G.R. No.

L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed
by the petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided
on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request,
appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
(Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased
to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for
Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault
against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School;

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don
Bosco Technical High School;
 (e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed
against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed
later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the
mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was

agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983,
pp. 2-12).

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at
the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn,
March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard

complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan
and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to
one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without
the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by
the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the
following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the
term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200
is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

 Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described:

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence.
The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a
third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening
to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the
extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused
Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only
one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with
the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine
bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have
his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone
line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It
would be the word of the caller against the listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra
heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone
and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that
he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the
private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase
"any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement
as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private
secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering
or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman.
Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that
matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration
of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill
No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension
telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known
communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor
of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in
the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or
walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere
oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus
consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which
can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be
plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the
other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of
a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to
agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in

paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory
and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent.
 The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be
restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the
minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the
generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are
used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered.
(Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited
in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party
or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to
place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a
third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause
the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension
telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.
Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and
that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension
telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including
an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the
rationale behind the rule:

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the
law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States
v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26
F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109
VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a
guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's
Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of
the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the
inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater
importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment

which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special
amendment which Your Honor may introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be

less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of
government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant.
With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government
officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record
their conversation.

Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party
could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying:
"Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In
these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with
the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these

conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the
testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to
record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then
the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we
could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be
wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations
which later on will be used in court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such
as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage
over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are
of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed
the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it
denied petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash the Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases
for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Therein included were informations involving: (a)
consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Roberto S. Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-
101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already
dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884.

The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 relation to Section 342 of the Central Bank Act (Republic
Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to
submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960.
Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank.3 It also required all residents of the
Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or
abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were
punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.

That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same
offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these as
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the charge sheet in
Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:

That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime thereafter,
both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports
in the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central
Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from whatever source
or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests
regularly every six (6) months for the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their
investment of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-
issued dollar denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name
of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front
organization established for economic advancement purposes with secret foreign exchange
 account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA)
in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda
Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16,
1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States
of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985, aside from the
redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and
outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50
on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the Philippine without first complying
with the Central Bank reporting/registering requirements. 1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the offenses,
the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the foreign exchange accounts
maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by the accused.

On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same
offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were similarly worded as the earlier
indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of
the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks
where these accounts were maintained.

All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court.

On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central Bank
issued Circular No. 13185 which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange
transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.

On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the government’s policy of further liberalizing
foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356, 6 which amended Circular No. 1318.
Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-
funded expenditures obtained from the banking system.

Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from their
coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular
No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.

On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the
Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them,
including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.

On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to
the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar
plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their
motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the
repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Bank’s reporting requirement,
and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with the
government.

On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. A similar motion filed on May 23,
1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of
Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners
then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18,
1994.

On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. The
trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners’ motion and set the consolidated
cases for trial on January 5, 1995.

Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary restraining
orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Finding
that both cases involved violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated
the two cases.

On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in

denying petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case
No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-
101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.7

Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion ordering the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant petition, attributing the
following errors to the appellate court:

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:

(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION

(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 153;

2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 76538

(C) PRESCRIPTION

(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT

 GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.9

Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid preliminary
investigation?

(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No.
1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners?

(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?

(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?

(5) Were petitioners’ alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute immunity
granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?

On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that the
dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No.
3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.

Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in
force at the time the action is instituted. 10 The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The applicable law on
jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1601. 11 Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the
Sandiganbayan.12

In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34
of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular No. 960 are punishable by
imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D.
No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is
less than six years of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960
are, therefore cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the Court of Appeals
when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-salting cases.

Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of Circular No.
960 before the RTC of Manila Constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in
an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, filed separate cases involving
virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the
prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the
failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the
act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft Law’s
provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but an
element of the offense of prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and should,
thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.

For the charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one
court and another action pending in one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 13 Here, we find
that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad
constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A.
3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied
independently.14 Hence, no fault lies at the prosecution’s door for having instituted separate cases
before separate tribunals involving the same subject matter.

With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in relation
to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be
penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign exchange accounts to the
proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest
earnings from the same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses
Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction
prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is
the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses charged, and
prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no forum
shopping.

Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the Department of
Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that government’s
ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and personally appearing at the
preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary
investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC for violation
of Circular No. 960.

Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. 15 It is an
inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. 16 Instead, the right to a
preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived,
either expressly or by implication. 17 The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.

The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:

1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 … on the condition that he
face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-
petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting bail in
the above-mentioned cases.

2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation
because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked
their right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigation … Upon denial of their
demands for preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the
Honorable Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but immediately caused the
withdrawal thereof … in view of the prosecution’s willingness to go to pre-trial wherein
petitioner would be allowed access to the records of preliminary investigation which they
could use for purposes of filing a motion to quash if warranted.
 3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice … respondent
Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of
prosecution…

xxx

5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera
moved for the quashing of the informations/cases… 18

The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived their right to
question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new preliminary
investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail immediately
following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various
motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary
investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation.19 The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on the
ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash the information. 20

On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable under
laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal of Central Bank Circular No.
960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by
Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, 21 contend that
repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under
the old laws.22

As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. 23 This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been
previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who
committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a
saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions.24 Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the
act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the
reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected,
regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused. 25

In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions.26 Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing circulars,
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the
repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter
Circular.27 A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would
otherwise be lost under the new law.28 In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular
Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and
punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending
or under investigation.

Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section 34, 29 by
Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any special sanction for violations of any non-
trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit that a
comparison of the two provisions shows that Section 3630 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained
nor reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the application of Section 34
of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners’ pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft of
statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a
provision in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for the
repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly required under Circular No.
960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be prosecuted criminally.

A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentral’s charter repealing the former
show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain
internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the international value of the
peso,"31 both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a penal cause which sought to
penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or regulations issued
by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was
expanded to include violations of "other pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented by
the Bangko Sentral." In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be penalized are violations
of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in
the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and penalty was reenacted in
the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it
was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where a clause
or provision or a statute for the matter is simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect,
upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment,
in effect "neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption. 32 The rule applies
to penal laws and statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under
which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the
same act done by him under the old law, will neither preclude the accused’s prosecution nor deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case.33 As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before
the reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the
repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case,
be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.

Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of
the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the
Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653
an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.34

Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 and ex post facto legislation?

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 35

The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does the
law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right that was regarded at the time
of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at
the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." 36

The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty." 37 We find, however, the
test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not
penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively.38 Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are
favorable to the accused.39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there
any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively.
There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the criminal
cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to
1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the commission of
the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the State’s right to prosecute
them for said offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in
computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since the
remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates of the alleged
violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted from these dates.

In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the court a
quo quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that:

[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in 1986 when
the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the offense, therefore,
should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses charged are
punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they prescribe in eight (8) years.
Thus, only a little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986
when the cases were filed in 1991. 40

The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265
"by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more
than five years." Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the periods of prescription for violations
of special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years. 41 The
period shall commence "to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment."42 In the instant case, the indictments against petitioners charged
them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular
No. 960. Petitioners’ contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged violations were
known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be viewed in the context of the
political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only
protected from investigation by their influence and connections, but also by the power and authority
of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that
Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates "resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and
manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions." 43 In the instant case, prescription cannot,
therefore, be made to run from the dates of the commission of those offenses were not known as of
those dates. It was only after the EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth became a highly prioritized state policy,44 pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional
Constitution.45 To ascertain the relevant facts to recover "ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders
and supporters of the (Marcos) regime" 46 various government agencies were tasked by the Aquino
administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper
cases. Applying the presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed", 47 we are more
inclined to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only during
the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period should be counted
from the dates of discovery of their commission. The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave
rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period
counted from February 1986.

The fourth issue involves petitioners’ claim that they incurred no criminal liability for violations of
Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.

Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the Central
Bank’s Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were coursed through its
Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of reports would be
surplusage, since the requisite information were already with the Central Bank. Furthermore, they
contend that the foreign currency investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute
confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No. 6426, 48 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting requirements imposed by Circular
No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting provided for in Section
10(q),49 Circular No. 960, and the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of
Switzerland.

Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the reporting
requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange Currency
Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to avail of the
aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the
requirements for eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426. 50 Not only do we find the
record bare of any proof to support petitioners’ claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that said
law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426
speaks of "deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as may…be designated by the
Central Bank for the purpose."51 The criminal cases filed against petitioners for violation of Circular
No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By
invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such
reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as their
language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the
exception.52 Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).

With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that Philippine courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.53 Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged and
proved.54 Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either by: (1) an official publication
thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied by a certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such
country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in such
country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service assigned to said country
that such officer has custody.55 Absent such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance of
the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.

Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity under
the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.
Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314 (1993), upholding the
validity of the said Agreement and directing the various government agencies to be consistent with it.
Benedicto and Rivera now insist that the absolute immunity from criminal investigation or
prosecution granted to petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and employees of firms
owned or controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the suits filed for violations
of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.

The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:

WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases of the
Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates and nominees,
namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x

WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following cases (stress
supplied):

1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9

2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24

3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34

4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)

5. PCGG I.S. No. 1.

xxx

WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also without
admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently involved in
uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the Philippines, solely
motivated by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its recovery mission and Mr.
Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and normal pursuit of his endeavors, the
parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims under
the cases pending in the Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring supplied);

xxx

II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the Freedom
to Travel

a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex "C"
hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the exercise of
his profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas listed in his name in
Negro Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or acquired with income from his
inheritance…and all the other sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his
corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex "A" as ceded or to be ceded to the
Government.

Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this Compromise
Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by proper competent court
as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the Government for appropriate custody and
disposition.
 b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent
provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his
family, officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned, who are included in
past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that
there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts (or)
omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may be alleged to have violated any
laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any
asset treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement. lawphil.net

x x x56

In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the words
employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly listed and limited the
applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein. We have ruled in
another case involving the same Compromise Agreement that:

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the
Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent Roberto
S. Benedicto.57

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations of Circular
No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code, 58 the Agreement relied upon by petitioners
should include only cases specifically mentioned therein. Applying the parol evidence rule, 59 where
the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the sole
repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties. 60 Whatever is not found in the text of
the Agreement should thus be construed as waived and abandoned. 61 Scrutiny of the Compromise
Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by the government against Benedicto,
his family, and associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only "criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for
acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any
penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any
asset treated, mentioned, or included in this Agreement." 62 It is only when the criminal investigation
or case involves the acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth "treated mentioned, or included in this
Agreement"63 that petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any showing that the
interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the subject matter of the
present case, are "treated, mentioned, or included" in the Compromise Agreement. The phraseology
of the grant of absolute immunity in the Agreement precludes us from applying the same to the
criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. A contract cannot be
construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which the parties intended to
contract.64

In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of Appeals in upholding
the orders of the trial court denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969. In our view,
none of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court 65 upon which petitioners rely, finds
applications in this case.
On final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S. Benedicto
gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.66

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA G.R. SP No. 35719,
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S.
Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and
92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered
dropped and that any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in
the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000.  No lawphil.net

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176169             November 14, 2008

ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar
assailing the Decision2 dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution3 dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of
Appeals. This case originated from an Information4 for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 80425 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on 5 October 1998 for acts
committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or about January 1993. The Information reads:

That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another through
fraudulent representation and deceitful machination, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,] demand and receive the amount
of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and
prejudice of the herein offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur found
the evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible than that presented by the defense and
thus held petitioner liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, as amended. 7 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and, in accordance with the
penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as amended, said accused is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR YEARS as minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.

On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to justify a grant of civil
damages, this Court makes no pronouncement thereon.

With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of this case are
hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in the event that said accused would be apprehended.
Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the apprehension of said accused.

SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged error by the trial court in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of the trial court's appreciation of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005, 9 following the principle that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, noted that the criminal acts alleged to have
been committed happened sometime in 1993. However, R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was
charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took effect on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals
declared that petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13(b) thereof,
and not under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the provisions of the Labor
Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The
appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, decreeing in the dispositive portion,
thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
11th Judicial Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, finding Rosario Nasi-Villar
guilty beyond reasonable doubt o the crime of Illegal Recruitment
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-Villar is ORDERED to pay Nila Panilag
the sum of P10,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.10

On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 11

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given
retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was
allegedly committed, petitioner argues that law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for
illegal recruitment. What was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in relation to Art.
39, the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than
eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other
hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less
than P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment provided in the Labor
Code was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner concludes that the charge and conviction of an
offense carrying a penalty higher than that provided by the law at the time of its commission constitutes a
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law and the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042.

In its Comment12 dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Court
of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct. While conceding that there was an
erroneous designation of the law violated by petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of the
offense in the Information is not determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged against
her but the acts alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge petitioner with
illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, and penalized under
Art. 39(c) of the same Code. The evidence on record substantiates the charge to a moral certainty. Thus,
while there was an erroneous specification of the law violated by petitioner in the Information, the CA was
correct in affirming the RTC's imposition of the penalty for simple illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code, the OSG concludes.

The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been
violated–these being conclusions of law–but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
What controls is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view,
and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of the crime of which
he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of the information, in the
manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the
crime which those acts constitute.14

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had performed the
acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the
Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the Information. To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be
shown, namely: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any
of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not
have a license or authority to do so.15 Art. 13(b) defines "recruitment and placement" as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
to two or more persons, is considered engaged in recruitment and placement." The trial court found these
two elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not offered any argument or proof that
countervails such findings.

The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its commission.
Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the Labor Code which was in force in 1993
when the acts attributed to her were committed. Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that
erroneously designated the offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are
punishable under the Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was
charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.

There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto  law nor a retroactive application of R.A. No.
8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which, among others, aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than it was when committed or changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 16 Penal laws and laws which, while not
penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to
the accused.17

R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new definition of the crime of
illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said
law, including the penalties provided therein, would take effect retroactively. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.18 Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give R.A.
No. 8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's case only under the aegis of
the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court did not violate the
prohibition against ex post facto  law nor involved a retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042 in any way.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005 and Resolution dated
28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125865           January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received
an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. 1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's
advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the
accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was
acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
1 

immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. 2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The 3 

imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of
law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does
4 

not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a
5 

crime is not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that
preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
6 

granted by law. The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is
7 

required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides the absence of preliminary
8 

investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 219581

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Maximo De La Peña (appellant) filed this appeal assailing the December 16, 2014 Decision  of the
1

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 which affirmed with modification the October
22, 2007 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, in Criminal Case
2

No. CC-2006- 1608 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy.

Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less,
a1ong the river bank of Barangay San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7,537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[:]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* cash money worth [₱] 1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00)to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Romy Real (Romy), Danny Real
(Danny), and Onyong Reyes (Onyong), have not been an-ested and remain fugitives from justice.

Version of the Prosecution

On September 24, 2005; at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband, Jose Nacoboan
(Jose), and their son, Marwin Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board their pump boat loaded with
13 sacks of copra. These sacks of copra were supposed to be loaded and transferred to a bigger
passenger boat that would ferry the copra to Catbalogan, Samar. Their barangay is situated along a
river which opens to the sea. When the tide is low, the bigger passenger boat cannot dock along the
shore so a smaller pump boat has to be used to ferry the cargo to a bigger passenger boat.

As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. For
fear of collision, Jose stopped the engine of their pump boat Three armed men then immediately
ordered the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a firearm at Jose arid ordered him to proceed
to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Julita identified him as the appellant. Jose's hands were tied
and his head covered.

Another armed person grabbed Julita’s bag and took the following items:

1) ₱1,000.00 Cash; 2) Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace.

Another person operated the pump boat and docked it on a small island after nearly two hours of
travel. During the trip, Marwin’s shirt was taken off and used to blindfold Julita. When they arrived at
the small island, the appellant unloaded the 13 sacks of copra.

The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island where its
engine, prope1lertube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat. Consequently, the
Nacoboan’s boat was left without an engine and they had to paddle to safety. They discovered that
they were already in Equiran, Daram, Samar.

The following day, Julita went to the police authorities in Villareal, Samar to report the incident. She
reported that the value of the copra was then ₱15.00 per kilo and that the engine and other
equipment lost were valued at ₱30,000.00. She identified the appellant as one of the armed men
who took control of their boat and took away its engine, propeller tube, and tools since she had
known him for 16 years already arid she recognized him when he boarded their boat.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the accusa6on against him and testified that he was a resident of Brgy. San
Roque, Villareal, Samar for 15 years. He had been engaged in fishing for l0 years as a source of
livelihood. He claimed that from September ), 2005 up to December 5, 2005 he was fishing in
Daram, Samar with Edgar Pojas, Jose Dacletan (bacletan), Tope Dacletan, Nestor Bombay, and
Esok Pojas. During the said period, he smyed at the house of Barangay Kagawad Edgar Pojas and
used the boat of Dacletan to fish.

After their fishing activity, appellant went home to Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar. On December
6, 2005, four soldiers arrested and beat him up. He was brought to the Municipal Hall thereafter and
was imprisoned. He declared that he knew the complainants who were also residents of Brgy. San
Roque; Villareal, Samar but did not knew his co-accused Romy, Onyong, and Danny.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 22, 2007, the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33 rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty of piracy under PD 532. The RTC was convinced that the testimonies of Julita and Marwin
positively identifying the appellant as the one who boarded their boat and took away their cargo
through violence or intimidation were credible. The RTC ruled that appellant's denial and alibi could
not prevail over the positive identification made by the victims.

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the accused MAXIMO DE LA PEÑA is
sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA, without [eligibility for] parole,
and to pay the victims the following:

1. ₱49,679.00, total amount lost;

2. ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages;

3. ₱15,000.00 in moral damages;

4. ₱25,000.00 in nominal damages;

5. and to pay the costs.

Let the continued detention of the accused be transferred to the Leyte Regional Prison, as soon as
possible.

Issue an alias order for the arrest of Onyong Reyes, Romy Real and Danny Real, accordingly.

Furnish copies of this decision to [the] PNP station, PNP Regional Office and its Directorate for
operations.4

Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant filed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 16, 2014, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of piracy under PD 532
and held as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2007, convicting
accused-appellant for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without (eligibility for) parole is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION as follows:

a. [₱]30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

b. the award of moral damages, nominal damages, and exemplary damages are deleted; and.

c. interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until such amounts shall have been fully paid.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. 5
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, and after denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, appellant filed
a Notice of Appeal. 6

Issue

The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty of piracy. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of piracy under PD 532. Appellant insists that the RTC erroneously
convicted him since the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows:

Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or pa5sengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by
any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters
shall be considered as piracy. x x x

In his Appellants Brief, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of piracy
under PD 532. He posits that the Information failed to allege the elements of the crime of piracy.
Appellant maintains that the Information did not state that the vessel in question was in Philippine
waters and that its cargo, equipment, or personal belongings of the passengers or complement were
seized.

The Court disagrees.

The Information  charged appellant of the crime of piracy to wit:

7

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less,
along the river bank of Barangay San Roque. Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court; the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7.537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[;]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold] valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* Cash money worth [₱]1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00) to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy. San
Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine
waters''' is defined as follows:

[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting
each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or
dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegal title, including
territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters.

The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of
the passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. It stated, in no uncertain
terms, that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant through force and intimidation.
Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra were part of the vessel's cargo. The Information also stated that
the vessel's equipment which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and
carried away by the appellant. Furthermore, the Information also stated that the personal belongings
of the passengers consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the
appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along
with armed companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and seized control of the same. Armed with
firearms, appellant and his companions tied Jose's hands, covered his head, and operated their
pump boat. They travelled to an island in Samar where they unloaded the sacks of copra.
Thereafter, appellant and his armed companions travelled to another island where the engine,
propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on appellant's boat.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims' pump
boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same and
seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the passengers.

The Court finds no merit in appellant's contention that he was not positively identified by the
prosecution's witnesses. Fron1 the testimony of Julita, she positively identified the appellant as
follows:

Q: Among the three (3) accused, can you recall who particularly pointed and levelled at your
husband with his knife?

A: It was Maximo De la Peña, ma'am

xxxx

Q: Who [among the three (3) accused unloaded the 13 sacks of copra]?

A: The [ones] who unloaded our [copra] were Maximo De la Peña and the person who was guarding
me with a short [fire]arm [whom] I do not know x x x. [T]he other one who was carrying a long
[fire]arm [was] in charge of the engine. 8
The Court finds no reason to doubt the testimony of Julita identifying appellant as one of the
assailants who boarded their vessel and seized its cargo, equipment, and the passengers' personal
belongings. Julita testified that she was able to identify appellant because of the moonlight that
illuminated the area. Further, she testified that she then had a flashlight that allowed her to see who
boarded the vessel. More importantly, Juljta had known the appellant for 16 years since they reside
in the same barangay.  Appellant's bare denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
9

made by Julita. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails
over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."  Since both the RTC
10

and CA found Julita's testimony to be credible and straightfo1ward, the Court thus finds no reason to
disturb the same.

Lastly, appellant argues that the proper penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum: periods and not reclusion perpetua as imposed by the RTC.

Appellant's contention is incorrect, Section 3 of PD 532, provides:

Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein

defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:

a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium ai.1d maximum periods shall be
imposed.  If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof:
1âwphi1

the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape murder or homicide is committed as a

result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of
saving themselves or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companionsboarded the victims’
boat and seized 13 sacks of copra, the boat's engine, propeller tube, and tools, as well as the
contents of Julita’s bag. Hence, from the provision above, the proper imposable penalty should be
death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the Court thus finds. that the penalty imposed by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, was correct since the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was accomplished by
boarding the vessel.

Anent the award of damages, the Court sustains the modification made by the CA in deleting the
amount of ₱49,679.00 as actual damages and instead, awarding Julita temperate damages since
she failed to substantiate her losses with the necessary receipts. As we explained in Tan v. OMC
Carriers. Inc.: 11

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages
there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts.

The award of temperate damages is proper since under .Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperature
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss had been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Likewise, the Court finds the
deletion of nominal damages proper. The CA is correct in holding that temperate and nominal
damages arc incompatible and thus, cannot be granted concurrently. Under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code, nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plafr1tift: which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may he vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Last1y, the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary
damages are also proper for lack of factual and legal basis.

All told, based on the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of both
the RTC and the CA that appellant was guilty of piracy under PD 532.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The December 16, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 finding appellant Maximo De La Peña GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of piracy defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
18 Phil. 573

ARELLANO, C.J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of  First
Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his
possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been
surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth of prepared  opium." The
defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which
was  that  more  than  one crime was charged in the complaint.  The
demurrer was  sustained, as the court found that the complaint contained
two charges, one, for the  unlawful possession of opium, and  the other, for
the unlawful sale of opium, and, in consequence of that ruling, it  ordered
that the fiscal should separate one charge from the other and file a
complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns
only the unlawful possession of opium.  It is registered as No. 375,  in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of 
this court.

The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:

"The evidence,  it  says,  shows that between 11  and  12 o'clock a.  m. on the 
18th of the present month (stated as August 19, 1909), several  persons,
among  them  Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the
port of Cebu  and  internal revuene agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard
the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a
cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the  hold,
another sack  (Exhibit B). The sack referred  to as Exhibit A contained 49
cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained
several cans  of the same substance.   The hold, in which the sack
mentioned in  Exhibit  B was found, was under the defendant's control,
who,  moreover,  freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this
sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B  and  found  in the cabin,
belonged to  him.  The said defendant also  stated,  freely and voluntarily,
that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that,  as his hold
had already been searched several times for  opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack.  Exhibit A."
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as
Exhibits A  and B,  properly constitute the corpus delicti.  Moreover,
another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the  subject
matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of
the department of the  port of Cebu testified that they were found  in the
part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep,  and  that they were
delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said  firemen
after the vessel should have  left the  Philippines, because the firemen and
crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the  instructions he had from the 
Manila custom-house, were permitted to  retain certain amounts of opium,
always  provided it should not be taken ashore.

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus

delicti and important as evidence in this cause.  With  regard to this the 
internal revenue  agent testified as follows:

"Fiscal. What is it?

"Witness. It is a can of opium which was  bought from the defendant by a 

secret service agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the
accused had opium in his possession to sell."
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be
stricken out "because it refers to a sale."  But, with respect to this answer,
the chief of the department of customs had already given this testimony, to
wit:

"Fiscal. Who asked you to search the vessel?

"Witness. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a

party brought him a  sample  of opium and that the same party knew that
there was more opium  on board the steamer,  and the agent  asked that the
vessel  be searched."
The defense moved  that this  testimony be rejected,  on the ground of  its
being hearsay  evidence, and the court only ordered that the  part thereof
"that there  was more opium on board the vessel" be stricken out.

The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles

mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were  found on
board  the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that it was
true that the defendant stated  that  these sacks of opium  were his and that
he had them in his possession.

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant

stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese
interpreter (who afterwards  was not needed,  because the defendant spoke
English), the warden of the jail, and four guards,  that  the opium seized in
the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each
round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of
selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the
15th the vessel  arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he
had tried to sell opium for P16  a can; that he had a contract to sell an 
amount of the value of about P500; that  the opium found in the room of
the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause,  was his, and that he
had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in  his room, which
had already  been searched many times; and that, according  to the
defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium,  and of the
small one, 49, and the total number,  129.

It  was  established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality,
that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the  call
ports of Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for  a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein
did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument,
asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the
defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized.  The court
ruled that  it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime  had been
committed  within its district, on the wharf of Cebu,

The court sentenced the defendant to five years'  imprisonment, to pay a

fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in  case of
insolvency, though  not  to exceed one third of the  principal  penalty, and
to the payment of the costs.  It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of
the Insular Government, of the exhibits  presented in the case,  and that, in
the event of an appeal  being taken or a bond  given, or when the sentence
should have been served, the defendant be not released  from  custody, but
turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of
the existing laws on immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court. The appeal
having  been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the
parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing  of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country,  on account of  such vessel being considered as an
extension of  its  own  nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the  laws of the land, with respect to which,
as  it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only  the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in  the  absence of an agreement  under an  international
treaty.

It is also found: That, even  admitting that the quantity of the drug seized,
the subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear
that, on such account, the two penalties fixed  by the law on the subject,
should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the  imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months
and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all  other  respects the  judgment
appealed from, with the costs of this instance  against the appellant.  So
ordered.

Torres, Mapa,  Johnson,  Carson,  Moreland,  and  Trent, JJ.,  concur.

G.R. No. L-18924             October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and
it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.  1awph!l.net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based
on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief
Justice Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,
and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
 Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
through the proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper
of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the
peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be
easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder
belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and
that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in
the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation
of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in
the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories
of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the
two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any
parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for
the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said
territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on
him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13005        October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Sanz for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty
of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.

The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on
the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu
on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his
possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on
April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned
hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was
the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to
his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?

Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation that
there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither
decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.

In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed down by
the Chief Justice, it is found —

That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty. 1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present instance
is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of
opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the
foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look
Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of
United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution
turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug,
the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel from
which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on
board. In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium
was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no question but what the opium
came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which
may be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:

The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic
Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was
sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.

Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return to an
examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381
begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have
held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the making
entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is
complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028;
Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any
person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty
of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely
carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would
likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his
personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant
intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was
illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any
possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in
transit, a situation not present.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and
the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment
must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 164815               September 3, 2009

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso)
praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision 2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new
one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

The facts are briefly stated as follows:

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession
and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty." 5 Trial on the merits ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio
Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command;
and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp
Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom. 6

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in
Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a
tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial
No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7

Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification 8 that the subject firearm was
not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for
the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located
at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. 10 The raiding team
tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy,
may nakuha akong baril sa loob!" 11

Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding
team was not armed with a search warrant.12

Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt 13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the
subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. 14

On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as
charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was further
ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.

On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.

Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal 20 imploring this Court to once more take a
contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.21

Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on
Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. 22

In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valeroso’s
acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a
boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was
obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that
the subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime,
since he was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt
issued by his superiors.

After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSG’s
position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider. 23

The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second
motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion
of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may
be better served thereby.24

This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case
from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 25 despite the denial of De
Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a
second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded
the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In that case,
we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner
would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not
have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we
set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito
Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution,
the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and
resolve respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral
arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.

Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings
of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.

We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus,
if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always
be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation. 29

Now on the substantive aspect.

The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is different
from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing
Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm
and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding
house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom),
some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.

After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by
Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.

Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement
of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers,
or effects of any individual.30

To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2),
that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."31

The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances
where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations.33

In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above, is
the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?

We answer in the negative.

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and
seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.

We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People
v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 38

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested.42

In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping
with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed
him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of
Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked
cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. 45 With such discovery, Valeroso was
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the
warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be
sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an
"area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him.

The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the
tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former.
But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all
the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. 46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 47 In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within
Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as
an incident to a lawful arrest.48

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."

The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 49

As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification –
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.52

Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they were
supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence
against Valeroso.

Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
against him.1avvphi1

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the
loss of liberty.53

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. 54

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position
of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power. 55

Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. 57

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.

One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic
constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory
powers of the government.58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008
Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016 ]
JERWIN DORADO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on  Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 8, 2014 Decision[1] and the
January 29, 2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33581, which affirmed the July 5,
2010 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, Branch 163 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 127784, finding
accused Jerwin Dorado (Dorado) guilty of the crime of Frustrated Murder.

The Antecedents

Dorado, Julius Ramos (Ramos), Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were charged with the
crime of frustrated murder, defined under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
committed against Ronald Bonion (Ronald) before the RTC. They were also charged with violation of Section 10(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, committed against Raniel Parino (Raniel). These cases were docketed, as Criminal Case Nos. 127784-85. The
respective Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 127784

xxxx

That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another and with Jerwin
Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2) unidentified companions whose true identities
and present whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to kill by means of the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and with the use of an improvised shotgun
(sumpak), a deadly weapon and unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said deadly weapon, one Ronald Bonion y Bozar, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
victim which prevented his death.

Contrary to law.[4]

Criminal Case No. 127785

xxxx

That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another and with Jeffrey
Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2)
unidentified companions whose true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of cruelty upon the person of complainant Raniel Parino, a 15 year old minor
by then and there hurling stones at the latter, which act is prejudicial to the normal growth and development of said
child.

Contrary to law.[5]

On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
Thereafter, the trial ensued.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the victims, Ronald, Ronald's brother, Robert Bonion (Robert), Raniel Parino (Raniel) and
Dr. Ronaldo Artes (Dr. Artes), as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends Raniel, Delon Busar,
Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At
that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and
threw stones and bottles at Ronald's group.

Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid inside to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles.
When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came out of hiding. Dorado's group,
however, was out there waiting for them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at
Ronald's group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell
unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was brought to the Rizal
Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan. He sustained the following injuries:

Xxx Ruptured Globe, OU; S/P Excision of prolapsed Uvea + Repair of Corneal & Scleral laceration, OD; S/P
Enucleation & Evacuation of Foreign body's + Repair of Lower lid margin laceration, OS xxx.[6]

Ronald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at the Rizal Medical Center. As a result of the
shooting incident, Ronald lost his left eye while his right eye could only see some light. Dr. Artes, the operating
surgeon, testified that without medical intervention, Ronald could have died.

Evidence of the Defense

The defense presented the accused Dorado and Ramos; Gloria Confessor and Jessie Confessor, the mother and
brother of accused Confessor; Mark Matuguina; Jeffrey Quijano; Aurin Reyes, and Ofelia Ramos (Ofelia) as its
witnesses, who collectively narrated the following:

On April 15, 2004, between 8:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Dorado was at home watching television
with his siblings and his mother. Suddenly, the barangay tanods arrived and blamed him for the shooting of Ronald.
Dorado denied any participation in the incident and did not go with the tanods. No sumpak was taken from his house.
He also denied that he was a gang member and that he went into hiding.

The witnesses for Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso testified that they were not present in the crime scene when
Ronald was shot.

Ofelia, on the other hand, testified that on April 15, 2004, between 10:00 and 10:30 o'clock in the evening, she was
on her way to see her friend when she noticed five persons running in the opposite direction. Four of them entered an
alley, while one stayed and shot the face of another teenager. She added that she would be able to recognize the
assailant, but it was not Dorado.

The RTC Ruling

On July 5, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision. In Criminal Case No. 127784, the trial court found Dorado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder; while in Criminal Case No. 127785, accused Dorado,
Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso were all acquitted as the crime was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It noted
that their participation in the crime was limited to the throwing of stones and bottles and there was no indication that
they Singled out Ronald as their target. The RTC also acquitted all the accused for the charge of violation of R.A. No.
7610 because the prosecution failed to establish Ronald's minority.

In finding Dorado guilty of frustrated murder, as defined under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
RPC, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was Dorado who shot Ronald
with a sumpak. The trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because of the
following: Dorado's group had an ongoing feud with Ronald's group; when the assault began, Dorado was already
holding a sumpak; after Ronald fled, Dorado waited intently for an opportunity to shoot him; and when Ronald came
out, Dorado shot him on the face. The RTC, nevertheless, appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority in Dorado's favor as he was still a minor at the time of the incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not
entitled to a suspension of sentence because he was above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the
pronouncement of guilt. Thus, it disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, taking all the foregoing into consideration, it is hereby adjudged that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 127784, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, 2nd paragraph,
2nd phrase of the Revised Penal Code and, taking into consideration the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as minimum,
 to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, with all the effects thereof as provided" by law. He is further
ordered to pay the victim Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 by way of moral damages; and to pay
the costs, at the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid. Accused Julius
Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey Confessor and Jayson  Cabiaso  are ACQUITTED  on  ground  of reasonable doubt.

2. In Criminal Case No. 127785, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe, accused Julius Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey
Confessor and Jayson Cabiaso are ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated August 8, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that Dorado committed the
crime of frustrated murder because he had the intent to kill Ronald when he fired his sumpak hitting the portion
between the two eyes of the victim. It noted that Ronald would have died were it not for the timely medical attention.
The appellate court also agreed with the RTC that Dorado's act of waiting for Ronald to come out of
the talipapa, where the latter was hiding, indicated evident premeditation.

The CA did not give credence to Dorado's defense of alibi because his house was merely one block away from
the talipapa. It opined that it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time in question.

Dorado moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated January 29,
2015.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.[8]

Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully appreciated by the Court as there was enough
evidence to support them; that he was at his home at the time of the incident; that defense witness Ofelia testified
that he was not the one who shot Ronald; and that the barangay officials did not find the sumpak  in his possession.

In its Comment,[9] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that Dorado had the intent to kill when he fired
the sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes; that the felony would have caused the death of the victim, were it not
for the timely medical intervention; and that Dorado's defenses of denial and alibi could not overcome the positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses.

In his Reply,[10] Dorado reiterated that his defense was supported by Ofelia's testimony and that the CA committed a
misapprehension of facts when it did not consider his defenses.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Dorado was a minor at the

time of the commission of
the crime

A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of the commission
of the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently stated his minority.[11] For said
reason, he must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as
amended. Even though the said law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for
the benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).[12]

Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to Dorado's minority and how it affected his criminal
responsibility. Thus, the Court deems it proper to lay down the salient provisions of R.A. No. 9344 regarding the
prosecution of a Child In Conflict with the Law (CICL).[13]

One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the minimum age of criminal responsibility, to wjt:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.[14]

In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt from criminal liability:

1. Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and ,

2. Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted without discernment.

Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and shall be subjected to an intervention
program as may be determined by a local social welfare and development officer, pursuant to Section 20 of the said
law.

Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who
acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.[15] Nevertheless, the said child does not
immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-
appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of the CICL without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds provided by law[16] are present, then the CICL
shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before the courts may
proceed.

Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its judgment; rather, it
shall place the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During the
suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are successful, then the court shall discharge the CICL.
Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order execution
of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[17]

In other words, aside from increasing the minimum age of criminal responsibility, R.A. No. 9344 also provides for
alternative measures to address the criminal tendencies of a minor. The law endeavors that a minor should be given
several opportunities to mend his or her ways without resorting to detention and incarceration. A judgment for
conviction shall only be executed if all the alternative measures prove to be ineffective. Indeed, the emphatic policies
of R.A. No. 9344 emulate the right of every child alleged, accused of, adjudged, or recognized, as having infringed
the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, taking
into account the child's age and desirability of promoting his or her reintegration.[18]

The Prosecution did not

determine the discernment
of Dorado at the time of
the commission of the crime

To recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility. During the deliberations for
Senate Bill No. 1402, the following discussions transpired:
Senator Pangilinan: xxx there is no criminal responsibility below 18 and above 15, provided that it can be shown that
the individual did not act with discernment.

The President: Can we have it again?

Senator Pimentel: Yes, Mr. President.

The President: Beyond 15 up to below...

Senator Pangilinan: Up to below 18, yes, Mr. President.

The President: Is there an exemption from criminal liability?

Senator Pangilinan: Provided that the individual did not act with discernment, Mr. President.

The President: So we are actually raising the age to 18?

Senator Pangilinan: Yes, Mr. President. However, if he is above 15 and below 18 and he committed a criminal
offense and it is shown that he acted with discernment, then he is criminally liable.

The President: So that there is no presumption that if he committed a crime when he is 15 and above, that he
has acted with discernment.

Senator Pangilinan: There is no presumption, Mr. President. It has to be shown that discernment was in fact]..

Senator Pimentel: Which means, Mr. President, in actual law practice, that the prosecutor is under obligation to
establish by competent evidence that this accused who is above 15 but below 18 acted with discernment as
a separate circumstance.

Senator Pangilinan: That is correct.

The President: All right.[19] [Emphases supplied]

Based on the above-cited discussion, when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged
with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must
specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime with discernment.

Notably, R.A. Np. 9344 was enacted while Dorado's trial was pending before the RTC. Consequently, Resolution No.
03-2006, dated July 11, 2006, of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Council (JJWC)[20] must apply in the present case. It
established the guidelines for the implementation of the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 9344 and it stated that one
of the duties of the prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was as follows:

4. For above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, with pending case but
released on bail or on recognizance or under detention

•  Trial may proceed for the prosecution to prove discernment.

JJWC Resolution No. 03-2006 is in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 because only those minors above
fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old who acted with discernment may be subjected to criminal prosecution.
Hence, in the present case, the Court must decide whether the prosecution made a determination of discernment on
the part of Dorado during the trial.

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor x x x who commits
an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of
said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial."[21]

"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the
offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong."[22] As earlier stated, the "prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness."[23] In an earlier case, it was
written:

For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it
was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and
after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his
attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.[24]

After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to prove that Dorado,
then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC
decision simply stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be appreciated as
it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether
Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is different from
intent. The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.[25] Thus:

Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first
issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96,
Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the
allegation of "with intent to kill..." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused
is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:

"If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with
discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner
an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action
or constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)

If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense
under Article 265 of the,RPC.

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with
the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.

The word "intent" has been defined as:

"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is
essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intent, p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence
being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC,
in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years
of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong ..." (italics Ours) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to
the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may
be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in .negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of
age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason
behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding
on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts
to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability.[26]" (Emphasis Ours)

Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule with certainty that
Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no presumption of discernment on the part of the
CICL. In the absence of such determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment. This is
in accordance with Section 3 of R.A. No. 9344, to wit:

Section 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. — In case of doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act,
including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with
the law.

Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, he is not excused from the civil liability
that arose from the act.[27] Thus, the Court is tasked to determine the crime committed and the civil liability that results
from it.

Only Frustrated Homicide

was committed as Evident
Premeditation was not
duly proven

The crime of murder is committed when there is an unlawful killing of any person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
and any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the RPC exists. On the other hand, a felony is in its
frustrated stage when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.[28]

The prosecution witnesses positively identified Dorado as the person who shot Ronald between the eyes with
a sumpak. The crime was not consummated as Ronald survived because of the medical assistance provided to him
after he was immediately brought to the hospital by his friends. Dr. Artes testified that without the timely medical
intervention, the shooting of Ronald could have led to his death. Accordingly, the CA and the RTC properly ruled that
the crime committed was at its frustrated stage.

The Court is of the view, however, that the prosecution was unable to establish the element of evident premeditation
to qualify the crime to frustrated murder. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[29] For this aggravating circumstance to be
considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out.[30]

In this case, evident premeditation was not established because, first, the prosecution evidence only referred to the
matters that happened during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by Dorado beforehand to kill
Ronald. There was no evidence on record which would indicate how and when Dorado hatched his plan to kill
Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the beginning of the . altercation does not
unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder Ronald. In order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident
premeditation."[31]

Second, the prosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow
Dorado to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. Raniel simply testified that:

Q: Jerwin Dorado only? Did he had (sic) companions?

A: Also Jeffrey Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, and I don't know the other who came, ma'am.

Q: Can you estimate how many they were?

A: About seven (7) up, ma'am.

Q: When they came, what did you do?

A: We ran because they were armed with sumpak ma'am.
Q: Who was armed with a sumpak?
A: Jerwin Dorado, (witness pointing to accused Jerwin Dorado)

Q: You said you ran, what did you do after you ran?
A: We hid, ma'am.

Q: Where did you hide?

A: We hide (sic) at the back of the talipapa, ma'am.

Q: After you hid, what happened?

A: When we came out, stones were hurled to us and they fired the sumpak to Ronald. [32] [Emphasis supplied]

As can be gleaned above, the prosecution witness did not testify on how long they hid at the back of the talipapa or
how long Dorado's group waited for them to come out. As the lapse of time between the determination until the
execution of the unlawful deed was unclear, it cannot be established that Dorado had sufficient time to reflect on his
actions.

Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he shot Ronald. The RTC observed that there was an
ongoing feud between Dorado's group and Ronald's group.[33] Certainly, Dorado would not have a calm and reflective
mind - from the time Ronald's group hid inside the talipapa market until they moved out of hiding - as he was
obscured by the heat or anger of the moment. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[34]

The OSG itself, in its Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee (With recommendation for reduction of penalty)[35] filed before the CA,
submitted that "the shooting of Ronald was not attended by evident premeditation.[36] For said reason, the crime
committed was only frustrated homicide.

Civil Liabilities

Pursuant to the recent case of People v. Jugueta,[37] the crime of frustrated homicide entails the following awards of
damages: P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. In addition, the damages awarded shall
earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to
the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.

He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald B onion, civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.,

The amounts of damages awarded shall have an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the two houses of Congress for their information and guidance in future
legislation regarding children in conflict with the laws.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 217874, December 05, 2017 ]
OPHELIA HERNAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolution[1] dated February 2, 2015 and Decision[2] dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd
Division which affirmed, with modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting clerk. In September
1984, she was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.[3] As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and
clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she received
were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.[4]

On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash
examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez
came across deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00
and P81,348.20, respectively.[5] Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of
receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found, she and Narag verified all the
reports and other documents turned-over to them by petitioner.[6] On the basis of said findings, Narag sent a letter to
the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the
teller's blotter, Nadelline Oralio, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made by petitioner for the
account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of P11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of
P81,340.20.[7]

Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct
their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of the DOTC
was that made by its Ifugao office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.[8] This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner
informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that
petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's
explanation as to the whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the COA Regional Director
who, in turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any P11,300.00 deposit on September
19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC.[9] Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said amount.
Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against
petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment
for the loss of P11,300.00.[10] Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an
accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount of P11,300.00 which accused received and
collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land Bank of the Philippines-
Baguio City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her
position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment
or negligence, permit other persons to take such amount of P11,300.00 to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits
ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and
Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline
Oralio.[12] In response, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio branch and
personally deposited the exact amount of P11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6) copies.[13] Since there
were many clients who came ahead of her, she decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with
the teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to
Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she
retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on
it. Being contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them in her
vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out that the said amount was not
remitted to the account of the LBP. When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested that she be
allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of
Investigation against some personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina Ngaosi.[14] The complaint, however, was
eventually dismissed.[15]

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of
Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from
7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days
of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P11,300.00.

Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification.

Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the amount of P11,300.00 plus
legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the tiling of the Information up to
the time the same is actually paid.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[16]
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty
imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over
the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a
position lower than Salary Grade 27.[17] Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, then appealed
the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's
judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that
the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties
under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of
P11,300.00 to be restored by the accused.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC,
her counsel was unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said counsel principally failed to
present certain witnesses and documents that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not
formally offered before the court below cannot be considered on appeal.[19]

On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became final and executory and
was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[20] On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Meshack
Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.[21] In
a Resolution[22] dated December 4, 2013, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution
of the judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the
reopening must be before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative
or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
(30) days from the issuance of the order.[23]

Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan's recent Resolution, that the case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of the
Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.[24] In a Resolution dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petition for lack of merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion for reconsideration, which is a
prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those raised
in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied
on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence to present, were already
thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by
petitioner are not on point.[25]

On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT
OF TIME CONSIDERING THE EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
CASE.

II.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED
BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTION FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

III.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD
MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was erroneously sent to said
counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in the
Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her
counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not properly notified of the subject resolution,
the entry of judgment is premature.[26] In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People v. Chavez[27] wherein
We held that an entry of judgment without receipt of the resolution is premature.

Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact
that the odds were against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict application of the rules and
consider remanding the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence.[28] In particular, petitioner seeks the
reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an accountant at the Department of Science and Technology
(Dosn, who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these
pieces of evidence would show that the P11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the
deposit made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is because the
P11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different amounts, which, if proper accounting
procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of
P11,300.00.[29] Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic,
and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.

Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are
considered as a second and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited pleadings. This is because the
additional evidence she seeks to introduce were not available during the trial of her case.

The petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate
remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify
the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.[30] It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[31] If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy
of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[32] Petitioner, in the instant
case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said
court denied her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that
dispose the proceedings completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.

Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for,
specifically: (1) the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 Resolutions denying
her motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of evidence;
and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.[33]

First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly notified of the August 31,
2010 Resolution as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of judgment is premature.
As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of
a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record.[34] It is the duty of the party and
his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform
the court officially of a change in his address.[35] If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of
that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be
expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or
not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably
resides or holds office.[36]

Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in her office address from
Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact that said new
address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to
the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the counsel of a party
changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted having received the subject
resolution "sometime in September or October 2010."[37] Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the same. As
respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the
time of the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already with the PAO.[38] Moreover, the Court
cannot permit petitioner's reliance on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the
Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence on his part.[39] Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject
resolution was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it
necessary to remind litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for
what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their case from
time to time.[40]

To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
Sandiganbayan's November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of the crime of
malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Said resolution became final in the absence of any pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through
her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated December 4, 2013.[41] Undeterred,
petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the
Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2,
2015 Resolution.

It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from the denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration to act upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her urgent motion to reopen. In
fact, her filing of said motion may very well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by
reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the
recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would
not even have inquired about the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to
have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
[42]
 On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny the instant petition.

Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the case is capricious,
despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor
factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order
intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be
terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.[43]

But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction already cripples the motion. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and
executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's
supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present witnesses and documents should have been
advanced before the trial court.[44] It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives
evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered.[45] Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance additional
allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An appellate court will generally not
disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the
evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension
of facts.[46]

Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or
whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to
refute are legally sound and appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the
elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender
is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3)
that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any
public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.[47]

As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense that she, together with her
supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and,
thereafter, had no idea as to where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was
never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in
the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she
could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.[48] Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Court quotes, with approval,
the trial court's ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of P11,300.00 and the corresponding
deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be believed
and then it came out that the said P11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank
and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation because in this latter
situation she permits through her inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And this is still
malversation under Article 217.[49]
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and
should therefore be held liable, as the accused would want to portray, the Court doubts the tenability of that position.
As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use
public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another
person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The accused, by her negligence, simply
created the opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which were not
machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary,
it all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she accepted deposit slips which
were not machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits.[50]
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and
petition for reconsideration are practically second and third motions for reconsideration from its Decision dated
November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those
raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were already thoroughly discussed by the
Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of pleading, courts
are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a
pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court should be guided by its averments.[51] Thus, the fact
that the pleadings filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with
Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the
Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the rules on prohibited
pleadings.

Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust
and inequitable.[52] None of the exceptions is present in this case.

Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a
losing party has the right to tile an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of
the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and
expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.[53]

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner
prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[54] When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line with Section
3(c),[55] Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law
are acted upon by the Court en banc. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An
Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed
Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal
Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of
such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00).

xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the
accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been
reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified
respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused,[56] she
may even apply for probation,[57] as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification,[58] in view of recent
legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known
as the "Probation Law of 1976," As Amended, allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she is
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition
of a probationable penalty.[59]

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits
arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June
26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead,
since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be
imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner.[60] Hence, taking into
consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the
range of the penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision
correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3)
years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in accordance with Article 64[61] of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period
of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional,
as maximum.

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the law are
hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity,
called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable
penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious
mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in
consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing
circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find
application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and
even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the
benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving
his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case,
moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before
the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties
more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties
to be imposed.

Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered
to determine if there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the accused in this particular case and
if there are, to coordinate and communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the
necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2)
For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-
bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old law, their respective counsels are
hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in the RTC or
undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where
the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby
ordered to file the necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime
charged against them based on the penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate
release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The
Rights Of Accused Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial;[62] and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts, are
hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and
Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum
term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First
and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office
of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National
Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information,
guidance, and appropriate action.

Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of Representatives, be
furnished copies of this Decision for their information.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130487               June 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D.  We nullify the proceedings in the
1 

court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.

In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was
charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The
Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO
ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby
causing his death shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic
Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of
the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994.  2

At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office,
filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at
Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently
enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the
crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He
prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said
hospital.  3

The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several
questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him
"intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day.  4

The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellant's
behalf. 
5

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health
Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim;
(2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the
policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's sister.
The prosecution established the following facts:

In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the
close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front
rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards
the center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the
Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who
was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-
appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-
appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this,
Santillan moved away.  6

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac
went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant stared
intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's hand
on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latter's hand. Still no reaction.
Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back,
lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant
went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant
looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!"
(No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac,
wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar.  7

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a
commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-
appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the
altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He
dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police
Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-
appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and
the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant.
The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
waist.  He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
8 

In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few
minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
wound."  He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the
9 

other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1
1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.

2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The edge
of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.

INTERNAL FINDINGS
 Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the
left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.  10

After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was
no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the
victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did
not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.  11

The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused
"pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he "furiously
continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a
holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted;" and the plea of unsound mind had
already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995.  12

On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan
City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was
confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should
remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not
comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up
the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 
13

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He
reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined;
unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail
warden was not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.  14

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence".  Accused-
15 

appellant moved for reconsideration.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-
appellant filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination."
Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail
inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had
been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that
once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste matter and
burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellant's counsel
prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio
General Hospital.  Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was
16 

from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge
informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the
immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant.  The second letter, dated
17 

February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an
association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary and
adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested
that immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 
18

On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the "Demurrer to
Evidence." The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996.  19
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of
Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan,  a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio
20 

General Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and clinical records at the said hospital.  Dr. 21 

Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February
22, 1993 and that he suffered from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia,
paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;"  and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in
22 

improved physical and mental condition.  The medical and clinical records consisted of the
23 

following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del
Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after "a relapse of his
violent behavior;"  (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH;  (3) the consent slip of
24  25 

appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH;  (4) the Patient's Record;  (5) the
26  27 

Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's wife;  (6) the Summary and Discharges of
28 

appellant;  (7) appellant's clinical case history;  (8) the admitting notes;  (9) Physician's Order
29  30  31 

Form;  (10) the Treatment Form/medication sheet;  and (11) Nurses' Notes. 
32  33  34

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer
the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00. 1âwphi1.nêt

The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.  25

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE

CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.

II

THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH
OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY
CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.  36

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by
him.  Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal
37 

liability is human free Will.  Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
38 

between good and evil.  When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
39 

presumed to have been done voluntarily,  i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.  Man,
40  41 

therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.  42
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound
mind  and that all acts are voluntary.  The moral and legal presumption under our law is that
43  44 

freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.  This presumption, however,
45 

may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from
criminal liability.  46

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval.
If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he
shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for
treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not
result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the
accused to a mental institution.  47

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.  The 48 

accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent."  He must be

49 

deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.  50

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence.  And the evidence on this point must
51 

refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.  52

To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence
of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time.  Direct 53 

testimony is not required.  Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as
54 

a defense.  Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can
55 

only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by
outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.  56

In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the
time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the
probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto
Santillan  attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the
57 

trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when
he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the
Bishop's chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in
a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient
provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in
front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the
stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered
words to the faithful which the rational person would have been made. He then returned to the
Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.

Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day of
arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion
for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides:

Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time

thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.

(b) x x x           x x x          x x x

The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering
from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must
suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be
necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full
possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither
comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.  58

The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court.  And the test
59 

to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the
accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as
early as 1917, thus:

In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an

accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not
every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair
trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a
system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not
necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no
advocate but himself.  60

In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time of
the court proceedings is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of
commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is commonly referred to as
"competency to stand trial"  and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal
61 

proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively.  In
62 

competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the
offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand
trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to
stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial.  63

In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to
comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his
counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.  This test is prescribed by state
64 

law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law.  Thus: 65 

[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place,
and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him. 66

There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a
defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to
it.  The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant
67 

must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-
vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings.  68

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than
of the public.  It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to
69 

make a just defense for his life or liberty.  To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict
70 

and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial  and due process of
71 

law;  and this has several reasons underlying it.  For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not
72  73 

be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not
appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a
position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to
effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront
opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the
fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of
a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his
plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to
conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if
the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of
the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is
not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective against an
insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a
comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An
incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of
institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against
one who cannot comprehend its significance.  74

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in
the discretion of the trial court.  Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
75 

circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt"  or a "bona fide doubt"  as to defendant's

76  77 

competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendant's
irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for
mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on
the issue of competency in a particular case.  78

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
of accused's mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions
propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:

x x x           x x x          x x x

It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on
the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where
he was born, he answered, in Tayug.

The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.  79

The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section
12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that "effectively renders [the accused] unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether
accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him. It is also
not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of "not guilty" was not made by
accused-appellant but by the trial court "because of his refusal to plead."  80

The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is
not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellants competency
to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness.

If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of accused-
appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of
accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to
determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge
ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to Confine Accused
for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter by the
new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang
Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters,  the judge ignored the
81 

"Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records are
barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant
to present his evidence.  82

Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a
"lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses.  After accused-
83 

appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a
check-up.  84
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant
was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental
illness."  This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and
85 

still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming
indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and
never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the
judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!

Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination."  The 86 

human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a
large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation.  Thus, an intelligent determination of
87 

an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior.
Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused's abilities may be measured against the
specific demands a trial will make upon him.  88

If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have
served a dual purpose  by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time
89 

of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made
immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the
accused.  The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6)
90 

years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate
appellant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting
circumstance of insanity.  Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant's
91 

competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate, in his trial
meaningfully.

By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair
trial.  The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for
1awphil

this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica,  we
92 

ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a
quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one
(1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three charges and was sentenced to
death. We found that the accused's plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he
was "not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered
that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the
time of commission of the crime.  93

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is
vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination
on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public
1 

funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known
as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for
review under Rule 45.

Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which
pertinently reads:

That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA
and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of
the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for
public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V
of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority,
apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was
found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision dated August 25, 2000
2 

(promulgated on September 27,2000), as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby
acquitted of the crime charged. The cash bond posted by each of the said accused for their
provisional liberty are hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the usual auditing and
accounting procedures.

Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of
three thousand pesos, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
She is further imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period of six (6) years.
She shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the
temporary special disqualification imposed upon her, thus:
Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25, 2000, is hereby amended to the
effect that the penalty of temporary special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and
set aside. Hence, the last paragraph of said decision shall read as follows:

Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three
thousand pesos, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She
shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 3

Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence and
instead opted to mark in evidence the following exhibits:

EXHIBITS   DESCRIPTION
     
"A"   Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of
Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from the
Office of the Special Audit Team, COA, dated May 8, 1992,
consisting of nine (9) pages;
     
"B"   Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of Budget
and Management through Secretary Guillermo N. Carague to
the President of the Sulu State College dated October 30,
1989;
     
"C"   Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the Year
1989;
     
"C-1"   The entry appearing in Exhibit "C" which reads: "Purpose –
release partial funding for the conversion of 34 Secondary
School Teacher positions to Instructor I items; Fund Source –
lump-sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of RA 6688
and the current savings under personal services;"
     
"D"   Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself dated
November 24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages appearing on
pages 225 to 226 of the record;
     
"E"   Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez dated
February 9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b of the
records of this case; and
     
"F"   Prosecution’s Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit "E"
dated February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3) pages,
appearing in pages 383 to 385 of the record. 4

Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of Evidence, and, with the admission
thereof by the court, rested its case.
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4) witnesses, namely, accused
Mahmud Darkis, who was the Administrative Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused
Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same College; appellant Norma Abdulla herself, who was the
College President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the Department of Budget
and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga City.

The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:

The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers to Instructor I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused
Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); that consequent to
the approval of the said request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose
of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers in the amount
of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the "lump sum appropriation authorized on page
370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act January 1 –
December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services of said school (Exhibits `B,’
`C’ and `C-1;’ Exhibit `18,’ pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that
out of the thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers, only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid
salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying
Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled to salary differentials as they were already receiving
the same salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, par. 1; Exhibits `1’ to `6,’ inclusive; Exhibit `14-
A;’ tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 10-11);
and that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00 allotment,
was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits `D’ and `E;’ Exhibits `7’ to
`12,’ inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23,
1998, p. 13).

Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials of only six (6),
out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-
eight (28) were already holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III receiving the salary of
Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and
therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary differentials (tsn,
hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8, 10 and 11). In fact, the notarized audit investigation report
(Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, 1st par.) and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Exhibit `14-a’), also point that said act of the accused is justified.

In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction rendered against her, claiming that
the Sandiganbayan erred:

"I

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL INTENT

DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

II

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE
THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE".

The Court grants the appeal.

So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise
that appellant came all the way to this Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by
the Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no imprisonment at all. And
recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor
of an accused.

In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of murder in People vs. Abujan, the
5 

Court wrote:

We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and we commiserate with her family.
But with seeds of doubt planted in our minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are
unable to accept the lower court’s conclusion to convict appellants. We cannot in conscience accept
the prosecution’s evidence here as sufficient proof required to convict appellants of murder. Hence,
here we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this rule more compelling than in a case involving the
death penalty for a truly humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free than send one
innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare both appellants not guilty and set them
free.

Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape in People vs. De Jesus on ground of
6 

reasonable doubt, to wit:

With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of proceedings on record, we are unable to
accept the lower court’s conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental retardation, she showed
unnecessary dependence on her mother when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching
taints her testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go outside the courtroom
impresses us as significant. We are unable to accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to
convict appellant of rape based on the alleged victim’s sole testimony. Hence, here we must fall
back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the accused.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling,
Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of
the charge of rape on reasonable doubt.

The Court’s faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes upon it the imperative of
closely scrutinizing the prosecution’s evidence to assure itself that no innocent person is condemned
and that conviction flows only from a moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua : 7 

Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every
accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has often happened that at the
commencement of a trial, people’s minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed
sentence against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done should
never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof must be closely examined under the
lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to convict.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.

We shall now assay appellant’s guilt or innocence in the light of the foregoing crucibles.
In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
prove criminal intent on her part. When she raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration
before the Sandiganbayan, that court, invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, ruled in
a Resolution promulgated on September 17, 2001, as follows:
8 

Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation as it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution
failed to prove, attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter.

Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent.’ Hence, dolo may be inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303;
Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935; Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the
Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts
alleged, it is properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal
intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such presumption.’ Further, the same court also ruled
that when the law plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law implies the
guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law which he had
violated (State vs. McBrayer, 98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580;
Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the act is criminal, then criminal intent is
presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).

In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was committed by the
accused under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused
did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent was present when she committed
the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the
accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b],
Rule 131).

The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule
131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.

For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from its
very language that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent
presupposes the commission of an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is presumed when the victim
dies because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya, the Court
9 

held:

The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused proves by
convincing evidence that any of the justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting
circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.

In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs. Delim,  the Court en
10 

banc categorically stated:

If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
(Emphasis supplied).

Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is found in possession of stolen
goods precisely because the taking of another’s property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People
vs. Reyes, the Court held:
11 
Accused-appellant’s contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential
when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be
presumed from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim’s
wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind
him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.

The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of
the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were
entitled to under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar case, the Court reversed a conviction
12 

for technical malversation of one who paid out the wages of laborers:

There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of
laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which
laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources.

In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence
that appellant’s act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was
done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to
prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any
single witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the
documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful
intent on the part of appellant.

Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the defense. The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this
responsibility. And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of an
accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest
on nothing less than moral certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. There must be moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this
required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. 13

The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the
prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from
the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this
Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction.

x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,’ which
expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in
certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a
presumption of criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the
general rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this
presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be
a criminal act In the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum
prohibitum, the mere commission of which makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted without
evil intent.
14

The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of all the
essential elements of the crime of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, which are:

"1. That the offender is a public officer;

"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;

"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;

"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been
appropriated by law or ordinance." 15

Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the
crime charged.  She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part
16 

of savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.

The Court finds merit in appellant’s submission.

As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally
intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose
employment status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation"
authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal
services of said school. 17

The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:

"K.2 Sulu State College

For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, salary standardization, higher

education and secondary education services, including locally-funded project as indicated
hereunder…………………………………………………..…P 17,994,000

New Appropriations, by Function/Project

Current Operating

Expenditures

-----------------------------------

  Personal Maintenance Capital Total

Services and Other Outlays
Operating -----------------
 Expenses
------------------ ----------------- --
-- ----------------- --
--
         
A. Functions        
         
1. General P 1,605,000 P 1,196,000 P P 2,801,000
Administration and
Support Services
         
2. Administration of 608,000     608,000
Personnel Benefits
         
3. Salary 57,000     57,000
Standardization
         
4. Higher Education 1,967,000 577,000   2,544,000
Services
         
5. Secondary 2,636,000 736,000   3,372,000
Education Services
------------------ ----------------- -----------------
Total, Functions 6,873,000 2,509,000   9,382,000
  ------------------ -----------------   -----------------
         
B. Locally-Funded        
Project
         
1. Acquisition and ------------------ ----------------- 8,612,000 8,612,000
Improvements of
Lands, Construction, ----------------- -----------------
Rehabilitation or -
Renovation of
Buildings and
Structures, and
Acquisition of
Equipment
Total New P 6,873,000 P 2,509,000 P 8,612,000 P17,994.000
Appropriations, Sulu
State College ========== ========== ========= ==========
=

xxxxxxxxx

New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures

(In Thousand Pesos)

A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project
 Current Operating Expenditures  
Personal Services  
Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel 4,148
Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency 146
Personnel
Total Salaries and Wages 4,294
Other Compensation
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 185
Cost of Living Allowances 1,292
Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums 44
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 35
Medicare Premiums 18
Merit Increases 20
Salary Standardization 37
Bonuses and Incentives 511
Others 437
   
Total Other Compensation 2,579
O1 Total Personal Services 6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical
malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is
therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use
of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34
secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan that in the absence of a law or
18 

ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of
any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the
use thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on
projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the
DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers
of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of
any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials
only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed decision and resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
appellant ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her. The cash bond posted by appellant for her
provisional liberty, if any, is ordered returned to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting
procedures.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN
URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA ACCUSED.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 dated 19
November 2012 which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and affirmed with
modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No.
13155 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide through
the use of unlicensed firearm.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with Violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
with homicide through the use of an unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
with and abetting one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Isuzu Highlander car, colored Forest Green,
with Plate No. UUT-838 of one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00)
Philippine Currency, owned by and belonging to said MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and consent and to his
damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P500,000.00, and on the occasion of the carnapping, did assault
and use personal violence upon the person of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter with an
unlicensed firearm, a Norinco cal. 9mm Pistol with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on
the head which caused his death.[3]
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against him. His two co-accused
remain at large.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2
Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).

Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's disappearance and discovery of his death.
She narrated that her husband used to drive for hire their Isuzu Highlander with plate number UUT-838 from Pulilan,
Bulacan to the LRT Terminal in Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four o'clock in the morning, her
husband left their house in Pulilan and headed for the terminal at the Pulilan Public Market to ply his usual route.
When her husband did not return home that day, Shirley inquired of his whereabouts from his friends to no avail.
Shirley went to the terminal the following day and the barker there told her that a person had hired their vehicle to go
to Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to call her husband's mobile phone but no one answered. At around 10
o'clock in the morning of 13 November 2002, her husband's co-members in the drivers' association arrived at their
house and thereafter accompanied Shirley to her husband's supposed location. At the Sta.Rosa police station in
Nueva Ecija, Shirley was informed that her husband had passed away. She then took her husband's body home.
[4]
 Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21 November 2002 from the Cabanatuan City Police Station. She then had it
cleaned as it had blood stains and reeked of a foul odor.[5]

SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified concerning the circumstances
surrounding accused-appellant's arrest. He stated that in November 2002, their office received a "flash alarm" from
the Bulacan PNP about an alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color. Thereafter, their office was
informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL Subdivision, Cabanatuan City. Thus, a team conducted
surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set up outside its gate. Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20
November 2002, a vehicle that fit the description of the carnapped vehicle appeared. The officers apprehended the
vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight therefrom. When the officers noticed
the accused-appellant's waist to be bulging of something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered
tucked there. The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with magazine and twelve (12) live ammunitions.
The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of the victim's. Found inside the vehicle were two
(2) plates with the marking "UUT-838" and a passport. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the
back and on its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant and filed a case for illegal possession of firearm
against him. The subject firearm was identified in open court.[6]
Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of his death. He stated that the victim
sustained one (1) gunshot wound in the head, the entrance of which is at the right temporal area exiting at the
opposite side. The victim also had several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose and around the right
eye. He also had blisters on his cheek area which could have been caused by a lighted cigarette.[7]

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed the defense of denial.

Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in October 2002 from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista, an owner-
type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his business. The brothers, however, allegedly delivered instead a green
Isuzu Highlander around half past three o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November 2002. The brothers told accused-
appellant that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment with the remaining undetermined amount to be paid a
week after. Accused-appellant agreed to this, amazed that he had been given a new vehicle at such low price.
Accused-appellant then borrowed money from someone to pay the balance but the brothers never replied to his text
messages. On 16 November 2002, his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to surrender the vehicle as it could be a
"hot car." Accused-appellant was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he
eventually decided to sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back. On 18
November 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the vehicle upon advice by a certain Angie. But when he arrived
home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged that he was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.[8] Accused-appellant also testified that he found
out in jail the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise.[9] On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted
that his real name is "Michael Tapayan y Baguio" and that he used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second
passport in 2001 to be able to return to Taiwan.[10]

The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles), testified that he had known the accused-appellant as Michael
Tapayan when they became neighbors in the AGL subdivision. Accused-appellant also served as his computer
technician. Angeles testified that accused-appellant previously did not own any vehicle until the latter purchased the
Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from the latter's friends in Bulacan. Angeles advised accused-appellant that the
vehicle might have been carnapped due to its very low selling price. Angeles corroborated accused-appellant's
testimony that he did not want to surrender the car at first as he wanted to recover his payment for it.[11]

On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The RTC
anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.[12] It held that the elements of carnapping were proven
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through the recovery of the purportedly carnapped vehicle from the
accused-appellant's possession and by his continued possession thereof even after the lapse of one week from the
commission of the crime.[13] The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Fabian Urzais alias Michael Tapayan y
Lanurias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping as defined and penalized by Republic Act
6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) as amended by R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of unlicensed firearm.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full time of his preventive detention if he agreed
voluntarily and in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant to Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato the sum of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.[14]
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.[15]

On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial court's decision.
The CA noted the absence of eyewitnesses to the crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial evidence was
presented to prove accused-appellant's guilt, solely, accused-appellant's possession of the allegedly carnapped
vehicle.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution[16] dated 12 August 2013, accused-
appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they
so desired. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief[17] while the OSG manifested[18] that it adopts its Brief[19] filed
before the CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.

Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct evidence that he robbed and
murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence consisting
only of the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-appellant decries the appellate court's
error in relying on the disputable presumption created by law under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to
conclude that by virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he is considered the author of both the carnapping of the
vehicle and the killing of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold in the case at bar.

The Court agrees.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence
of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option
but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
against persons, or by using force upon things.[20] By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two
of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life
imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-
vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus,
under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites
of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original
criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[21]

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove all
its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of
accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.[22] Both lower courts solely based
accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the discovery
of his death and the details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had
been carnapped. Theres is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle had
been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial evidence to
sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and
proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.[24]

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence of
possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution
did not offer any iota of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's participation.
In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was discovered to be in possession of the
vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the
vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter testified he was arrested
at home. The following testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa on cross-examination raises even more
questions:
Q: You mentioned the car napping incident, when was that, Mr. witness?

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave his answer, he is looking at a
piece of paper and he is not testifying on his personal knowledge.

xx
xx

COURT:

The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min. now. Fiscal, here is another
witness who has lapses on the mind.

FISCAL MACARAIG:

I am speechless, Your Honor.

WITNESS:

It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the carnapping incident.

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the simple matter when this car
napping incident happened then he is an incompetent witness and we are deprive (sic)
of the right to cross examine him. I move that his testimony would be stricken off from
the record.

xx
xx
Q: Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the accused Fabian Urzais?
A: It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you met the accused is that correct, Mr.
Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002, Mr. Witness?
A: During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL were (sic) the Highlander was often
seen, sir.

Q: So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting this check point at AGL, it is safe to
assume that the carnapping incident happened earlier than November 3, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when this vehicle was car napped, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.

Q: Since you were not present, you have no personal knowledge about this car napping
incident, right, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: No further question, Your Honor.[25]

Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the non-return of the
victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November
2002, as stated by the prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps, the
check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In any event, accused-appellant's
crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps
guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone should lead to a
conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is
downright disturbing.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found
in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case
the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either
unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent
thereto.[26] In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his
unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though
the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the
unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce
evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to
discharge. In contrast to prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused, apprehensive and uncorroborated
testimony accused-appellant unflinchingly testified as follows:
Q: Will you please tell us how you came into possession of this Isuzu Highlander with plate
number UTT 838?
A: That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex Bautista, sir.

xx
xx

Q: Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you that Isuzu Highlander?
A: Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic) them, I ordered an owner type jeep
worth Php60,000 but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu Highlander, sir.

Q: Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?

A: Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a videoke for rent business, sir.

xx
xx

Q: What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky Bautista on that date and time?
A: I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted from an Isuzu Highlander colored
green, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my money is only Php60,000, sir.

Q: What did he told (sic) you?

A: He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will leave the vehicle and when I have the
money next week I will send text message to them, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and the price is low, sir.

xx
xx

Q: Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander that they left to you?
A: When I could not contact them I went to my friend Oscar Angeles and told him about the
vehicle then he told me that you better surrender the vehicle because maybe it is a hot car,
sir. "Nung hindi ko na po sila makontak ay nagpunta ako sa kaibigan kong si Oscar Angeles
at sinabi ko po yung problema tungkol sa sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na
lang at baka hot car yan"[27]

xx
xx

Q: Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are saying is true, immediately on the 16th,
according to your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend, you then decided to
surrender the vehicle, why did you not do it on the 16th, why did you still have to wait until
you get arrested?
A: Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos (Php60,000.00) at that time, and on
how I can take it back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty Thousand (Php60,000.00)
ko nung oras na un ... pano ko po yun mabawi sabi ko".)

xx
xx

Q: So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased a carnapped vehicle, your intention
is to surrender it but you never did that until you get caught in possession of the same, so in
other words, that is all that have actually xxx vehicle was found dead, the body was dumped
somewhere within the vicinity of Sta. Rosa, those are the facts in this case?
A: I only came to know that there was a dead person when I was already in jail, sir.

Q: What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are they correct or not?
A: When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that it was a hot car and I came to know it
only on the 16th, sir.[28]
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by defense witness Angeles who had known accused-
appellant by his real name "Michael Tapayan y Baguio," to wit:
Q: Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle sometime in 2002?
A: At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.

Q: What do you mean when you say at first he has no vehicle?

A: Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.

xx
xx

Q: Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that vehicle?
A: I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00)
Pesos, sir.

Q: What was your reaction when you were told that the vehicle was purchased for only Thirty
Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00)?
A: I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it might be a carnap (sic) vehicle.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you told him that?
A: He thought about it and he is of the belief that the person who sold the vehicle to him will
come back and will get the additional payment, sir.

Q: Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you have any other conversation with
Michael Tapayan concerning that vehicle?
A: After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said vehicle to the authorities because the
persons who sold it to him did not come back for additional payment.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this suggestion?

A: He told me that he will think about it because he was thinking about the money that he
already gave to them.[29]
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's explanation for his possession of the
missing vehicle. The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find
application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions necessarily
require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not be
solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping.
Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the
guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on the
circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley,
the widow, testified that her husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave
testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained. Most glaringly, no connection
had been established between the victim's gunshot wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the
person of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant was
found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony was
true, it does not link accused-appellant to the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it
does not preclude the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista
brothers who have themselves since gone missing.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise
rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional, presumption of
innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[30]

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not
sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by
the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor
is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable
probability.[31]

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes
the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral
certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest
its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[32] The
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[33]

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on the
guilt of accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 November 2012 in C.A. G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y Baguio
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to investigation for
the crime of fencing penalized under Presidential Decree 1612. His immediate release from confinement is hereby
ordered, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 17958             February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros
all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-
lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in
the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the

physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
 If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision   dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in
1

Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not
yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the
sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."   The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a
2

resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for
parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division.  3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision   on the appeal of Custodio
4

Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling
in People vs. Ramos,   the appellate court certified this case to us for review.
5 6

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building.   Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
7

incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales
spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded
to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred.   There they
8

saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom.   The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
9

the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings.   The next10

day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by
a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan,
two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed
of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued
with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior
aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum,
6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic
cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic
cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed
toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid
muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,

proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
palm right.
 11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large
intestine and mysentery coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right,
directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of
the medial border of the right scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of
the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion,
middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE

LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

JESUS
D.
ROJAS,
M.D.
Rural
Health
Physici
an
Ajuy,
Iloilo 
11

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."  12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force.  13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO

GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at
large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent
and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab,
hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached
to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 

14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria   who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
15

Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information,   dated March 3, 1982,
16

naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose
Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy.   His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
17

punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In
his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high.   The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
18

the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified
mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.

By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982,   at 5:00 19

o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo
where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home;   he took a short-
20

cut route.   While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in
21

the evening, he heard cries for help.   Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
22

shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees.   From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
23

stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight.   Huntoria further
24

recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan".   Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his
25

house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife   before he went to sleep.   Huntoria
26 27

explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life.   In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly
28

witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the
victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981.  29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep   in his house which was located
30

some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime   when the incident happened. He asserted
31

that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.  32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:

. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-
39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased,
it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.
 As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria
for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 
33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi.   The appellate court,
34

however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:

Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As
there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements   even gave the date of the
36

commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch   he made of the scene is of
37

little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where
the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue
as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an
additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February
23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the
killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint   four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to
38

have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described
in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the
possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony
and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible
for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas
that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy
report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness.
Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns
in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant

movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

 COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I

only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who
did the stabbing?

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?

A Yes, sir. 39

(Emphasis supplied)

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part
in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of
Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what
act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world."   In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
40

appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
"stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not
whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act
was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the
victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could
not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex
gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not
him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the
five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable,
that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable,
that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in
rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
conviction can not be sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out
to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,  here, the
41

unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity.   If the silence of
42

coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,   the more it
43
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he
allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life
would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused,   why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto
44

and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information,   thus the supposed danger on
45

Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He

admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you
saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.
46

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land
to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and
means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the
entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981.   Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he
47

was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family.   Given all the
48

foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the
least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of
their 65-year old   father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
49

was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime,   we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
50

aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,   under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant
51

case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as
exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 
52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152133             February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie
Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306,
dated 29 August 2001,1 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of
Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, 2 finding petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –

That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion
of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.

Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released 5 after posting sufficient
bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide charged against him.7

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B.
Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre
when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with
two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to
their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the
latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus,
upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan
then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left
side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back.
Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already
holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano
accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the
pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00
noon, and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen. 8

Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By
nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and
his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a
piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later
vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and
shortly thereafter, he died.9

Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report 10 and Certification of
Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.

Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-
Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the
body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996, 12 after which, he reported the following
findings –

Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants
placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.

Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.

Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.

Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].

Laceration, spleen.

Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.

Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.

xxxx

CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.

In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy
report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of
the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed
the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan. 13

To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the
accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.

According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his
house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when
they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and
punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter
refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he
was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten
meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the
enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim
Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim
Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police
authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre.
Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and,
instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14

Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan
maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning
incident.15

On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision, 16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –

It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his
companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the
victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael
was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the
victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held
criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the
spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)

One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely
because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).

The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and
to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as
compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by
the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –

The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim
was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not
deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the
impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the
laceration of the victim’s spleen.

This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal
Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…

The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was
not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the
contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and
correctness of her findings.

Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.

Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of
the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch
46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby
AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, 18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had
already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.

Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1)
the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals,
dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal
of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.

Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings
on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of
petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –

x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip
Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second
government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the
cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and
with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other
materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of
the petitioner.

As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar,
it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to
acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981). 19

In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a
moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does
not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error. 20

In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner
Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.

Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of
prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence
against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and
consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was
hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.

It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness,
whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense
itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient
knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine
germane to the issues involved in a case.22

Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, 23 and although it does not necessarily bind
the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and
probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having
performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death
of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With
no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the
autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be
seriously considered by this Court.

Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the
victim Cantre.

One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries 24 in the following manner –

The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of
the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs,
especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.

The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the
two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to
trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing
direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as
well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas
are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in
the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-
stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).

As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –

The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the
crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its
upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of
its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.

Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people
without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived
therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area.
The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper
triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are
vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from
the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-
mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured
or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen
cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The
laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which
qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –

Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most

frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage.
Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and
blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x

The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could
rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even
without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the
victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration
of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not
necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim
Cantre were fatal.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause
of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate
cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."27

The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre, had
adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between
the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition
of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and
Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by
the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of
backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than
being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have
been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.

Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury
sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem
report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre,
can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s
post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food
poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for
the following reasons –

First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the
death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the
cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-
mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no
showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that
the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to
the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.

Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which she had explained her
findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –

05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?

A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.

06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B.
CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I
stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I
didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that
an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.

07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?

A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and
from the police investigation.

08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the
cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?

A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the
abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting
inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.

09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?

A: On the left portion of his back, sir.

10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his
SPLEEN could be injured?

A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.

In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy
of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –

Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in
this case?

A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.

Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?

A Yes, sir.

Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters
did you do in connection therewith?

A We examined the internal organs.

Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?

A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.

xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury
of the abdomen?

A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes of death
as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the
injury was at the abdomen of the victim.

Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is
located?

A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.

Q What particular organ are you referring to?

A The spleen, sir.

The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the
victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the
cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by
Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.

Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included
in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the
presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced. 32 As this Court
already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –

The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute,
contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the
exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of
them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the
non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would
not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were
not presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the
adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is
not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their
testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance,
by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.

It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps
believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from
calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court
as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and
affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his
lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the
determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been
convicted for.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender –

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this
Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as
rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence –

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the
view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless
imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely
overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.

It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one
hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as
the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano
were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and
his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on
record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not
establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan. 1avvphil.net

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it
was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and
companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was
swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this
Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and
with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only
15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have
hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the
victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The
stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a
road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery
on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the
stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter
also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief
scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a
retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked
attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the
victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of
the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with
the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this
Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and
smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the
victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a
stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his
own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with
such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with
malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore,
retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a
maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12219            March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.

Alejo Mabanag for appellant.

G. E. Campbell for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum
of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.
From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant
from liability the plaintiff has appealed.

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on
the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the
plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to
the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right
to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left
hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident
occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge
was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the
bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side;
but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while
the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of
the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this,
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of
horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye
of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under
these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps
be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part
of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce
the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The
defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed
upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road
bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and
broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had
dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment
of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in
front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its
negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the
damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be
seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the
company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one
now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective
parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to
say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of
the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the
court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question
occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace
charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed.
Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for
the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from
negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of
the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the
plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-6641             July 28, 1955

FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.

Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Pedro S. David for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for
respondents.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal
complaint against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said
municipality charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence, the
value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that,
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed on the accused
would be a fine or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by
the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice
of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of First
Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.

Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:

Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:

Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.

Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:

(6) Malicious mischief;.

In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86
Phil., 596; and Natividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in
Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the
peace and judges of the municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first
instance, when the penalty to be imposed is more than six months imprisonment or a fine of more
than P200.00.

The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or
imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125.

We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court
has jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has
jurisdiction over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of
the latter. This assumption is not legally warranted.

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:

ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause
to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding
chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief.

It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the
general intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he
should act under the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho
concurra animo especifico de dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of
Tribunal Supreme of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921).

El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho

dañoso y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar.
Si no existe semejante animo el hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon, p.870-871).

The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the
requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender
"shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the
next preceding chapter", i.e., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things,
malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence)
and malice ( or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in
its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized
that this crime is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or negligence.

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not
be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict
technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property".
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.

It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of
malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our
conclusion is that "malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has
exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised
Penal Code, and to no other offense.

A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87
of the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at
offenses punishable with not more than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00
or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act added eight (8) specific exceptions in the
form of felonies triable in said courts without reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious
mischief is one of these exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of
them.

For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies
exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978

MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Diosdado Bacolod for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, for respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental and
imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight physical injuries.

The background facts as found by the trial court as follows:

In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom
to go to the principal's office. While the teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma
Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while
leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a fourth classmate,
Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble
on it and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and
her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room.
She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just
taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was
using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the following
injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:

1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four
inches in length and 1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two
on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right thigh.
 The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (Pages 26-
27, Record.)

Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting
her of the crime of slight physical injuries. She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to
discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so. She contends
she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in this pose by the Solicitor General,
who recommends her acquittal, coupled with the observation that although "petitioner is not
criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held accountable for her conduct administratively.

We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises substitute
parental authority over the students. (Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article
352, "The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind
of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools
Service Manual enjoins:

The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils

about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and
unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for bad conduct,
holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions
tending to destroy the pupil's self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of
personal effects of pupils are forbidden.

In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no teacher may
impose corporal punishment upon any student in any case. But We are not concerned in this appeal
with the possible administrative liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to pass on her
civil liability other than what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be the
outcome hereof. The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal relates exclusively to her criminal
responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of
the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in the courts below.

In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did
not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer,
in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that
she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and
somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the means she
actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches
long and ¼ cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show,
to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did
not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit
any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of corporal
punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of
the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before
the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by
complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as
she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within
her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the
degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is
not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine.

Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary measures that may be
employed by teachers under Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted
above, We feel it is wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities.

After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes
necessary for conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to
acquittal. ,

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being
dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting exdelicto.

Castro, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Santos, JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.

Separate Opinions

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends on her
ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the
punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature that the parent of the
child might expect the child would receive if she did wrong.

AQUINO, J., concurring:

The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined administratively. In People vs.
Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and
Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not
criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B. 160. (Justice
Torres dissented.)

FERNANDO, J, dissenting:

I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar not
only in view of the humanity that should permeate the law but also in accordance with the tendency
much more manifest of late in international law to accord greater and greater protection to the
welfare of the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the
doctrine parens patriae calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to assure that teachers and
educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of
the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the
nature and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v. Cagoco,   where the accused approached the victim
1

from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on the back part of his head causing him to fall
backwards, his head striking the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later
comes to mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there was alevosia,
although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so great
a wrong as that inflicted. 
2

Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the judgment
of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries
requiring four to six days' healing time inflicted upon the victim.

I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the offense of
slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"(T)he relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government,
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the Heart and mind
of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those
who exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual further categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking,
or pushing pupils about)."

It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis may,
without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate
punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively, in the parents.

The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as
having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provisions of law she may not be
absolved of the proven charge.

The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the degree
of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for
Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws and rules
which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their
pupils but provide for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts,
which as pointed out by Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted by petitioner
on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate" (even assuming that teachers had the
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment).

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The facts in this case are as follows.

Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girl-classmate,
causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in charge who just
then came back, the erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry and,
with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs with such violence as
to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The
medical certificate described the injuries thus:

1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four
inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width. There are three on the right leg and 2
on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right thigh.

The above lesions, if without complications, may heal in four to six days (page 2.
Brief of Solicitor General).

Convicted by the municipal court for slight physical injuries, the accused appealed to the Court of
First Instance, which affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.

The Solicitor General recommends the reversal of the decision of the court below. Accordingly, the
majority returns a judgment of acquittal.

WE dissent.

Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General practically argues that a
good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal
liability.

Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which may prompt or induce a
person to perform the act constituting a crime (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result,
as distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result
(People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The foregoing distinction
has gained wide acceptance among our criminal law commentators (see Francisco, The Revised
Penal Code, Annotated and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38; Reyes, the Revised Penal
Code, Criminal Law, 6th ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law
Review, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means" employed — the overt acts
committed by a person — motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed. One motive can give rise
to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated
by one of several possible motives, good or bad. That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful
motive is presumed from the proof of commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such presumption, if
there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is to the prohibited overt act, it is not
essential to the determination of a crime.

Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved a
person to commit an act. This finds excellent example in the case at bar. While the accused stoutly
asserts that her motive was to discipline the child, The trial court and the lower appellate court hold
differently. Their unanimous finding is that the accused committed the act in the heat of anger — a
state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance expresses its
findings thus —

It appears that ... (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered the room and asked
Wilma what had happened. Wilma answered that she had nothing to do with the
failing down of Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma purposely
blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the floor. The accused became
angry and whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).

xxx xxx xxx

From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta Guirigay was
passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly raised her leg and Benedicta
stumbled on it and fell to the floor. She fainted and suffered some injuries. The
accused became very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using as a
pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times, thereby causing on Wilma the
physical injuries described by Dr. Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4;
Emphasis supplied).

In the same manner, the municipal court finds that —

... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away by
her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really
apt for the purpose. The victim of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay
a working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...

The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as found by the trial court, has
been living with (and working for) the accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?

But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean that criminal intent on
her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier
intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his
motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y.
1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255;
252 App. Div. 463). A classic example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law
although the motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father drowns
his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide though he was
actuated by a good motive — love for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also
U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The
father or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the rape. to
avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping father,
who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother from so much misery, does
not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from
doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands
liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a
child, is less serious than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less
serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad
infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally,
on their seriousness.

II
The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused is not unlawful.
"Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is not so defined as felony by the Revised
Penal Code."

But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code categorized it under the
more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The pertinent provision is stated as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering punishment, it would still be
punished as an illtreatment by deed under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.

From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear: (1) the teacher beat the
child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused physical injuries on the child, consisting
of linear bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt,
constitutes the very offense penalized by the cited provision.

Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is
necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused), freely and deliberately executed, the moral
and injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary"
(People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v. Abando, 2
CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).

In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing the child as the latter's
teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful
exercise of a right under paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows from the civil law
concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by teachers over their pupils. The argument is
that since under Article 349 of the Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and
under Article 316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them moderately, it
follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils under their charge. And if parents, in the
exercise of their authority, can inflict corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their
pupils.

The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient children must be
conceded as it is necessary to the government of families, and to the good order of society.
However, this right was not meant to be a license for manhandling or physically chastising a
misbehaving child. At the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard
for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be carried (Johnson v.
State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of
the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law provides for 'moderate' punishment. Since
modern educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this would be a good
test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to correct and punish their children
moderately. Parents should never exceed the limits of prudence and human sentiments in
proceeding against their children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and
Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez Roman 1140;
Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1901).

This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to correct
and to punish children moderately should be understood as not including corporal or physical
punishment, for otherwise it will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the
provision of the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).

The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children bear towards their
parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have over their children, should give parents
enough force to maintain the prestige of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords
parents recourse to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of disrespect or
disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of parents. This law is a strong
suggestion that parents are not to take the law in their hands. In our republican set-up, even the
government of families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.

Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the cloak
of the parental privilege, "treat their children with excessive harshness" which is a cause for
deprivation or suspension of their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p.
5368). The procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court, which
includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the parents "unlawfully beat or
otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.

Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be observed that our
general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents (much less teachers) from criminal liability
for bodily harm inflicted on children or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession
given to the parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case of serious
physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the circumstance of relationship shall not
be considered for the purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer
only the ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended party within the
specified degrees.

Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred on
parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly,
defined in law. The very chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental
authority explicitly denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent provision
of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student, are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student (emphasis supplied).
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations promulgated pursuant to
law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as
follows:

Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel
and unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third Revision, 1959 ed.).

Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to clean the room or mow
the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although these penalties do not involve physical injury.
Neither can the teacher order the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or
humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that his conduct is
reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold the power to apply corporal
punishment as a legitimate means of correction?

In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child several times with a
bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused could
not have meant to give expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the
punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it was plainly and simply
excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could have done under the circumstances was to
admonish the child, if she was certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to
the parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured child could have
reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the institution of the proper criminal charges
or could have sued the parents of the erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these
available courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the process,
arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.

From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the acts of the teacher. The
acts committed are not only unauthorized even under the concept of the substitute parental authority
behind which the accused seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly
forbidden to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather, acted
forgetting that she was a teacher.

Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered on "parts of the body
which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But precisely, the teacher stands accused only of
slight physical injuries.

The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People versus
Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public elementary
school has authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been
expressly revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 and
Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in
the Javier case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was
because the Court of Appeals

cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that caused the serious injury.
An equally strong probability is that it was caused by the other boys during their
boxing game. As a matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the
prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must have been caused by a
hard and blunt instrument.' We are constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt,
 We are inclined to believe appellant's theory that the incident was magnified in order
to find cause for removing him from the teaching staff of Quinalabasa for reasons
appearing uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in the barrio
because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty of extracurricular work in
school, ... . There was also the desire of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the marriage
of Hilaria Bagaoisan, mother of Bravo, to put his niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a
temporary teacher in another place, in appellant's stead. That the barrio People
desired to appellant dismissed as a school teacher was also testified to by Elpidio
Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th Supp. p. 152, Emphasis supplied).

It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was not
demonstrated beyond moral certainty. Consequently, the additional reason that the teacher has the
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment was purely obiter dictum, as it was not necessary to
a finding of acquittal.

Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate court laid down limitations on the exercise of such
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict any bodily
harm and that he is not dictated by any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-154). In the
case at bar, appellant caused bodily harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to give vent to her
anger as a measure of revenge for the injury caused by the erring pupil on another pupil, appellant's
ward and househelper.

The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Javier case is further weakened by the dissenting
opinion of Justice Torres, which dissent proclaims most accurately the present policy. "The age
when corporal punishment was the basic factor of discipline in the schools has passed, and a
teacher who has to resort to violence to enforce discipline among his pupils, not only forfeits his right
to be their mentor, but practically confesses his inability and utter failure to act as such, in which
case he should choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G. 18th Supp. 159).

The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing
the 1940 case of People versus Javier, supra) in further stating that the authority to inflict moderate
corporal punishment without causing any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the position of a
teacher, especially in the grade schools, is a competent of that old adage — 'spare the rod and spoil
the child', not only failed to consider the prohibition against the infliction of such corporal punishment
of any degree whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil, correctly expressed in Article 352 of the
New Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of
Public Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the said case involves assault by the appellant
Padua against the teacher for allegedly slapping the head of her niece with a notebook, for which
reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for assault upon a person in authority and was accordingly
convicted by the court of first instance, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
worthy to note that in said case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals found in the Padua case
that the appellant was infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping her niece, it did not consider
said anger of the appellant as a mitigating circumstance.

It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the Court of Appeals, whose
opinion on questions of law is not binding on the Supreme Court.

The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and punish
moderately" an erring child, does not include the infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the
power "to discipline the child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character" under
Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth Welfare Code.
Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If the law intended to authorize the
parent to inflict such moderate corporal punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done
in the statutes of Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time Magazine
(July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.

The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does not include all the rights
comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the
teacher cannot demand support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher
is not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil to inherit from him or
even to educate the child at his own expense.

The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the liability of
the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts the parent from the special aggravating
circumstances mentioned in the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise
Penal Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement,"
does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of
the special aggravating circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.

No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent on
the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the most
hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as a form of punishment in penal institutions. So
must it be in schools. Respect for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children
when teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to make him
remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery was fashionable and instruments
of torture were symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the
child" had been deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code
and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools.

Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental convicting her of slight physical injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty (P50.00)
Pesos.

It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece of
bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma Alcantara inflicting upon her the following injuries:

1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four
inches in length and ¼ centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two
on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right thigh.

The above lesions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (page 2,
Majority Opinion)
Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any criminal intent because
she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay
causing the latter to stumble and fall down.

The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor General sets aside the
conviction and acquits petitioner, holding, inter alia:

. . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case
before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the
trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries
suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears
is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief that as a teacher exercising authority
over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for
purposes of discipline. ... (pp. 3-4, Majority Opinion)

I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following reasons:

The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is punishable by law.   Every
1

felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary with all three elements present, to wit: freedom,
intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault (culpa).   Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or
2

threat;   intelligence, by insanity or infancy;   intent, by proof of mistake of fact, performance of duty,
3 4

or the like.
5

The issue now is: was there malice or criminal intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on
Wilma?

The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner as
one committed by a teacher exercising authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the Civil Code.

Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among the persons exercising substitute parental authority
while Art. 350 states that the latter shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of a child.
However, by the very provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a condition that as to the relations
between teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced

The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art. 352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the
use of corporal punishment by teachers is forbidden.

It is contended in the Opinion that the above provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and
administrative liabilities of petitioner are concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the law on
substitute parental authority under which the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is justified, expressly
prohibits the use of corporal punishment by teachers in their relations with their pupils.

But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by
protestation of good faith and honest belief of petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for
the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that
petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of anger"   because Benedicta
6

Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of
the accused (petitioner now) for several years."  7
In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege Benedicta, motivated
petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.

Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did was to impose a
"moderate penalty" on Wilma.

Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with such vehemence and
force as to produce not one or two but seven linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right
thigh which according to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting
physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline was
necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of bodily punishment which would leave
injuries on the person of the recalcitrant pupil.

Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.

Separate Opinions

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends on her
ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the
punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature that the parent of the
child might expect the child would receive if she did wrong.

AQUINO, J., concurring:

The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined administratively. In People vs.
Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and
Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not
criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B. 160. (Justice
Torres dissented.)

FERNANDO, J, dissenting:

I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar not
only in view of the humanity that should permeate the law but also in accordance with the tendency
much more manifest of late in international law to accord greater and greater protection to the
welfare of the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the
doctrine parens patriae calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to assure that teachers and
educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of
the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the
nature and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v. Cagoco,   where the accused approached the victim
1

from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on the back part of his head causing him to fall
backwards, his head striking the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later
comes to mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there was alevosia,
although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so great
a wrong as that inflicted. 
2

Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the judgment
of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries
requiring four to six days' healing time inflicted upon the victim.

I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the offense of
slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"(T)he relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government,
regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the Heart and mind
of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those
who exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual further categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking,
or pushing pupils about)."

It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis may,
without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate
punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively, in the parents.

The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as
having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provisions of law she may not be
absolved of the proven charge.

The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the degree
of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for
Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws and rules
which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their
pupils but provide for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts,
which as pointed out by Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted by petitioner
on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate" (even assuming that teachers had the
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment).

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The facts in this case are as follows.

Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girl-classmate,
causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in charge who just
then came back, the erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry and,
with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs with such violence as
to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The
medical certificate described the injuries thus:
 1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four
inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width. There are three on the right leg and 2
on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right thigh.

The above lesions, if without complications, may heal in four to six days (page 2.
Brief of Solicitor General).

Convicted by the municipal court for slight physical injuries, the accused appealed to the Court of
First Instance, which affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.

The Solicitor General recommends the reversal of the decision of the court below. Accordingly, the
majority returns a judgment of acquittal.

WE dissent.

Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General practically argues that a
good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal
liability.

Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which may prompt or induce a
person to perform the act constituting a crime (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result,
as distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result
(People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The foregoing distinction
has gained wide acceptance among our criminal law commentators (see Francisco, The Revised
Penal Code, Annotated and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38; Reyes, the Revised Penal
Code, Criminal Law, 6th ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law
Review, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means" employed — the overt acts
committed by a person — motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed. One motive can give rise
to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated
by one of several possible motives, good or bad. That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful
motive is presumed from the proof of commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such presumption, if
there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is to the prohibited overt act, it is not
essential to the determination of a crime.

Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved a
person to commit an act. This finds excellent example in the case at bar. While the accused stoutly
asserts that her motive was to discipline the child, The trial court and the lower appellate court hold
differently. Their unanimous finding is that the accused committed the act in the heat of anger — a
state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance expresses its
findings thus —

It appears that ... (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered the room and asked
Wilma what had happened. Wilma answered that she had nothing to do with the
failing down of Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma purposely
 blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the floor. The accused became
angry and whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).

xxx xxx xxx

From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta Guirigay was
passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly raised her leg and Benedicta
stumbled on it and fell to the floor. She fainted and suffered some injuries. The
accused became very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using as a
pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times, thereby causing on Wilma the
physical injuries described by Dr. Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4;
Emphasis supplied).

In the same manner, the municipal court finds that —

... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away by
her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really
apt for the purpose. The victim of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay
a working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...

The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as found by the trial court, has
been living with (and working for) the accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?

But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean that criminal intent on
her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier
intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his
motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y.
1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255;
252 App. Div. 463). A classic example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law
although the motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father drowns
his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide though he was
actuated by a good motive — love for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also
U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The
father or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the rape. to
avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping father,
who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother from so much misery, does
not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from
doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands
liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a
child, is less serious than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less
serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad
infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally,
on their seriousness.

II

The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused is not unlawful.
"Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is not so defined as felony by the Revised
Penal Code."
But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code categorized it under the
more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The pertinent provision is stated as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering punishment, it would still be
punished as an illtreatment by deed under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.

From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear: (1) the teacher beat the
child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused physical injuries on the child, consisting
of linear bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt,
constitutes the very offense penalized by the cited provision.

Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is
necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused), freely and deliberately executed, the moral
and injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary"
(People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v. Abando, 2
CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).

In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing the child as the latter's
teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful
exercise of a right under paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows from the civil law
concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by teachers over their pupils. The argument is
that since under Article 349 of the Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and
under Article 316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them moderately, it
follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils under their charge. And if parents, in the
exercise of their authority, can inflict corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their
pupils.

The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient children must be
conceded as it is necessary to the government of families, and to the good order of society.
However, this right was not meant to be a license for manhandling or physically chastising a
misbehaving child. At the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard
for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be carried (Johnson v.
State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of
the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law provides for 'moderate' punishment. Since
modern educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this would be a good
test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to correct and punish their children
moderately. Parents should never exceed the limits of prudence and human sentiments in
proceeding against their children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and
Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez Roman 1140;
Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1901).

This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to correct
and to punish children moderately should be understood as not including corporal or physical
punishment, for otherwise it will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the
provision of the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).

The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children bear towards their
parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have over their children, should give parents
enough force to maintain the prestige of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords
parents recourse to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of disrespect or
disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of parents. This law is a strong
suggestion that parents are not to take the law in their hands. In our republican set-up, even the
government of families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.

Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the cloak
of the parental privilege, "treat their children with excessive harshness" which is a cause for
deprivation or suspension of their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p.
5368). The procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court, which
includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the parents "unlawfully beat or
otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.

Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be observed that our
general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents (much less teachers) from criminal liability
for bodily harm inflicted on children or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession
given to the parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case of serious
physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the circumstance of relationship shall not
be considered for the purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer
only the ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended party within the
specified degrees.

Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred on
parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly,
defined in law. The very chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental
authority explicitly denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent provision
of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student, are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student (emphasis supplied).

Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations promulgated pursuant to

law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as
follows:
 Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel
and unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third Revision, 1959 ed.).

Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to clean the room or mow
the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although these penalties do not involve physical injury.
Neither can the teacher order the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or
humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that his conduct is
reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold the power to apply corporal
punishment as a legitimate means of correction?

In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child several times with a
bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused could
not have meant to give expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the
punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it was plainly and simply
excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could have done under the circumstances was to
admonish the child, if she was certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to
the parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured child could have
reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the institution of the proper criminal charges
or could have sued the parents of the erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these
available courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the process,
arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.

From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the acts of the teacher. The
acts committed are not only unauthorized even under the concept of the substitute parental authority
behind which the accused seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly
forbidden to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather, acted
forgetting that she was a teacher.

Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered on "parts of the body
which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But precisely, the teacher stands accused only of
slight physical injuries.

The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People versus
Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public elementary
school has authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been
expressly revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 and
Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in
the Javier case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was
because the Court of Appeals

cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that caused the serious injury.
An equally strong probability is that it was caused by the other boys during their
boxing game. As a matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the
prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must have been caused by a
hard and blunt instrument.' We are constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt,

We are inclined to believe appellant's theory that the incident was magnified in order
to find cause for removing him from the teaching staff of Quinalabasa for reasons
appearing uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in the barrio
because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty of extracurricular work in
school, ... . There was also the desire of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the marriage
 of Hilaria Bagaoisan, mother of Bravo, to put his niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a
temporary teacher in another place, in appellant's stead. That the barrio People
desired to appellant dismissed as a school teacher was also testified to by Elpidio
Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th Supp. p. 152, Emphasis supplied).

It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was not
demonstrated beyond moral certainty. Consequently, the additional reason that the teacher has the
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment was purely obiter dictum, as it was not necessary to
a finding of acquittal.

Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate court laid down limitations on the exercise of such
authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict any bodily
harm and that he is not dictated by any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-154). In the
case at bar, appellant caused bodily harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to give vent to her
anger as a measure of revenge for the injury caused by the erring pupil on another pupil, appellant's
ward and househelper.

The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Javier case is further weakened by the dissenting
opinion of Justice Torres, which dissent proclaims most accurately the present policy. "The age
when corporal punishment was the basic factor of discipline in the schools has passed, and a
teacher who has to resort to violence to enforce discipline among his pupils, not only forfeits his right
to be their mentor, but practically confesses his inability and utter failure to act as such, in which
case he should choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G. 18th Supp. 159).

The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing
the 1940 case of People versus Javier, supra) in further stating that the authority to inflict moderate
corporal punishment without causing any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the position of a
teacher, especially in the grade schools, is a competent of that old adage — 'spare the rod and spoil
the child', not only failed to consider the prohibition against the infliction of such corporal punishment
of any degree whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil, correctly expressed in Article 352 of the
New Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of
Public Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the said case involves assault by the appellant
Padua against the teacher for allegedly slapping the head of her niece with a notebook, for which
reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for assault upon a person in authority and was accordingly
convicted by the court of first instance, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
worthy to note that in said case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals found in the Padua case
that the appellant was infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping her niece, it did not consider
said anger of the appellant as a mitigating circumstance.

It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the Court of Appeals, whose
opinion on questions of law is not binding on the Supreme Court.

The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and punish
moderately" an erring child, does not include the infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the
power "to discipline the child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character" under
Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth Welfare Code.
Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If the law intended to authorize the
parent to inflict such moderate corporal punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done
in the statutes of Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time Magazine
(July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.
The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does not include all the rights
comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the
teacher cannot demand support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher
is not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil to inherit from him or
even to educate the child at his own expense.

The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the liability of
the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts the parent from the special aggravating
circumstances mentioned in the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise
Penal Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement,"
does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of
the special aggravating circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.

No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent on
the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the most
hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as a form of punishment in penal institutions. So
must it be in schools. Respect for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children
when teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to make him
remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery was fashionable and instruments
of torture were symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the
child" had been deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code
and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools.

Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental convicting her of slight physical injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty (P50.00)
Pesos.

It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece of
bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma Alcantara inflicting upon her the following injuries:

1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four
inches in length and ¼ centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two
on the left leg.

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right thigh.

The above lesions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (page 2,
Majority Opinion)

Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any criminal intent because
she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay
causing the latter to stumble and fall down.
The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor General sets aside the
conviction and acquits petitioner, holding, inter alia:

. . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case
before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the
trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries
suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears
is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief that as a teacher exercising authority
over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for
purposes of discipline. ... (pp. 3-4, Majority Opinion)

I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following reasons:

The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is punishable by law.   Every
1

felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary with all three elements present, to wit: freedom,
intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault (culpa).   Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or
2

threat;   intelligence, by insanity or infancy;   intent, by proof of mistake of fact, performance of duty,
3 4

or the like.
5

The issue now is: was there malice or criminal intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on
Wilma?

The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner as
one committed by a teacher exercising authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the Civil Code.

Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among the persons exercising substitute parental authority
while Art. 350 states that the latter shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of a child.
However, by the very provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a condition that as to the relations
between teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced

The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art. 352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the
use of corporal punishment by teachers is forbidden.

It is contended in the Opinion that the above provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and
administrative liabilities of petitioner are concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the law on
substitute parental authority under which the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is justified, expressly
prohibits the use of corporal punishment by teachers in their relations with their pupils.

But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by
protestation of good faith and honest belief of petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for
the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that
petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of anger"   because Benedicta
6

Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of
the accused (petitioner now) for several years."  7

In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege Benedicta, motivated
petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.

Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did was to impose a
"moderate penalty" on Wilma.
Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with such vehemence and
force as to produce not one or two but seven linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right
thigh which according to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting
physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline was
necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of bodily punishment which would leave
injuries on the person of the recalcitrant pupil.

Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.

G.R. No. 126921 August 28, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE MORENO y CASTOR, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Evidence of overwhelming physical force is not necessary to sustain a conviction for the rape of an
imbecile. When the victim is a retardate with the mental age of a six-year-old child, the force required
to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult.

The Case

Jose Moreno y Castor seeks the reversal of the June 17, 1996 Judgment   of the Regional Trial
1

Court of Pasig City, Branch 165, in Criminal Case No. 101919, convicting him of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

In a Complaint dated October 4, 1993, Jocelyn Bansagales and her mother, Dolores Bansagales,
charged appellant with rape by means of force and intimidation. This was treated as the Information
upon certification that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by Fourth Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Amerhassan C. Paudac. Below is the accusatory portion of the Complaint:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1993, in the Municipality of Pasig,
Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned against
her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  2
Assisted by his counsel, Atty. Gabriel C. Alberto of the Public Attorney's Office, the accused pleaded
not guilty during his arraignment.   Trial proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the court a
3

quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Jose Moreno y Castor guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.

The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be credited in his favor
pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
6127.

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

In the Appellee's Brief,   the solicitor general   presents the following narration of the facts:
4 5

Accused-appellant Jose Moreno, a carpenter, and complainant Jocelyn Bansagales,

a mental retardate, were neighbors in Villa Tech, Palatiw, Pasig City. At the time of
the incident, Jocelyn was twenty-six (26) years old. She fondly calls appellant "Kuya
Joe." In the afternoon of September 29, 1993, while Jocelyn was laundering clothes,
appellant approached and held her hand. He led her to a tricycle and drove off to a
rented house somewhere in Rotonda, Pasig. No one was in the house. Once inside,
appellant began to undress Jocelyn. Afterwards, he [lay] on top of her. He inserted
his penis into her vagina and while in this position, moved in an upward and
downward motion. Jocelyn did not like what appellant was doing to her. Terrified, she
was forced to submission after appellant threatened that he [would] hurt her some
more. (pp. 7-8, tsn, May 16, 1994) After satisfying his lust, appellant gave her twenty
pesos (P20.00) and sent her home.

When Jocelyn's mother, Dolores, learned what had happened to her daughter, she
immediately brought her to the police station in Pasig City. She booked her complaint
with PO2 Aida Verzosa, the policewoman on duty at the station. PO2 Verzosa,
together with police officers Nida Balagot and Mario Garcia, then went to Villa Tech,
Palatiw, Pasig. Upon seeing appellant, they confronted him with Jocelyn's accusation
and invited him to the police station. Jocelyn positively identified appellant as the one
who raped her. PO2 Verzosa then took down the sworn statement of Jocelyn, on the
basis of which, the instant complaint for rape was filed against appellant.

Dra. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer, examined Jocelyn sometime in

October 1993. She found deep healed lacerations and shallow healed lacerations in
Jocelyn's hymen. These lacerations, according to her, could have been caused only
by sexual intercourse. (Exhibits "C" - "C-1")

Dra. Ester Regina Servando, a resident on training in Psychiatry at the National

Center for Mental Health (NCMH) also examined Jocelyn and submitted a medical
certificate of her findings wherein she concluded that:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 Based on history [and] mental status examinations, patient was
diagnosed to have moderate mental retardation. This condition is
permanent and I.Q. range is between 35-50. Patient['s] mental age is
equivalent to 6 years old.

(Exhibit "D")

These findings were concurred in by Dra. Cecilia Albaran, a psychiatrist holding the
position of Medical Officer III at NCMH. She had seen and talked to Jocelyn only
once. She observed that Jocelyn had low intelligence. Although Jocelyn was twenty-
six years old, she had the mental age of a six-year-old child. Maria Suerte G.
Caguingin, a psychologist at NCMH, administered psychological tests on Jocelyn.
Test results showed that Jocelyn [was] a mental retardate. (Psychological Report,
Exhibit "E")

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the defense alleges denial as follows:

[T]he defense presented the accused himself who denied that he ever had any
sexual intercourse with the complainant. According to the accused's version, it was
Jocelyn Bansagales who came to his house while he was sleeping and who woke
him up by mashing his penis. Furthermore, it was stated by Jose Moreno that he only
went as far as kissing, hugging and "fingering" the complainant. He denied inserting
his penis nor [sic] that he ever attempted to insert his penis inside the vagina of the
victim.

The defense likewise presented the testimony of Elena Angustia who alleged that the
accused and the complainant were neighbors and that she often saw them together,
making her believe that they ha[d] an amorous relationship. (TSN, January 15, 1996,
pp. 11-12)  6

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court ruled: "The denial of the accused that he had sexual
intercourse with Jocelyn Bansagales and his claim that he inserted his forefinger and middle finger
only inside her private part is unworthy of belief and cannot prevail over the statement of Jocelyn
that he inserted his penis in her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. With the low I.Q. of
Jocelyn, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or fabricated her charge against the
accused."   Jocelyn's Complaint was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer.
7

Based on the aforementioned grounds, the trial court concluded that the accused "is guilty of rape
under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code because the offended party, having a
mental age of six years old, was deprived of reason. Alternatively, the accused is liable under
paragraph 3 of the same article because at the time she was raped, Jocelyn Bansagales [was] in the
same category as a child below twelve years of age for lacking the necessary will to object to the
accused's lewd design." 8

Hence, this appeal. 9

Assignment of Errors
In assailing the trial court's Decision, appellant alleges the following errors: 
10

The court a quo erred in convicting the accused on a ground other than that which
has been alleged in the complaint.

II

The court a quo erred in convicting the accused under the second and third
paragraphs of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

III

The court a quo erred in failing to apply the mens rea doctrine.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

First Issue:
Ground for Conviction

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed thus:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in convicting him under the second, and alternatively the
third paragraph, of the foregoing provision, because the Complaint (which was later converted into
the Information) charged him with rape under the first paragraph thereof. Appellant argues that the
three methods of committing rape enumerated in Article 335 are separate and distinct from each
other, and that one particular method does not necessarily include the others. In support of his
contention, appellant cites People v. Pailano,   in which the Court ruled that the "[c]onviction of the
11

accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or otherwise
deprived of reason — and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged [in the
Information] — would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him."  12

We concede that appellant cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, because none of the modes of committing rape specified therein were alleged
in the Information. To convict him under either of these statutory provisions is to deprive him of the
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. The heart of this constitutional
guarantee was explained in US v. Karelsen:  13

The object of this written accusation was — First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had.

Thus, this Court has ruled that "an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right."   Relying on this
14

Constitutional guarantee, the Court held that "appellant . . . cannot be convicted of homicide through
drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing."   Closer to the milieu of this
15

case is People vs. Pailano,   cited by appellant himself, in which the Court ruled that a person
16

cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 2, of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code because
the Information alleged rape by force and intimidation.

Appellant, however, is here being convicted under paragraph 1, not paragraphs 2 or 3, of Article
335.

Jocelyn's testimony clearly proved that appellant, by means of force and intimidation, had carnal
knowledge of her against her will. She testified:

Fiscal: So you saw the penis of Kuya Joe out because he was
nude[;] what did he do with his penis when you said that he
was lying on top of you?

Witness: It was on top.

Fiscal: It was on top of what?

Witness: "Dito po sa puki ko."

Fiscal: When his penis was placed on top of your vagina,

what else did he do?

Witness: "Nakapasok po."

Fiscal: Which one penetrated, his penis? Where did it

penetrate?

Witness: Inside my vagina.

Fiscal: Did you like it that he inserted his penis [in]to your
vagina?

Witness: No, ma'am.

 Court: Why did you not do anything if you did not like what he
did?

Witness: I was afraid of him.  17

The force necessary in rape is relative, depending on the age, the size and the strength of the
parties.   Hence, it has been held that "for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force and
18

intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, it

is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule."  19

It is well to stress that the victim in this case was not "normal"; she was a retardate with the mental
age of a six-year-old. Because her mental faculties are different from those of a fully functioning
adult, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less. Hence, a quantum of force, which may
not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against
an imbecile. Appellant's acts may not have intimidated a normal person. But Jocelyn was not normal;
she was a retardate with the mind of a six-year-old child. From her perspective, appellant's acts were
sufficient to engender fear in her mind. Jocelyn's testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the sexual
act was forced on her. Moreover, a normal person could have offered a more vigorous resistance to
the assault of appellant. But Jocelyn was different; being a retardate, she could not muster the mind
or the will to resist, for she was already afraid. It is clear that appellant committed the outrage
against her will — with minimal force, but force nonetheless.  20

That the complainant is mentally retarded is beyond question. The results of the mental and
psychological tests administered to her showed that she had a mental age equivalent to that of a six-
year-old. During the trial, these results were verified by the two doctors who examined her, namely,
Dr. Cecilia Albaran, a psychiatrist; and Dr. Ester Regina Servando, a resident on training in
psychiatry.

Second Issue:
Strength of the Prosecution Evidence

Appellant argues that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, because "his
conviction based solely on the testimony of the victim who has been shown to be an imbecile. . . . As
such, her testimony should have been considered by the trial court with great caution." The
prosecution allegedly failed to establish that complainant fully understood the nature of an oath and
that she was capable of giving a correct account of the matters which she had seen or heard with
respect to the questions at issue. Accordingly, appellant contends that said complainant might not
have been able to distinguish right from wrong or to give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative
of the matters to which she testified; that is, she "might be stating things which never really
happened but were only impressed upon her fragile mind."  21

Sec. 18, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, specifies the qualifications of a witness in this wise:

Sec. 18 Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding

section, all persons who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. . . . .

To repeat, the evidence showed that Jocelyn Bansagales had the mental age of a six-year-old.
Other than a bare statement of that fact, appellant has presented no proof whatsoever that she was
incapable of perceiving events and communicating such perceptions, or that she did not possess the
qualifications of a competent witness.

Mental retardates have, in the past, been allowed to testify. In People v. Salomon, this Court held
that "[a] mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case
of other witnesses, acceptance of one's testimony depends on its nature and credibility. "   In People
22

v.
Gerones,   the Court allowed the victim to testify, even if she had the mental age of a 9 or 10-year-
23

old. Likewise, in People v. Antonio,   the Court allowed the testimony of a 24-year-old woman who
24

had the mental age of a seven-year-old child, because the Court was convinced that "she was
capable of perceiving and making her perception known."  25

On the ability of Jocelyn to understand the nature of an oath, the trial court was satisfied with her
affirmation, while under direct examination, that she understood the need to tell the truth during her
testimony. The lower court aptly stated that "with the low I.Q. of Jocelyn, it is highly improbable that
she could have concocted or fabricated her charge against the accused. This conclusion is
strengthened by the appellant's admission that he knew no reason or motive why she would want to
file a case or falsely testify against him.

Moreover, Dr. Ester Regina Servando, one of the doctors who examined he complainant, testified
that the latter was capable of narrating the events that transpired despite her mental state, as shown
by her testimony:

Fiscal: Mrs. Witness, earlier you stated that Jocelyn

Bansagales through your queries [was] able to say what Jose
Moreno did to her. Mrs. Witness, considering her IQ range is
that of a moderate retardate, is it possible that such kind of
information can really be elicited from a person like her?

Witness: After several questioning, she was able to give that

information although it was not continuous questioning[;] the
questions were made in a simple manner so that she could
understand it.

Fiscal: With her mental range, is it possible for her to give that
information?

Witness: Yes.

Fiscal: Even in her aspect she can also give [the] narrative or
information?

Witness: Yes.  26

In fact, Jocelyn graphically described the manner by which appellant raped her. Even though she
was mentally deficient, Jocelyn clearly testified that appellant had carnal knowledge of her against
her will.

The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand, was
convinced of her credibility. We find no reason reverse or alter its holding, considering that "[i]t is a
time-tested doctrine that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled [to] great
weight — even [considered] conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence."  27

Appellant additionally argues that complainant's low intelligence quotient "does not necessarily mean
that she is incapable of any sexual judgment"   or of consenting to any sexual congress with the
28

accused. He cites Dr. Futnam Kivowitz, purportedly an expert in the field of mental retardation, who
opines that "given proper instruction, the retarded person may well have sexual judgment."  29

Again, this argument is extraneous. Dr. Kivowitz's position is premised on the fact that the retarded
person is given proper instruction. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence or indication
that Jocelyn Bansagales was given proper instruction, or that she possessed such knowledge as to
enable her to have sexual judgment. In fact, in our jurisdiction, having carnal knowledge with a
woman under twelve years of age is rape without need of proof of force or deprivation of reason. Our
law presumes that a woman under twelve years of age does not have the mental capacity for the
requisite sexual judgment to consent to the sexual act.

Third Issue:
Mens Rea

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Jurisprudence instructs us that a crime cannot be committed
if the mind of the one performing the act is innocent and without any criminal intent;   That is, bereft
30

of mens rea, which is defined as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent."  31

Pursuant to the above, appellant claims that he was not aware of the mental deficiency of the victim;
or if he was aware, he did not know that the deficiency was of such degree as to render her
incapable of loving or of giving consent to the sexual act. Thus, he maintains that the prosecution
failed to prove criminal intent on his part, because he could not have known that the victim was
incapable of giving consent to the sexual act.

This contention has no factual foundation. It is undisputed that complainant and appellant had been
neighbors for several years. In fact, appellant was well-known to complainant, such that the latter
called him "Kuya Joe." Appellant even testified that complainant sometimes washed his clothes and
picked lice from his hair without receiving payment therefor.   That complainant was a mental
32

retardate was quite apparent and easily discernible. Under these circumstances, appellant could not
have been unaware of the complainant's deficient mental condition.

Defense Witness Elena Angustia, who was a neighbor of both appellant and complainant, stated
during her cross-examination that complainant's mental retardation was obvious even from plain
observation of her conduct. Her testimony proceeded as follows:

Prosecutor Cecilio: Is it not a fact

Madam Witness that the complaining
witness has some kind of mental
deficiency?

Witness: Yes sir.

Prosecutor Cecilio: In fact Madam

Witness, the complaining witness
does not go to school anymore is it
not?
 Witness: Yes, sir.

Prosecutor Cecilio: And do you know

Madam Witness what is meant by
retardate?

Witness: Yes, sir.

Prosecutor Cecilio: Is the complaining

witness a retardate? As far as your
observation is concerned, is she a
retardate?

Witness: A little. 
33

Dr. Cecilia Albaran herself stated that she could conclude, simply on the basis of her observation of
the victim, that the latter had low intelligence.   In People v. Rosare,   the Court also noted that
34 35

complainant's mental deficiency was so obvious that it was easily observable during preliminary
investigation, viz.:

Her deficient mentality stuck out like a sore thumb at the center. Her behavior as a
mental retardate was so obvious that even the investigating fiscal, who is not a man
of science was able to observe it during preliminary investigation.  36

In the present case, we find it highly improbable that appellant, who had known complainant as a
neighbor for a long time, was unaware of her mental deficiency. Therefore, he cannot claim that his
act of having carnal knowledge of complainant was without any, guilty purpose or criminal intent.

Civil Indemnity

We note that the trial court did not award any civil indemnity. Pursuant to current jurisprudence and
without need of further proof, we award the offended party civil indemnity   and moral damages,
37

each in the sum of P50,000, or a total of P100,000. In People v. Prades,   the Court resolved that
38

"moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such
amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice."

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the EXPLANATION that appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code; and with the MODIFICATION that the appellant is ORDERED to pay the victim civil
indemnity and moral damages, in the sum of P50,000 each, or a total of P100,000. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
 there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of
the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
 punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he
visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated
that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
 the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J

ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y
Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death,
and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages. 1

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for
having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry
and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.2

While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,   Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John
3

Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only
Joselito del Rosario was tried.

These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul
Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle
by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him.
Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by
accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman
sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the
ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused
del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver
while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was
able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. 4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon
he was hired for P120.00  by a certain "Boy" Santos,  his co-accused. Their original agreement was
5 6

that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum.  However despite their earlier
7

arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and
"Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.  Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot
8

of Merced Drugstore at the public market.  Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the
9

corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.
The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her
bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya.   Accused del Rosario tried to
10

leave and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and
threatened in fact to shoot him.

Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle
"Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground.
After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode
behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his
tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St.
where there were cogon grasses.   Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned
11

del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would
be harmed.   Del Rosario then went home.   Because of the threat, however, he did not report the
12 13

matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.  14

As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and
sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1)
Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused
Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense
that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and
"Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations
on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.  15

The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must
be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at
gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and
killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.  16

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be
considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because
it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 
17

We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by
me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear
or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat.  18
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those
less powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do
what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario
was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a
stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal
welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.  19

Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was
"Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on
the head, instantly killing her.   A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the
20

testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran
after the victim's helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination —

Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that
time?

A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag,
sir . . . .

Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two
men?

A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.

Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?

A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . . .

Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by
the two men who grappled the same from her?

A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene
while the other man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the
ground, sir.

Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?

A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot
the woman who was then lying on the ground, sir . . . .

Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?

A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.

Q: Will you please state before the the Court what you noticed from
the tricycle which was at a distance of about one and a half meter?

A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . . .

Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who
grappled for the possession of the bag?
 A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.

Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else
happened?

A: They went away, sir . . . .

Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did
these men sit in the tricycle?

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the
driver while the other man entered the sidecar, sir. 21

On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene
conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically
stated —

Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused
who was then holding the gun fired at the victim?

A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other

companion holding a gun chased the helper of the deceased going
towards Burgos Avenue, sir.

Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?

A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying
down in this spot the man holding a gun shot the victim, sir. 22

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

x x x           x x x          x x x

Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag

was given.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the
person with the gun?

A: Yes, sir. 23

On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that —
Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the
tricycle as testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral
and the Nita's Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was
used by the assailants?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Then what did you do?

A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.

Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?

A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.

Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag
of the victim.

Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?

A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.

Q: And after that what happened?

A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.

Court: Did you not see any shooting?

A: There was, sir.

Q: Who was shot?

A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . . .

 Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that
what was transpiring was wrong and illegal?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But you did not try to leave?

A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle

prevented me.

Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you
see?

A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez

and one in the possession of Boy Santos . . . .

Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy
Santos?

A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.

Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle
and when you tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos
threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your
family?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?)
Marquez or Dodong Visaya?

A: Dodong Visaya, sir.

Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle

sitting at your back?

A: Yes, sir. 24

On cross-examination, accused further stated —

Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened?

A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.

Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while
Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the woman?

A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.

Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?

 A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . . .

Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any
private persons?

A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun
to me, sir.

Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used
in shooting the old woman?

A: No, sir . . . .

Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez
were grappling for the possession of the handbag?

A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . . 

25

Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot
leave the area where the incident occurred is because a gun was
pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should
not do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will
be killed also, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle
which was loaded by your other three co-accused in this case, all of
them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim
going towards the public market along Burgos Street?

A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.

Court: Are you quite sure of that?

A: Yes, sir. 26

Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at
him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who
shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.

From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was
grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot
the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a person who
was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of
del Rosario, it can be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to
when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other man," and that this "other
man" could not be "Boy" Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed
over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the
tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him
with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason
for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos
could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw
the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy"
Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and
insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.  27

Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-1/2) in front of the tricycle
of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were
transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario
simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the
prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent.  28

There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him
was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos,
making him for the moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could
not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore
exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will
to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.

On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's conviction on his participation in
the orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the trial
court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and
conspiracy between accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the
bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas
were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor
was running;"   that the "accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control
29

was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure
to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the
crime." 
30

We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is
to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for
"concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and design."
Its manifestation could be shown by "united and concerted action."  31

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of
the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy.   Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
32

cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but
that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.  33
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of
the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he
had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any
briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was
prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them
escape.

In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement
concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same."   Therefore, in order to
34

convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime
was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish
conspiracy.   The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the
35

crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been
successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security
because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout for help. No
complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly
participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed
and killed the victim. 
36

That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer
or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.   It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a
37

tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably
did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened
with physical harm should he squeal.

Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these
rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.   As testified to by SPO4 Geronimo de
38

Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13
May incident, during his cross-examination —

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan
in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned
and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver
was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May
13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and
lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they
reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out
transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief
encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a
magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at
the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The
investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14, 1996, and was only
subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.  39
 A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del
Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough
evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.  40

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-
settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way.   This concept of
41

custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438   to include "the practice of issuing an
42

"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have

committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that —

. . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by
the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the baranggay captain,
he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the
latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the
prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal
admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against
him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of provides:  43

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the
place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro   we held that when a
44

police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of
Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or
caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside
the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of
the robbery with homicide.

On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense
of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge
of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.   Again,
45

the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the
arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed
the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they
became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court
a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional
defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without
any objection, as in this case. 
46

A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property
in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del
Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was
forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's
defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other
hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by
the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is
REVISED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate
RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the
Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31683 January 31, 1983

ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO,
as Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL., respondents.

Juan T. David for petitioner.

Jose Torcuator for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

All persons appointed to positions covered by the civil service law are required by regulation to
accomplish an information sheet on the prescribed form. The information sheet provides in summary
outline the personal date, eligibilities, education, experiences, and other qualifications of the
appointee. Included in the information sheet is a query on any criminal records of the applicant,
which in later versions of the prescribed form asks if he has ever been arrested, indicted, or
convicted of any crime or accused in any administrative proceeding.

The issue in this petition for review is whether or not a person otherwise qualified but who admits
having violated a city ordinance on jaywalking and another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy
only the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa is disqualified for appointment to the Quezon City
Police Force.

Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police Department
by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August 16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken and
passed the civil service patrolman's examination given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed
the usual character investigation conducted before appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman,
the petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training course.

On March 21, 1966, the petitioner's appointment was forwarded to the Commissioner of Civil
Service. On August 18, 1966, or a year after the appointment and with no action on the appointment
papers being taken by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city treasurer and city auditor
stopped the payment of the petitioner's salaries.

On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner returned the Petitioner's appointment papers,
without action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the ground that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified
for appointment under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966, which provides:

(d) SEC. 9. General Qualifications of Appointment. —No person shall be appointed

to a local police agency unless he possesses the following qualifications:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) He must have no criminal record.'(SEC. 9 (5), Police Act of 1966)

The above finding was based solely on the petitioner's own answer to question No.
15 in the information sheet:

15. Have you been accused, indicted, or tried for the violation of any law, ordinance,
or regulation, before any court or tribunal?

The answer given by the petitioner was:

Yes. Jaywalking-paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d. (Mla.) Sect. 1187 (cochero) paid fine
of P5.00.

On September 7, 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon city.

On May 29, 1969, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the petition. According to the court,
the requirement of "no criminal record" means without any criminal record and makes no distinction
whether an act violates a state law or only a municipal or city ordinance.

The issue posed in this petition is presented by Mr. de Guzman, thus:

Whether or not violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances, one, for

'Jaywalking' and the other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 1187, prohibiting the
cochero from 'occupying any part of the vehicle except the seat reserved for him',
constitute 'CRIMINAL RECORD' to disqualify the petitioner under the Police Act of
1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force.

We are constrained to grant the petition.

The former Civil Service Act, Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, stated in its Section 23 that
opportunity for government employment shag be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts
shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. The same policy is reiterated in the
Civil Service Decree, Presidential Decree No. 807, at Section 19, which superseded Republic Act
No. 2260.

The requirements for applicants to a policeman's position may be quite stringent but the basic policy
of attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically excluding any person who in an absent
minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or
stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a
person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who, pitying his horse
struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand after and forward to balance the calesa
load or who, alone on his way home, sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for
violating an obscure municipal ordinance.

The petitioner cites decisions of American courts in support of his arguments:

By weight of authority, the violation of a municipal ordinance, enacted by a city under

legislative authority, as in the case of ordinances prohibiting and punishing gaming
and the keeping of gaming houses, etc., is not a crime, in the proper sense of the
term, for such ordinances are not public laws, and the punishment for their violation
is imposed by the state.'(Withers v. State, 36 Ala. 252; City of Greely v. Hamman, 12
Cole., 94, 20 Pac. 1; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509) as cited on p. 7, Francisco's
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 3rd Edition.

xxx xxx xxx

The common-law definition of a 'crime' as given by Blackstone, is 'an act committed

or omitted in violation of a public law,' ... giving the accused the right to be heard in
all 'criminal prosecutions' relates exclusively to prosecution for violation of public laws
of the state, and a city ordinance is not a public law of the state, but a local law of the
particular corporation, made for its internal practice and good government. (Castillo
[should be Costelo] v. Feagin, 50 South 134, 135, 162 Ala. 191)

There are other federal decisions which state that prosecutions to enforce penalties for violations of
municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions and the offenses against these ordinances are
not criminal cases. (City of Mobile v. McCown, Oil Co., 148 So. 402, 405; City of Mankato v. Arnold,
30 N.W. 305, 306; Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 124 N.W. 1119, 1120).

We do not go so far as to sustain the arguments that only violations of statutes enacted by the
national legislature can give rise to "crimes" or "a criminal record" as these terms are used in our law
on local governments or the law of public officers. However, we take cognizance of the distinction in
the law of municipal corporations which distinguishes between acts not essentially criminal relating
to municipal regulations for the promotion of peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort of
residents and acts in, intrinsically punishable as public offenses. (See cases cited in Dillon, A
Treatise On The Law of Municipal Corporations, Vol. II, 5th Edition, Sections 745, 746, and 749.) A
penalty imposed for the breach of a municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of the
sovereign authority, to define crimes and provide for their punishment, delegated to a local
government. In many cases, the penalty is merely intended not to render the ordinance inoperative
or useless.

The phrase "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments could not have been intended
by the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a
sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "crime"
must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of
principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office.

Automatic and perpetual disqualification of a person who in one unguarded moment threw a
cigarette butt on the street, spat in public, deposited house garbage in a market receptacle for
garbage, exceeded the speed limit for vehicles. blew his car horn near a school or hospital, or, as in
this case, jaywalked, and who has paid the fine imposed by ordinance as commensurate deterrence
for the act, would be unreasonable, if not oppressive.

Respondent Subido should have gone deeper into the nature of the petitioner's acts instead of taking
every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information sheet as an automatic disqualification. Under
Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent commissioner had 180 days from
receipt of the appointment papers to act on them. Inaction means the appointment is approved as
properly made. The papers were returned more than a year by the commissioner after he received
them. The appointment, not having any defect of record except the matter in issue in this case, must
1äwphï1.ñët 

be deemed complete and properly made after the 180 days period. The termination of the
petitioner's services was, therefore, an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be
reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other requirements of the Integrated National Police
under the new legislation and procedures governing police forces. In addition to being paid any
salaries for services actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following the formula in cases of
illegal dismissals is entitled to five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175,187).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is set aside. The Integrated National Police and the
respondent officials are directed to reinstate the petitioner to the Quezon City Police Force provided
he meets the age, physical, and other qualifications and eligibilities for patrolman under present
legislation and rules. The city government of Quezon City and the incumbent Mayor, Treasurer, and
Auditor of the city are ordered to pay the petitioner any unpaid services and allowances for services
actually rendered and five years backpay from the date his services were actually terminates.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81337               August 16, 1991

RICHARD V. PETRALBA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision  of the Sandiganbayan
*

promulgated on October 5, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 9390 entitled "The People of the Philippines
vs. Richard V. Petralba" convicting herein petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated December 15, 1987 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Abstract from the records are the following facts:

Herein petitioner Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of
Alcoy Cebu on October 23, 1 979. Fourteen (14) months after designation, petitioner's cashbook
balance was audited by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores. He was found short of
P28,107.00, Petitioner, theretofore, was charged with, and convicted of, 31 counts of "Malversation
of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and "Falsification of Public Documents." Petitioner
was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from
December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15, 1981.

Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981 were
audited by Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of P50,447.06
which was arrived at as follows:
 GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST

  FUND FUND FUND SEF TOTAL

Balance last examination 12/23/80 P 10,336.91 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P145.86 P46,298.32
ADD: Re-receipts, collections
withdrawalsDec. 24-31, 1980 P 1,264.22 P -- P -- P -- 1,264.22
January, 1981 12,515.04       12,515.04
February, 1981 23,479.07       23,479.04
March, 1981 4,418.65 _________ ________ ________ 4,418.65
  41,676.98 -- -- -- 41,676.98
Total P52,013.89 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P 145.86 P87,975.30
LESS:Disbursements:          
Dec. 24-31, 2,962.93 P -- 764.40 P -- 3,727.23
1980          
January, 1981 4,041.94 1,769.84 3,383.98 -- 9,195.76
February, 1981 5,019.00 1,768.84 16,402.71 -- 23,191.55
March, 1981 293.60 1,000.00 120.00 -- 1,413.60
  12,317.47 4,539.68 20,671.09 -- 37,528.24
Balance as of March 15, 1981 (Date of
turnover) P39,696.42 P(4,237.61) P14,842.39 P145.86 P50,447.06

(pp- 106-107, Rollo)

On December 4,1981, the Trazo Team sent a letter (Exhibit "H") to the petitioner demanding the
turnover of the latter's cash accountability.

Vouchers amounting to P43,468.84, which were previously allowed by Auditors Constantino Alagar
and Rene Flores, were presented by petitioner to Auditors Trazo and Pacana. Only the amount of
P21,348.87 was allowed reducing the petitioner's accountability to only P29,098.19 while the
remaining vouchers amounting to P22,119.97 were disallowed for want of administrative approval.

On July 30, 1984 herein petitioner, Richard V. Petralba, was charged with Malversation of Public
Funds, in violation of Article 217, Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on the 5th day of November, 1981 and for some time prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Alcoy Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, a Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer then designated as the
Officer -in- Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and misappropriate the amount of P29,098.19 representing
 various receipts and collection and, therefore, public funds, which he had custody or control
by reason of the duties of his office and for which he was accountable, and despite repeated
demands for him to produce or restitute the amount, failed and still fails to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.

In violation of Article 217 of the Revised (Penal) Code.

(Rollo, "Information," pp. 21-22)

During the pre-trial inquest, the parties stipulated and agreed on the following facts:

(A) The accused admits that he had been appointed Deputy Provincial and Municipal
Treasurer of Alcantara, Cebu as shown by Exh. A;

(2) That on October 23, 1979, he was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal
Treasury of Alcoy Cebu and acted as such until March 15,1981 as shown by Exh. B

(3) Accused also admits that on March 15, 1981 the office of the accused as Officer-in-
Charge of the Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu was turned over to Mrs. Lilia Suico;

(4) That accused admits that after the turn-over of the office to Suico the statement of his
cash accountability was prepared and signed by him as shown in Exh. C and C-1;

(5) Accused admits that on November 5,1981 COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora
Pacana conducted an examination on the cash and accounts of his (sic) as shown by the
Reports of Examination for General Funds marked Exh. D, Trust Funds marked Exh. E,
Infrastructure Funds as Exh. F and Special Educational Funds marked as Exh. G and that
certified the findings of the COA examiners as reflected in said report and his signatures
already marked as Exhs. D-1, F-1 and G-1;

(6) Likewise, accused admitted that on December 7, 1981, a letter of demand was served on
and received by him as reflected in Exh. H, as shown by his signature acknowledging receipt
thereof;

(7) Accused admits that COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana were duly
authorized to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accused as shown by
Exh, 1;

(8) That accused admits that he was originally found short in the amount of P50,447.00 as
shown by Exh. J, however, after he submitted vouchers which were allowed, his shortage
was reduced to P29,098.19 as shown by Exhs. J-1 and K ;

(9) That accused denies that up to the present he has not yet paid the amount of
P29,098.19, and which he will explain on the witness stand.

(Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 24-24)

In view of the admission of the petitioner that he was short of P29,098.19, the prosecution waived
the presentation of testimonial evidence. Instead, it offered its documentary evidence, marked as
Exhibits "A" to "K", and rested its case. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence.
The respondent Court found that the vouchers disallowed by the Trazo team in the amount of
P22,119.19 were either supported by invoices or receipts or duly signed by respective payees. Thus,
the amount of P6,978.22 out of the P29,098.19 remained unaccounted for. The respondent
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Richard V. Petralba guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds described in and penalized under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code, Appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating
circumstance of Voluntary Surrender, there being no aggravating circumstance adduced and
proven by the prosecution, the accused should be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of, from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties of the law to pay a fine in the sum of P6,978.22, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; to indemnify the
government in the aforesaid sum of P6,978.22; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 68-69, Rollo)

Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15, 1987.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY AUDITED AND WHETHER

EXHIBITS "10" TO "11-M" WERE INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ACCOUNT
OF THE PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS ADDUCED EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT

THE MISSING FUNDS WERE NOT PUT TO HIS PERSONAL USE.

On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending before Us, petitioner's counsel filed a
manifestation that his client, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a death certificate dated
July 10, 1989. (Rollo, Annex "A" of Manifestation, p. 173).

Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal liability. In
view of the fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is personal. Actio personalis
moritur cum persona; actio peonalis in haeredem non datur nisi forte ex damno locupletior haeres
factus sit. (A personal right of action dies with the person. A penal action is not given against an heir,
unless, indeed, such heir is benefited by the wrong.)

Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties
but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art. 89(l), Revised
Penal Code). In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any
final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and
pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities.

Though the death of an accused-appellant during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his
criminal liability, his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean
that the civil liability is also extinguished. In People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 410, and in People vs.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, We ruled that only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is
pecuniary but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. The
claim of the government for the civil liability survives Petralba but only if the offense can be proved.

The Supreme Court continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner's possible civil
liability for the money claims of the government arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of,
in much the same way as when no criminal action had been filed. No separate civil action need be
instituted (People v. Senday-diego supra).

Going now into the civil liability of the accused, be it noted that he claimed that no shortage ever
occurred because:

1. The discrepancy between Exhibit "4" prepared by the accused and Exhibit "H" prepared
by the Trazo team casts doubt on the veracity of the latter. Petitioner's total collection for the
month of January, 1981 in Exhibit "4" appears to be P13,515.04 while Exhibit "H" indicates a
collection of P12,515.04, or a difference of P 1,000.00. For the month of February, 1981
petitioner's collection, as reflected in Exhibit "4", is P21,532.36, while Exhibit "H" indicates a
collection of P23,479.07, or a difference of P 1,946.71.

2. The respondent Court failed to include Exhs. "11" to "11-M" representing the amount of
P6,835.48 to settle the account of petitioner.

The above allegations are devoid of any merit.

Exhibit "4" was prepared by the petitioner to apprise Suico of his transactions from January 1, 1981
to March 15,1981. Due to the in veracity of Exhibit "4", an audit was performed, the result of which is
listed in Exhibit "H". Evidently, Exhibit "4" is self-serving and unreliable and, therefore, cannot prevail
over the official findings of the Trazo team contained in Exhibit "H". Besides, petitioner himself
acknowledged and signed the official findings of the Trazo team. He is estopped from impugning the
veracity of Exhibit "H".

Equally baseless is the claim of the petitioner that Sandiganbayan did not consider his Exhibit "l1 " to
"l1-M". It is admitted by petitioner that Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M" were among the vouchers listed in
Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" allowed by the Alagar team and by the Trazo team. (Memorandum for the
accused, p. 11). Auditor Alagar declared that Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" were taken into account during
his audit. (Decision of Sandiganbayan, p. 7, Rollo, p. 58). Thus, the amount appearing in Exhibit its
"11" to "11-M" was included in the amount of P22,119.97 allowed by the Trazo team in reducing the
original unaccounted amount of P50,447.06 to P29,098.19. (Exhibit "8-B").

Petitioner alleges that Exhibit "2", indicating a total of P10,296.47, should total P10,371.47.  His
1âwphi1

argument is based on the non- inclusion of the amount of P75.00. However, a perusal of Annex "B"
of petitioner's Reply (Rollo, p. 126) indicates that the name of creditor opposite the amount of P75.00
was erased, and the same was not presented by petitioner as part of his Exhibit "7". Thus, the Trazo
team did not commit any abuse of discretion in their failure to credit P75.00.
Petitioner was able to explain the amount of P22,119.97 out of the shortage of P29,098.19, but he
failed to explain the remaining balance of P6,978.22, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that he
had spent such amount for his personal use.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the estate of the deceased petitioner is hereby sentenced to indemnify
the government in the amount of P6,978.22. With costs.

SO ORDERED.