G.R. No.

189162, January 30, 2019
POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM
MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE (POPARMUCO),
REPRESENTED BY SILANDO GOMEZ AND ELIAS RAMOS,
PETITIONER, v. RODOLFO T. INSON, CESO III, AS
REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, REGION VII - CEBU CITY,
RESPONDENT.
moved for the suspension of the survey, but Regional Adjudicator
Arrieta denied the Motion for lack of jurisdiction. 13
Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its property to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It contended that the City
of Tanjay had already reclassified the area into a mixed residential,
commercial, and industrial land. It also assailed the eligibility of the
identified agrarian reform beneficiaries. 14

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Respondent Rodolfo T. Inson (Regional Director Inson)'s cognizance
of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries, and
his subsequent issuance of the March 12, 2010 Order disqualifying
some members of petitioner Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform
Multipurpose Cooperative (POPARMUCO), were improper.
Nonetheless, these acts do not constitute an indirect contempt of
court.
For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Contempt 1 filed by
POPARMUCO, a duly organized and registered cooperative of
agrarian reform beneficiaries, 2 against Regional Director Inson of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Region VII, Cebu City.
Sometime in 2003, a 394.9020-hectare portion of the
landholding3 owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut)
in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 4 A
Notice of Coverage was sent on May 23, 2003 to Polo Coconut
President Rene Espina (Espina).5
On December 11, 2003, the Department of Agrarian Reform received
from the Land Bank of the Philippines a Memorandum of Valuation,
indicating the amount of P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for
393.1327 hectares6 of Polo Coconut property. A Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition was then sent to Polo Coconut. On January
16, 2004, a Certificate of Deposit was issued to Polo Coconut for the
said amount.7
After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation
and Acquisition, the Department of Agrarian Reform conducted
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation.
In his March 31, 2004 Resolution, 8 Regional Adjudicator Atty.
Arnold C. Arrieta (Regional Adjudicator Arrieta) of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (the Adjudication Board),
Region VII, Cebu City affirmed the valuation offered by Land Bank
of the Philippines in the amount of P85,491,784.60.9
Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines. On January 27, 2004, a collective
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, with CLOA No. 00114438,
was issued. It was registered on January 30, 2004, under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-802, 10 in favor of POPARMUCO
members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as
agrarian reform beneficiaries.11
Subsequently, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Negros
On February 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo
Coconut. It found that the Polo Coconut property was no longer an
agricultural land when the Department of Agrarian Reform placed it
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Further, it held
that the identified beneficiaries were not qualified as beneficiaries, as
they were not tenants of Polo Coconut. 15 The Court of Appeals
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DECLARING as NOT VALID the acts of the
[Department of Agrarian Reform] of subjecting PCPCI’s [Polo
estate] to the coverage of the CARP, of canceling and causing the
cancellation of [PCPCI’s] Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2304
covering such land, of issuing or causing the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-36318 for this land in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines by way of transfer to it, of issuing or
causing the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-802 for the
said land in the names of [petitioner-beneficiaries] in the case at
bench by way of award of them of such land as purported farm
beneficiaries and of doing other things with the end in view of
subjecting [the Polo estate] to CARP coverage, SETTING ASIDE
and ENJOINING such acts and the consequence thereof,
ORDERING the [petitioner-beneficiaries] to vacate the premises of
[the Polo estate] if they had entered such premises, and ORDERING
the respondent Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-36318 and T-802 and to reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2304 in the name of petitioner
PCPCI.
SO ORDERED.16 (Citation omitted)
In its September 3, 2008 Decision, this Court in Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation Company,
Inc.17 reversed the Court of Appeals Decision. 18 It confirmed the acts
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, through the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer, and declared the issuance of TCT No. T-
802 and CLOA No. 00114438 as valid. This Court also ruled that
Polo Coconut did not exhaust its administrative remedies when it
directly filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
instead of first filing a protest or opposition before the Department
Secretary.19 Furthermore, it held that the property was never placed
beyond the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
as the Department Secretary never approved the land's conversion. 20
This Court further recognized the Department of Agrarian Reform as
the proper authority to identify and select agrarian reform
beneficiaries. Courts, it ruled, cannot substitute their judgment unless
there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. 21 This Court
farther held that the Department of Agrarian Reform could not be
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion just because its chosen
beneficiaries were not tenants of Polo Coconut. Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, it ruled, "does not limit
qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the landowners." 22
1

Oriental, Stephen Leonidas, sent Espina a letter dated July 16, 2004,
Page

informing him of the Department of Agrarian Reform's intention to

proceed with the relocation survey of the property. 12 Polo Coconut
 The September 3, 2008 Decision became final and executory on
November 26, 2008.23
On June 30, 2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut
(Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for Inclusion as qualified
beneficiaries in TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438 and Exclusion
of those named as beneficiaries therein (Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion).24 They were allegedly not informed when the
Department of Agrarian Reform conducted the identification and
screening process for potential beneficiaries. 25 They contend that the
Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders were not qualified
beneficiaries under Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.26
On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for Immediate
Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction. 27 They
averred that the Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders had
attempted to occupy the property even without authority from the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Moreover, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Tanjay had allegedly scheduled the relocation and
subdivision of the property for the final installation of the qualified
beneficiaries. Thus, they sought a Cease and Desist Order to preserve
their legal rights while the administrative proceedings for the
inclusion/exclusion of farmer beneficiaries were pending resolution. 28
Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and
Desist Order29 dated July 7, 2009, disposing as follows:
On July 30, 2009,40 POPARMUCO members filed before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudication Board a
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution 41 dated July 14, 2009,
seeking to enforce the September 3, 2008 Decision.
POPARMUCO filed before this Court a Petition for
Contempt42 against respondent Inson, raising the following grounds:
1. Respondent issued a Cease and Desist Order without any
notice in violation of petitioner's members' constitutional right to due
Process.43
2. Respondent defied this Court's September 3, 2008
Decision, which ruled with finality on the qualification of petitioner's
members as beneficiaries in Polo Coconut's landholding covered
under TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438.44
3. Petitioner's members, as registered owners of the
landholding involved, are entitled to the property as the last step in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementation. 45
Petitioner prayed that a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, directing respondent to cease: (1) from
enforcing the Cease and Desist Order in light of the Petition; and (2)
from reviewing the beneficiaries, as this Court had decided with
finality on the issue. It further prayed that this Court hold respondent
guilty of contempt of court.46

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ORDER is hereby
issued:
1. DIRECTING the [Certificate of Land Ownership Award
holders], their agents, representatives, or assigns, to CEASE and
DESIST from entering, occupying, and/or taking possession of the
property pending final determination of the inclusion-exclusion
proceedings, to attain and maintain a peaceful and orderly
implementation of CARP in the subject landholding;
2. ENJOINING the PARO of Oriental Negros and the MARO
of Tanjay not to undertake any relocation/subdivision survey on the
subject landholding until the matter of the inclusion-exclusion of
farmer beneficiaries [has been] decided, except the areas utilized as
roads, residential, commercial, institutional and recreational portions,
creeks and rivers, etc[.]
1.
SO ORDERED.30
2.
On July 20, 2009, Regional Director Inson also issued Special Order
No. 070, series of 2009,31 creating an independent body32 to conduct a
revalidation of farmers-beneficiaries in the property. The independent
body conducted their interviews from August 3 to 7, 2009.33
3.
On July 23, 2009, POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of
Land Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion to Quash the Cease
and Desist Order with Motion for Reconsideration. 34 They alleged
that they were not given prior notice of the filing of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion,35 and that the Cease and Desist Order defied this
Court's September 3, 2008 Decision.36 Further, they were indeed
qualified under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law as their
families were landless farmworkers.37 Alcantara, et al. allegedly did
not submit their applications during the Department of Agrarian
Reform's investigation on qualified beneficiaries from 1999 to
In his Comment,47 respondent, through counsel, asserts that the
September 3, 2008 Decision is no legal impediment to his taking
cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and issuance of a
Cease and Desist Order. 48 He adds that this Court had recognized the
Department Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction over the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
including the identification and selection of its
beneficiaries.49 Further, his issuance of the Cease and Desist Order is
authorized under Section 22, which vests in the Department of
Agrarian Reform the power to reassess the qualification of identified
beneficiaries, and even strip them of their rights if found to have
violated agrarian laws.50
Petitioner filed a Reply,51 stating the following arguments:
Respondent's Comment should be expunged from the
records for having been improperly signed by respondent's counsel;52
Petitioners in the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion were
under the control of the previous landowner and some of the parties
in G.R. Nos. 168787 and 169271; thus, they were bound by the
September 3, 2008 Decision;53]
Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, on the
indefeasibility of a title, cannot be subverted by the Department of
Agrarian Reform's rules and regulations.54
During the pendency of this Petition, respondent dismissed in a
September 29, 2009 Order55 the Motion to Quash and upheld the
validity of his Cease and Desist Order.
Thus, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court and
Supplement to the Petition for Contempt,56 alleging that:
2

2000.38 POPARMUCO members added that as Certificate of Land

Page

Ownership Award holders, they were entitled to all ownership 1. Despite the pendency of the Petition, respondent proceeded
rights.39 to conduct a reinvestigation and re-qualification of the farmer
 beneficiaries, "in complete defiance and lack of respect for a final and
executory judgment" issued by this Court;57 and
2. Respondent had proceeded to issue his March 12, 2010
Order58 disqualifying some of petitioner's members. 59 Specifically, the
March 12, 2010 Order declared, among others, that:
a. 109 of the petitioners in the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion are qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries
because they were connected with, or working in, the Polo Coconut
property before a Notice of Coverage was served on Polo Coconut; 60
b. 62 of the petitioners were disqualified on the
grounds that they worked for Polo Coconut after the Notice of
Coverage was sent, and are not yet connected with Polo Coconut
during the beneficiary identification. They also did not appear during
the investigation, are retired from service, or those whose work do
not include cultivation of the land;61
c. 39 Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders
(petitioner's members) were disqualified because they were not
connected with Polo Coconut;62]
d. Six (6) Certificate of Land Ownership Award
holders (petitioner's members) were disqualified as they have already
migrated to other places, and thus, were disinterested to occupy and
cultivate their awarded lots;63 and
e. 102 existing Certificate of Land Ownership
Award holders maintained their status as qualified farmer
beneficiaries.64
Respondent further directed the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
of Oriental Negros "to facilitate the inclusion of the . . . qualified
agrarian reform beneficiaries in CLOA No. 00114438 under TCT No.
T-802 by filing a petition before the [Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator] of Oriental Negros for the amendment/correction of the
subject [Certificate of Land Ownership Award]."65
In his Comments (to the Supplemental Petition for
Contempt),66 respondent reiterates his allegations in his previous
Comment. He further informs this Court that petitioner's members
have voluntarily submitted to the Department of Agrarian Reform's
jurisdiction when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
subsequent Appeal of respondent's March 12, 2010 Order, despite the
pendency of this Petition. Thus, he avers, this Petition is considered
moot.67
In its Reply,68 petitioner contends that respondent's Comments should
be expunged for his counsel's failure to indicate his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Number. It further avers that the
adjudged agrarian reform beneficiaries have not been installed in the
land despite the September 3, 2008 Decision's finality, and that the
Petition has not been mooted.
In compliance with this Court's November 12, 2012
Resolution,69 both parties submitted their respective Memoranda. 70
Petitioner argues that respondent, in issuing the Cease and Desist
Order, committed acts amounting to "disobedience of or resistance to
a lawful writ, process, order, judgment" 71 of this Court in G.R. Nos.
168787 and 169271.72
On the other hand, respondent argues that the September 3, 2008
Decision "did not pass on the merits of [petitioner's members']
qualifications as farmer beneficiaries." 73 According to him, nowhere
in the Decision did this Court pronounce that they were qualified as
beneficiaries. He contends that Department of Agrarian
Reform74 mainly involved the validity of placing the Polo Coconut
property under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.75 The discussion on beneficiaries, he avers, was included
merely to highlight the Department of Agrarian Reform's exclusive
jurisdiction over issues on the program's implementation, 76 and that,
without proof that the Department of Agrarian Reform committed
grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment. 77
Respondent adds that he had legal and factual bases to issue the
Cease and Desist Order. It was alleged in the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion that petitioner's members were not seasonal
farmworkers, but outsiders not related to the Polo Coconut
management and the land. 78 He points out that, per the amended
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian
Reform is mandated to monitor the beneficiaries' performance; thus,
it can reevaluate their qualification, and even strip them of their rights
if they violated agrarian reform laws. 79 He further states that Section
20 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-
03 authorizes the Regional Director to issue a Cease and Desist Order
on any of these grounds:
1. That any party may suffer grave or irreparable damage;
2. That the doing of or continuance of certain acts will render
the case moot and academic; or
3. That there is a need to maintain peace and order and
prevent injury or loss of life and property.80
Finally, respondent avers that petitioner's voluntary submission to the
Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction, through the Motion for
Reconsideration and Appeal, has rendered this case moot. The
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary's April 3, 2013 Order, he
claims, affirms his position that his cognizance of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion and issuance of related Resolutions and Orders
did not constitute defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision. 81
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent
Regional Director Rodolfo T. Inson's cognizance of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries, and his subsequent
issuance of the July 7, 2009 Cease and Desist Order and the March
12, 2010 Order disqualifying some of petitioner's members, constitute
defiance of this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos.
168787 and 169271.
This Court dismisses the Petition.
The validity of the July 7, 2009 Cease and Desist Order and the
correctness of the March 12, 2010 Order will not be discussed in this
Petition for Contempt. They should instead be tackled in a more
appropriate mode and forum. Petitioner had appealed the Order
partially granting the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and the July 14,
2010 Order82 denying their Motion for Reconsideration. In an April 3,
2013 Order,83 the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
We proceed first to discuss the scope of the Department of Agrarian
Reform's jurisdiction in agrarian law implementation cases.
3
I
Page
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law vested in the Department
of Agrarian Reform the primary responsibility of implementing the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Section 50 defines the
Department's powers over agrarian reform matters:
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
....
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of
the DAR shall be immediately executory. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante 85 clarifies that
Section 50 pertains to both the Department of Agrarian Reform's: (1)
administrative function, which involves enforcing, administering, and
carrying agrarian reform laws into operation; and (2) quasi-judicial
function, which involves the determination of parties' rights and
obligations in agrarian reform matters.
Prior to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, however,
Executive Order No. 129-A86 created the Adjudication Board and
authorized it to assume the Department of Agrarian Reform's quasi-
judicial functions:
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. — There is
hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the
Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed of the
Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be
designated by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs,
and three (3) others to be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be
constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases under Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order.
These powers and functions may be delegated to the regional offices
of the Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Board. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law authorizes the
Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council, to plan and program the acquisition and
distribution of all agricultural lands in accordance with the order of
priority under the law. Inherent in this function is the Department of
Agrarian Reform's power to identify the landholdings within the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and to
identify, screen, and select agrarian reform beneficiaries. 87 The
Department of Agrarian Reform is further tasked to make support and
coordinative services available to farmer-beneficiaries and affected
landowners.88
There are two (2) modes of acquiring land under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law: (1) compulsory acquisition89 and (2) voluntary
offer for sale/land transfer.90
I (A)
Section 16 outlines the procedure for compulsory land acquisition:
SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For
purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures
shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered
mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the
DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent
provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform
the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other
monuments of title.
   
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the
LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above
period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The
DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.
   
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.
   
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
Section 16(a) requires that after identification of the land,
landowners, and farmer beneficiaries, the Department of Agrarian
Reform will send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, through
personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous
place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where
4
the property is located.
Page
 While the law does not provide how the identification process must
be made, the details or guidelines can be found in pertinent
administrative issuances of the Department of Agrarian Reform or the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Council, per their rule-making power
under Section 49.91
Under the Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
01-03, or the 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage
and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under Republic Act No. 6657,
compulsory acquisition is commenced through two (2) ways.
The first is through a Notice of Coverage. After determining that the
land is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and
writing a pre-ocular inspection report, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer sends a Notice to the landowner. The Notice would
be posted for at least seven (7) days in the bulletin boards of the
barangay hall and municipal/city hall where the property is located.
The other way is through a Petition for Coverage, filed by any party
before the Department of Agrarian Reform's Regional Office or
Provincial Office of the region or province where the property is
located. Either of these offices transmits the case folder to the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer where the property is located. 92
Under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01-
03, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer serves copies of the
Notice of Coverage or Petition for Coverage on the landowner.
Through the Notice, the landowner is informed that his or her
landholding is subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. He or she is invited to a public hearing or field investigation
on the date specified in the Notice. Moreover, the landowner is
informed of his or her rights and privileges (with corresponding
restrictions and conditions), as follows:
1. apply for an exemption clearance or for exclusion from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program's coverage;
2. retain an area not exceeding five (5) hectares pursuant to
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657;
3. nominate his/her child/ren who may qualify as
beneficiary/ies to the subject landholding; and/or
4. submit evidence for determining just compensation of the
subject landholding.
The landowner or any real party-in-interest may file before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office a protest or
petition to lift the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program within 60 calendar days from receipt of the Notice. 93 The
protest will be resolved in accordance with the procedure set forth in
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-03, or
the 2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
Meanwhile, the process of identifying and screening potential
agrarian reform beneficiaries is suspended until after the lapse of the
60-day period from the landowner's receipt of the Notice, or upon the
authorized agency's final determination of the petition for retention,
exclusion, and exemption, if any were filed.94
Upon receipt of the Memorandum of Valuation from the Land Bank
of the Philippines and Claim Folder Profile and Valuation Summary,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer sends a Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition to the landowner in accordance with the
same service procedures in Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 01-03.
Section 16(e) mandates the Department to take immediate possession
of the land only after full payment or deposit of the compensation
with the bank (in case of rejection/non-response of landowner), and
to request the Register of Deeds to transfer title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, and later on to the intended beneficiaries.
I (B)
Upon land acquisition, the Department of Agrarian Reform
immediately proceeds to distribute the land to qualified
beneficiaries.95
Sections 22 and 22-A96 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
provides the order of priority in the distribution of lands covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to landless
farmers/farmworkers. The basic qualification for a beneficiary is his
or her "willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the
land as productive as possible."
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-
0397 provides the qualifications, disqualifications, and rights and
obligations of agrarian reform beneficiaries. It also provides the
operating procedures for their: (1) identification, screening, and
selection; (2) resolution of protests in the selection; and (3) certificate
of land ownership award generation and registration.
The Municipal or Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, together with
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the
possible agrarian beneficiaries, under the criteria in Sections 4 and 5
of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-03:
Section 4. Qualifications. Only those who meet the following
qualifications shall be eligible as beneficiaries:
4.1 General Qualifications. All agrarian reform beneficiaries must be:
4.1.1 Landless as defined by R.A. No. 6657;
4.1.2 Filipino citizen;
4.1.3 Permanent resident of the barangay and/or municipality, if
applicable[;]
4.1.4 At least fifteen (15) years of age or head of family at the time of
acquisition of the property (titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines), or at least 18 years old as of 15 June 1988 in the case of
Commercial Farms (CFs); and
4.1.5 Willing and have the ability and aptitude to cultivate and make
the land productive.
4.2 Specific Qualifications for Farmworkers in Commercial Farms. In
addition to item 4.1 above, the applicant must have been employed in
the property being covered on June 15, 1988.
Section 5. Grounds for Disqualification/Exclusion. The following
shall be the grounds for disqualification/exclusion as ARBs of the
CARP:
5.1. Failure to meet the qualifications as provided for under Section
22 of R.A. No. 6657;
5
Page
5.2. Non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations
or default in payment of three (3) annual amortizations with the
landowner (LO) that resulted to the foreclosure of mortgage on the
awarded land by the LBP or repossession by the landowners (in the
case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme or VLT/DPS)
of the awarded lands except if the non-payment of the rental is due to
crop failure as a result of fortuitous events per Section 36(6) of R.A.
No. 3844, to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%);
5.3. Misuse or diversion of financial support services extended to
them (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657);
5.4. Negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to
them (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657);
5.5. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as
provided for under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and
other agrarian laws;
5.6. Sale, disposition, or abandonment of the lands awarded by
government under CARP or P.D. No. 27 which is violative of the
agrarian laws;
5.7. Conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural use without
prior approval from the DAR;
5.8. Retirement from the service, whether optional or mandatory, or
voluntary resignation, provided this was not attended by coercion
and/or deception, and there is no case questioning said retirement or
voluntary resignation by the applicant as of the date of approval of
this Order;
5.9. Dismissal from the service for cause and there is no case filed
questioning said dismissal as of the approval of this Order and if
there is any such case, the same has been affirmed by the proper
entity of government;
5.10. Obtaining a substantially equivalent and regular employment, as
defined in Section 3 (m) of this A.O.;
5.11. Retrenchment from the farm and receipt of separation pay, and
the retrenchment not having been appealed or questioned in the
proper government entity as of the approval of this A.O.;
5.12. Execution of a waiver of right to become an ARB in exchange
for due compensation and waiver not having been questioned in the
proper government entity as of the approval of this A.O.;
5.13. Refusal to be listed as an ARB and to provide pertinent
information as requested by the DAR in the invitation letter, which
shall be construed as unwillingness on the part of the potential
beneficiary to be listed;
5.14. Forcible entry into the property or illegal detainer (e.g. after
beneficiaries were paid by the LO); and
5.15. Commission of any violation of the agrarian reform laws and
regulations, or related issuances, as determined with finality after
proper proceedings by the appropriate tribunal or agency.
All qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries are then ranked in
accordance with the order of priority under Sections 22 and 22-
A.98 Then, the master list of agrarian reform beneficiaries is posted
for 15 days in at least three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay
hall, municipal hall, and in the community where the property is
located.99
Written protests for the inclusion/exclusion from the master list must
be filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform's Regional or
Provincial Office, as the case may be, not later than 15 days from the
last day of posting of the list.100 The Regional Director will resolve
the protest through summary proceedings within 30 days from
receiving the Beneficiary Screening Committee's case records or the
Provincial Office's investigation report and recommendation. 101 The
master list becomes final and executory after the lapse of 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Director's decision on the protest, but
such finality is only for the specific purpose of generating the
certificate of land ownership award.102
An appeal or motion for reconsideration from the Regional Director's
decision or order for inclusion/exclusion of potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries in/from the master list will be governed by Department
of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-03.
After the issuance of certificates of land ownership award, a petition
to reopen the identification and selection of agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be filed on grounds of duress or threat by the
landowner against the petitioner during the identification phase.
Section 14 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order
No. 07-03 provides:
SECTION 14. Re-Opening of ARB Identification and Selection
14.1 Subsequent to the issuance of CLOAs but prior to the
installation of ARBs, the Regional Director may grant due course to a
sworn petition to re-open the identification, screening and selection
process on the grounds of duress or threat by the landowner against
the petitioner during the identification phase. After installation of the
ARBs, only the Secretary may grant due course to such a petition.
14.2 Any petition to re-open the ARB identification, screening and
selection process subsequent to installation shall be directly filed with
the Office of the Regional Director where the property is located
which shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition. The
procedures shall be in accordance with A.O. No. 3, Series of 2003
titled, "2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases".
The re-opening of ARB identification, screening and selection shall,
however, subscribe to the provisions for qualification,
disqualification, rights and obligations, and procedures prescribed
under pertinent sections of this Administrative Order.
As in protests for inclusion/exclusion of agrarian reform
beneficiaries, petitions to reopen the identification and selection
process are governed by Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 03-03.103
I (C)
Under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-
03,104 the Regional Director105 has primary jurisdiction over all
agrarian law implementation cases, while the Department of Agrarian
Reform Secretary106 has appellate jurisdiction over them. Rule I,
Section 2 provides:
6
SECTION 2. ALI cases. These Rules shall govern all cases, arising
Page
from or involving:
 2.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for
coverage under the agrarian reform program and the initial
issuance of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs), including
protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of
such coverage;
2.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion,
qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual
farmer- beneficiaries;
2.3 Subdivision surveys of land under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform [Program] (CARP);
2.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals,
Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP
Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the
purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall, or cancellation of Emancipation Patents
(EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs)
not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
2.5 Exercise of the right of retention by landowner;
2.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10
of RA 6657;
2.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
2.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used
for livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
2.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms
from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
2.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory
Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for agricultural
purposes;
2.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non agricultural
uses and purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;
2.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries
to homelots;
2.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenant's/farmer-
beneficiary's landholdings;
2.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
2.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR
and its predecessors; and
2.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns
referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
On the other hand, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, the
Department of Agrarian Reform, through its adjudication arm— the
Adjudication Board and its regional and provincial adjudication
boards— adopted the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. Under Rule
II, Section 2, the Adjudication Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm resolutions,
orders, and decisions of its Adjudicators who have primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases:
Rule
Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. — The
Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate the following cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of
all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian laws;
1.2 The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable
and just compensation of lands acquired under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP);
1.3 The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of
sale or their amendments involving lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR or Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP);
1.4 Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of
tenants and/or leaseholders;
1.5 Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-emption, and
redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARL or other agrarian laws;
1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents
(EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority[.]
Rule II, Section 3 further states that neither the Adjudicator nor the
Adjudication Board has jurisdiction over matters involving the
administrative implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and other agrarian laws, as they are exclusively
cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.
In Sutton v. Lim,107 this Court clarified that the Adjudication Board's
jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of registered certificates of
land ownership award is confined to agrarian disputes:
While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of
CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction is, however, confined only to
agrarian disputes. As explained in the case of Heirs of Dela Cruz v.
Heirs of Cruz and reiterated in the recent case of Bagongahasa v.
Spouses Cesar Caguin, for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the
controversy must relate to an agrarian dispute between the
landowners and tenants in whose favor CLOAs have been issued by
the DAR Secretary, to wit:
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section
2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA.
However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they
must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to
whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs
by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian
reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not
agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the
DAR and not the DARAB.
7
II
Page
Thus, it is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation
of a CLOA already registered with the Land Registration Authority.
What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute between the parties.108 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Concha v. Rubio,109 this Court, citing Lercana v.
Jalandoni110 and Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante,111 held that the identification and selection of agrarian reform
beneficiaries involve the administrative implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Hence,
when seeking to contest the selection of beneficiaries, a party should
avail of the administrative remedies under the Department of
Agrarian Reform, not under the Adjudication Board. In Concha:
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, this Court held that the administrative
prerogative of DAR to identify and select agrarian reform
beneficiaries holds sway upon the courts:
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were
potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on
November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the
CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in
substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency
...
Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer's (MARO) decision not
to include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded
respect in the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it
is the MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
who, together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee,
screens and selects the possible agrarian beneficiaries. If there are
farmers who claim they have priority over those who have been
identified by the MARO as beneficiaries of the land, said farmers can
file a protest with the MARO or the PARO who is currently
processing the Land Distribution Folder. Afterwards, the proper
recourse of any individual who seeks to contest the selection of
beneficiaries is to avail himself of the administrative remedies under
the DAR and not under the DARAB, which is bereft of jurisdiction
over this matter.112 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
113
Under the new law, Republic Act No. 9700,  all cases involving the
cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary. Section 9 provides:
SECTION 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 24. . . .
....
All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation
patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.
I (D)
In addition to identifying the qualified beneficiaries, Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law mandates the Department of
Agrarian Reform to "adopt a system of monitoring the record or
performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of
negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall
forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary."114
The Department of Agrarian Reform, mandated to monitor the
performance of beneficiaries and ensure the integrity of its master list
of agrarian reform beneficiaries, integrated the Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Carding and Identification System 115 in its land
acquisition and distribution process.
Under the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Carding and Identification
System, agrarian reform beneficiaries with titles under the agrarian
reform laws will be issued identification cards as proof of their being
bona fide beneficiaries. These identification cards are validated
yearly based on the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal
Office's inspection of the beneficiaries' performance and compliance
with their duties under the laws. The Municipal Office checks if they
still own and cultivate the landholding awarded to them, or if they
have committed any offense. Beneficiaries found to have violated the
laws will be removed from the master list. Consequently, their
identification cards and emancipation patents or certificates of land
ownership award will be canceled.
Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law states that
the rights and obligations of beneficiaries commence from the time
the land is awarded to them. The certificate of land ownership award
contains the restrictions and conditions provided in the law and other
applicable statutes. Thus:
SECTION 24. Award to Beneficiaries. — The rights and
responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the
DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be
completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the
DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the
beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided
for in this Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds
concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title. (Emphasis
supplied)
The restrictions and conditions refer to payment of annual
amortizations, transferability of the awarded land, and proper use of
financial and support services, which are found in the following
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:
SECTION 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. — Lands awarded pursuant
to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty
(30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The
payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at
reduced amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first
five (5) annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of
the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR.
Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten
percent (10%) of the annual gross production and the failure to
produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may
reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the
repayment affordable.
8
Page
The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded
to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP
for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations.
The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter
shall subsequently award the forfeited landholdings to other
qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land, as provided
herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently
disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.
SECTION 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired
by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a
period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the
spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from
the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice
of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay
where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform
Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) as herein provided, shall, in
turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to
the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the
DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who,
as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land
himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to
the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in
the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate
the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already
paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the
land.
....
SECTION 37. Support Services to the Beneficiaries. — The PARC
shall ensure that support services to farmer-beneficiaries are
provided, such as:
(a) Land surveys and titling;
   
(b) Liberalized terms on credit facilities and production loans;
   
(c) Extension services by way of planting, cropping, production
and post-harvest technology transfer, as well as marketing
and management assistance and support to cooperatives and
farmers' organizations;
(d) Infrastructure such as access trails, mini-dams, public
utilities, marketing and storage facilities; and
   
(e) Research, production and use of organic fertilizers and other
local substances necessary in farming and cultivation.
....
Misuse or diversion of the financial and support services herein
provided shall result in sanctions against the beneficiary guilty
thereof, including the forfeiture of the land transferred to him or
lesser sanctions as may be provided by the PARC, without prejudice
to criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
Failure of beneficiaries to comply with the prescribed conditions may
result in the forfeiture of the land awarded to them. A certificate of
land ownership award may be corrected and canceled for violations
of agrarian laws, rules, and regulations.116
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-
09117 provides the rules and procedures for canceling certificates of
land ownership award and other titles under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.118 The causes of action in a petition for
cancellation of a certificate of land ownership award are:
SECTION 4. Causes of Action. — No petition for cancellation shall
be filed unless it has been determined and ruled with finality by the
DAR Secretary or the Courts that:
(a) The land subject matter of the CLOA, EP or other title under
agrarian reform program is found to be:
1. The retention area of the landowner;
2. Excluded from the coverage of CARP, PD No. 27 or other
agrarian reform program;
3. Exempted from the coverage of CARP, PD No. 27 or other
agrarian reform program;
4. Outside of the authority of the DAR to dispose and award,
as the same falls within the authority of the DENR to distribute;
5. Consist in the erroneous issuance of the said title resulting
from the defect or lacking in documentation (DNYP or DNYD
generated titles but not yet distributed).
(b) The CLOA or EP holder is found to have:
1. Misused or diverted the financial and support services;
2. Misused the land;
3. Materially misrepresented his basic qualifications as
agrarian reform beneficiary;
4. Illegally converted into other uses the awarded the land;
5. Sold, transferred, conveyed the awarded land to other
person;
6. Defaulted in the payment of obligation for three (3)
consecutive years in the case of Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct
Payment Scheme;
7. Failed to pay the amortization for at least three (3) annual
amortizations;
8. Neglected or abandoned the awarded land; and
9. Circumvented the laws related to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program.
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-09
further states that the cancellation of registered certificates of land
ownership award, emancipation patents, and other titles "under any
agrarian reform program shall be strictly regulated and may be
allowed only in the manner and conditions prescribed" 119 in the
Administrative Order.
II
Here, the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award, with
9
CLOA No. 00114438, was issued in favor of petitioner's
Page
members120 on January 27, 2004, and registered on January 30, 2004
under TCT No. T-802.121
On July 16, 2004, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer informed
Polo Coconut that a resurvey of the land will be conducted. Polo
Coconut filed a Motion to suspend the survey before the Adjudication
Board, but it was denied for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, Polo Coconut
filed a Petition for Certiorari.
Polo Coconut raised two (2) issues before the Court of Appeals: (1)
the propriety of land coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program and (2) the qualification of the identified
beneficiaries.122 The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo Coconut
and nullified CLOA No. 00114438/TCT No. T-802. It held that the
identified beneficiaries were not tenants of Polo Coconut, and thus,
could not qualify under the program.123
Both the Department of Agrarian Reform and petitioner's members
moved for reconsideration, but their Motions were denied. 124 Hence,
the Department filed before this Court a Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 168787. Petitioner's members filed a separate
Petition for Review, entitled "Abarca, et al. v. Polo Coconut
Plantation Company, Inc., et al." docketed as G.R. No. 169271. They
contended that while they were neither farmers nor regular
farmworkers of Polo Coconut, they were either seasonal or other
farmworkers eligible to receive land under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.125 The two (2) Petitions were later
consolidated.
In its September 3, 2008 Decision, this Court reversed and set aside
the Court of Appeals Decision. It found that Polo Coconut did not
exhaust its administrative remedies because Polo Coconut did not file
a protest or opposition before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary.126 Moreover, on the issue of qualification of the identified
beneficiaries, this Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Department.127 It ruled that Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows the designation of
eligible beneficiaries other than the tenants of the
landowners.128 Hence, this Court declared CLOA No. 00114438/TCT
No. T-802 as valid.129 Its Decision attained finality on November 26,
2008.
Seven (7) months later, on June 30, 2009, Alcantara, et al. filed the
Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion. They questioned the inclusion of
petitioner's members as beneficiaries and recipients of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award. They contended that the existing certificate
holders were "outsiders" and have no connection with the Polo
Coconut property.130 Respondent took cognizance of the Petition and
granted the Cease and Desist Order.
By that time, however, the September 3, 2008 Decision 131 had already
become final and executory. Consequently, this Court affirmed the
Department of Agrarian Reform's previous identification and
designation of qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, who were
named in CLOA No. 00114438. The finality of this Decision meant
that:
[T]he decrees thereof could no longer be altered, modified, or
reversed even by the Court en banc. Nothing is more settled in law
than that a judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and
unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. This rule rests on the principle that all litigation
must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear;
otherwise, litigation will become even more intolerable than the
wrong or injustice it is designed to correct.132 (Citations omitted)
A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title. The
title becomes incontrovertible after expiration of the one (1)-year
period from the issuance of the registration decree, upon which it was
based.133
In Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,134 the petitioners
were issued emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title over
parcels of land in Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with
a total area of 527.83 hectares, from 1984 to 1988. The landholding
was brought within the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer
under Presidential Decree No. 27 upon the request of its previous
owner, Hacienda Maria, Inc.
However, in December 1997, Hacienda Maria, Inc. filed 17 petitions
before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of CARAGA,
Region XIII. These petitions sought the declaration of erroneous
coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of
its former landholdings. Hacienda Maria, Inc. claimed that the area
was untenanted, and that it was not paid compensation for it. It
sought that the emancipation patents covering the disputed area be
canceled.
The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator declared as void the
transfer certificates of title and emancipation patents over the
disputed area. The Adjudication Board affirmed this decision. The
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal on technicality, since
the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping was not
signed by all petitioners.
This Court sustained the validity of the transfer certificates of title
and emancipation patents. It held that certificates of title issued
pursuant to emancipation patents are as indefeasible as transfer
certificates of title issued in registration proceedings. Further, it ruled
that the transfer certificates of title issued to the petitioners became
indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of
the emancipation patents. Thus:
Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of
title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as
certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
....
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of
government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the
possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest,
just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative
proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in
the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law,
regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be
construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into
the possession of his homestead after complying with the
requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should
be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the
Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in
accordance with law.
10
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Page
Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-
farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the
TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same
protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent, . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject
matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person."
....
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are,
in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title
issued in registration proceedings.135 (Emphasis supplied)
In Heirs of Nuñez, Sr. v. Heirs of Villanoza,136 where the issue was
the retention limit of the purported heirs of the landowner, this Court
held:
Finally, the issuance of the title to Villanoza could no longer be
revoked or set aside by Secretary Pangandaman. Acquiring the lot in
good faith, Villanoza registered his Certificate of Land Ownership
Award title under the Torrens system. He was issued a new and
regular title, TCT No. NT-299755, in fee simple; that is to say, it is
an absolute title, without qualification or restriction.
Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform has held that
"certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as [those] issued in judicial proceedings." Section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 03-09 provides that "[t]he State recognizes
the indefeasibility of [Certificate of Land Ownership Awards],
[Emancipation Patents] and other titles issued under any agrarian
reform program."
Here, a Certificate of Land Ownership Award title was already issued
and registered in Villanoza's favor on December 7, 2007. Villanoza's
Certificate of Land Ownership Award was titled under the Torrens
system on November 24, 2004. After the expiration of one (1) year,
the certificate of title covering the property became irrevocable and
indefeasible. Secretary Pangandaman's August 8, 2007 Order, which
came almost three (3) years later, was thus ineffective. 137
Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9700, now explicitly provides that certificates of
land ownership award, "being titles brought under the operation of
the [T]orrens [S]ystem," enjoy the same indefeasibility and security
afforded to all titles under the Torrens System:
Section 24. Award to beneficiaries. — The rights and responsibilities
of the beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly
registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award
and their actual physical possession of the awarded land. Such award
shall be completed in not more than one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the emancipation patents, the
certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under
any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and
imprescriptible after one (1) year from its registration with the
Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to the conditions, limitations
and qualifications of this Act, the property registration decree, and
other pertinent laws. The emancipation patents or the certificates of
land ownership award being titles brought under the operation of
the Torrens system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and
security afforded to all titles under the said system, as provided for
by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act No.
6732.
It is the ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to register the title
of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, after the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has certified that the necessary
deposit in the name of the landowner constituting full payment in
cash or in bond with due notice to the landowner and the registration
of the certificate of land ownership award issued to the beneficiaries,
and to cancel previous titles pertaining thereto.
Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, shall have
usufructuary rights over the awarded land as soon as the DAR takes
possession of such land, and such right shall not be diminished even
pending the awarding of the emancipation patent or the certificate of
land ownership award.
All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation
patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.
Here, by the time the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion was filed on
June 30, 2009, the September 3, 2008 Decision declaring the validity
of CLOA No. 00114438 had attained finality and TCT No. T-802 had
already become incontrovertible. As registered property owners,
petitioner's members were entitled to the protection given to every
Torrens title holder. Their rights may only be forfeited in case of
violations of agrarian laws, as well as noncompliance with the
restrictions and conditions under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
III
However, petitioner's assertion that respondent's cognizance of the
Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion constituted defiance of the
September 3, 2008 Decision does not lie.
In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao,138 this Court
explained the concept of contempt of court:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting
in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not
only a willful disregard of the court's order, hut such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration
of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly
contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person
cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the
Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is
clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt
or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or
required.139 (Emphasis supplied)
The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for
a preservative, and not vindictive, purpose. "Only in cases of clear
and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised." 140
11
Page
In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation, the Department officials' act
of installing farmer-beneficiaries in Rivulet Agro-Industrial
Corporation's landholding did not constitute an open defiance and Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang,*JJ.,
disobedience of this Court's December 15, 2010 temporary concur.
restraining order in G.R. No. 193585. This Court held:

[W]hile the DAR was an intervenor in G.R. No. 193585, the

December 15, 2010 TRO issued by the Court was only expressly
directed against the LRA Administrator, the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and/or all persons acting upon their order or in
their place and stead, and specifically for the following acts: "(a)
from canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 105742 issued in
favor of petitioner RIVULET Agro-Industrial Corporation; (b) from
issuing a new certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines; (c) from issuing Certificate of Land Ownership Award in
favor of anyone covering Hacienda Bacan, a 157.2992-hectare
property situated in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Negros
Occidental; and (d) distributing such Certificate of Land Ownership
Award that it may have heretofore issued pending trial on the merits."
Clearly, the DAR and its officials were not among those enjoined.
Neither can they be considered agents of the LRA Administrator and
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Moreover, the
installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts
specifically restrained, negating the claim that the performance
thereof was a contumacious act.141

Here, respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for

Inclusion/Exclusion based on the Department's exclusive prerogative
in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of
agrarian reform beneficiaries.142

However, as earlier stated, the issue on the qualification of the

existing Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders had long been
laid to rest in this Court's final and executory September 3, 2008
Decision. Some of the petitioners in the inclusion/exclusion
proceedings were even respondents in that case. 143

Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for

Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion,
which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a
petition for contempt. "No one who is called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment."144

At any rate, whether respondent's actions were improper is not an

issue here. What is crucial in contempt proceedings is the intent of
the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in St.
Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez:145

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the
good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered.
Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show
on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting
in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a
contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of
its character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must be done
wil[l]fully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.146 (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)

All told, this Court finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the
part of respondent. His acts do not qualify as a willful disobedience to
this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.
12

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Contempt is DISMISSED for lack

of merit.
Page

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204045
MAGDALENA C. DILLENA, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO ALCARAZ, BERNARDO ALCARAZ, JOSELITO
ALCARAZ and AMOR ALCARAZ STA. MARIA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the F
ebn1ary 28, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA’.G.R. SP No. 110423, which reversed and set aside the March 2,
2009 Decision3 and August 4, 2009 Resolution4 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case
No. 15202 and dismissed herein petitioner's Petition with Very
Urgent Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Status Quo Order5 in DCN R-03-02-0837'04, as well as
the CA's October 11, 2012 Resolution 6 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.7
Factual Antecedents
As found by the CA, the facts are as follows:
Magdalena C. Dillena8 x x x, represented by Enrico C. Dillena, filed
a Petition with Very Urgent Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order dated June 30,
2004 with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(P ARAD), Malolos, Bulacan against Mariano Alcaraz, Bernardo
Alcaraz, Joselito Alcaraz and Amor Alcaraz Sta. Ana 9 x x x alleging
that Salud Crespo was the original owner of the subject landholding,
a fishpond with an area of more than ten (10) hectares located in
Barangay Nagbalon, Marilao, Bulacan; sometime in 1950, Salud
Crespo instituted Catalino Dillena as tenant of the subject
landholding; when Ana Alcaraz purchased the subject landholding
sometime in 1960, she recognized Catalino Dillena's tenancy over the
same; and when Catalino Dillena died, [petitioner's] husband,
Narciso, succeeded to the former's tenancy rights.
[Petitioner] further alleged that on April 2] , 1995, Ana Alcaraz died
and was survived by [respondents] who inherited the subject
landholding and who also recognized Narciso's tenancy rights
therein; that Narciso continued to pay the annual lease rental of
₱120,000.00 and introduced improvements thereon worth
₱200,000.00 upon the assurance of[respondents] that they would
maintain Narciso in peaceful possession of the hmdholding; that
sometime in May 2004 or about a month after Narciso died,
[respondents] informred [petitioner] about their intention to increase
the annual lease rental from ₱120,000.00 to ₱240,000.00 which
[petitioner] believed was unconscionable and was merely meant to
dispossess her of the subject landholding; and that [respondents] gave
[petitioner] 30 days or until June 30, 2004 to vacate the subject
landholding, which prompted her to file the petition with the PARAD
praying that she be declared as a de jure tenant and be maintained in
peaceful possession of the subject property.
[Respondents] filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing the PARAD's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition. [Respondentsl
alleged, inter alia, that [petitioner] is a civil law lessee and that
the Kasunduan sa Upahan ng Palaisdaan expired in May 2004. As a
civil law lessee, any dispute that may arise from this relationship of
the parties is cognizable by the regular courts.
[Respondents] further alleged that assuming that there is an agrarian
dispute, the case should have been brought first to the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) for mediation or conciliation,
and that absent a BARC Certification attesting that efforts for
mediation or conciliation failed, the P ARAD cannot assume
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Section l, Rule 3 of the
DA.RAB New Rules of Procedure.
In a Resolution dated September 20, 2004, the PARAD denied
[respondents’] Motion to Dismiss. Thus, [respondents] filed
an Answer with Counterclaim with. Opposition to the Prayer for the
Issuance of Prelimina1y Injunction or Status Quo Order essentially
reiterating their averments in their Motion to Dismiss.
After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers,
the PARAD rendered a Decision dated September 15, 2006 declaring
(petitioner] as a bonafide tenant who is entitled to peacefully possess
and cultivate the subject landholding.
[Respondents] filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied
by the P ARAD in an Order dated February 26, 2007.
[Respondents] interposed an appeal to the DARAB, which rendered
the assailed Decision dated March 2, 2009 affirming the
PARAD's Decision. The dispositive portion of the DARAB’s
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the appeal for lack of merit and the decision of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator is hereby. AFFIRMED in
toto.
[Respondents] x x x are hereby DIRECTED to immediately turn over
and reinstate possession of the subject landholding to herein
[petitioner] x x x.
SO ORDERED.’
[Respondents] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Decision but it was denied by the DARAB in the assailed Resolution
dated August 4, 2009.10
Ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (P ARAD)
In his September 15, 2006 Decision, 11 the P ARAD held that the
culture of tilapia fish is not an industrial activity that is exempt from
agrarian laws; that fishponds remain agricultural lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); that the dispute
between the parties is an agrarian controversy within the jurisdiction
of his office; that petitioner is a legitimate tenant and not a mere civil
law lessee of the subject landholding, her predecessors-in- interest
having been instituted by the former landowners as such; and, that
petitioner enjoys security of tenure pursuant to her tenurial
arrangement with respondents.
Ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
13
(DARAB)
Page
In its March 2, 2009 Decision, the DARAB held that-
Section 166 of Republic Act No. 3844 defines Agricultural land
as land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop
lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle lands and abandoned land as
defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of thi11 section. This Board
cannot give any other interpretation to this explicit, direct and crystal
clear provision.
xxxx
In the case of Sanches, Jr. vs. Marin et al. (G.R No. 171346, October
9, 2007), the Supreme Court ruled that DARAB continued to be
possessed of jurisdiction despite the passage of said Republic Act No.
7881 as, meanwhile, petitioner, as previously declared as bona
fide tenant and later displaced/ejected without court order. The Court
said, "x x x as a tenant of the subject fishpond and his right to
security of tenure x x x (he) has acquired a vested right over the
subject fishpond which has become fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy x x x even if the fishpond was
later excluded/exempted from the coverage of CARL x x x."
Besides, the court further held that since jurisdiction was already
assumed by the PARAD, same may not be denied/withdrawn by the
mere passage of said Republic Act No. 7881 by according it
retroactive application.
That fishpond is now an industry or no longer agricultural in
character is a matter that is still an open issue. What is provided
under said amendatory law, clearly by its tenor, is that same ceased to
be covered by CARL of 1988, meaning, that it cannot under said law
be anymore covered, acquired m1d redistributed to the fanner
beneficiaries. But, this may not prevent the continued applicability of
Republic Act 3844, as amended.
The possession of petitioner's predecessors in interest for a period of
almost 50 years has been admitted by the respondents; x x x in their
pleadings and during the proceedings before the Adjudicator a quo.
In fact, in one of the hearings, the landowner himself declared in
open court that prior to the institution of this complaint, petitioner
and her husband were tenants/lessees of the landholding and such
was for 50 years including the possession of the petitioner's
predecessors.
Being recognized as such, petitioner x x x having inherited the right
from her deceased spouse, Narciso Dillena who inherited the same
from his father Catalino Dillena, agricultural leasehold relationship is
not extinguished by a mere expiration of period. Section 10 of R.A.
3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a. leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possessions
of the landholding.
As correctly observed by the Adjudicator a quo:
'It is an established fact that the late Narciso Dillena was the
identified tenant of the subject landholding and had performed his
obligations as such for a period of fifty years. This fact was never
refuted by the respondents in all of their pleadings and was never
questioned in all stages of the proceedings for their defense was
anchored solely on the fact that the late Narciso Dillena is not a
tenant but is more of a civil law lessee. Respondents anchored their
defense on the series of alleged civil law lease contracts that the late
Narciso Dillena executed with the landowner and from the fact that
the subject land is industrial land, which argument was, however,
already ruled out by this Board.
xxxx
‘Hence, the mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is
given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable
against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest
(Tinalgo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No. L-34508, April 30, 1980)’ x
xx
There is simply no valid ground for the Board to deviate from the
findings and conclusion of the Adjudicator a quo, as they are
supported by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the appeal for lack of merit and the decision of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
Respondents x x x are hereby DIRECTED to immediately turn over
and reinstate possession of the subject landholding to herein
petitioner x x x.
SO ORDERED.12
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the DARAB stood its
ground.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Certiorari13 before the CA, respondents questioned
the above DARAB dispositions and prayed for the dismissal of the
petition in DCN R-03-02-083 7'04.
On February 28, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor
of respondents, decreeing thus:
The main issue in this petition involves a question of jurisdiction, that
is, whether or not the PARAD and DAR.AB have jurisdiction over
the action filed by (petitioner] for maintenance of peaceful possession
of the subject fishpond.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The crux of the instant controversy is whether or not the P ARAD
and the DARAB have jurisdiction over the instant dispute between
[respondents] and (petitioner] regarding the lease of the subject
fishpond.
[Respondents] aver that the subject fishpond is not an agricultural
land; fishponds are exempted or excluded from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) pursuant to Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7881 or "An
Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657"
[Respondents] allege that, since a fishpond is not an agricultural land,
no agricultural tenancy relationship can be created between the
parties and no agrarian dispute can emanate therefrom. [Respondents]
further aver that [petitioner] has no security of tenure, being a mere
14
civil law lessee over the subject fishpond.
Page
We rule for the [respondents].
Prior to the enactment of RA. No. 7881, under RA. No. 3844
('Agricultural Land Reform Code') and RA. No. 6657
('Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law'), fishponds were considered
as agricultural lands. In the case of Sanchez, Jr. vs. Marin, the
Supreme Court explained:
‘x x x this Court traced the classification of fishponds for agrarian
reform purposes. Section 166(1) of Republic Act No. 3844 defined an
agricultural land as land devoted to any growth, including but not
limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned
land. Thus, it is beyond cavil that under this law, fishponds were
considered agricultural lands. Even when Republic Act No. 6657
entitled, ‘'Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,’ took effect
on 15 June 1988, fishponds were still considered as agricultural land.’
However, with the enactment of RA. No. 7881 on February 20, 1995,
fishponds were exempted or excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. Section 2 of RA. No. 7881, amending Section 10 of RA. No.
6657, explicitly provides:
‘SECTION 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
‘Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
‘a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife,
forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act.
‘b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act, Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.'
The ruling of the Supreme Court in Sanchez, Jr. vs. Marin, is
instructive:
‘In sum, the issues in this case may be summarized as follows:
l. Whether the Subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
government by virtue of the amendments introduced by RA. No.
7881 to R.A. No. 6657.
II. Granting that the subject fishpond is exempted/ excluded from the
coverage of the CARL, whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the
case.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals grounded its Decision on this Court's
pronouncements in Romero v. Tan. In the said case, this Court traced
the classification of fishponds for agrarian reform purposes. Section
166 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 defined an agricultural land as land
devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt
beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land. Thus, it is beyond
cavil that under this law, fishponds were considered agricultural
lands. Even when Republic Act No. 6657 x x x took effect on 15 June
1988, fishponds were still considered as agricultural land. However,
when Republic Act No. 7881 was passed by Congress on 20 February
1995, it amended several provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private
lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. Section 3(c) of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, now defines agricultural land as
land devoted to agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. As to what
constitutes an agricultural activity is defined by Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, as the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting
of such farm products, and other farm activities and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. By virtue of
the foregoing amendments, the operation of fishponds is no
longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel of land
devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land. x
xx
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, a5 amended by Republic Act
No. 7881, explicitly provides:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. –
xxxx
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act; Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not
been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. x x x
x x x           x x x          x x x
This Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the case, contrary to the declaration made by the
appellate court in its Decision. Notably, the present case was
instituted as early as 1991 when the petitioner filed a Petition before
the PARAD for the fixing of his lease rental on the subject fishpond.
Respondents subsequently filed a countercharge against the petitioner
for the accounting, collection of sums of money, and dispossession.
At such point, the law applicable was Republic Act No. 6657,
wherein fishponds and prawn farms were not yet exempted/excluded
from the CARL coverage. Evidently, there was an agrarian dispute
existing between the petitioner and the respondents, cognizable by
the PARAD at the time it rendered its Decision on 2 March 1993 in
favor of the petitioner. On 20 February 1995, however, Republic Act
No. 7881 came into being, which expressly exempted/excluded
fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of the CARL. In effect,
cases involving fishponds and prawn farms are no longer considered
agrarian disputes as to make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB or its Adjudicators. Nevertheless, considering that prior to
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7881, this case was already
pending appeal before the DARAB, the aforesaid amendments then
cannot be made to apply a5 to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction
over the case. It is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by
the court, it remains with it until the full tem1ination of the case.’ x x
x
Following the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court
in Sanchez, Jr. vs. Marin, the present rule is that fishponds are no
15
longer considered as agricultural lands in accordance with the explicit
provisions of RA. No.7881. Accordingly, all disputes missing from or
Page
involving the operation of fishponds after the enactment of R.A. No.
7881 on February 20, 1995 now fall within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. However, the PARAD or DARAB shall not lose and
continue to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving fishponds
which have been filed or pending before said agency prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 7881 pursuant to the doctrine that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full
termination of the case, and the proscription against the retrospective
application of R.A. No. 7881.
Thus, considering that [petitioner's] Petition with Very Urgent
Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
or Status Quo Order dated June 30, 2004 was filed long after the
enactment of RA No. 7881 on February 20, 1995, the PARAD and
the DARAB have no authority to act on said [petitioner's] Petition x x
x. Accordingly, said petition must be dismissed in view of the
obvious lack of jurisdiction on the part of the PARAD and
1he DARAB to entertain the same. This renders unnecessary the
resolution of the other issues raised by [respondents] in the instant
petition for review.
WHEREFORE. premises considered, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED.1âwphi1 The Decision dated March 2, 2009 mid
Resolution dated August 4, 2009 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[Petitioner's] Petition with Very Urgent Motion for the Immediate
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order is
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14 (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied the
same via its October 11, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
15
In a March 24, 2014 Resolution,  the Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
(1)
THE HON. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRONEOUSLY RULED
THAT THE DARAB HAS OBVIOUS LACK OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE INST ANT CASE, IN VIEW OF R.A. NO. 7881 THAT
FISHPONDS ARE NO LONGER AGRICULTURAL LANDS
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THAT THIS CASE BELONGS TO
THE EXCEPTION THAT TENURIAL RELATION IS ALREADY
A VESTED RIGHT AND THEREFORE IT REMAINS AN
AGRARIAN DISPUTE.
(2)
HON. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO
RULE ON THE ISSUE OF THE EXISTENCE OF TENANCY
WHICH ALREADY EXISTED PRIOR TO THE PASSAGE OF
R.A. 7881.16
Petitioner's Arguments
In her Petition and Reply17 seeking reversal of the assailed CA
dispositions and, in lieu thereof, the reinstatement of the P ARAD
and DARAB Decisions, petitioner essentially argues that the CA
erred in failing to consider that her case falls within the exceptions
laid down in Republic Act (RA) No. 7881, in that there is an existing
tenurial arrangement between her and respondents which must be
respected; that the amendments introduced in 1995 by RA 7881 to
RA 6557 (CARL) cannot be given retroactive application as to
deprive a farmer of his rights under previous agrarian laws; that while
the subject landholding is no longer covered by the CARL, the parties
tenurial arrangement subsists and remains governed by RA 3844 as it
was vested prior to the effectivity of RA 7881; and thus, the PARAD
and DARAB possess jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute
Respondents’Arguments
In their Comment18 to the Petition, respondents counter that the
operation of fishponds is no longer an agricultural activity but an
industrial one; that under Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, it is specifically declared
that under RA. 7881, aquaculture, fishponds, and prawn farms are
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP); that under the CARL, a fishpond is not an arable
land; that in Spouses Romero v. Tan, 19 the Court held that the
PARAD has no jurisdiction over cases involving fishponds, as they
are no longer considered agricultural lands; and that the relationship
between the parties is that of civil law lessor and lessee.
Thus, respondents pray for denial of the instant Petition.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Under Section 2 of RA 7881, which took effect on February 20,
1995,
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act:
Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
When petitioner filed DCN R-03-02-0837'04 with the Bulacan
PARAD in 2004, RA 7881 was already in effect; therefore, the
subject landholding - which remained undistributed under and was
not subjected to the CARP - ceased to be covered by the CARL.
Consequently, the Bulacan PAR.AD, as well as the DARAB, had no
authority to take cognizance of her case, since their jurisdiction is
limited to agrarian disputes. In Pag-asa Fishpond Corporation v.
Jimenez,20 this Court held:
The jurisdiction of the PARAD, DARAB and the CA on appeal, is
limited to agrarian disputes or controversies and other matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the CARP under R.A. No.
6657, R.A. No. 3844 and other agrarian laws. An agrarian dispute is
defined as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
16
As early as February 20, 1995, private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds were exempted from
Page
the coverage of the CARL by virtue of RA. No. 7881. Section 2 of
the said law expressly provides:
Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
xxxx
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act:
Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
Evidently, petitioner and Narciso did not apply to become
beneficiaries in other landholdings, and chose instead to remain in the
subject fishponds; for this, they could not claim protection
specifically under the CARL and other agrarian laws, as the
landholding ceased to be covered under said laws.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 28, 2012
Decision and October 11, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 110423 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

Admittedly, there is no express repeal of R.A. No. 3844 as a whole.

Its provisions that are not inconsistent with R.A. No. 6657 may still
be given suppletory eftect. Nonetheless, there is now irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy between the two laws as regards the
treatment of fishponds and prawn farms. Such repugnancy leads to
the conclusion that the provisions of RA. No. 6657 supersede the
provisions of RA. No. 3844 insofar as fishponds and prawn farms are
concerned. In any event, Section 76 of RA. No. 6657, as amended,
provides that all other laws, decrees, issuances, or parts thereof
inconsistent thereto are repealed or amended accordingly.

Verily, the DARAB finding of agricultural leasehold tenancy

relations between petitioners civil law lessee David Jimenez and
respondents have [sic] no basis in law. x x x

The above pronouncement also nullifies petitioner's claim that a

tenurial arrangement, which is governed by RA 3844, exists between
her and the respondents. In short, and to repeat, RA 7881 supersedes
RA 3844, with regard to fishponds and prawn farms. This is
understandable; to subscribe to petitioner's view would precisely
render the exemption and exclusion of fishponds and prawn farms
from CARP granted under the amendatory law practically useless; it
would be as if no exemption was granted.

The case of Sanchez, Jr. v. Marin,21 cited by petitioner, the PARAD,

and DARAB cannot be made to apply in the present case either. In
that case, the petition for the fixing of the farmer-complainant's lease
rental was instituted in 1991, when RA 7881 was not yet in effect and
fishponds and prawn farms were not as yet exempted/excluded from
CARL coverage. Thus, the Court held that there was an agrarian
dispute existing between die parties cognizable by the PARAD at the
time it rendered its Decision on March 2, 1993. Thus, considering
that prior to the enactment of RA 7881, the case was already pending
appeal before the DARAB, the amendatory law cannot be made to
apply as to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction over the case. In the
present case, however, petitioner filed her petition to be declared a de
Jure tenant before the P ARAD in 2004, when the subject
landholding already ceased to be covered by the CARP by virtue of
the amendments under RA 7881, which took effect as early as 1995.

Petitioner and her husband Narciso, who was then still alive, were not
exactly without remedies, as they were given, pursuant
to DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, 22 the option to
remain as workers or become beneficiaries in other agricultural lands.
If they had chosen to remain in the exempt area, they should be
17

entitled to such rights, benefits and privileges granted to farmworkers

under existing laws, decrees, and executive orders - but not under the
Page

agrarian laws, for the specific and precise reason that the subject
landholding ceased to be covered by the CARP and RA 3844.

G.R. No. 185312, December 01, 2016
NICANOR MALABANAN, AURORA MANAIG, RONNIE
MALABANAN, VICTOR MALABANAN, SEVERINO
MALABANAN, EUFROCINIA MALABANAN, EUFROCILA
MALABANAN, REYNALDO MALABANAN, AND DONATA
MALABANAN, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ALFREDO
RESTRIVERA, REPRESENTED BY BIENVENIDO
RESTRIVERA AND REMEDIOS RESTRIVERA-
ESPERIDION, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97787, which affirmed
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Resolution dated 10 October 2006. 2 The latter reinstated the
Decision3] issued by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (RARAD), Region IV, in the Petition for Cancellation of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs), Declaration of
Nullity of Sale, Repossession and Reconveyance filed by respondents
against petitioners.
RARAD directed the Cavite Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO), as well as the Register of Deeds (RD), to recall the CLOAs
and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued to petitioners
over a sequestered agricultural land previously owned by
respondents' father. In lieu thereof, RARAD ordered the issuance of
new certificates in favor of respondents. Petitioners argue, however,
that it had no jurisdiction over the petition.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The disputed property is an 8.839-hectare agricultural land situated in
Potrero, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. It used to be registered under the
name of Alfredo Restrivera, as shown by his Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-13.4 In 1968, OCT No. 0-13 was cancelled by TCT
No. T-28631 under the name of Independent Realty Corporation
(IRC). After the ouster of the Marcos administration, the IRC
voluntarily surrendered the land to the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG).5
The PCGG then transferred the above property to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for distribution to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) by virtue of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on
Sequestered Agricultural Lands between the PCGG and the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR),6 as well as Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 407, Series of 1990.7
In February 2002, DAR awarded the land to petitioners. Two
collective CLOAs8 were generated and the RD eventually issued to
them derivative TCT Nos. CLOA-28389 and CLOA-2839.10
Invoking their preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries under Section
22 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, 11 respondents filed before the
Adjudication Board for Region IV a Petition for Cancellation of
CLOA, Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Repossession and
Reconveyance12 against petitioners, Charmaine Uy, the PARO of
Cavite, and the RD of Cavite in February 2003.
Respondents alleged that (1) Alfredo never transferred his title to the
subject land to any entity; (2) petitioners were perpetually
disqualified from benefitting from CARP because they had sold the
subject land to Charmaine Uy in violation of Section 73(f) of R.A.
6657 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1996; 13 (3)
prior to the award, petitioners also executed a waiver of their rights to
the subject land in favor of other potential farmer-beneficiaries; and
(4) the land had a slope of 18% as shown in the DAR regional
director's Investigation Report14 and was, therefore, exempt from
CARP coverage.
The Malabanans, the DAR-Legal Assistance Division, and
Charmaine Uy filed separate Answers15 raising these substantially
similar defenses: (1) no waiver of rights or sale of the subject land
had ever occurred; (2) respondents had no legal standing to file the
petition, because Restrivera was not the registered owner of the
property; and (3) the petition was premature because whether or not
the land was exempt from CARP was an Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI)16 issue that needed to be resolved first by the
DAR Secretary.
RULING OF RARAD
RARAD disposed of the petition as follows: 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby issued: 
1. Declaring that the generation and the subsequent issuance of
CLOA Nos. 00596619 and 00596620 registered under TCT No.
CLOA 2838 and TCT 2839, respectively, covering the subject parcel
of land were in violation of petitioners' preferential rights as farmer-
beneficiaries under Section 22 of RA 6657 and under the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DAR and the PCGG
dated February 23, 1987;
2. Declaring further that the afore-cited CLOAs were issued over a
property which is excluded/exempted under Section 10 RA 6657 for
having more than 18 degrees slope;
3. Declaring finally that the preceding paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof
warrant the cancellation of CLOA and the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of Title derived therefrom registered in the name of
private respondents;
4. Directing the public respondents to recall the afore-cited CLOAs
and generate new ones in the name of the petitioners and submit the
same to the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite;
5. Directing the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite to cause
the cancellation of CLOAs and the derivative Transfer Certificate of
Title above-cited and upon receipt of the newly generated CLOA as
directed in paragraph 4 hereof to cause the registration of the same in
place of the cancelled TCT/CLOA.17
18
RARAD gave credence to the petitioners' denial of the supposed
Page
waiver of their rights and the sale of the subject land. Still, it
sustained the claim of respondents as preferred beneficiaries and
ruled that they had legal standing to assail the award of the land,
since they were Alfredo's compulsory heirs.
Moreover, RARAD dismissed petitioners' theory that there were
pending ALI issues that needed to be resolved by the DAR Secretary.
Instead, it ruled that the regional director's Investigation Report was a
conclusive finding that the land was exempt from CARP coverage;
and that the issue of whether or not there was a violation of
respondents' preferential right was judicial in nature.
Consequently, DAR's legal counsel 18 filed a Motion for
Reconsideration19 on behalf of the Malabanans, PARO, and the RD.
Subsequently, he filed a Withdrawal of Appearance for Private
Respondents-Farmer Beneficiaries.20 The Malabanans, without the
assistance of counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal within the
reglementary 15-day period.21
Because of the pending Motion for Reconsideration, RARAD
deferred its action on the Notice of Appeal. 22 In the end, it denied the
motion for lack of a new matter or substantial argument supporting a
reversal of its Decision.23
RULINGS OF DARAB
Upon Notice of Appeal24 filed by DAR's legal counsel, DARAB
directed all parties to submit their respective
memorandums.25cralawred
In due course, DARAB rendered a Decision dated 28 April
2006,26 with the following dispositive portion:  RULING OF THE CA
WHEREFORE, the Board resolves to SET ASIDE the assailed
decision dated August 27, 2003 and immediately refer this case to
the Honorable Office of the DAR Secretary for its determination on
prejudicial issues concerning Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI). 27
According to DARAB, the issues of whether the subject land was
exempt from CARP coverage and whether the respondents were the
preferred beneficiaries were ALI issues that had yet to be resolved by
the DAR Secretary. It observed that the Investigation Report cited by
respondents was not the outcome of an application for exemption or
exclusion under the "Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) Cases." In this light, there was no basis for
RARAD's cancellation of the CLOAs and the derivative TCTs on the
ground that the awarded land was exempt from land distribution.
DARAB held that the adjudicator should have referred the petition to
the DAR Secretary for the determination of those pending prejudicial
ALI issues.
Moreover, DARAB dismissed respondents' argument that the appeal
was dismissible because both the Malabanans and DAR failed to
perfect their appeals. Instead, DARAB allowed the appeal in order to
prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration28 by respondents, however,
DARAB issued a Resolution dated 10 October 2006 disposing as
follows:  WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Resolution
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Board
dated April 28, 2006 is SET ASIDE. A NEW DECISION is hereby
rendered:  On 11 November 2008, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
1. RECALLING and REINSTATING the Decision dated August
27, 2003 rendered by the Honorable Adjudicator a quo; and
2. DECLARING the Decision dated August 27, 2003 and the
Resolution dated November 18, 2003 rendered by the Honorable
Adjudicator a quo final in view of the defective notices of appeal
filed by both public and private respondents-appellants. 29
DARAB noted that the petition filed by respondents stemmed from
their letter30 to the DAR Secretary requesting an inspection of the
subject land. In turn, the Secretary issued a Memorandum 31 indorsing
their letter to the regional director and directing him to submit a
comprehensive report on result of the latter's inspection. DARAB
then ruled that the director's report was a determinative finding that
the land was exempt from CARP, and that there were no pending ALI
questions that needed to be resolved by the DAR Secretary.
It was further held that petitioners were indeed disqualified from
benefitting from the agrarian reform program. Their waiver of their
rights as farmer-beneficiaries supposedly showed that they did not
possess the requisite willingness, aptitude or ability to cultivate the
subject land. Therefore, the cancellation of their CLOAs and
derivative TCTs was only proper.
DARAB reversed, as well, its earlier pronouncement that there was a
compelling reason to relax procedural rules in this case. It ruled that
the RARAD Decision had already lapsed into finality because of the
failure of both the Malabanans and DAR to perfect their appeals.
After the DARAB's denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration,32 petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule
42 before the CA.33
The appellate court, however, found petitioners' appeal
unmeritorious. While conceding that the legality of the transfer of the
subject land to the IRC had yet to be determined before the proper
forum, the CA nonetheless ruled that respondents were entitled to the
property, because it was registered under their father's name prior to
its transfer to the IRC. For this reason, they had legal personality to
assail its award to petitioners.
The CA ruled further that the transfer by petitioners of their rights to
the land was an additional ground for the cancellation of their titles.
Consequently, the DARAB properly affirmed the RARAD Decision.
Lastly, the CA emphasized that only the last order or resolution
completely disposing of the case can be the subject of an appeal. It
noted that the subject of petitioners' appeal was only the RARAD
Decision; they did not file a new notice of appeal from the Resolution
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. The appellate court
therefore ruled that the RARAD Decision had long become final
because of the failure of petitioners to perfect their appeal.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: 
dated October 10, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated January 10,
2007 respectively of DARAB are hereby AFFIRMED.34
19
Page
Reconsideration.35 Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
The essential issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether
petitioners have the legal personality to assail the distribution of the
subject land under the agrarian reform program; and (2) whether the
agrarian adjudicator has jurisdiction over a petition for cancellation of
title and reconveyance of agricultural land sequestered by or
surrendered to the PCGG.
COURT RULING
We GRANT the petition.
Before delving into the substantive issues, we first address the
procedural issue of whether the RARAD Decision has become final
because of the failure of petitioners to perfect their appeal.
True, petitioners did not file a new notice of appeal after RARAD had
disposed of DAR's Motion for Reconsideration. Contrary to
respondents' claim, however, RARAD did not dismiss the petitioners'
notice of appeal for being premature. Its Order36 states:  question, however, the last known owner of the land before it was
This treats of private respondents' Notice of Appeal from the
Decision dated August 27, 2003 which was duly countered by
petitioners with an Opposition on the ground that there is a pending
motion for reconsideration, hence, the notice of appeal is premature.
Finding that the notice of appeal is too early to be acted upon, the
same is held in abeyance until the motion for reconsideration shall
have been disposed of.37
Additionally, while the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on
behalf of both the Malabanans and DAR, their common legal counsel
subsequently withdrew his appearance for the Malabanans. His
withdrawal was in light of the letter38 of the Malabanans informing
him that they were intending to pursue their appeal separately from
DAR. Notably, too, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal after the
Withdrawal of Appearance by their former legal counsel.
Suffice it to say that petitioners filed a timely Notice of Appeal. It did
not lose validity merely because RARAD deferred action on it during
the pendency of DAR's Motion for Reconsideration. 39 Indeed,
DARAB eventually accepted petitioners' appeal. The findings of both
DARAB and the CA that petitioners failed to perfect their appeal are,
therefore, wrong.
We now resolve the substantive issues.
Respondents have no legal standing
to assail the award of the subject
land to petitioners.
Fortich v. Corona40 ordains that farmer-beneficiaries who are not
approved awardees of CARP have no legal standing to question the
exclusion of an agricultural land from CARP coverage. This
pronouncement is anchored on the rule that any person seeking legal
relief must have a real or present substantial interest, as opposed to
mere expectancy; or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest in the matter under litigation. 41
Simply put, the policy under the Constitution is that courts can only
resolve actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable; judicial power cannot be invoked to
settle mere academic issues or to render advisory opinions. 42
In Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya v. Mosquera,43 a farmer's
association challenged the exemption from land distribution of a 53-
hectare property. On the issue of whether the individual members of
the Samahan were real parties in interest, we ruled that those farmer-
members could not be deemed to possess the legal personality to
question the property's exclusion from CARP, unless two
requirements are fulfilled: the actual approval by the DAR and the
consequent grant of CLOAs and award of the disputed land to those
members. The generation of CLOAs under their names was of no
consequence; at best, they had a mere expectancy, which was
inadequate to vest them with the requisite interest in the subject
matter of the litigation.
In this case, respondents trace their alleged ownership of the disputed
property to OCT No. 0-13. Their claim that the property was illegally
acquired by the IRC is unsubstantiated. The CA correctly noted that
the issue of whether the acquisition of the property by IRC was
lawful or not was still undetermined by the proper tribunal. Without
surrendered to the PCGG was the IRC. In fact, the derivative titles
under question cancelled the latter's title under TCT No. 28631,
instead of OCT NO. 0-13. All things considered, there is yet no
sufficient basis to say that Alfredo Restrivera was the previous owner
of the land prior to its award to petitioners.
Respondents cannot rely solely on their father's title to assert
ownership over the subject land. A title is merely evidence of
ownership of the particular property described therein. Ownership is
not the same as a certificate of title. 44
On the other hand, we cannot just disregard the existence of TCT No.
28631, which is under the name of the IRC. A Torrens certificate is
the best evidence of ownership of registered land and serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
in whose name it was issued. 45 In the absence of a definitive ruling
that TCT No. 28631 was illegally procured, we can only take the
titles presented in evidence at their face value. At this point,
respondents cannot claim ownership of the land, or any interest
therein that could have been the subject of succession.
Concomitantly, they have no legal standing to challenge the propriety
of its distribution under CARP by virtue of their interest as Alfredo's
compulsory heirs.
Neither can respondents claim to have any present substantive
interest in the disputed property as preferred beneficiaries under
paragraph 2 of the MOA between DAR and the PCGG on
sequestered lands. The cited paragraph states: 
[2.] The PCGG shall transfer to the Republic of the Philippines the
titles to those agricultural lands defined in paragraph 1 above
that have been voluntarily turned over or surrendered to the
PCGG and whose titles can now be transferred to the Republic
without the need of further adjudication by the
Sandiganbayan. These lands are to be distributed by MAR to
qualified applicants/beneficiaries in accordance with R.A. 3844 and
other pertinent law, rules and regulations; provided that
the preferential rights over these lands of laborers, farmers, wage
earners and employees of Independent Realty Corporation and
other registered owners of these lands at the time they were
20
surrendered or turned over voluntarily to PCGG, who have been
occupying and/or working on said lands shall he recognized and
Page
respected by all parties concerned.46 (Emphases supplied)
The right recognized under the above paragraph is conditioned on
possession of title and actual occupation of property. In respondents'
case, the most they have established is that the land used to be
registered under Alfredo's name.
On the other hand, Section 22 of R.A. 6657 reads: 
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the
CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of
the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the
same municipality in the following order of priority:  filed by respondents. The applicable set of rules is the 2003 DARAB
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farm workers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are
qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in
the distribution of the land of their parents: and Provided,
further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholdings shall not be
ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably
sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become
beneficiaries under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness,
aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive
as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the
record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any
beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any
support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such
beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the
performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
If, due to the landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants,
lessees, or workers on the land, there is not enough land to
accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership
of other lands available for distribution under this Act, at the option
of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the
distribution of privately-owned lands will be given preferential rights
in the distribution of lands from the public domain.( Emphases
supplied)
The law, therefore, does not automatically vest preferential rights
upon the children of landowners.47 To avail themselves of this right,
claimants must show that: (1) their parents owned the subject land;
and (2) it has been determined in the proper proceeding that the
claimants are qualified beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.
Proof of these circumstances, however, are utterly wanting in this
case.
In sum, respondents failed to show any real or present substantial
interest in the subject land. Indeed, procedural rules can be relaxed in
the interest of justice, but the present case does not merit such
leniency. The requirement that a party must have real interest in the
case is not simply procedural; it is essential to the administration of
justice.48 For these reasons, we set aside the CA's finding that
respondents have the legal personality to assail the award of the
subject land to petitioners.
DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
petition filed by respondents.
It is settled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there
must be an agrarian dispute or tenancy relationship existing between
the parties.49 There must be harmony between this settled principle
and the rules that apply to the petition for the cancellation of CLOAs
Rules of Procedure, under which Section 1, 50 Rule II, grants DARAB
and its adjudicators jurisdiction over cases involving the correction,
partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of
CLOAs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with
the Land Registration Authority.
It is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation of a
CLOA already registered with the Land Registration Authority as in
this case. For purposes of determining whether DARAB has
jurisdiction, the central consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute.51
Section 3 (d) of R.A. 6657 defines agrarian dispute as follows: 
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee. (Emphases supplied)
In this case, respondents have not alleged any tenurial relationship
with petitioners. Rather, their petition is centered on their supposed
preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries and the suitability of the
land for CARP coverage. These are matters falling under the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction of DAR, which is supposed to determine
and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform.52
Section 2, Rule I of DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series of
2003,53 defines, by enumeration, ALI cases over which the regional
director has primary jurisdiction. These cases include, among others,
those arising from or involving the classification and identification of
landholdings for CARP coverage (including protests of and petitions
for lifting that coverage); and the classification, identification,
inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of
potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries.
The proceedings in ALI cases are commenced by the filing of an
initiatory pleading or petition either before the DAR Regional Office
(DARRO) or the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO), depending on
whether or not there has been a notice of CARP coverage. 54 After
notice to all parties concerned, investigation and ocular inspection
21
shall be conducted. The investigating officer may require the
submission of position papers prior to the issuance of a decision. 55
Page
The question of whether the TCTs issued to petitioners should be
cancelled hinges on whether the landholding is exempt from CARP
coverage, which remains undetermined up this point. 56 As DARAB
correctly pointed out in its Decision dated 28 April 2006, the
investigation conducted by the regional director does not measure up
to the proceedings and outcome described above. Hence, RARAD
should not have acted on the petition. Under Section 5, 57 Rule II of
the procedural rules on ALI cases, the petition should have been
referred to the office of the DAR Secretary for the determination of
pending ALI issues; specifically, whether the subject land was
exempt from CARP coverage, and whether respondents were
qualified and preferred farmer-beneficiaries.

Relevant to this case, too, is DAR Administrative Order No. 09-

9758 as amended. This issuance sets the guidelines for the recovery of
lands turned over to DAR pursuant to E.O. 407, 59 but those lands
were later found to be outside the coverage of CARP. Under these
guidelines, the petition for reconveyance should be filed with the
provincial, regional or national offices of DAR. 60 Moreover, the
Order of Reconveyance should be issued by the regional
director,61 which can only be appealed to the DAR Secretary. 62

Based on the above, we find that the Decision of RARAD was

rendered without authority and jurisdiction; hence, it is void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
June 2008 and Resolution dated 11 November 2008 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97787 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The DARAB Decision dated 28 April 2006 is

hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. Moreover, the Office of
the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is directed to
expedite the resolution of this case.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,*Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ.,

concur.

22
Page

[ G.R. No. 218666, April 26, 2017 ]
HEIRS OF LEONILO P. NUÑEZ, SR., NAMELY, VALENTINA
A. NUÑEZ, FELIX A. NUÑEZ, FELIXITA A. NUÑEZ,
LEONILO A. NUÑEZ, JR., MA. ELIZA A. NUÑEZ, EMMANUEL
A. NUÑEZ, ROSE ANNA A. NUÑEZ-DE VERA, AND MA.
DIVINA A. NUÑEZ-SERNADILLA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
CO-HEIR AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROSE ANNA A. NUÑEZ-
DE VERA, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF GABINO T.
VILLANOZA, REPRESENTED BY BONIFACIO A.
VILLANOZA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the landowner may
retain a maximum of five (3) hectares of land, but this land must be
compact or contiguous. If the area selected for retention is tenanted,
the tenant-farmer may choose to remain in the area or be a
beneficiary in a comparable area.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45, seeking to
reverse the Court of Appeals' September 26, 2014 Decision [2] and
June 4, 2015 Resolution,[3] which affirmed the August 11, 2011
Decision of the Office of the President and reinstated the February
23, 2005 Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Director. This case arose from the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No.
130544.
Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez (Sebastian) owned a land[4] measuring
"more or less" 2.833 hectares (28,333 square meters) located at
Barangay Castellano, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. [5] This land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-143003 [6] and
was registered on March 16, 1976 to "Leonilo Sebastian . . . married
to Valentina Averia."[7]
On July 7, 1976, Sebastian mortgaged this property to then
ComSavings Bank or Royal Savings and Loan Association, now
GSIS Family Bank,[8] to secure a loan. His loan matured on June 30,
1978, but the bank did nothing to collect the payment due at that
time.[9]
In 1981, tenant-farmer Gabino T. Villanoza (Villanoza) started tilling
Sebastian's land.[10]
It was only on December 11, 1997, about 19 years after the maturity
of Sebastian's loan, that GSIS Family Bank extrajudicially foreclosed
his mortgaged properties including the land tenanted by Villanoza.
[11]
 A public auction was held, and GSIS Family Bank emerged as
"the highest and only bidder."[12]
Sebastian's land title was cancelled and TCT No. NT-271267 was
issued in the name of the new owner, GSIS Family Bank. [13]
On June 20, 2000, Sebastian filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. [14] Sebastian
argued that an action to foreclose the mortgage prescribed after 10
years. GSIS Family Bank's right of action accrued on June 30, 1978,
[15]
 but it only foreclosed the property 19 years later. [16] Thus, its right
to foreclose the property was already barred. [17]
While the case was pending at the Regional Trial Court, the
Department of Agrarian Reform sent a notice of coverage under
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program to GSIS Family Bank, then landowner of the disputed
property.[18] Neither GSIS Family Bank nor Sebastian exercised any
right of retention within 60 days from this notice of coverage.
On November 10, 2000, the government compulsorily acquired from
GSIS Family Bank the land covered by TCT No. NT-271267. The
bank's land title was cancelled, and TCT No. NT-276395 was issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Department of
Agrarian Reform put a portion of what is now TCT No. NT-276395
under agrarian reform.[19]
On November 27, 2000, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued
an emancipation patent or Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA No. 00554664) to Villanoza. [20] The Certificate of Land
Ownership Award title was generated but not yet released as of
February 23, 2005.[21]
During the pendency of his complaint to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, Sebastian died and his heirs, namely: Valentina A.
Nuñez, Felix A. Nuñez, Felixita A. Nuñez, Leonilo A. Nuñez, Jr.,
Eliza A. Nuñez, Emmanuel A. Nuñez, and Divina A. Nuñez,
substituted him.[22]
On August 9, 2002, the Regional Trial Court found that GSIS Family
Bank's cause of action had prescribed. [23] "[T]herefore, the
proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
[against Sebastian, as substituted by his heirs,] [24] were null and
void."[25] GSIS Family Bank appealed the case before the Court of
Appeals.[26]
On March 1, 2004, some of herein petitioners Leonilo A. Nuñez, Jr.,
Ma. Eliza A. Nuñez, Emmanuel A. Nuñez, Rose Anna Nuñez-De
Vera, and Ma. Divina Nuñez-Sernadilla, represented by attorney-in-
fact Ma. Eliza A. Nuñez (petitioners), submitted a Sworn Application
for Retention (Application for Retention). Their Application for
Retention was made pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 and filed
before the Department of Agrarian Reform, naming "Leonilo P.
Nu[ñ]ez" (Nuñez, Sr.), instead of Sebastian, as the registered owner
of the land.[27] It was filed almost four (4) years after the Department
of Agrarian Reform issued a notice of coverage over the same
property.[28]
Petitioners applied to retain this land [29] although the stated name of
their predecessor-in-interest "Leonilo Sebastian," as found in TCT
23
No. NT-143003[30] or "Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez" as found in Nuñez v.
GSIS Family Bank, was different from "Leonilo P. Nuñez" as found
Page
in the Sworn Application for Retention.[31]
 In the Order dated September 2, 2004, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Region III Director Narciso B. Nieto (Regional Director
Nieto) denied petitioners' Application for Retention and ordered the
release of Certificate of Land Ownership Award in favor of
Villanoza. Regional Director Nieto ruled that petitioners were not
entitled to retain the land under Republic Act No. 6657, as their
predecessor-in-interest was not qualified under Presidential Decree
No. 27.[32] Thus, his heirs could not avail themselves of a right which
he himself did not have.[33]
The dispositive portion of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Office's September 2, 2004 Order read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an ORDER is hereby issued:
1. DENYING the application for retention filed by the heirs of
the late Leonilo S. Nu[ñ]ez, Sr., as represented by their co-
heir/attorney-in-fact, Ma. Eliza A. Nu[ñ]ez, involving the 4.9598
hectares, embraced by TCT Nos. NT-143003; P-8537; and P-9540,
situated at Barangay Castellano, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, for lack
of merit;
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to acquire the
rest of the landholdings and distribute the same to qualified
beneficiaries pursuant to existing DAR policies, rules and
regulations; and
3. ORDERING the DAR personnel concerned to issue and
release TCT CLOA-CA-19771 with CLOA No. 00554664 covering
the 28,833 square meters, more or less, in favor of Gabino T.
Villanoza.
SO ORDERED.[34]
On September 23, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.[35]
Meanwhile, Villanoza registered his Certificate of Land Ownership
Award title under the Torrens system.[36] On November 24, 2004, the
Certificate of Land Ownership Award title was cancelled and a new
regular title, TCT No. NT-299755, was issued in his name. [37]
On February 23, 2005, Regional Director Nieto partially modified his
September 2, 2004 Order.[38] He held that petitioners were entitled to
a retention area of not more than five (5) hectares from the total
landholdings, but they could not retain the property covered under
TCT No. NT-143003 (now TCT No. NT-299755) as it was neither
compact nor contiguous.[39] Petitioners were ordered to choose their
retained area from the other lots of their predecessor-in-interest.
The dispositive portion of Regional Director Nieto's reconsidered
Order[40] dated February 23, 2005 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the ORDER, dated September
2, 2004, issued by this Office in the above case is hereby
RECONSIDERED, and is accordingly modified, as follows:
1. GRANTING the heirs of the late Leonilo P. Nu[ñ]ez, St., as
represented by their co-heir/attorney-in-fact, Ma. Eliza A. Nu[ñ]ez, to
retain five (5) hectares of their landholdings at Barangay Castellano,
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, provided the same must be compact,
contiguous[,] and least prejudicial to the tenants therein pursuant to
RA No. 6657, as amended;
2. MAINTAINING the tenants affected in the retained area as
lessees pursuant to RA No. 3844;
3. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to acquire the
rest of the landholdings and distribute the same to qualified
beneficiaries pursuant to existing DAR policies, rules and
regulations; and
4. ORDERING the DAR personnel concerned to issue and
release TCT-CA-19771 with CLOA No. 00554664 covering the
28,833 square meters, more or less, in favor of Gabino T. Villanoza.
SO ORDERED.[41] (Emphasis in the original)
On March 21, 2005, petitioners appealed the February 23, 2005
Regional Director Order before the Office of Department of Agrarian
Reform Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman).
[42]
In the meantime, this Court reversed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals and reinstated that of the Regional Trial Court on November
17, 2005 in Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank.[43] It held that GSIS Family
Bank's foreclosure of Sebastian's mortgage was null and void and that
his heirs were the rightful owners of the property. [44] The heirs,
however, did not move to execute this Decision. [45]
As for the Application for Retention, Secretary Pangandaman
directed the cancellation of Villanoza's Certificate of Land
Ownership Award title in the Order dated August 8, 2007.
[46]
 According to him, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657 "[did] not
require that the landholding (sought to be retained) should always be
compact and contiguous,"[47] particularly so if it involved "small
landownership of bits and pieces in hectarage." [48] The dispositive
portion of Secretary Pangandaman's August 8, 2007 Order read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated 23 February 2005 issued
by the Regional Director of DAR Regional Office-Ill is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, a new Order is hereby issued to
read as follows:
1. GRANTING the landowners, herein applicants-appellants,
the five (5) hectares as their retention area;
2. DIRECTING the [Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer],
[Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer], or landowner concerned to
initiate the cancellation of the CLOA No. 00554664 issued to
GA[B]INO T. VILLANOZA;
3. GRANTING the tenant to exercise the option whether to
remain in the retained area as a leaseholder or be a beneficiary in
another agricultural land with similar comparable features, the choice
of one forfeits the other option; and
4. DIRECTING the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer]
concerned to assist the parties in the execution of the Leasehold
Agreement, if warranted.
SO ORDERED.[49]
On September 6, 2007, Villanoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(Villanoza's Motion for Reconsideration).[50] He argued that the title
issued to him was already indefeasible and the land it covered was
"not compact and contiguous."[51]
24
On April 25, 2008, Villanoza died[52] and his heirs substituted him. [53]
Page
On December 10, 2008, Secretary Pangandaman resolved to deny
Villanoza's Motion for Reconsideration.[54]

Respondents heirs of Villanoza appealed before the Office of the
President,[55] which ruled[56] in their favor on August 11, 2011.
Interpreting Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657, it held that the land
sought to be retained "must be compact and contiguous," [57] contrary
to the view of the Department of Agrarian Reform in its August 8,
2007 Order. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657 gives the
landowners the right to retain[58] up to five (5) hectares[59] of land
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
According to the Office of the President, the proceedings before
Regional Director Nieto established that petitioners had other
landholdings which, taken together, exceeded the five (5)-hectare
retention limit allowed by law. Likewise, it held that Villanoza's title
had become "irrevocable and indefeasible."[60]
The dispositive portion of the Office of the President Decision dated
August 11, 2011 read:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Orders
dated August 8, 2007 and December 10, 2008 of the-Honorable
Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman, Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated
February 23, 2005 rendered by the Regional Director of DAR Region
III is hereby reinstated.
SO ORDERED.[61]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,[62] which the Office of the
President denied in its Order dated May 30, 2013. [63]
In the Decision dated September 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals
likewise denied[64] the appeal for lack of merit. It held that the
Department of Agrarian Reform should have rejected petitioners'
Application for Retention outright as petitioners failed to prove that
Sebastian intended to make the land, measuring more or less 2.833
hectares and now titled in Villanoza's favor, a part of his retained
holdings.[65]
Neither the heirs of Sebastian may invoke this right. Citing
Administrative Order No. 02-03, Section 3.3, [66] the Court of Appeals
held that petitioners could only exercise the retention right had
Sebastian himself manifested before August 23, 1990 that he wished
to exercise this right. August 23, 1990 was the day when this Court's
ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform[67] became final.
[68]
 Administrative Order No. 02-03 was issued pursuant
to Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Presidential
Decree No. 27, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657. [69]
The Court of Appeals added that the ruling in Nuñez v. GSIS Family
Bank could not apply to the parties here. That case pertained to the
claim of "Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez" while this case pertains to the
claim of petitioners over the same lot but in their capacities as heirs
of "Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr."[70] Petitioners failed to present any
evidence that "Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr." and "Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez"
were the same person.[71]
Even assuming that they referred to only one person, the Court of
Appeals questioned petitioners' failure to push for the execution of
this Court's Decision in Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank. That ruling was
promulgated on November 17, 2005, but as of September 26, 2014,
there was no information yet as to the status of the decision in that
case.[72] The Court of Appeals held that petitioners were barred
by laches for failing to protect their rights for an unreasonable length
of time or for nine (9) long years.[73]
The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 26, 2014
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 11, 2011
and Order dated May 30, 2013 issued by the Office of the President
in O.P. Case No. 09-A-022 is AFFIRMED insofar as it reinstated the
February 23, 2005 Order of the DAR Regional Director confirming
the title issued in favor of Gabino T. Villanoza.
SO ORDERED.[74] (Emphases in the original)
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners posited that Nuñez,
Sr. did not receive a notice of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program coverage from the Department of Agrarian Reform; thus, he
could not be deemed to have waived his right to retain the property.
[75]
 They also submitted, for the first time, photocopies of Nuñez, Sr.'s
Certificate of Baptism[76] and the Affidavit of Nuñez, Sr.'s mother,
Teofila Patiag vda. de Nuñez (Teofila), dated September 14, 1959. [77]
According to the baptismal certificate, "Leonilo S. Nuñez" was the
son of Teofila Patiag and Felix Nuñez. [78] Meanwhile, Teofila's
Affidavit stated that "Leonilo Sebastian Nu[ñ]ez" and "Leonilo P.
Nu[ñ]ez" referred to "one and the same person only." [79] The Affidavit
was allegedly an ancient document which the Court of Appeals could
consider in evidence. [80] Therefore, petitioners argued, this Court's
ruling in Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank had become immutable and
unalterable in their favor.[81]
In its Resolution[82] dated June 4, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, which petitioners appealed
before this Court.
On April 6, 2016, this Court [83] required the respondents to comment.
In their Comment[84] dated July 5, 2016, respondents pointed out the
absence of any evidence on record to show that "Leonilo Sebastian
Nuñez" and "Leonilo P. Nuñez" were the same person. [85] They also
objected to the petitioners' belated presentation of new pieces of
evidence in a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
[86]
They added that, in the eyes of the law, GSIS Family Bank was the
landowner when the government compulsorily acquired the property.
[87]
 However, GSIS Family Bank did not exercise its retention right
within 60 days from receipt of the notice of coverage. [88]
When this Court promulgated Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, the land
was already distributed to tenant-farmer Villanoza. [89] Meanwhile, this
Court's decision was never executed against GSIS Family Bank. [90]
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised its appellate
jurisdiction;
Second, whether Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank binds respondents; and
25
Finally, whether petitioners have a right of retention over the land
measuring "more or less" 2.833 hectares awarded to farmer
Page
beneficiary Gabino T. Villanoza.
I
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, signed into law by
then President Corazon C. Aquino on June 10, 1988, is the
government initiative to comply with the constitutional directive to
grant ownership of agricultural lands to landless farmers, agricultural
lessees, and farmworkers.[91] As of December 31, 2013, about 6.9
million hectares of land, or 88% of the total land subject to agrarian
reform, has been acquired and distributed by the government. [92]
To understand the context of the issue relating to a retention right,
this Court reviews the history of the agrarian reform program.
Prior to any colonization, various ethnolinguistic cultures had their
own customary laws governing their property relationships. The
arrival of the Spanish introduced the concept of encomienda, or royal
land grants,[93] to loyal Spanish subjects, particularly the soldiers.
[94]
 Under King Philip II's decree, the encomienderos or landowners
were tasked "to maintain peace and order" within their encomiendas,
to protect the large estates from external attacks, and to support the
missionaries in converting the natives into Christians. [95] In turn, the
encomienderos had the right to collect tributes or taxes such as gold,
pearls, cotton cloth,[96] chickens, and rice[97] from the natives called
indios.[98] The encomienda system helped Hispanicize the natives and
extended Spanish colonial rule by pacifying the early Filipinos within
the estates.[99]
There were three (3) kinds of encomiendas: the royal encomiendas,
which belonged to the King; the ecclesiastical encomiendas, which
belonged to the Church; and the private encomiendas, which
belonged to private individuals. The local elites were exempted from
tribute-paying and labor, or polo services,[100] required of the natives.
The encomienda system was abused by the encomienderos.
[101]
 Filipinos were made to pay tribute more than what the law
required. Their animals and crops were taken without just
compensation, and they were forced to work for the encomienderos.
[102]
Thus, the indios, who once freely cultivated the lands, became mere
share tenants[103] or dependent sharecroppers of the colonial
landowners.[104]
In the 1899 Malolos Constitution and true to one (1) of the principal
concerns of the Philippine Revolution, then President General Emilio
Aguinaldo declared "his intention to confiscate large estates,
especially the so-called [f]riar lands." [105] Unfortunately, the First
Philippine Republic did not last long.
The encomienda system was a vital source of revenue and
information on the natives for the Spanish crown. [106] In the first half
of the 19th century, the cash crop economy emerged after the
Philippines integrated into the world market, [107] increasing along with
it the powers of the local elites, called principalias, and landlords. [108]
The United States arrived later as the new colonizer. It enacted the
Philippine Bill of 1902, which limited land area acquisitions into 16
hectares for private individuals and 1,024 hectares for corporations.
[109]
 The Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No. 496) established a
comprehensive registration of land titles called the Torrens system.
[110]
 This resulted in several ancestral lands being titled in the names
of the settlers.[111]
The Philippines witnessed peasant uprisings including
the Sakdalista movement in the 1930's.[112] During World War II,
peasants and workers organizations took up arms and many identified
themselves with the Hukbalahap, or Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa
Hapon.[113] After the Philippine Independence in 1946, the problems
of land tenure remained and worsened in some parts of the country.
[114]
 The Hukbalahaps continued the peasant uprisings in the 1950s. [115]
To address the farmers' unrest, the government began initiating
various land reform programs, roughly divided into three (3) stages.
The first stage was the share tenancy system under then President
Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957).[116] In a share tenancy agreement, the
landholder provided the land while the tenant provided the labor for
agricultural production.[117] The produce would then be divided
between the parties in proportion to their respective contributions.
[118]
 On August 30, 1954, Congress passed Republic Act No. 1199
(Agricultural Tenancy Act), ensuring the "equitable division of the
produce and [the] income derived from the land[.]" [119]
Compulsory land registration was also established under the
Magsaysay Administration. Republic Act No. 1400 (Land Reform
Act) granted the Land Tenure Administration the power to purchase
or expropriate large tenanted rice and corn lands for resale to bona
fide tenants or occupants who owned less than six (6) hectares of
land.[120] However, Section 6(2) of Republic Act No. 1400 set
unreasonable retention limits at 300 hectares for individuals and 600
hectares for corporations,[121] rendering President Magsaysay's efforts
to redistribute lands futile.
On August 8, 1963, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 3844
(Agricultural Land Reform Code) and abolished the share tenancy
system,[122] declaring it to be against public policy. The second stage
of land reform, the agricultural leasehold system, thus began under
President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965).
Under the agricultural leasehold system, the landowner, lessor,
usufructuary, or legal possessor furnished his or her landholding,
while another person cultivated it[123] until the leasehold relation was
extinguished.[124] The landowner had the right to collect lease rental
from the agricultural lessee,[125] while the lessee had the right to a
homelot[126] and to be indemnified for his or her labor if the property
was surrendered to the landowner or if the lessee was ejected from
the landholding.[127]
Republic Act No. 3844 also sought to provide economic family-sized
farms to landless citizens of the Philippines especially to qualified
farmers.[128] The landowners were allowed to retain as much as 75
hectares of their landholdings. Those lands in excess of 75 hectares
could be expropriated by the government. [129]
The system finally transitioned from agricultural leasehold to one of
full ownership under President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-1986). On
September 10, 1971, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6389 or the
Code of Agrarian Reform.
Republic Act No. 6389 automatically converted share tenancy into
agricultural leasehold.[130] It also established the Department of
26
Agrarian Reform as the implementing agency for the government's
agrarian reform program.[131] Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed
Page
the whole country as a land reform area. [132]
On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27, or the Tenants
Emancipation Decree, superseded Republic Act No. 3844. Seeking to
"emancipat[e] the tiller of the soil from his bondage," [133] Presidential
Decree No. 27 mandated the compulsory acquisition of private lands
to be distributed to tenant-farmers. From 75 hectares under Republic
Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 27 reduced the landowner's
retention area to a maximum of seven (7) hectares of land.
Presidential Decree No. 27 implemented the Operation Land Transfer
Program to cover tenanted rice or corn lands. According to Daez v.
Court of Appeals,[134] "the requisites for coverage under the
[Operation Land Transfer] program are the following: (1) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system
of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein." [135]
Therefore, the land for acquisition and distribution must be planted
with rice or corn and must be tenanted under a share tenancy or an
agricultural leasehold agreement.[136] The landowner would not enjoy
the right to retain land if his or her entire landholding was intact and
undisturbed.[137]
On the other hand, if a land was subjected to compulsory land reform
under the Operation Land Transfer program, the landowner, who
cultivated this land, or intended to cultivate an area of the tenanted
rice or corn land, had the right to retain an area of not more than
seven (7) hectares.[138]
On October 21, 1976, Letter of Instruction No. 474 further amended
the rule. If the landowner owned an aggregate area of more than
seven (7) hectares of other agricultural lands, he or she could no
longer exercise any right of retention. Letter of Instruction No. 474
states:
1. You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of
the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted
rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to
landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families.
Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao [139] affirmed that the landowner's
retention right was restricted by the conditions set forth in Letter of
Instruction No. 474.[140] In Heirs of Sandueta v. Robles,[141] this Court
denied the landowner's application for retention as it fell under the
first disqualifying condition of Letter of Instruction No. 474: the
landowner's total area was 14.0910 hectares, twice the seven (7)-
hectare limit for retention. [142]
In Vales v. Galinato:[143]
[B]y virtue of [Letter of Instruction No.] 474, if the landowner, as of
October 21, 1976, owned less than 24 [hectares] of tenanted rice or
corn lands, but additionally owned (a) other agricultural lands of
more than 7 [hectares], whether tenanted or not, whether cultivated or
not, and regardless of the income derived therefrom, or (b) lands used
for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes, from
which he [or she] derives adequate income to support himself [or
herself] and his [or her] family, his [or her] entire landholdings shall
be similarly placed under [Operation Land Transfer] Program
coverage, without any right of retention.[144]
Following the People Power Revolution, then President Corazon C.
Aquino (1986-1992) fulfilled the promise of land ownership for the
tenant-farmers. Proclamation No. 131 instituted the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Executive Order No. 129 (1987)
reorganized the Department of Agrarian Reform and expanded it in
power and operation. Executive Order No. 228 (1987) declared the
full ownership of the land to qualified farmer beneficiaries under
Presidential Decree No. 27.
Likewise, the 1987 Constitution, which was promulgated during
President Corazon C. Aquino's term, enshrines the promotion of rural
development and agrarian reform.[145] To balance the interests of
landowners and tenants, Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution
also recognizes the landowner's retention right, as may be prescribed
by law:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis
supplied)
On June 10, 1988, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6657,
[146]
 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, to
supersede Presidential Decree No. 27.
The compulsory land acquisition scheme under Republic Act No.
6657 empowers the government to acquire private agricultural
lands[147] for distribution to tenant-farmers. [148] A qualified farmer
beneficiary is given an emancipation patent, [149] called the Certificate
of Land Ownership Award, [150] which serves as conclusive proof of
his or her ownership of the land. [151]
To mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition, [152] Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6657 allows the landowners the right to retain up
to five (5) hectares of land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, thus:
Section 6. Retention Limits. —
....
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That
in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted,
the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features...
On July 14, 1989, this Court promulgated Association of Small Land
Owners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[153]
 acknowledging that the landowner, whose property was subject to
compulsory land reform, might opt to retain land under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6657.
27
On August 30, 2000, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6657 and this Court's ruling in Association of
Page
Small Land Owners in the Philippines, the Department of Agrarian
Reform issued Administrative Order No. 05-00 to provide
 implementing rules on the landowner's retention right. [154]
Section 9(a) of Administrative Order No. 05-00 states that the
retention limit for landowners covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
is "seven (7) hectares, except those whose entire tenanted rice and
corn lands are subject of acquisition and distribution under
[Operation Land Transfer]." Section 9(a) further states that a
landowner may not exercise his or her retention right under the
following conditions:
1. If [the landowner], as of 21 October 1972, owned more
than twenty- four (24) hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands; or
2. By virtue of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474, if [the
landowner], as of 21 October 1972, owned less than twenty-four (24)
hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands but additionally owned the
following:
i. other agricultural lands of more than seven (7)
hectares, whether tenanted or not, whether cultivated or not, and
regardless of the income derived therefrom; or
ii. lands used for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes from which he derives adequate income to
support himself [or herself] and his [or her] family.
On January 16, 2003, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued
Administrative Order No. 02-03 to further clarify the rules governing
the landowner's retention right.[155]
Section 4.1 of Administrative Order No. 02-03 gives the landowner
the option to exercise the right of retention at any time before he or
she receives a notice of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
coverage.[156]
7.3. The landowner must execute an affidavit as to the aggregate area
of his landholding in the entire Philippines; and
7.4. The landowner must submit a list of his children who are fifteen
(15) years old or over as of 15 June 1988 and who have been actually
cultivating or directly managing the farm since 15 June 1988 for
identification as preferred beneficiaries, as well as evidence of such.
7.5. The landowner must execute an affidavit stating the names of all
farmers, agricultural lessees and share tenants, regular farmworkers,
seasonal farmworkers, other farmworkers, actual tillers or occupants,
and/or other persons directly working on the land; if there are no such
persons, a sworn statement attesting to such fact.
If the area selected by the landowner for retention is tenanted, "the
tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain ... as lessee
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features." Section 9 of Administrative Order
02-03 states that the tenant must exercise this option within one (1)
year from the time the landowner manifests his or her choice of the
area for retention, as follows:
SECTION 9. When Retained Area is tenanted
9.1. In case the area selected by the landowner or awarded for
retention by the [Department of Agrarian Reform] is tenanted, the
tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein as
lessee or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features.
9.3. The tenant must exercise his option within one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention, or
from the time the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Office] has chosen the
area to be retained by the landowner, or from the time an order is
issued granting the retention.

The right to choose the area to be retained belongs to the landowner, If the landowner fails to manifest an intention to exercise the right to
subject to the condition that the area must be (a) a "private retain within 60 calendar days after receiving the Comprehensive
agricultural land"[157] that is (b) compact and contiguous, and (c) Agrarian Reform Program coverage, he or she is considered to have
"least prejudicial to the entire landholding and the majority of the waived the right of retention as explained in Section 2.2 of
farmers" of that land.[158] Administrative Order No. 02-03:

2.2. The landowner shall exercise the right to retain by signifying his
Landowners who voluntarily sold or transferred their land must have
intention to retain within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of
exercised the right of retention simultaneous with the offer for sale or
coverage. Failure to do so within the period shall constitute a waiver
transfer.[159] If the land was compulsorily acquired by the government,
of the right to retain any area.
the right of retention must have been exercised "within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice of coverage." [160] On August 7, 2009, Republic Act No. 9700 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms was enacted to
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 02-03 provides that the strengthen the comprehensive agrarian reform program and to extend
landowner seeking to exercise his or her retention right must submit the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands.
an affidavit stating "the aggregate area of his [or her] landholding in
the entire Philippines" and "the names of all farmers . . . actual tillers The rules on the retention right have remained the same.
or occupants, and/or other persons directly working on the land,"
thus: The Court of Appeals properly exercised its jurisdiction in finding
that "Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr." was different from "Leonilo Sebastian
SECTION 7. Criteria/Requirements for Award of Retention — The
Nuñez." Contrary to petitioners' allegations, [161] the Court of Appeals
following are the criteria in the grant of retention area to landowners:
could not be estopped simply because the issue was never raised
before the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the exercise of its
7.1. The land is private agricultural land;
appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals is empowered to have an
independent finding of fact or adopt those set forth in the decision
28

7.2. The area chosen for retention shall be compact and contiguous
appealed from.[162] This is true especially when the factual finding on
and shall be least prejudicial to the entire landholding and the
the matter contradicts the evidence on record.
Page

majority of the farmers therein;

 Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc. [163] has held that even
this Court, which generally reviews questions of law, may review
questions of facts when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts.[164] This Court may likewise do so when there is no citation
of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based or when
the relevant and undisputed facts have been manifestly overlooked
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[165]
 This gives all the more reason for the Court of Appeals to review
questions of facts and law. In Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,[166] this
Court has also held that a matter not raised by the parties may be
reviewed if "necessary for a complete resolution of the case." [167]
II
This Court cannot apply Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank in petitioners'
favor or to respondents' prejudice.
First, neither Villanoza nor his heirs were impleaded in that case.
Villanoza and his heirs were non-parties to the mortgage and did not
participate in the proceedings for foreclosure and annulment of
foreclosure of mortgage. No person can be affected by any
proceeding to which he or she is a stranger. Being complete strangers
in that case, respondents are not bound by the judgment rendered by
this Court.
Second, the Court of Appeals properly found that petitioners did not
furnish timely and sufficient evidence to prove that "Leonilo P.
Nuñez, Sr." was also "Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez."
The new pieces of evidence that petitioners attached are
inadmissible. Cansino v. Court of Appeals[168] has held that "a motion
for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new
evidence."[169] The belated introduction of these documents in a
motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals violates
respondents' right to contest the new evidence presented. [170]
Moreover, the Certificate of Baptism and Teofila's Affidavit are
"mere photocopies."[171] Petitioners failed to present the original or
certified true copies of these documents. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court states that "[w]hen the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself[.]"
The due execution and authenticity of the baptismal certificate, being
a private document,[172] were also not established. Under Section 20 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners did not comply Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of
Court. Likewise, the photocopy of Teofila's Affidavit may not be
considered an ancient document under Rule 132, Section 21 of the
Rules of Court as follows:
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not
necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty years old,
is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
A copy purporting to be an ancient document may be admitted in
evidence if it bears a certification from the proper government office
where the document is naturally found genuine that the document is
the exact copy of the original on file. [173] Here, the photocopied
Affidavit of Teofila does not carry such certification from the notary
public or the Register of Notaries Public, among others.
[174]
 Petitioners have not shown that the Affidavit of Teofila is free
from suspicion and unblemished by alterations.
Even assuming that "Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr." is also "Leonilo
Sebastian," the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners' non-
execution of this Court's Decision in Nuñez v. GSIS Family
Bank constituted an abandonment of their rights. The Court of
Appeals considered this Court's judgment in that case, which was
never executed for almost 10 years, [175] a hollow victory. According to
the Court of Appeals, "if [petitioners] truly believe that said decision
will entitle them to get back the subject property," [176] then they had
every reason to have quickly taken steps to enforce the judgment in
their favor.
The Office of the President ruled similarly, thus:
Clear from the records ... is the fact that [petitioners] are not the
owners of the subject property when the same was placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government through the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
existence of a Court decision finding them to be the rightful owner[s]
without the decision having been executed . . . renders the decision
inutile and becomes an empty victory for the prevailing part[ies].
[177]
 (Citations omitted)
Cormero v. Court of Appeals[178] has established that the failure to
assert one's right for an unreasonable amount of time leads to the
presumption that he or she has abandoned this right. The Court of
Appeals properly held that petitioners were barred by laches for
failing to protect their rights for at least nine (9) years, which was an
"unreasonable length of time."[179]
In their defense, petitioners aver that they sought for the execution
of Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, only that the sheriff did not
implement it.[180] However, they did not show any evidence to prove
their claim. "Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof."[181] The one alleging a fact has the burden of
proving it.[182]
III
Finally, assuming that Sebastian could properly exercise his retention
right, this could not cover the land awarded to Villanoza.
Petitioners cite Santiago, et al. v. Ortiz-Luiz[183] to claim that an
emancipation grant cannot "defeat the right of the heirs of the
deceased landowner to retain the [land]." [184] However, in that case,
this Court denied the landowner's retention right for exceeding what
29
the law provides.[185] There is no cogent reason why this Court should
rule differently in this case.
Page
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657 [186] gives the landowner the
option to choose the area to be retained only if it is compact or
contiguous. The Department of Agrarian Reform, the Office of the
President, and the Court of Appeals have consistently found that the
land subject of the dispute is neither compact nor contiguous.
Section 6 also provides that if the area selected for retention is
tenanted, it is for the tenant to choose whether to remain in the area or
be a beneficiary in the same or a comparable agricultural land.
[187]
 Petitioners' Application for Retention stated that Villanoza
occupied the property as a tenant and farmer beneficiary. [188] Thus, the
option to remain in the same land was for Villanoza to make.
The landowner's retention right is subject to another condition. Under
Section 3.3 of Administrative Order No. 02-03, the heirs of a
deceased landowner may exercise the retention right only if the
landowner signified his or her intention to exercise the right of
retention before August 23, 1990.[189] Section 3.3 states:
3.3 The right of retention of a deceased landowner may be exercised
. by his heirs provided that the heirs must first show proof that the
decedent landowner had manifested during his lifetime his
intention to exercise his right of retention prior to 23 August 1990
(finality of the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines Incorporated versus the
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform).
Petitioners cannot claim the right of retention through "Leonilo
Sebastian" or "Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr." when the alleged predecessor-
in-interest himself failed to do so. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that during his lifetime, Sebastian did nothing to signify his
intent to retain the property being tilled by Villanoza. It was only two
(2) years after his death that petitioners started to take interest over it.
[190]
Neither was any right of retention exercised within 60 days from the
notice of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage. The
Court of Appeals properly considered this as a waiver of the right of
retention,[191] pursuant to Section 6.1 of Administrative Order No. 02-
03.
always been subject to conditions. Unfortunately in this case, the
landowner has miserably failed to invoke his right at the right time
and in the right moment. The farmer beneficiary should not, in
equity, be made to suffer the landowner's negligence.
Finally, the issuance of the title to Villanoza could no longer be
revoked or set aside by Secretary Pangandaman. [196] Acquiring the lot
in good faith, Villanoza registered his Certificate of Land Ownership
Award title under the Torrens system. [197] He was issued a new and
regular title, TCT No. NT-299755, in fee simple; [198] that is to say, it
is an absolute title, without qualification or restriction.
Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform [199] has held that
"certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as [those] issued in judicial proceedings." [200] Section 2
of Administrative Order No. 03-09 provides that "[t]he State
recognizes the indefeasibility of [Certificate of Land Ownership
Awards], [Emancipation Patents] and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program."
Here, a Certificate of Land Ownership Award title was already issued
and registered in Villanoza's favor on December 7, 2007.
[201]
 Villanoza's Certificate of Land Ownership Award was titled
under the Torrens system on November 24, 2004. [202] After the
expiration of one (1) year, the certificate of title covering the property
became irrevocable and indefeasible. Secretary Pangandaman's
August 8, 2007 Order, which came almost three (3) years later, was
thus ineffective.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
Decision dated September 26, 2014 and Resolution dated June 4,
2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 130544, which affirmed the Office of the
President's Decision dated August 11, 2011 and reinstated the
Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Director's Order dated
February 23, 2005, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Section 6.1 provides that the landowner's "[f]ailure to manifest an

intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty (60) calendar days
from receipt of notice of CARP coverage" is a ground for losing his
or her right of retention.

The Department of Agrarian Reform sent a notice of Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program coverage to GSIS Family Bank, which
was then landowner of the disputed property. [192] Neither GSIS
Family Bank nor Sebastian exercised any right of retention within 60
days from this notice of coverage.

In Vda. De Dayao v. Heirs of Robles,[193] this Court has held that the

Department of Agrarian Reform "has no authority to decree a
retention when no application was in the first place ever filed." [194]

Petitioners themselves admit that the Department of Agrarian Reform

sent a notice of coverage to GSIS Family Bank. [195] During this time,
no application was ever filed by GSIS Family Bank or petitioners.
The same land, which the Republic of the Philippines subsequently
30

acquired, was awarded to Villanoza.

Page

While all agrarian reform programs have always accommodated

some forms of retention for the landowner, all rights of retention have

G.R. No. 217943, June 06, 2016
J. MELLIZA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, ATTY. RAFAEL S.
VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO SIMOY, GREGORIO
SIMOY AND CONSEJO SIMOY, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenges the August 27, 2014 Decision 1 and the March 24, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04944,
which affirmed the July 10, 2009 Decision 3 and the January 25, 2010
Resolution4 of the Office of the President (OP). The issuances of the
OP reversed and set aside the June 20, 2005 Order 5 of the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granting the
application for retention filed by the petitioner, J. Melliza Estate
Development Company, Inc. (petitioner).
The CA summarized the facts of the case as follows:
The present controversy arose from an application for retention filed
by Melizza Estate Development Company, Inc., (petitioner) over a
portion of the landholding situated at Barangay San Jose, San Miguel,
Iloilo, identified as Lot No. 665, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-76786 containing an area of 87,313 square meters, or
8.7313 hectares and registered in the name of the petitioner.
The said lot was transferred to respondents Rosendo Simoy, Gregorio
Simoy and Consejo Simoy, as evidenced by TCT No. EP-7881, TCT
No. EP-7882, TCT No. EP-7880 and TCT No. EP - 7883, which were
registered in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Iloilo on 30
August 1998, pursuant to Emancipation Patent (EP) Nos. A-112160,
A-112161, A-112163, A- 112164-H issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondents were farmer-beneficiaries of
the landholding chosen by the petitioner as its retention area under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Hence, petitioner sought to cancel the
said EPs on the ground that it applied to retain the land subject of the
EPs.
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Malo, Iloilo,
recommended the approval of the application for retention to which
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) for Iloilo province
concurred in an endorsement letter to the Regional Director of DAR
Regional Office No. 6. In an Order, dated 22 May 2001, by the
Regional Director, the latter upheld petitioner's right of retention and
approved its chosen retention area by citing Section 6 of RA 6657
which provides for a five (5) hectare retention limit for landowners.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that the petitioner had already availed of its right of
conversion over the 55.01 hectares located at Barangay Jibao-an,
Pavia, Iloilo, hence, it should be disqualified from other landholdings.
However, the Motion was denied by the Regional Director in his
Order dated 9 July 2001 ruling that the arguments advanced by the
movants have already been considered and exhaustively discussed.
Subsequently, respondents filed their Notice of Appeal but the same
was denied by the Regional Director in an Order of Finality dated 07
August 2001, on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed their case to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. In resolving the appeal, the DAR Secretary, in his
Order dated 20 June 2005, still found the appeal devoid of merit and
affirmed the findings of the Regional Director.
Undaunted, respondents filed their Memorandum on Appeal with the
Office of the President on 21 July 2005. In a Decision, dated 10 July
2009, the Office of the President resolved to give due course to the
appeal and reversed and set aside the Order issued by the DAR
Secretary. Thereafter, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
decision of the Office of the President but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 25 January 2010.6
On August 27, 2014, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Rosendo,
Gregorio and Consejo, all surnamed Simoy (respondents).
The CA explained that petitioner's insistence that the order of the
DAR Regional Director granting its application for retention had
already attained finality and, therefore, could no longer be
reconsidered, reversed or modified, could not be sustained
because: first, issues of retention were within the domain of the DAR
Secretary, who, by virtue of his special competence, should be given
an opportunity to settle the issues involved in a certain case;  second,
rules of procedure were construed liberally in administrative
proceedings as administrative bodies were not bound by the
technicalities applicable to courts of law; and third, the welfare of the
landless farmers and farm workers received the highest consideration
in promoting social justice, strict application of the rules might be
brushed aside in the interest of substantial justice.
The CA, thus, declared that petitioner could not exercise the right of
retention under Republic Act (R.A.) 6657, also known as The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), because,
pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 02, Series of 2003,
petitioner had waived its right of retention by failing to exercise the
same before its receipt of notice of coverage; by failing to manifest
an intention to exercise its right to retain within sixty (60) calendar
days from receipt of the notice of the CARL coverage; and by
performing acts which constituted estoppel by laches. The CA added
that it took petitioner more than eleven (11) years from the time of
the issuance of Emancipation Patents (EPs) to file its application for
retention on October 17, 2000. Therefore, granting its application for
retention would be unjust and prejudicial to the farmer-beneficiaries
31
who had already acquired vested rights of absolute ownership on the
subject lot.
Page
Hence, the CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing disquisition, the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 10 July 2009 and
Resolution dated 25 January 2010 of the Office of the President in
O.P. Case No. 05-H-250 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7cralawred
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THAT
ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS "ENTITLED TO
RETENTION," YET "IT IS NOW BARRED TO EXERCISE
SUCH RIGHT" BY REASON OF ALLEGED DELAY OR
LACHES, WHEN THERE IS NO SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE
PRESENT IN THE CASE, AS PETITIONER FILED ITS
APPLICATION FOR RETENTION PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISION OF R.A. 6657 AND OF THE NEW RETENTION
RIGHTS PRONOUNCED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
CASE OF "ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS OF
THE PHILS., INC., ET. AL V. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM" AND FOLLOWING THE
APPLICABLE DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON THE
MATTER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
DECISIONS OF THE DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR AND THE
DAR SECRETARY IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR PRIMARY
JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE AS ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES SPECIALIZED IN IMPLEMENTING AGRARIAN
REFORM LAWS WHEN IT GRANTED PETITIONER
RETENTION RIGHTS, INSTEAD OF RESPECTING THEIR
DECISION IN DUE RESPECT TO THE EXPRESS
PROVISION OF SECTION 54 OF R.A. 6657 THAT "THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DAR SHALL BE FINAL AND
CONCLUSIVE IF BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE."
III
CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT IN DENYING PETITIONER THE EXERCISE OF
ITS RETENTION RIGHTS, INSTEAD OF SUSTAINING THE
EARLIER DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR
AND THE DAR SECRETARY.8
Expounding on the foregoing, petitioner argues that landholders, who
were unable to exercise their right of retention under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, were given a new right of retention by R.A.
No. 6657, or the CARL; that this new retention right was confirmed
by the Court in its decision in Association of Small Landowners of
the Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 9 (Small Landowners);
that it had seasonably availed of such retention rights by filing its
application on October 17, 2000, which date was within the sixty
(60)-day period from the issuance of DAR A.O. No. 05, Series of
2000, issued on August 30, 2000; that the CA had erroneously agreed
with the OP that there was delay or laches on the part of petitioner as
the application was not filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the "Notice of Coverage," under DAR A.O. No. 02-03; that the CA
erroneously applied A.O. No. 02-03, and not A.O. No. 05-00, in
affirming the decision of the OP; that the filing, processing and
approval of petitioner's application for retention all happened during
the effectivity of A.O. No. 05-00; that A.O. No. 02-03 was only
issued on January 16, 2003 at least two (2) years after the date of the
filing of the application and of its approval; that A.O. 02-03 cannot
have retroactive effect on petitioner's application; that the "Notice of
Coverage" procedure does not apply to petitioner's application; that
respondents have not yet acquired a vested right of ownership over
the subject lot after having complied with their obligation to pay their
amortization; and that the issuance of the EPs in the name of
respondents was not a bar to the granting of petitioner's retention
rights.
Respondents' Counter-Position
Respondents counter that although it is true that a landowner who has
not availed of his right of retention under P.D. No. 27 may avail of
such right under R.A. No. 6657 in light of the ruling of the Court
in Small Landowners , which was reiterated in Daez v. Court of
Appeals10 (Daez), this is still subject to the condition that the
landowner is qualified to such right of retention; that petitioner was
not qualified because it owned more than fifty (50) hectares of
landholding; that the ruling of the Court in the case of Heirs of Juan
Grino, Sr. rep. by Remedios C. Grino vs. DAR (Griño)11 is applicable
in this case; that petitioner pointed out in its Comment filed before
the CA that it had 188.3586 hectares of landholding and only six (6)
hectares was subject of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT); that
petitioner had still 182.3586 hectares remaining; that petitioner had
already 68.2150 hectares while its stockholders had a total 135.8317
hectares of landholdings; and that the issue of whether or not
petitioner timely filed its application for retention on October 17,
2000 is no longer important because the petitioner was not qualified
for retention rights due to its vast landholdings.
All the arguments presented by both parties boil down to this lone
issue of whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's
application for land retention.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Right of retention expressly recognized
and enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the landowner retention
rights under Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. 12
P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657
32
In the case of Heirs of Sandueta v. Robles13 (Sandueta), the Court
Page
expounded on the concept, nature, purpose, restrictions and coverage
or applicability of the right of retention.
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution,
balances the effects of compulsory land acquisition by granting the
landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to
legislative standards. Necessarily, since the said right is granted to
limit the effects of compulsory land acquisition against the
landowner, it is a prerequisite that the land falls under the coverage of
the OLT Program of the government. If the land is beyond the ambit
of the OLT Program, the landowner need not — as he should not —
apply for retention since the appropriate remedy would be for him to
apply for exemption. As explained in the case of Daez v. CA (Daez):
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct
concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for
coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must
be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is
absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a
landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the
entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
If the land is covered by the OLT Program which hence, renders the
right of retention operable, PD 27 — issued on October 21, 1972 —
confers in favor of covered landowners who cultivate or intend to
cultivate an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain
an area of not more than seven (7) has thereof. Subsequently, or on
June 10, 1998, Congress passed R.A. 6657 which modified the
retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA 6657
states that covered landowners are allowed to retain a portion of their
tenanted agricultural land not, however, to exceed an area of five (5)
has. and, further thereto, provides that an additional three (3) has.
may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing
the farm. In the case of Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao (Reyes),
however, the Court held that a landowner's retention rights under RA
6657 are restricted by the conditions set forth in LOI 474 issued on
October 21, 1976 which reads:
WHEREAS, last year I ordered that small landowners of tenanted
rice/corn lands with areas of less than twenty-four hectares but above
seven hectares shall retain not more than seven hectares of such lands
except when they own other agricultural lands containing more than
seven hectares or land used for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, the Department of Agrarian Reform found that in the
course of implementing my directive there are many landowners of
tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less who also
own other agricultural lands containing more than seven hectares or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves
and their families;
WHEREAS, it is therefore necessary to cover said lands under the
Land Transfer Program of the government to emancipate the tenant-
farmers therein.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, do hereby order the following:
landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families.
2. Landowners who may choose to be paid the cost of their lands by
the Land Bank of the Philippines shall be paid in accordance with the
mode of payment provided in Letter of Instructions No. 273 dated
May 7,1973.cralawred
Based on the above-cited provisions, it may be readily observed
that LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of retention
from persons who own:
(a) other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) has. in
aggregate areas; or
(b) lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families.
To clarify, in Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis, the Court, citing the cases
of Ass'n. of Small Landowners and Reyes, stated that while
landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under
PD 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by RA 6657,
the limitations under LOI 474 would equally apply to a landowner
who filed an application under RA 6657.
xxx
Nevertheless, while the CA properly upheld the denial of the petition
for retention, the Court must point out that the November 24, 2009
DARCO Order inaccurately phrased Romulo Sandueta's entitlement
to the remaining 14.0910-hectare landholding, outside of the 4.6523-
hectare subject portion, as a vestige of his retention right. Since the
14.0910-hectare landholding was not shown to be tenanted and,
hence, outside the coverage of the OLT Program, there would be no
right of retention, in its technical sense, to speak of. Keeping with the
Court's elucidation in Daez, retention is an agrarian reform law
concept which is only applicable when the land is covered by the
OLT Program; this is not, however, the case with respect to the
14.0910-hectare landholding. Thus, if only to correct any confusion
in terminology, Romulo Sandueta's right over the 14.0910-hectare
landholding should not be deemed to be pursuant to any retention
right but rather to his ordinary right of ownership as it appears from
the findings of the DAR that the landholding is not covered by the
OLT Program.14 [Emphases Supplied]
Petitioner not entitled to exercise its
retention right over the subject land
In this case, the piece of land that was the subject of retention,
measuring 87,313 square meters or 8.7313 hectares and registered in
petitioner's name, was transferred to respondents and registered in the
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, on August 30, 1998, pursuant
to the EPs issued by the DAR. Respondents were farmer-
beneficiaries of the landholding chosen by petitioner as its retention
area under P.D. No. 27.
At this point, petitioner basically contends that it is entitled to new
retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 and based on the decision of the
Court in Small Landowners and Daez cases. Respondents, on the
other hand, argue that the petitioner should not be granted retention
rights because it has still vast landholdings or more than enough
properties in its name.
33

Respondents are correct.

1.  You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of
Page

the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted Records show that based on the Order15 of the Regional Director of
rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to
DAR Regional Office No. 6, dated May 22, 2001, petitioner PARAD and the DARAB found that the 15.3864 hectares of
submitted certifications, among others, to support its application for sugarland was subdivided by respondents into a 4.8836 subdivision
retention, dated October 17, 2000, which included the certification, lot to support themselves and their family; hence, under LOI No. 474
dated April 3, 2001, issued by the Office of the City Assessor of and Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, the PARAD and the
Iloilo City and the certification, dated April 4, 2001, issued by the DARAB held that respondents are no longer entitled to retain seven
Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Iloilo, hectares of the land subject to Operation Land Transfer. The
confirming that petitioner had no agricultural lands registered in its decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB are supported by the
name in the city and province of Iloilo. The Order 16 of the DAR Court's ruling in Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao cited above. As
Secretary, dated June 20, 2005, however, explicitly stated that the PARAD and the DARAB found that respondents are disqualified
petitioner had aggregate agricultural landholdings of 68.2140 to retain the parcel of land, which is the subject matter of this case,
hectares covered by the following Transfer Certificates of Title there was no ground to cancel the emancipation patent of
(TCTs): petitioner; hence, the DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD
dismissing respondents' complaint for lack of merit. 19 [Emphases
TCT No. 76779 (2.6884 has.) Supplied]
TCT No. 76780 (.2894 ha.)
TCT No. 76781 (.4791 has.) Also in the cited case of Sandueta, the Court did not favor retention
TCT No. 76782 (.1934 ha.) when the landowner had more than what could be kept. Thus:
TCT No. 76783 (6.3882 has.)
TCT No. 76784 (1.0739 ha.)
In this case, records reveal that aside from the 4.6523-hectare
TCT No. 76785 (2.3539 has.)
tenanted riceland covered by the OLT Program, i.e. the subject
TCT No. 76786 (8.7313 has.)
portion, petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Sandueta, own
TCT No. 76787 (1.5738 has.)
other agricultural lands with a total area of 14.0910 has_which
TCT No. 76788 (39. 4806 has.)
therefore triggers the application of the first disqualifying condition
TCT No. 76789 (.9943 ha.)
under LOI 474 as above-highlighted. As such, petitioners, being
mere successors-in-interest, cannot be said to have acquired any
All these lands were placed under the OLT program of the retention right to the subject portion. Accordingly, the subject
government. portion would fall under the complete coverage of the OLT
Program hence, the 5 and 3-hectare retention limits as well as the
This fact has been affirmed by the electronic copies of the TCTs 17 on landowner's right to choose the area to be retained under Section
record submitted by no less than the respondents. All the said TCTs 6 of RA 6657 would not apply altogether.20 [Emphasis and
are still in the name of J. Melliza Estates Development Company, Underscoring Supplied]
Inc. and existing in the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo.
Among the said TCTs, only TCT No. 76785 has been cancelled.
Considering that petitioner failed to qualify for retention, there is no
Moreover, respondents claim that aside from this 68.2140
need to discuss the other issues raised.
landholding of petitioner, six (6) of its corporate stockholders have
total landholdings of 1, 358, 317 square meters or 135.8317 hectares
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
embraced in one (1) title - TCT No. T-66933 issued on September 1,
1971.
SO ORDERED.
The Court agrees with respondents that petitioner has more than
enough properties registered in its name. Of the total landholdings of
petitioner and that of its corporate stockholders, only eight (8)
hectares have been subjected to the OLT. Even if the land areas
owned by its corporate stockholders would be excluded, petitioner
still has 68.2140 hectares in its name. Its vast land ownership of
68.2140 definitely disqualifies it from exercising its right of retention
over the subject lands under P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657.

Although petitioner is correct in saying that a landowner who failed

to exercise his right of land retention may do so under R.A. No. 6657,
such landowner must, nevertheless, be qualified to retain land.
Unfortunately, petitioner in this case is not qualified to retain the
subject land because it has 68.2140 hectares of collective
landholdings as evidenced by the electronic copies of the TCTs on
record. As it is not entitled to retain land under the combined
application of P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657, it is also disqualified
to retain land under R.A. No. 6657.

The case of Pangilinan v. Balatbat18 applies. In the said case,

petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLTs) issued in favor of his tenants pursuant to P.D. No.
27. The Court wrote:
34

In this case, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals agreed that
respondents' total landholding is 25.2548 hectares, and that 9.8683
Page

hectares thereof was riceland, which was subjected to Operation Land

Transfer, while 15.3864 hectares was sugarland. In addition, the

G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY &
PABLO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. ROMEO C.
CARRIEDO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
JARDELEZA, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration1 filed by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision2 dated January 20, 2016.
At the onset, we note that the DAR was not given the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and before
this Court, until it filed its motion for reconsideration of this Court's
Decision. In its motion for reconsideration, the DAR contends that
the agency had been denied due process when it was not afforded the
opportunity to refute the allegations against the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 20063 (AO 05-06) before the
Court of Appeals and before this Court. 4 It argues that the basic
requirement of due process has not been accorded to the agency
because it was not even notified of the petition filed before the Court
of Appeals; nor did the Court of Appeals notify the DAR of the
proceedings and its Decision. 5 The DAR, therefore, insists that the
Decision dated January 20, 2016 be reconsidered by this Court
especially so that the issues involve the enforcement and validity of
its regulations.6
We agree with the DAR. Being the government agency legally
mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
19887 (CARL) and the primary agency vested with the expertise on
the technicalities of the CARL,8 the DAR's position on the issues
raised before us deserves cogent consideration. In fact, the CARL
specifically empowers the DAR to issue rules and regulations,
whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and
purposes of the law.9 Administrative rules and regulations ordinarily
deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the
rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their
specific expertise in their respective fields. 10 In this case, it cannot be
denied that the DAR possesses the special knowledge and acquired
expertise on the implementation of the agrarian reform program. To
pay no heed to its position on the issues raised before us ignores the
basic precepts of due process. Therefore, under these circumstances,
we are impelled to revisit our Decision, this time taking into account
the arguments and position of the DAR.
To reiterate, the core issue before us is whether Romeo C. Carriedo's
(Carriedo) previous sale of his landholdings to Peoples' Livelihood
Foundation, Inc. (PLFI) can be treated as the exercise of his retention
rights, such that he cannot lawfully claim the subject landholding as
his retained area anymore.11 The issue necessarily touches on the
validity of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 and the relevant provisions of the
CARL. Further, the issue of whether Certificates of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOAs) possess the indefeasibility accorded to a Torrens
certificate of title is likewise raised before this Court.
We will discuss the issues in seriatim.
On the validity of Item No. 4, AO 05-06
The Decision adjudged Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for
providing terms which appear to expand or modify some provisions
of the CARL.12 The DAR argues that this ruling sets back the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program by upsetting its
established substantive and procedural components. Particularly, the
DAR contends that the nullification of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06
disregarded the long-standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale
(without its clearance) as valid based on the doctrine of estoppel, and
that the sold portion is treated as the landowner's retained area. 13
Applying Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 to the facts of this case, the DAR
submits that the subject landholding cannot be considered as the
retained area of Carriedo anymore because he has already exercised
his right of retention when he previously sold his landholdings
without DAR clearance.14 The DAR specifies that sometime in June
1990, Carriedo unilaterally sold to PLFI his agricultural landholdings
with approximately 58.3723 hectares. The DAR, therefore, argues
that Carriedo's act of disposing his landholdings is tantamount to the
exercise of his right of retention under the law. 15
Item No. 4 of AO 05-06, provides:
II. STATEMENT OF POLICIES
xxxx
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectare
retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5)
hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the
corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the
name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be
35
considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s' retained area
but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding
Page
ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar
as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered
considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP
coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still
registered in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions
totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his
retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP.
The DAR's argument has merit.
The Constitution mandates for an agrarian reform program, thus:
ARTICLE XIII
xxxx
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations,
and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.
The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To give life to the foregoing Constitutional provision, the CARL
provides, among others:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. -It is the policy of the
State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
The welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive
the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the
nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the
establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the
basis of Philippine agriculture.
To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land,
with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and
to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide
farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their
dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater
productivity of agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Both the Constitution and CARL underscore the underlying principle
of the agrarian reform program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable
and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account, among
others, equity considerations. We find merit in the DAR's contention
that the objective of AO 05-06 is equitable16—that in order to ensure
the effective implementation of the CARL, previous sales of
landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the
exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item
No. 4 of the said administrative order.17
The equity in this policy of AO 05-06 is apparent and easily
discernible. By selling his landholdings, it is reasonably presumed
that the landowner already received an amount (as purchase price)
commensurate to the just compensation conformable with the
constitutional and statutory requirement. At this point, equity dictates
that he cannot claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention area
or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale of
his land.
In Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao,18 the issue of whether the inclusion of the
two-hectare portion sold by Delfino to SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
(without DAR clearance) resulted in the diminution of his retention
rights was raised before this Court. In that case, Delfino was
adjudged by the DAR to be entitled to five hectares of retention area,
to be taken out from the tenanted area that he owns. Subsequently,
however, and without prior clearance from the DAR, Delfino sold
two hectares of land to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. This supervening
event prompted the DAR Secretary to clarify his previous Order
(albeit the same having already attained finality) and found it fair and
equitable to include the two-hectare portion sold to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. as part of Delfino's retention area. Consequently,
Delfino is now entitled only to the balance of three hectares. Upon
motion for reconsideration by Delfino, the DAR Secretary explained
that the clarification was made in order not to circumvent the five-
hectare limitation as said landowner "cannot [be allowed to]
simultaneously enjoy x x x the proceeds of the [sale] and at the same
time exercise the right of retention under CARP. "19 This Court
upheld the clarification issued by the DAR Secretary insofar as in
holding that Delfino had partially exercised his right of retention
when he sold two hectares to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. after his
application for retention was granted by the DAR. 20 We do not see
any reason why the same principle cannot be applied in this case.
In relation to this, we also take note of the submissions of the DAR
pertaining to the "immense danger to the implementation of CARP"
that it perceives to arise as a consequence of our Decision.
Particularly, DAR posits that the Decision "will provide landowners
unbridled freedom to dispose any or all of their agricultural properties
without DAR clearance and still at a moment's notice decide which of
those lands he wishes to retain, to the prejudice not only of the
tenants and/or farmer beneficiaries but of the entire CARP as
well."21 It further posits that to allow Carriedo to claim the subject
landholdings as his retained area "will in effect put on hold the
implementation of [the] CARP to wait for the landowner, despite
selling majority of his agricultural landholdings, and despite
receiving compensation for the same, to still be able to choose the
retention area."22
The DAR, therefore, maintains that AO 05-06 is the regulation
adopted by the agency precisely in order to prevent these perceived
dangers in the implementation of the CARL. The policy behind AO
05-06 should deter any attempt to circumvent the provisions of the
CARL which may arise under a factual milieu similar in this case.
We also agree with the DAR on this point.
AO 05-06 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has
been held to be the property concept in Section 6, 23 Article II of the
1973 Constitution. Under this concept, private property is supposed
to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general,
who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must
exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and
selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or
nation.24 Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner
but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice,
may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
36
ownership and profits.25 It has been held that Presidential Decree No.
27, one of the precursors of the CARL, embodies this policy and
Page
concept.26
This interpretation is consistent with the objective of the agrarian
reform program, which is, of course, land distribution to the landless
farmers and farmworkers.27 The objective is carried out by Item No. 4
of AO 05-06 as it provides for the consequences in situations where a
landowner had sold portions of his/her land with an area more than
the statutory limitation of five hectares. In this scenario, Item No. 4 of
AO 05-06 treats the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of
the landowner's retention rights. The reason is that, effectively, the
landowner has already chosen, and in fact has already disposed of,
and has been duly compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain
under the law.
Further, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 is consistent with Section 70 28 of the
CARL as the former likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares
(in case of multiple/series of transactions) as valid, such that the same
already constitutes the retained area of the landowner. This legal
consequence arising from the previous sale of land therefore
eliminates the prejudice, in terms of equitable land distribution, that
may befall the landless farmers and farmworkers.
We note that records also bear that the previous sale of Carriedo's
landholdings was made in violation of the law, being made without
the clearance of the DAR. 29 To rule that Carriedo is still entitled to
retain the subject landholding will, in effect, reward the violation,
which this Court cannot allow. We emphasize that the right of
retention serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition
by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant, and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. 30 In this case, however,
Carriedo claims his right over the subject landholding not because he
was "deprived" of a portion of his land as a consequence of
compulsory land coverage, but precisely because he already
previously sold his landholdings, so that the subject landholding is
the only portion left for him.
Although constitutionally guaranteed, the exercise of a landowner's
right of retention should not be done without due regard to other
considerations which may affect the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. This is especially true when such exercise pays no
heed to the intent of the law, or worse, when such exercise amounts
to its circumvention.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 is
valid. Indeed, the issue in this case is more than the mere claim of an
individual to his retained area, but had been, at the onset, an issue of
the implementation of the CARL in line with the mandate and
objective as set forth in the Constitution.
On Certificate of Land Ownership Award
The Decision also adjudged that CLOAs are not equivalent to a
Torrens certificate of title, and thus are not indefeasible. 31 The DAR
disagrees and submits that this ruling relegated Emancipation Patents
and CLOAs to the status of a Certificate of Land Transfer, which is
merely part of the preparatory steps for the eventual issuance of a
certificate of title.32
We agree with the DAR. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award or
CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or
awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions
and conditions provided for in the CARL and otl1er applicable
laws.33
Section 24 of the CARL, as amended,34 reads:
Sec. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of
the beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly
registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award
and their actual physical possession of the awarded land. Such award
shall be completed in not more than one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the emancipation patents, the
certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and
imprescriptible after one (1) year from its registration with the
Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to the conditions,
limitations and qualifications of this Act, the property registration
decree, and other pertinent laws. The emancipation patents or the
certificates of land ownership award being titles brought under
the operation of the torrens system, are conferred with the same
indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said
system, as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6732. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Further, in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,35 we held
that:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the
character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue
thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words,
upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title
shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding. (Emphasis and italics omitted.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter
IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued
in registration proceedings.36 (Citation omitted.)
We, however, note that the issue involving the issuance, recall, or
cancellation of CLOAs is lodged with the DAR, 37 which has primary
jurisdiction over the matter.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration
filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby GRANTED,
and the Decision dated January 20, 2016 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Item No. 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006 is hereby declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
37
Page

G.R. No. 139285               December 21, 2007
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM and DAR
REGIONAL DIRECTOR (Region V), Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) has truly noble
goals, and these noble goals should not be stymied by the creation of
exemptions or exceptions not contemplated by the law.
The Case
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres (Archbishop) questions the
February 4, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48282, which upheld the December 8, 1997 and June 10,
1998 Orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The Facts
Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines
Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236
hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432
hectares are planted with coconut trees.
In 1985, Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
District Office No. 19, Naga City, Camarines Sur several petitions for
exemption of certain properties located in various towns of
Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.2 Two of these petitions were
denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986, issued by the Regional
Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena.3
Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and
sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice
and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Caceres. In his appeal, Archbishop cited the
following grounds:
a) That said properties are all covered by conditional donations
subject to the prohibitions of the donors to SELL, EXCHANGE,
LEASE, TRANSFER, ENCUMBER OR MORTGAGE the
properties;
b) That they are used for charitable and religious purposes;
c) That the parishes located in depressed areas badly need them for
the furtherance of their mission work, propagation of the faith,
maintenance and support of their chapels, churches and educational
religious institutions like the Holy Rosary Major and Minor
Seminaries for the promotion of the priesthood vocation;
d) For the preservation of good relationship between church and state
thru non-infringement of the right to exercise religious profession and
worship;
e) For the maintenance of the Cathedral and Peñafrancia Shrine,
which now include the Basilica Minore Housing our venerable image
of Our Lady of Peñafrancia and the venerable portrait of Divine
Rostro;
f) That the petitioner (church) is amenable to continue the leasehold
system with the present cultivators or tenants.4
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao in
an Order dated December 8, 1997.5 A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 10, 1998. 6
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Archbishop argued that even if the lands in question are
registered in his name, he holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his
followers as cestui que trust. Archbishop further argued that the deeds
of donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed
numerous fiduciary obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange,
lease, transfer, encumber, or mortgage the subject lands. By this
reasoning, Archbishop concluded that he is not the "landowner"
contemplated by PD 27 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, the CARL
of 1988. He then prayed that the assailed orders of the DAR be
reversed, or in the alternative, that the alleged beneficiaries of the
trust be each allowed to exercise rights of retention over the
landholdings.7
The petition was dismissed by the CA in its February 4, 1999
Decision.8 Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was
denied in the June 18, 1999 CA Resolution.9
Archbishop now brings the matter before us through this petition.
38
The Issues
Page
Archbishop raises issues he had raised previously, which, he
contends, the CA failed to properly address. He claims that the CA
erred in holding that he is only entitled to assert one right of retention
as the subject properties are registered in his name. He further claims
that an express trust had been created wherein he only held naked
title to the subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues
that it is not the "landowner" contemplated by the law, but merely a
trustee, and as such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf
of the beneficiaries of each particular property. He then raises the
question of the applicability of the ruling in The Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration
Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, 10 which, he
cites, ruled that properties held by the Church are held by it as a mere
administrator for the benefit of the members of that particular
religion. As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of the
subject properties, he argues that these subject properties should have
been exempt from the OLT.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Archbishop’s arguments, while novel, must fail in the face of the law
and the dictates of the 1987 Constitution.
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to
under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the
landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the
landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of
ownership. Archbishop would have us read deeper into the law, to
create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do
so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is
the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless
farmers and farmworkers.
Archbishop was found to be the registered owner of the lands in
question, and does not contest that fact. For the purposes of the law,
this makes him the landowner, without the necessity of going beyond
the registered titles. He cannot demand a deeper examination of the
registered titles and demand further that the intent of the original
owners be ascertained and followed. To adopt his reasoning would
create means of sidestepping the law, wherein the mere act of
donation places lands beyond the reach of agrarian reform.
There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per
landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA 6657 has a provision for a
landowner to exercise more than one right of retention. The law is
simple and clear as to the retention limits per landowner. PD 27
states, "In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more
than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or
will now cultivate it"; while RA 6657 states:
SEC. 6. Retention Limits.––Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain, directly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but
in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at
least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the
land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Nothing in either law supports Archbishop’s claim to more than one
right of retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. The provisions of
PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation––
there is only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple
rights of retention can be held by a single party. Furthermore, the
scheme proposed by Archbishop would create as many rights of
retention as there are beneficiaries, which could in effect protect the
entire available land area from agrarian reform. Under Archbishop’s
reasoning, there is not even a definite landowner to claim separate
rights of retention, and no specific number of rights of retention to be
claimed by the landowners. There is simply no basis in the law or
jurisprudence for his argument that it is the "beneficial ownership"
that should be used to determine which party would have the right of
retention.
Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not
have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or
mortgage the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions
do not make him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This
matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili,
Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform. 11 In that
case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any
consideration of lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable
organization, the Court found that the lands of the Hospicio were not
exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform. In characterizing the
sale of land under agrarian reform, we stated:
Generally, sale arises out of contractual obligation. Thus, it must
meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence
of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the
agreement. The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either
void or voidable.
In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicio’s property did not arise
as a consequence of the Hospicio’s consent to the transfer. There was
no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the
DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause
which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the
basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the
obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D.
No. 27.12
We discussed further:
The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and the
payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been
aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the
process of the court and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which
is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt,
whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc." The term has not
been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase
itself is made in Articles 223, 242, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code,
which uniformly exempt the family home "from execution, forced
sale, or attachment." Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the
sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are
conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement
of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law
39
is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no
dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by
Page
law.13
Archbishop’s claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the
subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory
sale under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less
scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their
lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has
no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27
and RA 6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by
jus disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an
issue, and the disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective.
Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged
conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application
of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of
the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond
Archbishop’s control. The application of the law cannot and should
not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land.
If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other
landowners to place their lands without limit under the protection of
religious organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donation,
rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream.
Archbishop’s contention that he is merely an administrator of the
donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the
coverage of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands
devoted to rice and corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture." The lands in Archbishop’s name are
agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall
under the exemptions.
The exemptions under RA 6657 form an exclusive list, as follows:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.––
(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife,
forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act.
(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
under the Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell,
or commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition,
a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or
tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to
this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed
collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form
cooperative or association to manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the
farmworkers shall no longer be necessary; however, the provision of
Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot
production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto,
mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal
burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act. (As amended by R. A. 7881)
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian
reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does
not appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed
status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt
from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. 14 does not create another
definition for the term "landowner."
We explained in Hospicio:
It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute
with exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the latter by
implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all
others. We cannot simply impute into a statute an exception which
the Congress did not incorporate. Moreover general welfare
legislation such as land reform laws is to be construed in favor of the
promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic
security of the people. Since a broad construction of the provision
listing the properties exempted under the CARL would tend to
denigrate the aims of agrarian reform, a strict application of these
exceptions is in order.15
Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of
Filipino faithful, as the lands are clearly not exempt under the law.
He should not fear that his followers are simply being deprived of
land, as under both PD 27 and RA 6657, he is entitled to just
compensation, which he may then use for the benefit of his followers.
His situation is no different from other landowners affected by
agrarian reform––they are somewhat deprived of their land, but it is
all for a greater good.
As Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform16 recognized the revolutionary
character of the expropriation under the agrarian reform law, we
follow such lofty ideal for the resolution of this case. This grand
purpose under the CARL must not be hindered by the simple
expedient of appending conditions to a donation of land, or by
donating land to a church. This is not to cast aspersions on religious
organizations, but it is not fitting for them to be used as vehicles for
keeping land out of the hands of the landless. The law is indubitably
in line with the charitable ideals of religious organizations to ensure
that the land they own falls into the hands of able caretakers and
owners. As a religious leader, Archbishop can take solace in the fact
that his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can
utilize them to the fullest.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4,
1999 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 133507           February 17, 2000
EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO
D. DAEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES,
APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and
MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision  of the
Court of Appeals2 dated January 28, 1998 which denied the
application of petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez for the retention of a
4.1685-hectare riceland pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 3,
thereby reversing the Decision4 of then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres and the Order5 of then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, both of which had earlier set aside the Resolution 6 and
Order7 of then Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the same riceland from
coverage under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
The pertinent facts are:
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare
riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being
cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad,
Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-
tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 8 as amended
by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 4749. Thus, the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private respondents as
beneficiaries.
However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit,
allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but
hired laborers10. Armed with such document, Eudosia Daez applied
for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due
to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to
private respondents.1âwphi1.nêt
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her
husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of
agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14)
hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10)
hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands 11 in
Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in
Meycauayan.
On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an
Order denying Eudosia Daez's application for exemption upon
finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner
being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7)
hectares12.
On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary
Benjamin T. Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary
Medina's order. But on January 16, 1992 13 Secretary Leong affirmed
the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide
tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private
respondents' May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed under
duress because he found that Eudosia's son, Adriano, who was then
the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan, pressured private
respondents into signing the same.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of
Appeals, however, sustained the order of Secretary Leong in a
decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia pursued her petition before
this court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18,
1992. We also denied her motion for reconsideration on November 9,
1992.
Meantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation
Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs).
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an
application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A.
41
No. 6657.
Page
In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director
Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject
riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to
retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of
the land or direct management thereof as required by law 14.
Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR.
On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set
aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution, 15 the
decretal portion of which reads, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Resolution is hereby issued
setting aside with FINALITY the Order dated March 22, 1994 of the
Regional Director of DAR Region III.
The records of this case is remanded to the Regional Office for
immediate implementation of the Order dated January 16, 1992 of
this office as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.
SO ORDERED.
Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on
January 19, 199516.
She appealed Secretary Garilao's decision to the Office of the
President which ruled in her favor. The dispositive portion of the
Decision17 of then Executive Secretary reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby
SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by
Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the 4.1685-hectare landholding subject
thereof.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a
review of the decision of the Office of the President.
On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President
was reversed. The Court of Appeals ordered, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of July 5, 1996 and Order dated
October 23, 1996 of the public respondents are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE, and the Resolution and Order of DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao respectively dated August 26, 1994 and January 19, 1995
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition which assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM
AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF
RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A MATTER OF
SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER
WILL FORECLOSE FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE
LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND,
THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN
SEQUEL.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE CITED (EXEMPTION
FROM COVERAGE DUE TO NON-TENANCY) AND THE
PRESENT CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT
CAUSES OF ACTION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED/OPINED THAT THERE WAS A CUT-OFF DATE
(AUGUST 27, 1985) FOR LANDOWNERS TO APPLY FOR
EXEMPTION OR RETENTION UNDER PD 27 AND THOSE
WHO FAILED TO FILE THEIR APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS
ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS (RESPONDENTS THEREIN)
ARE GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS NO
LONGER OWNED BY PETITIONERS SINCE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED NOT ONLY
THEIR RESPECTIVE CERTIFICATES OF LAND TRANSFER
BUT ALSO THEIR INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
OVER THE DISPUTED AREA.19
We grant the petition.
First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct
concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for
coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must
be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is
absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a
landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the
entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot,
or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a
family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to
retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate
landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise,
his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any
retention right20.
Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding
if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7)
hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT
program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474
clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or
corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other
agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other
agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn
lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support
his family.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the
land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2)
the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
42
Page
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of
his right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted
to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or
lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding
must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than
twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares
thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it
consist of "other agricultural lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for
exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an
application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention, are
different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an
application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct
remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural
impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention
of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for
exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became
final and executory.
Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of
retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is
subject to qualification by the legislature 21. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner22. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing
the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return
it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the
Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform23, we held that landowners
who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27
are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 24. We
disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by
OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after
August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements
required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention
limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27 25. Otherwise, he is only
entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:
Sec. 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to
factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but
in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen
(15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact
or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however,
That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain
therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to
remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and
shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the
tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he
loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner.
The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year
from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for
retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on
the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease,
management contract or transfer of possession of private lands
executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be
null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this
Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds
within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act.
Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty
(3) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of
five (5) hectares26.
defines the nature and incidents of a landowner's right of retention.
For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it
does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a
landowner's choice of the area to be retained, must prevail. Moreover,
Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991,27 which supplies the
details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise
recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he
is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of
farmers.
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted
land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)
to farmer-beneficiaries.28 What must be protected, however, is the
right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be
retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. 29
Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the government's agrarian
reform program are subject to the exercise by a landowner, who is so
qualified, of his right of retention.
Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to
possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued Emancipation Patents (EPs)
after compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their
presentation to the Register of Deeds, result in the issuance of the
corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor of the
beneficiaries mentioned therein30.
Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified 31. Only
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of
EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites. Thereafter, upon
presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued
to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
43
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely
bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under
Page
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 199432, an EP or CLOA may be
cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive
statement of the status of the fee held by the owner of a parcel of
land.33 As such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not
constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot confer title where no
title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law 34.
Thus, we had, in the past, sustained the nullification of a certificate of
title issued pursuant to a homestead patent because the land covered
was not part of the public domain and as a result, the government had
no authority to issue such patent in the first place 35. Fraud in the
issuance of the patent, is also a ground for impugning the validity of a
certificate of title36. In other words, the invalidity of the patent or title
is sufficient basis for nullifying the certificate of title since the latter
is merely an evidence of the former.
In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject
4.1685-hectare riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having
been accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her
landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis
of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of
deceased Eudosia Daez to retain the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 28, 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Office of the
President, dated July 5, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In the
implementation of said decision, however, the Department of
Agrarian Reform is hereby ORDERED to fully accord to private
respondents their rights under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6657.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 205321, July 24, 2019 ]
SPOUSES ATTY. DOROTEO AND IGNACIA GONZALES,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR DAUGHTER AND ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT BEATRIZ A. GONZALES V. COURT OF APPEALS,
PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF DAVAO
CITY [PARO], REGION XI, REPRESENTED BY OIC PARO I
ERNESTO B. TAN, ET AL
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please  take  notice  that  the Court, First Division, issued a
Resolution dated July 24,2019 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 205321 (Spouses Atty. Doroteo and Ignacia Gonzales,
represented by their daughter and attorney-in-fact Beatriz A.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
of Davao City [PARO], Region XI, represented by OIC PARO I
Ernesto B. Tan, et al). - We affirm the Decision[1] dated April 18,
2012 and Resolution[2] dated December 10, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00901-MIN. The Decisions of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Regional Adjudicator and DARAB, as affirmed by the CA, that the
procedure followed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in
acquiring petitioners' property was in accordance with the law and
rules and regulations of compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), are correct.
Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific
field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive,
and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should
not be disturbed.[3]
Petitioners Spouses Doroteo (Doroteo) and Ignacia Gonzales
(collectively, Spouses Gonzales) were the registered owners of
several parcels of land situated in Calinan District, Davao City. One
of these properties  was  composed  of 5.8455 hectares  and with
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-108601. [4]
On August 11, 1995, pursuant to Section 16, Chapter V of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[5] Elizabeth Caparo, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Calinan District, Davao City, issued a
notice of coverage to Doroteo informing him that his landholdings
covered by TCT No. T-108601 and three other properties were
covered by CARP and inviting him to a meeting on August 22, 1995
at the MARO office. The notice further stated that Doroteo had the
right to select and retain an area in accordance with Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6657 which should be more or less contiguous and that failure to
attend will mean that the identification of the retained area will be left
to MARO.[6]
On August 31, 1995, Doroteo informed Ernesto B. Tan, Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), that since more than one-half of
the lands have an 18-degree slope, they are exempted from CARP
coverage. Doroteo also claimed that his six children are all qualified
beneficiaries of the farmlands.[7]
In a letter dated October 30, 1995, the MARO informed Doroteo that
it could not act on the request until he submits the necessary
requirements required by law. The MARO attached the forms for the
application for exemption/exclusion and other requirements. Doroteo
received the letter on November 7, 1995. [8]
Because Doroteo failed to submit the requirements, the MARO wrote
him a letter on January 18, 1996 requesting that the requirements be
submitted on or before February 15, 1996. [9]
Doroteo still failed to submit the requirements. Thus, on July 30,
1997, the MARO gave Doroteo only until August 20, 1997 to submit
the documents; otherwise, the MARO will determine the
landholdings to be exempt from CARP and will proceed with the
documentation of Doroteo's landholdings in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657[10]
Since Doroteo still failed to submit the requirements, the MARO
proceeded with the actual ocular inspection/field investigation of the
properties stated in the notice of coverage. Field investigation report
44
dated December 15, 1997 found that the entire 5.8445 hectares of the
property covered by TCT No. T-108601 was below 18% slope,
Page
suitable for agriculture, and therefore, "recommended for acquisition
and redistribution."[11]
Subsequently, the MARO transmitted the claim folder of the
agricultural land covered by TCT No. T-108601 to the PARO on
December 17, 1997. On December 22, 1997, Doroteo received a copy
of the field investigation report and he acknowledged receipt of it in
his letter dated January 14, 1998.[12] Doroteo stated that he had an
application for exemption submitted to the Regional Director, and if
the proceedings will continue, he will file an administrative
complaint.[13]
Still, the process of acquisition continued, and on the basis of the
PARO's determination, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-
108601 and TCT No. T-302186 was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Register of Deeds then issued TCT
No. CL-3526 with corresponding cancellation of Certificate of Land-
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00513032, in favor of the farmer-
beneficiaries private respondents Diosiminda Abella, Hilario Abella,
Jr. and Romeo Oming.[14]
On January 18, 1999, petitioners wrote the MARO saying that, they
are applying for the retention and award to them and to their qualified
children-beneficiaries the agricultural lands covered by TCT No. T-
108601 and two other properties. They emphasized that their four
qualified children-beneficiaries are entitled to three hectares each
while the spouses are entitled to five hectares. [15]
On January 22, 1999, Spouses Gonzales filed before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a "Petition for
Cancellation of Certificate of Land-Ownership Award (CLOA)
and/or the Non-issuance of the said CLOAs with Prayer for a
Restraining Order or Injunction" against the PARO of Davao City,
the Register of Deeds of Davao City, and the farmer-beneficiaries
private respondents.[16]
 
In their answer, respondents stated that the cancellation of TCT No.
T-108601 was done in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 and the corresponding CLOA generated had already been issued
to the farmer beneficiaries. On the allegation, that the MARO was
still in the process of compiling the Application for Land Exemption
Folder (ALEF), respondents countered that the said application was
filed only on January 18, 1999 despite demands/request to file it as
early as 1995.[17]
After the submission of position papers, on July 25, 2000, Regional
Adjudicator Norberto Sinsona (RARAD) dismissed the petition.
[18]
 The RARAD ruled that petitioners were given ample time to
submit the requirements but they failed to do so. Thus, the MARO of
Calinan District, Davao City correctly proceeded with compulsory
acquisition of the property, in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied. [19]
Meanwhile, on December 13, 2000, the DAR Regional Director acted
on petitioners' application for retention. Of the three properties
applied for retention, including the land covered by TCT No. T-
108601, the DAR Regional Director approved the retention of five
hectares of land covered by TCT No. T-7903. [20]
Petitioners appealed the RARAD's Decision to the DARAB Central
Office which, in its Decision dated March 9, 2005, affirmed the
Decision of the RARAD.[21] The DARAB also denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.[22]
Petitioners filed a petition for review under Rule 43. They argued
that: (1) the pending applications for retention and award to the
children and for exemption are prejudicial questions which the DAR
should have resolved first before it proceeded to award the subject
land to the private respondents; and (2) they were deprived of the
opportunity to contest the award made to the private respondents. [23]
The CA denied the petition. [24] The CA ruled that the DAR's
acquisition of the property was in accordance with the law and rules
and regulations for compulsory acquisition under CARP.   The CA
noted that as early as August 11, 1995, the MARO sent petitioners
the notice of coverage, invited them to several conferences and gave
and extended petitioners' deadlines to submit their applications for
retention and exemption, but petitioners still failed to comply with the
requirements. The field investigation report which petitioners
received was also sufficient notice to them. While the landowner has
the right to choose his area of retention, as spelled out in Section 6,
R.A. No. 6657, its exercise is subject to a certain period of time, i.e.,
60 days from the date of receipt of the notice of coverage as provided
under Administrative Order No, 11, series of 1990. There was no
violation of due process since petitioners were given every
opportunity to take part in the proceeding through various notices and
invitations for conferences. They were also given the opportunity to
submit their position paper at the RARAD and DARAB and to seek
reconsideration from the decisions of the two administrative bodies.
Last, petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies in
immediately filing their petition before the CA. Pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1994, they should have either
sought reconsideration of the DAR Regional Director's determination
of the beneficiaries or appealed to the DAR Secretary. [25]
The CA also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. [26]
In this petition, petitioners raise the following arguments: (1) the
resolution of the application for retention, exemption, and award of
the parcels of land to their children is a prejudicial question which
should have been resolved first because if all the applications were
approved, there would be nothing left to be distributed to other
beneficiaries;[27] (2) the lapse of two years from the time that they
were required to submit the requirements should not automatically
cause the award of the landholdings to private respondents; [28] (3)
petitioners were denied of their right to due process since their
landholding was immediately placed under CARP coverage despite
the pendency of their applications for retention, exemption and award
to their children;[29] and (4) there is no violation of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction since cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs
registered with the Register of Deeds fall within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB.[30]
We deny the petition.
First, We rule that the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB properly took
cognizance of the petition for cancellation of CLOA and/or the non-
issuance of the said CLOAs with prayer for a restraining order or
injunction.
Under the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which was effective at
the time petitioners filed their petition before the PARAD, the
RARAD and the PARAD have concurrent original jurisdiction with
the DARAB to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their
assigned territorial jurisdiction.[31]
The DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the CARP under R.A. No. 6657,,
Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. This
includes cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
CLOAs and emancipation patents which are registered with the Land
45
Registration Authority.[32]
Page
Second, We find that there was no prejudicial question to resolve
prior to the award of the land covered by TCT No. T-108601 to
private respondents. The CA, affirming the DARAB Decision, was
correct in ruling that the procedure followed by the DAR in acquiring
the property was in accordance with the law and rules and regulations
for compulsory acquisition under CARP.[33]
Petitioners already waived their right to choose the area of the
farmland to be retained including the land covered by TCT No. T-
108601. Availment of such right is subject to the observance of rules
and procedures promulgated for the implementation of the CARP.
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1990 on the Rules and
Procedures Governing the Exercise of Retention Rights by
Landowners and Award to Children under Section 6 of R.A. 6657
provides for a 60-day period from receipt of the Notice of Coverage
within which the landowner must file the application for retention,
thus:
III.
Application for Retention
xxxx
D. Period Within Which to Exercise the Right of Retention -
1. Under Compulsory Acquisition (CA) — The right of retention and
the possibility of award to children, where applicable, must be
availed of by the landowner within a period of sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of Notice of Coverage from the DAR that his
landholding is subject to compulsory acquisition. Failure to respond
within the specified period and after due notice would mean that the
landowner waives his right to choose which area to retain.
xxxx
Moreover, the landowner applying for retention must satisfy the
following requirements:
C. Criteria/Requirements for Retention and Award
1.    The land is a private agricultural land;
2.    The area chosen for retention shall be compact and contiguous
and shall be least prejudicial to the entire landholding and the
majority of the farmers thereon
3.    The landowner must execute an affidavit as to the aggregate area
of his landholding;
4.    The landowner must submit a list of his children who were
fifteen (15) years old or over as of June 15, 1988 and who have been
actually cultivating or directly managing the farm since June  15,
1988.[34]
Petitioners received the notice of coverage on August 11, 1995.
Petitioners filed their application for retention of their farmlands
including the lot covered by TCT No. T-108601 with supporting
documents only on January 18, 1999.[35] This is way beyond the 60-
day period within which they should have filed the application for
retention.
Moreover, petitioners did not follow the procedure in pursuing its
protest and in applying for the retention and exemption of their
farmlands from CARP coverage.
Under Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1994, all protests against
CARP coverage shall be filed with the MARO or the PARO currently
processing the claim folder. Once the written protest is filed, the
MARO or PARO shall comment on said protest and submit the same
to the Regional Director who shall rule on the same. [36]
Under Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1990, the MARO shall
receive the written application for exemption which shall include the
following documents: (1) ownership documents and other muniments
of title; and (2) evidence to support application and convince DAR
that the area qualifies for exemption under Section 10, R.A. No. 6657
such as: copy of proclamation, topographic map, sketch map, area
development plan, affidavit, certification from relevant government
agency.[37]
Here, petitioners' letters to the MARO cannot be considered as the
application for exemption from CARP coverage since they were not
accompanied by evidentiary documents to support their application.
[38]
Verily, petitioners cannot claim violation of their due process when
they were remiss in the exercise of their rights as landowners. We
approve the conclusions of the CA:
In this case, as early as August 11, 1995, the MARO had sent a notice
of coverage to the petitioners informing  them that portions of their
landholdings were under CARP. As a matter of procedure, they were
invited to several conferences for them to discuss and participate in
the land acquisition initiated by the DAR. As can be gleaned from the
series of letters from the MARO, the petitioners were given
ultimatums or deadlines which were nonetheless extended a number
of times, xxx Petitioners have allowed the periods to lapse.
Petitioners cannot now cry lack of due process. The DAR has, in fact,
been lenient in applying the rules.
xxxx
Thus, the landowner may not unduly delay in exercising his right to
choose which land he desires to retain. As long as the landowner is
properly notified, DAR can choose in his behalf if he fails to
seasonably exercise that right.
xxxx
In other words, the petitioners were given every opportunity to take
part in the proceeding through various notices and invitations for
conferences. These are indications that they were afforded procedural
process. They were also given the opportunity to submit Position
Paper at the RARAD and DARAB and to seek reconsideration from
the decisions of the two administrative bodies. It is only in the
absence of opportunity to be heard when they claim deprivation of
procedural due process.[39]
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition. The Decision dated April
18, 2012 and Resolution dated December 10, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00901-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." Del Castillo, J., on official leave; Jardeleza, J.,
designated as Acting Working Chairperson of the First Division per
Special Order No. 2680 dated July 12, 2019.
Very truly yours,
 
(Sgd.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Division Clerk of Court
46
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