CONSTI2 Cases under Privacy of Communication and Right to Privacy

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

Zulueta v. CA, February 20, 1996

Cecilia Zulueta vs. CA and Dr. Alfredo Martin

Privacy of Communication. 
Doctrine in Nachura: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the
wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of
private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour.
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic
of her husband, together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and
forcibly opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs without Dr.
Martin’s knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as
damages against her wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to
be the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE:
the case is between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the
court ruled that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and that the
use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and gross
misconduct. 
Issue: WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.
Held: Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.  But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of
evidence; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered
evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied. A petition for
certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the CA assailing the admission in evidence of
the aforementioned cassette tapes. The CA dismissed the said petition. From this
adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
Issue: Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as
evidence in court
Held: No, RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described.
and Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, RTC and CA failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112

Gaanan vs. IAC G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 145 SCRA 113 (1986)

Facts: complainant and his client were in the living room of complainant’s residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the the City Fiscal against Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. Laconico telephoned
appellant, to advise him on the settlement of the direct assault. When complainant
called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. Twenty minutes later, complainant called
up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered
‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his
wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demands for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he
filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a
decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed to the appellate court who affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that
the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200;
Issue: Whether “any other device or arrangement” includes extension phones and
listening thru it is a violation of RA 4200.
Held: No, an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as
the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line.
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in
order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases
of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that ‘however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.’
Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that ‘the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or
the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments
of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382

In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings
Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March  1987

Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M.

Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division.
Ilustre  using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered
unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to
inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel
Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of
the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself
from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986
after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed
letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to
another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta
is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of
law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of
the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government
are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Ople v. Torres, July 23, 1998

Ople v. Torres 292 SCRA 141. (1998) G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Facts: The petitioner seeks the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the
right to privacy, Petitioner prays that the court  invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
privacy.
Issue: Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy
enshrined in the constitution?
Held:  Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the
“right to be let alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under
A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened
rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources —
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.  In the case at bar, the
threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves
on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr.,
“the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record
of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this
counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy
as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001

Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending

case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

Facts:Pursuant to an investigation regarding the PEA – AMARI project, Ombudsman

Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of
inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.. 
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera  inspection the subject
accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, was based on a
pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al.
for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), Sec. 3 (e)
and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority
and AMARI.
Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to clarify if such an action will
violate RA. No. 1405 (AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO,
DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.).
Issue: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits
(R.A. No.1405). 
Held: No. Before an in camera  inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the
account identified in the pending case.
 In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short,
what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to
formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was
no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for
inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that” [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts for
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or employee
or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties
of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by
an officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion
of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.