Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168787             September 3, 2008

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer

STEPHEN M. LEONIDAS, petitioner,
vs.
POLO COCONUT PLANTATION CO., INC., FLORENCIA D. REMOLLO, NOLI C.
ALCANTARA,1 ZOSIMO BARBA, ROBERT B. BAJANA, EMETERIO V. TAG-AT, JUVENAL T.
MENDEZ,2 SHIELA R. REYES, JONITA M. CADALLO, PRISCO P. BACO, BENJAMIN C. DAYAP,
ANTONIO DEDELES,3 NARCISO D. DIAZ, JOVENIANO REYES,4 RODOLFO C. SALVA, AVELINO C.
BAJANA, PRAXEDES BAJANA, ALEJANDRO T. GIMOL, EMELINA B. SEDIGO 5 and HERMINIGILDO
VILLAFLORES, respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169271             September 3, 2008

MARTINA Q. ABARCA, TOLENTINA E. ABLAY, CONCHITA M. AC-AC, JOSEPHINA S. AC-AC,

LORETA C. AC-AC, CARIDAD Q. AGUILAR, DIOSDADO A. AGUILAR, ROMULO S. AGUILAR,
SHERLITA T. AGUILAR, WILFREDO T. ALCANTARA, ANACLETO B. ALFORQUE, RICARDO P.
BACO, RODRIGO P. BACO, SR., DARIO B. BAJANA, SR., DEMETRIO F. BALBUENA, GREGORIA
R. BARBA, TOMAS T. BARBA, WILFREDO R. BARBA, VIVIAN F. BAROT, DOMINGO O. BAROY,
ARTURO A. BORROMEO, FEDENCIA R. BORROMEO, JUANITA P. CABIL, SALVADOR A.
CABORNAY, SEVERINO M. CABUG-OS, AUREA M. CALDA, BALTAZAR R. CATALOÑA, DANILOO
B. CURATO, ARNULFO B. DAEL, DEMOCRITO B. DAGODOG, GENARO C. DURAN, JOSEPHINE M.
ELLEMA, ALBINA R. ELMAGA, ENRIQUE R. ELMAGA, EDWIN L. ELUMIR, TOMAS M. GABIHAN,
ALBERTO A. GASO, PEDRO R. GASO, VISITACION S. GASO, ERLINDA S. GAZO, ANDRES M.
GENEL, DIOSCOR M. GENEL, ANGEL R. GOMEZ, LORENZO S. GOMEZ, SANTIAGO T. GOMEZ,
SILANDO Q. GOMEZ, CONSORCIA G. GUEVARRA, FREDESWINDA M. GUMA, CELODONIA A.
GUZMAN, HERCULANO B. GUZMAN, JR., CESAR Q. HAROY, SR., EDDIE Q. HAROY, ROMEO E.
INOFERIO, GENARA R. JUANO, GEVINO B. JUANO, SR., ROGELIA B. JUANO, ROSALITA G.
JUANO, DIOGRACIAS R. LARAZAN, RELINA H. LARENA, JOSE G. MAGALSO, INOCENCIA G.
MALCO, LUCENA B. MALTO, SANTOS S. MALTAO, ELINA T. MARIMAT, RAMON C. MARIMAT,
MERCY B. MARO, RUTHELMA D. MARO, CHARITA S. MATEO, ALMA D. MEDINA, ABUNDIO M.
MENDEZ, RENOLD S. MINDEZ, ALBERTO B. MIRA, GAUDENCIA S. MIRA, CRESTITA D.
MONTAÑA, DIONISIA T. MONTAÑA, LORETO R. NAPAO, ALICIA P. NILLAS, ESPERANZA M.
OMATANG, JR., FELICISIMA M. ORACION, JOEL M. ORACION, PATROCINIO T. PAO, LOURDES T.
PARTOSA, FABIAN S. PIÑERO, FELIX R. PUBLICO, MARIBELLE B. PUBLICO, CARMELITA M.
QUILARIO, ENRIQUE R. QUILARIO, MANOLITA M. QUILARIO, MIGUEL S. QUILERIO, LEONILA J.
QUINQUILLERIA, DELTA M. RAMIREZ, ELIAS O. RAMOS, CONSOLACION T. REAL, ERLINDA I.
REGALA, DOMINGA M. REMAN, EUGENIO O. REMAN, PEPITA R. REMAN, RODNEY D. REMAN,
RONNIE O. REMAN, SR., DOMINADOR P. REMPOJO, EUTIQUIO T. REMPOJO, ROSITA C.
REMPOJO, CAROLINA T. REYES, DIONISIA M. REYES, EUGENIA B. REYES, LORETA D. REYES,
MARIO S. REYES, LAUREANO C. RIVERA, PETER C. RIVERA, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ,
RICARDO R. RODRIGUEZ, PATROCINIO I. SABIHON, FELIPE G. SAGA, ANESIA D. SALIN,
FLAVIANO T. SALIN, JR., WENEFREDO T. SALIN, VIRGILIO B. SALOMA, ESTELA S. SALVA,
GEORGE R. SALVA, TEOFISTA R. SALVA, JOSEPHINE T. SEDIGO, MICHAEL P. SEGISMAR, SR.,
JOSEPH S. SEVILLA, MARISSA H. SIENES, MA. GINA M. SILVA, ARTURO T. SOLITANA, MARILYN
M. TABORA, GABINO G. TEMBLOR, REYNALDO Q. TEMBLOR, ELSA A. TEVES, LEONORA D.
TORCO, GREGORIA O. TOROY, ANDRES P. TORRES, HILARIO P. TORRES, LEONARDO G.
TORRES, MANOLITA T. TORRES, GENEROSO I. TORRES, LEONARDO F. TUBAGA, AGRIPINO
P.TURCO, FLORDELICO S. VERBO, OLYMPIA T. YORONG and ROSENDA C. ZERNA, petitioners,
vs.
POLO COCONUT PLANTATION CO., INC., FLORENCIA D. REMOLLO, NOLE C. ALCANTARA,
ZOSIMO BARBA, ROBERT B. BAJANA,6 EMETERIO V. TAG-AT, JUVENAL T. MENDEZ, SHIELA R.
REYES, JONITA M. CADALLO, PRISCO P. BACO, BENJAMIN C. DAYAP, ANTONIO DEDELES,
NARCISO D. DIAZ, JOVENIANO REYES, RODOLFO C. SALVA, AVELINO C. BAJANA, PRAXEDES
BAJANA, ALEJANDRO T. GIMOL, MELINA B. SEDIGO and HERMINIGILDO
VILLAFLORES, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In the late 1990s, respondent Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc. (PCPCI) sought to convert 280 hectares
of its Polo Coconut Plantation7 (Polo estate) in Tanjay, Negros Oriental into a special economic zone
(ecozone) under the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). On December 19, 1998, PEZA issued
Resolution No. 98-320 favorably recommending the conversion of the Polo estate into an
ecozone8 subject to certain terms and conditions including the submission of "all government clearances,
endorsements and documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act (RA) 7916."

The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands into mixed residential,
commercial and industrial lands with the municipal government of Tanjay. After conducting the prescribed
hearing, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanjay adopted Resolution No. 344 granting PCPCI's application on
November 3, 1999.

When Tanjay became a city, its Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted Resolution No. 16 approving

Tanjay's Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance where PCPCI's real properties, including
the Polo estate, were reclassified as mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands.9

Sometime in 2003, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer Stephen M. Leonidas, notified PCPCI that 394.9020 hectares of the Polo estate had been placed
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)10 and would be acquired by the government.

Thereafter, Leonidas requested the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Oriental to cancel PCPCI's certificate of
title and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. He likewise asked Region VII
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta to determine the just compensation due to
PCPCI.11

On January 29, 2004, a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.12 The next day, that title was cancelled and another was issued in the name of petitioners in
G.R. No. 169271 (petitioners-beneficiaries).13

Meanwhile, on March 11, 2004, Arrieta approved the land valuation (P85,491,784.60)14 of the Land Bank
of the Philippines for the Polo estate. PCPCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in an order
dated March 30, 2004.

On July 16, 2004, Leonidas informed PCPCI that a relocation survey of the Polo estate would be
conducted. PCPCI moved for the suspension of the survey but it was denied. 15
Aggrieved, PCPCI filed a petition for certiorari16 in the Court of Appeals (CA) asserting that the DAR acted
with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP. It argued that the Polo estate
should not be subjected to the CARP because Resolution No. 16 had already designated it as mixed
residential, commercial and industrial land. Moreover, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified to
receive land under the CARP.

In its February 16, 2005 decision, the CA found that the Polo estate was no longer agricultural land when
the DAR placed it under the CARP in view of Resolution No. 16. Furthermore, petitioners-beneficiaries
were not qualified beneficiaries as they were not tenants of PCPCI. Thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DECLARING as NOT VALID the acts of the [DAR] of subjecting PCPCI's [Polo estate] to the
coverage of the CARP, of canceling and causing the cancellation of [PCPCI's] Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-2304 covering such land, of issuing or causing the issuance of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-36318 for this land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines by way of transfer
to it, of issuing or causing the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-802 for the said land
in the names of [petitioner-beneficiaries] in the case at bench by way of award of them of such
land as purported farm beneficiaries and of doing other things with the end in view of subjecting
[the Polo estate] to CARP coverage, SETTING ASIDE and ENJOINING such acts and the
consequence thereof, ORDERING the [petitioner-beneficiaries] to vacate the premises of [the
Polo estate] if they had entered such premises, and ORDERING the respondent Register of
Deeds of Negros Oriental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-36318 and T-802 and to
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2304 in the name of petitioner PCPCI.

SO ORDERED.17

Both the DAR and petitioners-beneficiaries moved for reconsideration but they were denied. 18 Hence, this
recourse.

The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate under Resolution No. 16 as mixed residential,
commercial and industrial land did not place it beyond the reach of the CARP. Petitioners-beneficiaries,
on the other hand, insist that they were qualified beneficiaries. While they were neither farmers nor
regular farmworkers of PCPCI, they were either seasonal or other farmworkers.

There is merit in these petitions.

Non-Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies

Recourse to court action will not prosper until all remedies have been exhausted at the administrative
level.19

Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure (DARAB Rules) provides:

Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or Board shall have no
jurisdiction over matters involving the implementation of RA 6657 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other related agrarian laws enunciated
by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of
and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances to
wit:

3.1. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian
reform program and the initial issuance of [certificates of land ownership award] and
 [emancipation patents], including protests or oppositions thereto and petitioners for lifting
of such coverage;

3.2. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification or disqualification of

potential/actual farmer/beneficiaries; (emphasis supplied)

xxx   xxx   xxx

Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary. He determines whether a tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP. 20 Likewise,
questions regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries must be addressed to him. The DAR Secretary
decides to whom lands placed under the CARP shall be distributed. 21

Before PCPCI filed its petition for certiorari in the CA, it did not file a protest or opposition questioning the
propriety of subjecting the Polo estate to the CARP. Neither did it assail the eligibility of petitioners-
beneficiaries before the DAR Secretary. There were available administrative remedies under the DARAB
Rules but PCPCI did not avail of them.

Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court can be availed of only in
the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.22 Here, recourse to the DAR Secretary was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law contemplated by Rule 65.

Non-Conversion To Mixed
Residential, Commercial and
Industrial Land

In Ros v. DAR,23 we held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the process of conversion in
the DAR24 before they may be used for other purposes.25 Since the DAR never approved the conversion
of the Polo estate from agricultural to another use, the land was never placed beyond the scope of the
CARP.

The approval of the DAR for the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial estate is a condition
precedent for its conversion into an ecozone.26 A proposed ecozone cannot be considered for Presidential
Proclamation unless the landowner first submits to PEZA a land use conversion clearance certificate from
the DAR.27 This PCPCI failed to do.

PEZA Resolution No. 98-320 expressly provides:

Resolved, that the application of [PCPCI] for (1) declaration of the 280-hectare property in Brgy.
Polo, Municipality of Tanjay, Province of Negros Oriental as a Special Economic Zone, subject to
Presidential Proclamation, henceforth to be to be known as POLO ECOCITY- SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE and (2) registration as the Developer/Owner of the said ECOZONE is
hereby APPROVED subject to the following terms and conditions:

xxx   xxx   xxx

2. Prior to PEZA's endorsement of the subject area to the President for proclamation as an
ECOZONE, the PCPCI shall submit all government clearances, endorsements and documents
required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the [Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 7916];

xxx   xxx   xxx
This condition proves that the favorable recommendation of PEZA did not ipso facto change the nature of
the Polo estate. The property remained as agricultural land and, for this reason, was still subject to the
CARP.

In fact, Resolution No. 16 did not exempt PCPCI's agricultural lands (including the Polo estate) from the
CARP. Section 20 of the Local Government Code 28 provides that a city or municipality can reclassify land
only through the enactment of an ordinance. In this instance, reclassification was undertaken by mere
resolution;29 thus, it was invalid.

Qualification Of CARP
Beneficiaries

Section 22 of the CARL provides:

Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as
much as possible to landless residents of the same baranggay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the abovementioned beneficiaries and

(g) others directly working on the land.

xxx   xxx   xxx

A basic qualification of a beneficiary is his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make
the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or
performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the
land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The
DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the [Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council].

xxx   xxx   xxx

This provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. Determining whether or not one
is eligible to receive land involves the administrative implementation of the program. For this reason, only
the DAR Secretary can identify and select CARP beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot substitute their
judgment unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. 30

Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the landowners. Thus, the DAR
cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of discretion simply because its chosen beneficiaries
were not tenants of PCPCI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The February 16, 2005 decision and June 29, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00043 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The March 11, 2004, March 30, 2004 and August 30, 2004 orders of Region VII Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta in RARAD Case No. VII-N-1284-2004 are REINSTATED. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-802 and Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00114438 are
declared VALID.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Carpio, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Also referred to as "Nole C. Alcantara" in some parts of the records.

2
 Also referred to as "Jovenal T. Mendez" in some parts of the records.

3
 Also referred to as "Anotonio Dedeles" in some parts of the records.

4
 Also referred to as "Jovenciano Reyes" in some parts of the records.

5
 Also referred to as "Melina B. Sedigo" in some parts of the records.

6
 Also referred to as "Robert C. Bajana" in some parts of the records.

7
 Described as Lot 3478-D of Psd-30972 with a total area of 431 hectares and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2304.

8
 Annex "Y," rollo (G.R. No. 169271), pp. 97-100.

9
 Approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Oriental in Resolution No. 312 on July
12, 2001.

10
 In its earlier letter to PCPCI, DAR stated that the September 16, 1991 notice of coverage
subjecting "lands covered by TCT Nos. T-1187, etc." to the CARP included the Polo estate (which
was covered by TCT No. T-2304). Annex "J," rollo (G.R. No. 169271) p. 76. Subsequently, this
was reiterated in letters signed by Leonidas (dated April 23, 2003 and May 5, 2003, respectively).
Annexes "K," and "L," id., pp. 77-78.

11
 Docketed as RARAD Case No. VII-N-1284-2004.

12
 TCT No. T-36318.

13
 TCT No. T-802/ Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00114438. Annex "C," rollo (G.R. No.
169271), pp. 62-68.

14
 Annex "M,"id., p. 79.
15
 Signed by regional adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta. Dated August 20, 2004. Annex "N," id., pp. 80-
82.

16
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00043.

17
 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio
A. Abarintos and Vicente L. Yap (retired) of the Special Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Dated February 16, 2005. Rollo  (G.R. No. 168787), pp. 32-45 and rollo  (G.R. No.
169271), pp. 46-59.

18
 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio
A. Abarintos and Sesinando E. Villon of the Former Special Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Dated June 29, 2005. Rollo (G.R. No. 168787),  pp. 48-49 and rollo (G.R. No. 169271),
pp. 60-61.

19
 Board of Commissioners v. de la Rosa, 274 Phil. 1156 (1991).

20
 See DAR v. Philippine Communication Satellite Corporation , G.R. No. 152640, 15 June 2006,
490 SCRA 729.

21
 See Lercanda v. Jalandoni,  426 Phil. 319, 328-329 (2002) and Joson v. Mendoza, G.R. No.
144705, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 95, 105-107.

22
 Equitable PCI Bank v. Ng Sheung Ngor, G.R. No. 171545, 19 December 2007.

23
 G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 471.

24
 See DAR Administrative Order No. 01, s. 1999 and DA Administrative Order No. 37, s. 1999.

25
 Ros v. DAR, supra note 23 at 478-479.

26
 Republic Act (RA) 7916, Sec. 5 provides:

Section 5. Establishment of ECOZONES.-To ensure the viability and geographic

dispersal of ECOZONES through a system of prioritization, the following areas are
initially identified as ECOZONES, subject to the criteria specified of section 6:

xxx   xxx   xxx

(mm) Any private industrial estate which shall voluntarily apply for conversion into an
ECOZONE. (emphasis supplied)

xxx   xxx   xxx

See also  DAR Administrative Order No. 1, s. 1999, Sec. 6(e) which provides:

Section 6. Priority Development Areas.-In accordance with EO 124, s. 1993, EO 84, s.

1994 and RA 7916, the following are priority development areas for land conversion:

xxx   xxx   xxx

(e) Agricultural areas intended for ECOZONE Projects pursuant to RA 7916.

 xxx   xxx   xxx

27
 Rules and Regulation to Implement RA 7916. Part III, Rule IV, Sec. 3 provides:

Section 3. Development of the Areas/ Documentary Requirements. - x x x       x x x       x

xx

The proposed ECOZONE shall not be considered for Presidential Proclamation unless
the following sets of documents have been submitted directly to PEZA:

(1) Set A- Pertinent land use/clearances/certificates to be secured from the concerned

Regional Land Use Committee (RLUC) member-agencies as follows:

- Land Use Conversion Clearance Certificate from the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR);

- Certification from the Department of Agriculture (DA) that the proposed area is not
covered by Administrative Order No. 20 and that such land has ceased to be
economically feasible for agricultural purposes;

xxx   xxx   xxx

28
 Local Gov't Code, Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality
may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when
the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned x x x       x x x       x x x

29
 A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but
not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
(Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation , G.R. 127820, 20 July 1998, 292 SCRA
678.)

30
 Joson v.  Mendoza, supra note 21 at 102-104. (citations omitted).

G.R. No. 209661, October 03, 2018 - AURELIO PADILLO, Petitioner, v. ROLLY
VILLANUEVA AND JOSEPH DIOPENES, Respondents.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 209661, October 03, 2018

AURELIO PADILLO, Petitioner, v. ROLLY VILLANUEVA AND JOSEPH

DIOPENES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Court of Appeals September 30, 2013
Decision2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 05797, which reversed the June 23, 2010 Decision 3 and
February 10, 2011 Resolution4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, and reinstated the March 15, 2007 Decision5 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator denying the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award over
the subject lots.

Perfecto Vales (Vales) owned a parcel of land in Barangay Dela Paz, Banate, Iloilo,
which was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Portions of the
land were awarded to three (3) people: (1) Rodrigo Boso, Lot No. 579-D; (2) Joseph
Diopenes (Diopenes), Lot No. 577-B; and (3) Rolly Villanueva (Villanueva), Lot No. 7.
On September 28, 1998, Transfer Certificates of Title or Certificates of Land Ownership
Award were issued to Diopenes (TCT No. CT-7914/CLOA No. 00033986) and Villanueva
(TCT No. CT-7915/CLOA No. 33987).6

Four (4) years after, Aurelio Padillo (Padillo) filed before the Agrarian Reform Regional
Office No. 6 a Petition for Inclusion as Farmer-Beneficiary 7 over Lot Nos. 579-D, 577-B,
and 7.8 He stated that in 1985, Vales allowed him to occupy a portion of his land with
an area of 23,000 square meters.9 He applied as farmer-beneficiary when Vales'
property was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and was
awarded an area of 1,003 square meters, allegedly less than the portion he actually
occupied.10 Moreover, some portions he occupied were erroneously awarded to
Diopenes and Villanueva.11

Diopenes and Villanueva opposed the Petition.12

In his September 30, 2003 Order,13 Regional Director Alexis M. Arsenal (Regional

Director Arsenal) of the Agrarian Reform Regional Office No. 6 declared Padillo a
qualified beneficiary of Villanueva's portion.14 The dispositive portion of this Order
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued:

 1. Declaring Aurelio Padillo as qualified beneficiary over Lot No. 7,
specifically Lot 7-A with an area of 263 sq. m. and Lot 7-B with an area of
388 sq. m. or a total of 651 square meters, (reflected in the Sketch)
located at Brgy. De la Paz, Banate, Iloilo.

Consequently, Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) shall be generated in his

favor;

2. Denying the petition for inclusion as beneficiary over Lot 577-B and Lot
579-D for lack of merit; and

3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) concerned to strictly implement this
Order.

SO ORDERED.15

On Padillo's Petition for Reconsideration,16 Regional Director Arsenal in his February 24,

2004 Order17 declared that Padillo was also a qualified beneficiary of Diopenes's portion.
He ordered the Iloilo Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer and the Banate, Iloilo Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer to facilitate the cancellation or amendment of the concerned
Certificates of Land Ownership Award to effect the inclusion of Padillo. 18 The dispositive
portion of this Order read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued: AMENDING/MODIFYING

the assailed Order dated September 30, 2003, as follows:

1. GRANTING the inclusion of the herein petitioner (Aurelio P. Padillo) as beneficiary of

Lots 577-B (also known as Lot 578) and 579 with an aggregate area of 2.3000
hectares, [m]ore or less, located at Brgy. De La Paz, Banate, Iloilo;

2. DIRECTING and ENJOINING the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), DARPO-
Iloilo[,] and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) DARMO Banate, Iloilo to
facilitate the cancellation/amendment or administrative correction of CLOA Nos.
00033994, 00033988, and/or 00033989, respectively, before the DAR Adjudication
Board [(]DARAB) based in Iloilo City, and to effect the inclusion of the petitioner herein;

3. DIRECTING the Chief Legal Assistance Division, DARPO-Iloilo to assist the PARO,
DARPO-Iloilo in the filing of an appropriate action before the DARAB, to effect the
implementation of this Order;

4. DIRECTING FURTHER the MARO, DARMO, Banate, Iloilo, to transfer farmer-

beneficiary Rolly Villanueva to another area or portion of the subject landholding with
comparable or similar features;

5. Any provision of the previous Order inconsistent herewith is hereby amended,

modified, or rectified accordingly.

SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, Diopenes and Villanueva on March 15, 2004 filed a Notice of Appeal, 20 to
which Padillo filed a Motion21 to dismiss it, arguing that the February 24, 2004 Order
was final and executory.22

In his December 10, 2004 Resolution, 23 Regional Director Arsenal denied Diopenes and
Villanueva's Appeal, and declared the February 24, 2004 Order final and executory.24 A
Writ of Execution25 was issued on March 10, 2005.

On Padillo's Motion for Correction, Regional Director Arsenal issued a Supplemental

Order26 on May 31, 2005 to correct the February 24, 2004 Order's dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued:

1. GRANTING the inclusion of the herein petitioner (Aurelio P. Padilla) as

beneficiary of Lot No. 577-B (CLOA No. 00033986, TCT No. CT- 7914)
with an area of 2,849 square meters, in the name of Joseph T. Diopenes;
Lot No. 7 (CLOA No. 00033987, TCT No. CT-7915[)], in the name of Rolly
Villanueva, with an area of 9,615 square meters, more or less; Lot No.
579 (CLOA No. 00033988, TCT No. CT-7916, in the name of Rodrigo T.
Boso, [et] al., with an area of 16,947 square meters, more or less, or
2.9410 hectares, all in all, located at Barangay De La Paz, Banate, Iloilo;

2. DIRECTING and ENJOINING the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer

(PARO), DLR-PO, Iloilo and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (DLR-
MO), to cause and facilitate the cancellation/amendment or administrative
correction of the aforesaid TCT, CLOAs before the DAR (now DLR)
Adjudication Board (DARAB) based in Iloilo City, and to effect the
inclusion of the petitioner, as farmer-beneficiary under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to R.A. 6657 of 1988;

3. DIRECTING the Chief, Legal Assistance Division, DLR-PO, Iloilo or the

counsel of herein petitioner-appellee in the filing of an appropriate action
before the DARAB based in La Paz, Iloilo City, to effect the
implementation of this Order;

4. DIRECTING FURTHER the MARO, DLR-MO, Banate, Iloilo, to transfer

farmer-beneficiary Rolly Villanueva to another area or portion of the
subject landholding with comparable or similar features, if warranted;

5. Any provision of the previous Order inconsistent herewith [is] hereby

amended, modified, or rectified accordingly.

SO ORDERED.27

On May 8, 2006, Padillo filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Iloilo
a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Land Ownership Award 28 against Diopenes
and Villanueva.
In their Answer, Diopenes and Villanueva claimed that Padillo was not a qualified
beneficiary. They alleged, among others, that he was a mere intruder as Vales never
allowed him to plant on his land.29

On March 15, 2007, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator dismissed the Petition
for Cancellation of Certificate Award of Land Ownership for lack of merit. 30

On Appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ordered the

cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title and Certificates of Land Ownership
Award issued to Diopenes and Villanueva. It ruled that Regional Director Arsenal had
jurisdiction to order Padillo's inclusion as farmer-beneficiary.31

Diopenes and Villanueva moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in the
February 10, 2011 Resolution32 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board. Thus, they filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals.

In its September 30, 2013 Decision,33 the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
June 23, 2010 Decision and February 10, 2011 Resolution of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and reinstated the March 15, 2007 Decision of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. It ruled that the cancellation of the Transfer
Certificates of Title or Certificates of Land Ownership Award was not proper.34 When
Padillo filed the Petition for Inclusion, four (4) years had lapsed since the Transfer
Certificates of Title or Certificates of Land Ownership Award were issued to Diopenes
and Villanueva,35 which meant that their titles were indefeasible and incontrovertible.36

Thus, Padillo filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.37 He argues that
a certificate of land ownership award, a creation of Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, may be a corrected
administratively.38 Canceling it "will not [deprive] respondents['] rights as farmer-
beneficiaries"39 since the law mandates the "more equitable distribution and ownership
of land."40

In their Comment,41 respondents Villanueva and Diopenes argue that the Transfer

Certificates of Title issued in their names enjoy the same protection given to other
transfer certificates of title.42 Invoking the rulings in Lonoy v. City of Iloilo43 and
in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 44 they state that "the certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the order for issuance of the patent." 45 They further argue that
Regional Director Arsenal grossly erred in entertaining the Petition for Inclusion, which
was filed four (4) years after the Certificates of Title were issued in respondents'
names, and that his Orders regarding the Petition for Inclusion are void. 46

In his Reply,47 petitioner notes that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board has granted the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award issued
in favor of respondents. It found that Regional Director Arsenal's Order to include
petitioner as farmer-beneficiary in the disputed land had already attained finality. Thus,
if his Petition for Cancellation is denied, the judgment, which had attained finality,
would be rendered nugatory.48
Moreover, petitioner argues that the cancellation, amendment, or administrative
correction of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award to include petitioner as farmer-
beneficiary is not an "impairment of the indefeasibility of the [Certificates of Land
Ownership Award] issued to the respondents." 49

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Department of Agrarian
Reform may cancel the registered Certificates of Land Ownership Award or Transfer
Certificates of Title four (4) years after their issuance.

The Petition is denied.

A certificate of land ownership award is evidence of the award of a public land by the
Department of Agrarian Reform to the beneficiary under Republic Act No. 6657. 50 Upon
its registration, the subject land is placed under the operation of the Torrens system.51

Well-settled is the rule that certificates of title emanating from the grant of public land
in an administrative proceeding enjoy the same protection as those issued in
registration proceedings. This Court affirms the Court of Appeals in ruling that "a
certificate of land ownership award becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of registration with the Office of the Registry of
Deeds."52

In Lahora, et al. v. Dayanghirang, Jr., et. al.,53 this Court held:

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by
the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded,
and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other
words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall
become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding.54

This was reiterated in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,55 where this Court

declared that the emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award under
Republic Act No. 6657 are "in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates
of title issued in registration proceedings." 56

However, the Court of Appeals erred in its Decision to reinstate the March 15, 2007
Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Regional Director Arsenal acted
without jurisdiction in rendering his September 30, 2003 Order. Thus, all subsequent
proceedings are void for lack of jurisdiction.

Similar to a certificate of title issued in registration proceedings, the registration of a

certificate of land ownership award places the subject land under the operation of the
Torrens system.57 Once under the Torrens system, a certificate of land ownership award
or certificate of title issued may only be attacked through a direct proceeding before the
court.
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree:

SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. - A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.

An attack is collateral when "it incidentally questions the validity of the transfer
certificate of title in an action seeking a different relief." 58 A direct attack is an action
that annuls the title itself.59

In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,60 this Court explained:

An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it
challenges the judgment decree of title.

In Goco v. Court of Appeals, this court said that "[a]n action for annulment of
certificates of title to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by
a Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the
land's true owner."61 (Citations omitted)

Thus, under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a registered certificate of land
ownership award may be altered, modified, or canceled only through an action for
annulment of the certificate itself.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, an action
for annulment of a registered certificate of land ownership award, like the annulment of
a certificate of title, involves title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein. This falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of either the Regional Trial
Court62 or the Municipal Trial Court,63 depending on the assessed value.

In this case, the lots were already covered by Certificates of Land Ownership Award
registered with the Registry of Deeds, with Transfer Certificates of Title issued four (4)
years before petitioner filed his Petition for Inclusion as farmer-beneficiary. This Petition
was a collateral attack on respondents' title. It incidentally questioned the validity of
the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in respondents' favor in an action seeking a
different relief—purportedly for petitioner to be included as farmer-beneficiary in the
subject lots.

Regional Director Arsenal's inclusion of petitioner as farmer beneficiary over the lots
needed the modification of the Transfer Certificates of Title and Certificates of Land
Ownership Award registered in respondents' names. In his February 24, 2004 Order,
Regional Director Arsenal directed the filing of the appropriate action before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board "to effect the implementation" 64 of
his Order.65 This led to petitioner filing a Petition for Cancellation of respondents'
Certificates of Land Ownership Award before the Provincial Adjudicator. He is now
before this Court after the Court of Appeals annulled the Decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board granting the cancellation of respondents'
Certificates of Title, albeit on the ground of indefeasibility of title. Petitioner himself
stated that the final decision in his favor shall be insignificant without the cancellation
of respondents' title.

Clearly, the Petition for Inclusion as farmer-beneficiary was a collateral attack on

respondents' title to the property. This is prohibited by law .

Moreover, Regional Director Arsenal has no jurisdiction in a Petition for Inclusion as

farmer-beneficiary over lots covered by the Certificates of Title or registered Certificates
of Land Ownership Award. Thus, all subsequent proceedings are void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9700, which amends Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657,
states that "the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land
ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the [Department of Agrarian
Reform]."66 This covers only certificates under the Department of Agrarian Reform's
jurisdiction. The cancellation of a registered certificate of land ownership award or a
certificate of title does not fall under it.

Finally, petitioner must be reminded that certificates of title do not vest ownership, but
merely evidence title or ownership of the property. 67 "Courts may, therefore, cancel or
declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds that it was issued
irregularly."68 Petitioner provided evidence of being an actual tiller of the lots before the
Department of Agrarian Reform. He may file the action to annul respondents' title
before the competent court, taking into consideration the principle of indefeasibility of
title to property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
September 30, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 05797, the June 23, 2010 Decision and
February 10, 2011 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
in DARAB Case No. 15114, the March 15, 2007 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, and the September 30, 2003, February 24, 2004, and May 31,
2005 Orders of Regional Director Alexis M. Arsenal in Adm. Case No. A- 0604-0811-02
are all SET ASIDE. The Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Land Ownership Award
in DARAB Case No. VI-3603-IL-06 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
by Aurelio P. Padillo of an action before the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gesmundo, J., on official business.

Tranferrability

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181370               March 9, 2011

JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO, Petitioners,

vs.
REMEDIOS LOYOLA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 2 dated 4 January 2008
and Decision3 dated 17 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

The Facts

Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay
Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, known as Lot No. 723-6, Block 1, Psd-73149 (lot), awarded by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (RA 6657) or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered by Certificate of Land
Ownership5 (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered
on 14 March 1991 under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.

On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and represented by his
son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an action 6 for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA
in the name of Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudo’s
favor.

In a Decision7 dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case without prejudice on the
ground that the case was filed prematurely. On 11 March 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action. 8

Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to redeem the lot, which was
mortgaged by Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot
for ₱250.00 and a cavan of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo’s help in obtaining title to the lot in
her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from her mother,
Cristina Hugo. In exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot.
Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay9 dated 28 December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-
half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed
two more Sinumpaang Salaysay10 dated 1 December 1992 and 3 December 1992, committing
herself to remove her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to
Lebrudo.

Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola refused. Lebrudo
sought the assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay of Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the Department of Agrarian Reform to mediate.
However, despite steps taken to amicably settle the issue, as evidenced by certifications from the
PNP and the barangay, there was no amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against
Loyola.

In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her and offered to
redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied promising one-half portion of the lot as
payment for the transfer, titling and registration of the lot. Loyola explained that the lot was her only
property and it was already being occupied by her children and their families. Loyola also denied the
genuineness and due execution of the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3
December 1992. The records do not show whether Loyola renounced the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 1 December 1992.

In a Decision11 dated 13 February 2002, the PARAD of Trece Martires City, Cavite decided the case
in Lebrudo’s favor. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring Respondent Remedios Loyola disqualified as farmer beneficiary of the subject

land identified as Lot 723-6, Block 1, under TCT/CLOA No. 998;

b) Declaring the Deed of sales over the subject lot illegal and ordered the same set aside;

c) Declaring Plaintiff JULIAN LEBRUDO entitled to one half (½) of the subject property under
TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of Remedios Loyola;

d) Ordering the other one half (½) of the subject lot ready for allocation to qualified
beneficiary;

e) Ordering the DAR PARO Office thru the Operations Division to cancel TCT/CLOA No. 998
and in lieu thereof, to generate and issue another title over the 120 square meters in the
name of JULIAN LEBRUDO;

f) Ordering the survey of the subject lot at the expense of the petitioner so that title be issued
to plaintiff herein;

g) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to cancel TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the
name of Remedios Loyola;

h) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to register the title in the name [of]
Julian Lebrudo as presented by the DAR or its representative over the lot in question;

No pronouncement as to costs and damages.

SO ORDERED.12

Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). 13 In a
Decision14 dated 24 August 2004, the DARAB reversed the decision of the PARAD and ruled in
Loyola’s favor. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new judgment rendered as follows:
 1. Upholding and maintaining the validity and effectivity of TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of
the respondent;

2. Declaring the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and December 3, 1992
attached to the petition as Annex C and F, null and void without legal force and effect;

3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, Cavite to reinstate TCT/CLOA No.
998 in the name of the respondent.

The status quo ante order issued by this Board on November 3, 2003 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.15

Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied in a Resolution 16 dated 12 April
2005. Lebrudo then filed a petition 17 for review with the CA.

In a Decision18 dated 17 August 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the DARAB. Lebrudo filed a
motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution 19 dated 4 January 2008.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by RA 6657
on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28
December 1989 and 3 December 1992 allegedly executed by Loyola in his favor.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or
awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA
6657 and other applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700, 20 which provides
for the transferability of awarded lands, states:

SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. – Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this ACT
may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years:
Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase
the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of
the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the
barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM),
as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform must indicate that it is an emancipation
patent or a certificate of land ownership award and the subsequent transfer title must also indicate
that it is an emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or
conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary
who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing
compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law
enumerated four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the
prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as
allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.

In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola
under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot
from Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.

Lebrudo’s assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by
farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law
provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v.
Ellano,21 we held that the waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the
government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of
rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for falling
under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.

Lebrudo asserts that he is a qualified farmer beneficiary who is entitled to the lot under the CARP.
DAR Administrative Order No. 3,22 series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary:

1. Landless;

2. Filipino citizen;

3. Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of
filing application; and

4. Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.

Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless.
According to the records,23 Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a
certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a homelot
consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona,
Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the
application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to
be a beneficiary under the CARP.

Further, the CA, in its Decision dated 17 August 2007, correctly observed that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title and after the expiration of the one-year period from the
issuance of the registration decree upon which it is based, the title becomes incontrovertible. The CA
also declared that the basis of Lebrudo’s claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December
1989 and 3 December 1992, were illegal and void ab initio for being patently intended to circumvent
and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian law. The relevant portions of the decision
provide:

x x x It is undisputed that CLOA 20210 was issued to the respondent on December 27, 1990 and
was registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on March 14, 1991, resulting in the issuance of
TCT/CLOA No. 998 in her name.

Under Sec. 43, P.D. 1529, the certificate of title that may be issued by the Register of Deeds
pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the land shall be the transfer
certificate of title, which shall show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same
land and also the fact that it was previously registered, giving the record number of the original
certificate of title and the volume and page of the registration book in which the original certificate of
title is found.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it is based, the title becomes incontrovertible.

Accordingly, by the time when original petitioner Julian Lebrudo filed on June 27, 1995 the first case
(seeking the cancellation of the respondent’s CLOA), the respondent’s certificate of title had already
become incontrovertible. That consequence was inevitable, for as the DARAB correctly observed,
an original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding
was as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Clearly,
the respondent, as registered property owner, was entitled to the protection given to every holder of
a Torrens title.
1avvphi1

The issue of whether or not the respondent was bound by her waiver and transfer in favor of Julian
Lebrudo, as contained in the several sinumpaang salaysay, was irrelevant. Worse for the petitioner,
the DARAB properly held that the undertaking of the respondent to Julian Lebrudo under
the sinumpaang salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and December 3, 1992 – whereby she
promised to give him ½ portion of the homelot in consideration of his helping her work on the
release of the CLOA to her and shouldering all the expenses for the purpose – was "clearly illegal
and void ab initio" for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by
the agrarian laws and their implementing rules. He could not, therefore, have his supposed right
enforced. x x x24

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. The main purpose of the agrarian reform law is
to ensure the farmer-beneficiary’s continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land he
tills.25 To do otherwise is to revert back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners reacquired
vast tracts of land and thus circumvent the government’s program of freeing the tenant-farmers from
the bondage of the soil.26

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 17 August 2007 and

Resolution dated 4 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 192629, November 25, 2015 ]
FILINVEST LAND, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO R. ADIA, LITO M. ADIGUE,
CANDIDO M. AMPARO, MARINO S. AMPARO, RODOLFO S. AMPARO,
FLORDELIZA L. ARIAS, BALBINO M. ATIENZA, PEDRO M. ATIENZA, DALMACIO
C. AVANILLA, PASTOR M. AVANILLA, VENACIO P. BAUTISTA, RODOLFO S.
BERGADO, ENRIQUE R. BRABANTE, EMMA D. BUBAN, JUANITO A. CANDARE,
ROMEO O. CANDARE, ANTONIO M. CATAPANG, EDUARDO A. CATAPANG,
GRACIANO C. CATAPANG, HERMINIO V. CATAPANG, JUANA P. CATAPANG,
REYNALDO P. CATAPANG, ROMEO A. CATAPANG, RODOLFO A. CATAPANG,
VICTORIANO A. CATAPANG, JUAN D. CENTOS, FERNANDO B. CERNETCHEZ,
EDUARDO C. CREENCIA, ARNEL N. M. CREMA, REYNALDO B. CRISTAL,
MOISES CUBCUBIN, DELSO POBLETO, SALVADOR M. DE LEON, MELQUIADES
P. DESCALSO, GREGORIO P. DINO, ROBERTO L. DOMINO, CELSO R. ESCALLAR,
ARMAND P. ESCUADRO, ELISA C. FELICIANO, PASTOR C. FERRER, ERLINDO
M. FORMARAN, LEONARDO D. GARINO, RAFAEL R. GRANADO, ALMARIO
IBANEZ, CASIMIRO P. IBANEZ, CEFERINO P. IBANEZ, MIGUEL V. IBANEZ,
MONTANO V. IBANEZ, CESAR N. JECIEL, ALFREDO B. LAURENTE, EFIGENIA B.
LAURENTE, CELSO C. MEDINA, EDUARDO A. PANGANIBAN, ROMEO C.
PASCUA, DANILO L. PAULMINO, LAURO A. PEGA, LEONARDO M. PEREZ,
FELIPE V. PETATE, LEONARDO V. PETATE, ESTANISLAO PORTO, MAXIMO D.
PORTO, GREGORIO L. REYES, JOSE L. REYES, LEONARDO M. SALINGYAGA,
DEMETRIO A. SALONGA, MANOLITO G. SORILLA, HERMOGENES L. TORRES,
JUANITO M. TORRES, MARIANO B. TAGLE, MARIO D. TAGLE, AND SANCHO V.
VILLA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BRION, J.:**
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari challenging the April 15, 2010 decision[1] and June 17, 2010 resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 87424. The CA decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
decision[2] directing the petitioner to vacate the properties and to return the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) to the
respondents.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The respondents were the registered owners of various parcels of land located in Barangay Hugo Perez, Trece
Martires, Cavite. These properties were awarded to them pursuant to the Comprehensive Land Reform Law (CARL),
[3]
 and had a total land area of about 709,910 square meters under seventy-five (75) TCTs.

In 1995, Filinvest Land, Inc. (Filinvest) acquired possession of these properties. Each of the respondents executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay entitled Pagbibitaw ng Karapatan (affidavits). Based on these affidavits, the respondents
relinquished all their rights over the properties for valuable consideration.

The respondents alleged that they surrendered possession of their properties with the understanding that Filinvest
would develop these into a residential subdivision, pursuant to a joint venture agreement (JVA). They also entrusted
their respective owner's duplicate original copies of the TCTs to Filinvest because they were told that these would be
used in preparing the development plans. The respondents added that they were even given money to find their own
place while the development was taking place.

The respondents repeatedly requested Filinvest to return their owner's TCT copies and to give them a copy of the
JVA. Since development had not yet begun, they also sent a letter to Filinvest to allow them to temporarily return to
their lands. They received no response. Instead, Filinvest began to fence the area and prohibited entry. To protect
their rights, the respondents filed notices of adverse claim.

In 2010, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Filinvest.

In its answer, Filinvest argued that (a) the respondents had relinquished their rights over the property, (b) no JVA was
signed, and (c) all of the respondents signed the affidavits under which possession was validly transferred to
Filinvest.

At trial, the respondents' witnesses initially denied that they executed the affidavits but changed their answers when
they saw their signatures on them.

Filinvest presented two witnesses. Leilanie Faforga (Faforga), the custodian of Filinvest's acquisition documents,
testified that she did not possess any documents on the properties other than the respondents' affidavits. To her
knowledge, no JVA had been signed.

Lina Ferrer-De Guzman (De Guzman) testified that she was the Head of the Land Acquisition Department at the time
of the transactions. She stated that the sale with Filinvest did not push through because the properties were covered
by the CARL. Under its Section 27, the properties cannot be sold, transferred, or conveyed within a period of ten (10)
years. Thus, instead of a sale, she negotiated a transfer of possession to Filinvest through the affidavits until such
time that a sale could be made.

In its decision, the RTC found the respondents to be the lawful possessors. It then ordered Filinvest to: (a) vacate the
properties; (b) return all the TCTs to the respondents; and (c) pay two hundred thousand pesos as attorney's fees.

The respondents challenged this ruling through a petition for review before the CA.

THE CA RULING

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision. It ruled that the respondents undoubtedly own the properties and are entitled to
possession.

First, the CA ruled that the respondents failed to prove the JVA's existence and due execution. They failed to produce
the original copy and any secondary evidence to prove that it exists. Thus, the CA had no basis to conclude that
Filinvest did not perform its obligations under the alleged JVA.

Second, the CA ruled that the affidavits could not be valid sources of Fil invest's right because their terms were
contrary to law, specifically Section 27 of the CARL. A plain reading of these affidavits showed that all rights, not just
possession, over the properties were transferred. Without expressly mentioning transfer of ownership, the affidavits
effectively gave Filinvest indefinite control over the properties; thus, the affidavits were void.

Third, the CA ruled that, although both parties knew that the transfers were prohibited, the respondents may still
recover the properties based on Article 1416 of the Civil Code. This provision is an exception to the pari
delicto doctrine. This provision states that when an agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition is designed to protect the plaintiff, he may recover what he has delivered. Section 27 of the CARL was
designed to protect the landless farmers; thus, the respondents may still recover their properties.

Lastly, the CA removed the award of attorney's fees because the RTC did not give any reason for granting it.

The CA denied Filinvest's motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.

THE PETITION

In its petition and supplemental petition, Filinvest insists that:

First, the affidavits are valid. Section 27 of the CARL only prohibits the sale, transfer, or conveyance of the properties.
It does not prohibit the assignment of possessory rights. When the respondents executed the affidavits, they
voluntarily assigned their possessory rights over the properties in Filinvest's favor. Filinvest is, therefore, the lawful
possessor of the properties.

Second, assuming arguendo that the affidavits are void, the respondents must return the consideration they received.
Otherwise, they will unjustly enrich themselves at Filinvest's expense.
Third, both parties are in pari delicto for entering into the void transaction. Thus, the Court should leave them as they
are. Furthermore, the pari delicto exception in Article 1416 of the Civil Code does not apply to void contracts.

THE RESPONDENTS' CASE

On their part, the respondents argue that:

First, the affidavits are void because they effectively transferred ownership, not just possession, over the properties.
The affidavits' provisions require a perpetual surrender of the respondents' ownership rights. This transfer violates
Section 27 of the CARL.

In Maylem v. Ellano,[4] this Court ruled that the waiver or surrender of possession of properties awarded under CARL
is a prohibited transfer. Thus, Filinvest's contention that they validly acquired possession through the affidavits is
baseless. Since the transfer to Filinvest is prohibited, the respondents are the properties' lawful possessors.

Second, all the requisites of Article 1416 of the Civil Code are present. Thus, the courts may return the properties to
the respondents' possession. Moreover, the respondents will not be unjustly enriched if the properties are returned to
them because Filinvest has possessed their properties for more than fifteen years.

In sum, the CA did not commit any error in affirming the RTC's decision.

In a manifestation in 2006, the respondents informed this Court that while this case is pending, Filinvest was able to
cancel the TCTs in respondents' names and to obtain new ones in its name.

THE ISSUE

The core issue in an accion publiciana case is who between Filinvest and the respondents are the properties' lawful
possessors.

OUR RULING

The petition is unmeritorious.

An accion publiciana or a case for recovery of possession determines who between the parties has the better and
legal right to possess the properties, independently of title.[5]

Filinvest's claim of rightful possession relies on the affidavits. Hence, we must ascertain whether these affidavits
validly transferred possession.

The affidavits are void for violating Section 27 of the CARL.

Since the properties involved were awarded pursuant to CARL, its provisions apply here. Section 27 of the CARL
states:
"Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by the beneficiaries under this Act may not be
sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or the LBP, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
This provision prohibits the sale, transfer, or conveyance of the properties within ten years, subject to four
exceptions[6] which do not apply to this case.

As early as 1990, the transfers of possessory rights over landholdings awarded under agrarian laws had been
declared void in Torres v. Ventura.[7]

In that case, Torres tilled the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) was promulgated in 1972. In
1978, he transferred his rights of possession and enjoyment over the land to Ventura for P5,000.00. Through an
Affidavit of Waiver, Torres relinquished all his rights over the property in Ventura's favor. In 1985, he offered to
redeem the property but Ventura refused. Thus, he filed a complaint for recovery of possession.

This Court resolved the question of who has better right of possession between the tiller and the transferee of the
land, ruling in Torres' favor based on the facts and on the constitutional mandate to promote agrarian reform. We
noted that the fundamental policy of the law is to transfer ownership over the land to the farmers who till them. To
give effect to this policy, PD 27 prohibits the transfer of the land to third parties, subject to certain exceptions. In a
1979 memorandum circular,[8] the Minister of Agrarian Reform acknowledged the prevalence of transactions
transferring ownership, rights, or possession over awarded lands. The Minister emphasized that these transactions
violate PD 27 and are, thus, void.

The ruling in Torres was reiterated in Corpuz v. Grospe[9] and in Lapanday v. Estita.[10] In Lapanday, the Court stated
that waivers of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government are invalid for violating agrarian
reform laws. Thus, these waivers are void.

The proscription in PD 27 against transferring land awards to third persons was carried over to Section 27 of RA
6657.[11]

The pronouncements in Torres were ruled to be applicable to land awards under RA 6657 in Maylem v. Ellano,
[12]
 in Lebrudo v. Loyola,[13] and in Gua-an v. Quirino.[14] In these cases, the Court emphasized that any waiver and
transfer of rights and interests within the 10-year prohibitory period under RA 6657 is void for violating agrarian
reform law[15] whose main purpose is to ensure that the farmer-beneficiary shall continuously possess, cultivate, and
enjoy the land he tills.[16] The affidavits and quitclaims signed by the farmers to surrender possession were
accordingly declared void.

In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the transfers occurred within the ten-year period. Filinvest
contends, however, that only transfer of ownership is prohibited, not of possession.

We now examine the affidavits' contents. The affidavits signed by the respondents read, in part, thus:
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
(PAGBIBITAW NG KARAPATAN)

xxx

1. Na pinapatunayan ko/naming (sic) na tinanggap ko/naming nang lubos na kasiyahan ang halagang ____________
(P________) Salaping Pilipino, mula sa FILINVEST LAND, INC. bilang kabuuang bayad pinsala (disturbance fee) sa
mga pananim ko/naming at ng aking/aming buong pamilya at sa lahat ng iba pa ko/naming mga pag-aari sa lupaing
nabanggit at bilang karapatang bayad sa lahat kong/naming interes, karapatan at paghahabol sa nasabing
lupain.

2. Na alang-alang sa nabanggit na tinanggap kong/naming kabayaran, kusang-loob ko/naming pinawawalang

bisa at kabuluhan ang anumang interes, karapatan at paghahabol bilang magsasaka at kaagad kong isasauli
sa mga nasabing may-ari, sa paglagda ko/naming nito, ang aking/aming pamumusisyon at lahat ng kaparatan sa
nasabing lupain.

3. Na ako/kami at ang aking/aming pamilya ay nangangako na mula sa paglagda ko/naming nito ay hindi na ako/kami
magtatanim ng ano pa mang halaman sa lahat ng mga nasabing lupain o di kaya'y makikialam pa sa anumang
paraan sa nasabing lupain.

4. Na aking/aming kinikilala ang karapatan ng mga may-aring nabanggit at ng kanilang mga kahalili na bakuran
ang lahat ng lupaing nabanggit matapos kong/aming lagdaan ang salaysay na ito at, ako/kami ay wala nang ano pa
mang karapatan na pumasok o kaya'y makialam sa kahi't (sic) anong paraan maging sa nasabing parselang
nasasakop ng Titulong nabanggit, maging may maani man kami o wala sa mga bunga, kung mayroon man, o ang
ano pa mang mga nalalabing pananim na matatagpuan doon pagdating ng nasabing takdang araw na iyon.

5. Na alang-alang sa mga nakasaad sa itaas, ako/kami at ang aming buong pamilya ay wala nang paghahabol na
ano pa man ukol sa nasabing lupain laban sa nabanggit na may-ari at sa kanilang maaaring maging kahalili pa
sa pagmamay-ari nito, at aming pinagtitibay na ang nasabing may-ari at mga kahalili ay wala nang magiging ano pa
mang pananagutan sa akin/amin sa ilalim ng anumang nakaraang kasunduan namin sa kanila o sa kanilang mga
magulang, o sa ilalim ng batas.

x x x"[17] (emphases supplied)
The affidavits, as worded, totally waive or transfer the respondents' rights and interests over the properties. The CA
correctly observed that the affidavits do not only assign possessory rights, but perpetually surrender the respondents'
ownership rights. Furthermore, De Guzman admitted that the affidavits were deliberately designed to circumvent the
proscription under RA6657.

Clearly, the transfers of the properties, through the affidavits, violate Section 27 of the CARL. Under our established
rulings, these affidavits or waivers are void.
Because the transfers made to Filinvest in 1995 are void, Filinvest cannot claim rightful possession over the
properties. The respondents are the awardees based on the CARL and should be recognized as the lawful
possessors.

The  pari delicto  exception does not apply here.

We now go to the issue of whether the principle of pari delicto applies to this case. We answer in the negative.

Filinvest claims that if the affidavits are void, this Court should consider the parties to be in pari delicto. Both parties
came to court with unclean hands because they voluntarily entered into the void transactions. Thus, the court should
leave them where they are Filinvest possessing the properties and the respondents keeping the money they
received.

We see no merit in Filinvest's position.

In Torres, we ruled that the pari delicto doctrine does not apply in an agrarian reform case.[18] To hold otherwise would
defeat the spirit and intent of the agrarian reform to free the tillers from the bondage of the soil.[19] The policy of the
law must be upheld.

To elaborate, Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides an exception to the pari delicto doctrine. Under this article, the
plaintiff may recover what he paid or delivered pursuant to a void contract if the following requisites are met: (a) the
contract is not illegal per se but merely prohibited; (b) the prohibition is for the plaintiffs protection; and (c) public
policy will be enhanced by his recovery.[20] These requisites are present in this case.

On the first requisite, the affidavits here are merely prohibited. A contract is illegal per se if, by universally recognized
standards, it is inherently bad, improper, immoral, or contrary to good conscience.[21]

Ordinarily, affidavits or contracts of sale are lawful. Only Section 27 of the CARL made them unlawful.

On the second requisite, the prohibition under Section 27 of the CARL is meant to protect the farmer-beneficiaries.
Section 2 of the CARL explains that the agrarian reform program is founded on the landless farmers' right to own
land.[22] Thus, their protection must be given utmost importance.

On the third requisite, public policy will be promoted by allowing the respondents to recover their land. The CARL
distributes agricultural land to landless farmers to improve their quality of life.[23] Returning the land to them will
enhance this public policy of agrarian reform.

Thus, the respondents may recover the subject properties.

No unjust enrichment

We find merit in the respondents' argument that no unjust enrichment took place. We note that Filinvest had
possessed the properties since 1995 or for about twenty years. During this period, the respondents were deprived of
the productive use of their land. The amount they paid to the respondents may serve as compensation for Filinvest's
use of the properties for this long period.

In sum, we hold that the respondents are the lawful possessors of the disputed properties. Their affidavits are void
and did not transfer possessory rights.

In 2006, the respondents filed a manifestation that new TCTs had already been issued in Filinvest's name. An accion
publiciana, however, resolves only possessory rights. The revocation of TCTs, on the other hand, requires a
conclusive determination of ownership. Thus, the respondents must file the appropriate action to annul the TCTs
issued in Filinvest's name.

So as not to frustrate our pronouncement in this case, we order the registration of this Decision with the Register of
Deeds of the place where the disputed properties are situated, in accordance with Section 78 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529,[24] which provides:
"SEC. 78 Judgment for Plaintiff. - Whenever in an action to recover possession or ownership of real estate or any
interest therein affecting registered land judgment is entered for the plaintiff, such judgment shall be entitled to
registration on presentation of a certificate of the entry thereof from the clerk of court where the action is
pending to the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, who shall enter a memorandum
upon the certificate of title of the land to which such judgment relates. If the judgment does not apply to all the land
described in the certificate of title, the certificate of the clerk of court where the action is pending and the
memorandum entered by the Register of Deeds shall contain a description of the land affected by the judgment."
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The April 15, 2010 decision and June 17, 2010
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 100262 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Office of the 2nd Division Clerk of Court is directed to furnish certified copies of this
Decision and its Entry of Judgment to the appropriate Register of Deeds pursuant to Section 78 of PD No. 1529.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D.
AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO
ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL
JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E.
NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T. PATIÑO,
ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and
JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review
and reversal of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August
2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over
parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:

Areas
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 2.0000

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 0.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 4.5526

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 0.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939

 14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased
recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur,
with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:

Areas
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a
forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas
believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants
in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683
in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of
land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47

TOTAL 527.834
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn
lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be
placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI
allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire
landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR
approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire
landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the
determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land
Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement
(LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other
persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-
3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of
the Deed of Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA,
Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree
No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI
claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that
no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the
cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to
petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential
Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice
and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a
Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was
not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI
and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was
based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs
and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of
Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following
assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special
Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED. 6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the
Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-
Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari.

We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since
petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be
justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the
relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the
case at bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias vs.
Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper
authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby
rendering the petition fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:

"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice x x x"

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be
dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed
could cure the petition’s defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has
not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are
ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

The petition is impressed with merit. 1awphil.net

Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
concerning the Certification Against Forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid
the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to
avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues.
Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice
as expeditiously as possible." 8 Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate,
justice.9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping,
falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters
mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by
this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio 11 that the
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and
not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,12 we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner.
For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and
not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the
part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,13 where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of
the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.
Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under
oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only
petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is
no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the
certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge,
whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that
substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The
attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign
the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the
Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at
the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide
the Petition.14 There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to
obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.’s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence the
remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside
in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they
allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of
convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the
mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old
age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged
in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the
RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The
petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able
to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their
farmers’ organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong
Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners’ counsel went to
Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA
was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various
reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other
towns, while some already died because of old age. 15 Be that as it may, those who did not sign the
SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify
the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at
bar,16 without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not
strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be
determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or relaxation
of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those which we
appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 17 the appeal to the Court of
Appeals had a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board
resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board
resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the
same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board
resolution or a secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner
to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly
authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial compliance with,
and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while
the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not
suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be
allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for
the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings
Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to sign

the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter
dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board
authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the
filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with
the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the
Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v.
Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and certification
against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a
motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were
special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring
verification and certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the
instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to
show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a
secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner
likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the
substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement
of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not
unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements,
there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the
petition. x x x

There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on
certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De
Guia v. De Guia,20 petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents’
Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held therein that:

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us
to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of
respondents’ counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held
that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in
order to do justice."

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 the non-compliance was disregarded

because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping.
The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct.
The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the
attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal
of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social
justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we
must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result
would be detrimental to the working woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation
of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified
for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as
shall be heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in
registration proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian
reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules
and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is
not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative

proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant
to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under
a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public
land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land
patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act,
now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility.
Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to
the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance
of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration
cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it,
and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the
land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the
homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and
cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of
the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there
would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government’s system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to
the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest,
just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of
Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as
that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted
thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come
into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of
the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the
Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the
President of the Philippines, in accordance with law. 23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same
protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." 25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. 26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title
that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of
the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall
become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.  (Emphasis
supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX 27 on the subject of EPs.
Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title
issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time
on appeal with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the
RARAD.28

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots
covered under the Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with
CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares,
leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the
alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten
years after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a
substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be
covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27. 30 This is further proved
by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:

(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they
were cultivating;

(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never
protested petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire
landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and
corn lands;

(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of
Rights in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their
successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832

25. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO