CHAVEZ vs.

PEA and AMARI

GR. NO. 133250 – JULY 9, 2002

Facts:
PEA is a government owned and controlled corporation which was tasked to reclaim land
including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire,…lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands owned , managed, and controlled by the government. PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop some of its reclaimed lands.
The said JVA became subject to investigation for the reason that questions on its legality occurred.
Then renegotiations between PEA and AMARI happen which had produced the Amended JVA.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against PEA and AMARI assailing the transfer of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed by PEA to AMARI as stated in the Amended JVA. The petitioner
further prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds, the renegotiated contract be declared null
and void.

Issue:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended Joint Venture Agreement for the transfer to
AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the constitution.

Held:
The court declares the Amended Joint Venture Agreement null and void ab initio. The court
orders PEA and AMARI to enjoin from implementing the Amended JVA.

Ratio:
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of
public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale
to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential
as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of public domain are to be distributed
equitably among our ever growing population. To ensure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and
1987 Constitution have barred private corporation from acquiring any kind of alienable land of public
domain.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement clearly violates Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of public domain.
Luz Farms (petitioner) vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (respondent)

G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein
petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioner.

On June 10,1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
(Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657.

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No.
6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2,1989
and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9,1989.

Issue: Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is constitutional.

Held: If legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void? This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution;
Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has
exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]). (reason why it was held as
the court did)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
DAR vs SUTTON, G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC),

Petitioner,

vs

DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTONSOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

FACTS:

• The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

• On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farm
used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

• On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,
this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.

• In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising and thus exempted
from the coverage of the CARL.

• On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

• On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner
ignored their request.

• On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only
portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June
15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be
excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animalland ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land
per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

• On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as
final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire
landholding is exempted from the CARL.

• On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially
granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the
retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents
land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered
the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

• Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should b
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
• They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President. On October 9, 2001, the Office
of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s.
1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. Provided the guidelines to determine
whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattleraising. However, the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters
of such issue.

• On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.

ISSUE: W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners
of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD: NO.

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The
A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultryraising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the
form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers
and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, antipollution equipment like biogas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses,
sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.
DAR vs SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRIBUSINESS CORP, G.R. No. 179071 January 10, 2011

FACTS:

• Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161
hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corporation. Said parcels of land
are hereinafter described as follows:

• On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a
Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were
subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law).

• On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO),
Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T12637 and T12639
from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels
of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455
hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9
heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).

• On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on
the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The Investigation
Report dated March 9, 1993 stated:

“Cognitive thereto, we are favorably recommending for the exemption from the coverage of CARP
based on LUZ FARMS as enunciated by the Supreme Court the herein Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835
under TCT No. T12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad. 286 of TCT No. T12637 which is already covered
under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had already been valued by the Land Valuation
Office, Land Bank of the Philippines.”

• On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots 1454A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994,
petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letteraffidavit addressed to the
respondent Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 on
the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995,
petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from
CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to
June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.

• The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5,
1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that it was not
clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in
its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The
application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.

• On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454A & 1296 were taken
beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District
(Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted
on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied the Motion.
• The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998,
the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional Directors ruling on Lots 1454A & 1296 and
further declared Lots 1298 and 1293B as covered by the CARP.

• On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent
prompting the former to file the instant petition.

• The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels
of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T12637 and T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique
Lopez (the Lopez lands) from coverage of the CARL.

• However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the
application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in
Barrio Limot (the Limot lands). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP T16356). The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial
reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration
were subsequently denied.

ISSUE: W/N the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock
business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Courts ruling in Luz Farms
v. DAR.

HELD:

NO. The Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are
thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.

In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that the entire
Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and
recommended the denial of the application for exemption. Verily, the Limot lands were actually,
directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to
the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director
who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the
Court of Appeals.

Tthe MARO itself in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock
were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The
DAR Secretary even described SNLABCs use of the area as a seasonal extension of the applicants
grazing lands during the summer. Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been
actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock business, especially since these were
only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable and are in
fact actually, directly and exclusively being used for agricultural purposes.
MILESTONE FARMS, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was incorporated with the SEC. On June 10, 1988, a new
agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its
coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or
swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the
exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.

Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of
Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following
findings:

The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the
coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCEC's findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director
Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from CARP.

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by
Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994.Subsequently, the Pinugay
Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.

Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil
Case No. 781-T.The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its
Decision dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants
therein to vacate portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its
Resolution dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion
for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision;
hence, the same became final and executory.

In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,which was approved on February 20,
1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from
the coverage of the CARL.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP
only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and
declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

On February 4, 2000, the Office of the President rendered a decision reinstating Order declared the
entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.

Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. the CA found that, based on the documentary
evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the
animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner
applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that
petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it
from CARP coverage. Hence, the instant petition is hereby granted. Finally, petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Is the land exempted from CARL coverage?

HELD: In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case
that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop
or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in
this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated
water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.

While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process,the same is not without exception,such as this case. The CA, under Section
3,Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of justice, entertain and resolve factual
issues. After all, technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus be allowed to attain
the prime objective of dispensing justice, for dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of courts.Moreover, petitioner cannot validly claim that it was deprived of due process
because the CA afforded it all the opportunity to be heard.The CA even directed petitioner to file its
comment on the Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim that the subject property was
excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before
the CA by submitting pleadings and pieces of documentary evidence, such as the Investigating
Teams Report and judicial affidavits. The CA also went further by setting the case for hearing. In all
these proceedings, all the parties rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, GR No. 200454, 2014-10-22

Facts:

Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located in Brgy. Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan (Dakila
property) registered in the name of Freddie Santiago

The Dakila property used to be tenanted... but in August 1991, these tenants freely and voluntarily
relinquished their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their respective sinumpaang pahayag...
in exchange for some financial assistance and individual... homelots titled and distributed in their
names... the petitioner purchased the remaining 208,050 square meters of the Dakila property from
Santiago,[7] and later caused the transfer of the title to its name as well as subdivided the Dakila
property into six lots

The petitioner then developed the property by dumping filling materials on the topsoil, and by
erecting a perimeter fence and steel gate. It established its field office on the property.

the Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 reclassifying four of the six
subdivided lots

Consequently, the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) of Malolos, Bulacan issued a
Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion (Certificate of Zoning Conformance),[11] as well as a
Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance in favor of the... petitioner for its residential
subdivision project on the Dakila property.

n Augus

On August 23, 1999, the petitioner purchased from Santiago another parcel of land with an area of
25,611 located in Barangay Sumapang Matanda, Malolos, Bulacan (Sumapang Matanda property)

April 2006, a certain Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila
property.[14] This was followed by the letter request of

Sumapang Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman Numeriano L. Enriquez to
place the Dakila property within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27,... The OIC-Regional Director opined that the sale of the Dakila property
was a prohibited transaction under Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6657[18] and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989; and that the petitioner was...
disqualified from acquiring land under Republic Act No. 6657 because it was a corporation.

Pending resolution of the Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside,... the Register of Deeds issued
emancipation patents (EPs) pursuant to the order of the OIC-Regional Director. The petitioner's titles
were canceled and EPs were issued to the respondents... on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the DAR Secretary said that the Dakila property was not exempt from the coverage
of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No. 6657 because Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 did
not change or reclassify but merely re-zoned... the Dakila property.

(OP) reversed the ruling of DAR Secretary Pangandaman upon its finding that the Dakila property
had ceased to be suitable for agriculture, and had been reclassified as residential land pursuant to
Municipal Resolution No. 16-98... the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the OP. It declared
that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 and even after the passage of
Municipal Resolution No.

16-98 on March 4, 1998, the Dakila property was an agricultural land; that there was no valid
reclassification
Issues:

Did the CA gravely err in limiting its decision to the issue of whether or not the Dakila property was
subject to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657?

Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential
Decree No. 27?

Was the issuance of the EPs pursuant to the August 16, 2006 order of the DAR Regional Office
proper?

Ruling:

We reverse the CA, and reinstate the decision of the OP

The CA declared that the Dakila property as an agricultural land; and that there was no valid
reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 because the law required an ordinance, not a
resolution.

We agree in part with the CA.

Nonetheless,... the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic
Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.

Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 is that it
must either be primarily devoted to or be suitable for agriculture.

Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity; and (2)
that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or... industrial land.

Considering that the Dakila property has not been classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial, the second requisite is satisfied. For the first requisite to be met, however,
there must be a showing that agricultural activity is... undertaken on the property.

Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity like cultivation of the land,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,... and other farm activities and practices were... being
performed on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657.

Even if we supplemented the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, the outcome is still the same,
because the Dakila property was still not within the scope of the law. For land to be covered under
Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and... there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, the land must be
excluded.

ection 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be follow

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:

The unquestioned non-compliance with the procedures set by Republic Act No. 6657 and its relevant
rules and regulations further denied to the petitioner the exercise of its right of retention.[81] In
doing so, the OIC-Regional Director disregarded this... constitutionally guaranteed right. We cannot
understate the value of the right of retention as the means to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine
that social justice is not... meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

In fine, the order of the OIC-Regional Director was patently null and void. The denial of due process
to the petitioner sufficed to cast the impress of nullity on the official act thereby taken. A decision
rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked... directly or collaterally.[83] All
the resulting acts were also null and void. Consequently, the EPs awarded to the respondents should
be nullified.

Principles:

Land on which no agricultural activity is being conducted is not subject to the coverage of either
Presidential Decree No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
Arce vs. Department of Agrarian Reform (2018)

Petitioners: HEIRS OF RAMON ARCE, SR.

Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY VIRGILIO

DELOS REYES

Ponente: Tijam (First Division)

FACTS:

As early as the 1950s, the Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr. (petitioners) were registered owners of a parcel
of land located in Brgy. Macabud, Montalban, Rizal with an area of 76.39 hectares (ha.), covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-442673, 442674, 442675, and 442676 (referred to as subject
lands). The subject lands were utilized as pasture lands for the petitioners' cattle, i.e., buffaloes,
carabaos and goats (hereinafter referred to as livestock), for milk and dairy production in the
manufacture of Selecta Carabao's Milk and Ice Cream (now Arce Dairy Ice Cream). The farming
method adopted by the petitioners was known as "feedlot operation" where the animals were
confined and fed on a cut-and-carry basis or zero grazing.

Sometime in 1998, the Philippine Carabao Center-Department of Agriculture (PCC-DA) recommended

that petitioners' livestock be transferred to avoid the liver fluke infestation in the area. In compliance
with PCC-DA's recommendation, petitioners transferred the older and milking livestock, which are
susceptible to infection, to their feedlot facility located in Novaliches, Quezon City (Novaliches
property). The younger cattle, which are not susceptible to the fluke infection, remained in the
subject lands.

Notwithstanding the transfer of some of their livestock, petitioners continued to plant and grow
napier grass in the subject lands. The napier grass were then cut, carried and used as fodder for
their livestock which were maintained both in the subject lands and in the Novaliches property.

On August 6, 2008, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Teresa, Rizal issued a Notice of
Coverage (NOC) over the subject lands under the CARP. In response, petitioners sent a letter dated
October 17, 2008 to the PARO of DAR Region IV-A, seeking to exclude and exempt the subject lands
from the NOC considering that it has been utilized for livestock raising even before the enactment of
the CARP.

On September 30, 2009, the petitioners filed a Manifestation to Lift Notice of Coverage with the
PARO, which was treated as a petition and docketed as Case No. A-0400- 0250-09 of DAR Regional
Office IV-A with the PARO. This was anchored on the ground that petitioners were in the business of
livestock raising, and were using the subject lands as pasture lands for their buffaloes which produce
the carabao milk for their ice cream products. The petitioners claimed that the NOC is contrary to the
1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that livestock farms are not among those described as
agricultural lands subject to land reform.

Based on these findings, DAR Regional Director Antonio G. Evangelista (RD Evangelista) issued an
Order dated December 22, 2009, granting the Petition to Lift Notice of Coverage.

On April 29, 2011, RD Evangelista issued a Certification, stating that the Order dated December 22,
2009 had become final and executory, considering that no motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
was filed.

Meanwhile, Joevin M. Ucag (Ucag) of DAR Region IV-A submitted an Ocular Inspection Report dated
May 12, 2011 to the MARO, stating that "there was no livestock/cattle found in the area of Macabud,
Rodriguez, Rizal".
Subsequently, the Samahan ng mga Magsasakang Nagkakaisa sa Sitio Calumpit (SAMANACA),
through their leaders, sent letters dated March 2, 2011 and June 14, 2011, to DAR Secretary Virgilio
R. De Los Reyes (Secretary De Los Reyes), seeking to annul RD Evangelista's Order dated December
22, 2009. The letters were treated as a Petition to Annul an Invalid Resolution by the Regional
Director.

On November 8, 2011, petitioners filed their Comment and countered that RD Evangelista's Order
dated December 22, 2009 had become final and executory and that the subject lands were within the
retention limit. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of SAMANACA's Letters-Petition.

On December 7, 2012, DAR Secretary De Los Reyes issued an Order, denying petitioners' Petition for
Exclusion from CARP Coverage. The DAR ruled, among others, that while it is true that the subject
lands had been a livestock farm prior to the CARP's enactment, the petitioners failed to prove that
the said lands are actually, directly, exclusively and continuously used for livestock activity up to the
present. According to the DAR, there were no longer cattle and livestock facilities within the subject
lands.

Eventually, petitioners filed an Appeal Memorandum with the Office of the President (OP), which
ruled that petitioners' subject lands were exempted from the coverage of CARP.

The DAR filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which ruled for DAR.

ISSUES:Wheter The subject lands are devoted to livestock raising; thus, they remain to be exempted
from the coverage of the CARP

Ruling:

Contrary to the rulings of the DAR and the CA, the subject lands are exempted from the coverage of
the CARP.

The CARP shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced.43
Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land" as land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.44

In Luz Farms v. The Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,45 the Court
declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions46 that included lands devoted to livestock under the
coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally
mandated agrarian reform program of the government.47 (Emphasis ours)

Reiterating Our ruling in the Luz Farms case, We held in Natalia Realty and Estate Developers and
Investors Corp. Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform Sec. Benjamin T. Leong and Dir. Wilfredo
Leano, DAR¬ REGION IV,48 that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the
CARL. In the same case, We stressed that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include lands
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial.

Guided by the foregoing, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been
classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus, exempted from agrarian reform.

thorough review of the records reveals that there is substantial evidence to show that the entirety of
the petitioners' subject lands were devoted to livestock production since the 1950s, i.e., even before
the enactment of the CARL on June 15, 1988. No less than the DAR, who has the competence to
determine the status of the land,50 acknowledged this when it held that:

It cannot be denied that the Arce properties [subject lands] had been a livestock farm. The
documentary evidence presented by the Applicants [petitioners] established the existence of
livestock activity in the landholding prior (sic) the enactment of the CARL on 15 June 1988, such as
Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued from 1981 to 1988, Certification from the Philippine
Carabao Center attesting that the Selarce Farm is a cooperator of the Center as early as 1982, and
the Technical Paper published by the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research
featuring the Arce Farm in the "Philippines Recommends for Carabao Production 1978."

Indeed, the subject lands are utilized for livestock raising, and as such, classified as industrial, and
not agricultural lands. Thus, they are exempted from agrarian reform