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Does Prior Knowledge Matter? Do Lamarckian misconceptions exist? A

critique of Geraedts and Boersma (2006)
Patrick J. Enderle a; Mike U. Smith b; Sherry Southerland a
a
Florida State University, USA b Mercer University School of Medicine, USA

First published on: 16 January 2009

To cite this Article Enderle, Patrick J., Smith, Mike U. and Southerland, Sherry(2009) 'Does Prior Knowledge Matter? Do
Lamarckian misconceptions exist? A critique of Geraedts and Boersma (2006)', International Journal of Science
Education, 31: 18, 2527 — 2532, First published on: 16 January 2009 (iFirst)
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09500690802428106
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 International Journal of Science Education
Vol. 31, No. 18, 1 December 2009, pp. 2527–2532

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Does Prior Knowledge Matter?

Do Lamarckian misconceptions exist?
A critique of Geraedts and
Boersma (2006)
Patrick J. Enderlea*, Mike U. Smithb and
Downloaded By: [FErnandez, Nancy] At: 15:29 16 February 2010

Sherry Southerlanda
aFlorida State University, USA; bMercer University School of Medicine, USA
pje07@fsu.edu
Taylor
02008
00
Mr.
000002008
PatrickEnderle
& Francis
International
10.1080/09500690802428106
TSED_A_342978.sgm
0950-0693
ResearchandArticle
(print)/1464-5289
Francis
Journal of Science
(online)
Education

The existence, preponderance, and stability of misconceptions related to evolution continue as foci
of research in science education. In their 2006 study, Geraedts and Boersma question the exist-
ence of stable Lamarckian misconceptions in students, challenging the utility of Conceptual
Change theory in addressing any such misconceptions. To support their challenge, they describe
the study of a particular pedagogical strategy (which they describe as being influened by dynamic
systems theory) and report the results supporting its effectiveness in enhancing students’ under-
standing of evolutionary theory. However, we argue that the description offered by Geraedts and
Boersma demonstrates several flaws, both in its theoretical assertions and methodological deci-
sions. In response, we reject the disavowal of Conceptual Change theory argued for by these
authors due to several theoretical misinterpretations. As well, we question the validity of the data
presented and assertions generated based on the methodologcal limitations of the study design.

Introduction
Educators interested in improving their craft must seek deeper and more informative
understandings of how students approach and engage with ideas. Instructors have
typically found that understanding evolution and natural selection is particularly
difficult for many students. Science educators have developed a variety of pedagogi-
cal approaches for evolution instruction, spanning several different contexts and
approaches (cf., Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Bizzo, 1994; Jensen & Finely, 1997).
Geraedts and Boersma (G&B, 2006) continue this line of research.

*Corresponding author. Florida State University, Science Education, 209 Milton Carothers Hall,
Mail Code 4482, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA. Email: pje07@fsu.edu

ISSN 0950-0693 (print)/ISSN 1464-5289 (online)/09/182527–06

© 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09500690802428106
 2528 P. J. Enderle et al.

The focal claim of the foundation of G&B’s instruction is a disavowal of the

‘stable and static nature of Lamarckian conceptions’ (2006, p. 844). G&B oppose
the central premise of conceptual change (CC) theory; that is, the existence of stable
mental frameworks of conceptions (and misconceptions) that impede learning (Dole
& Sinatra, 1998; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gerzog, 1982; Strike & Posner, 1992).
G&B propose, instead that each student’s response to a query is an ‘instantaneous
dynamic construction’ (2006, p. 844). Based on this assumption, G&B propose that
consideration of students’ previous conceptions is not necessary in evolution instruc-
tion. These claims merit close review because they demand the rejection of the body
of CC theory and research—work that is particularly robust in evolution education.
In our view, however, the G&B work is seriously flawed. Our reservations fall along
both theoretical and methodological lines.
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Theoretical Concerns
The authors present a faulty view of the nature of misconceptions and of the claims of
CC research
Based on their rejection of the existence of ‘static’ cognitive structures, G&B make
an implausible claim that ‘if we pose a question about inheritance, the student does
not select one of his or her pre-existing conceptions (or misconceptions) about
heredity as a basis for the response’ (2006, p. 844). First, the authors’ rejection of
CC theory because the theory purportedly claims that alternative conceptions are
fixed entities embedded in some sort of ‘static’ conceptual framework is a straw-
man argument. CC theorists make no such claims. CC research has in fact repeat-
edly documented that misconceptions are indeed persistent, but that they exist
within a personal conceptual ecology that is amenable to change through experi-
ence. The more fundamental misconceptions are less likely to be replaced but are
not entirely intractable (‘static’). Otherwise, prima facie, learning of major organis-
ing concepts would be impossible (Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). Second,
G&B’s claims that misconceptions do not exist opposes an extensive body of litera-
ture that has documented the existence and prevalence of a host of misconceptions
in a wide array of fields, including Lamarckian misconceptions (cf., Karbo, Hobbs
& Erikson, 1980; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & Anzelmo, 2001; Tamir &
Zohar, 1991). G&B’s assertion that all student expressions are dynamic construc-
tions that do not reflect a student’s cognitive pattern (2006, p. 844) does not
therefore offer a parsimonious explanation for the vast array of misconception
research and literature that exists (Driver, 1994; Vosniadou, 2002).
The authors also claim that CC theory demands that misconceptions ‘can only be
overcome by conceptual strategies’ (G&B, 2006, p. 844). This assertion mistakes the
import of this learning theory, which aims primarily to understand how conceptual
organisation occurs. CC concepts and the findings of research based on these ideas
would be of limited value if they did not eventually provide useful pedagogical
guidance, but CC theory (Strike & Posner, 1992) does not attempt to provide a
 Does Prior Knowledge Matter? 2529

prescriptive model for achieving this learning. Rather than focusing on pedagogical
design, CC concerns the restructuring of cognitive structures in a manner that
provides deeper understanding and will limit or avoid students’ spontaneous
construction of misconceptions. CC theory identifies concepts that are surprisingly
difficult for students to understand, and attempts to explain why this is so and to
predict similar difficulties with other concept learning. It certainly does not claim that
so-called ‘CC strategies’ are the ‘only way that misconceptions can be overcome’ any
more than constructivism would claim that learning can only occur when construc-
tivist methodologies are employed.
G&B also reject CC theory because they perceive that CC-based instruction
reported in the literature has been largely unsuccessful. We would point out that
recent pedagogy informed by CC theory has resulted in as much as 50% of
subjects achieving more scientific understandings of concepts where learning gains
from using more traditional approaches are usually small or non-existent, often
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leaving major misconceptions unaddressed (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1995).

We interpret these results as laudable success and evidence of the fruitfulness of
instruction based on CC principles. Thus, pedagogy informed by CC principles
engenders effective learning of major organising scientific concepts. The magni-
tude of these learning gains cannot be solely attributed to any singular factor,
such as a particular strategy; rather, they are reflective of a complex interaction of
factors, including both affective and cognitive dimensions (Strike & Posner,
1992).
G&B conclude that ‘the occurrence of Lamarckian expressions is commonly
regarded as a conceptual problem [a misconception] when, to the contrary, it is
mainly a linguistic problem’ (2006, p. 865). They maintain that student use of
Lamarckian explanations is largely ‘metaphorical and figurative’ (p. 865). We take
these claims to mean that Lamarckian conceptions are not true misunderstand-
ings, and thus can be corrected by simply substituting correct words for incorrect
ones. ‘The same’, they continue, ‘applies for teleological expressions’ (p. 865).
These are bold claims. Acceptance of such claims (that negate decades of research
finding) requires extensive support. Unfortunately, the only evidence provided in
support of this position is an ambiguous quote from one student and a second
quote from a (more than 20-year-old) previous research study (p. 865). Although
we agree with Clough and Wood-Robinson (1985) that both students and faculty
may use Lamarckian language as ‘shorthand’ for describing evolutionary
processes, and have argued as much ourselves (Southerland, Smith, & Cummins,
2000), it does not follow that Lamarckian misconceptions are simple linguistic
errors and that they do not impede learning.
Many of the studies cited above have documented the fact that expert and student
understandings differ in essential and consistent ways. In spite of their occasional
sloppy use of language, experts can clearly distinguish between Lamarckian and neo-
Darwinian concepts and, in contrast to novice learners, can provide cogent and
accurate explanations of both when called upon to do so. This research has also
demonstrated that the misconceptions held by students are often impediments to
 2530 P. J. Enderle et al.

understanding and thus affect student responses to various targeted prompts, usually
evidenced as persistent incorrect responses on pre-tests and post-tests (Bishop &
Anderson, 1990; Demastes et al., 1995; Demastes-Southerland, Good, & Peebles,
1996; Wandersee et al., 1994). Most students do not in fact achieve scientific under-
standings in these areas in spite of extensive traditional instruction, strongly opposing
any claim that apparent misconceptions in students’ utterances are merely ‘linguistic’,
‘metaphorical’, or ‘figurative’.

Concerns about Methodology and Research Design

Instructional methods and research design do not provide support for discarding CC theory
First, G&B (2006) maintain that their instructional strategy was not informed by
CC strategies, but we note that their approach models cognitive processes and
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events of CC, provides events that lead to cognitive dissonance, and follows a logical
construction of evolutionary precepts that is understandable and plausible—all of
which are common teaching strategies informed by CC theory (Strike & Posner,
1992). Indeed, the problem-posing approach supported in this article has already
been found to be beneficial in previous studies linked to CC theory (Jensen &
Finley, 1996). Second, G&B claim that their instruction resulted in marked learning
gains but, because there is no pre-test of the students’ knowledge, we do not know
the pre-instructional level of student knowledge. Thus it is impossible to judge
whether understandings evidenced in the study post-test were the result of the
G&B’s instruction or of prior learning. Indeed, the prior instruction that students
received in heredity and genetics noted by the authors could have already addressed
some aspects of the students’ Lamarckian alternative conceptions. The comparison
of learning outcomes from other studies (G&B, 2006, p. 864) does not support
G&B’s conclusion of instructional effectiveness because no evidence is presented to
show that pre-instructional understandings were equivalent among the student
subjects being compared. The variation in student populations in general, and the
pre-intervention instruction noted by G&B in particular, weakens these compari-
sons, especially in light of the importance of context in understanding learning
(Sinatra, 2002).
Third, all assessment items were developed by the researchers and no validity and
reliability testing is reported. One example of how the lack of validation of measures
affects outcomes is found in the manner in which statements are coded ‘Lamarckian’.
According to this protocol, statements are coded as ‘Lamarckian’ only if the partici-
pants both mention the inheritance of acquired characteristics and accept adaptation
as occurring within the lifetime of the individual (G&B, 2006, p. 848). Furthermore,
a response is excluded from being Lamarckian if it includes any mention of mutation
(p. 870). It is not surprising that a relatively limited number of subjects were
classified as Lamarckian using these coding protocols. Fourth, there is a great poten-
tial for assessment bias, given that the instructors, interviewers, and coders (and
potentially authors) appear to be the same individuals.
 Does Prior Knowledge Matter? 2531

The post-assessment strategies employed in this investigation also include flaws

that call into question the validity and reliability of the conclusions drawn. First, the
context of the written post-test questions (only three are employed and these refer-
ence the evolution of an imaginary species of ‘Kworgs’) is categorically different
from that of the pre-interview or instructional sequence (tanning in humans, fur
thickness in arctic foxes, etc.). Although the ability to consider evolutionary notions
across different species is an important outcome for learning, changing from exist-
ing species for the pre-test to imaginary ones on the post-test is an unacceptable
research design because shifting the context so substantially may invoke dissimilar
considerations/misconceptions that can be held simultaneously (Sinatra, 2002).
Learners may not call upon constraints for the imaginary species similar to the
existing species, thus skewing their answer. Second, the post-instructional interview
is composed of only ‘one general question’ (p. 860) (i.e., was not set in the context
of a specific problem or species) about the origin of species (which is the only
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explicit mention of the species concept in the paper). Given the importance of
context described above, again, this assessment design seems inadequate to
evidence deep understandings of evolutionary principles or to elicit related miscon-
ceptions. Third, the short-answer format of the three post-assessment questions
does not examine the full extent of students’ conceptions because students respond-
ing to items of this sort often fail to produce evidence of the full extent of their
understandings and are also prone to merely repeating the words of the instructor.
Given these and other shortcomings in research design, the reliability of the effects
measured and resulting analyses remain questionable.

Conclusion
Evolution education presents many challenges to science teachers. G&B (2006)
offer problem-posing reinvention of natural selection as an interesting approach to
facing these challenges. The authors’ misrepresentation of CC theory and research,
however, constitutes an ill-informed theoretical framework for their work. This
research also employs flawed research elements that further decrease the depend-
ability of the study data and conclusions. We argue that G&B’s research is
sufficiently flawed that, both theoretically and methodologically, the called-for
revision/rejection of current CC theory is not warranted. We would, however,
support additional investigations of the effectiveness of G&B’s basic instructional
methods along with other approaches, but using principles of sound research design.

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