CHAPTER 1: ADMISIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Case 1:
EDGARDO A. GAANAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
145 SCRA 112, No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
FACTS:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the
AntiWiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception
of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assauit which they filed against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Atty. Laconico.

Atty. Laconico telephoned appellant, Edgardo Gaanan, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem.

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement Appellant
heard complainant his conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. The settlement consisted of
monetary claims, amongst which is the demand for a fee of Atty. Pintor for persuading his client to withdraw
the direct assault case. Atty. Laconico said yes to the conditions and was told to wait for further instructions
where to drop the money.

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Uestaurant, cornplainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.(traydoray besh!)

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appeliant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. (resbak pud ang ahak!)

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The
two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the deeision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

The IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of Atty. Gaanan based on what he heard on the extension line is admissible. YES

RULING:
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is
not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is
whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an
extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to
both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty.
Laconico was “private” in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties
gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller’s message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the
alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge
against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening.
We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying
the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener’s.
The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through
a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determines the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts.

Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does
not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius
of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line
probably has an extension teiephone and he runs the risk of a third party iistening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension
telephone as a prohibited “device or arrangement” but of greater importance, they were more concerned
with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
goyernment authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

Case 2:
CIRSE FRANCISCO “CHOY” TORRALBA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
467 SCRA 552, G.R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial court’s2 decision finding petitioner Cirse
Francisco “Choy” Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called “Tug-Ani ang Lungsod” which was aired over the
radio station DYFX in Cebu City. An information for libel was filed before the RTC of Tagbilaran City against
petitioner Torralba. The information alleged that Torralba maligned the honor of the late Judge Agapito
Hontanosa on his radio program thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas
including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas, one of the legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social
humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental anguish.

Turns out, there were 3 other cases filed by Atty. Hontanosas against Torralba and these were cases were
consolidated. During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento. Segundo Lim has a recording of
three broadcasts of Torralba’s program because he recorded the broadcasts due to the latter’s previous attack
on him and his company.

During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that he asked
either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralba’s radio program. He
maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had actually heard
petitioner Torralba’s radio program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a
continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person
who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings, Lim admitted that they were
recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to the presentation by
the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner
Torralba’s objection to the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the
three tape recordings into evidence.

For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the chairman and manager
of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of petitioner Torralba’s radio program
aired on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him and stated that he was a
person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that
“he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had a sad experience with someone who betrayed him
and this ‘someone’ was like his father who was a collaborator”; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office
a tape recording of petitioner Torralba’s radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba
averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor
Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his siblings
regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba. On cross-examination, private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts and
he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine.
Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3, Tagbilaran
City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of private complainant
Atty. Hontanosas.

The trial court acquitted Torralba on the three counts of libel but found him guilty of libel for Criminal case 9107
(malicious statements against the late Judge Hontanosas). Upon appeal to the CA, the guilty verdict was
affirmed with reduced imprisonment sentence and lesser amount for damages.

ISSUE: WON the tape records are admissible as evidence, even without authentication. NO

RULING:
Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable weight on the
tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lim’s adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without
said authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence. We agree.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a proper foundation has
been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence
that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must
first be established, to wit:

(1)a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2)a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3)establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4)a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5)a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6)identification of the speakers; and
(7)showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its operation, his
method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a
sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings.27 Likewise, a witness’ declaration that the sound
recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of
authentication.28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of going
forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the conversation
recorded.29

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape
recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording
provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and
for its protection against tampering.30

In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording
was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not
familiar at all with the process of tape recording31 and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record
petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts.

Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralba's radio show on 11 April 1994, should
have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the
purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial
court to admit the tape recording—Exhibit “D”—in evidence.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that
“[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity
of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or
speech, or by the witness’ recognition of the voice of the speaker.”33

The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the alleged
libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralba’s radio program on that
date was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even touch the
same.

In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails to
meet the standard that a witness must be able to “recognize the voice of the speaker.” Being near the radio is
one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker is another. Indeed,
a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily listening to the contents of a radio
broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over the airwaves.

Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas
particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralba’s radio show subject of this
petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Note: Witness Lim has a beef against Torralba. Torralba filed a libel case against Lim in a previously and got
the latter convicted (mentioned in the full text)

3) HERMOGENES BAUTISTA, plaintiff and appellant vs. APOLONIO APARECE,

defendant and appellee
1954-08-23 | No. 7793-R

Facts:

As owner of the portions of land designated as II, III and VIII in the sketch (Exhibit A), Nicolás Añasco
sold the same in 1923 to Valentín Justiani in whose name it was assessed in 1923 (Exhibit 5). In the same
year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani and it was accordingly in the latter’s name (Exhibit 4). On
October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument (Exhibit 2) whereby he sold the same
property for ?100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935 (Exhibit 3). Apolonio was in
possession of the land from the time he acquired it, but in the month of June 1944, Hermogenes Bautista
illegally entered a part of said land (portions III and VIII) and took possession thereof. Consequently, Apolonio
filed a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol and when the case was called
for hearing, and after an inspection was made by a guerilla officer, Hermogenes Bautista executed a public
instrument (Exhibit 1) stating that Hermogenes promises that the land controverted before the Military Office
will be returned to Mr. Apolonio Aparece in good will and without any grudge that will ever happen. Thus, the
possession of the land was restored to Apolonio Aparece on October 22, 1944.

Claiming that the property rightfully belongs to him and alleging that with the aid of armed men, with the use of
forces, threat as well as intimidation, and pretending to be the owner, Apolonio Aparece usurped on October
22, 1944, the northwestern portion of the parcel of land, particularly that part planted to rice, Hermogenes
Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Alleging further that defendant’s failure to
return the property damaged him in the sum of ?300, and hat for the two harvests said defendant had enjoyed,
plaintiff would have realized ?500, the latter prays that judgment be rendered in his favor by declaring that he
the true and absolute owner of that portion on the northern part of the parcel of land and pay damages.

In his answer, which was amended on June 19, 1948, defendant, as a special defense, states that the piece of
rice land referred to in paragraph III of the complaint is a portion of the parcel of land which he
acquired from Claudio Justiniani on October 22, 1935. And by way of counterclaim, defendant alleges that
while the land in question was in the wrongful possession of plaintiff and before he returned the same to the
defendant, he harvested therefrom fifteen cavans of palay with a total cost of ?562.50, and that as a
consequence of the action for the recovery of possession of the land, said defendant suffered the amount of ?
200 as damages. He, therefore, prays for the dismissal of the complaint and damages.

On October 3, 1950, decision was rendered declaring that defendant is the owner of portions III and VIII of the
sketch (Exhibit A). Plaintiff appealed stating that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the Exhibit 1.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibit 1. NO

Ruling:

To convince us that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibit 1, the translation of which is Exhibit
1-A, counsel for appellant stresses that this document was executed under duress, violence and intimidation,
in addition to the fact that the guerilla officer, before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter.
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility in evidence of a certain
document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The document (Exhibits 1 and 1-A), which
counsel for appellant wanted the lower court to have rejected, is not only relevant but also material and
competent to the issue of ownership between the parties litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value
in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in an action. And evidence is said to be material when it is
directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent
evidence is one that is not excluded by law in a particular case with these criteria in mind, we hold that the
mere fact that Exhibit 1 was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. Exhibit 1, considered together with the
other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies us that the portions of land in question really belong to
defendant Apolonio Aparece.

Moreover, contrary to appellant’s allegation that Exhibit 1 was signed under duress, violence and intimidation,
the record preponderantly shows otherwise, for Apolonio Aparece not only denied such circumstances, but
also testified in cross-examination that it was Hermogenes Bautista who invited Apolonio Aparece to go with
him to the camp at Napo, because, according to former, he would return the land to the latter.

Case 4:

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES
216 SCRA 25, G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

FACTS:

Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106,
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga. Devoted to the production of
palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.
Julian died on September 25, 1979.

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the
subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants,
prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force and intimidation from entering and working on
the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and
surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of
possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials of
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff
and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots. Claiming that they have always
exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the
dismissal of the case and claimed moral damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P165,000.00
(Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).

For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his
consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his
defenses. He also demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees (Answer, pp. 77-78).

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had
cultivated the same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of
the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the gross
harvest the seeds used and the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject to the
disposition of the court.”3

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court’s decision with the modification
that Lot 106 is not covered by it. Hence this petition for certiorari.

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and Severino
Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the same Estate, which lot was purchased by
petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza’s father, Juan, and which he later donated to the Barangay
Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. As to their
supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding, petitioners
present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576,7 wherein private respondent’s complaint
against petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 5838 was dismissed, to
show that private respondent’s “point is already settled and considered closed.” Lastly, petitioners claim that
they were included in the present controversy so that their political career would be destroyed.

ISSUE: WON the the defendants are jointly and severally liable with Mendoza. YES

RULING:

It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the
trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving
at the trial court and appellate court’s findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but
instead put finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not
obtain in the instant case.

“In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she ‘is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-
38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters,
more or less x x x’ (Complaint, Records, vol. 1, p. 1). However, during Violeta’s testimony, she clarified that
actually only Lot No. 46 containing an area of 23,000 square meters is the one involved in the dispute. Lot No.
106, which contains an area of 19,000 square meters, is not included in this controversy.

This statement was corroborated by plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the
19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The
inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should not be taken
against appellee not only because there was no showing that she intended to mislead defendants and even
the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It would appear that Lot No. 106 had been included in the
complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olimpio’s father.

We also concur with the trial court’s finding on the participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of
appellee. They not only knew Olimpio personally, some of them were even asked by Olimpio to help him
cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olimpio, together with his co-
defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through ‘strong arm methods.’

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren
Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even
in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence.’

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This
substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976
(Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226,
the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct
or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court
in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.’”

5. PEOPLE VS. TURCO, JR., 337 SCRA 714, G.R. NO. 137757 AUGUST 14, 2000

FACTS:

Escelea Tabada was raped by her 2nd cousin and neighbor Rodegelio Turco when was twelve (12) years and
six (6) months old.

Escelea was coming home and was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her
neighbor, Leonora Cabase. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who was already sleeping in the
room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when she
asked who was it, the party introduced himself as the appellant.

For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the harrowing experience until she was able to muster
enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro,
the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked
Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination.
Escelea was accompanied by her sister to the Provincial Hospital. She was examined by Dr. Rimberto
Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed
Escelea’s complaint against appellant.

The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili,
and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him
were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.

The trial court described complainant as “a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate,
having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television
set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show . . . and exposes
herself to the danger of the dark night.” But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility.
Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.

On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense counsel asked her
about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query prompted her to narrate the
incident prior to said date when she also watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when
she arrived home, accused-appellant came and called her “Lea” and when she asked who was it, he answered
“si Totong.” When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said that she could
not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around.

The accused-appellant particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela
and before the Clerk of Court of the MTC, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was
presented to conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-
appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily
covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able
to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant only because
her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant
actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of the complainant should be given credence (YES); and
2. Whether or not the medical certificate should be admitted as evidence (YES).

HELD:
There are guiding principles in rape cases are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult
to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the
credibility of the complainant is a paramount importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof.

The victim’s relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having intermingled two
incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the defense counsel may have
contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim what transpired “before” the incident (tsn, August 19,
1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness’ testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape. Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not
remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one’s life experience as to be
worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma
upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget. These
lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the
malefactor. Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by
truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.

The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her testimony
deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court. Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.

The Court held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to
introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the
defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were
sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and photographs.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the
examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (Under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his qualifications.

We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value
thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the
rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is
determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law . On
the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while
evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which
may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).

Although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very
little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was “[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile
insertion” as well as “foul-smelling discharges.” The diagnosis was “[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape”. In
fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict.

It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of
medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone
is credible and sufficient to convict.

6. SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA

G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995

FACTS:

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City against that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and the transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.”

An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accuses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter’s conversation with said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, and held that allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recording of a private conversation of a party privy to such communication without
the consent of the other party is in violation of RA 4200. (YES)
HELD:
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
“process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols
(as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally—charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative
body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
“conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tanada in his Explanatory Note to
the bill.
NAMAE NOTES: Effect of evidence derived in violation of RA4200
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

7th Case
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTAÑEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURTOF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, PresidingJudge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City andRAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ, respondents

Facts
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortañez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortañez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits “A” to “M”.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on
the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration
from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence
of the aforementioned cassette tapes. On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the
subject of the present petition, which in part reads:
“It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
 1. Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
2. A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting
evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it
impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal
from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The
error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be any more than an error of law,
properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ‘ping-pong’ to and from the
appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby
DISMISSED.”

Based on this decision, the petitioner filed the herein petition.

Issue
Whether or not the recordings are admissible in evidence.

Ruling
No.

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by
private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wiretap his home telephone.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence.

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of
said Act.

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in
evidence under Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.