang Bansing sold a
portion thereof, with an area of about 5 hectares to Juan Cruz Yap Chuy. A cadastral survey was made and Lot 664-B-3 was
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designated as Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Juan Cruz sold Lot 1846-C to the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the amount
of P6,347.50. On February 25, 1965, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 459, transferring ownership of certain
parcels of land situated in Sasa Davao City, to the Mindanao Development Authority, now the Southern Philippines Development
Administration, subject to private rights, if any. Lot 1846-C, the disputed parcel of land, was among the parcels of land transferred to
the Mindanao Development Authority in said proclamation. He, in selling his property to another, made a written promise to work for
the titling of the land, but it was not done. The court ruled that there was no express trust, because the written promise did not
categorically create an obligation on the part of the landowner to hold the property in trust for the other. Neither was the subject matter
of the supposed trust clearly described.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an express trust between Ang Bansing and Juan Cruz over Lot 1846-C of Davao Cadastre

HELD:

No express trust had been created between Ang Bansing and Juan Cruz over Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Herein petitioner
relies mainly upon the following stipulation in the deed of sale executed by Ang Bansing in favor of Juan Cruz to prove that an
express trust had been established with Ang Bansing as the settlor and trustee and Juan Cruz as the cestui que trust or beneficiary. The
stipulation, however, is nothing but a condition that Ang Bansing shall pay the expenses for the registration of his land and for Juan
Cruz to shoulder the expenses for the registration of the land sold to him. The stipulation does not categorically create an obligation on
the part of Ang Bansing to hold the property in trust for Juan Cruz. Hence, there is no express trust. Thus, the petition is denied.

In a separate opinion of Justice Aquino, however, it is said that the disputed land should be adjudicated to the government agency
known as the Southern Philippines Development Administration, the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It is argued
that Ang Bansing did not touch at all Lot No. 1846-C because he knew that it was not his property and that it belonged to the State. It
is claimed that Ang Bansing was the true owner of Lot No. 1846-C, there being an express trust in this case. In any event, the real
plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines and prescription does not run against the State. The maxim is nullum tempus
occurrit regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the
commonwealth). The best reason for its existence is the great public policy of preserving public rights and property from damage and
loss through the negligence of public officers. The government officials concerned were negligent in not intervening in the land
registration proceeding or in not promptly asking Ang Bansing to reconvey the disputed lot to the Commonwealth or to the Republic
of the Philippines. Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The negligence or omissions of public officers as to their public
duties will not work an estoppel against the State.

PROCEEDINGS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION: INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS

A. ATTACHMENTS

a. Registration

i. Duty of the Clerk of Court if the duplicate certificate of title is not presented at the time of the
registration.
ii. Regitration of entry of any court process that reduces, dissolves or discharges the writ of attachment.

b. Effects of Attachment

SANTOS VS AQUINO (205 SCRA 127)

FACTS:

Santos and Camus filed a case against the FINASIA and its officers who are responsible in luring them to make the money
placement in that company and upon the application and strength of the attachment bonds, the court issued an attachment to the
property owned by the company in its officer. The proceedings against FINASIA were suspended because it was placed under
receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for operating without prior SEC registration and for failure to pay
maturing money market placements. FINASIA file a motion to lift the attachment by offering counter bonds but opposed by the
Santos. Then later they filed again a motion to substitute the attached properties and were set on September 22, 1988. But a day before
the hearing, the counsel of Santos informed him that the hearing was cancelled because the judge is attending a seminar but the truth is
he was there so he decided the case without the petitioner. An order was issued to the counsel of the petitioner but for some
unexplained reason he failed to inform his client. Santos discharged his lawyer and he himself filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied. So he filed a petition for certiorari.
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ISSUE:

Whether the judge exercises grave abuse of discretion in ordering the substitution of the attached properties?

HELD:

Yes, Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the substitution of the attached properties over the vigorous
opposition of the petitioners and without hearing them. His orders dated October 10, 1988 and December 10, 1988 are hereby annulled
and set aside. The original writ of attachment should be deemed to have subsisted on the attached properties from the date of the
original levy. The writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the
termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper
tribunal on the plaintiff's claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.

There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property although an attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon
the security of a counterbond offered by the defendant upon application to the court, with notice to, and after hearing, the attaching
creditor, or upon application of the defendant, with notice to the applicant and after hearing, if it appears that the attachment was
improperly or irregularly issued.

If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to apply to the court for a reduction or partial discharge of the
attachment, not the total discharge and substitution of the attached properties. The reason for this is that the lien acquired by the
plaintiff-creditor as of the date of the original levy would be lost. It would in effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law
of the attaching creditors' interest in the attached property as security for the satisfaction of the judgment which he may obtain in the
action.

The notice of levy in Civil Cases 365-MN and 374-MN was annotated on FINASIA's TCTs Nos. 120450 on November 22
and 23, 1983 and on Villarosa's TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351-A on November 7 and 30, 1983. By ordering the substitution on
October 11, 1988, the Court obliterated the petitioners' earlier lien under the original attachment and in effect deprived the petitioners
of their interest in the attached properties without due process of law.

B. REGISTRATION OF SALE OF LAND ON EXECUTION OR FOR TAXES or for any assessment, issuance of new
transfer certificate of title.

C. ADVERSE CLAIMS. Instances when claim is adverse.

a. Claim is adverse when there is no other provision made for the registration of such right to claim.

ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS 86 SCRA 279 (1978)

This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and
T-6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area
of 12,830 square meters.

FACTS:

On May 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas executed in Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita, her allegedly
adopted daughter, and instituted respondents (his siblings) as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had
allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita. On June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the
CFI of Capiz a petition for the probate of the former’s will. On December 12, 1967, Pedro filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a
verified notice of adverse claim. He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were conveyed by his brother Elviro to
Teresita Rosal Bernas "involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him
and his sister Soledad. After the ROD annotated the adverse claim on TCT Nos. T-6881 and T-6882, Teresita filed in the cadastral
and probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. She contended that she was not served with
prior notice of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro and
Soledad opposed the motion. The lower court granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the annotation.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in granting the cancellation of the annotation on the titles?

HELD:

YES. Under section 110 Act 496, the adverse claimant must be one who claims any right or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the original araregistration. That interest is registerable as an adverse claim if no
other provision is made in Act No. 496 for its registration. Applying section 110, it was held that a claim based on occurrences prior
to the original registration is not registerable as an adverse claim. In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the
adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate respondents are
merely presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas
has not yet been probated, but there is still a pending proceeding for its probate. In that will, the testator transmitted to his surviving
siblings the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to petitioner. Teresita's title to
the two lots have become controversial because of that will. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact that
Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy
267
of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then the registered
owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or
frustrated. The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous
or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that
the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit. It has been said
that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a proper proceeding and
that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one.

b. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of PD 1529 requires a claim on the title
of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of
the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It
is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
dispute.

ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS (175 Phil. 452)

FACTS:

Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in
Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas
Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.

A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance
of Capiz a petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965).

On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.

In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet
been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.

ISSUE:

Did the lower court err in cancelling the adverse claim?

HELD:

We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas
has not yet been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to
his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the
invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.

Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the
whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No.
496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to
them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse
claim will be nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952 as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of
a conveyance made in fraud of the deceased.)

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of
the dispute.

Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably
frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the
courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.

c. A mere money claim cannot be registered as an adverse claim.

268
LUCIO C. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF ORMOC CITY, INC.,
respondents.

[G.R. No. L-40177 February 12, 1976]

FACTS:

Respondent Rural Bank of Ormoc City, Inc. had executed certain affidavits of adverse claim to certain registered sugar lands
in Tacloban and Ormoc Cities alleged by petitioner to belong to him either as co-owner and/or as redemptioner. The said lands were
the subject of mortgage loans obtained from respondent bank which had been fully paid and discharged either by payment or
redemption after extra-judicial foreclosure. Upon the refusal of the Tacloban Register of Deeds to register the bank's adverse claim,
respondent bank filed with the court of first instance of Leyte as a land registration court three petitions 3 for an order to direct the
Tacloban and Ormoc Registers of Deeds to annotate its adverse claim on the titles, while petitioner in turn opposed the petitions and
filed his counter-petition for an order directing respondent bank to return the said titles without such annotations.

The court of first instance oredered the Registers of Deeds to annotate respondent' bank's adverse claims and thereafter
release the aforesaid titles to the corresponding registered owners. The Order was immediately implemented even before it became
final and executory and the bank's affidavits of adverse claim were annotated by the Registers of Deeds on the back of the certificates
of title. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of Appeals for the setting aside of the Order and the
cancellation of the annotations of adverse claims, pleading the inadequacy of resorting to an ordinary appeal with its concomitant
delay.

ISSUE(s):

Whether or not a mere money claim may be properly registered as an adverse claim on a Torrens Certificate of Title within
the purview of the Land Registration Act.

HELD:

A mere money claim may not be registered as an adverse claim on a torrens certificate of title and a judge who orders the
annotation on the certificate of title of such money claim as an adverse claim acts without any authority in law and commits a grave
discretion amounting in law and commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that calls for the issuance of the
corrective writ of certiorari. Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) manifestly provides that a person or entity who wishes
to register an adverse claim in registered land must-claim a "part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner. Thus,
purely money claims such as those of respondent bank by virtue of unsecured personal loans granted by it on promissory notes
executed in its favor signed by the borrowers and co-signed by petitioner as co-maker are not registrable as adverse claims against the
petitioner's registered lands. The claim asserted must affect the title or be adverse to the title of the registered owner in order to be duly
annotated as an adverse claim to the land against the registered owner. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided
for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. If respondent bank wanted the additional security
of petitioner's real properties besides his personal signature assuming liability for the payment of the personal loans, then it should not
have extended the loans without requiring furthermore the execution of a covering real 'estate mortgage. If the loans were due and it
feared that there would be a fraudulent removal-or disposition of the debtors' properties, then its proper course was to file the proper
collection suit and seek a court order for attachment under bond — but certainly not to execute and submit for registration a mere
baseless adverse claim, simply because it happened to be in possession of petitioner's certificates of title as a mortgagee whose
mortgage lien had been fully discharged.

d. Formal Requisites.

DARIO N. LOZANO, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the deceased AGUSTO N. LOZANO, PATROCINIO
DEL PRADO and ANTONIO LOZANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. IGNACIO BALLESTEROS, defendant-appellee.

[G.R. No. 49470 April 8, 1991]

FACTS:

Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered exclusive owner of the land in
question. On March 6, 1958, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios. Augusto,
Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano, together with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan and for the annotation of several

269
documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. The court approved the consolidation-subdivision plan and
directed the inscription of said deed of sale at the back of the title. On January 22, 1963, plaintiffs caused the annotation of their
adverse claim at the back of the title of the said lot. On August 25, 1966, De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name. Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios
alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B. The court rendered a default decision in favor of
the plaintiffs. Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several complaints for reconveyance
and recovery of possession. The appellants insist that "the said adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent titles of the
defendants." Appellee however, stresses that a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs-appellants readily
reveals that the same has failed to comply with the formal requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse claims. And
for which, and for all legal purposes, the adverse claim under comment is not valid and effective.

ISSUE(s):

Whether or not the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the
defendant meets the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court that whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act
for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the
right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate
a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court,
upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall
enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If
in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse
claimant double or treble costs in its discretion. Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above quoted provision
are the formal requisites of an adverse claim. However, as the lower court noted "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of
the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of
Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property. Thus, the effect of such non-
compliance renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.

e. The duty of the Register of Deeds to record the adverse claim on the title is ministerial.

ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES,
SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]

FACTS:

Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to spouses
Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The
property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.
Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property. Upon
full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas
couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.

When the deed of absolute sale was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the
Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21,
1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did
not push through as scheduled. On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution
upon defendant-appellant Pilares. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. The Sajonases
filed their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the
Uychocdes. Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the Sajonas
couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417. Pilares appealed to the
Court of Appeals and the appellate court upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.

ISSUE(s):

Whether or not a subsequent sale prevails over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title
over the property.

HELD:
270
 The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies. Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A
person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.

While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse
claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. Deeds of conveyance of property registered under the
system, or any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not
required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed
to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale
cannot prevail over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title over the property. If the rationale of the
law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to
include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

i. Purpose of registering adverse claim:

(1) Is to apprise third person that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land, such that any transaction
regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.

CHING vs. ENRILE

GR No. 156076, 17 September 2008

FACTS:

On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370-square meter lot located at Barrio
Tungtong, Las Piñas and covered by TCT No. 83618. The conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds. Instead, on
November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim.

In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the subject property.

Three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of
Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents.

On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of
the disputed property.

On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners upholding the latter’s superior right over the disputed
property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents.

In time, respondents appealed to the CA, theorizing that the prior conveyance of the disputed property made by La Fuente to
petitioners being a voluntary dealing with a registered land, mere registration of their adverse claim was insufficient.

On August 29, 2002, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents were purchasers in good faith when they acquired the disputed lot despite the annotated adverse
claim on their title.

HELD:

No.
The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who
registers the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as
against a vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is
because registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that
there is notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at the
time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. Respondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as such, could not
acquire good title to the property as against the former transferee.

271
 (2) to serve notice of existing controversy involving the land

G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978

TERESITA ROSAL ARRAZOLA
vs.
PEDRO A. BERNAS and SOLEDAD VERNAS ALIVIO
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-6882
in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola).
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5, 1967 executed a notarized will wherein he disinherited
Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including the lots
in question which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, Elviro Bernas died, and his brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition for the probate of his
will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas
"involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him (Pedro) and his sister
Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim, Teresita R. Bernas Arrazola filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings
a motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim, which was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with
prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro A.
Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim annotated in the name of the petitioner should be cancelled.

HELD:
No.
It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And
in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right
to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them,
then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will
be nullified or frustrated.

ii. A claim that is not validly registered is ineffective for the purpose of protecting claimant’s right or interest on the
disputed land; rights in favor of 3rd parties arising after are not prejudiced.
G.R. No. L-28529 April 30, 1979
L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN
vs.
HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land Registration Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, and MARIA VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
The property involved is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425 of the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia Realty,
Inc. On a date that does not appear of record, the property was converted into a subdivision called the Garville Subdivision. This
subdivision has blocks and certain lots and the controversy in this case centers on Lot 6, Block 4.
On September 7, 1964, a Notice of lis pendes was presented by Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case No. 2489-P
referring specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new subdivision plan. It is to be noted that the lis pendens does not refer to
Lot 6, Block 4. On April 28, 1966, an Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 was presented by J. Antonio Leviste,
Executive Vice President of petitioner company, based on an assignment in his favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot from
Garcia Realty. Also to be noted is that this has no reference to Lot 6, Block 4. On May 6, 1966 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering

272
Lot 6, Block 4 was presented by respondent Maria Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her favor executed by Garcia Realty.
This is the Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste
and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had registered adverse claims and attachments. The Register of Deeds refused to issue a
new title to Villanueva without carrying over the two annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim.
Petitioners take the position that the agreement to sell in favor of Maria Villanueva was not registered. Hence, the rights of a
lienholder established by law cannot be invoked in favor of petitioner (herein respondent).

ISSUE:
Whether or not a claim not validly registered is effective for the purpose of protecting claimant's right or interest on the disputed land.

HELD:
No.
In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, it was held that for the special remedy of adverse claim to be availed of, it must be
shown that there is no other provision in the law for registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in the property. In said case,
the basis of the adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale. As the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for
registration of the vendee's right on a registered property (Section 57), the filing of an adverse claim was held ineffective for the
purpose of protecting the vendee's right.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and
that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument. Instead,
Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act
prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being
no showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was
resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or
interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties.

f. Samples of registrable and non-registrable adverse claims.

i. Expected hereditary rights do not constitute adverse claim.

ARRAZOLA vs BERNAS (86 SCRA 279)

FACTS:

Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and when he was 79 years old , he executed a notarized will
instituting his brother and sister as heirs to all his properties including the lots which he had involuntary transferred to Teresita. In
1967, Elviro died. On December, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim. A
copy of the will was attached to the adverse claim.

After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on the transfer certificates of title, Teresita filed in the cadastral
and probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds
that she was not served with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification" filed with
the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The lower court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it
and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the annotation. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not expected hereditary rights do not constitute adverse claim.

RULING:

Yes, the contingent, expectant and inchoate hereditary rights of the children of a living parent do not constitute an adverse
claim during his lifetime which could be annotated on the titles covering the parent's land. That is an illustration of a frivolous or
vexatious adverse claim.

In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet
been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.

273
 The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.

It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a
proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one

ii.The subject matter of a contract of sale between Lazaro Tanedo and the respondents is “one hectare of whatever
share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829
of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac”. It constitutes a part of Tanedo’s future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. It may not be registered as an Adverse Claim.

TAÑEDO VS. COURT APPEALS (322 Phil 84)

FACTS:
Lazaro Tañedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo Tañedo and Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of
land which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He also
executed another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering the parcel of land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed
of sale in the registry of deeds in their favor.

Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children through a deed of sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Tañedo spouses have a better right over the property against the children of Lazaro Tañedo

RULING:
Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract, the deed of sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro
has no effect. The subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale made by him in favor of spouses Tañedo and another to his children
after he already legally acquired the property.

Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in
the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took possession thereof. As
between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his
title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.

iii. A waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid is
not invalid. An adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver is likely invalid and ineffective. It
does not bind subsequent owners and does nothold them liable to the claim.

ATTY. FERRER VS SPS. DIAZ

GR No. 165300

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaintthat on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante,
through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
Contractby way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title and a Promissory Note pimary payable within six months or up to November
7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of said loan. Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
based solely on the waiver of hereditary interest executed by Comandante.

274
 The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon
presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on
September 29, 1999 a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and
Comandante .

Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and,
second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by Transfer of Certificate of Title was
already transferred under their names in Transfer of Certificates of title. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all
the respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid. Whether not the petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver likewise
valid and effective.

RULING:
Yes. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to
the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the
properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely
hereditary in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied
in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim should have been determined by the trial court after the petition for
cancellation of petitioner’s adverse claim filed by Comandante It has been held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse
claim may be cancelled.
.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioner’s adverse claim which was based upon such
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property. Petition is denied.

iv. Sales and leases when the owner refuses to surrender owner’s copy for annotation may be registered as adverse
claims.
v. Interest on the land based on the lawyer’s contingent fee that arose after the original registration may be
registered as an adverse claim after the termination of the litigation involving the land.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA

88 SCRA 513 (1979)

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the
cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.

The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case
No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a
contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to
compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal executed a document on June 10, 1961 whereby he obliged himself to
give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.

The real property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R6573 was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and
5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner Maximo
Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in said civil case.

Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on May 19,1965 in the name of Maximo Abarquez, married
to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters. These parcels of
land later by the subject matter of the adverse claim filed by the claimant.

The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply
with ha obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by delivering the one-half (½) portion of the said parcels of
land. Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841
to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse
claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1965 with the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. By virtue of the affidavit, the adverse claim for one-half (½) of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was
annotated on TCT No. 31841.

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 Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas conveyed
by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two-thirds (2/3) of the lands covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan
Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.

When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841
necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of
cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The adverse
claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18, 1966 .The trial court resolved
the issue on March 19, 1966, denying the petition to cancel adverse claim.

Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal. Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates
Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject of litigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez is valid.

RULING:
Yes. In resolving the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest
or right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was
won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one-half (½) portion of the lots in question became effective and binding.
So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one. There was therefore a valid interest in the
lots to be registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Maximo Abarquez.

Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question arose long after the original petition which took
place many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be
registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof.

Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is held
to be valid.

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered
owner thereof.

vi. A claim based on occurrences prior to the original registration is not registrable; nor can a claim based on
prescription or adverse possession be registered by the possessor when the land is already registered in the name of another.

ARRAZOLA VS BERNAS
86 SCRA 279

FACTS:

This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and
T-6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area
of 12,830 square meters.

Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in
Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas
Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had allegedly involuntarily transferred to Teresita.

A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance
of Capiz a petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will.

On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claimwhich was
recorded as a notice of adverse claim in favor of Pedro and Soledad, all surnamed Bernas. Claiming ownership in the parcels of land
described in T-6881 and T-6882 by virtue of the Last Will. He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were
conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration and that in Elviro's will
the two lots were devised to him (Pedro) and his sister Soledad.

After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on TCT Nos. T-6881 and T-6882, Teresita R. Bernas Arrazola
filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion dated August 13, 1968 for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim.
The motion was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with prior notice of the adverse claim and that there was no petition
for approval or justification thereof filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The lower
court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the annotation. The oppositors appealed.

The appellate court decided that the correctness of the lower court's order is to be passed upon in the light of section 110 of
Act No. 496. Applying section 110, it was held in De los Reyes vs. De los Reyes, 91 Phil. 528 that a claim based on occurrences prior
to the original registration is not registerable as an adverse claim.

276
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the adverse claim by the lower court is correct.

RULING:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas
has not yet been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to
his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the
invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.

Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the
whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No.
496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to
them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse
claim will be nullified or frustrated.

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.

Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably
frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the
courts that the titles of Teresita Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.

It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a
proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one.

ESTELLA VS RD
106 PHIL 911

FACTS:
These are appeals from two decisions of the Land Registration Commission dated 7 February and 30 April 1957, upholding
the refusal of the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal to record the claimant's adverse claims under the provisions of
section 110, Act No. 496 .

On 24 December 1956 Pedro Moraga filed in the Office of the Registar of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal and
affidavit of adverse claim subscribed and sworn to by him, No. 14, Block No. 51-C of the subdivision plan Psd-15136, situate in
barrio Calaan, Municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, containing an area of 682.5 sq. m. more or less, described in transfer
certificate of title No. 47961 issued in the name of John O. Yu, married to Anicate T. Yu, registered on the registration book in the
registry of deeds of Rizal, on the ground that in or about the year 1945 the Philippine Realty Corporation sold that said parcel of land
to a Chinese citizen disqualified to acquire public agricultural lands or to holds lands of the public domain in the Philippines; that the
contract of sale of the parcel of land in question to the disqualified alien is null and void and neither the vendor nor the vendee
retained or acquired ownership thereof.

He further claimed that he and predecessor-in-interest have been in actual continuous, public, exclusive and uninterrupted
possession of the parcel of land in question for more than ten years and built two houses thereon; that no one has claimed from then
ownership or possession of the parcel of land in question or demanded from them payment of rentals for its use and occupation had
prescribed; and that the vendee had in it already has prescribed; and that the registered owner was aware that the appellant had been in
possession of the parcel of land in question when he brought it from the Philippine Realty Corporation and that the transaction
between the Philippine Realty Corporation and the disqualified alien was illegal. The appellant requested the Registrar of Deeds to
record his adverse claim pursuant to section 110, Act No. 496.

On 29 December 1956 the Registrar of Deeds refused the request and submitted the following questions to the Land
Registration Commission for resolution pursuant to section 4, Republic Act No. 1151 on the issue that is the adverse claim of Pedro
Moraga, a mere squatter on the registered private land, registerable.

On 7 February 1957 the Land Registration Commission rendered a decision answering in the question in the negative
because the parcel of land in question being registered under Act No. 496, the appellant's claim of prescription and/or adverse
possession is untenable of "No title registered in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession."
On 26 February 1957 the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. On 12 March 1957 John O. Yu, the registered owner who had
intervened, filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

On 28 February 1957 Juan Estella, Felicisimo Vargas, Maximo de Lara, Domingo Samson and Florentina Tabocboc by
counsel filed in the Land Registration Commission a written consulta based upon an affidavit of adverse claim subscribed and sworn
to by them, the first two claiming ownership to one-third; the rest, to one-third; and Pedro Moraga to one-third of the parcel of land in
question, on the same grounds invoked by the latter in his affidavit of adverse claim filed in the first case. They prayed that the
Registrar of Deeds be ordered to register their respective adverse claims under the provisions of section 110, Act No. 496.

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 On 30 April 2957 the Land Registration Commission denied the motion for reconsideration of Pedro Moraga and the petition
of the other appellants, reiterating its decision dated 7 February 1957 in the first case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim of the appellants registerable?

RULING:

Here the appellant's adverse claim of ownership is based upon prescription and adverse possession, would serve no useful
purpose and could not validly and legally after the parcel of land.

The appellant's claim that as neither the vendor nor the vendee could claim ownership of it, it reversed to the State as
patrimonial property, which they may acquire by prescription or under the free patent law. Even if their opposition of reversion to the
State be sustained, still their respective adverse claims cannot be registered. Prescription does not run against the State. 2 Besides, the
reversion to the State of the parcel of land in question did not withdraw it from the operation of the provisions of Act No. 496. Neither
could the fact that their adverse possession which might entitle them to fact that their under the free patent law constitute a registerable
adverse claim.

vi. An annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal
easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support constituted
on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less, of
the property of petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is ordered cancelled. It is not valid as an Adverse Claim.

MARGARITA F. CASTRO VS NAPOLEON A. MONSOD,

G.R. No. 183719

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071, with an area of one hundred thirty (130) square meters (sq.m.).
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village,
Phase 2, Las Piñas City. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2) meters high,
dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.

On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of
petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent
was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the
property from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of
petitioner’s property. Respondent also filed a complaint for malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the office of
the barangay chairman.

In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Petitioner also prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City be ordered to
cancel the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. T-36071.

Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or existence of
any easement over the property. Respondent neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65 sq.m. of her
property as easement. Upon learning of the adverse claim, she felt disturbed and experienced sleepless nights for fear that she would
not be able to sell her property. Petitioner admitted that TCT No. 36071 does not cover the open space at the dead-end portion
of Garnet Street.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his
property over the property of petitioner, in view of the latter’s manifest determination to remove the embankment left by the developer
of Manuela Homes.

The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim
was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner. Furthermore, the
adverse claim of respondent failed to comply with the requisites provided under Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.The CA ruled that while respondent’s adverse claim could not be
sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as
recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent
petitioner from making injurious excavations on the subject embankment as to deprive the residential house and lot of respondent of
its natural support and cause it to collapse. Respondent only asked that petitioner respect the legal easement already existing thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the
same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.

RULING:
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 Respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not
have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential
Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It
is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral
support over the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioner’s property covering the land support/embankment area. His reason for the annotation is
only to prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on the property for fear of soil erosion that might weaken
the foundation of the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the property of petitioner that the annotation at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted
on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less, of the property of
petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is hereby ordered removed.

viii. The annotation of inscription of Entry No. 86-622/T-83618 is obviously and indeed very clear indicating that the
plaintiffs’ registered adverse claim in reference to the sale of the same property sought by defendants to be levied on
attachment, final execution and sale came ahead.

SPS. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN

Versus
SPS. ADOLFO & ARSENIA ENRILE,
G.R. No. 156076
FACTS:

Petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370-square meter lot located at Barrio Tungtong, Las Piñas and
covered by TCT No. 83618. La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the Owner’s Duplicate
Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical possession of the subject property.

For reasons known only to petitioners, the conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed by Section
51 of PD 1529.Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was recorded and annotated
at the back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the Memorandum of Encumbrances under Entry No. 86-62262.

In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the subject property.

On August 19, 1988 ─ three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy on
Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617
entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. 83618 under Entry No. 3433-2 while the Writ of Execution was inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2. Also inscribed
in the TCT is the Certificate of Sale dated January 26, 1989 covering the disputed property in favor of respondents.

On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of
the disputed property.

On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners upholding the latter’s superior right over the disputed
property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents

CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC. Even as the CA viewed the prior sale of the disputed
lot in favor of petitioners as perfected and consummated, it nonetheless upheld respondents’ preferential right over the disputed
property.The CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered the order of attachment and the sale of the property
to them as the highest bidders, acquired a valid title to the disputed property as against petitioners who had previously bought the same
property from the registered owner but failed to register their deed of sale.The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good
faith.

ISSUE:

Whether the levy on attachment later annotated shall prevail over the Adverse Claim earlier annotated at the back of the title
by the mere lapse of 30 days and even without any petition in court for its cancellation

RULING:

Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the annotated adverse claim had already prescribed by
the mere lapse of 30 days from its registration. The issue is no longer of first impression. In the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of
Appeals, we explained that a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of
PD 1529.

279
 We held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting

The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who
registers the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as
against a vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This
is because registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration
that there is notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at
the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him.Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration

It is beyond dispute that the property in question had already been sold by La Fuente to petitioners on September 5,
1985. Petitioners immediately took possession thereof. When the Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal portion of
TCT No. 83618 and when the Writ of Execution and Certificate of Sale were inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2 in favor of
respondents, on January 26, 1989, petitioners have been, since September 5, 1985, in actual, physical, continuous and uninterrupted
possession.

Here, petitioners’ adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the
disputed property. To us, these circumstances should have put respondents on guard and required them to ascertain the property being
offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. A person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.

H. When adverse claim cancelled.

SAJONAS V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102377July 5, 1996

FACTS:

The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of
real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land
from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.

The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August
1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.

Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares
(Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant
sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the
same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy
on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.

ISSUE:

Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale?

RULING:

The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law
(PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be
gleaned on the following discussion:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to
the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a
statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices
may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse
claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verifiedpetition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land
is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration
thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered
was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its
280
discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn
petition to that effect.”

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the
provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law,
taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the
inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be
effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless
ceremony.

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very
purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered
owner thereof.

Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.

I.An adverse claim can subsist concurrently with an annotation of notice of lispendens involving the same right or interest
covered by the adverse claim.

ARRAZOLA V. BERNAS
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978

FACTS:

This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and
T-6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area
of 12,830 square meters.

Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in
Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas
Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.

A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance
of Capiz a petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965).

On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.

In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet
been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.

ISSUE:

Is the lower court correct in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim?

RULING:

No. The lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.

Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the
whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No.
496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to
them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse

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claim will be nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952 as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of
a conveyance made in fraud of the deceased.)

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.

Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably
frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the
courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.

TY SIN TEI V. DY PIAO

G.R. No. L-11271 May 28, 1958

FACTS:

Dy Lac, the testator, purchased houses and a lot located at Zurbaran Street, Manila, and placed the title thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 58652, in the name of his maidservant and concubine named Paz Ty Sin Tei in 1940. After the testator's death
in 1948, Paz filed a petition for the probate of his will. Lee Dy Piao and Uy Cho, the respective legitimate son and widow of Dy Lac
acting pursuant to section 110 of Act No. 496, caused their claim, as heirs of Dy Lac, to be annotated on the back of TCT No. 58652
pending the determination of their hereditary rights in the testamentary proceeding.

On March 23, 1955, Paz Ty Sin Tei filed a petition in the land registration record of TCT No. 58652 for the cancellation of
the adverse claim. The Court of First Instance of Manila cancelled it over Lee Dy Piao's opposition. On appeal, this Court set aside the
order of cancellation and further held that the adverse claim could subsist concurrently with a subsequent annotation of a notice of lis
pendens which referred to a case filed by Lee Dy Piao, involving the same right or interest covered by the adverse claim.

In further support of our holding that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim,
it is also relevant to cite the holding that where a guardianship proceeding was instituted for an octogenarian woman, it was proper to
annotate on the title of her land the pendency of such a proceeding by means of a notice of lis pendens for the purpose of alerting
anyone who might wish to buy the land that his purchase might be questioned later on. An adverse claim and a notice of lis pendens
have the same purpose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a notice of lis pendens would be, unecessary and superflous where an adverse claim has previously been
annotated.

RULING:

There no dispute as to the fact that appellant caused the annotation of an adverse claim on said property on August 22, 1951,
and that without said notation having been cancelled a notice of lis pendens was also inscribed on the same title on March 21, 1955,
upon the institution by said claimant of a civil action based on the same ground as his adverse claim. Hence, appelle protested against
the existence of 2 notices in her title and sought the cancellation of the adverse claim on the allegation that one invalidates the other.
We find this contention to be untenable. The registration of an adverse claim is allowed by Section 110 of Act 496, which reads as
follows:

SEC.110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of
the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at which
all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition
of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree
therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If any case the
court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivoluos or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double
or treble costs in its discretion.

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided, for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered
owner thereof. The aforequoted Section 110 lays down the procedure for the registration of such notice-by filing a sworn statement
with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting for the basis of the claimed right together with other
data pertinent thereto. The validity or efficaciousness of the claim, however, may only determine by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled. In the
case at bar, no such petition was filed by appelle who should be the party interested in having the notation cancelled. Instead, We find
that from August 22, 1951, when the adverse claim was registered, to March 21, 1955, when the notice of lis pendens was annotated,

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petitioner-appellee took no step in having the claim inquired into or investigated in order that the question of the validity of such claim
may be resolved.

J. A notice of lispendens serves the purposes of the adverse claim.

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF

TITLE NO. T-7601 OF DAVAO. NATIVIDAD VILLAFLOR v. JOSE JUEZAN

G.R. No. 35205 April 17, 1990

FACTS:

The appellant registered his affidavit of adverse claim, which conformed to the requirements of Section 110, Act 496, in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1217 under primary entry No. 26083 of the Register of Deeds.

The appellant filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from the defendant the surrender of owner's duplicate of TCT T-1217 for the
deed of sale in favor of the appellant be registered or annotated in the certificate of title. In this case, the defendant's answer raised the
issue of validity of the deed of sale in favor of the appellant.

More than four years after the appellant's adverse claim was annotated and while case No. 3496 is (sic) pending, the appellee
presented for registration two deeds of sale affecting the land subject of the action, the first conveyed 8.6186 hectares and the second
conveyed the remaining 3.0219 hectares and that TCT T-1217 was cancelled and TCT T-7601 was issued to the appellee wherein the
adverse claim annotated was carried on.

It is this adverse claim which the appellee seeks to be cancelled. The lower court first ordered its cancellation, then in an
order the court reconsidered and finally returned to its original stand. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner-appellee filed a motion to dismiss appeal in the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issue involved has become
moot and academic, because oppositor-appellant Jose Juezan filed a notice of lis pendens on the property covered by T.C.T. No. T-
7601 and in connection with Civil Case No. 3496.

ISSUE:

Whether an adverse claim annotated in a transfer certificate of title may be cancelled when the validity or invalidity of the
claim is still subject of inquiry in a civil case pending resolution by the trial court.

HELD:

The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale, allegedly executed by Simon Maghanay in favor of appellant
Jose Juezan. This document is also the basis of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of
said adverse claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending this litigation.

Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on T.C.T. No. T-7601 of petitioner-appellee, the Court
finds no basis for maintaining the adverse claim.

This Court sees no reason for disturbing the questioned order of the trial court directing the cancellation of the oppositor-
appellant's adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-7601. The notice of lis pendens filed by the oppositor-appellant affecting the same
property in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.

D. Notice of lispendens.
a. Contents
b. Nature & purpose of the notice
i. Definition and purpose:

ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P. SORIANO v. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS
OF MAKATI CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO

G.R. No. 174290

January 20, 2009

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for Certiorari and Prohibition were consolidated per Resolution. SMWSI is an educational
institution incorporated and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, Marcial Soriano being the President.

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 Hilario Soriano is one of the siblings of petitioner Marcial Soriano. The cases originated from the Complaint filed by H.
Soriano for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Sale and Cancellation of 3 TCTs registered in the name of Oro
Development Corporation; and another TCT registered in the name of SMWSI. Hilario Soriano alleged that during the marriage of his
parents, the couple acquired both real and personal properties, including the subject properties. Soriano couple allegedly executed a
Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Soriano’s subscription of stocks in the said
corporation. Tomas Q. Soriano died intestate.

Thereafter, ODC sold the property to SMWSI. Private respondent discovered that his father’s signature in the Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on the 3 TCTs in the name of ODC which notice
was carried over to the new certificate of title. The RTC dismissed the private respondent’s Complaint.

Hilario Soriano moved for reconsideration but RTC denied the same. The RTC granted the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens. CA granted private respondent’s Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens on the TCTs of the subject
properties.

ISSUE:

Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent’s Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of
Lis Pendens

HELD:

No.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over
property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.

Lis pendens is intended (1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated
and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation; and (2) to announce to the whole world that a particular
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

A trial court has the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose
of molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to
be recorded.

Considering that the dismissal of the Complaint bearing the annotations of lis pendens on the 3 properties by the RTC was
appealed to the CA, CA rightly saw the need to give notice to the public of such fact. The necessity becomes more compelling
considering that SMWSI already entered into transactions with third parties involving the subject properties.

The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has
taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with the consummation of the judgment by any ad interim
transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession.

Now that the case is pending before us on appeal, there is no certainty as to the outcome of the case. There is a need to warn
the whole world that a particular property is in litigation, serving as a warning that the one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.

ii. The notice is not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to
those dealing with the property that it is under litigation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MABELLE RAVELO and SPOUSES EMMANUEL and PERLITA REDONDO

G.R. No. 165114

August 6, 2008

FACTS:

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 Jose Fernando filed miscellaneous sales application over a lot and relinquished his right over it to Victoriano Mortera, Jr.
Then, one Severino Muyco also filed a miscellaneous sales application for the same property.

After investigation, DENR ordered in favor of Fernando and Mortera.

Before the DENR's action, the Director of Lands issued Sales Patent and Original Certificate of Title covering the same lot to
Mabelle Ravelo. Thus, the DENR’s Order was not enforced, to which Fernando protested.

Petitioner filed complaint for cancellation of title alleging that sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional office that
has jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the Director of Lands in Manila. The government also accused Ravelo of fraud for
asserting in her application that the land was not occupied and was a part of the public domain.

A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on Ravelo's OCT.

In a separate development, Antonio Chieng obtained a judgment against Ravelo in a collection suit, which led to the issuance
of a writ of execution. The Notice of Levy was registered with the Register of Deeds. In the auction sale that followed, Wilson
Chieng, Antonio Chieng's son, won as highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Chieng and the sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds.

The respondent-spouses bought the lot from Chieng. The parties first signed an agreement for the purchase of the subject lot
and upon payment of the agreed purchase price, executed a deed of absolute sale.

The final deed of sale covering the subject lot in favor of Chieng was inscribed. On the same date, TCT covering the subject
lot was issued to Chieng. The petitioner's complaint for cancellation and reversion was carried at the back of Chieng's TCT.
Chieng and Redondos entered into another deed of sale in the Redondos' favor inscribed at the back of TCT and issued to
Redondos.

The RTC cancelled Ravelo's Sales Patent and OCT, Chieng's TCT, and the Redondos' TCT and ordered the reversion of the
land to the mass of the public domain.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good
faith.

ISSUE:

Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, whose title over the subject lot that could defeat
the petitioner's cause of action for cancellation of title and reversion.

HELD:

No. The CA erred in concluding that the Redondos were buyers in good faith. They purchased the subject lot from Chieng
subject to the government's notice of lis pendens; hence, their purchase was at the risk of the outcome of the State's complaint for
cancellation and reversion which we find to be meritorious. The subject lot must therefore revert back to the public domain.

Lis pendens literally means "a pending suit," while a notice of lis pendens, inscribed in the certificate of title, is an
announcement to the whole world that the covered property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest in the
property does so at his own risk and subject to the results of the litigation. The notice that this provision speaks of - the notice of lis
pendens - is not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those dealing with the property
that it is under litigation.

The government's notice of lis pendens came after the execution sale and thus cannot affect Chieng and the conveyance to
him of the subject lot. However, the sale by Chieng to the Redondos of the subject lot was subject to the notice of lis pendens duly
annotated on Chieng's title.

iii. A notice of lispendens is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court; may be ordered
cancelled any time.

HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN VS IAC

152 SCRA 253

FACTS:

In 1975, Marron filed a case against the spouses Bazaar, praying for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a lot in his
favor. Notably, while the case is still pending in 1976, Marron caused the annotation of notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT.
Judgement was thereafter rendered in favor of Marron, ordering spouses Bazaar to execute Deed of Absolute Sale.

Notwithstanding the writ of execution, the spouses Bazar refused to execute the Deed. The clerk of court was then ordered to
execute the deed in behalf of the spouses.

When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure
a court order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.

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 It appears that in 1974, a Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject property was executed by spouses Bazaar in favor of
Marasigan. It was, however, only in 1977 that such Deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds. When the new title was issued in
the name of Marasigan, the notice of lis pendens effected by Marron was carried over.

In 1979, Marasigan filed a case for the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale issued by the Clerk of Court in his favor
with the Registry of Deeds. He also prayed for the cancellation of the Deed issued in favor of Marasigan.

The trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Marron. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the CA was correct in ruling that herein respondent has a better right?

RULING:

Yes.

There is a clear showing that although the late Marasigan acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a
deed of absolute sale on 1974, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and,
therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit.

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.

iv. The continuance or the removal of the notice of lispendens is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION V. CA

184 SCRA 325 (1990)

FACTS:

Magdalena Estate Inc. owns a subdivision known as Magdalena Rolling Hills. The disputed property in the case at bar is a lot
within the subdivision initially set as an “open space” and therefore could not be sold, disposed or encumbered.

Thereafter, the subdivision plan was amended with the approval of the City Council and the Court of First Instance. The
“open space” was made open for public disposition and was surveyed into several lots. A part of the lot was then donated to the city
government and part was conveyed to the Developmental Bank of the Philippines by way of dacion en pago.

Herein petitioners then filed an action against Magdalena Estate Inc. for the recovery of the “open space” for their use as
residents of the subdivision. At the instance of the petitioners, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title of the lot conveyed to
DBP.

The trial court rendered judgment not favorable to the petitioners. Hence, an appeal with the CA was perfected. Pending
judgment, DBP and MEI filed motions for the cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The motions were subsequently granted.

Contending that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motions filed by DBP and MEI, the petitioners
brought herein petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA has power to remove the notice of lis pendens?

RULING:

Yes.

The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice
is but an incident in an action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights
they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal — like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction — is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

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C. Cases where notice of lispendens is proper. The litigation must involve title to, or the use or occupation of, a specific
property. Hence, it does not apply where the object of the suit is money judgment or proceedings for the probate of will or
administration of the estate of a deceased person, levy on execution or preliminary attachments.

BIGLANGAWA V. CONSTANTINO
109 Phil 168

FACTS:

Biglangawa and Espiritu were co-owners of a parcel of land. Constantino was appointed as their agent who is to develop the
area and sell them to prospective homeowners. In 1951, Constantino was able to dispose off more than half of the lots. However,
Biglangawa and Espiritu failed to give him sufficient compensation as agreed upon.

Later, Biglangawa and Espiritu terminated the agency contract with Constantino. They, however, acknowledged their liability
to Constantino and promised him that they will pay the unpaid commissions. Payments were made but the entire amount was not
given. A case for the collection of the unpaid sum was then filed by Constantino.

Pending the resolution of the case, Constantino filed for the annotation of notice of lis pendens with the Registry of Deeds.
Biglangawa and Espiritu refused, however, to surrender the owner’s copy of transfer certificate. Upon sale of the lot to Santos, the
notice of lis pendens was annotated in the TCT. Hence, Biglangawa and Espiritu filed for the cancellation of the annotated notice of lis
pendens.

Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of Biglangawa and Espiritu. Constantino then filed with this court.

ISSUE:

Whether the annotation was proper.

RULING:

No.

Appellant's amended complaint, not being "an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property", nor one "to
recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceeding
of any kind in court affecting the title to real estate or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon . . .", the same cannot be
the basis for annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title of the petitioners-appellees.

i. Entry in the day book is sufficient; notice must be carried over in all certificates subsequently issued.

i. Grounds for Cancellation:

ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P. SORIANO vs. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS
OF MAKATI CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO

G.R. No. 174290

FACTS:

Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Q. Soriano’s death, he discovered that the latter’s
signature in the Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 in favor of ODC was a forgery. Being very familiar with his father’s signature,
private respondent compared Tomas Q. Soriano’s purported signature in the Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 with Tomas Q.
Soriano’s genuine signature in another document captioned Second Amendment of Credit Agreement. RTC dismissed the complaint
files by the private respondent.

On 16 May 2005, petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens[31] annotated on the titles
covering the subject properties, which Motion was opposed by the private respondent.

As mentioned in the case, the notice of lis pendens can be cancelled if it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party
who caused it to be recorded. Private respondent Hilario P. Soriano has no interest to be protected insofar as the subject properties are
concerned because of his acknowledgment that he already received his share in the estate of Tomas Soriano.

On 14 March 2006, private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis
Pendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its
dismissal had been duly appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lispendens be cancelled

HELD:

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 The inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the
purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.

The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has
taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with the consummation of the judgment by any ad interim
transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.

ii. The notice of lispendens shall be deemed cancelled when the adverse right fails in litigation.

NORMA S. TIRADO vs.

LILIA SEVILLA, THOMAS S. ONG, CELSO UY and COURTS OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Norma S. Tirado (hereafter Mrs. Tirado) acquired ownership of a parcel of land under a Deed of Assignment
executed by her father Jose Dimzon on October 12, 1967. The deed assigned 73,000 sq. m. of Dimzon's land consisting of 361,558 sq.
m.Tirado subsequently sought the assistance of respondent Lilia Sevilla to have her land titled, including that of her father.

Keenly interested in having her land titled, Mrs. Tirado agreed to execute another deed of sale whereby she would sell 15,000
sq. m. (or 1.5 has.) to Mrs. Sevilla who, in turn, would deliver three (3) fishing boats worth P150,000.00 and advance initial expenses
for the titling of the land. The first deed of sale would be deemed cancelled. The second document of sale was finalized on December
23, 1975.

Despite the lapse of several months, and repeated demands, Mrs. Sevilla failed to institute any proceedings nor to advance
any money for the titling of Mrs. Tirado's land. Instead, without Mrs. Tirado's consent and knowledge, she filed a petition in her name
(Civil Case 1755, CFI, Br. XXXII Kalookan City) for the issuance of title over the entire area of Lot B-2, Psd-4350 (Dimzon's land)
which includes Mrs. Tirado's 73,000 sq. m.

On November 8, 1977, Mrs. Sevilla sold 4/5 portion of TCT No. C-10299 to Thomas Ong and, on November 15, 1977, 1/5
portion thereof to Celso Uy (p. 77, Rollo). On February 14, 1978, TCT No. C-12456 was issued to Ong and Uy.

RTC’s judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent Lilia Sevilla, ordering the questioned decision
partly nullified and transfer certificate of title No. 4128 issued therefrom is hereby amended to exclude the claim of herein petitioner
to the extent of 73,000 square meters.

On appeal by Mrs. Sevilla, Ong and Uy, the Court of Appeals modified the decision by declaring Ong and Uy purchasers in
good faith and for value, in effect depriving Mrs. Tirado of that portion of land to the extent covered by TCT No. 12456.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ong and Uy were notified of filing notice of lis pendens.

RULING:

The purpose of filing notice of lis pendens is to charge strangers with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the
notice; and if the notice is effective, a third person who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes same subject to the
eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such litigation, the lis pendens loses its efficacy.
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 At the time appellants Ong and Uy purchased the realty in question (TCT No. C-10299), they were well aware that it was
involved in a litigation because of a notice of lis pendens filed by the counsel of Roqueta Rodriguez on July 28, 1977. However, they
(Ong and Uy) took a calculated risk and brought (sic) it just the same from Lilia Sevilla, hoping all the while mayhap, that a decision
would be rendered favorable to their predecessor-in-interest, Lilia Sevilla in Civil Case No. C-1836.

iii. While an adverse claim and a notice of lispendens can concurrently subsist, when either is deemed
unnecessary or superfluous it would be the notice of lispendens that will cancelled; reasons therefore.

DORONILA vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. L-42956-57 January 12, 1988

FACTS:

Blue Chips Projects, Inc. a Corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, is the registered owner
of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Paths, Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal and covered by TCT Certificate of Title No.
344936 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. Blue Chips Projects, Inc. purchased said property from Purita Landicho the lawful
registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167681. On December 11, 1972, petitioner-appellant A. Doronila Resources
Development Inc. availed of the remedy of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 12044 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the same
having been annotated on Transfer Certificate Title No. 344936 in the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc. On August 8, 1973, petitioner
thru its President Alfonso Doronila, filed an affidavit of adverse claim for registration on Transfer Certificate of title No. 344936 with
the Register of deeds of Rizal on the ground that the property covered by the aforesaid title registered in the name of Blue Chips
Projects Inc. is a portion of a big parcel of land which was purchased by petitioner corporation from Alfonso Doronila.
Respondent-appellee, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied the registration of the affidavit of the aforementioned adverse claim on the
ground that a notice of lis pendens remain registered on the certificate of title involved should be a bar to the registration of an
affidavit of adverse claim. Considering that the rights and interests of the petitioner are already amply protected thereby without
imposing a further burden on the registered owner by the registration of an affidavit of adverse claim which would be serving the same
purpose. After all an affidavit of adverse claim does not add anything to the validity of one's claim nor does it create a non-existent
right. Petitioner elevated the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission. On November 6, 1973, the Land Registration
Commission issued its Resolution holding that the affidavit of adverse claim be denied registration. On November 5,1973,Transfer
Certificate of Title No.344936 registered in the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc. was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
425582 was issued in favor of the purchaser Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. with an annotation at the back thereof that the property
therein described is subject to the Resolution of LRC Consult No. 887. Petitioner A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. again sought the
registration of an affidavit of adverse claim Identical to that which was the subject of LRC Consult No. 887 on TCT No. 425582
registered in the name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. Respondent-appellee Register of Deed elevated the records to the Land
Registration Commission for resolution under Sec. 4 of RA No. 115. The Land Registration Commission rendered on January 8, 1974,
a resolution in L.R.C. Consult No. 894 main its oponion L.R.C. Consult No. 887 and ruling against registrability of the affidavit of
adverse claim.

Not satisfied with the above resolution, petitioner-appealed to this Honorable Court.
On March 12, 1974, appellant filed before this Honorable Court a petition for Consolidated of Case SP-02569 and Case SP-
02711which was granted by this Honorable Court on March 19, 1974.
On 26 November 1975, the respondent Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered a decision, affirming the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commission in LRC Consults Nos. 887 and 894.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of a certificate of title precludes the subsequent
registration on the same or successor certificate of title of an adverse claim.

RULING:

The Land Registration Commission, in its resolutions in the Consultas, abovementioned, declared, and the respondent
appellate court affirmed, that since the petitioner had already availed of the remedy of lis pendens, and that the rights and interests of
adverse claimant are already amply protected by the registration of such notice of lis pendens, "it does not seem fair to have a title
saddled by two encumbrances arising from one and the same source, and serving one and the same purpose."
This Court, however, has ruled differently, i.e., that the two remedies, notice of lis pendens and adverse claim, are not contradictory or
repugnant to one another; nor does the existence of one automatically nullify the other, and if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens, and not the annotation of an adverse claim which is more
permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim involved. The Court said:
“But We have to give certain consideration to the implication created by the lower court's ruling that the institution of a court
action for the purpose of securing or preserving the light which is also the object of an adverse claim invalidates the latter, irrespective
of whether a notice of lis pendens has been annotated or not, for such a doctrine gives the impression that the 2 remedies are
contradictory or repugnant to one another, the existence of one automatically nullifying the other. We are inclined to believe
otherwise, for while both registrations have their own characteristics and requisites, it cannot be denied that they are both intended to
protect the interest of a claimant by posing as notices and caution to those said with the property that same is subject to a claim. But
while a notice of lis pendens remains during the pendency of the action, although same may be cancelled under certain circumstances
all where the case is prolonged unecessarily or for failure of the plaintiff to introduce evidence bearing out the allegations of the
complaint ; and it has even been held that a court, in the of absence in the absence statute,has the inherent power to cancel a lis
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pendens notice in a proper case, the same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e.,
after the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court, acting either as a land registration court or one of general
jurisdiction while passing upon a case before it where the subject of the litigation is the same interest or right which is being secured
by the adverse claim. The possibility therefore, that parties claiming an interest in a registered property desire, for any other purpose,
to have their cause ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction may result in giving them two ways of making the registration of their
claimed rights. In such instances, it would not only be unreasonable but also oppressive to hold that the subsequent institution of an
ordinary civil action would work to divest the adverse claim of its validity, for as we have pointed out, a notice of lis pendens maybe
cancelled even before the action is finally terminated for causes which may not be attributable to the claimant. And it would similarly
be beyond reason to confine a claimant to the remedy afforded by Section 110 of Act 496 if there are other recourses in law which
such claimant may avail of. But, if any of the registrations should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice
of lis pendens and not the annotation of the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing
and proper disposition of the claim.

Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the petitioner over the land in question are amply protected by the
annotation at the back of TCT 425582 issued in the name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc., that "the property therein described is
subject to the resolution of LRC Consults No. 887." The statement that the property described is subject to the resolution of a consulta,
unlike a statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to third persons dealing with the property that someone is
claiming an interest in the same or a better title than that of the registered owner thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but
the reference of a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by a Register of Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step
to be taken when a deed or instrument is presented to him for registration

ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTRATION
A. Concepts and procedures of public land disposition
B. Homesteads

a. Who may apply

b. The prohibition on the alienation and encumbrance of a homestead
 Lands erroneously included in a homestead Patent must be returned to the State, not re-convened to a private person
through a private quitclaim. The transferee must himself comply with the requirements for a grant.

LOPEZ/ NORDEC v Esquivel

GR No. 170621 April 24, 2009

FACTS:

The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino, Felisa, Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings), seek to
reverse and set aside the assailed Decision of the appellate court affirming in toto the Decision RTC, which (1) ordered the Lopez
siblings to vacate and to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel) and Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of land, measuring 2.6950
hectares, situated in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal (subject property); and (2) directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
Metropolitan Manila, to divest the Lopez siblings of their title over the subject property and to issue title over the same property in the
names of Esquivel and Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Lopez siblings.

On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development Corporation (Nordec Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar), the petitioners
in G.R. No. 170621, pray for the setting aside of the Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 where it dismissed for prematurity the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, as they were not impleaded in said case, neither as indispensable nor necessary parties. The appellate court, in its other
questioned Resolution dated16 November 2005, denied the Motion for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar.

G.R. No. 168734

FACTS:
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez siblings. During Hermogenes’ lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of
Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land. The Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes’ application. The patent was
subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of titlein
Hermogenes’ name. Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold
the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey
plan H-138612 of Hermogenes’ property. The subject property supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon),
which adjoined that of Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over his rights and
interests to the subject property in Hizon’s favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Hermogenes died. The Lopez siblings, as Hermogenes’ heirs, filed an action with the
RTC for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959, executed between Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which
involved the entire 19.4888-hectare land.

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ISSUE:

Whether the petition is meritorious

RULING:

The instant Petition is meritorious.

A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act,
as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who
is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land
applied for.

In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes’ application for homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land after finding
him qualified for the same. In contrast, the only evidence supporting Hizon’s claim to the subject property was the Quitclaim. There
is no other proof that Hizon possessed, cultivated, and introduced improvements on the subject property. Neither is there any showing
that after the execution of the Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a homestead patent over the subject property. In fact, it is
undisputed that the subject property has always been in the possession of Hermogenes, then the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel
and Talens never came into the possession of the subject property even after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in
their favor.

The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is
the rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead
applicant himself must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the
law if an individual were permitted to apply “in behalf of another,” as the latter may be disqualified or might not comply with the
residency and cultivation requirements.

In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not have validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject property
from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a result,
Hizon acquired no right over the subject property which he could have sold to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of an object.

Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and transferred ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes to Hizon, the
latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches from asserting their
rights to the subject property, after failing to exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.

In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC their application for registration of the subject property on 5 March
1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by Hermogenes of the Quitclaim covering the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from the execution by Hizon of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of
Esquivel and Talens on 26 August 1968. During these periods, without providing any reasons therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel
and Talens took possession of the subject property or exercised in any other way their rights over the same.

Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the Lopez siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Quitclaim, as ruled by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out that the question of estoppel is relevant only if the Lopez siblings
are challenging the validity of the Quitclaim on the ground that when Hermogenes executed the same, he had already previously sold
his 19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject property, to Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings successfully had the said
sale of the land by Hermogenes to Aguilar nullified. Since the Court herein refuses to give effect to the Quitclaim in question on other
grounds already discussed above, the issue of estoppel actually loses relevance and need not be resolved anymore.

Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the Quitclaim covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Hizon is null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, on homestead grants; and that the
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens is null and void for lack of a proper
object, then Esquivel and Talens have no basis to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. Hizon never owned the subject
property and could never have sold the same to Esquivel and Talens.

G.R. No. 170621

FACTS:
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property
to Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however, was already supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-
interest of Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta.
Cruz. Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, covered by TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 of the Registry of Deeds
of Marikina City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares, and which constituted the subject property. Beginning 20 April 1994,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the afore-mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles
and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao), as evidenced by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after
making such purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale improvements on the subject property, among which
were several business establishments with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.

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In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty. Angeles who represented and protected the interest of Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss. In Cabuay, Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were
named the respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and
Executory but Conflicting Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty. Angeles who appeared for Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar.

Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again informed Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed against
the Lopez siblings involving the subject property. Atty. Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case involving the subject
property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar the Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own inquiry,
and were surprised to discover that the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was actually
adverse to their rights and interest; and despite this, they were neither impleaded nor represented therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the
supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did not lift a finger to protect their rights in said case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the judgment
sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final
and executory.

RULING:

The Court answers in the negative.

The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a
party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot make use of a petition for relief from judgment. Indubitably, Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for new trial, petition for relief from
judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated 11
January 2001 sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January
2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and
lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only
essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, like in this case, is still on appeal or under review by a
higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open and on-
going. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final and executory
for it to be annulled must fail.

This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
96-4193 was still pending appeal before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for annulment of
the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk promulgating a ruling which could be contrary to and inconsistent with the
ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.

C. Free Patents
a. Who may acquire?
b. Purpose in granting a free patent

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. VIRAY

G.R. No. 162218. February 25, 2010

FACTS:
Rico Shipping, Inc., together with respondent Viray, obtained 3 separate loans from petitioner MBTC. The three loans were obtained
on July 1979, June 1981 and September 1981, or several years before the free patents were issued to the respondent on December
1982.
However, on the due date, the debtors failed to pay the loan despite demands to pay by MBTC. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the debtors. On April 1983, the RTC rendered a judgment in favor of MBTC.

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Meanwhile, on December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of Viray over three parcels of land.

On March 1984, the RTC issued a writ of execution over the lots owned by Viray, whereby, the lots sold at public auction in favor of
MBTC as the winning bidder. Thus, the Certificate of Sale issued to MBTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the auction sale falls within the 5-year prohibition period laid down in Section 118 of CA 141.

RULING:

The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under free patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated
within 5 years from the date of issuance of the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
the period.

For a period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots
comprising the free patents shall not be made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years expires. In this case, the
execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls within the five-
year prohibition period provided in the law, regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred.

It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free patent or homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

c. Filing, processing & issuance of free patent constitutes the administrative mode of confirming an imperfect title; judicial
mode is under Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act

KAYABAN vs.REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973

FACTS:

The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common predecessor-in-
interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was admitted to probate. After the properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban acquired
the shares of his co-heirs by purchase and afterwards he and his wife applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in question.

The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by the
said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and void
on the ground that since the owners had acquired the properties partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from
their co-heirs, and their father had been in possession thereof for many years before them, the lands were no longer public and hence
not subject to disposition by the government under the Public Land Act. The procedure that should have been followed, said the court,
was judicial confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative legalization thereof through patent application.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedure that must be followed judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.

RULING:

Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action for
annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his prior authority and consent.

Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete title is
of no practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496,
which, except for some restrictions as to alienability within entitled to all the protection afforded by the Torrens System of
registration.

d. A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent procured thru fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since
such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

MARTINEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008

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FACTS:

Petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and
as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that name applied for free patents over the properties. Unknown to private
respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez.

The evidence shows that the appellant committed fraud and misrepresentation in her application for free patent which later became the
basis for the issuance of the certificates of title in her name. More than the issue of the use of the surname “Martinez,” her fraudulent
act consists essentially in misrepresenting before the CENRO that she is the heir of Celedonia Martinez whom she admitted in her
Answer as the original absolute owner of the subject parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.

RULING:

A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership
of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake, as the
case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow
and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State
but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the
defendant.

A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent procured thru fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title
is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

D. Free patents to residential lands

a. Qualifications. Area Limitations. Conditions
 Lands acquired under Free patent shall not be encumbered or alienated within five years from the date of issuance of
the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the period

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. EDGARDO VIRAY

G.R. No. 162218

FACTS:

On 7 July 1979, Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President, Erlinda Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray
(Viray), in their own personal capacity and as solidary obligors, obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (MBTC). The debtors failed and refused to pay on due date. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the
debtors with the RTC of Manila, Branch 4. On 28 April 1983, the RTC of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of
MBTC. Meanwhile, on 29 December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of Viray over three parcels of land, all
situated in Barangay Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental. On 6 March 1984, the RTC of Manila issued a writ of execution
over the lots owned by Viray. On 12 October 1984, pursuant to the writ of execution, the City Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro sold the lots
at public auction in favor of MBTC as the winning bidder. On 30 July 1991, Viray filed an action for annulment of sale against the
sheriff and MBTC with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 23.Viray sought the declaration of nullity of the
execution sale, the sheriff’s certificate of sale, the sheriff’s deed of final conveyance and the TCT's issued by the Register of Deeds.
The RTC of Cagayan de Oro City rendered its decision in favor of MBTC. Viray filed an appeal with the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the auction sale falls within the five-year prohibition period laid down in Section 118 of CA 141.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. Petitioner MBTC insists that the five-year prohibition period against the alienation or sale of the property
provided in Section 118 of CA 141 does not apply to an obligation contracted before the grant or issuance of the free patent or
homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law pertains to voluntary sales and not to “forced” or execution sale.Respondent Viray,
on the other hand, maintains that the express prohibition in Section 118 of CA 141 does not qualify or distinguish whether the debt
was contracted prior to the date of the issuance of the free patent or within five years following the date of such issuance. Further,
respondent asserts that Section 118 of CA 141 absolutely prohibits any and all sales, whether voluntary or not, of lands acquired under
free patent or homestead, made within the five-year prohibition period. The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired
under free patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within five years from the date of issuance of the patent or be
liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the period.

In the present case, the three loans were obtained on separate dates – 7 July 1979, 5 June 1981 and 3 September 1981, or several years
before the free patents on the lots were issued by the government to respondent on 29 December 1982. For a period of five years or
from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents shall not

294
be made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years expires. In this case, the execution sale of the lots occurred
less than two years after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls within the five-year prohibition period provided in
the law, regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred.

It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free patent or homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

E. Sales Patents
a. Who may apply?
b. How is it acquired?
c. Procedure for acquiring agricultural lands suitable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes
d. When sale WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION is allowed:

ROBERTO AGURA, et al. vs. FEDERICO SERFINO, SR., FEDERICO SERFINO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. L-50685 December 4, 1991

FACTS:

On 10 December 1965, private respondent Federico Serfino, Sr., filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) No. (V-3)2 over a 4,172 square meter parcel of land located at San Patricia Bacolod City. On 18 February 1966, his son,
respondent Serfino, Jr., filed MSA No. (V-3)1 over an adjoining lot with an area of 1,358 square meters.

On 11 March 1968, District Land Officer Pedro C. Reyes ordered an investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Sr.'s MSA
No. (V3)2 and that of an unnumbered Revocable Permit Application (VRAP) of a certain Primitive Donozo. On 2 April 1968, another
investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Jr.'s MSA No. (V-3)1 and the RPAs of petitioners Agura, Alib, and Sta. Rita and
a certain Domingo Natividad was ordered.

Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent to the President of the Philippines a petition dated 22 August 1969
requesting that the small parcels of land located in the areas covered by private respondents' MSAs which they have been occupying
for thirty (30) years be awarded to them.

On 7 January 1970, the City Court of Bacolod rendered decision in Civil Case No. 6533 ordering the ejectment of the defendants
therein from the lots in question for "failure to pay rentals." On 22 August 1970, Civil Cases Nos. 6534 and 6674 were dismissed on
the ground that "the question of who has a better right to the areas claimed by the parties will be determined by the Bureau of Lands
who has charge of the disposal of public lands."

On 10 February 1971, Land Investigator Villamarzo submitted a report recommending that the petitioners herein be given
"preferential right" over the portions occupied by them.

On 7 August 1971, private respondents moved for a reconsideration alleging that they were not given the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their behalf.

On appeal by herein private respondents, the Secretary of Natural Resources held that the Order of the Director of Lands dated July 6,
1971be SET ASIDE, and the appellees are hereby ordered to vacate the two lots in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of
their copies of the decision hereof and leave the appellants in peaceful possession of the same.

On appeal by herein petitioners, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs on 20 September 1977 affirmed in toto the decision of
Secretary of Natural Resources.

In affirming the Secretary's decision, the Office of the President held as without merit the contentions of petitioners that the land in
question is foreshore and cannot therefore be disposed of by sale but only by lease pursuant to Section 61, in relation to Section 59 of
the Public Land Act, and that if at all it could be disposed of by sale, purchasers are limited to 1,000 square meters pursuant to R.A.
No. 730. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been denied, they filed with the respondent trial court a
special civil action for certiorari and asked for the nullification of the decisions of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs and the
Secretary of Natural Resources. On 30 April 1979, the trial court affirmed the questioned decisions and dismissed the petition. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the sale to the respondents Serfinos at public auction of more than 1,000 square meters of residential public land violated the
provisions of R.A. No. 730 and is therefore void.

HELD:

Petition is devoid of merit. We agree with the ruling of the respondent court that R.A. No. 730 does not repeal or amend Sections 61
and 67 of C.A. No. 141; it merely establishes an exception to said sections.

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R.A. No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding, if the area applied for
does not exceed 1,000 square meters, and that the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof. Hence, if
the area applied for is in excess of 1,000 square meters, as in the instant case, the sale must be done only through bidding.

F. Special Patents
G. Emancipation Patents
H. Registration of Patents
I. Certificates of Title Issued Pursuant to Patents
a. OCT issued pursuant to a patent becomes indefeasible after 1 year from registration

HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCOvs. HEIRS OF JOSE and VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77541 November 29, 1988

FACTS:

Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933.
Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent covering this lot. On December
12, 1936, the Director of Lands granted this application and issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588. OCT No.
159 was issued in the name of Jose Aliwalas. As owner of this property, Jose Aliwalas, thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul, had this
parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some portions thereof and cattles were raised on other portions. When the properties left
by Dr. Jose Aliwalas were petitioned among his surviving heirs, the lot in question was alloted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria L.
Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated in the amended project of partition executed by her mind her nine children, one of whom is Jose
Aliwalas, Jr. After this amended project of partition was approved and registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, OCT No.
52526-R was issued in the name of the plaintiff on November 14, 1966.

On the other hand, on October 31, 1973, the defendant Ponciano Tengco in representation of the defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco
filed an application with the Bureau of Lands, thru its District Land Office here in San Fernando, Pampanga. Among other things, he
alleged in his application that this parcel of land had been occupied and cultivated originally and continuously thereafter by Gregorio
Tengco. After being given due course, this application was approved by the Director of Lands who issued Free Patent No. 557692.
This free patent issued in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was predicated on the assumption that the lot still formed part of the
public domain and on the findings of the Public Land Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted an investigation thereon and
who also reported that the land in question was possessed and occupied by the applicant. On rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence
showing that the prewar records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications were burned during the war as indicated
in the certification issued by the Chief of the Records Management Division of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the Bureau
has no more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas in i936 which gave rise to the issuance of
OCT No. 159 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937. The certification also attests that what is now found in the files
of the Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V-557692 issued on February 5, 1974 in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco pertaining to Lot
No. 3563. Private respondents argue that since a homestead patent and an original certificate of title had already been issued to their
predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased to be part of the public domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction over
the controversy. Private respondents add that since an original certificate of title had been issued pursuant to the homestead patent,
their title to the property had become conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible.

ISSUE:

Whether the heirs of Victoria,granting that they have proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not long lost such rights by
laches and/or prescription.

HELD:

An original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible
and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the
issuance of the patent.

b. Lands covered by such titles can no longer be subject matter of a cadastral proceeding

GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
296
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among those
involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor.

On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.

On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued
in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order
of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands
during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final
and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the homestead patents are still be subject matter of a cadastral proceeding.

HELD:

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding.

J. Restrictions on alienable/encumbrance

a. Prohobition against encumbrance or alienable of homestead patents within 5 years from issue; rationale or purpose of the
prohibition

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. BANATAO

FACTS:

On November 16, 1962, Banatao, et al. (plaintiffs-respondents) initiated an action for recovery of real property against Marciano
Carag (one of the defendants-respondents) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The disputed property was a new land formation on
the banks of the Cagayan River — an accretion to Lot 3192 of the Iguig Cadastre — that the plaintiffs-respondents claimed as the
owners of the adjoining Lot 3192. The defendants-respondents, on the other hand, were the occupants of the disputed property. While
the case was pending, the defendants-respondents were able to secure homestead patents evidenced by Original Certificates of Title
(OCTs) issued in their names.
The OCTs were issued in 1965 and 1966, and all bear the proviso that, in accordance with the Public Land Act, the patented
homestead shall neither be alienated nor encumbered for five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The defendants-
respondents separately applied for loans with the Philippine NationalBank (PNB or the bank) secured by real estate mortgages on their
respective titled portions of the disputed property.

The PNB mortgages were annotated on the defendants-respondents' respective OCTs also in the years 1965 and 1966.

The trial court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and ordered the return of the disputed property to the plaintiffs-
respondents. Carag appealed the trial court decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs-respondents also added two (2) additional causes of action, or a total of three (3) causes of
action, namely: (1) recovery of real property; (2) cancellation of the OCTs; and (3) annulment of real estate mortgage. The bank was
made a party to the case in view of the suit for annulment of mortgage.

The records disclose that on March 29, 1973, while the case was pending before the trial court, the bank extra judicially foreclosed the
property. The bank was declared the highest bidder in the ensuing public auction, resulting in the consolidation of title in the bank’s
name; hence, the issuance on October 3, 1985 of TCT No. T-65664 in the name of the bank.

On February 28, 1991, the plaintiffs-respondents and the defendants-respondents entered into a compromise agreement whereby
ownership of virtually the northern half of the disputed property was ceded to the plaintiffs-respondents, while the remaining southern
half was given to the defendants-respondents. In the same compromise agreement, the defendants-respondents acknowledged their
indebtedness to petitioner PNB and bound themselves to pay their respective obligations to the bank, including the interests accruing
thereon. Petitioner PNB, however, was not a party to the compromise agreement.
297
The trial court rendered its decision, approving and adopting in toto the compromise agreement, and ordering the participating parties
to strictly comply with its terms. The appellate court dismissed the appeal in its decision of March 30, 2001.

PNB submits that its consent to the compromise agreement is necessary to secure a final and complete determination of the claims and
defenses of all the parties to the case. The PNB further argues that when the appellate court approved in toto the trial court's judgment
on the compromise agreement, it failed to consider that the bank was a mortgagee in good faith. The bank claims good faith on the
position that the OCTs presented to it were all clean on their faces at the time the mortgages were applied for; that there were no
notices of lis pendens or any annotation of liens or encumbrances on all of them; and that it had no knowledge, actual or constructive,
of facts or circumstances to warrant further inquiry into the titles of the defendants-respondents.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the disputed land covered by a homestead patent is valid.

HELD:

Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, which contains a proscription against the alienation or encumbrance of homestead
patents within five years from issue. The rationale for the prohibition, reiterated in a line of cases, first laid down in Pascua v. Talens
states that “x x x homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their
home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section
116, now Section 118) within five years after the grant of the patent. x x x. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him.

b. Restriction applies to disposition of rights before or after issuance of patents

GONZAGAvs.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On October 13, 1958, Juan Evangelista died intestate leaving among others, a parcel of land situated in Barrio Darangan,
[Municipality] of Binangonan, Province of Rizal covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 183 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and Tax Declaration No. 12131 of the Provincial Assessor of Rizal, which parcel is now the subject of this litigation; That said Juan
Evangelista was survived by the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and plaintiffs, the latter being the sons and daughters of the brothers and
sisters of the deceased;

That during the lifetime of Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana Gonzaga on April 21, 1956 sold for valuable consideration several
parcels of land to the spouses, Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio (defendants herein) including that parcel of land describe in
the foregoing paragraph and as a consequence which sale, the corresponding tax declaration was transferred to said vendees; that at
the time of said sale, there was a pending application of Juan Evangelista an Ana Gonzaga over the land in question with the Bureau
Lands, but the title thereto was not issued until November 28, 1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; That on April 21, 1962,
defendant Ana Gonzaga alleging to be the surviving spouse of the deceased Juan Evangelista, executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and
Sale of the sum parcel of land in question in favor of the same vendees, herein defendants, Servillano Ignacio and Anastasia San Juan;

That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same parcel of land was sold on March 6, 1963 by the spouses Servillano
Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan to the defendant R & R Realty Co., Inc. and the latter, together with other properties owned by it,
mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by reason of these subsequent conveyances that defendants Filipinas
Agricultural & Realty Co., Inc. and the Continental Bank were impleaded as party defendants." On the above facts, the lower court
relying on the aforesaid Section 20, declared he 1956 sale void and consequently ruled in favor of the successional rights of private
respondents as heirs of the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of the land between Juan Evangelista and Sps. Servillano Ignacio is valid?

HELD:

Section 118 of the Public Land Act 9 reads: "Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent
or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops of the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations." Is it not a clear
expression then of the state policy to assure that the original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is deprived for a period of five
years of his freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected from his own weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen,
the purpose being to keep and preserve for him "or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State, so that being a property
owner, he may become and remain a contented and useful member of our society." Considering that such is policy, does it not
logically follow that he is precluded disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the patent? Both policy and reason, therefore,
unite in conclusion that no such distinction should be made. Then, it is not to be forgotten that the state is possessed of plenary power
as the persona in law to determine who shall the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
such privilege, not excluding placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership?
298
c. Patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of order for issuance by the Director of Lands; relevant for reckoning 5-year
period of prohibition
ANDREA C. DECOLONGON, ET AL. vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and FELICIDAD CUENCA, ET AL.

FACTS:

Gregorio Cuenca was an applicant for a homestead patent for a certain parcel of land in Negros Occidental. On Oct. 1951, an order for
issuance for the patent was given, but it was only after 20 years on Oct. 1971 that the patent was issued by the president.
Unfortunately, Gregorio and his wife already died before said issuance and herein petitioner Andrea Decolongon stated that she is the
only child and legal heir of the late Gregorio. In view of that, the title was cancelled and placed in her name on May 1972.

The brothers and sisters of Gregorio, herein private respondents, claimed that on May 1966 Gregorio has relinquished and transferred
all his rights to the said patent to Felicidad Cuenca. Therefore, an action was filed by the private respondents for the reconveyance of
the subject land.

The CFI ruled in favor of Andrea Decolongon, which the private respondents appealed with the Court of Appeals, who later reversed
said judgment. Hence, this petition filed by Andrea Decolongon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of relinquishment which conveyed the land to the private respondents was within the prohibited five-year
period.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that, from a long line of decisions they have made with similar issues, they have time and again reiterated
and emphasized that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of the order for issuance thereof by the Director of Lands.

In the case at bar, the issuance of patent was made on Oct. 1951, but it was only 20 years later that the patent itself was issued. The
Deed of Relinquishment executed on May 1966 in favor of the private respondents was valid since it has been 14 years after the order
that said parcel of land was relinquished in favor of the private respondents.

The Supreme Court then denied the petition for review and affirmed the CA decision.

d. Reason for the prohibition

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES

G.R. Nos. L-46898-99 November 28, 1989

FACTS:

On Aug. 1966, private respondent spouses Amando and Julia Arana, mortgaged 6 parcels of land to herein petitioner PNB. Two of the
parcel of lands were acquired thru a homestead patent, while the remaining four were only under tax declarations.

On July 1969, upon the failure of the private respondent spouses to pay their loan upon maturity, PNB foreclosed said properties and
were publicly auctioned whereby PNB was the highest bidder. Without any action of redemption from the spouses, the said bank
consolidated their ownership over the 6 parcels of land.

A civil suit was instituted by the respondent spouses for the redemption of the said parcels of land, furthermore, they refused to vacate
the 2 lots which the bank has sold to a private person. The bank agreed for the redemption of the parcels of land covered by patent, but
not the remaining four under tax decalaration.

A case was filed in the RTC by herein respondents agains the petitioner bank, and the court rendered a decision in favor of the former.
The bank Is ordered to release the mortgage upon full payment of the spouses of their balance and further contended that the sale
executed in favor of the third person be cancelled by the bank.

The bank then filed a direct appeal thru certiorati to the Supreme Court, as the dispute raises questions of law and not of facts.

299
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to redeem all the lots covered by the mortgage?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the indivisibility of mortgage does not apply to the instant case because the aggregate number of the lots
which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is neither partial
payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. Note, however, that applications for free patent covering the four (4)
unregistered parcels of land had been filed by respondent spouses, and were then still pending action, which thus gives rise to the
admission that said properties involved in the aforestated cases were public lands and which the petitioners never rebutted.

It is an essential requisite to the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property, mortgaged. 21
Consequently, private respondents, not being owners as yet of the subject lots when the same were supposedly mortgaged, they could
not have validly made any disposition of or created an encumbrance on said four (4) lots to which they had neither title nor any vested
right. At most, what they had was a mere right of expectancy dependent on the continuance of the circumstances then existing or a
contingent right dependent on the performance of some conditions, 22 but which could not be the proper object of a valid mortgage
contract.

Consequently, there was no need for private respondents to repurchase the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the case
actually calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy. Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual
restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received from each other under the contract in connection with the four (4) lots
must be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them. While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract is
contrary to law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an
exception, namely, that when the contract is merely prohibited by law, not illegal per se, and the prohibition is designed for the
protection of the party seeking to recover, he is entitled to the relief prayed for whenever public policy is enhanced thereby. The
Supreme Court then affirmed the appeal of the petitioners.

e. Stipulation that actual conveyance of the land would be made only after lapse of the 5-year period makes deed illegal deed
and void ab initio.

HOMENA vs. CASA and REGISTER OF DEEDS

G.R. No. L-32749 January 22, 1988

FACTS:

The complaint, filed by plaintiffs-appellants against the spouses Dimas Casa and Maria Castor, was for alleged unlawful acts of
dispossession disturbing plaintiffs peaceful, continuous, open, uninterrupted adverse and public possession of the property in question.
In their complaint, plaintiffs also sought to annul the original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of
Cotabato in favor of defendant spouses pursuant to a Homestead Patent on the ground that said patent was obtained by defendant
spouses through fraud and misrepresentation by stating, among others, in their application, that the lot was not claimed and occupied
by another person.

Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1952, they purchased from the defendants two (2) hectares of the aforementioned parcel of land, on
the condition that the said portion would be reconveyed to plaintiffs after the five-year prohibitory period, as provided for in the
Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed, and that defendants failed to abide by said agreement. Plaintiffs averred that they were not
assailing the validity of the patent as a whole, but only with respect to that portion of two (2) hectares owned by them which
defendants, through fraud, were able to register in their name. RTC dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the agreement entered into between the herein parties that the land as purchased be reconveyed after the five-year
prohibitory period under the Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed is valid?

HELD:

The agreement is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to circumvent and violate the law. As parties to a void contract, the
plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the court can not lend itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can neither invoke the
doctrine of implied trust based on an illegal contract. The issue of prescription or laches becomes irrelevant in a case such as this,
where plaintiffs clearly have no cause of action.

f. Right of repurchase cannot be allowed when the land sought to be redeemed is no longer agricultural but residential and/or
commercial

SANTANAS v MARINAS
94 SCRA 853

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FACTS:

Respondent Marinas alleged that he acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 217, a parcel of land containing an area of four hectares, twelve ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16,
1956, he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco Santana for a sum of P4,128.60; that the other petitioner Jose H.
Panganiban was included in the complaint because he is a subsequent lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold
to him by Santana on March 25, 1956 for the same amount of P4,128.60.

On April 21, 1960, Sotero Mariñas — as plaintiff — filed in CFI of Rizal a complaint to recover the above real property praying
among others, that he be allowed to repurchase the property.

The petitioners interposed the following affirmative defenses: (1) that at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were
totally ignorant of and had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to repurchase by private respondent, who assured
petitioner Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in question absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not
subject to any right of repurchase; (2) that they (petitioners) are purchasers in good faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for value,
they acquired absolute ownership over the property and private respondent cannot enforce against them any right of repurchase of
whatever nature (4) that the property in question now a residential area with real estate subdivisions and roads in front and at the back
thereof.

The trial court ruled out respondent Marinas’ right to repurchase the property and dismissed the complaint but that on appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision of dismissal and ordered petitioners to reconvey the land to private respondent
upon payment to the former of "the repurchase price thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether under all the circumstances, the repurchase of the land in question by Marinas is in consonance with the reason and purpose
of the law

HELD:

SC upheld petitioners’ proposition that to allow the repurchase of the subject land, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining herein,
would be repugnant to the philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter.

The findings of fact of the trial court are clear and duly supported by the evidence. The property of Sotero Marinas has ceased to be in
the nature of a homestead, and that instead it has been transformed into growing commercial and residential area. The vicinity of the
property is now a vast expanding business empire, the lands having (been) converted into subdivisions. which are sold to the public at
fantastic prices. Close to this particular property of Sotero Mariñas the subdivision being developed by a son of the plaintiff who has
extensive business interests centered on construction of buildings. By plaintiff’s own admission, he is 78 years old and sick with a
lung ailment; while from the testimony of his son, Antonio Mariñas, it is shown that the sons of plaintiff are all financially
independent from the latter and have their respective properties and means of livelihood. Under these circumstances it is evident that
to grant plaintiff the right to repurchase the property at this time would be not for the purpose of giving him back the land for his
house and cultivation but for him to exploit it for business purposes at the expense of the defendants who are innocent purchaser(s) in
good faith and for value."

In Simeon v. Peña We arrived at the conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141." . .is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a
reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it."The basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent
living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order."

As it was in Simeon v. Peña, respondent Mariñas’ intention in exercising the right of repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving
the same within the family fold", but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law’s policy and spirit."

It could be true that the land in question is the only land owned by respondent-appellee. But this is not the determinant factor in
allowing the repurchase of land acquired through homestead or free patent. We can, therefore, properly inquire into the motives
behind the repurchase and convinced as We are in the instant case, that the intention is not so, but to exploit it for business purposes or
greater profit, We can deny the repurchase. To sustain respondent-appellee’s claim under the circumstances would put a premium on
speculation contrary to the philosophy behind Sec. 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Law.

K. Manner of exercising right to repurchase or redeem

a. Right to repurchase or redeem can be exercised even if not stipulated in the deed of sale

VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 55336 May 4, 1989

FACTS:

Involved in this case is the more than eleven (11) hectares of agricultural land located in Buguey, Cagayan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1648 in the name of Heirs of Esteban Billena which was later on transferred in 1940 to Maximiana Crisostomo
and Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of the deceased Esteban Billena under Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 1005.
When Mariana Crisostomo died, the land was left to Ana Billena then married to Fortunate Vallangca with whom she had three (3)
children namely Benjamin, Rodolfo and Alfredo who are the petitioners herein.

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Upon Fortunate Vallangca's death in 1944, his widow Ana Billena, together with her eldest son Benjamin, mortgaged the land in
dispute to her cousin Nazario Rabanes for Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) in Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses of her
deceased husband. There being no notary public in the place at the time, the agreement was not reduced to writing.

After the Pacific war, Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document which
Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a mortgage contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and trusting in her
cousin Rabanes signed the document. In the same year Billena was informed that the document she signed was actually a Deed of
Absolute Sale and not a Mortgage Contract. This prompted Ana Billena and her son Benjamin to Rabanes' place for the purpose of
redeeming the land and actually tendered to him the loan amount of P800.00, this time, in genuine and legal Philippine currency.
However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer be redeemed.

Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them
on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before the CFI of Cagayan and Recovery of Possession in 1972. A decision by RTC and CA was
rendered upholding the ownership of Rabanes over the subject land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ana Billena and her heirs have the right to repurchase the land notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the
deed of sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land.

HELD:

Under the law, restrictions are imposed on the conveyance of patented lands within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the
free patent; the owner of the land is precluded from subjecting the same to any encumbrance or alienation. After the lapse of five (5)
years, such prohibition is lifted, but the owner-vendor is entitled to repurchase the property from the vendee within five (5) years from
the date of the execution of the deed of sale or conveyance.

The document signed by Ana Billena in 1946, whether be it an Absolute Deed of Sale or a Mortgage Contract was to become absolute
and irrevocable only upon the failure of Billena or her heirs to repurchase the same within five (5) years from February 2, 1946. In the
case at bar, it is not refuted that Billena, together with her son Benjamin, went to Rabanes' residence in 1946 to redeem the property
and tendered to him the amount of P800.00 in Philippine currency, but the latter told them that the land could no longer be redeemed.
By Ana Billena's act of tendering to Rabanes the P800.00, she had in effect exercised her right to repurchase.

For, notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land, Billena or her heirs
are granted such right by operation of law. Petitioners may redeem the property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the
amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private respondents, with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 1
January 1962 until fully paid.

b. Right cannot be waived

RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC. vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GABRIEL ABELLANO and
FRANCISCO SEQUITAN
G.R. No. 83992 January 27, 1993

FACTS:

On 18 April 1978, private respondents Gabriel Abellano and Francisca Sequitan obtained a loan in the amount of P45,000.00 from the
petitioner, a rural bank organized and existing under the Rural Banks' Act. As security for the loan, the private respondents mortgaged
with the petitioner a parcel of land, belonging to them, with an area of one (1) hectare, more or less, located at Matina, Davao City and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7392. The land was acquired through a homestead patent.

On 1 July 1978, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City a complaint for
the expropriation of several parcels of land located in Davao City to carry out its Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program; said
action was directed against the private respondents, with respect to the mortgaged property, and fifteen (15) other persons. The case
was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 11157 and was raffled off to Branch II of said court. As mortgagee, the petitioner filed therein
a motion to intervene, which the court granted.

ISSUES:

1) whether or not the two-year redemption period fixed by the Rural Banks' Act in a foreclosure sale of property acquired through a
homestead patent superseded or repealed the five-year repurchase period prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and

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(2) if it did not, whether, in the event of the expropriation by the Government of the subject property during the redemption or
repurchase period, a homesteader, who thereafter exercised his right to redeem or repurchase, is entitled to the compensation for such
expropriation less the redemption or repurchase amount.

RULING:

A.) In affirming the trial court's decision, the respondent Court held that Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act, as amended, did not reduce
the period of redemption of homestead lands from the five (5) years prescribed in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, to two (2)
years from the date of registration of the foreclosure sale as fixed in the former; in support of such conclusion, it summoned Oliva vs.
Lamadrid.
It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, refers to lands "not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent," or to
owners of lands "without torrens title," who can "show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved," or of
"lands pending homestead or free patent titles." Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which
were issued over 26 years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank. Accordingly, there is no conflict between Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 720, as amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in
the latter is not applicable to him.
Respondent Court further ruled that C.A. No. 141 is a special law and must prevail.

B.) Because of such underlying policy and reason, the right to repurchase under Section 119 cannot be waived by the party entitled
thereto, and applies with equal force to both voluntary and involuntary conveyances , the certificate of sale — if it is already covered
by a Torrens title.
The expropriation of the land in question by the NHA is of no moment. The expropriation case was begun before the foreclosure sale
and was brought against the private respondents, among other parties. The court's order for the payment of compensation was entered
and the compliance thereof by the NHA was made within the private respondents' 5-year repurchase period. Although the petitioner
had a Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot at the time of payment, its right thereto was subject to the private respondents' right to
repurchase. Since the private respondents seasonably exercised said right, the petitioner was under the obligation to restore to the
former the compensation paid by the NHA, which in effect replaced or substituted for the land. From such amount should be
subtracted, however, the repurchase price. The argument that the petitioner was under no obligation to deliver the above portion of the
compensation because the property was acquired by the NHA and therefore it was legally impossible for the former to convey the land
to the private respondent, is without merit. This is so because if, instead of having been expropriated, the land was sold to other
parties, the private respondents could still have repurchased the same from the subsequent vendees. But since the land was
expropriated by the Government, and the private respondents could no longer repurchase the same, reason, justice and equity demand
that they receive the compensation therefor less the amount adverted to above, for such compensation merely substitutes for the land
they are entitled to.

c. 5-year period starts from the date of execution of deed of sale

CRISOSTOMO SUCALDITO and the HEIRS OF FELISA DE GUZMAN vs.THE HON. JUAN MONTEJO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH XX, BLAS B. LABAD AND PACIENCIA
L. LABAD
G.R. No. 75080 February 6, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioners Crisostomo Sucaldito and Felisa de Guzman, spouses, were grantees, by way of free patent, of two (2) parcels of public
agricultural land. Both lots are situated in Barrio Ponpong, Municipality of Sta. Maria, Province of Davao del Sur. On 20 June 1975,
petitioners wrote the respondents informing the latter that they desired to repurchase the lots and that they had the necessary amount
representing the repurchase price. A reply from respondents within five (5) days from their receipt of the letter was requested by
petitioners, for otherwise, they would be constrained to file a court action for reconveyance. Respondents sent a reply dated 2 July
1975. The reply letter, however, was not received by petitioners. Thus, on 10 July 1975, petitioner-spouses brought an action for
reconveyance before the RTC of Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 952 entitled "Crisostomo Sucaldito and Felisa de Guzman
v. Blas Labad and Paciencia Labad" seeking the repurchase and reconveyance of the two (2) above-mentioned parcels of land.

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On 1 October 1976, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners and against the respondents. Petitioners were declared to
have the right to repurchase the two (2) parcels of land within thirty (30) days from the date the decision becomes final, provided that
the petitioners paid to the respondents the amount of P73,103.79. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 61286, entitled"Blas Labad, et al. v. Crisostomo Sucaldito, et al.". Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated 8 October 1984. .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period ruled to be followed for the petitioners to exercise their right of redemption is the period specified in the
decision of the trial court and not the period provided in Sec. 119 of CA 141, as amended
RULING:

Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act) provides:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

Under the above section, the five (5) year period for legal redemption starts from the date of the execution of the deed of sale, even if
full payment of the purchase price is not made on said date, unless there is a stipulation in the deed that ownership shall not vest in the
vendee until full payment of the price. On 14 March 1972, petitioners sold to the respondents the two (2) parcels of land in question,
which had been acquired by said petitioners under Commonwealth Act No. 141, by way of free patent. The sale was evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale.

It has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. The RTC in its 14 October 1976 decision, erred in ruling that petitioners had the
right to repurchase the two (2) parcels of land but only within thirty (30) days from the date the aforesaid decision became final. The
right to repurchase being granted by law (Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141), no other legal restriction could be added thereto. To
hold otherwise would sanction judicial legislation.Stated differently, the RTC amended what is expressly provided for in the law. And,
while the law speaks of five (5) years from the date of conveyance within which to exercise the right to repurchase, we regard the
filing by petitioners of the action for reconveyance on 10 July 1975 as having suspended the running of the redemption period and to
have kept them within the protective mantle of Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

In an action to enforce the right to repurchase public land covered by free patent or a homestead within five (5) years from the sale
thereof, it is of no consequence what exactly might be the motive of the plaintiff, and it is unnecessary for the court to inquire
beforehand into his financial capacity to make the repurchase. The reason is that such question will resolve itself should he fail to
make the corresponding tender of payment within the prescribed period.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The RTC resolutions dated 8 October 1984, 19 August 1985 and 14 May 1986 are
SET ASIDE.

d. Vendor alone has the right of redemption

ROQUE ENERVIDA vs. LAURO DE LA TORRE and ROSA DE LA TORRE

G.R. No. L-38037 January 28, 1974

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Roque Enervida, filed a complaint against the defendant-spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la
Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed on December 3, 1957, by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land
covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years, in
violation of the provision, of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Law. He further prayed
that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father.
In due time, defendants filed their answer, stating among others that the plaintiff has no cause of action against them as his father,
Ciriaco Enervida, is still living; that it is not true that plaintiff is the only son of Ciriaco Enervida as he has also other living children,
namely, Juan, Filomena, Nieves and Antonio, all surnamed "Enervida"; and that the sale of the property in question did not take place
within the prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957,
although ratified and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.

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In view of plaintiff's admission of the material facts at the pre-trial conference, the defendants spouses were constrained to ask for
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 34, in relation with Section 3, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that there is no
genuine issue on the case because with plaintiff's admissions it is evident that the sale in question was not executed within the
prohibited five-year period imposed by Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant made untruthful statement of facts and that he failed to correct the
alleged falsity regarding the death of his father and that he is the only heir;
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant lacked the legal capacity to sue because his father is still very much
alive and in finding that his father is the only person authorized to bring the action;

RULING:

Summary Judgment should be availed of as an effective method of disposing civil actions where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Here it was clearly shown at the pre-trial conference that plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner, virtually admitted that his
father, Ciriaco Enervida, the patentee, is still living; that petitioner is not the sole heir as he has other brothers and sisters who were
also living, contrary to his allegations in the complaint under oath, that he was the sole heir. As the patentee is still living, plaintiff-
appellant could not have, on his own right, sought the repurchase of the land as it would be violative of Section 119 of the Public Land
Law which reads:

Section 110 — Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.

This Court, through then Associate, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, previously ruled that where the vendor is still living, it is he alone
who has the right of redemption.It is clear, therefore, that the complaint is without basis and there is no cause of action and the
plaintiff-appellant has no legal capacity to sue. On this score alone, the petition should be denied. For the purpose of computing the
five-year prohibition against alienation of homesteads, it is to be reiterated and emphasized that the patent is deemed issued upon
promulgation of the order for issuance thereof by the Director of Lands. This being the case, We see no violation of the provisions of
either Section 118 or 119 of the Public Land Law committed by herein respondents because even assuming that the sale sought to be
nullified was made on December 3, 1957, as claimed by appellant, still the same was made well beyond the five-year period provided
by Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141.

On the strength of the admissions by plaintiff-appellant at the pre-trial conference which the latter never bothered to oppose or deny in
a later motion or by counter-affidavits, the order granting summary judgment was indeed proper (Jugador v. Vera).

WHEREFORE, the dismissal order is hereby affirmed with the modification that only attorney's fees in the amount of P1,500 are
hereby awarded to the respondents. No Costs.

i. But, widow and legal heirs have the right if vendor dies

Ferrer v. Mangente,
G.R. No. L-36410, 50 SCRA 424 April 13, 1973

FACTS:

The case was decided on a stipulation of facts. There it was shown that the disputed property, Lot No. 53, located in Manjuyud,
Negros Oriental, was originally acquired by one Rolando Ferrer, under a homestead patent issued on January 17, 1941, covering an
area of 19 hectares. Upon his dying, single and intestate on February 14, 1945, without DEBTS and liabilities, his father, Segundo
Ferrer, executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate adjudicating unto himself such lot to which a homestead patent had previously
been issued. The father likewise obtained a new transfer certificate of title. He then sold such lot, already thus registered in name to
defendant, Abraham Mangente, on July 2, 1963. In a little over two years, August 15, 1965 to be exact, he met his death. Plaintiff,
who is his son, sought to repurchase such property on June 28, 1968, the offer being sent by registered mail and received by defendant
on July 3, 1968. 2

On the above facts, plaintiff Felix Ferrer, who filed the action for reconveyance, did prevail. In the well-written decision of the lower
court, presided by Judge Macario P. Santos, there is discernible the commendable effort to deal justly with the respective claims of
plaintiff and defendant. Thus the judgment was rendered by him "ordering the defendant to reconvey and deliver the possession of the
land in question to the plaintiff and upon payment by the latter to him of the sum of three thousand five hundred (P3,500.00) pesos as
repurchase money, plus the additional sum of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos spent by him for removing the stamps of the trees
thereon." 3 The matter was elevated by defendant to the Court of Appeals, but in a resolution of November 15, 1972, copy of which

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was filed with this Court only on February 22 of this year, the case was forwarded to this Court as the principal errors assigned are
legal in character

ISSUE:

1. WON The principal error assigned by appellant is that plaintiff is devoid of any right to step into the shoes of his deceased father, as
if he were not a legal heir falling within the terms of Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

2. WON the appellant raise the issue that the offer to repurchase was not on time when well within such period, appellee did through
the registered mail?

RULING:

It has already been intimated in the opening paragraph of this opinion that such an approach is at war with the cardinal postulate that
the land in question having been acquired by homestead patent inures to the benefit, not only of the applicant, but of his family
included in which are both the deceased father Segundo Ferrer and his son, appellee Felix Ferrer. The land in question was originally
acquired through a homestead patent. It did not lose such character by the mere fact of the original grantee, his brother Rolando,
having died in the meanwhile with the title passing to their father. The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that
the law offers and is entitled to its full protection.

The courts of the land, including this Tribunal, allow parties the full benefit of filing the pleadings that way as long as the period given
to them has not expired. Appellant would want to be placed on a higher plane, ignoring that to sustain his contention could lead to
nullification of a statutory right.

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental dated February 28, 1970 is affirmed.

e. Right to repurchase may be expressed in any form or manner

VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 55336, May 4, 1989

FACTS:

The more than eleven (11) hectares of agricultural land in dispute is located in Buguey, Cagayan, originally registered on 28
December 1936 in the name of "Heirs of Esteban Billena", and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1648. In 1940, said
certificate of title was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1005 was issued in the name of
Maximiniana Crisostomo and Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of the deceased Esteban Billena. Each of the then new
owners owned an undivided one-half (1/2) portion of, or interest in the land. Maximiniana Crisostomo died during the Japanese
occupation, leaving behind her only child Ana Billena, then married to Fortunate Vallangca with whom she had three (3) children,
namely, Benjamin, Rodolfo and Alfredo, all surnamed Vallangca who are the petitioners herein.

Upon Fortunate Vallangca's death in 1944, his widow Ana Billena, together with her eldest son Benjamin, went to Centro, Buguey,
Cagayan and MORTGAGED the land in dispute to her cousin Nazario Rabanes (private respondent herein) for Eight Hundred Pesos
(P800.00) in Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses of her deceased husband Fortunato Vallangca. There being no notary
public in the place at the time, the agreement was not reduced to writing. At the time of said MORTGAGE of the land to Nazario
Rabanes, the land was already MORTGAGED to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), said FIRST MORTGAGE having been
executed on 16 November 1940, and annotated on said TCT No. 1005.

After the Pacific war, Nazario Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document
which Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a MORTGAGE contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and
trusting in her cousin Rabanes affixed her signature on the document in the space indicated to her.Since Ana Billena and her three (3)
sons were in possession and actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit
before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. II-14). The trial court order of dismissal.

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioners, invoking the rule on "res judicata contend that the dismissal of the "Injunction" case filed on 7 July 1971 by
Rabanes against them, barred the filing by Rabanes against them of the second action for "Recovery of Possession."
2. WON Petitioners maintain that the first suit, although styled as for "Injunction", had for its actual primary purpose the recovery of
the land in dispute and, therefore, after its dismissal, no other action for recovery of possession of the same land and against the
same parties (herein petitioners) could be pursued by the same complainant (Rabanes).
3. WON the dismissal of the suit for injunction was not made without prejudice.

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RULING:

Under Section 40 of Act 190, which provides that: Sec. 40. Period of Prescription as to real estate — An action for recovery of title to,
or possession of real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within 10 years after the cause of such action accrues.
According to petitioners, from the date private respondent claims to have bought the land, that is, 2 February 1946, more than ten (10)
years had elapsed when Rabanes filed on 7 July 1971 his action for injunction which, in effect, was an action for recovery of
possession of the disputed land. Hence, the action was barred by prescription.

Since the land is registered in the name of both Maximiniana Crisostomo and Ana Billena, the latter could not outrightly dispose of
the undivided one-half share of the former (Crisostomo), without first accomplishing an affidavit of adjudication of Crisostomo's
interest or share, and registering said affidavit of adjudication.The heirs of private respondent Rabanes in turn aver, among others, that
the Court of Appeals was correct in finding petitioners' reliance on res judicata as untenable.

In an impressive line of cases, 8 the requisites for res judicata have long been established. They are: (a) that there be an earlier final
judgment; (b) that the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (e) that it is a judgment on the
merits; and (d) that there is between the first and the second actions, Identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Despite
the above oversight, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is nonetheless correct when it held that the defense of res judicata was
unavailing to the petitioners.

Also the owner of the land is precluded from subjecting the same to any encumbrance or alienation. After the lapse of five (5) years,
such prohibition is lifted, but the owner-vendor is entitled to repurchase the property from the vendee within five (5) years from the
date of the execution of the deed of sale or conveyance.Applying the foregoing rules in the instant case, it is to be noted that the free
patent was issued to the heirs of Esteban Billena on 5 December 1936. From this date and until 5 December 1941, any transfer,
conveyance or alienation of the property covered by TCT 1005 was not allowed.

In effect, if the 2 February 1946 deed was actually intended to evidence a sale of the disputed land, made by Ana Billena to Nazario
Rabanes, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it was a sale with pacto de retro wherein title of the vendees Rabanes to
the property was to become absolute and irrevocable only upon the failure of Billena or her heirs to repurchase the same within five
(5) years from 2 February 1946. With these as premises, it can be said that Rabanes' title to the property remains to this date revocable
and unconsolidated.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61133-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners may redeem the
property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private respondents, with
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 1 January 1962 until fully paid.

f. Period to redeem in case of mortgaged lands

BELISARIO vs. IAC

G.R. No. 73503, August 30, 1988

FACTS:

On August 3, 1948, upon the death of Rufino Belisario, the ownership of the land was extra-judicially settled among his children
(petitioners herein), namely: Benjamin, Pacita, Victoria Silverio, Francisco, Anatolia Felipe and Teresita, all surnamed Belisario and
his widow, Felipa Lauga and in whose names Transfer Certificate of Tittle No. T-124 was issued. Sometime in 1950, on the strenght
of a special POWER OF ATTORNEY executed by some of the petitioners in favor of petitioner, Benjamin Belisario, said land was
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory note in the sum of P1,200.00.

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Petitioners-mortgagors defaulted in the payment of THE LOAN. Consequently, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and on
January 31, 1963 the land was sold at public auction for P3,134.76 with respondent PNB as the highest bidder.

On April 21, 1971, petitioners wrote to respondent PNB making known their "desire to redeem and/or repurchase the said property for
and in the same price as the auction sale, P3,134.76," and enclosed therein a postal MONEY ORDER in the amount of P630.00 as
partial payment, with the balance to be paid in twelve equal monthly installments. At the time petitioners offered to redeem the subject
property, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale covering the sale at public auction to the respondent PNB was not yet registered.

Having been apprised of the non-registration, the respondent PNB caused the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with the
Register of Deeds of Bukidnon on July 22, 1971 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6834 was later issued in the name of
respondent bank.

On February 8, 1973, respondent PNB sold the land in question to respondent Cabrera for P5,000.00 and the corresponding TCT No.
7264 was issued in his name.

On November 20, 1974, respondent Cabrera filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against herein petitioners,
together with their tenants, who were actual possessors of the land, with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Bukidnon and docketed as Civil Case No. 708. In turn, petitioners filed on January 9, 1975, an action for Repurchase of Homestead
against the respondents PNB and Cabrera with the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon and docketed as Civil Case 715. Being
interrelated, the two cases were heard jointly.

On September 15, 1977, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss. After their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
denied by the trial court, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), assigning the following
errors:

ISSUE:

1. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court cited in holding that appellants never bothered to tender the payment of
redemption and that the filing of judicial action to redeem did not preserve appellants' right to redeem.
2. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in holding that appellants' posture that they have offered to
repurchase the property from the appellee bank and tendered payment of redemption price within the redemption period is
unmeritorious.
3. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in considering long inaction or laches in deciding the case, the said
defense not having been raised in the answers of defendants-appellees not even in the motion to dismiss or appellees'
memoranda.

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is
hereby rendered authorizing petitioners to redeem the property subject matter hereof, within thirty (30) days from entry of judgment,
and ordering private respondent Cabrera to execute a deed of absolute conveyance thereof in favor of the petitioners upon payment by
the latter of the purchase price thereof at the auction sale, with 1% per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any taxes or assessments which respondent Cabrera may have paid thereon after purchase, if
any, minus the P5,000.00 consigned in the court a quo. No pronouncement as to costs at this instance.

i. Filing a suit to redeem during 1-year period is equivalent to an offer to repurchase

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKvs.HON. RUSTICO DE LOS REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES

G.R. Nos. L-46898-99 November 28, 1989

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FACTS:

The records show that on August 30, 1966, respondent spouses mortgaged six (6) parcels of land located at Cantilla, Sorsogon to
petitioner bank (PNB) to secure the payment of a loan of P10,000.00. Two (2) of the six (6) parcels of land are covered by free patent
titles while the other four (4) are untitled and covered only by tax declarations.

For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity, petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at
public auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale, interest and attorney's fees. The certificate of sale, dated
July 1, 1969, was duly registered with the Register of Deeds on July 8, 1970.After the one-year redemption period provided in said
law expired without respondent spouses having exercised their right or redemption, petitioner executed and registered an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership over the six (6) parcels of land on July 9, 1970 and new titles were issued in its name for the two (2)
parcels covered by free patent titles and the corresponding tax declarations for the four (4) parcels were placed in its name. Spouses
were informed of the consolidation of title and inviting them to repurchase the lands not later than June 15, 1971. Spouses requesting
petitioner to extend the period of repurchase to November 5, 1971. On December 19, 1971, petitioner sent another letter to respondent
spouses reminding them of the projected repurchase and informing them that petitioner would take actual possession of the lands
unless the repurchase would be effected on or before November 30, 1971.

ISSUE:

WON filing a suit during the 1 year period is equivalent to an offer to repurchase.

HELD:

Yes, filing a suit during the 1 year period is equivalent to an offer to repurchase there was no need for private respondents to
repurchase the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the case actually calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy,
especially since the records before us are barren of the factual background, or the mode of acquisition by petitioners, of their
possession of said lots and the circumstances under which the mortgage in question was arranged between the parties.

Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received
from each other under the contract in connection with the four (4) lots must be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them.

While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract is contrary to law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we
cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an exception, namely, that when the contract is merely prohibited by
law, not illegal per se, and the prohibition is designed for the protection of the party seeking to recover, he is entitled to the relief
prayed for whenever public policy is enhanced thereby. Under the Public Land Act, the prohibition to alienate is predicated on the
fundamental policy of the State to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has
gratuitously given to him, and recovery is allowed even where the land acquired under the Public Land Act was sold and not merely
encumered, within the prohibited period. This is without prejudice to such appropriate action as the Government may take should it
find that violations of the public land laws were committed or involved in said transaction and sanctions are in order.

L. Other restrictions
M. Effect of violations of restriction
N. Actions against improper, illegal issuance of patents
a. Reversion Suiots; objectives; where filed; nature of

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

FACTS:

On August 20, 1976, Decree No. N-161749 was issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration. And on September 26, 1976, the
Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 in favor of the applicants.

In a Motion dated October 16, 1976, the registered owners (Graciano B. Neri, Jr., et al.) alleged that squatters who had built shacks
before the issuance of the decree refused to vacate the land for which reason they prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and a
writ of demolition. The court granted the motion in an Order dated October 22, 1976. After several motions for reconsideration, the
court issued an Order dated August 8, 1980, as stated by the applicants, there is no more legal obstacle for the issuance of the writ of
possession and demolition. On August 18, 1980, the writ of possession and demolition was actually issued. However, on October 22,
1980, Petronilo R. Bullecer as President of the Taguanao Settlers Association asked for a 90-day stay in the enforcement of the writ.
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General also asked that the execution of the writ "be stayed or held in abeyance pending the
result of the Annulment proceedings which this Office is filing with the proper court.

ISSUE:

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WON the remedy sought to annul the illegal patent was correct.

HELD:

Yes, The Court ordered the reversion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State and declaring the same
as owned and belonging to the latter. The issue in respect of the validity of OCT No. 0662 has been previously and directly raised in
Civil Case No. 7514 which is the proper action. Resolution of the same issue in this Court will displace a tribunal which can best
ascertain the veracity of the factual allegations and which first acquired jurisdiction over an action which exclusively pertains to it.
There should be no multiplicity of suits.

i. Grounds: Violations of Secs. 118, 120, 121-123, Public Land Act; Land patented is not capable of registration. Failure of
grantee to comply with conditions

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUGUSTO MINA

G.R. No. L-60685 June 29, 1982

FACTS:

On July 7, 1967, defendant August Mina filed with the Bureau of Lands Free Patent Application for tract of land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, with an area of 2 hectares, 69 ares and 47 centares. the Director of Lands on August 14,1969 issued an order approving said
free patent application and also directing the issuance of patent to defendant Mina and, pursuant thereto, Free Patent was
correspondingly issued to said defendant on February 6, 1970. on December 16, 1972, Montano F. Esguerra Jr. filed with the Bureau
of Lands a petition assailing the validity of the patient issued to defendant Augusto Mina claiming that the latter obtained the same by
means of fraud and misrepresentation. Acting on the aforementioned petition by Montano F. Esguerra, Jr, an investigation was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands which revealed that neither defendant Augusto Mina's free patient application aforesaid had been
fraudulently obtained hereby prompting the Director of Land to issue an order on April 2, 1973, the proper court action be initialized
for the cancellation of the patent and the corresponding certificate title issued, ands for the reversion of the covered thereby to the
state.

ISSUE:

WON the application is void

HELD:

Yes, A certificate of title that is void may be ordered canceled. And, a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as
when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable
public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void.).
The lapse of the one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation
thereof for the hold that a little may become in defeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in
violation of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title A title founded on
fraud may be canceled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the
Solicitor General, The complaint in the present case was brought by the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the
exercise of its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property. This Court has held that the statutes of
limitations does not run against the right of action of the Government of the Philippines.Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
does not run against the state. It has been held that the statute of limitations does not run against the right of action of the Government
of the Philippines

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE

G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976

FACTS:

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Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area
of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less,
under Transfer Certificate of Title issued in her name. The deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of
the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
69322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17, 1967. Under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322,
the sum of all the lands (composed of 4 lots) contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters,
which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of said defendant Luisa
Villa Abrille.

Ten days after the approval by the Land Registration Commissioner, Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of
First Instance of Davao directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate
of Title and thereafter to cancel the same and issue new TCT’s. On March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered the
lot and issued a new TCT in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille.

However, it appears that the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square
Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Law, and that the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the
approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the
change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Certificate of Titles was validly cancelled?

HELD:

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, we are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted
correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly
covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the
City of Davao.

Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322
and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular.
This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a
mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in
the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to
have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the
herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of
land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still,
the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the
Director of Lands.

ii. Who institutes action for reversion

iii. Investigation prior to institution

KAYABAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973

FACTS:

The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in the municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan. The plaintiff was Vicente
Kayaban, one of the petitioners herein, the other petitioner being his wife Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were the
spouses Benjamin Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo.

The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common predecessor-in-
interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was admitted to probate in 1923. After the properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban
acquired the shares of his co-heirs by purchase and afterwards he and his wife applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in
question.

The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by the
said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and void
on the ground that since the owners had acquired the properties partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from
their co-heirs, and their father had been in possession thereof for many years before them, the lands were no longer public and hence
not subject to disposition by the government under the Public Land Act. The procedure that should have been followed, said the court,
was judicial confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative legalization thereof through patent application.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the Original Certificates of Title are null and void?

HELD:

Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action for
annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his prior authority and consent.
In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the appellants chose the wrong remedy in applying for free patents instead of
obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a technicality that is of no material consequence now in view of the
declaration by the same court that the appellants are the rightful and exclusive owners of the lands covered by said titles. Indeed,
insofar as the kind of land that may be the subject of one or the other remedy is concerned, there is no difference between them. Both
refer to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require continuous occupation and cultivation either by the applicant
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time; and both are modes of confirming an imperfect or
incomplete title — one judicially and the other administratively.

Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete title is
of no practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496,
which, except for some restrictions as to alienability within entitled to all the protection afforded by the Torrens System of
registration.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed is reversed insofar as it declares null and void Original Certificates of Title in the names of
Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban, respectively.

Consultants

TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS:

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province
of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and
to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: 1.)
That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2.) That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 3.) Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was
made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of such refusal, Almirol
went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with
costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD:

No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession
and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a
document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction. A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and
discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the
said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for

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registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Orilla , GR. No. 170422

FACTS:

Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of situated in Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title .The Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of
Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory
acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657)
for P371,154.99 as compensation based on the valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner)

Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed
the valuation made by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the payment of just compensation
RULING:

The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social
justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of
police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it.
His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As
expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to “just compensation.”
Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just
compensation.

Constitutionally, “just compensation” is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to modify the meaning
of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full, and ample.

LBP vs. Heirs of Domingo, GR No. 168533

FACTS
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of a 70.3420-hectare rice land situated at Macapabellag,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 was issued, pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural
lands devoted to rice and corn were deemed as full owners of the land they till.

Consequently, out of the 70.3420 hectares of the said rice land, 34.9128 hectares (subject land) were taken by the government
under its land transfer program and awarded the same to tenant farmers.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for
determination and payment of just compensation against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just compensation for the subject land should be computed using
the parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657.
ISSUE: Whether or not Heirs of Domingo shall be paid just compensation from the parameters setforth under R.A 6657.
RULING
In sum, in determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.Petition is denied.

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Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7,2008

FACTS:

On 7 August 2001, petitioners received a notice of coverage informing them that their landholding is covered by the
government’s compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an original petition for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Bataan.

LBP filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals and argued that the SAC erred in giving considerable weight on
the appraisal report of the private appraisal firm thereby disregarding the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing
regulations.

It found that the SAC made a wholesale adoption of the valuation of the appraisal company and did not consider the other
factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657 even though the appraisal company admitted that it did not consider as applicable the CARP
valuation of the property.

Finally, relying on the presumption of regularity, petitioners claim that the SAC had considered the criteria set forth in the
law for the determination of just compensation in computing the value of the subject landholding. In any case, according to them,
R.A. No. 6657 does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven factors enumerated therein in its determination of just
compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A 6657 shall be considered in determining of just compensation.

RULING:

Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be considered in determining just compensation reads.

SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as
the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institutions on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
49 of R.A. No. 6657. AO No. 5 precisely filled in the details of Section 17, R. A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which
the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.This formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors
referred to in Section 17 of the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

LBP vs. Heirs of Cruz, GR No. 175175 September 29, 2008

FACTS:

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government banking institution designated under Section 64 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6654 as the financial intermediary of the agrarian reform program of the government.

Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan per Transfer
Certificate of Title of the total 13.7320 hectares of respondents’ landholding, an area of 13.5550 hectares was placed by the
government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27

Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27
and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding
for the preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD.

The SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by the PARAD should be accorded weight and probative value
and that the SAC is guided by the various factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation. It
disregarded respondents’ claim that the valuation should be based on the current market value of the landholding since no evidence
was adduced in support of the claim. The SAC also did not accept petitioner’s valuation as it was based on P.D. No. 27, in which just
compensation was determined at the time of the taking of the property.
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 Petitioner insists that the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable to lands acquired under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance of the well-
settled rule that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of the taking on 21 October 1972, when the ownership of the
subject property was transferred from the landowner to the farmers-beneficiaries and when the former was effectively deprived of
dominion and possession over said land.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD. 27 and EO 228 are still applicable in determining payment for just compensation

RULING:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court explained why the guidelines under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are
no longer applicable to the delayed payment of lands acquired under P.D. No. 27, to wit:

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD
No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs. Natividad, GR No. 127198(2005)

FACTS

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for
their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as
co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.

The judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly,
respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which
are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as
the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.

Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorney’s Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.

Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents’ evidence of the valuation of the properties
at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank’s evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation instead of filing a
petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 27 and EO 228 are applicable for the determination of payment of just compensation

RULING:

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be
paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)before the completion of
this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228
considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial,
full and ample.

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its
nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor’s value and the volume and value of its produce. This
Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance
with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.

The petition is DENIED.

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EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
NEPOMUCENO vs. City of Surigao, GR No. 146091
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 4570 was a complaint for “Recovery of Real Property and/or its Market Value” filed by petitioner Maria Paz
Nepomuceno to recover a 652 sq. m. portionof her 50,000 sq. m. lot which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city
government of Surigao. Maria Paz alleged that the city government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted
expropriation proceedings for its acquisition. On October 4, 1994, she and her husband, co-petitioner, Fermin A. Nepomuceno, wrote
respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable settlement for the payment of the portion taken
over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and
refused to pay them anything.RTC rendered its judgment in favor to the petitioner.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other respects.
Petitioners claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity demand that the value at the time of actual
payment should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They demand P200/sq. m. or a total sum
of P130, 400 plus legal interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value at the time of actual taking should be the basis of the property
RULING
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the
value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the
reason for this rule is:
The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the
time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., “just” not only to the
individual whose property is taken, “but to the public, which is to pay for it.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

NPC vs. Suarez. GR No. 17525 October 8,2008

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint on August 23, 1996 for
expropriation of a parcel of land (the property) in Brgy. Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon registered in the names of Angel Suarez,
Carlos Suarez, Ma. Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez (respondents).
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Legazpi
City Branch the amount of P7,465.71 “representing the provisional value” of the property, alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square
meters.
By Decision of April 15, 1999, the trial court adopted as basis for determining just compensation the recommendation of the
Commissioners. Thus it disposed:
Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial easement over the property, the decision of the appellate court
affirming the trial court’s order for the payment of just compensation in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the total value of the
property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is erroneous.
ISSUE: whether petitioner in its acquisition of an easement of right of way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value
of the land, must be paid.
RULING:
An easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full
ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by
the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land
for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled
to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land

The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of taking is thus the principal criterion in determining just
compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must
thus be considered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

NPC vs. Purefoods, GR No. 160725 September 12,2008

FACTS
On 5 November 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for eminent domain before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan .
The complaint alleged that the defendants were either the registered owners or the claimants of the affected pieces of
property.
The complaint also alleged the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of
acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land consisting of 62,426.50 square meters. It also averred that the

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affected properties had not been expropriated for public use and were selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury and that the negotiations between NAPOCOR and the defendants had failed. The
complaint prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused
entry to the affected properties.
Respondent Pure foods counters that determination of just compensation is a factual finding, which may be reviewed by this
Court only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions to the prohibition against factual review. Since the instant case does
not fall under any of the exceptions, it argues that the issue of just compensation may not be reviewed in the instant proceeding.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising a question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of
10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation shall be based on the market value of the affected properties
RULING
The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by
NAPOCOR’s transmission lines has already been answered in National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation. In that case, the Court held that because of the nature of the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the land for
an indefinite period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected properties. The Court explained therein
that expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-
way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present
case, also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that
the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value.
Based on the foregoing elucidation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s finding of the value of just compensation based
on the majority report’s valuation of P400.00 per square meter for the properties belonging to respondents with the exception of
respondent Moldex. Both the Court of Appeals and the RTC were convinced that the commissioners’ recommendation was arrived at
after a judicious consideration of all factors. Absent any showing that said valuation is exorbitant and unjustified, the same is binding
on this Court.
Denied

FORFOM Dev. Corp vs. PNR GR No. 124795

FACTS:

Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) and all of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Binan, Laguna a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of
military men, and without its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna
and installed thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property
to squatters along the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written demands for the return of the property or for the payment of
its price, PNR failed to comply.

PNR alleged that, per authority granted by law (Presidential Decree No. 741), it acquired parcels of land used in the
construction of the railway track to Carmona, Cavite. It, however, denied that the property acquired from Forfom was leased to
tenants. It stressed that the acquisition of the properties used in the project was done through negotiations with the respective owners.
It claimed that it negotiated with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they were paid just compensation. Dr. Felix
Limcaoco, it said, was not paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his properties. It claimed that the right to and
just compensation for the subject property was the declared fair market value at the time of the taking which was P0.60 per square
meter. Defendant explained that President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the PNR to acquire said right of way in a Cabinet Meeting
on 1 November 1972 as evidenced by an excerpt of the minutes of the meeting of the PNR Board of Directors on Resolution No. 751.

Judgment rendered in favor to the plaintiff. The trial court found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without
due process of law and without just compensation.

Not contented with the decision, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing their respective Notices of Appeal.
PNR questioned the trial court’s ruling fixing the just compensation at P10.00 per square meter and not the declared value of P0.60 per
square meter or the fair market value of P1.25 paid to an adjacent owner. CA affirmed the decision with modification as to damages.

Plaintiff filed for a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner FORFOM can recover the property because respondent failed to file aby expropriation and to pay
just compensation.

RULING:

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 A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise
informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a private land. The entrance into Forfom’s
property was permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period.It is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can
no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of
the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED insofar as it denies Forfom Development Corporation’s prayer
for recovery of possession (in whole or in part) of the subject land, unearned income, and rentals.

Registration of Chattel Mortgage.

Where chattel mortgage registered.

A chattel mortgage over a vehicle shall be registered BOTH in the RD and in the Motor Vehicle Office, now Land
Transportation Office (LTO).

FLORENTINA ALEMAN, ET ALvs.PRESENTACION DE CATERA, ET AL

G.R. No. L-13693

Facts:
De Catera is and was the owner and operator of several passenger trucks. One of her trucks was the "Catera No. 5." One morning, said
passenger truck fell into the ditch because it was over speeding the driver was trying to overtake another truck. Aleman and her son
who at that time were on the lawn in front of their house were hit by the said truck thereby causing the instantaneous death of the son
and the injury of Florentina Aleman. Civil case No. 2969 is for the recovery of damages instituted by Florentina Aleman and her
husband Federico Real for the death of their son and for the injury of Florentina Aleman.Two of the passengers of the aforesaid truck
were killed as a result of the mishap.
The Southern Motors, Inc. filed with the provincial sheriff a third-party claim to the bus, On 16 May in both cases the plaintiffs filed
with the Court a motion to strike out the third-party claim filed by the motor company. The intervenor motor company filed an answer
in intervention setting up a counter claim and praying that it be declared the owner of the bus attached by the sheriff to answer for the
damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The counter-claim of Southern Motors, Inc. is dismissed. The filed a notice of appeal. Hence, the
appeal before the Court is that taken by the intervenor Southern Motors, Inc. in both cases from that part of the judgment dismissing
its counterclaim

Issue
Which has a preferred right to the bus under attachment — the Southern Motors, Inc. in whose favor, as seller of the bus, a chattel
mortgage thereon had been executed and recorded in the corresponding registry of deeds, or the families of the vehicular accident
victims who, having been awarded damages for death and injuries, had caused an attachment on the said bus owned by the operator
whose purchase and ownership thereof had been recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office.

Ruling
A Mortgage in order to affect persons should not only be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also be
recorded in the Motor Vehicle Office as required by section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law." Here, the Southern Motor, Inc.
did not record in the Motor Vehicle Office the mortgage executed in it's favor. Such being the case the mortgage is ineffective as far as
the appellees are concerned. Its right or interest, therefore, in the truck, because of the mortgage constituted in its favor, cannot prevail
over of that appellees who thought mere judgement creditors may be deemed innocent purchase of the bus owner-operator
Precentacion de Catera, who had her purchase of the bus from Wenceslao Defensor recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office,

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DELFIN MONTANOvs.JOSE LIM ANG, ET AL
G.R. No. L-13057

Facts
Montano brought to the Philippines from the United States a Cadillac car which he registered in his name in the Motor Vehicles Office
and for which he obtained a certificate of registration. He sold the car to Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A. for which the latter
executed a promissory note. Having paid part of the price, said spouses executed on the same date a chattel mortgage on the car in
favor of Montano to guarantee the payment of the balance. Because Montano did not want to transfer the registration certificate to
Jose Lim Ang before the registration of the mortgage, the latter was registered in the office of the register of deeds, but Montano failed
to notify the Motor Vehicles Office of the execution of the mortgage.

Jose Lim Ang transferred the registration certificate to Villanueva. Villanueva sold the car to Santos for Santos sold the car to
the Manila Trading & Supply Company and this company sold the car to Tinio . . He also executed a chattel mortgage on the same car
to secure the payment of the promissory note. This mortgage was registered both in the office of the register of deeds as well as in the
Motor Vehicles Office
Jose Lim Ang failed to pay the balance of the purchase price to Montano in spite of the latter's demand. Montano requested the sheriff
of Manila to sell the car in accordance with the conditions agreed upon in the chattel mortgage. Having found, however, that the car
was no longer in the possession of Lim Ang but in that of Angel M. Tinio, Montano commenced the present action of replevin before
the Court of First Instance of Manila against spouses Lim.

Issue
Whether or not the chattel mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang and Teodora A. Gonzales in favor of Delfin Montano is binding
against third persons even if they failed to give notice thereof to the Motor Vehicles Office as required by Section 5(e) of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law;

Ruling
"A mortgage in order to affect third persons should not only be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also
be recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office as required by section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. And the failure of the
respondent mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in its favor had the effect of making said mortgage ineffective against
Borlough, who had his purchase registered in the said Motor Vehicles Office."' Adopting this view in our case the inevitable
conclusion is that as between Montano whose mortgage over the car was not recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office and Angel M.
Tinio who notified said office of his purchase and registered the car in his name, the latter is entitled to preference considering that the
mere registration of the chattel mortgage in the office of the register of deeds is in itself not sufficient to hold it binding against third
persons.

Replacement of Lost or Destroyed Certificate

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 A. When not applicable. When the owner’s duplicate copy is not in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is
unwarranted as the court has no jurisdiction over the petition.

FELIX CAMITAN vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 128099

Facts
The spouses Camitan sold to Fidelity Investment Corporation (respondent) a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
After the death of the spouses Camitan, without the knowledge of respondent, the heirs of the spouses-petitioners herein - filed a
petition for the issuance of a new Owner’s Copy, 2 However, it appears that respondent was not given notice of such proceedings. The
trial court issued an order of general default. When respondent learned of the petition and order for the first time, it caused the
annotation of a notice of sale on the title of the property. In a Petition6 for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the
Court of Appeals, respondent argued that the order is null and void, having been issued by the trial court without jurisdiction since the
Owner’s Copy of TCT exists and has been in its possession, and not lost as petitioners alleged. Moreover, it claimed that petitioners
have no standing to file the petition, not being the registered owners of the property, nor persons in interest, since all the rights and
interest of the spouses Camitan had already been transferred to respondent upon the sale of the property. Respondent further accused
petitioners of perjury; intentionally suppressing from the trial court the fact that they were not in possession of the property; and not
serving notice on respondent despite knowledge that it was in actual possession of the property. 7

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the annulment of the impugned Order. 8 It found that the Owner’s Copy is in the
possession of respondent since 1967. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners committed perjury in executing their Joint
Affidavit of Loss in support of their petition before the trial court as they made it appear that the Owner’s Copy was still in the
possession of the spouses Camitan, when in fact, as early as 1967, the same had already been given to respondent.

Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the annulment of the Order of the trial court which directed the Register of Deeds
to issue a second Owner’s Copy of the title.

Ruling
The petition for issuance of the new Owner’s Copy before the trial court was filed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the "Property Registration Decree," Section No. 109 of which provides:

SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate.—In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and
registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost
duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

Thus, before a duplicate certificate of title can be replaced, the petitioner under the foregoing provision must establish that the
duplicate certificate was lost or destroyed. This Court has consistently held that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a
petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title, if the original is in fact not lost but is in the possession of an
alleged buyer.In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.

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Reconstitution of Title

REPUBLIC v SANTUA
G.R. No. 155703September 8, 2008

Facts:

On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with the RTC a petition for judicial reconstitution of a TCT. He alleged
that the original copy was among those destroyed by the fire that completely razed the Capitol Building then housing the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August 12, 1977. The documents he presented were tax declarations, survey plan and
technical description. On February 25, 1999, the RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing of the case and it also directed the
publication of the order. On December 15, 2000, the RTC granted the petition. On January 16, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the RTC. On September 23, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the documents presented by Santua are sufficient bases for the

Ruling:

No, they are not sufficient.

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear
proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. In this regard, Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26
enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient bases for reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. The Court has
already settled in a number of cases that, following the principle of ejusdem generis in statutory construction, “any document”
mentioned in Section 3 should be interpreted to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein. As aptly observed
by the petitioner, the documents enumerated in Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents that had been issued or are on file with
the Register of Deeds, thus, highly credible.

Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules is
vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over
parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. Courts should bear in mind that should the petition for
reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner is not left without a remedy. He may still file an application for
confirmation of his title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the lawful owner

Basis for Reconstitution of Title

PASCUA v REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162097 February 13, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner claimed that she is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3209, Pagsanjan, Laguna Cadastre, having inherited it from her
parents, Guillermo Abinsay and Leoncia Rivera. On December 4, 1930, the cadastral court awarded the lot to Limuaco, who sold the
lot to petitioner’s parents on December 24, 1956, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

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On December 8, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 3209 with the RTC of
Laguna. The RTC denied the petition for reconstitution for insufficiency of evidence because Tax Declaration No. 5471 in the name of
spouses Abinsay did not indicate any certificate of title number, cadastral lot number or even an assessor’s lot number while Tax
Declaration No. 1376 only indicated Assessor’s Lot No. 19-pt.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that Assessor’s Lot No. 19-pt and Lot No. 3209 are the same. For respondent Republic of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General contended that what petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest bought from Limuaco was Assesor’s Lot
No. 19-pt, which was neither designated nor mentioned as Lot No. 3209. Also, the Solicitor General said the property described in the
documents presented is still unregistered land of the public domain and there is no evidence that an OCT was actually issued to Lot
No. 3209.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s order. The CA held that petitioner failed to present the documents enumerated in Section 2, RA 26.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner should be allowed to reconstitute her alleged title

Ruling:

No, the petitioner is not qualified to file an action for reconstitution.

We are not convinced. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under
the provisions of the Torrens System, Act No. 496. Petitioner’s evidence itself, the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and her parents,
stated that the lot was not registered under Act No. 496 and that the parties agreed to register it under Act No. 3344. Even the Deed of
Co-owner’s Partition stated that the subject lot, Lot No. 19-pt, is not registered. The other piece of evidence, the certifications from
the LRA, merely stated that Decree No. 412846 covering Lot No. 3209 was issued on December 4, 1930, but the copy of said decree
is not among the salvaged decrees on file with said office. The said copy is presumed lost or destroyed during World War II. The
LRA neither stated that a certificate of title was actually issued nor mentioned the number of the OCT. It cannot be determined from
any of the evidence submitted by petitioner that the adjudicatee of the purported decree was Limuaco.

The Court is not persuadsed that petitioner’s pieces of evidence warrant the reconstitution of title since she failed to prove the
existence of the title in the first place. The purpose of reconstitution of title is to have the original title reproduced in the same form it
was when it was lost or destroyed. In this case, there is no title to be re-issued.

VILLANUEVA v VILORIA
G.R. No. 155804 March 14, 2008

Facts:

On February 22, 2001, respondent Francisco Viloria filed a verified petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a
TCT in lieu of the lost one, before the RTC of Zambales. He further prayed that the court should declare the owner’s duplicate copy
of the TCT null and void which the trial court granted. The land covering said TCT was then sold to Ruben M, Marty. As a
consequence of the sale, the former TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of the vendee
Petitioners, however, filed a petition for annulment of judgment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.They
alleged that they were never given the necessary notices and information regarding the pendency of respondent Viloria’s petition
despite the fact that they are the actual possessors and owners of the land covered by the TCT.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA held that alleged ground of extrinsic fraud failed because the failure to
disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one’s own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will
justify or require a vacation of the judgment. The appellate court added that petitioners were not entitled to be notified of the petition
before the RTC for not being persons whose claim, right or interest is annotated at the back of TCT under its Memorandum of
Encumbrances. Petitioners claim that at the time that the petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was
filed by respondent Viloria, the subject land had already been sold to them, who are the actual possessors of the property. They
further allege that they are in possession of TCT, with serial number 2136412, which was delivered to them by the late wife of
respondent Viloria, Cresencia P. Viloria, along with a copy of the sales contractdated June 5, 1986.

Issue:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate.

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The trial court could not have validly acquired jurisdiction to reconstitute the alleged lost owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT since the
same was not lost but was in the possession of petitioners who had purchased the property from its late owner. As there is no proof to
support actual loss of the said owner’s duplicate copies of the said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and
the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void. If an owner’s duplicate copy of certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact
in possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.

THE PHILIPPINE COTTON CORPORATION v GAGOOMAL&ANG

G.R. No. 130389 February 11, 2008

Facts:

Pacific Mills, Inc. originally owned five parcels of land covered by four TCTs. These properties were subsequently purchased by
respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills on July 19, 1979. The RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering Pacific Mills
to pay its obligation under the loan agreement which the CA affirmed after the respondent filed a collection case against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the appeal or on June 11, 1988, the Quezon City Hall was razed by fire thereby destroying the records of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, including the TCTs of Pacific Mills.
Pacific Mills filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned TCTs through administrative reconstitution, in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6732. On March 23, 1992, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued to Pacific Mills the reconstituted TCTs. However, the
aforesaid alleged annotations of the preliminary attachment in favor of petitioner were not incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs, but
annotated therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to respondents and their payment in full. On even date, the reconstituted TCTs
were cancelled in favor of the respondents.
On February 8, 1993, petitioner wrote the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City requesting for the annotation of the notice of levy, and,
subsequently, the annotation of a favorable decision of this Court rendered on August 3, 1992, on the new TCTs issued to respondents.
On February 10, 1993, Samuel C. Cleofe, the Quezon City Register of Deeds, informed respondents that the letter-request for re-
annotation of notice of levy had been entered in the Primary Entry Book and asked them to surrender their owners’ duplicate copies of
TCTs. Immediately upon receipt of the said letter, respondents verified the original copies of titles in the possession of the Registry of
Deeds and discovered that the following annotations were included at the back of the titles: “Request for Re-Annotation of Notice of
Levy” and “Letter Request for Annotation of Entry of Judgment of Supreme Court.” Thereafter, respondents filed on March 3, 1993, a
Petition for the Cancellation of Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of respondents. Under the circumstances, respondent [the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City] should and could have properly refused
such request instead of immediately annotating it. In the same light, “The Register of Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration
of an order attachment when it appears that the title involved is not in the name of the defendant and there is no evidence submitted to
indicate that the said defendant has any present or future interest in the property covered by the titles.” The appellate court dismissed
the appeal because the issue raised by the petitioner was a pure question of law, over which the CA had no jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether it is the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the
reconstituted certificate of title

Ruling:

No, it is not.
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529 merely involves the general functions of the Register of Deeds, while Section 71 thereof relates to an
attachment or lien in a registered land in which the duplicate certificate was not presented at the time of the registration of the said lien
or attachment.
A special law specifically deals with the procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed.
Furthermore, Sections 8 and 11 of the same Act provide for the procedure for the notation of an interest that did not appear in the
reconstituted certificate of title, mandating that a petition be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Clearly, therefore, it is not the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in
the reconstituted certificate of title. As a matter of fact, this task is not even within the ambit of the Register of Deed’s job as the
responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. As correctly observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the
registration of property, while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that
were lost or destroyed. Specifically, Section 69 of P.D. No. 1529 refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance of a certificate of
title; while Section 71 of the same law pertains to the registration of the order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced,
dissolved or otherwise affected by a judgment of the court. Undoubtedly, the foregoing provisions find no application in the present
case since petitioner insists that its interest was annotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed certificates of title.

Requisites for Reconsitution of Title

SPOUSES FELIPE and VICTORIA LAYOS v FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC
GR No. 150470 August 6, 2008

Facts:

FEGDI is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in
Laguna. Felipe Layos filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction against FERC. It was
alleged in the said complaint that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and possessor of two (2) parcels of land that the Southwoods project
encroached upon. FERC filed an Opposition to Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and explicitly stated therein that the
developer of the Southwoods project is its sister company, FEGDI. FEGDI filed an Answer to the abovementioned complaint and
reiterated that it is the developer of the Southwoods project and not FERC and that the land covered by the project is covered by

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Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of La Paz (to whom they entered a joint venture), copies of which were attached to said
answer as annexes.

For the Reconstitution of Title:

The instant Petition originated from a Petition for Reconstitution of OCT No. 239 filed by the Spouses Layos. It is noted that the
Spouses Layos instituted this reconstitution case on the same day as their quieting of title case before the RTC.
The same allegations of souses Layos were retained. The Spouses Layos additionally alleged that the Original Copy of the said title
which used to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna appears to have been lost and/or destroyed.
The San Pedro RTC denied the Spouses Layos' Motion for Reconsideration in an Order issued on 1 October 1998.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Layos filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in
the ruling of the lower court dismissing the Spouses Layos' Petition for Reconstitution. According to the Court of Appeals, the validity
of OCT No. 239 of the spouses Layos was already determined by the Supreme Court in its Decision dated 16 December 1996 in G.R.
No. 120958, in which the Supreme Court categorically declared that the said certificate of title was a forgery.

Issue:

Whether the ruling of the CA should be sustained

Ruling:

Yes, the ruling of the CA should be sustained.

The position of the Spouses Layos is untenable. Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit. Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos'] OCT No. 239,
inasmuch as the said issue has already been mutually controverted by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court no
less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos'] title.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon
the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The
very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the
issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof.
A reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not
pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the
subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the
issue of ownership of the land. The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself,
does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property. Evidently, the Spouses Layos seek more than just
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 in LRC Case No. B-1758. They want to hold a trial so as to prove before the San Pedro RTC the
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by several people, including their former counsel, to sabotage their cases before the courts; the errors in
the Decisions of the courts that have long attained finality; and, ultimately, the validity of their title to the subject property. Again,
these are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the San Pedro RTC to determine in a case for reconstitution. If truly the Spouses Layos
have been misled and defrauded in a concerted effort to ruin their chances before the courts, then their recourse is not to persist with
this petition for reconstitution of title, but to institute other actions to hold those responsible administratively, civilly, and even
criminally liable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v Taustumban

G.R. No. 173210 April 24, 2009

Facts:

Respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 7129, Flr-133, Talisay-Minglanilla Estate under Patent No.
43619 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo. The OCT which was in the possession of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cebu was allegedly either lost or destroyed during World War II. Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution
on Sec. 2(d) of R.A. No. 26 which provides that an original certificate of title may be reconstituted from an authenticated copy of the
decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued. The RTC found the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance and set the hearing of the petition on 29 March 2000. Respondent claims she bought
the property from the said owners who are also her relatives, as evidenced by an Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of
Inheritance Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale. She claims that since the time of purchase, she has been occupying and possessing the
land and paying the realty taxes thereon. Respondent prayed for reconstitution of the title covering the property since the title,
supposedly on file and under the custody of the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province, had either been lost or destroyed during World
War II as certified by said office.

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The RTC rendered its decision ordering the reconstitution of the lost OCT in favor of the legal heirs of Sofia Lazo.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which, granted the same and reversed the RTC judgment. The appellate
court at first held in favor of the petitioner on the ground that no proper reconstitution can be done since respondent did not utilize the
sources of reconstitution provided under Sec. 2of R.A. No. 26 in the order therein stated, merely presenting as it did a Certification
from the CENRO that a patent had been issued over Lot No. 7129 in the name of the heirs of Sofia Lazo.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and held that respondent has
substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution under RA 26. The Court of Appeals traced the ownership of Lot No.
7129 based on the records of the Bureau of Lands, Friar Lands Division, now the CENRO of the DENR. It found that: The property
was part of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate covered by one mother title, OCT No. 188. One such possessor was Sofia Lazo
who was granted Sales Patent No. 43619 on 21 July 1938. This led to the issuance by the Philippine Government of a Deed of
Conveyance which led to the issuance by the Register of Deeds of a TCT in favor of the Heirs of Sofia Lazo, and not an original
certificate of title as claimed by respondent. The plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis for the
inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that no certificate of title covering the same
parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned. The CA believed that these government records as duly certified
and reported by the CENRO and the LRA uphold the prior existence of a certificate of title in favor of the Heirs of Sofia Lazo over
Lot No. 7129. Respondent’s alleged failure to prove the loss of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was held to be justified by
petitioner’s failure to deny or oppose the allegation. As the allegation of loss was never specifically denied, the averment in
respondent’s petition was deemed admitted without need of evidence to prove the same. Thus, respondent properly resorted to the
sources of reconstitution under Sec. 2(f) of R.A 26. The CA added that petitioner’s objections were belatedly raised in the appeal
before the appellate court and should be barred.

Issue:

Whether the decision of CA is correct

Ruling:

No, it is not.

The petition should be granted. The governing law for judicial reconstitution of titles is R.A. No. 26. Sections 2 and 3of RA 26
enumerate the sources upon which reconstitution should issue. The requirements of Secs. 2 and 3 are almost identical, referring to
documents from official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest.
Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of RA 26. Respondent however failed to present an authenticated
copy of the decree of registration or patent pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued. She relied on the CENRO
certification which is however not the authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent required by law. The certification
plainly states only that Lot No. 7129 is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo. It is not even a copy of the decree of
registration or patent itself but a mere certification of the issuance of such patent.

Even if we base respondent’s petition on Sec. 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 as the Court of Appeals did, and as respondent now argues in this
petition, reconstitution would still not issue. Resort to other documents in Sec. 2(f) must be employed only when the documents
earlier referred to in Secs. 2(a) to (e) do not avail.
The problem though is that respondent has not established the issuance or existence of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 7129
nor of the other documents enumerated in Secs. 2(b) to (e) that would prove the existence, execution and contents of the certificate of
title sought to be reconstituted. There is nothing in the evidence she presented that would show that Lot No. 7129 had been registered
in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo and that the certificate of title in the name of the said heirs over said property had been
issued.

Sources of Reconstitution of Title

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v LAGRAMADA

G.R. No. 150741 June 12, 2008

Facts:

A parcel of land (lot 8) located at Banlat, Tandang Sora, QuezonCity, was allegedly covered by a TCT in the name of Pangilinan. The
original copy of the TCT was allegedly destroyed when a fire razed the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 11 June
1988.
In 1996, Pangilinan sold Lot 8 to the spouses Vicente and Bonifacia Lagramada (respondents). Respondents filed a petition for
reconstitution of the original copy of the TCT and for the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Pangilinan allegedly
misplaced the owner’s duplicate copy and it could no longer be found despite diligent efforts to find it.
The following documents were submitted as evidentiary bases for the reconstitution:

1. Certification from the Office of the Acting Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City respecting the destruction of
TCT No. 118717;
2. Affidavit of Loss of TCT No. 118717 executed by Pangilinan;
3. Deed of Sale executed by Pangilinan in favor of respondents;
4. Tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1997;
5. Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735 in the name of Pangilinan; and

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6. Certified true copy of the technical description, verified and approved for the administrator by Apolinar R. Lucido of the
Subdivision and Consolidation Division; and
7. The plan prepared and verified as correct by Geodetic Engineer Eligio L. Cruz and approved for the LRA

The trial court found the petition meritorious and ruled in favor of respondents.

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal on the ground that respondents’ pieces of evidence are not
sufficient to warrant reconstitution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents sought the reconstitution not in their capacity as owners but as persons who have an
interest in the property. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were asking for reconstitution not in their names but in the name
of Pangilinan. The Court of Appeals ruled that nowhere in Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26) was it provided that the term “any other
document” refers to similar documents enumerated under Sections 2(f) and 3(f). The Court of Appeals ruled that the only requirement
was that the “other document” must be “in the judgment of the court” proper and sufficient, and accompanied with a plan and
technical description of the property approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration. The Court of Appeals ruled that, in this
case, the proofs presented by respondents were, “in the judgment of the court,” proper and sufficient bases to support the application
for reconstitution of TCT No. 118717.

Issue:

Whether the documents presented by respondents are sufficient bases for the reconstitution of the TCT

Ruling:

The petition has merit.

In this case, two certificates of title were allegedly lost – the original copy of the transfer certificate of title in the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City which was destroyed in a fire, and the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title which Pangilinan
misplaced. Hence, respondents were asking for the reconstitution of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title and the
issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title. The requirements of Sections 2 and 3 are almost identical. We
agree with petitioner that the enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the ownership of the
owner and his predecessors-in-interest. We likewise agree that “any other document” in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to
documents similar to those enumerated. We find that the documents submitted by respondents are not sufficient bases for
reconstitution.
The Certification of the alleged loss of TCT No. 118717 due to fire, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 28 February
1996 upon the request of respondents’ counsel, was a form document where the name of Pangilinan and the TCT No. were typed on
the blanks provided. The one-page deed of sale, denominated
“Kasulatan ng Biling Lampasan ng Isang LupangResidencial,”where Pangilinan allegedly sold the 500-square meter lot to respondents
for P15,000, did not even indicate the TCT No. of the lot sold. The tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1996 presented were all paid by
respondents in 1995 in the name ofPangilinan. They likewise did not indicate the title of the lot covered. The technical description
and blue print plan, prepared at the instance of Vicente Lagramada, are additional requirements under Section 12 of RA 26 and are
not on their own sufficient bases for reconstitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROYALES

G.R. No. 168742 September 3, 2008

Facts:

The Director of Lands filed a cadastral case involving four lots located in Camarines Sur. He prayed that these parcels of land be
declared public land. Respondent Norma Royales was a claimant of these lots.
On September 17, 1975, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the registration of the lots in the name of respondent. However, before
the certificate of finality of the decision and order for the issuance of the decree of registration could be issued by the court, the
Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by fire on June 26, 1976 and all the titles and documents therein were burned. 27 years
later, respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the September 17, 1975 CFI decision in the RTC. The RTC issued an order
setting the petition for hearing without directing the respondent to cause the publication of said order in the Official Gazette. The RTC
rendered a decision granting the petition and ordered the reconstitution.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an appeal in the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It denied reconsideration in a
resolution dated June 28, 2005. It held that publication was no longer required because the CFI, through the Land Registration
Commission (predecessor of the LRA), had already caused the publication of the order in the Official Gazette. Petitioner argues that
under Section 10 of Act 3110, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in a petition for reconstitution of records of pending
cadastral cases.

Issue:

Whether or not publication was necessary in this case

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Ruling:

Yes, it is necessary.
The case here involves a cadastral undertaking. Under the cadastral system, the government initiates the proceedings for the
compulsory registration of lands within a stated area by filing a petition in court against the holder, claimants, possessors or occupants
of such lands. All claimants are compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they lose their right to own their property. The
purpose is to serve public interest by requiring that the titles to the lands “be settled and adjudicated.” Notice of the filing of the
petition is published in the Official Gazette. During the trial, conflicting claims are presented and the court adjudicates ownership in
favor of one of the claimants. When the decision becomes final, the court orders the issuance of the decree of registration which, in
turn, becomes the basis for the issuance of a certificate of title. The cadastral system was conceived to hasten the registration of lands
and therefore make it more effective. However, these two kinds of proceedings also vary in a number of ways and the legislature
chose to treat them differently in Act 3110. Its intent to differentiate the two reconstitution procedures should be given effect. It was
presumed to know the meaning of the words it employed and to have used them advisedly. It is Section 10 which is applicable to this
cadastral proceeding. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for reconstitution for failing to
comply with the publication requirement.

Mantok v Barque
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605

Facts:

Basing on the 2005 case of Manatok v Barque, on 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among
others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In the context of an administrative reconstitution
proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause
the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject
to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. The Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA’s position, but ultimately, upon
motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title. Both assailed
Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the
reconstitution of the Barque title.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

No, it did not acquire.

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate
questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P.
129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for
annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the
Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of aTorrens title in the course of
reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. That the RTC
has “exclusive original jurisdiction” over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law
that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence under Sect 19 of BP 129. Nowhere in Section 6 of PD
1529 we can see that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms
the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which
authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure
that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrenstitles. It is thus clear that neither the Court of
Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of
titles have been lost due to “flood, fire and other force majeure.”

Furthermore, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26 and Sections 11 and 12 of RA 6732 indubitably establish that the administrative
reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an
existing title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution
proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title
whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property is
already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the
petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on
whether or not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may
inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the
cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by
duly issued subsisting titles in the name of their duly registered owners

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CONDOMINIUM LAW

Hulst v PR Builders
566 SCRA 333 September 25, 2008

Facts:

Jacobus Bernhard and Ida Hulst (spouses Hulst), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the
purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Batangas. The spouses Hulst filed a complaint for
rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney’s fees against PR Builders, Inc. for the latter’s failure to complete the project
that they agreed upon verbally. The HLURB decided the case in favor of the spouses. Spouses Hulst, however, divorced. Ida assigned
her rights over the purchased property to petitioner. From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case. The Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded
to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties. The Sheriff tried to
implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution. The Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land
covered by 13 TCTs in Batangas. In a Notice of Sale, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties.Two days before the
scheduled public auction, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff
made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the
Appraisal Report of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.
Respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of
Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land.
Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of P5,450,653.33. The sum
of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.
Four months later, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real
properties. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. The CA rendered herein assailed Decision dismissing
the petition. There is an inadequacy that shocks the senses.

Issue:

Whether the spouses can own a real property

Ruling:

No, they cannot.

The spouses Hulst are foreign nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their names. Private
land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain
for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

In addition, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent
only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project
after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been built. The
Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The
basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units." 74 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the
projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report
is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving.

Lesson learned:

No condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interest in the
condominium management body, the Condominium Corporation; and no one can buy shares in a condominium unit. RA 4726 allows
foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to more than 40% of the total and outstanding
capital stocks of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.

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-To God Be The Glory-

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