Assignment For January 9

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ASSIGNMENT FOR JANUARY 9, 2017

Read on Sections 3-6, Article III;
Read and prepare a case digest for the cases enumerated hereunder
Section 3 (Privacy of Communications and Correspondence)
Section 4 (Freedom of Expression)
Section 5 (Freedom of Religion)
Section 6 (Liberty of Abode and Travel)
Section 3. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

1. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, GR 93833, 9/28/95
2. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, GR 107383, 10/16/86
3. Waterous Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, GR 1113271, 10/16/96
Sec. 4 Freedom of Expression

4. Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628, 7/19/1985
5. Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, GR 205728, 1/21/15
6. Jose Jesus Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, 2/18/14- RA 10175, - on freedom of
expression
7. GMA Network vs. COMELEC, GR 205357, 9/2/14
8. Adiong vs. COMELEC, GR 193956, 3/31/92
9. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. COMELEC, GR 133486, 1/28/00
10. Bayan vs. Ermita, GR 169838, 4/23/06
Sec. 5 Freedom of Religion (Non-establishment clause and freedom of religious

profession and worship)
11. Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256
12. Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, 8/4/03
Sec. 6 Liberty of abode and of travel

13. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760
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Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by
the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication”
to a point of absurdity
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ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
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another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing
to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at
P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms.
Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.
Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
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EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. DANS

137 SCRA 628
Facts:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE
which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere
allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing
was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner
was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was
taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the
reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech.
It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit
acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of
public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press?
RULING:
Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Yet the
freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution
The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in
AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast
station may be closed or its operations curtailed.
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THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates
for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
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HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally

imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper
in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing
of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.

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Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong
to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party,
or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter

of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on
the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
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Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property

or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form
of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
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3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

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Case Digest: Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335: February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE
TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
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m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
RPC on the crime of libel.
HELD:
a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws
that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially
a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally
condemned conduct.
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to

the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. Since the
ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate
him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Hence, valid and constitutional.
b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

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(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration
of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private
documents.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain
name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of
a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clausein
that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate
as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device.
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same.

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Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with
liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of
Privacy."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that,
"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy
of communication and correspondence.In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion
of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers
personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists
would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to
secure information about him that could be published.
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
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nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required
by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly,
of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer
system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes
"gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a
ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially
tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of
married couples or consenting individuals.
The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor
and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a
right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act
No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775.
The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009(ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from
invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer
system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of
"electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled
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proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is

incalculable.
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known
as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy
games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to
ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That
is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
forms of expression.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional. Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
18
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to
the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of
it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which
may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
19
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of
the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the
penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a

sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory
statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking
site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other
internet users.
Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the
original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it; and
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any
of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated
as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on
aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude
that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the
innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times
sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives,
and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
(Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and
other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It

is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium
creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce
the law.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension
on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in
a fuzzy way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel,
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise
of the freedom of expression.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special
laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies
shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between
crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar
crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often
evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The
distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
21
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said
to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject
of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same
elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online
libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353.
Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7
that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic
Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and
unconstitutional.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections
4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at
least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate
to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of
reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand
22
pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act
shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be
punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be
punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the
offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious
cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority
to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause,
shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration,
or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained
is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic
23
data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and
where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are
to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is
within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance
its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective
test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over
a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must
be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a
particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use
all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation
of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into
two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the
right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers
to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to
informational privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time seek to protect.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing
whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written
with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional
24
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information
relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a
minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be
similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement
authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months:
Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is
used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue
deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement
authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data
that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors
or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service
provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the
benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to
keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six
months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months
from receipt of the order for their preservation.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason
of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the
normal transmission or use of the same.
Hence, valid and constitutional
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court
warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit
subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially
docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a
25
function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive
functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure
warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following
powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act,
and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or
computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge
about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the
computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination
of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period
longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and
seizure procedures.
The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they
were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.
26
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections
13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall
immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or
examination violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he
wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the
data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie
found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or
block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision
may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must
satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free
speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section
19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically
the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with
an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the
27
mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where
non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which
are defined therein.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or
willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor
General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section
20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the
Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision
of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the
formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x
x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v. Department
of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law
gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users assets.This definition serves as the parameters within
28
which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law
and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.
Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.

29
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right
to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time

limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all
of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
30
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decalsâ€¦ Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:â€¦
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted
areas and/or billboardsâ€¦
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile”
places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347
of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null
and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom
of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
31
regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the
part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met
in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated
that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
32
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

January 28, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS
CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The
Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted
immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order
issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by
media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit
polls
ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a
clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and
maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters,"
and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to
who are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and
anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the
ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits
that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation
by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger
to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the
tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further
33
make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not
be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words,
the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the
electoral process."
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set
aside.
1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general
has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at
stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit
polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all,
the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls --
disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly,
the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or
the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been
presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that
could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever
remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social
scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current
events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and
the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the
ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to
other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to
be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is
forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that
the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster
of whom they have voted for.
34
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##
35
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of
the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum
tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This
petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising
the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20,
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
36
and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does
not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,”
“protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist
and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet
complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR),
insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID
and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
37
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which
refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her
Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove
from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students
and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony
and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious
belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu
officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As
a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated
July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness
teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against
the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not
answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari
and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right
to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of
expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons
acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the
expulsion orders issued by the respondents.
38
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is
no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates
right receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled
will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the
state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period
of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled
and set aside.
39
Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC
of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in
the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing
the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon
and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the
Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
40
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling
state interest” test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief
and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
41
Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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ASSIGNMENT FOR JANUARY 9, 2017

Section 3. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

Sec. 4 Freedom of Expression

Sec. 5 Freedom of Religion (Non-establishment clause and freedom of religious

Sec. 6 Liberty of abode and of travel

NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC

G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. DANS

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FIRST ISSUE: No.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally

SECOND ISSUE: No.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

THIRD ISSUE: No.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Case Digest: Disini v. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335: February 11, 2014

Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to