TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 governing law: Art XI et al.
et al. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local
Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government
Code
Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3,
1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new
province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC
scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed,
filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other
than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros
del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area, which would comprise the new province of Negros del
Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the
minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the
Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new
Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall within the meaning and
scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3
of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents
maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the
Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President,
Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of
Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents
discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500
square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for
a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist
that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del
Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which
evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress
that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province
plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte
comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. The
reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were
formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that
local autonomy would be better promoted .
Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that —
“Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”?
Ruling: Not legal. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division
of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local
Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are
involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the
largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the
Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less
than three cities and eight municipalities will besubtracted from the
parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal
of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an
existing province whose boundaries will be consequently
substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all
the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent
province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are,
therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated
therein. Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken
as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of
Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be
divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
Torralba vs Municipality of Sibagat
Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality
of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity
for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine
the criteria for the creation of any province, city, municipality, or
barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date BP 56
was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when the Municipality was created.
The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February
1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in
existence.
Issue: WON the Local Government Code must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city,
municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had
as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute
could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent
Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
Ruling: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its
enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative
competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of
the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the
enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no
requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the
creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a
Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is
that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the
criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of
such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the
people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose should
approve the creation of the new local government unit.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units
affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local
government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not
questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have
effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their
functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature.
In the absence of any constitutional limitation, a legislative body may
create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality
was a valid exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973
Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
Gemiliano Lopez vs Comelec
GEMILIANO LOPEZ JR V COMELEC (1985)
Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila, was
enacted to establish and administer program and provide services
common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well
as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. This is in response
to the sharp growth in the population of Manila and the proliferation
of commercial firms and industries, which resulted to the ever-
increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with
the ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall be administered by
the Commission. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824.
They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983.
Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted prior to the
creation of a local government code.
Held: No. Ratio: The challenge does not suffice to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality. The last vestige of doubt has been
removed by the present constitutional provision regarding the
Batasang Pambansa. That provision clearly recognizes the existence
of the Metropolitan Manila. Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824,
reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975
wherein the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the
President to restructure the local governments into an integrated
unit of the manager or commission form of government.” It was then
pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the
corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the
contiguous communities has brought into being a large area that calls
for development both simultaneous and unified. It "is vital to the
survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that
a workable and effective system be established for the coordination,
integration and unified management of such local government
services or functions" therein. There is necessity for "the unified
metropolitan services or functions to be planned, administered, and
operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards." 15
The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the objective of
such Presidential Decree. Application of Paredes vs Executive
Secretary. In Paredes vs Executive Secretary, the Court did came to
the conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected
would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the
barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot
be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to
constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27,
1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen
municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having
manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by
petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the
time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local
Government Code. Presidential Authority to Issue the PD.At that time
there was no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who
was entrusted with such responsibility. The legality of the law making
authority by the President during the period of Martial Law was
already established in Aquino vs Comelec. Sangguniang Bayan. The
point has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No.
824 be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other
cities and municipalities, there should be elections for the
Sangguniang Bayan, then there is a denial of the equal protection
provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken. It is clear
that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden.
But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted.The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class." All such elements are present. There is no
need to set forth anew the compelling reasons that called for the
creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the
conditions then existing - still present and, with the continued growth
of population, attended with more complexity - what was done was
a response to a great public need. The government was called upon
to act. PD 824 was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of
the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen
municipalities that the membership be identical with those of other
cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for such a
distinction Basis in the Constitution.Article VIII, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as
Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its
existence in the fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these
petitions, there being no legal justification for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first
time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of
Metropolitan Manila. (Election Code of 1978, Presidential Decree No.
1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements, Presidential
Decree No. 824, creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
Amendments to the Constitution, Ordinance) Control of the
President. It is undeniable that the creation of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection. There
is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers
of the President over the Commission. According to PD 824: "The
Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission
shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President.
Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall
have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance,
resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the
Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as
it confers the power of control on the President. That control he
certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the
ministries. His power over local governments does not go that far. It
extends no further than general supervision. These doubts, however,
do not suffice to nullify such a provision. Succinctly put, that
construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that
will destroy. To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is
to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the constitution
enters into and forms part of every statute. Accordingly, the
presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila
Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in
character. There can be no valid objection to such exercise of
authority. That is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are
those of a national character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro
Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to
local government functions, the power of the President is confined to
general supervision. As thus construed, Section 13 clearly appears to
be free from any constitutional infirmity. Abad Santos, dissenting. 1.
The referendum of February 27, 1975, did not satisfy the prohibition
contained in Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For one thing the
provision speaks of "the criteria established in the local government
code." There was then no local government code so there were no
criteria. Also the grant of power to restructure the 4 cities and 13
municipalities in the Greater Manila area "under such terms and
conditions as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in
fact not an intelligent decision on the part of the people. I submit that
a grant of power must be definite to be valid; it must not be nebulous
and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdication thereof.
Finally, the referendum did not include all of the peoples of Bulacan
and Rizal to ascertain if they were willing to give up some of their
towns to Metropolitan Manila. The referendum suffers from the
same infirmity present in the case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary,
cited in the main opinion, where I dissented. 2. The January 27, 1984,
amendment to the Constitution providing for representation in the
Batasang Pambansa and which allocates representatives to "districts
in Metropolitan Manila" cannot be construed to constitutionally
validate P.D. No. 824 for the simple reason that the issue before the
people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was not
the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Alvarez vs Guingona
ALVAREZ V GUINGONA (1996)
Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the
municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent component city
to be known as the city of Santiago. The law was challenged mainly
because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago
has not met the minimum average annual income required under
Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component
city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on
April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was transmitted to the
Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243
was filed on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was
transmitted to the senate. The committee recommended that HB
8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration
that the house bill was identical to the senate bill.
Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city
Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into
a component city because its average annual income for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the
required annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city.
After deducting the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotments), ti appears
that the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Petitioners
asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or
budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate,
increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and
equal sharing. Petitioners asseverations are untenable because
Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted
into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual
income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must
be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government
Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law
and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining
to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not
intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The practical side
to development through a decentralized local government system
certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its
broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government
unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive
operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local
government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out
its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and
broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just
share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal
revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the
national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. For purposes
of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of
the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and
the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered
items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the
Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or
received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. 11 They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is
there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used
in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct
from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
"funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities
and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its own version
of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives
Held: Ye s. Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817
should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a
bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is
untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in
the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the
Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission
that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was
filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive
not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB
No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that
culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation
of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under
the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore,
petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already
approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public
hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third
Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on
January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February
23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance
any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already
approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill. Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance: Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of
a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
so long as action by the senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.Every law, including RA No 7720 has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. It is a well entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption
of constitutionality,. Consequently, for RA No 7720 to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Consititution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one, in other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will
justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking
into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately
preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No 7720, the court stands on the holding that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal
of this petition is therefore inevitable. It is a well-entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption
of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20
Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional
must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a
declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into
consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately
preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
Municipality of san fernando vs Firme
FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died.
The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages against the owner
and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig.
Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability
of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Baniña.
ISSUES: 1. Are municipal corporations suable? 2. Is the Municipality
liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged
in the discharge of governmental functions?
Ruling: 1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance
of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right
to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant
cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions
are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty,
and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their
acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless
public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
City of Manila vs IAP
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery
which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of
the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document
embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only
for Fve years, the city certifieded the lot as ready for exhuma±on. On
the basis of the cer±Fca±on, Joseph Helmuth authorized the
exhuma±on and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were
placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was
also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the
private respondents were shocked to Fnd out that Vicencio’s remains
were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the
husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children
brought an ac±on for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline
Suva of the City Health O²ce; Sergio Mallari, o²cer-in-charge of the
North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the la³er's predecessor as
o²cer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the
City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give
plain±´s the right to make use of another lot. CA affirmed and
included that award of moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the operations and functions of a public
cemetery are a governmental or a corporate or proprietary functions
of the City of Manila
Ruling: Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body
corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue
and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are
twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers
on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage
of the community and include those which are ministerial, private
and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is
stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character
as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government,
and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
[1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it
may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and
private or proprietary capacity. The North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila. With the acts of dominion, there is,
therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of
property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was
leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as
the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles
the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract. nder the doctrine of respondent superior,
(Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check
the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No.
5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5)
years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease
contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
Drilon vs Lim
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because
it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not
been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to
failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it
anyway.) In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar
as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances
and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction
between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a
superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions
in accordance with law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged
section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X,
specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers
of local governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.
Ruling : Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside
the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He
did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only
was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was
an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely
this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of
control but of mere supervision.
Solicitor General vs Metropoliotan Manila Authority
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among
the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even
the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to
be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that
Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses
and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the
PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the
removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a
resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction
between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power
conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of
resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it
violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and
so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of
examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to
its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Ruling: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative
power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites
of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first requirement, the
statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute
reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the
discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the
case at bar.As a second requirement, the enforcement may be
effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function
of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement
has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of
the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at
bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's
authority. But the problem before us is not the validity of the
delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the
validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments
acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts
of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6)
must be general and consistent with public policy. 7A careful study of
the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not
conform to existing law. In fact, the above provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The
Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline"
traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as
are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the
removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5
thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the
driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are
applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local
political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate
existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from
the national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called
the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress,
the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments
in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against
the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the
ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances
amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing
them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent
bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the
execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to
deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end
be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of
PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and
in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and
violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
Ganzon vs CA
Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of
administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by
various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and
reasons, the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued a
preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In the other
case, respondent ordered petitioner's second preventive suspension
for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. The
second preventive suspension was not enforced. Amidst the two
successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent in the RTC. Presently, he
instituted an action for prohibition, in the respondent CA.
Meanwhile, the respondent issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in
twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced
before the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment
dismissing the cases.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's
alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with
the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding
the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative
as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to
break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy,
to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations,
in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of
local government units, as in the federal governments of the United
States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to
have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small
republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units
from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not
instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the
passage of a local government code,27 a local tax law,28 income
distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and
measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the
local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the
existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to
the President. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was
meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to
strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its
affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and
insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of
national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: Now,
autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or
suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal
and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations.
Since local governments remain accountable to the national
authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein,
impose disciplinary action against local officials; "Supervision" and
"investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not have);
MCIAA vs Marcos( doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the
National Government over local governments.) the petitioner
contends that being an instrumentality of the National Government,
respondent City of Cebu has no power nor authority to impose realty
taxes upon it in accordance with the aforesaid Section 133 of the LGC,
as explained in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation:[9] Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stock are owned by the National
Government. . . .
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually
is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)This doctrine emanates from the supremacy
of the National Government over local governments.
Facts :MCIAA basically contended that the taxing powers of local
government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any
kind on an instrumentality of the national government. Petitioner
insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it
nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or
instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its
powers and functions. Respondent City, however, asserted that
MCIAA is not an instrumentality of the government but merely a
government-owned corporation performing proprietary functions.
As such, all exemptions previously granted to it were deemed
withdrawn by operation of law, as provided under Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Government Code.
Ruling: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very
nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only
in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations
thereon may be imposed by the people through their
Constitutions.[13] Our Constitution, for instance, provides that the
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.[14] So potent indeed is the
power that it was once opined that the power to tax involves the
power to destroy.[15] Verily, taxation is a destructive power which
interferes with the personal and property rights of the people and
takes from them a portion of their property for the support of the
government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.[16] But
since taxes are what we pay for civilized society,[17] or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from
taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority.[18] A claim of exemption from tax payments must
be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken.[19] Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption
therefrom is the exception.[20] However, if the grantee of the
exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule
of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be
handled by the government in the course of its operations.[21]
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer
merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to
direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution.[22] Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the
petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies,
and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and
exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception
to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties
based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then
becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution. The terms Republic of the Philippines and
National Government are not interchangeable. The former is broader
and synonymous with Government of the Republic of the Philippines
which the Administrative Code of 1987 defines as the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made affective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.[27] These
autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions are the political subdivisions.[28]
On the other hand, National Government refers to the entire
machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the
different forms of local governments.[29] The National Government
then is composed of the three great departments: the executive, the
legislative and the judicial.[30]
An agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein;[31] while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
and controlled corporation.
Limbona vs Mangelin GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of
the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with
local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and
informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary
that there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on
November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and
void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership
therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines
of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal
as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region
XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so.
In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called
his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act
of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.
San Juan vs CSC
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant;
thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay
Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position.
However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the
ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was
subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the
appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service
Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest
on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the
appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof,
he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was
not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to
recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing
laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required
standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor
recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation
of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend
cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of
public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any
existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the
qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's
Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed
in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such
power over local governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The
exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the
present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the
list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Cordillera vs COA
Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13,
1986, the Cordillera People s LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the
Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people
shall notundertake their demands through armed and violent
struggle but by peaceful means, such as politicalnegotiations.A
subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties.
Such agreement states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in
drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that
couldperform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for
the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel
join the study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive
Order.Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted
by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the representatives of
the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President
CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the
Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and
theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220
on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in
the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras
Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created
the Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed on the primary ground
that the President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by
Congress and the approval of such act through a plebiscite.
Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a
step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does
not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution.
It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous
region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure
for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which
undoubtedly, will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising
legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it
fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime the organic act had not yet been passed.
Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR
contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for
the provinces composing it. It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers
to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. On
the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy, not just
administrative, to these regions. As said earlier, the CAR is a mere
transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in
the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.