CARL and Agrarian Jurisprudence Index

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INDEX-DIGESTS OF AGRARIAN RELATED JURISPRUDENCE
A

ABANDONMENT
For abandonment to occur, the tenant must have unequivocally and absolutely relinquished his
occupation and cultivation of the lots. This is not so in this case. Petitioner continued to occupy Lot No.
2679 for residential and small backyard farming purposes, despite the fact that the eruption of Mr.
Pinatubo made it impossible for him to continue with its cultivation. Moreover, under Memorandum
Circular No. 10, series of 1983, the alleged abandonment of the land by the tenant does not
automatically terminate the tenancy relationship as there must be a proper court declaration of such
fact. In this case, such court declaration of abandonment is wanting.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND TOMAS SOBREVIÑAS
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. No. 138289

ABANDONMENT; Requisites:
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right
or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. The
intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or
claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versus-
Sps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297

ACCOUNTING; What includes

We have ruled in Yusay vs. Alojado, that accounting includes the determination, adjudication and
settlement of what is due the landholder and the tenant under the law. Moreover, Sec. 38, R.A. No.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, provides that "an action to enforce any
cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three (3) years after such
cause of action accrued". Construing this provision is Dolofino vs. Court of Appeals (SCRA), we rule
that "the law does not specifically require a judicial action, hence it can be an administrative action.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos".
DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON

-versus-
LEONARDO ARELLANO
Promulgated: November 6, 1992
G.R. No. 77104

ACQUISITION; Mode of
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and
voluntary.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526

ACQUISITION; Procedure for Compulsory Acquisition

In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries
must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the
landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the
LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowners accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects
the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested
parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days
from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of
just compensation.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526

ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

"Under this rule, only a person who is interested 'under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of
his rights or duties thereunder.' This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."
NATALIA REALTY, INC.

-versus-
G.R. No. 126462

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF LAND; Prescription thereof

In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals we observed that an action for reconveyance of
a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but this rule applied only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.

-versus-
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547

ACTION; Must be prosecuted in name of real party in interest

We, therefore, take exception to the literal application of Section 17 of P.D. 946 for as stated in
Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. (88 Phil. 125 (1951), an action is brought for a practical
purpose, may obtain actual and positive relief. If the party sued upon is not the proper party, any
decision that may be rendered against him would be futile, for it cannot be enforced or executed. The
effort may be employed will be wasted.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought a party
which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd.
supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 (1917).
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versus-
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
SCRA No. 207

ACTION; Nature of
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE

-versus-
MARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122276

ACTION; Party not impleaded not bound by the decision rendered therein
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 (1990), a person who was not
impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be
affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his
disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to
pay for it.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versus-
IAC & BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.
G.R. No. 76225

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT; When can it be assailed

Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law. A grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it may stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law of putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the land and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provision of the law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEPARTMENT

OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 118712 & 118745

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality
by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the
jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB
officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking
cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who
should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess
of its jurisdiction.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 132048
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collusion,
arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a department head, in rendering
his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with.
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.

-versus-
ADJUTO ABILLE
G.R. No. 130196

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter
is the alter ego of the President.
Note: The doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 80719

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Interpretation thereof; rule on

It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and
are entitled to great respect.
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versus-
HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 60269
SCRA Vol. No. 201 p. 536

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS; Effect

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force
of law and are entitled to great respect.
-versus-
HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 60269
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and

policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
-versus-
HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 60269

AGENT; Personality
Erilla as an agent of the landowner(s) was not an independent personality who could provide insulation
for the landowners from their obligations to private respondents as tenants or agricultural lessees. To
hold that the landowner(s) did not give their consent because private respondents had been hired or
give their consent because private respondents had been hired not give their consent because private
respondents had been hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the landowner(s) with too
easy an escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple expedient of hiring an employee
or overseer to stand between the landowner(s) and the tenants or agricultural lessees. To sustain this
particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the force and effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended,
well nigh to the vanishing point.
SPS. AMADEO AND AURORA CUAÑO

-versus-
CA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159

AGRARIAN CASES; Appeal

In appeals in agrarian cases, the only function required of the Court of Appeals is to determine whether
the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations are supported by substantial evidence. And
substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, and where the findings of fact of the agrarian court are
supported by substantial evidence, such findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court
(Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226 (1986); Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. vs. Tolentino, 167
SCRA 334 (1988). In such cases, the appellate court cannot make its own findings of fact and
substitute and same in lieu of the findings of fact of the agrarian court.
ANGELES MALATE, NORBERTO ESGUERRA AND

BENEDICTO ESGUERRA
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELINO GEMANIL
G.R. No. 55318

AGRARIAN CASES; Prescriptive period of action for accounting

Unfortunately, private respondent's claim has already prescribed. Under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 1199, an action for accounting may be filed by the tenant within three (3) years from the date of the
threshing of the crop in question.
DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONARDO ARELLANO
G.R. No. 77104

AGRARIAN CASE; Quantum of evidence required

In agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the trial court findings of fact
which attained the minimum of evidentiary support demanded by law, i.e., by substantial evidence, are
final and conclusive and cannot be disturbed by the appellate tribunals.
Moreover, in agrarian case, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence.
This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in Section 18 , P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June
17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989).
These findings are supported by substantial evidence on record particularly in his rebuttal testimony on
October 20, 1970 (October T.S.N., pp. 68-70, which are not sufficient in this case being an agrarian
case where all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
This court has consistently ruled that in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which attained the minimum evidentiary support demanded
by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by
the appellate tribunal.
NICOLAS REYES, ET AL.

-versus-
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 96489
ROMEO REYES, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 96492
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
IAC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323

AGRARIAN CASES; Resolution

The rationale of the rule requiring a defendant in an agrarian case to file an answer and not a motion to
dismiss is to expedite the proceedings. The filing of the motion to dismiss and the granting thereof by
the lower court based upon indubitable grounds precisely expedited the proceedings and conforms with
the spirit and intention of P.D. No. 946 which requires courts trying agrarian cases to employ every
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity without
regard to technicalities of law and procedure and empowering the Court to adopt any appropriate
measure or procedure in any situation or matter not provided for or covered by the Decree (Section
116, 3rd and 4th sentences, P.D. No. 946).
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225

AGRARIAN DISPUTE; Defined

Section 3, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6657 defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to controversy
relating to tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworker's association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.

-versus-
G.R. No. 132048
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.

-versus-
CA AND CELESTINO VILLALON
G.R. No. 109093

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Definition

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

-versus-
G.R. No. 122276
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS Represented by

his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA.
DE SANTOS
-versus-
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 109992

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Resolution

The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a
better nay presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Thus, respondent appellate
court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal
battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic
in Quismondo vs. Court of Appeals (SCRA), the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage to the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are
summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to
the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive proceeding.

-versus-
CA AND CELESTINO VILLALON
G.R. No. 109093

AGRARIAN LAW; Powers of the President

The promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no reason to modify
or reverse it in that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

-versus-
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 342

AGRARIAN LAW; Rationale for the enactment

The agrarian law was established in the light of the social justice precept of the Constitution and in the
exercise of the police power of the state to promote the common weal (Primero vs. CIR, L-10594, May
29, 1957; Pineda, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., L-23773-74, December 29, 1967).
DOMINGO AND ROSA SALEN

-versus-
HON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 59082

AGRARIAN REFORM; Objectives

Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by Congress to establish owner-cultivatorship and the
family size farm as the basis of Phil. Agriculture; to achieve a dignified for the small farmers free from
pernicious industrial restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizens and a source of a genuine strength in our democratic society.
In other words it was enacted to help the small farmers and to uplift their economic status by providing
them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter,
education and other basic necessities.
ANACLETO DE JESUS
-versus-
175 SCRA 559

AGRARIAN REFORM; Raison d'être

Agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that there is an urgent need to
alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our country.
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.

-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 110335

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY; Defined

Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether
natural or juridical.
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versus-
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586

AGRICULTURAL LABORER; Defined

Agricultural laborer — works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives salary or wage,
regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.
COCONUT COOP. MARKETING, INC.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 568

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Coverable under CARL

Be that, as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
noted in an opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the
NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes to be developed as human
settlements by the proper land and housing agency, are not deemed agricultural lands within the
meaning and intent of Section (3) of R.A. No. 6657. Not being deemed "agricultural", they are outside
the coverage of CARL.
NATALIA REALTY, INC., ET AL.

-versus-
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: August 12, 1993

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Defined

Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, "all public and private agricultural lands."
Section 3(c) defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
Respondent vehemently insists that its lots had been classified as residential prior to June 15, 1988, the
date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. As earlier mentioned, Engineer Gregorio Bermejo, Municipal
Engineer and Deputized Zoning Administrator of Dasmariñas, Cavite, certified that respondent's lands
are within the residential zone of
Dasmariñas, based on the Land Use Plan of that municipality duly approved by the HLURB in its
Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981. We observe, however, that this factual issue was
never determined below. Thus, we cannot conclude that respondent's parcels of land are residential.

-versus-
APEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422
As a preliminary point, we note that the landholding in dispute is a mango plantation.

We consider that — and there appears no dispute on this point – this plantation is covered by
the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Section 166 (1) of which defines agricultural
land as "land devoted to any growth, including but no limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish
ponds, idle lands and abandoned lands as defined in pars. 18 and 19 of this Section,
respectively". It is worth noting also that R.A. No. 1199, the earlier statute known as "The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines", effective 30 August 1954, although it did not
expressly define agricultural land, did not limit its scope to rice land, to the contrary, Chapter
III, Section 41 of the Statute, among other provisions, expressly recognized share tenancy in
respect of crops other than rice.
SPS. AMADEO CUAÑO AND AURORA Y CUAÑO

-versus-
RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Effect of transfer

The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferees is simply subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, R.A. 3844).
SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO AND MONINA FULE

-versus-
G.R. No. 89545
Note: Deliberate refusal of lessee to pay rent for two years carries with it the penalty of
forfeiture.

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Establishment

The present dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No. 3844, which,
except for Section 35 thereof, was not specifically repealed by the passage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657), but was intended to have suppletory effect to the latter
law. Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold
relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written
agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural
share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other
method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. In the instant case,
it is not disputed that an agricultural leasehold contract was entered into between petitioner and Ramon
Castro. Respondents, however, insist that an agricultural leasehold contract over a one-hectare portion
of the landholding arose as a result of the actions of Ramon's overseer, who must be viewed as the
latter's agent. They conclude that because of this implied leasehold, the application of the contract
between petitioner and the landowner should be limited to the remaining portion of the property.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versus-
RICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 140164

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; How established

An agricultural leasehold relationship exists by operation of law when there is a concurrence of an
agricultural lessor and an agricultural lessee. As clearly stated in Section 5 of the Code:
"Sec. 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relations. — The

agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in
accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or
in writing, expressly or impliedly."
In other words, in the case at bar, from the moment Benigno, as legal possessor (and, therefore, an
agricultural lessor) granted the cultivation and use of the landholding to Bernas in exchange or
consideration for a sharing in the harvest, an agricultural leasehold relationship emerged between them
"by operation of law.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versus-
G.R. No. 85041

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD RELATION; Extinguishment

Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844, on the other hand, states that once the agricultural leasehold relation is
established, the same shall confer upon the lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until
such relation is extinguished, and the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court and for causes provided by
law. It is worthy to note that the sale or alienation of tenanted land is not among the causes of
extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation provided under the law.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL

-versus-
G.R. No. 125063

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing

Agricultural Leasehold
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing
agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent
evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are
therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN

-versus-
G.R. No. 126425

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Agricultural Lessee Installed by Legal Possessor Cannot be

Ejected by Landowner on the Land's Return to the Latter
Clearly, the return of legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the rights of Bernas
as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an agricultural leasehold are provided
for by law. The enumeration is exclusive and no other grounds can justify termination of the lease. The
policy and letter of the law are clear on this point.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD
BITO-ON DEITA
G.R. No. 85041

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Defined

As defined in Section 166 (3) of the Code, an agricultural lessor is a natural or juridical person who,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation
and use of his land for a price certain. Nothing in said Section, it will be noted, requires that the civil
law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor should have the prior authorization of the landowner in
order to let or grant to another the cultivation or use of the landholding.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versus-
G.R. No. 85041
"Agricultural Lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in
produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the
Philippines".
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versus-
G.R. No. 96489

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Right in a contract of mortgage

The right of redemption vested in agricultural lessees is superior to the right of the mortgagee of the
land. The land was, in the hands of the two (2) daughters of Andres Cruz and of petitioner Cuaño
spouses, already subject to the right of redemption vested in private respondents. It follows that when
the Cuaño spouses mortgaged the same land to secure a loan obtained from PAIC, PAIC's right as
mortgagee was subject to, and junior to, the prior right of private respondents to redeem the said
property. Put a little differently, what the Cuaño spouses mortgaged to PAIC was not absolute or
unqualified dominium plenum over the land, but rather a right of ownership qualified by and subject to
the right of redemption of private respondents. PAIC, of course, could not have acquired rights superior
to those of its mortgagors.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159

AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Right, to whom it is enforceable

This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals where this court further held that the
agricultural lessee's rights are enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor-in-
interest. Therefore, as the adjudged legitimate tenant on the land in question, private respondent
Montano may enforce his right of possession against petitioner PNB, whose contention that private
respondent Montano is illegally occupying the property lacks basis in fact and in law.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND HON. JUDGE OF THE RTC OF
GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, BR. 34 AND ILDEFONSO MONTANO
G.R. No. 105760

AGRICULTURAL SHARE TENANCY

Under identical facts, Republic Act No. 6389 (September 10, 1971) which later amended Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3844, by providing for an "automatic conversion" from agricultural share tenancy to
agricultural leasehold, was held to be applicable to presidential proclamations to the effect that
measures have been adopted to insure efficient management of the agricultural and processing phases
of crops covered by marketing allotments, it would be nothing short of regressive to deny sugarland
share tenants of their right to elect the leasehold system. Considering the policy of the government as
enunciated in Section 4 of the Code as amended, which mandates the automatic conversion of share
tenants to leaseholders, individual sugarlands should not be discriminated against. Hence, any share
tenant in sugarlands tenants who do not avail of said option may still be subject to existing lawful
arrangements with the landowner in the absence of the Presidential Proclamation adverted in Section 4
(Wilfredo David vs. CA, supra).
CARLOS DAYRIT
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57675

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Defined

Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to
or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
member of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
GUERRERO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
142 SCRA 136
CARAG
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
151 SCRA 44

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites

One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by the landowner
and tenant, of the produce. There is no basis for the petitioner's claim that he is an agricultural tenant.
No proof of sharing has been shown in this case.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND ARMANDO ANGELES
G.R. No. 111179

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Requires consent

It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true
and lawful owner is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is
cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or permission to work on the farm
land.
SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI
G.R. No. 88113

AGRICULTURAL WORKER; Defined

A farmhand or agricultural worker is any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to
a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian
dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323

AMORTIZATION PAYMENTS; Credited

We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and
subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1971 by the private
respondent tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were
required to apply under Presidential Decree No. 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to
petitioners, the former landowners as part of the compensation for the dominion over land of which
they were deprived by operation of P.D. No. 27. Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals like
those which had been paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27 and
prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer.
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versus-
HON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 51333
Pending full payment of the cost of the land to the old landowner by the Land Bank of
the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally maintained" by the "lease rentals"
paid by the tenant-farmers prior to such full payment by the Land Bank to the old landowner,
would be credited no longer as rentals but un-amortized portion being payable by the Land
Bank. In respect of lands brought within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the
leasehold system was legally and effectively terminated immediately on 21 October 1972
(notwithstanding the curious statement in Department Circular No. 8 that it was subjected to
the terms and effects of Operation Land Transfer that the leasehold system did continue to
govern the relationship between the "landowner and his tenant-tillers".
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versus-
G.R. No. 51333

APPEAL
The failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not permissible for decisions of the
said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to determine whether a petition for review is
the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they
act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without
exclusivity in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a
petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for
quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong.
Although Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 [13] (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure) included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for
review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a
quasi-judicial agency.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.

-versus-
ARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
G.R. No. 143275

APPEAL; Appeal to the Office of the President

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18, Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as

otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is
filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 131457

APPEAL; Change of theory, not allowed

The long settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory of the case or
his cause of action on appeal. The Court previously held that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or
power to decide a question not in issue" and that a judgment something upon which the parties were
not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental
tenets of fair play and, in the present case, the Court is properly compelled not to go beyond the issue
litigated in the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano
Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation as such by Benigno Bito-on, the
legal possessor of the landholdings at the time Bernas was so installed and, consequently entitled to
security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for the dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural
leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and only then can be the private respondent (landowner)
initiate a separate action to dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she must allege and prove
compliance with Section 36 (1) of the Code which consist of, among others, a one year advance notice
to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land involved being less than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay
him the damages required also by the Code.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versus-
G.R. No. 85041

APPEAL; Decisions of the Regional Director

Pursuant to DAR Administrative Orders Nos. 9-94, 10-94 and 12-94, the remedy of a party aggrieved
by the decision of the Regional Director is to file a motion for reconsideration, and in the event the
motion is denied, to appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless, we agree that in the
instant case a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of respondent Regional Director would have
been useless. It appears that upon the issuances of the Resolution of respondent Regional Director
denying petitioners' Application for Exemption on 27 November 1996 or thereabouts, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform proceeded to cancel their title over the disputed property and transferred it to
designated beneficiaries through the issuance of a collective CLOA. Hence, considering that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform had already canceled petitioners' title to the property and caused its
distribution to designated beneficiaries even before the pending incidents with respondent Regional
Director could be resolved, it would indeed be futile to expect the latter to reconsider his earlier posture
and contradict or reverse the position taken by his superior, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA

-versus-
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 133806

APPEAL; Decisions of the secretary of DAR appealable to the office of the president
The question as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are
exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary of Agrarian Reform) whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus
excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Court.
Failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in
this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter
ego of the President.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versus-
MIN. OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND SULPICIO BOMBALES
G.R. No. 80719

APPEALS; From decisions of special agrarian court

It is relevant to mention in this connection that —
(1) Appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, and
(2) Appeals from any "decision, in order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on
any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and
other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as
otherwise provided within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof", the "findings of fact of the
DAR (being) final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence". (This mode of appeal is sui
generis. It is the only instance when an appeal by certiorari may be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Heretofore, appeals by certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court).
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, UDK No. 9864

APPEAL; How Appeal Taken

We note that at the time of the promulgation of the DARAB decision on June 1, 1995, appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR were governed by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91). As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the remedy should have been a
petition for review, filed by petitioner in seven legible copies, without impleading the DARAB, the
agency a quo as required by Circular No. 1-95. As found by the respondent court, not only did
petitioner implead the DARAB, all his annexes other than the assailed resolutions of the DARAB were
not certified true copies. In addition, it did not state the date petitioner received a copy of each
resolution, such that it could not determine if the appeal was filed on time. Petitioner's failure to
comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal merited the dismissal of his petition before the
Court of Appeals.
ROBERTO MITO
-versus-
G.R. No. 126099

APPROPRIATION LAW; Purpose

An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of
public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS

-versus-
HON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343

AUTHORITY OF DAR SECRETARY

P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land
to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5)
issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No.
816.

-versus-
G.R. No. 132048
B

BACK RENTALS; Payment

The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold rental is an issue which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal competence of the Regional Trial Court to
resolve. Consequently, there is exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively
cognizable y the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold
contract with private respondents is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial
court to resolve.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
G.R. No. 109093

BENEFICIARIES; Determination of
At this juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded only that the identification and selection of CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
LOLIHALA SABERON LERCANA

-versus-
PORFERIO JALANDONI, ET AL.
G.R. No. 132286

BENEFICIARIES; Qualification
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much
as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of
the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make
the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or
performance of each beneficiary, that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any
support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports
on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND TOMAS SOBREVIÑAS
G.R. No. 138289

BENEFICIARY; Woman
Neither is their argument that Plaintiff-Appellee, being a woman, is not capable of discharging the
demands of farming, valid. This Board finds said argument anachronistic with the changing times of
great awareness of the potentials of women. Women today are found manning our commerce and
industry, and agriculture is no exception.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versus-
G.R. No. 140164

BILL; Requires one subject

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill
does not have a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant
to each other and may be inferred from the title.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versus-

B.P. 129; CAR was integrated into the RTC

In the 1980, upon the passage of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts
and the jurisdiction of the former as vested in the latter courts.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versus-
G.R. No. 95664
C

CARETAKER; Construed
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the cultivator of the
land.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323

CARL PROVISION ON LIVESTOCKS, POULTRY AND SWINE; Declared unconstitutional

Section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as it deals the inclusion of the raising of
livestocks, poultry and swine raising in its coverage as well as in the implementing rules and guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent.
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE DAR
G.R. No. 86889

CARP; Limitations
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law itself provides for recognition, subject to limitations, of
existing contracts, like lease, even when the lands covered by lease, were subjected to CARP and were
transferred to owner-beneficiaries.
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC.

-versus-
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 134431

CARP; Objective
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless
farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth,
and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a
viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless
farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move
on the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.

-versus-
TROPICAL HOMES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER

It must be stressed, however, that the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences
the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms
for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to
comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a
period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate
of land transfer (Section 2, P.D. No. 816).
PAGTALUNAN
-versus-
TAMAYO
G.R. No. 54281

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Cancellation, jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary

Petitioner's contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to
cancel the Certificate of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not
correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of CLT fall within the Secretary's administrative
jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled
to retain their ricelands (which do not exceed seven (7) hectares and had been illegally denied that
right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the CLT which had been erroneously issued
to the petitioners.
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93045

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Effect of issuance

It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer has been issued to a tenant covering the
property under the supervisions of and in compliance with the implementing rules and regulations of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, he is thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land in
question. There is no more landlord and tenant relationship and all that remains is for the Department
of Agrarian Reform to determine the valuation of the land in accordance with existing rules and
regulations for purposes of compensation to the landowner.
GENEROSO QUIBAN
-versus-
HON. WALERICO B. BUTALID

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Ground for forfeiture

Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or
amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or the
agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer.

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; How to nullify

The records show that the CLT had already been issued over the landholding in question to Perdoe
Doe. Nullification of said certificate may be had only in a case directly attacking its validity but never
collaterally.
MIRANDA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-59730

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Issuance thereof, purpose

The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee of the land
described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee
as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land
titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor
irrevocable.
-versus-
G.R. No. 60269

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER; Rights of beneficiary thereof

It is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to
an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a
right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy
[See definition of "vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498
(1928); Republic of the Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At
best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or
expectant right of ownership over the landholding
CELSO PAGTALUNAN AND PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN

-versus-
HON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 54281

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; Evidence

Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property sought to be recovered as
required by Art. 434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is
located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay May-
Iba. But private respondent's title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay
Lagundi. A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also
its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly,
petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versus-
G.R. No. 111179

CERTIFICATIONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the
DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner
in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings
specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versus-
PATRICIA ARANETA
G.R. No. 135829

CERTIORARI; As a mode of appeal

A petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In this proceeding only questions of law may be raised. Petitioner's claim for damages is a
factual issue which may not be entertained. The findings of facts of the appellate court to the effect that
there is no proof of actual damages are conclusive and binding on this Court.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86500

CERTIORARI; Cannot be taken as a substitute for lapsed appeal

As ruled by this Court, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for
the lapsed remedy of appeal.
JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 76415

CERTIORARI; Issues to be entertained

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In this proceeding only questions of law may be raised. Petitioner's claim for damages
is a factual issue which may not be entertained. The findings of facts of the appellate court to the effect
that there is no proof of actual damages are conclusive and binding on this Court.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versus-
G.R. No. 86500

CERTIORARI; Not a substitute

Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is a statutory
privilege and it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law.
ROBERTO MITO
-versus-
G.R. No. 126099

CERTIORARI; Not a substitute for a lost appeal

As ruled by the SC, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the
lost remedy of appeal (Distillera & Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 706 (1988).
JULIO BARANDA
-versus-
HON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
G.R. No. 76415

CERTIORARI; Requisites
At the outset, it should be stated that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries
of both civil and common law traditions and that the grave abuse of discretion must be shown.

-versus-
G.R. No. 76415

CERTIORARI; When Applicable

The petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals
comes within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit: (1) where the
questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right
to due process; and (3) where the question involved is a purely legal one. The petitioner further
contends that certiorari, not appeal, is the proper remedy as a question of jurisdiction prescinding from
the alleged denial of due process is raised in the petition; and that the question Orders are merely
interlocutory and hence unappealable. Moreover, the Orders issued by the Regional Office of the DAR
are void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction based on the following: (1) the orders are
baseless as the petitioner never filed any land transfer claim with the DAR; (2) they were issued in
violation of the petitioner's right to due process as the latter was never notified of the approved final
survey plan, the land valuation summary and the farmer's undertaking; and (3) the orders fixed just
compensation based on the provisions of P.D. 27 which is inconsistent with, and therefore has already
been repealed by, Republic Act No. 6657.
LILIA Y. GONZALES
-versus-
Promulgated: May 9, 2001
G.R. No. 106028
Certainly, certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination of what constitutes a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular
circumstances of each case. In the case before us, we find that an appeal to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform would appear to be a useless exercise because he had already canceled
petitioners' title to the property, which simply means, he concurred in the decision of
respondent Regional Director denying the application for exemption; hence, an appeal would
no longer be deemed an adequate remedy in the instant case.
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA

-versus-
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 133806

CIVIL LEASE; Establish

The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the landholding should be
personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, indicates the
intent of the parties to establish only a civil lease relationship.
This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners, as a way of evading the provisions of tenancy
laws, to have their tenants sign contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their
relationship. But in the case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of the respondent court indicate
that the contracts entered into were bona fide civil lease in nature, and that they were entered into by
the petitioner voluntarily.
EVANGELISTA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-37736
The written agreement subscribed to by both parents in this case is in the nature of a
civil lease and not one of agricultural tenancy. There is no sharing of harvests and the
landowner has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production. Instead, there is a
fixed consideration regardless of the volume of the produce of the land. In the fourth paragraph
of the agreement, it is stated that the amount of P1,000.00 shall first be paid before the
respondent may work on the land. The fifth paragraph even provides a stipulation as to a
possible increase in consideration, provided it is first communicated to the respondent.
Moreover, the succeeding paragraphs provide that the petitioner may terminate the agreement
and recover the possession of the land at any time after the harvests.
ROSALINA MAGNO-ADAMOS, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. AGUSTIN O. BAGSAO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 63671

CIVIL LIABILITY
Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2) breach of contract or (3) tortious act. The
first is governed by the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by the Civil Code.
LEONARDA L. MONSANTO
-versus-
JESUS and TERESITA ZERNA and CA
G.R. No. 142501

CLASSIFICATION; Defined
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each others in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:
1. it must be based on substantial distinctions;
2. it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3. it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. it must apply equally to all the members of the class. . . .
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS

-versus-

CLASSIFICATION OF LAND; Lands within poblacion presumed to be residential, not

agricultural
The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is
not necessarily devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot
inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
HILARIO
-versus-
G.R. No. 70736

COMMISSION; Creation of
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore material in the
disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect
and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners
when it very well knew that the survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the
determination of the slope of the subject parcels of land. it is the protestation of petitioner that comes at
a belated hour. The team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons who
were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey and
inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full
faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 139592

COMMISSIONER; Findings not conclusive

Even so, the report and recommendations of the panel of commissioners were not conclusive upon the
trial court, which had the right and discretion to arrive at its own assessment of the land. The findings
of the commissioners were at best only advisory and persuasive and by no means final or binding.
B.H. BERKENKOTTER & CO.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND REP. OF THE PHILS.
G.R. No. 89980

COMPENSABLE TAKING; Conditions

As held in the Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the following
conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned the measures
before us.
PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

COMPENSATION; Land Bank of the Philippines, Role of

The act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion.
The compensation to be approved was not trifling but amounted to as much as P62 million of public
funds, to be paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier for only P3
million.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

-versus-
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93661

COMPLAINT; Party not impleaded not bound by decision

A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the
petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or
national, is in a position to pay for it.
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225
SCRA Vol. No. 207

COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM; Scope

Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the CARP. It states that the program
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987,
including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture".

-versus-
UDK No. 9864

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; Validity

It is apparent that despite the pendency of this case, the parties have endeavored and managed to
resolve the dispute among-themselves. The only thing left for us to do is to put our judicial imprimatur
on the compromise agreement in accordance with Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
Finding the Compromise Agreement to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy, the same is hereby approved.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CUETO
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CONSOLACION COMPUESTO
G.R. No. 141182

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION; Identification of Land

Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of
responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition
Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice
of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF.
He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or
agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION; Priority Mode of Land Acquisition

The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the
CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the
farmer beneficiaries.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526

CONSTITUTION — Construction thereof; aids

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by
itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision
which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the
people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
HON. SEC. OF DAR
G.R. No. 86889

CONSTRUCTION; Rules in Constitutional Construction

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution.
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by
itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision
which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the
people when they ratified it.
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
HON. SECRETARY
G.R. No. 86889

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is
not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are
still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge
was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited
Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: [24] First, the Rules of Court
clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied
with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion
filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of
the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent's
"Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3,
2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

-versus-
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR.
G. R. No. 152611

CONVERSION ORDER; Final and Executory

We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering that the Conversion
Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no more case to which it could
intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed pursuant to the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB
Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable. A perusal of the records reveal
that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the purpose of implementing the
Conversion Orders particularly the final fixing of the disturbance compensation to legitimate farmer-
occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy
relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does not have any jurisdiction.
Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant petition not intervene in
the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even recognized as the
rightful tenants occupying the subject land. as observed by the DAR, "members of petitioner are merely
holding on to an expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still
CARPable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already been excluded from the
purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which
had long become final and executory.
KOOPERATIBA NG SANDIGAN NG MAGSASAKANG

PILIPINO, INC. (KSMP)
-versus-
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD, ET AL.
G.R. No. 139051

CO-OWNER; Effect of sale of the entire property without consent of other co-owners
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the portion subject
matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
"As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923). This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share
and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
things owned in common. (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909). . . . For Article 494 of
the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

-versus-
G.R. No. 108547

CO-OWNERSHIP; Rights of an heir

In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, this Court rules that the heirs, as co-owners, shall each have the full
ownership of his parts and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir may therefore, alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when the personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

-versus-
G.R. No. 108547

COVERAGE; Homestead Patents

The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 1978, which
states: "Tenanted private agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn which have been
acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, shall also be covered by
Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably, petitioner's parcels of lands, though obtained by homestead
patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original
homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by
homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact
of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their
lands from land reform coverage.
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versus-
DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 139083

COVERAGE; Notice of
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent
domain. To the extent that the CARL retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum are allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere
limitation on the use of the land. what is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession
of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526
D

DAMAGES, Actual, burden of proof

The argument of petitioner that assuming there is no evidence of actual damages, the Court of Appeals
should have asked petitioner to present the evidences in this aspect as it authorized to receive evidence
in accordance with Section 18, P.D. No. 945 and Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, is untenable. The burden of
proof of the damages suffered is on the party claiming the same. It is the duty of proof of the damages
suffered is on present evidence to support his claim for actual damages. If he failed to do so he has only
himself to blame if no award for actual damages is handed down.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versus-
G.R. No. 86500

DAR; Authority of
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is granted with a
fusion of governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasi-judicial and the executive. The
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subject of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws have impelled this constantly growing tendency
toward such delegation.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of functions between
agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various agencies upon whom these powers are
reposed, and in the public that the agencies are supposed to serve. It divides the agencies resources and
prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very
situation is evident in the various laws distinct delineation of the functions of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, the Court must reject the
theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold that the DAR Regional
Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versus-
G.R. No. 101974

DAR SECRETARY; Powers and Functions

It should be pointed out that identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in
the DAR Secretary. Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989 provides:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10
Series of 1989
SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REGISTRATION OF
BENEFICIARIES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This
Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said
registration.
II. OBJECTIVES.
A. General
1. Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of the CARP
for the effective implementation of the program.
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
(Underscoring ours.)
DEOGRACIAS MUSA, ET AL.

-versus-
SYLVIA AMOR
G.R. No. 141396

DARAB
Apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of
the DAR), the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and
inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence", but also that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, that when there are two or more
representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among
themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings".

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
UDK No. 9864

DARAB; Creation of
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed of the Secretary as
Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for
Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume
the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive
Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions may be delegated to the regional
office of the Department in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versus-
G.R. No. 101974

DARAB; Jurisdiction
. . . the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in Section 50 of the CARL] is exercised
through hierarchically arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and PARAD. The latter who
exercise "delegated authority" while the first exercises appellate jurisdiction over resolutions, orders,
decision and other dispositions of the RARAD and the PARAD.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versus-
G.R. No. 101974
Rule II, Section I of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229,
228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (italics supplied)
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform
laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have
taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place.
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS Represented by

his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA. DE SANTOS
-versus-
G.R. No. 109992

DARAB JURISDICTION; Easement

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In Heirs of Herman Rey Santos vs. Court of Appeals, citing Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, we held:
"For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy relations is
outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of
general jurisdiction.
LAGUNA ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

-versus-
G.R. No. 119357

DARAB; Quasi-judicial function

We do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than
ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the complainants/petitioners, even in
an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-juridical body finds that the complainants/petitioners, are not
entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-
judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiary.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY

-versus-
DARAB, ET AL.
G.R. No. 100091

DARAB; Quasi-judicial powers

The quasi-judicial powers of the DARAB are provided in Executive No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so
far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Sec. 13. AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD — There is hereby created an
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. . . .. The Board shall
assume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of Agrarian Reform cases
under E.O. No. 229 and this E.O.
Sec. 17. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR — The DAR is hereby vested with
quasi-judicial powers to determine the adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian Reform.
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determined and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform . . ..
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY

-versus-
DARAB, ET AL.
G.R. No. 100091

DARAB RULES; Intervention

Thus, for such a motion for intervention to be entertained, two (2) requisites must concur. First, the
would-be intervenor must show that he has a substantial right or interest in the case and that second, it
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. The absence of even one requisite
will warrant its denial. Acting on this provision, the PARAD in fact denied the motion for intervention,
ruling that "their (petitioners-intervenors) rights over the property . . . can be properly threshed out in a
separate proceeding duly instituted for the purpose. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we held that the
discretion of a court (in this case a quasi-judicial agency) to allow intervention, once exercised, cannot
be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.

-versus-
TROPICAL HOMES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799

DECISION; President, no appeal but can be reviewed by courts thru certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus
There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the
courts through a civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE

-versus-
G.R. No. 80719

DEED OF DONATION; Registration necessary when 3rd persons are affected

Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not
prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties
to a donation of an immovable property, all that is requires is for said donation to be contained in a
public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in
order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry
of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its
validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in
the case at bar.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto. Thus,
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), provides:
SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. — . . . But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as
a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, . . .
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 110335

DEEMED OWNER CONCEPT
Reading the foregoing provisions, we observe that under Presidential Decree No. 27, the basic statute,
the tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size farm of five (5) hectares or, if the land was irrigated,
three (3) hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to pay for the cost of the land within fifteen (15) equal
annual amortization payments. Thus, it appears clear that ownership over lands (lie Lot No. 2-C-A-3)
subjected to OLT moved from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new
landowners). The fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenant-owners were intended to
replace the landholdings which the old landowners gave up in favor of the new landowners , the tenant-
owners. It follows that in respect of land subjected to OLT, the tenant-farmers became owners of the
land they tilled as of the effective date of P.D. No. 27, i.e., 21 October 1972.
RAMONA R. LOCSIN
-versus-
It will, however, be observed that from the outset under P.D. No. 27, the tenant-farmer
as of October 21, 1972 has already deemed in a certain sense, to be the owner of a portion of
land, subject of course, to certain conditions (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils.,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 390).
-versus-

DEFINITION FOR CERTIORARI; When may be Resorted

In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, [6] we held that the aggrieved landowners were
not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a
year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the
circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect their
interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their
protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve
its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate
respondent's lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition.

-versus-
G.R. No. 149422

DELIVERY, ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE

With respect to the non-delivery of the possession of the subject property to the private respondent,
suffice it to say that ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from the time of delivery thereof
either actual or constructive. Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made
through a public instrument the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. The
execution of the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from
the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same. In the
instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owners certificate of title to herein private respondent. It is not
necessary that vendee be physically present at every square inch of the land bought by him, possession
of the public instrument of the land is sufficient to accord him the rights of ownership. Thus, delivery
of a parcel of land may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by
embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive). The provision of Article 1358 on the
necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a
requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public
instrument.
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the
thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of
the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for
lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may
exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versus-
G.R. No. 109410

DEPOSIT AS CONTEMPLATED IN SECTION 16 (E) OF R.A. NO. 6657; Meaning thereof

Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LPB BONDS", to wit:
"Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — . . .
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank deposited by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . ".
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded
construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of the term
"deposit". Accordingly we must adhered to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
Thus, recourse to any rule which allow the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under
Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

-versus-
G.R. No. 118712
DAR, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

-versus-
Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account
as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgated rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of R.A. No. 6657.
The contention is untenable, it is very explicit therefrom from Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred
that the deposit can be made in any form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

-versus-
G.R. No. 118745
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform
-versus-
G.R. No. 118745

DISPOSITION OF LAND COVERED BY P.D. 27

Obviously, the land in question is covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and its disposition is under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform which had issued the corresponding Certificate
of Land Transfer and Original Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioner.
GENEROSO QUIBAN
-versus-
HON. WALERICO B. BUTALID

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy is to claim his
disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to
pay for it.
TANPINGCO
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Conversion

In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, the only
relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the
average of the gross harvest on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versus-
LOURDES AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 138979

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Payment

In the event that tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844:
"SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as
to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years;
xxx xxx xxx
the only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years. The award of 75
square meters of land originally granted by the Regional Adjudicator and
subsequently affirmed by the DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance
compensation for the dispossession of respondents of 2,500 square meters of
land.
. . . Notwithstanding, from 1976 until 1995 respondent never sought the payment of
disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844, an action to enforce any cause of action under such law shall be
barred if not commenced within three years after such case of action accrued.
Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square
meters of land of which their father was dispossessed in 1970 has prescribed. Thus,
respondents are only entitled to disturbance compensation for their dispossession of 2,500
square meters of land and we find that, in the absence of adequate data on the land's
harvest, the award of 75 square meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief.
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versus-
LOURDES AQUINO, CITA AQUINO and
ROBERTO AQUINO
G.R. No. 138979

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; Prescription

A cause of action for disturbance compensation arose from the time the tenants were ejected.
The collection of the disturbance compensation is within the three-year prescriptive period prescribed
by Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended.
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versus-
G.R. No. 96489

DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION; When to avail thereof, how computed

The landholding is declared by the Department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes;
Provided, that the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.
LOURDES PEÑA QUA, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 95318

DOCKET FEES; Failure to Pay Required Docket Fees
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less gravely, when it refused to dismiss the
complaint filed by petitioner directing him instead to complete payment of the required docket fees.
This is conformably with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Judge Asuncion where we said
that if the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. The disposition of the trial court is likewise in conformity with De
Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that the court may allow the payment of the
docket fee within a reasonable time.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versus-

DOCKET FEES; Legal Fees in Action Involving Real Property

In Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte we decreed that when an action involves real property the
legal fees for the filing thereof shall be assessed on the basis of its value. We have no reason to deviate
therefrom.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versus-
G.R. No. 117439

DOCKET FEES; Liberal Interpretation in Certain Case

While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules, may have been liberally construed in
certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, it should
not be ignored or belittled lest it scatches and prejudice the other party's substantive rights. The
payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions
which should be strictly construed.
CONRADO COLARINA
-versus-
G.R. No. 117439

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As to whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the execution of the writ of possession issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
answer is in the negative.
The doctrine is undisputed that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or
orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by injunction (Investor's Finance Corp. vs. Ebarle, 163 SCRA 61 (1988). In fact, the doctrine is
applied by analogy even to a body statutorily at par with the Regional Trial Court.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
HON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
LEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-49293

DOCTRINE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
A sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms
of the statute or by necessary implication.
BALATBAT
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-36378

DONATION
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated.
TANPINGCO
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225

DONATION; Mode of acquiring ownership

In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 (1191), a donation as a
mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated.
TANPINGCO
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225

DUE PROCESS
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a consideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis
supplied).

-versus-
ADJUTO ABILLE
G.R. No. 130196

DUE PROCESS; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Time and again, this court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available
administrative remedies is unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.

-versus-
G.R. No. 103953
E

ECONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained

R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits
efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to
provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and
education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter
lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and corn cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and
corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78214

EJECTMENT; The primary and only issue in an ejectment suit is material possession
The primary issue in an ejectment suit is material possession of the realty only, not possession de jure.
Here, the MCTC did not pretend to resolve issues other than the question of physical possession. The
trial judge referred to petitioners registration as agricultural tenant only for the purpose of determining
who, as between Teofila and her brothers, was the actual prior possessor of the property.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND
FLAVIANO DE LUNA
G.R. No. 97788

EJECTMENT; Jurisdiction
Where the answer files asserts agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold, and even of this assertion per se does not automatically
divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, in view of the defense asserted, the MCTC
should hear and receive the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possesses
jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, while it may said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil
Case No. 262 since Bayog's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian
relationship between him and Magdato, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of
Madato's answer. Although filed late, the answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the
case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and Magdato, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued
in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se did not automatically divest
the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of Magdato's defense, the
MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it
possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the
MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.
ALEXANDER BAYOG AND JORGE PESAYCO, JR.

-versus-
HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique and ALBERTO MAGDATO
G.R. No. 118691

EMANCIPATION PATENT
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining the area
covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries
may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. This includes
cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP
coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area. (emphasis supplied)

-versus-
ADJUTO ABILLE
G.R. No. 130196
This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the prescribed
conditions which entitles the farmer grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires
the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the farmer/grantee
prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of
ownership over the landholding. (Ibid.).
-versus-
G.R. No. 60269

EMINENT DOMAIN
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowner, there
is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative, the taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Defined

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under term also acceptable to the purchaser, in which
case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling
to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent
domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interests on the
time-honored justification, as in the cause of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Limitations

But for all its primary and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no
power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has
evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Police power, property condemned under police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of
City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that
the power being exercise was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and
intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or absence materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

EMINENT DOMAIN; Requisites

As held in Republic of the Philippines vs. Castellvi there is compensable taking when the following
conditions concur:
1. the expropriator must enter a private property;
2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

EMINENT DOMAIN; When it can be exercised

Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties.
It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by
the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of
the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public demands of the public interest on the time honored justification, as in the case of
the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS., INC.
-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

EQUAL PROTECTION; Defined

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of the other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between those two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS., INC.

-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

EQUITY
The application of the trial court of its equity jurisdiction is misplaced. As often held by this Court,
equity is available only in the absence of law not as its replacement. All abstract arguments based only
on equity should yield to positive rules, (judicial rules of procedure) which pre-empt and prevail over
such persuasions (Aguila vs. CFI of Batangas, L-48335, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 352; Zabat vs. CA,
L-36958, July 10, 1986). Moreover, a court acting without the jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption
thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93401

ESTOPPEL
Thus, it was held that an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon
and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in
other injustice.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-49293
It has been consistently held by the court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed
at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction
will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN

-versus-
HON. PEDRO DINGLASAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 59082
It is no argument either that the Government is bound by the official decisions of

Secretary Juico and cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is never
estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone
irregular.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93661

ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place, they never
disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the
Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of
numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's exercise of
jurisdiction. Not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were
prevented from contesting its jurisdiction during the eight years this case was under litigation.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
G.R. No. 144817

EVIDENCE; Doctrine of res inter alios acta

The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet", found in Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court
applies, for as stated in Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 201 (1990) the right of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98028

EVIDENCE; Quantum of evidence required

It was also found that Raymundo was motivated by hatred and vindictiveness against private
respondent Canuto Damaso who blamed for the loss of his carabao. These findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record particularly in his rebuttal testimony on October 20, 1970 (Original
T.S.N., pp. 68-70), which are sufficient in this case being an agrarian case where all that is required is
mere substantial evidence (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 383) (1989).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-35495

EVIDENCE; Substantial evidence required in agrarian cases

As pointed out in Hernandez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 1990), in agrarian cases,
all that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went
beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is supported by substantial evidence,
are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 1992
G.R. No. 98028

EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of
supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final
and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time.

-versus-
G.R. No. 126462

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing
party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to
the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. There is no need for an express
order to his effect to decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the
authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a
reasonable period of time. Precisely, the law requires in cases where there are improvements on the
land that a special order be issued by the court, directing the removal of such improvements. It is
apparent petitioners confuse the order of demolition with the decision ordering the eviction of the
defendant.
SPS. FELIPE BUÑAG AND IRMA BUÑAG

-versus-
G.R. No. 107364
It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a judgment
(or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final
and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment or a final
order of the court must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years counted from the time the judgment becomes
final.
The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution filed by private
respondents. Said Court, acting on the motion for execution had no jurisdiction to entertain
propositions outside of the scope of the agreement sought to be executed. Further, the agreement
sought to be enforced was approved by the Court on December 22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight
(8) months from the time the motion for execution was filed on August 22, 1984. It is settled that under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of judgment (or a final order) may be made by
motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary
action. Actions upon a judgment of a final order of the court must be brought within ten (10) years
from the time the right if action accrues [(Article 1144 (3)] or within ten (10) years counted from the
time the judgment became final (see PNB v. Deloso, L-28301, March 30, 170; Rosensons, Inc., et al. v.
Hon. Jose Jimenez, et al., L-41225, November 11, 1975). Furthermore, it is indubitable that the
agreement sought to be executed had already been executed by the parties. The obligations of spouses
De Vera, the original lessees, and of Roman Soriano, under the sub-lease agreement had already been
complied with. Possession and rentals under the contracts were already delivered. In fact, at the time
the motion for execution was files the sub-lease contract had already expired. Hence, there was nothing
more to execute.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA
ABALOS
G.R. No. 93401

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229; RTC divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian
reform matters
However, with the enactment of E.O. No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days
after its release for publication in the Official Gazette 14/ the regional trial courts were divested of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versus-
G.R. No. 95664

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407; Said law cannot have retroactive effect
The CARL (R.A. No. 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process of law. Nor is
it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner must E. O. No. 407 be regarded. It
was enacted two (2) months after private respondents had legally fulfilled the condition in the contract
of conditional sale by the payment of all installments on their due dates. These laws cannot have
retroactive effect unless there is an express provision in them to that effect.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, NORMY D. CARPIO and CARMEN
ORQUISA
G.R. No. 118180

EXEMPTION AND RETENTION; Two Different Concepts

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and
those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one
and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed
by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for
exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.
EUDOSIA DAEZ and/or HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D.

DAEZ
-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 133507

EXEMPTION FROM CARL COVERAGE

The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties
are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of private
respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average of 28 degree slope containing 66.5 hectares;
a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential
area of 8 hectares. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of the land of private
respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent reason to exempt these
portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point when it
provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act".
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 139592

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The failure to appeal to the office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform
in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the
alter ego of the President.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE

-versus-
G.R. No. 80719

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; When not required

It is settled rule that on purely legal question that aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative
remedies (Malabanan vs. Malabanan, 129 SCRA 359 (1984); Linorco vs. Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 133 SCRA 43 (1984); National Housing Authority vs. C.A. 121
SCRA 777 (1983). This is because "Nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done"
(Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 18 SCRA 223 91967) in the administrative
forum.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-49293

EXPROPRIATION
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdiction.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the
public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount.

-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

EXPROPRIATION; Requires payment of just compensation

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.

PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

EXPROPRIATION UNDER CARP

The issue of the constitutionality of the taking of private property under the CARP law has already
been settled by this Court holding that where the measures under challenge merely prescribe the
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power by the government, but where to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, then there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative.
-versus-
G.R. No. 60269

EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM DISTINGUISHED FROM

ORDINARY EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING
Even if Section 17 of the CARL were applied, the market value paid by the government in
expropriating other lands in Agusan del Norte cannot be the basis for fixing the compensation to be
paid in this case since the lands are not agricultural lands. What is more, those lands were taken by the
government under ordinary expropriation proceedings, whereas the taking of agricultural lands under
the government's land reform program is based on the combined exercise of the State's power of
eminent domain and police power. The 1973 Constitution enjoined the State to "regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and (to) equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits" (1973 Const. Art. II, Sec. 6), even as it mandated the State "to
formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil". (Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 12) Similar provisions are found in the present Constitution,
(Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. 2 and Sec. 4). Thus, to the extent that agrarian laws limit the size of the lands
which landowners may retain, they partake of the exercise of police power. On the other hand, to the
extent that they require the payment of just compensation, they reflect the nature of the taking as an
exercise of the State's power of eminent domain.
FELIPE GALEON
-versus-
HON. EDELWINA PASTORAL & DAR
CA-G.R. No. 23168

EXTINGUISHMENT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS

A court approved compromise agreement to vacate an agricultural landholding entered into by the
lessee in consideration of condonation of all his back rentals and his right to all crops harvested for the
main crop, is valid and enforceable.
JASMIN
-versus-
VALERA
137 SCRA 213

EXTINGUISHMENT OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

Anent second issue as to whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the vendee a retro has
been extinguished by the repurchase of the subject landholding, it has been held in analogous cases that
pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends to assure a greater degree of security of tenure
for tenants, further promoting the constitutional objective of social justice and protection to labor
(Pintacasi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29, 1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended,
the tight of the tenant is not severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the
preservation of the tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being
of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase by the
vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of the previous
landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted respondents Sevilla as tenant-tillers thereof, for the
axiom in land tenure states that generally once a tenant, always a tenant.

-versus-
G.R. No. 59082
F

FINDING OF FACTS; Conclusive upon the court, exception

In Talavera v. Court of Appeals, (182 SCRA 778), we held that a factual conclusion made by the trial
court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum evidence demanded by law, is
final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In
the case at bar, however, we find with the respondent court that there was such a compelling reason. A
careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it
ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86186

FINDING OF FACTS; Exceptions

Court ordinarily accords respect to factual findings of Administrative Tribunals, exceptions:
1) the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
2) the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
3) the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular;
4) palpable errors are committed, or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or
capriciousness is manifested.
RELUCIO III
-versus-
MACARAIG
173 SCRA 635

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
A mortgage who has foreclosed upon the mortgaged real property of a delinquent debtor and has
purchased the same at the foreclosure sale, can be granted a writ of possession over the property despite
the fact that the premises are in the possession of a lessee thereof and whose lease has not yet been
terminated, unless the lease has been previously registered in the Registry of Property or with prior
knowledge of the mortgagee.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-49293

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; Amount of payment

In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, we have ruled that the right of
redemption by the mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amounts owing
to the latter "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the
obligation from said date". In the case of foreclosure by the Philippine National Bank particularly,
Section 20 of its own charter provides:
"SEC. 20. Right of Redemption of property foreclosed.
The mortgagor shall have the right, within the year after the sale of real estate as a result of
the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the
court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage,
and all the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the Bank by reason of the
execution and sale and for the custody of said property." (Republic Act No. 1300).
-versus-
FILEMON REMIGIO AND CA
G.R. No. 78508

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; Redemption period

In the foreclosure of real property by banking institutions, as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by
any other mortgagee, the mortgagor could redeem the property within one year from date of
registration of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of Deeds (Santos vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila, 38 SCRA 42; Reyes vs. Noblejas, 21 SCRA 1027). In Medida vs. Court of Appeals (208
SCRA 887), we ruled that the "title to the land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains with the
mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period".

-versus-
FILEMON REMIGIO AND CA
G.R. No. 78508

FORECLOSURE SALE OF MORTGAGE

It is already a well settled rule that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of mortgage property is entitled
to a writ of possession and that upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the
court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
JULIO BARANDA
-versus-
HON. ALFONSO BAGUIO

FORECLOSURE SALE; Application of surplus money

Surplus money in case of a foreclosure sale, gains much significance where there are junior
encumbrances on the mortgaged property. Jurisprudence has it that when there are several liens upon
the premises, the surplus money must be applied to their discharge in the order of their priority. A
junior mortgagee may have his rights protected by an appropriate decree as to the application of the
surplus, if there be any, after satisfying the prior mortgage. His lien on the land is transferred to the
surplus fund. And a senior mortgagee, realizing more than the among of his debt on a foreclosure sale
is regarded as a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrances.
CESAR SULIT
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119247

FORECLOSURE SALE; Effect of the price

The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a foreclosure sale is based
on the theory that the lesser the price the easier it will be for the owner to effect the redemption. The
same thing cannot be said where the amount of the bid is in excess of the total mortgage debt. The
reason is that in case the mortgagor decides to exercise his right of redemption. Section 30 of Rule 39
provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the amount of the purchase price, plus one
percent monthly interest up to the time of which the purchase may have paid thereon after purchase,
and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.
CESAR SULIT
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119247

FORUM-SHOPPING; How to Determine If There is Forum-Shopping

There is a forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits file in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while
an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and
in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so,
as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, had no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum-shopping has been laid down
in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34) . . . and that is, forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in the other.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

FORUM-SHOPPING; Test in Determining Violation Against Forum-Shopping

The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum-shopping is where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each
other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's
order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other
hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1)
the DAR , in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title used documents while were
earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made
without payment of just compensation; (3) without notice to NQSRMDC's for the surrender of its title.
The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed "win-win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution
was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457
I

IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a court to modify its judgment and its jurisdiction to
enforce its judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates
when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.

-versus-
G.R. No. 126462

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS; Not subject to appeal

We find here to state the rule, once more, that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on
certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial,
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. This is exactly what
petitioner should have done in this case after his prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21-88 was
denied by the trial court. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there
is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, that vitiating error is
indubitably not present in the instant case.
MODESTO G. ESPAÑO, SR.

-versus-
G.R. No. 123823

ISSUANCE OF EPs OR CLOAs; Does not bar the landowner from retaining the area covered
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be
cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.

DAEZ
-versus-
G.R. No. 133507
J

JUDGMENT; Conclusiveness
Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other
agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and
deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or
a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question
litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that
this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public
policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization
of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
RAMON D. OCHO
-versus-
BERNARDINO CALOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 137908

JUDGMENT; Error of Judgment Distinguished from Error of Jurisdiction

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which
error is reviewable only by appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

JUDGMENT – Execution Thereof; Prescription

It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a judgment (or a final
order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date is becomes final and executory.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment or a final
order of the court must be ordinary action. Actions, upon a judgment or a final order of the court must
be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within
ten years counted from the time the judgment became final.

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93401

JUDGMENT, FINAL AND EXECUTORY; When it may be set aside

It is a settled rule that a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three way viz.. (1) by a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) when the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction,
by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack; and (3) when the judgment was obtained by fraud
and Rule 38 cannot be applied, by civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code. The fraud must be
extrinsic or collateral.
ALEJANDRO BAYOG, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO
G.R. No. 118691

JUDGMENT; Finality of Judgment or Resolutions of a Court or Quasi-Judicial Body

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write
finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which
there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice
Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is a "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

JUDGMENT; Land Registration

A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently,
the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is
being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's
occupancy was unlawful.

-versus-
G.R. No. 128177

JUDGMENT OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS; Mode of Appeal

We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our
ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP's right to appeal because pending appeals
in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the
substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a
party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of
said doctrine.

-versus-
ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON
JUDICIAL POWER; Essence
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law"
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many
instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 1987).
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
HONORABLE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 86889

JUDICIAL REVIEW; Requisites; Constitutional question, when SC will assume jurisdiction

It has been established that the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and
the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Ass'n of Small
Landowners of the Phil., Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA
343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it
will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving
at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political consideration are
irrelevances that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is a ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall
heavily", where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in
the Constitution (Ass'n of Small Landowners of the Phil., Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
78742; Ascuna v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R.
No. 79777, 14 July 1989).
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
HONORABLE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 86889

JURISDICTION
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it
conferred by acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to
violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be
invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such us understandable as this kind of
jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
G.R. No. 144817

JURISDICTION; Active participation in proceeding, effect

It was been consistently held by the Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will stop such party
from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 59082

JURISDICTION AS DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE

An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots
subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions
"incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even
the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of
the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings
for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth
of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC
of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of
Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the
province where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased
husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction
of the Court.
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the

Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA
-versus-
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122646

JURISDICTION – CONCURRENT ON SC, CA & RTC, OVER PETITIONS FOR

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for
review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly
made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the
Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the
Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE

-versus-
G.R. No. 80719

JURISDICTION; DAR
Having found therefore, that the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous
case for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor of herein respondent, we believe and so hold
that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals,
under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.

-versus-
IGNACIA CENTENO
G.R. No. 140825

JURISDICTION; DARAB
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish
all its indispensable elements to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee", on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent. Tenancy relationship
is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the
entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private
respondents assert ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an
Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show any juridical tie or
tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest.
RODOLFO ARZAGA AND FRANCIS ARZAGA

-versus-
SALVACION COPIAS and PRUDENCIO CALANDRIA
G.R. No. 152404
Petitioners, in raising the issue, is in effect questioning the factual findings of the
DARAB, contrary to the doctrine that findings of facts by administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts because of the special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. It must be stressed at this point that
the DARAB has the jurisdiction on all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
agrarian laws, including PD 27.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO

-versus-
SPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 134741
The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or
any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
(underlining supplied)
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order No. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic
Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Paten (EP) and the administrative
correction thereof; (underlining added)

-versus-
G.R. No. 122276
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.

-versus-
IGNACIA CENTENO
G.R. No. 140825

JURISDICTION; Decision or Order Appealable to DARAB

It is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of DAR officials
other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision
of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.
Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition
for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Under
Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals
by certiorari.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.

-versus-
G.R. No. 103953

JURISDICTION; Determination
What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated
February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr.
Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April
22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may
present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the
case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private respondent
to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not presented to the municipal trial court, must be set
aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
JAIME P. CORPIN
-versus-
AMOR S. VIVAR and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137350

JURISDICTION; Determination of Just Compensation

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the
power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the
courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, ?11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given
to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed
into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative
law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), but such determination is subject to challenge in
the courts.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

-versus-
G.R. No. 132767

JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATION

It is basic that whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined
from the allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational Village Homeowners Association, Inc.,
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: "Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations
made in the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the
claim asserted therein – a matter resolved only after and as result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant."
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versus-
G.R. No. 105586

JURISDICTION; Estoppel apply

Once a party to a case submits to the jurisdiction of the Court and participates in the trial on the merits
of the case, he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn about and
say that the condition precedent of compliance with P.D. No. 1508 has not been met. One cannot have
the cake and eat it, too.
LEONIDA LANTICAN, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 97929

JURISDICTION; Involving tenancy issue

Respondent claim that they were co-tenants of their father, Martin de Luna, who was apparently the
original tenant or lessee with whom landholder Atty. Redor had entered into contract of agrarian
tenancy or landholding. This allegation, however, in their answer, did not divest the MCTC of
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the cause of action and the relief alleged and
sought in the complaint, and not by the avertments in the answer. The complaint by the petitioner in the
MCTC did set forth a cause of action for ejectment and damages.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versus-
CA, CASIANO DE LUNA AND FLAVIANO DE LUNA
G.R. No. 97788

JURISDICTION; Land registration court

A Certificate of Title is, in general, conclusive evidence only of the ownership of the land described
therein and as to the matters which were actually contested and determined or could have litigated and
decided, in the land registration proceeding. A Land Registration court cannot adjudicate the existence
or non-existence of a tenancy relationship since exclusive jurisdiction over such relationship was
vested in the Court of Agrarian Relations and later in the Regional Trial Court.

JURISDICTION; Over special civil actions

Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for
review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly
made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the
Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the
Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80719

JURISDICTION; Over tenancy issue

Under Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 (as amended by Republic Act No. 1409) creating said court
(Court of Agrarian Relations), it is given jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle all
questions xxx involving those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of
person in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land. The Court
is thus empowered to act where there is a legal relationship between the parties fighting before it. Such
relationship must necessarily be that of agricultural tenancy.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, CASIANO DE LUNA AND FLAVIANO
DE LUNA
G.R. No. 97788

JURISDICTION; RTC
The jurisdiction of the RTC is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed
upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and
unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

-versus-
G. R. No. 132767

JUST COMPENSATION
Now, in the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as they
sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative that any
right to the immediate possession of the subject property, accruing to respondent VISCA, must be
firmly grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, i.e., there must be a deposit with the
National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly
ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
JAIME T. PANES, ET AL
-versus-
VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 56219-20 & 56393-94

JUST COMPENSATION; Payment in cash and bonds

However, it is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid "in the
manner provided by R.A. No. 6657. pursuant to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash
and bonds, as indicated below:
"Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP,
in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for
the land.
"The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment under the following terms and conditions
(a) For lands above fifty (50)Twenty-five percent (25%) cash the hectares, insofar as the
excess balance to be paid in government hectarage is concerned financial instruments
negotiable at anytime
(b) For lands above twenty -Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the four (24) hectares and
upbalance to be paid in government to fifty (50) hectares financial instruments negotiable at
anytime."
We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment.
Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been
construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its
compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from
the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner
demands, is not compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final
judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with
R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bask had already given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the
required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule
39.
EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-in-fact ROMEO

L. SANTOS
-versus-
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ, ROBERTO
ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO
G.R. No. 137431
L

LACHES; Defined
Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an
acquiescence in them.
MARILOU RIVERA
-versus-
G.R. No. 107903
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which be exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the
defendants title, but only with whether or not be reason of plaintiff's long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him
to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not concerned merely with
lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches deals
with the effect of unreasonable delay.

-versus-
G.R. No. 108547

LACHES; When not applicable

While petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is
settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally an abundance
of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a registered landowner
may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA

-versus-
G.R. No. 112519

LAND TITLES; Effect of annotation

The Court hold that such annotation cannot be regarded as conclusive upon the courts of justice so as to
the legal nature and incidents of the relationship between the landowner(s) in this case and private
respondents. Firstly, the annotations serves basically as notice to all persons of the existence of the
Certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo, but neither adds to the validity or correctness of that
certification nor converts a defective and invalid instruments into a valid one as between the parties.
Secondly, the certification issued Mr. Eugenio Bernardo of the MAR is very much like the
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other officials of the Ministry and later
the Department of Agrarian Reform concerning the existence of tenancy relationship in respect of
agricultural lands from which persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought to be ejected. It is well
settled at the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties is merely preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts.

LAWS AND OTHER ISSUANCES; Requires publication

But for all their peremptoriness these issuances from President Marcos still had to comply with the
requirement for publication as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, unless published in the
Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code they could have any force and effect if
they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was published
though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1979.)

-versus-

LAWS — CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY; Requisites

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the property party, and
the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
LUZ FARMS
-versus-
HON. SECRETARY OF DAR
G.R. No. 86889

LAWS; Prospective
We categorically rule that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under
the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79416

LAW; Prospective application

The Court of Appeals evidently erred in applying retroactively Republic Act No. 6389 particularly with
respect to personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment. It is well-settled that R.A. 6389 which
removed personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of tenant/lessee, cannot be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that
effect (Castro v. Castro, 128 SCRA 519 (1984), Diga v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421 (1984); Gallardo v.
Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (1988); Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 (1989).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-35495

LAWS — RETROACTIVITY THEREOF; Rule

Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. According to this provision
of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this
effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law.
PIO BALATBAT
-versus-
G.R. No. L-36378

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition

Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a
tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the
right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law.
But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically
authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd
situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in
the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would
technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant would then
gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most
unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good
faith only to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the
installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
G.R. No. 122363

LEASE – TERMINATION OF LEASE CONTRACT; Effect on tenant

Whether the tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite the termination of the lease,
or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon the expiration of the
contract, a tenant of the lessor, was answered in the affirmative, not so much because of Act 4054
relied upon by the Agrarian Court but pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by
Section 3 of R.A. 2263. The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto, a 1974 case, and this
Court declared that the question had been definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al. v.
Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein (it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the leased property to
the lessor upon the expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal possession of the land, the
termination, therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not divest the tenant of the lessee of the right
to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY, ET AL.

-versus-
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 71217

LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP
The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.
ANGEL CHICO
-versus-
G.R. No. 134735

LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
As correctly observed by the Regional Adjudicator, to give petitioners the right to exercise that choice
would merely result in the unnecessary displacement of respondent who, after years of labor, now has
an undeniable stake on the land. given the practical circumstances as well as the legal and equitable
considerations in this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals, the DARAB, and the
Regional Adjudicator that respondent's leasehold rights deserve to be protected and maintained.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.

-versus-
SIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137509

LEASEHOLD TENANCY; Requisites

Court of appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. Reasoning: First, not all
requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met. There was no consent given by the
landowner. The consent of former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy
relationship. Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them as
mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew that his
contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease. Third, the contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas
and Victoria, by its very terms, expired after one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of
harvest, means of production, personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing of harvest was not
proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the element of personal
cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted that he hired laborers to clear and
cultivate the land.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivations; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy
relationship between the party.
REYNALDO BAJASA and ERLINDA BEJASA

-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixteenth
Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and JAIME DINGLASAN
G.R. No. 108941

LEGAL ETHICS; Remission of duty as a lawyer

Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the
facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing
between the parties before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), thus
deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciated of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him
to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet respondents dares raised the same in
his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer would know that a
Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the fact of Transfer Certificate of Title over the
same parcel of land.
RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO
-versus-
ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
Adm. Case No. 3808

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 474

More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No.
474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella to undertake to place under the
Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to P.D. No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with
areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowner's who own other agricultural lands of more than
seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. It was held
that LOI 474 is neither a class legislation nor does it deprive a person of property without due process
of law or just compensation (Zurbano v. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333 (1985). Moreover, LOI 474 was duly
published in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976 and has therefore complied with the
publication requirement as held by this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 444 (1984)) Assn. Of
Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 369 (1989).
-versus-
HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA
G.R. No. 60269

LIS PENDENS; Effect of notice thereof

Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of the
land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject to the
outcome of the suit. In other words, a purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact
that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party xxx stands in the shoes of his vendor and his
title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation . . ..
JULIETA V. ESGUERRA
-versus-
G.R. No. 119310
M

MANDAMUS; When available

Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. For, it is essential for the writ to issue
that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required. The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing demanded must be
well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act
must also be clear and specific.
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned. It
is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-
ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to
act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a specific application (B.F. Homes, Inc. v. National
Water Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154 SCRA 88). Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the
right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act (Mata v. San
Diego, L-30447 March 21, 1975; 63 SCRA 170).
It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion. The writ may issue to compel the
exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself. Mandamus itself can require action only but not
specific action where the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

-versus-
G.R. No. 93661

MANDAMUS; When it should be exercised

Mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public officer to perform a duty specifically enjoined by
law once it is shown that the judge or public officer has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.
A court neglects the performance of its duties only when after demand has been made upon it, it refuses
to perform the same.
ROSALINDA MAYUGA, ET AL.
-versus-
G.R. No. 123899

MODES OF APPEAL
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three modes of appeal,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with
Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

-versus-
G.R. No. 143275

MORTGAGE; Right to rely on Certificate of Title of Mortgaged Property

The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of
title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse
suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the
rightful owner of or does not have a valid title to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee or transferee
in good faith is nonetheless entitled to protection. Although this rule generally pertains to real property,
particularly registered land, it may also be applied by analogy to personal property, in this case
specifically, since ship owners area, likewise, required by law to register their vessels with the
Philippine Coast Guard.
CEBU INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION

-versus-
G.R. No. 107554
N

NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL; Effect

The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with the hearing of
June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their counsel to inform them is
untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and the client is bound by the
negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v.
Sec. of Agriculture & Nat. Resources, G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 719). The client
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently
(Vivero v. Santos, 52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500), although he may have the right of action against the
attorney if prejudiced by the latter's negligence.
-versus-
HONORABLE PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 59082

NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the Notice of Acquisition
and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter's old address. Petitioner explained that its personnel could not
effect personal service of those notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from
Apex Investment and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that
personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner caused the service of
the notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657. On this point, petitioner
claimed that the notices were sent "not only by registered mail but also by personal delivery" and that
there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom left-hand
corner of petitioner's copies of the notices. But petitioner could not identify the name of respondent's
representative who allegedly received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon
is illegible. It is thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is elementary
that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of the claim against him
and the theory on which such claim is premised.

-versus-
G.R. No. 149422

NOTICE — TO COUNSEL; Effect on client

The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with the hearing of
June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their counsel to inform them us
untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and the client is bound by the
negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v.
Santos, 52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500), although he may have the right of action against the attorney if
prejudiced by the latter's negligence. (Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279).

-versus-
G.R. No. 59082

NOTICES; Required
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage
and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the
BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of
1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526
O

OCCUPATION BY TOLERANCE; Effect

More than one has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who
continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one
whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, where a
company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant its undertaking to buy the same, refused to
return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter
demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession** became illegal and the complaint for
unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her legal

guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA
-versus-
G.R. No. 110427

ORDER OF EXECUTION; Order of Demolition Issued Pursuance Thereof

It is settled that, generally, an order of execution is not appealable because otherwise a case would
never end. If the order of execution cannot be appealed, neither can the order of demolition issued in
pursuance thereof be appealable. Neither can an order of demolition be set aside through a special civil
action for certiorari except upon a showing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the same. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly found that there is no sufficient evidence to
show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order of demolition.
SPS. FELIPE BUÑAG AND IRMA BUÑAG

-versus-
G.R. No. 107364
P

P.D. NO. 27 CONSTITUTIONALITY

P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly
emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chavez
v. Zobel, [24] P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the
land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is
more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That
would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our
duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate
of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other
approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all
remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an
open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential
decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its
avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had
spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no
justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the
traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental
policy goals."
ROLANDO SIGRE
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES
G.R. Nos. 109568 and 113454

P.D. NO. 316; Referral to DAR mandatory

Denial of referral of the case to the DAR is in violation of the express mandate of Section 2 of P.D. No.
316.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastens the
award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not
foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for
review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way ahead of
the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of
Appeals.

-versus-
G.R. No. 143275

POLICE POWER; Elements

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the
public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of
agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement
has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
Constitutional goal.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS.,

INC.
-versus-

POLITICAL QUESTIONS; Concept

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they
decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of
Tañada v. Cuenco: The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitutions, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS.,
INC.
-versus-
G.R. No. 78742

POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP; Distinct Concepts

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to
one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the
rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are he right to enjoy the
thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means
to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be declared
owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as
a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived
without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment
for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

-versus-
G.R. No. 128177

POWER OF APPELLATE REVIEW; DARAB

In agrarian cases, the power of appellate review is limited to questions of law and findings of fact of the
DARAB, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding upon the Court of Appeals. Hence,
the appellate court cannot make its own findings of fact and substitute the same in lieu of the findings
of the DARAB, unless there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DARAB.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versus-
G.R. No. 140164

POWER OF EXPROPRIATION; Requirements

But for all of its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has
evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versus-

POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION

The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law.
ROLANDO SIGRE
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND LILIA Y. GONZALES
G.R. Nos. 109568/113454

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; Requisites, Purpose and Objective of Injunction

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of
preliminary injunction is issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of
the two requisites, namely: the existence of a right to be protected and acts which are violative of said
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's
right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN ASUNCION rep. BY DEMETRIA

DUROLFO ASUNCION
-versus-
HON. MARGARITO GERVACIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 115741

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; When it will be Issued

Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party
and place it into that of another whose titles has not clearly been established by law.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN ASUNCION

-versus-
HON. MARGARITO GERVACIO, JR. ET AL.
G.R. No. 115741

PUBLICATION; Indispensable
Petitioners insist that the rules are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them
also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required
by law and the ruling of this Court in Tañada vs. Tuvera.

-versus-
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ERFE
-versus-
FORTUN
36 SCRA 552
Q

QUESTION OF LAW V. QUESTION OF FACT

Two types of questions: there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of alleged facts.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO

-versus-
SPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 134741
R

R.A. NO. 3844; Prescriptive period

Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this
Code shall be barred if not commenced within 3 years after such cause of action accrued." The law
does not specifically require a judicial action, hence, it can be an administrative action. Ubi les non
distinquit nec nos distinquere debemos (Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish).
SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE

-versus-
G.R. No. 89545

R.A. No. 6389; Prospective in application

R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule that statutes have
no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79416
Republic Act No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory
provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.
Congress failed to express an intention to make R.A. No. 6389 retroactive, it may not apply to
ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts.
GALLARDO
-versus-
BORROMEO
161 SCRA 500
The Court of Appeals evidently erred in applying retroactively Republic Act No. 6389
particularly with respect to personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment. It is well-settled that
R.A. No. 6389, which removed personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of tenant/lessee,
cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a
clear implication of the law to that effect.
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versus-
G.R. No. L-35495

R.A. No. 6657; Constitutionality

Wherefore, the court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proclamation No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
sustained against all the constitutional objections in the herein petitioners.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon payment
of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained
and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27
shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.

-versus-

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; Defined

The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. If the suit is not brought against the real party-in-interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Section 1 (g) Rule 16,
Rules of Court).
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; Meaning of

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real property in interest is a party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy.
Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

REDEMPTION OR PRE-EMPTION
In time, both the court of origin and the appellate court could have found for petitioner were said courts
not unduly swayed by the circumstance that petitioner presented as his own evidence the deed of sale
wherein it was stated that the land involved is not tenanted. Such conclusion having been rejected and
the identity of the landholding as well as the fact of tenancy thereon of petitioner been established
matters, there is no further hindrance to the exercise by petitioner of the right of redemption or pre-
emption extended and granted to him by law.
VICENTE PALO-PALO
-versus-
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75584

REDEMPTION PRICE; Must be reasonable

The purpose of applying the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, which specifies
that the "redemption price" shall be the "reasonable price" of the land at the time of the sale".

REDEMPTION; Right is Transmissible

The issue on damages and share of harvest was not raised before the CA for failure of RUPA to file his
memorandum, hence, we cannot pass upon the same. It is well-settled that a party is not permitted to
raise before the Supreme Court an issue which he did not raise in the Court of Appeals.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.

-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN
SALIPOT
G.R. No. 80129

REFERRAL; Effect
The referral of a case for preliminary determination to the MAR refers to pending agrarian or civil
cases of those pending decision or execution where the issue of actual tenancy is raised. And even if
the said issue was properly raised a case that was terminated and duly executed cannot be reopened
much less referred to such administrative body as the MAR (now DAR) for a preliminary
determination of the relationship of the parties and a certification if the case is proper for trial in court.
GRACIANO B. VALLES, ET AL.

-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SAMAR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 61297

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; Acting as special agrarian courts

The Regional Trial Court have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters. However, it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been
completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. No. 6657 confers
"special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts", which are Regional Trial Court designated by this
Court-at least one (1) branch within each province – to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offense under the Act.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS AND CELESTINO VILLALON
G.R. No. 109093

REGISTRATION; Reckoning date

The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the motion, pleading, or any other
papers, which may included instruments as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
The Court therefore finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an instruments to the Register of
Deeds for purposes of registration should be considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the
Register of Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds which shall be regarded as the date of its registration.
Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by registered mail to the Register of Deeds
on September 09, 1988, said date is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the
instrument, although the instrument was actually received by said office only on September 20, 1988.
ATTY. PLARIDEL M. MINGOA

-versus-
LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR
G.R. No. 97282

REINSTATEMENT; Remedy for failure to carry out conversion

Petitioner may not invoke Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides that "when the
lessor-owner fails to substantially carry out the conversion of his agricultural land into a subdivision
within one year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee shall be entitled to reinstatement and
damages," for the petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion
into residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a
residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.
FELIX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES

-versus-
G.R. No. L-36213

REMAND; When it can be dispensed with

The normal course of action to take would be to remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings. However, noting that this case has long been pending, we resolve to end the entire
controversy. This is in line with jurisprudence that the remand of a case to the lower courts for
reception of evidence is not necessary if this court could receive the dispute on the records before it
(See Hechanova v. CA, 145 SCRA 550). In the case of Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Hon. Ruiz, et
al. (148 SCRA 326, 341), this court further held that: . . . such time consuming procedure may be
properly dispensed with to resolve the issue (Quisumbing v. CA, L-60364, June 23, 1983, 122 SCRA
709-710) where there is enough basis to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now,
dispensing with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their
respective claims (Velasco v. CA, L-47544, Jan. 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 621-622).
ROSALINA MAGNO-ADAMOS, LAURO C. ADAMOS AND

ANGEL GATMAYTAN
-versus-
HON. AGUSTIN O. BAGASAO, MELY DE JESUS, FRANCISCA
DE JESUS AND GLEN DE JESUS
G.R. No. 63671

RES JUDICATA; Rationale

Civil Case No. 5379 cannot be reviewed or reopened on the merits because res judicata had already set
in. The trial court may have jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings because the incident arose out
of the execution of a final and executory judgment, but certainly the trial court cannot reopen a case
already decided by final judgment, otherwise there will be no end to litigations.
GRACIANO B. VALLES
-versus-
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAMAR
G.R. No. 61297

RETENTION; Homestead Grantees

With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct descendants," the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands have been covered by Pres.
Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them provided the original homestead grantees
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the homestead. [50] The right to choose the area to be
retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule. [51]
However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct descendants" have complied
with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit
provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise of the administrative agency
concerned.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
G.R. No. 122363

RETENTION LIMITS
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section of the
law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. -
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, nay
public or private agricultural land, the size which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family sized farm, such as commodity produced, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) the he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by P.D. No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder
further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.

PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versus-

RETENTION LIMIT; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits.
As earlier stated, Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits allowed by
law to small landowners. Since the property here involved is more or less ten (10) hectares, it is then
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to determine whether or not the
property can be subjected to agrarian reform. But this necessitates an entirely different proceeding.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NORMY D. CARPIO AND
CARMEN ORQUISA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 118180

RETENTION; Right to Retain

Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that
the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon the
effectivity of the law.
"SEC. 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
the he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep an area originally retained
by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead."
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versus-
DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 139083

RETENTION; Under P.D. No. 27

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657. This should
counterbalance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose land have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retains the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.

-versus-
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are
disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural land of the estate for failure to comply
with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it".
The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained
riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein.
Which means, that while ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain
to the concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted
areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of
cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs".
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93045

RIGHT OF THE AGRICULTURAL LESSEE; Redemption

The right of the agricultural lessee to redeem the land he has been working on that has been disposed of
without his knowledge is statutory in character. It is created by and rests upon the provisions of a
particular law, and attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law.
LAURA SARNE, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. VIVIAN O. MAQUILING, ET AL.
G.R. No. 138839

RIGHTS OF A LESSEE
As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters affecting the land he
tills, without need for him to inquire about it.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL

-versus-
G.R. No. 125063

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Full Amount of the Redemption Price

It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court.
Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in
good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant
evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A
different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to
unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite
term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation
of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper
time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned
by him falls short of the requirement of the law and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against
him.
ANICETO M. QUIÑO
-versus-
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Redemption Price

An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or
by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed
period. It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or
exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the
repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. As to what constitutes
reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent
Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration.
ANICETO M. QUIÑO
-versus-
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Exist by operation of law

In view of the conclusion that private respondents were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of
the owner(s) of the land, it follows that private respondents were entitled to redeem the land upon the
alienation thereof by the two(2) daughters of Andres Cruz in favor of the petitioner Cuaño spouses.
When right of redemption is statutory in character, that is to say, it is created by and rest upon the
provisions of a particular law. It attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Purpose of Written Notice

The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms
and its validity, and to quite any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe
any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying he redemptioner. So long as the
redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption
will start running. The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to
make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an
authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper
to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic document on 02 March 1987. the
amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty
(180) days.
ANICETO M. QUIÑO
-versus-
G.R. No. 118599

RIGHT OF RETENTION: Constitutionality

The right of retention is a constitutionality guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the
legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of
the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless
process.

DAEZ
-versus-
G.R. No. 133507
S

SALE; Effect on agricultural relationship

The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferee is simply subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Sec. 10, RA 3844).
SPOUSES ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE

-versus-
G.R. No. 89545

SALE; PERFECTION
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the
thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract, and failure of
the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for
lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may
exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versus-
G.R. No. 109410

SALE, NON-PAYMENT; Effect

Devoid of any stipulation that "ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully
paid the price, ownership in the thing shall pass from the vendor to vendee upon actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. The failure of the buyer
to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to the seller unless the bilateral
contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-
payment only creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versus-
G.R. No. 109410

SECURITY OF TENURE
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective
landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the
exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.

-versus-
G.R. No. 128177

SECURITY OF TENURE; Concept

What is thus depicted by the evidence is not the figure of "a mere tenant of the land", as the court of
Appeals characterizes Leopoldo Clarito, but of an entrepreneur or independent contractor, developing
and managing fishponds belonging to other persons, hiring and paying wages to laborer for the
purpose, and who is himself the owner of a fishpond larger than that of the Oportos, his latest clients,
and in the process receiving not inconsiderable revenue, either as co-partner of the fishpond or in some
other manner. Leopoldo Clarito is not in any sense a small partner within the contemplation of the
Agricultural Reform Code, entitled to its beneficient provisions. His activities cannot in any sense be
described as owner-cultivatorship by a small partner of a family-size farm for his economic upliftment,
the establishment and protection of which is among the objectives of the law. He is a businessman,
pure and simple, who has absolutely no claim to that of security of tenure guaranteed by the law to
tenants or owner-cultivators of family-size farms. As this Court has had the occasion to observe in a
strikingly similar case (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 1989), in ruling on the assertion "that the
cultivation of another fishpond is irrelevant as the law does not require or prohibit the total absence of
other sources of income.
It is of much significance to look into the spirit of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. First and
foremost, the law is meant to assist and help the small farmers as enunciated in its declaration of policy.
In the case at bar, petitioner De Jesus is not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider him as
agricultural lessee despite the fact that he does not cultivate the fishpond personally and/or with the
help of his immediate farm household as defined by law, would render nugatory the letter and intent of
the Agricultural Reform Code.
TIRSO OPORTO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98258

SECURITY OF TENURE; Guaranteed

In Ponce vs. Guevarra (10 SCRA 649) for instance promulgated on March 31, 1964, this Court, upon
substantially identical facts, held that regardless of the extinction of the contractual relations between
petitioner (lessor) and Donato (lessee), and between Donato and respondents herein (as agricultural
tenants), the latter cannot be ejected from petitioner's land except upon judicial authority and for one of
the caused specified by law, reference being had to Joya V. Pareja (a 1959 case, 106 Phil. 645), where
the question, whether the tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite termination of
the lease, or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon the
expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor, "was" answered in the affirmative, not so much
because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court but pursuant to Section 3 Republic Act No.
2263. The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto, a 1974 case (58 SCRA 186, 191) and this
Court declared that the question had been definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al. v.
Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein (it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the lease property to
the lessor upon the expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal possession of the land, the
termination, therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not even vest the tenant of the lessee of the
right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY
-versus-
G.R. No. 71217
On both justiciable and equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian justice, has
generally upheld the tenants' security of tenure (Primero V. Court of Agrarian Relations and
Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil 675 (1957); Pineda v. De Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967);
Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294 (1972) or the right of the tenant to the
enjoyment and possession of his farmholding which has been created, conferred, protected and
guaranteed by the police power of the state in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution
expressed in Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution (as well as in the 1973 and 1987
Constitution).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, CALIXTO BLAZA and CANUTO
DAMASO
G.R. No. L-35495
The new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as
amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right
to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to
security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and
again, this Court has guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases
of a mere transfer of legal possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernanrdo vs. Court of
Appeals (168 SCRA 439 (1988), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings tantamount to deprivation
of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly
provides that the livelihood relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold
relationships is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian
Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy
relationship. The donation itself is valid.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versus-
G.R. No. 76225
The Court of Appeals opined that the Municipal Trial Court had correctly dismissed the
Oportos complaint against the Claritos on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Invoking
COCOMA vs. CA, decided in 1988 by this Court, the Appellate Tribunal ruled that under the
circumstances in the case at bar . . . there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties
notwithstanding the label of joint venture used in the written agreement. It set out its reasons
as follows:
"The records of this case show sufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. It is
undisputed that the land involved in this case is a fishpond which is considered under the
law as an agricultural land (Section 166 (1), R.A. No. 3844, as amended. Moreover, as to
the fish and other fishpond products raised, produced and harvested in the premises, the
contract states that these shall be divided in equal proportion between the contracting
parties . . .. Furthermore, having granted to the petitioners (Claritos) the use or cultivation of
their fishpond for a consideration in shares of the harvests thereof the petitioners are
considered in law as landholders (Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 1199). Lastly, since petitioners
be themselves and with the aid of their immediate family household occupied the land of the
private respondents (Oportos), converted developed the same into a fishpond, cultivated the
same by raising and maintaining the fish and other fishpond products therein, all these with
the owners consent, and the net produce or harvest from said fishpond is, by agreement,
shared equally between the parties, the petitioners (Claritos) are undoubtedly de jure
tenants on the land subject of the dispute and therefore they are entitled to security of tenure
(Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199).
TIRSO OPORTO, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 98258

SECURITY OF TENURE; Rights of an Agricultural Lessee

Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.
Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law.
The causes are specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
LAURA SARNE, ET AL.
-versus-
HON. VIVIAN O. MAQUILING, ET AL.
G.R. No. 138839

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION; Rule

The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL

-versus-
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122156

SEPARATION OF POWERS; Limitations

Although holding neither purse now sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of
the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the
legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason
for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly
assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking
down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy indeed, is a blend of
courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was
enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution
would no be breached.

-versus-

SETTLEMENT; Encourage
The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might
otherwise be filed in court.
CELESTINA G. DE GUZMAN
-versus-
G.R. No. 110122

SHARE TENANCY AND AGRICULTURAL WORKER (DISTINCTION)

Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production
wherein one party furnishes the land and the other, his labor, with either or both contributing any one or
several times of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 1199; Sec.
166 (25), R.A. No. 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural worker is any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not
limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless the Agricultural Land Reform Code
explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, a cement agrarian dispute or an obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SALVADOR P.
DE GUZMAN, JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323

SHARE TENANCY; Changed to leasehold, effects

Share tenants enjoys security of tenure even where relationships is change to leasehold.
Where a share tenant surrendered his landholding and them was instituted as a share tenant by the civil
lessee of the same land, said tenant's status did not change, vis-à-vis, the landowner, after the civil lease
terminated.
A share tenant who surrendered his landholding, who thereafter became the share tenant of the person
who lease the land from the owner for three years, and who thereafter continued the said lease on a 3-
year basis which was periodically renewed, is not a civil lessee, but an agricultural lessee.
There is no leasehold tenancy where alleged lessee never intended to cultivate the land personally.
NOVESTERAS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
149 SCRA 47

SHARE TENANCY; Defined

Share tenancy is defined as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
in money or in both. (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199, Agricultural) Tenancy Act, as amended).
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SALVADOR P.
DE GUZMAN JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323
Share tenancy - exist whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other is labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions.
GUERRERO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
142 SCRA 136

SHARE TENANCY OF POWERS; Limitations
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three department of the
government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative
or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for that
some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or
readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born
of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts
of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and
caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted,
earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would
not be breached.

-versus-

SHARE TENANT; Concept

The share tenant participates in the agricultural produce; his share is necessarily dependent on the
amount of the harvest.
COCONUT COOP. MKTG. ASS'N INC.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
164 SCRA 568

SHARING CROPS; Basis

Share of his labor in the production shall not be less than 30% of the harvest, after deducting the
expenses for harvesting and/or initial processing.
DR. JOSE TONGSON, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 77104

SHARING OF CROPS; Principles

Dean Jeremias U. Montemayor, in his book, "Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation," points to some
sharing arrangements and principles approved by the courts for crops other than rice: "3. Coconuts: 70-
30 in favor of the landholder after deducting expenses for harvesting, processing, hauling and
premiums (Abdon v. Malolos, CAR Case No. 33-Quezon '56, August 14, 1956). 4. Corn 1/3 – 2/3 in
favor of the tenant if he owns the carabao and 50-50 if the landholder provides the work animal
(Ybañez v. Camboya, CAR Case No. 70-Leyte ‘ 56, October 12, 1957; Aguilar v. Rosaroso, CIR Case
No. 5670-Leyte, March 14, 1956). 5. Tobacco: . . . The Supreme court has upheld a 50-50 sharing
arrangement for this crop . . . 6. Onions. 50-50 basis (Serrano v. Torres, CAR Case No. 188-NE, '56,
January 11, 1957)."
DR. JOSE TONGSON, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 77104

SITUS OF BRINGING PERSONAL OR REAL ACTIONS
It is fundamental that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain
the greatest convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by affording them maximum
accessibility to the courts of justice. The choice of venue is given to the plaintiff but is not left to his
caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.
JOSE BARITUA
-versus-
G.R. No. 100748

SOCIAL JUSTICE; Concept

This court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for that matter – is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that in case of
reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution
fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be
served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
GELOS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86186

SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT; With jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian related cases
1. petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
2. prosecution of all criminal offenses under the same law
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 107741

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It must be stated that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law and construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them (National Federation of Labor vs. Bisma, 127 SCRA 419, 425 (1984). The aforequoted
provision of PD 946 is clear and unambiguous. It provides, as an exception to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the subject matters exclusively cognizable
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform among which are the classification and identification of
landholdings, the parcellary mapping in question and the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLTs.
Accordingly, it should be taken to mean exactly what is says. It is elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says (Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663
673 (1984). Where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for
the court's seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition for
subtraction.
FAGEL TABIN AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION

-versus-
THE HONORABLE EMILIO A. JACINTO, ET AL
G.R. No. 55393

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF R.A. NO. 6389

Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: Laws shall not
have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. According to this provision of law, in order
that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provisions to this effect be made in
the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it
must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it
is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is
said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have
formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:
The Act contains, as in seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there
anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect.
Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment, prospective.
It is the rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without
number.
The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case entitled Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543).
Thus -- A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms
of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and
putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,
unless the words used so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them,
or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be
retroactive when the legislature has not said so. x x x (Farnel v. Pingree (1988), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac.,
843; Greer v. City of Ashville (1894), 114 N.C., 495, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Struthers Wells Co, (1907), 209 U.S., 306)
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength from later
developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with
social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit
himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the
promotion of social justice the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. The Constitution
also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life (Sections 7 &
9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
PIO BALATBAT
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-36378

SUBROGATION
Subrogation of Land Bank to the obligation of farmer-beneficiaries for payment of price of the land
brought under land reform does not mean the Bank has to pay interest on the acquisition price prior to
the payment of said price (partly in cash and bonds) to the landowner.
Land Bank may deduct from acquisition price the rents paid by tenant-farmer to landowner from
October 21, 1971 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
VDA. DE ORTIZ
-versus-
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
148 SCRA 685

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Defined

Substantial Evidence — to be such material evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion
for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled
to belief.
VELASQUEZ, ET AL.
-versus-
NERY, ET AL.
G.R. No. 64284

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Explained

In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial
evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary
civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate it support conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence
on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria
for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled
to belief.
ROMEO REYES, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 96492

SUCCESSION
The Respondent who is the only heir interested in succeeding his father who died, had the right to take
over as agricultural tenant in petitioner's land.
Nature of work performed by the respondent's father is that of tenant on the land.
ROBLES
-versus-
BATACAN
154 SCRA 644

SUGARLANDS; Covered
Sugarlands are not mentioned as among the areas neither by the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and
neither they are included in the exempted lands.
Any share tenant in sugarlands may exercise his option to change his relationships with the landowner
into the leasehold system.
Agricultural Land Reform Code should be given liberal interpretation.
DAVID
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
161 SCRA 114
T

TAKING; When it Takes Effect

The seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation, judicially determined.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, as of August 29, 1991, when it decreed the coverage of the
landholding in question under CARL (R.A. No. 6657) had not paid or even determined the just
compensation for the taking of the landholding.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131216

TAX DECLARATION; Effect on the status of landholding

The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the land merely on the basis of the tax
declaration, in the absence of further showing that all the requirements for conversion of the use of land
from agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the controversy in this case have been fully
satisfied.
LOURDES PEÑA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAIME QUA

-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIV.), ET AL.
G.R. No. 95318

TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops
thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing
gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant
thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban
area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided there are complied with and not
contrary to law, are even more important.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78214
We are not impressed with the argument that the private respondent could both have
been a mere share tenant and agricultural lessee because he has several children who are
professionals. That will not necessarily make him prosperous himself nor does it mean he can
stop making his own living. A man does not have to depend upon his children for his
livelihood even if they are well off as long as he retains his strength and his pride to continue
charting his own life and earning his own keep. There are thousands of such proud parents
who are able to provide their children with a good education and a brighter future while
themselves remaining as humble tillers of the soil and beholden to no man for their sustenance.
On the fixed yearly rentals of P1,000 from the fishpond, we have held that the use of the land by the
tenant for a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both as consideration is an element of tenancy
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. In the present case, the consideration was stipulated between the
parties pursuant to the aforementioned Section 46 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.
Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence
(Berenguer, Jr. v. C.A. 164 SCRA 433 (1988) citing and Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil.
635 (1940), we rule that there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that the element
of consent is present. But even assuming arguendo that the element of consent is present, we declared
in Delos Reyes v. Expineli (30 SCRA 574 (1969) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one
cannot be a tenant even of he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98028

"TENANCY"; Absence of any of the requisites; effect on relationship

That the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the
rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and
the absence of one or more requisites do make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-
distinguished from a de jure tenant.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY; Cannot be established by mere tolerance

The petitioner's tactic of entering the subdivision as lessee of a homelot and thereafter cultivating some
unsold lots ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly for the purpose of later
claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls the fable of the camel that sought shelter inside,
kicked its master out of the tent. Here, the private respondents tolerance of the petitioner's supposedly
temporary use of some lots in the subdivision was seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the
respondents of their land.
FELIX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES

-versus-
G.R. No. L-36213

TENANCY; Consent is indispensable

Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land. Consent of the
landowner is necessary. – From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazon Pengson did not give her consent
to Baltazar to work on her land consisting of only P1,740.00 square meters. We agree with the CAR
when it said, "the law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to work on his land.
For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the
land by the usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the
protection of security of tenure of the law (Sps. Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)".
No tenancy can be formed where alleged tenant does not pay any rental or share of harvest to the
landowner. The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or share to the
landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in his
favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever received anything from him.

TENANCY; Created by the act of overseer

The overseer Evaristo Erilla had hired or retained private respondents as tenants and later as
agricultural lessees with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landholders. That his knowledge and
acquiescence on the part of the landholders validated the relationship created (hypothetically) by the
overseer and private respondents. For this reason, Evaristo Erilla is properly considered as an agent of
the landowner(s) who acted as such with at least implied or apparent authority and whose principal(s)
were accordingly bound to private respondents.
SPS. AMADEO CUAÑO AND AURORA CUAÑO

-versus-
CA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159

TENANCY; Determination of whether a person is tenant or not, is a question of fact

In an analogous case of Guerrero vs. CA, 142 SCRA 130 (1986), it was held that whether a person is a
tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of fact and the findings of the respondent
court and the trial court are, generally entitled to respect and non-disturbance except for unusual
reasons (Macaraeg vs. CA, G.R. No. 48008, January 20, 1989; Anderson Co., et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No.
65928, January 21, 1988; Tarunez vs. IAC, 134 SCRA 414 (1985); Gagolar vs. CAR, 18 SCRA 992
(1966); Chavez vs. CAR, 9 SCRA 412 (1963), none of which is present in the case at bar.

TENANCY; Effect of non-payment of rentals

The deliberate refusal of the agricultural lessee to pay the rentals for a period of two (2) years carried
with it the grave penalty of forfeiture of the landholding, it is imperative under the law that every
opportunity must be given the lessee to be heard on his side of the controversy relating to non-payment
of rentals.
MAGNO
-versus-
BLANCO
174 SCRA 398

TENANCY; How established

Whether or not a person is a tenant is an issue of fact reviewable on appeal or petition for review when
the conclusion arrived at by the court below has no support in the evidence on record. The respondent
court, in judging the private respondent as the bona fide tenant of the petitioner spouses, relied
completely on the DAR's certification. There is no reference to any reliable investigative report or other
supporting papers justifying the finding that there was a tenancy relationship between the landowners
and the alleged tenant. In fact, there was a failure to appreciate the following testimony in open court of
the alleged tenant before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
ROSINA C. GRAZA, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-48368

TENANCY; Personal cultivation is shown

Petitioner spouses also aver that such cultivation as was done by private respondent tenants or lessees
was not "personal" in character, considering that private respondents had availed themselves of the
services of farm laborers hired by the overseer. Under the statutory definition of an agricultural lessee
quoted earlier, an agricultural lessee is a person "who by himself, or with the aid available from within
his immediate farm household" cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another. The fact,
however, that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may have been assisted by farm laborers, on an
occasional or temporary basis, hired by the landowners, does not preclude the element of personal
"cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. In De Guzman v. Santos, the
mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work himself but temporarily or on an emergency basis
utilized the services of others to assist him, was not taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached
the requirement imposed by the statute. We do not consider that the statute prohibits the tenant or
agricultural lessee who generally works the land himself or with the aid of members of his immediate
household, from availing occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO
DIEGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159

TENANCY; Reinstated tenants deemed "actual tiller"

Where a tenant is ordered reinstated, the person instituted as "tenant" by the landowner acquires the
status of an "actual tiller" only.
CUANO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
143 SCRA 417

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements
regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. [43] The fact alone of
working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
[44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that
the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to
prove the element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate. [46]
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson, and
subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later Fr. Flores were not
instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform held that a written civil law lease contract between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which
contained in clear and precise terms the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his
parcels of land without the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating
for the record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr. Flores
when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
G.R. No. 122363
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an agricultural

tenancy relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this relationship to exist, it is
necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural
land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR SOLIS
G.R. No. 138781
Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or

impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. Although petitioners did not
expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with respondent, in our view petitioners
consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding
in question and by receiving from him the landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable
length of time.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.

-versus-
SIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137509
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162 SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a legal relationship.
The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86186
The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on
the basis of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal
except for the most compelling reasons.
Where persons cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce or the cash
equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and the landowner is one of tenancy and not
employment.
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versus-
G.R. No. 96489

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Absence of

The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that respondent did not
personally cultivate and riceland portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its harvest proceeds with petitioner.
Petitioner did not consent to a leasehold agreement with respondent over Lot No. 2025, as shown by
petitioner's filing of complaint below to enjoin respondent from encroaching and planting thereon.
Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he is not entitled to security of
tenure relative to this lot.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR SOLIS
G.R. No. 138781

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; All requisites must concur

The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops
thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of
expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a
tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500 square meters and located in an
urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
DAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78214
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, that all these requisites
are necessary in order to created tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of
one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-
distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
LOURDES PEÑA QUA, represented by her husband, JAIME QUA,

-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIV.), ET AL.
G.R. No. 95318
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247
(1988)), that the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Well-
settled is the rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a
de facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua
vs. Court of Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482 (1984)).
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER

RELATIONSHIP, DISTINGUISHED
1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof;
2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the
lessee of agricultural land;
3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a
salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and
4. the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86186

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Concept

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It
is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 105586

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; De jure status

The Court reiterates the ruling on Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, that
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-
distinguished from a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor he is covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
LOURDES PEÑA CUA

-versus-
G.R. No. 95318

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Determination by DAR Secretary is only preliminary

The findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certificate as to the supposed tenancy
relationship between the contending parties are not binding on the lower court pursuant to Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 316 and Section 12, sub-paragraph (r) of P.D. No. 946. The Secretary's
determination of the relationship between the parties is only preliminary. The same cannot be final and
conclusive on the lower court. The last paragraph of Section 12 of P.D. No. 946 supplements Section 2
of P.D. No. 316 and Section 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 583 cited earlier. P.D. No. 946 provides that when a
case involving an agricultural land is certified as a proper case for trial, the preliminary determination
of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not bind
the court assuming jurisdiction over said case. It is evidently with more reason that when the Secretary
certifies that an agrarian case is nor proper for trial, the Court before which an appeal is ventilated
regarding the effect of said certification must look into the bases of the Secretary's preliminary
determination. Otherwise, the party adversely affected by the DAR's certification is left without any
judicial recourse. Definitely, such an unjust and absurd result could not have been the intent of P.D.
No. 946.
ROSINA C. GRAZA, ET AL.

-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEAL
G.R. No. L-48368

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Effect of repurchase

The issue as to whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the vendee a retro has been
extinguished by the repurchase of the subject landholding, it has been held in analogous cases that
pursuant to the Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends to assure a greater degree of security of tenure
for tenants, further promoting the constitutional objective of social justice and protection to labor
(Pintacassi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29, 1972), specifically Section 49 of RA 1199, as amended, the
right of the tenant is not severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation
of the tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the tenant
and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase by the repurchase
by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of the previous
landholder, vendee a retro, who had instituted respondents Sevilla as tenant-tillers thereof, for the
axiom in land tenure states that generally once a tenant, always a tenant. Thus, the agrarian law was
established in the light of the social justice a precept of the Constitution and in the exercise of the
police power of the state to promote the common weal (Primero vs. CIR, L-10594, May 29, 1957;
Pineda, et al. vs. de Guzman, et al., L-23773-74, December 29, 1967).

-versus-
G.R. No. 59082

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Ejectment Case Filed in Relation to Tenancy Relationship

The ejectment case is the proper forum for the full ventilation of the tenancy issue. Although rulings of
the DAR may be assailed before the higher appellate courts (CA or SC), a definite resolution by this
court at this time, that petitioner is indeed a tenant of private respondents — as petitioner wants this
court to do – would render nugatory the ejectment case still pending in the trial court. In the same vein,
a reversal by this court of the "preliminary determination" by the DAR would result in an absurd and
circuitous scenario where the findings of this Court on an incidental matter of the case may be
reviewed and probably reversed by the trial court since whatever is the outcome hereof, the case will
still be remanded and disposed of by the latter whose ruling may again be reviewed by this Court on
appeal. Also, from the records, the Court is not in a position to resolve the dispute since the evidence
required in courts is different from that of administrative agencies.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versus-
G.R. No. 124516

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Elements must concur
Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and private
respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant".
Petitioner can not, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the spring cannot rise higher
that its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether
explicitly or implicitly. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for petitioner
to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not
the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this
falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 110012

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites

Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration. It is also understood that
5. there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that
6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the
harvests.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN

-versus-
G.R. No. 126425
SPS. AMADEO CUAÑO AND AURORA CUAÑO

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO
DIEGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 107159
LOURDES PEÑA QUA

-versus-
G.R. No. 95318
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
G.R. No. 98028
HILARIO
-versus-
IAC
148 SCRA 573
JULIO BARANDA AND ROBERTO BARANDA

-versus-
HON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
BACOLOD, RURAL BANK OF HINIGARAN, INC.
G.R. No. 76415
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-49293
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versus-
G.R. No. 96489
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 105586
JULIO BARANDA
-versus-
HON. ALFONSO BAGUIO

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP;How is it established

The alleged testimony of the administratrix of Marietta A. San Buenaventura, Rosario Vda. de Arriola,
that respondent Sevilla was hired as a laborer on daily wage basis (Rollo, p. 13) cannot prevail over the
following evidence supporting the existence of tenancy relationship in the instant case: (1) the vendee a
retro, thru the administratrix, is the landholder and respondent's Sevilla are the tenants; (2) the subject
landholding is agricultural; (3) consent between the vendee a retro thru, the administratrix, and spouses
Sevilla is not disputed; (4) the purposes which are rice and coconut production are agricultural; and (5)
spouses Sevilla have physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1973 and performed
faithfully and religiously their obligations as tenants until petitioners Salen took possession of the
landholding and cultivated the same means of force and intimidations sometime in June 1977; hence,
respondents Sevilla have personally cultivated the said landholding and there is a sharing on a 50-50
basis between Arriola and Sevilla from the riceland and 1/3-2/3 on the coconut land.

-versus-
G.R. No. 59082
Where private respondents cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in
the produce or the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is one of tenancy and
not employment. The fact that respondents have huts erected on the landholding shows they
are tenants.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74323

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Existence

Where private respondents cultivated the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the produce or
the cash equivalent of his share in lump, the relationship is one of tenancy and not of employment. The
fact that respondents have huts erected on the landholding shows they are tenants (Cruz vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 650350, May 15, 1984, 129 SCRA 222).
Further, this Court has consistently ruled that in agrarian cases all that is required is mere substantial
evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which attained the minimum evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be
reversed by the appellate tribunal (Bagsican vs. CA, G.R. No. 62255, January 30, 1986, 141 SCRA
226).
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versus-

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Jurisdiction, where no tenancy relationship is shown

In a considerable number of cases, that where no agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the
contending parties and the situation is one merely for forcible entry, the RTC, acting as an agrarian
court, has no jurisdiction. And in Pabustan vs. de Guzman, 109 Phil. 278, when there is no tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, the agrarian court has no jurisdiction.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Not shown by sharing of harvest

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationships. Certainly it is
not unusual for landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain
crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of
expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a
tenant thereof specifically when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, sq. meters and located in an
urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
production.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
G.R. No. 78214

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Preliminary Determination by DAR of Tenancy Relationship

Pursuant to P.D. No. 316
When the trial court referred the ejectment case to the DAR, it only acted in accordance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 316 — before it was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 6657 — that the
Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative shall make a "preliminary
determination of the (agrarian) relationship between the parties." The same decree further provides
that:
"If the Secretary finds that the case is proper for the court, . . ., he shall so certify and such
court, . . . may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy."
The determination by the DAR concerning the tenancy relationship between the parties is only
preliminary. After making its determination, the DAR can issue the appropriate certification for court
action. There is nothing in the decree which vested in the Secretary the final authority to rule on the
existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship whenever a case is referred to it by the courts
pursuant to P.D. No. 316. The DAR's preliminary determination, in the exercise of its adjudicatory
powers, does not even foreclose a further examination by the courts nor is the latter bound by the
former's initial appreciation of the relationship between the parties as provided in P.D. No. 1038.
Moreover, with the express repeal of PDs 316 and 1038 by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657, the preference
to the DAR become unnecessary, as the trial court may now process to hear the case. The reference
requirement under the decree is merely a procedural matter, the repeal of which did not cause any
prejudice to petitioner. Besides, there is nothing in the decree which says that if the DAR determine the
existence of a tenancy relationship, an ejectment case cannot prosper.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versus-
G.R. No. 124516

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites

The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: [36] (a) the
parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent by
the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant;
and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled
the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to
entitle the claimant to security of tenure. [38]
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. Hence, a
perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents.
The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a
purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
G.R. No. 122363
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests. [9]
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing
tenancy laws.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE

-versus-
G.R. No. 138016
The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship and the absence of
one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from a
de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 110012
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versus-
PATRICIA ARANETA
G.R. No. 135829
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or
planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247).
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO AND EDUARDO M. BUENCAMINO

HILARIO, PETITIONERS
-versus-
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
SALVADOR BALTAZAR, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 70736
RAFAEL GELOS
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86186
LOURDES PEÑA QUA assisted by her husband JAMES CUA

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), ET AL.
G.R. No. 95318

-versus-
G.R. No. 76415
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
DAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78214

-versus-
HON. PEDRO M. S.
G.R. No. 59082
Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there resided,
with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly, private
respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing, planting, weeding
and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring of persons outside of the
immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control in the farmwork, was not
essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management of the farm was left
entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses. Fourthly, private
respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique
Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed rice miller of
Taloc, attested the cash value of the rental payments from "the first crop of 1979 and each crop
thereafter up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive". The rental payments made thereafter were
received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, court appointed police officers, or to the barangay
captain.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, ET AL
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and FEDERICO ARMADA
G.R. No. 103103
One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by
the landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this fact has been shown in this case.
As held:
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de jure tenant as contra-
distinguished from a de facto tenant.
DAVID ODSIGUE
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Sharing Harvest

However, we agree with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission that petitioners were
tenants on the subject landholding, the element of "sharing harvest" is assumed as a factual element in
that admission.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE

-versus-
G.R. No. 138016

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Source of income determines

As significantly held in Qua vs. Court of Appeals, the fact that the source of livelihood of the private
respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural
tenancy relationship.
Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent Ignacio is a businessman by occupation and this is his
principal source of income. He manufactures hollow blocks. He also has piggery and poultry farm as
well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the respondent farms are
riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos.
It is this evident that the working hours of the respondent as businessman and his other activities do not
permit him to undertake the land obligations of a real tenant. This is further supported by the
undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally perform the work of a gardener because on
October 22, 1996 the respondent hired some 20 people who are not members of his family to cut and
burn the grass in the premises of the subject land.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98028

TENANCY; Remedy of the mortgagee is against the mortgagor

At all events, PAIC's right of recourse, insofar as its mortgage loan is concerned, is not against the land
itself nor against its mortgagee, but rather against its mortgagors, the petitioner Cuaño spouses.

TENANCY; Security of tenure

Private respondent are entitled to security of tenure as they are legitimate tenants of the lands.
Alleged agreements executed by the respondent purportedly relinquishing possession of their
landholdings are not enforceable, as it would violate the Code of Agrarian Reform on security of tenure
of tenants.
Private respondent having been already listed as farmer beneficiaries of the Land Transfer Program,
strengthens the security of tenure of tenants.
DON PEPE HENSON

-versus-
PANGILINAN
161 SCRA 687

TENANT; Defined
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and with
the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landowner
under the share tenancy system, or in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.
-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN
SALIPOT
G.R. No. 80129
JOSE MATIENZO
-versus-
MARTIN SERVIDAD
G.R. No. L-28135

TENANT; Right over the landholding

Whether or not the tenancy relationship of Sevilla with the vendee a retro has been extinguished by the
repurchase of the subject of that landholding, it has been held on analogous cases that pursuant to the
Agricultural Tenancy Act which tends to assure a greater degree of security of tenure for tenants,
further promoting the constitutional objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacasi vs.
CAR, L-23704, July 29, 1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the right of the
tenant is not severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation of the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the tenant and
protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase by the vendor a retro,
petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of the previous of the landholder,
vendee a retro, who has instituted respondents Sevilla as tenant tillers thereof, for the axiom in land
tenure states that generally once a tenant, always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN
-versus-
G.R. No. 59082

THIRD PARTY; Construed

The "third party" mentioned in the said Section 21 should be construed to mean a person who is neither
landholder nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the landholder. For instance, a
sheriff enforcing as execution sale against the landholder; or a purchaser or transferee of the land, or a
mere dummy of the landowner.
TEOFILA DE LUNA
-versus-
CA, CASIANO DE LUNA and FLAVIANO DE LUNA
G.R. No. 97788

TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS; Not disposable until released

It should be remembered that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable or alienable, neither
the Bureau of Lands not the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sale or otherwise dispose
of these lands for homesteads, sales, patents, leases for grazing purposes, fishpond leases and other
modes of utilization.
THE HEIRS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA

-versus-
SPS. SEVERO BARZA and ESTER P. BARZA and CA
G.R. No. 79167

TITLE; Condition for the transfer

The CARP law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

-versus-
HON. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

TORRENS TITLE; Indefeasibility thereof

The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the
certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. (Anonuevo vs. Court of Appeals). The principle of
indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents
and titles.

-versus-
G.R. No. 108547
U

USUFRUCT; Extinguished
As to the question of what rights, if any were retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary, after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 27. We believe that the usufruct which had theretofore existed as jus in re aliena
in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by P.D. No. 27. To hold, as private respondent
Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed
upon the land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land
reform statute. P.D. No. 27 was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by
giving to tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption that
they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather than mere tillers
of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue enjoying, usufructuary, the
natural or civil fruits of lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be set at naught the major purpose projected by P.D.
No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order No. 228.
RAMONA LOCSIN
-versus-
HON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA and CARLOS
PANALIGAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 51333 & 52289
V

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Mode of Extinguishment

To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private person. It was
the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were
declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of
extinguishment of Government (now the Department of Interior and Local Government) regulates them
through the Bureau of Cooperative Development (Section 8, PD 175).
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versus-
G.R. No. 135297

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Proof needed

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court
authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. (see Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87
SCRA 263 (1978). To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender as
contemplated by law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The
tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere
implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to security of tenure becomes an illusory one.
VICTOR TALAVERA, ET AL.

-versus-
G.R. No. 77830
W

WAIVER OF RIGHTS; Null and Void

Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-
beneficiary because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land. they also cite his
"Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of
Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through
hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which
the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the government's program of freeing the
tenant from the bondage of the soil.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versus-
G.R. No. 135297

WRIT OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; Concurrent Jurisdiction to

Issue Writ
The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which
reads:
"SEC. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if
it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If
it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided
by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have
original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with
the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only
with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

WRIT OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; Discretionary Power of the

Supreme Court
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent case, namely: Uy vs.
Contreras, et al., Torres v. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we
have further stated in Cuaresma:
". . .. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket."
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition on the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.

-versus-
G.R. No. 131457

WRIT OF POSSESSION; Enforcement

It would be a gross error for the judge to suspend the implementation of the writ of possession. Once
the writ has been issued, the court has no alternative but to enforce it without delay (PNB vs. Adel, 118
SCRA 116 (1982). In fact in a later case, even the Court of Appeals was not allowed to restrain the
implementation of a writ of possession.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versus-
G.R. No. L-49293
Z

ZONING ORDINANCE; Defined

"A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs.

-versus-
G.R. No. 112526

CARL and Agrarian Jurisprudence Index

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CARL (R.A. 6657, as amended) and Related Laws

History and Evolution of Major Agrarian Reform Laws

Laws, Statutes and Presidential Issuances

Supreme Court Decisions and Issuances

INDEX-DIGESTS OF AGRARIAN RELATED JURISPRUDENCE

ACCOUNTING; What includes

DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

ACQUISITION; Procedure for Compulsory Acquisition

STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.

ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

NATALIA REALTY, INC.

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF LAND; Prescription thereof

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.

ACTION; Must be prosecuted in name of real party in interest

RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT; When can it be assailed

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEPARTMENT

HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA

LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

HILDA RALLA ALMINE

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; Interpretation thereof; rule on

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS; Effect

It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and

SPS. AMADEO AND AURORA CUAÑO

AGRARIAN CASES; Appeal

ANGELES MALATE, NORBERTO ESGUERRA AND

AGRARIAN CASES; Prescriptive period of action for accounting

DR. JOSE TONGSON, CARMEN TONGSON

AGRARIAN CASE; Quantum of evidence required

NICOLAS REYES, ET AL.

ROMEO REYES, ET AL.

AGRARIAN CASES; Resolution

AGRARIAN DISPUTE; Defined

HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO RIVERA

LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Definition

RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE

HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS Represented by

AGRARIAN DISPUTES; Resolution

LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.

AGRARIAN LAW; Powers of the President

ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

AGRARIAN LAW; Rationale for the enactment

DOMINGO AND ROSA SALEN

AGRARIAN REFORM; Objectives

AGRARIAN REFORM; Raison d'être

IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY; Defined

AGRICULTURAL LABORER; Defined

COCONUT COOP. MARKETING, INC.

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Coverable under CARL

NATALIA REALTY, INC., ET AL.

AGRICULTURAL LAND; Defined

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

As a preliminary point, we note that the landholding in dispute is a mango plantation.

SPS. AMADEO CUAÑO AND AURORA Y CUAÑO

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Effect of transfer

SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO AND MONINA FULE

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Establishment

AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; How established