G.R. No. 162267. July 4, 2008.

*
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., petitioner, vs. UCPB GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Damages; Negligence; Registered owner of a motor
vehicle may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either subsidiarily or
solidarily.—For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation
of a motor vehicle, the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the
negligent driver either 1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based
on a delict or crime under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or
2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option of the plaintiff
whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with
the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal action;
his only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-
standing principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is primarily
and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation, including the
negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons; In
contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of
its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being
considered as merely the owner’s agent.—In case a separate civil action is filed,
the long-standing principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is
primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation,
including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third
persons. In contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the
employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee,
being considered as merely the owner’s agent. This being the case, even if a
sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has
no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the
registered owner. The public has the right to con-
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* THIRD DIVISION.
142
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
42 ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
clusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue
accordingly.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Transportation and Traffic Code; RA No.
8556 does not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle
registration.—The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in
foreign jurisdictions, does not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory
motor vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a)
and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure to register a lease, sale,
transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the
prejudice of innocent victims.—The rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or
financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the Land
Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in
tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a
motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease such as the one
involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which
needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy,
the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of
tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A
contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a
lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties
responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Agcaoili & Associates for petitioner.
Tumangan, Payumo & Partners for respondent.
Jesus B. Roldan for Sugeco and Renato Gonzaga.
143
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated December 12, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City which ordered petitioner and
Renato Gonzaga (Gonzaga) to pay, jointly and severally, respondent the
amount of P244,500.00 plus interest; and the CA Resolution2 dated February
18, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as found by the CA, are undisputed:
 “On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 p.m., a Mitsubishi Lancer car with
Plate Number PHD-206 owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was
traversing the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was
insured with plaintiff-appellee [UCPB General Insurance Inc.], then driven by
Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said bank, was
hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck with Plate No. PJE-737
and Trailer Plate No. NVM-133, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing
& Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant
Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee,
defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga.
The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in
an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered
physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued
on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination and did not bother to bring his victims to
the hospital.
Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244,500.00
representing the insurance coverage of the damaged car.
As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing,
repeated demands were made by plaintiff-appellee for the
_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Rosmari D. Carandang, Rollo,
pp. 41-47.
2 Id., at p. 49.
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made. Thus,
plaintiff-appellee filed the instant case on March 13, 1991.”3
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it
could not be held liable for the collision, since the driver of the truck, Gonzaga,
was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant Superior Gas & Equitable
Co., Inc. (SUGECO).4 In fact, it was SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the
actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by
petitioner and SUGECO.5 Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner
of the truck in question.6
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 15, 1999,7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 “WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff UCPB General Insurance [respondent], ordering the defendants
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., [petitioner] and Renato Gonzaga, to pay jointly
and severally the former the following amounts: the principal amount of
P244,500.00 with 12% interest as of the filing of this complaint until the same
is paid; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and P20,000.00 as costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”8
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner appealed to the CA.
In its Decision dated December 12, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision, with certain modifications, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated April 15, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification that the award of attorney’s fees is hereby
deleted and the rate of interest shall be six percent
_______________

3 Rollo, p. 42.
4 Id., at p. 72.
5 Id., at pp. 72-73.
6 Id., at p. 72.
7 Id., at pp. 52-56.
8 Id., at p. 56.
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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(6%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint in the
trial court until the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the
interest remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent
(12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and
executory until it is fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.”9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated February 18, 2004.
Hence, herein Petition for Review.
The issues raised by petitioner are purely legal:
“Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in
a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof,
for the damages caused to third parties.
Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the Financing Company Act of
1998.”
 Anent the first issue, the CA found petitioner liable for the damage caused
by the collision since under the Public Service Act, if the property covered by a
franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite
approval, the transfer is not binding on the Public Service Commission and, in
contemplation of law, the grantee continues to be responsible under the
franchise in relation to the operation of the vehicle, such as damage or injury
to third parties due to collisions.10
Petitioner claims that the CA’s reliance on the Public Service Act is
misplaced, since the said law applies only to cases involving common carriers,
or those which have franchises to operate as public utilities. In contrast, the
case before this
_______________

9 Id., at p. 47.
10 Id., at pp. 44-45.
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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
Court involves a private commercial vehicle for business use, which is not
offered for service to the general public.11
Petitioner’s contention has partial merit, as indeed, the vehicles involved in
the case at bar are not common carriers, which makes the Public Service Act
inapplicable.
However, the registered owner of the vehicle driven by a negligent driver
may still be held liable under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on
compulsory motor vehicle registration and the liabilities of employers
for quasi-delicts under the Civil Code.
The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-
delicts resulting from its use is well-established in jurisprudence. Erezo v.
Jepte,12 with Justice Labrador as ponente, wisely explained the reason behind
this principle, thus:
“Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by
which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,
because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs.
Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the
vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.) The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on
public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient
or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily
ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.
_______________

11 Id., at pp. 21-22.

12 102 Phil. 103 (1957).
147
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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“ ‘One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is
identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and
another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always
available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the
rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever purpose there may be
in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of
rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of safety
shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him.’ The purpose of
the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a ‘snare and
delusion,’ if courts would entertain such defenses as that put forward by
appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation could be held
liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed
to place a ‘middleman’ between them and the public, and escape liability
by the manner in which they recompense their servants.” (King vs.
Brenham Automobile Co., 145 S.W. 278, 279.)
With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is:
should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual
and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade
responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We
hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with
its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility
that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of
registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by
collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer
the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with
which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of
recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or
identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to
determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him
would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to
escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be
enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove
the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that a
third person or another148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility
to the injured person.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and
would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A
registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to
recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the
vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of
liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the
registration that the law demands and requires.
In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant
herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the
plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified
by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as
damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant.”13
The case is still good law and has been consistently cited in subsequent
cases.14 Thus, there is no good reason to depart from its tenets.
For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle, the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent
driver either 1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on
a delict or crime under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or
2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option of the plaintiff
whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with
the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal
action;15 his
_______________
 13 Id., at pp. 108-110.
14 Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244, 256; 388 SCRA 445
(2002); Aguilar v. Commercial Savings Bank, 412 Phil. 834, 841; 360 SCRA
395 (2001); Spouses Hernandez v. Spouses Dolor, 479 Phil. 593, 603; 435 SCRA
668 (2004).
15 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 1, par. (a), sub-par. 1.
149
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.16
In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the
registered owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for
the consequences of its operation, including the negligence of the driver, with
respect to the public and all third persons.17 In contemplation of law, the
registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the
actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the
owner’s agent.18 This being the case, even if a sale has been executed before a
tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the
public and third persons to recover from the registered owner. 19 The public has
the right to conclusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner,
and may sue accordingly.20
_______________

16 Civil Code, Art. 2177.

17 Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra note 14, at p. 255; p. 453; First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91378, June
9, 1992, 209 SCRA 660, 663.
18 Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra 14, at p. 255; pp. 453-454,
citing First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 17; MYC-Agro-Industrial Corp. v. Camerino, 217 Phil. 11, 17; 132
SCRA 10, 17 (1984); and Vargas v. Langcay, 116 Phil. 478, 481-482; 6 SCRA
174, 178 (1962).
The only known exception to the rule is that enunciated in FGU Insurance
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 219, 225; 287 SCRA 718, 722 (1998), where
it was held that a rent-a-car company is not liable for the damages caused by
the negligence of its lessee, who drove the subject vehicle. Here, it was
established that between a rent-a-car company and a client who drove a leased
vehicle, there was a clear absence of vinculum juris as employer and employee.
 19 Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra; note 14, at p. 255; p. 454; First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at p.
664.
20 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note
17, at p. 664.
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
In the case now before the Court, there is not even a sale of the vehicle
involved, but a mere lease, which remained unregistered up to the time of the
occurrence of the quasi-delict that gave rise to the case. Since a lease, unlike a
sale, does not even involve a transfer of title or ownership, but the mere use or
enjoyment of property, there is more reason, therefore, in this instance to
uphold the policy behind the law, which is to protect the unwitting public and
provide it with a definite person to make accountable for losses or injuries
suffered in vehicular accidents.21 This is and has always been the rationale
behind compulsory motor vehicle registration under the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code and similar laws, which, as early as Erezo, has been guiding
the courts in their disposition of cases involving motor vehicular incidents. It
is also important to emphasize that such principles apply to all vehicles in
general, not just those offered for public service or utility.22
The Court recognizes that the business of financing companies has a
legitimate and commendable purpose.23In earlier cases, it considered a
financial lease or financing lease a legal contract,24 though subject to the
restrictions of the so-called Recto Law or Articles 1484 and 1485 of the Civil
Code.25 In previous cases, the Court adopted the statutory definition of a
financial lease or financing lease, as:
_______________

21 Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at p. 108.

22 Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at p. 107; Equitable Leasing Corp. v.
Suyom, supra note 14, at p. 256; p. 455; BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 98275, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 715, 720.
23 PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., G.R.
No. 142618, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 405, 420-421.
24 Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 650, 656;
407 SCRA 154, 159 (2003).
25 Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 242, 255;
307 SCRA 731, 743 (1999); PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative
Imaging Inc., supra note 23, at pp. 424-426.
 151
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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“[A] mode of extending credit through a non-cancelable lease contract under
which the lessor purchases or acquires, at the instance of the lessee,
machinery, equipment, motor vehicles, appliances, business and office
machines, and other movable or immovable property in consideration of the
periodic payment by the lessee of a fixed amount of money sufficient to
amortize at least seventy (70%) of the purchase price or acquisition cost,
including any incidental expenses and a margin of profit over an obligatory
period of not less than two (2) years during which the lessee has the right to
hold and use the leased property, x x x but with no obligation or option on his
part to purchase the leased property from the owner-lessor at the end of the
lease contract.”26
Petitioner presented a lengthy discussion of the purported trend in other
jurisdictions, which apparently tends to favor absolving financing companies
from liability for the consequences of quasi-delictual acts or omissions
involving financially leased property.27 The petition adds that these
developments have been legislated in our jurisdiction in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8556,28 which provides:
“Section 12. Liability of lessors.—Financing companies shall not be liable
for loss, damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel,
equipment, machinery or other property leased to a third person or entity
except when the motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property is
operated by the financing company, its employees or agents at the time of the
loss, damage or injury.”
Petitioner’s argument that the enactment of R.A. No. 8556, especially its
addition of the new Sec. 12 to the old law, is deemed to have absolved
petitioner from liability, fails to convince the Court.
_______________

26 Republic Act No. 5980 (1969), as amended by Republic Act No. 8556
(1998), Sec. 3 (d), quoted in Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 24, at p. 657; p. 160; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v.
Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., supra note 23, at p. 416.
27 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
28 Amending R.A. No. 5980, or the old Financing Company Act.
152
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
 Insurance Co., Inc.
These developments, indeed, point to a seeming emancipation of financing
companies from the obligation to compensate claimants for losses suffered
from the operation of vehicles covered by their lease. Such, however, are not
applicable to petitioner and do not exonerate it from liability in the present
case.
The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign
jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle
registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A.
No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, to wit:
“Sec. 5. Compulsory registration of motor vehicles.—(a) All motor
vehicles and trailer of any type used or operated on or upon any highway of
the Philippines must be registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation
(now the Land Transportation Office, per Executive Order No. 125, January
30, 1987, and Executive Order No. 125-A, April 13, 1987) for the current year
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
(e) Encumbrances of motor vehicles.—Mortgages, attachments, and other
encumbrances of motor vehicles, in order to be valid against third
parties must be recorded in the Bureau (now the Land Transportation Office).
Voluntary transactions or voluntary encumbrances shall likewise be properly
recorded on the face of all outstanding copies of the certificates of registration
of the vehicle concerned.
Cancellation or foreclosure of such mortgages, attachments, and other
encumbrances shall likewise be recorded, and in the absence of such
cancellation, no certificate of registration shall be issued without the
corresponding notation of mortgage, attachment and/or other encumbrances.
x x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
Neither is there an implied repeal of R.A. No. 4136. As a rule, repeal by
implication is frowned upon, unless there is clear showing that the later
statute is so irreconcilably inconsistent153
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PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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and repugnant to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made to
stand together.29 There is nothing in R.A. No. 4136 that is inconsistent and
incapable of reconciliation.
Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that
matter, that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does
not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter
need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive
evidence of ownership.30 A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is
an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in order
for it to bind third parties.31 Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is
the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not
being able to identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends
of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should
not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.
The non-registration of the lease contract between petitioner and its lessee
precludes the former from enjoying the benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8556.
This ruling may appear too severe and unpalatable to leasing and financing
companies, but the Court believes that petitioner and other companies so
situated are not entirely
_______________

29 Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 721, 745; 261 SCRA 17 (1996).
30 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note
17, at p. 664.
31 Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92245, June 26, 1991, 198 SCRA 541,
546; also Black’s Law Dictionary (abridged 5th edition) defines an
encumbrance as “any right to, or interest in, land which may subsist in
another to diminution of its value, but consistent with the passing of the fee. A
claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and binding real property; e.g., a
mortgage; judgment lien; mechanics’ lien; lease; security interest; easement of
right of way; accrued and unpaid taxes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General
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left without recourse. They may resort to third-party complaints against their
lessees or whoever are the actual operators of their vehicles. In the case at bar,
there is, in fact, a provision in the lease contract between petitioner and
SUGECO to the effect that the latter shall indemnify and hold the former free
and harmless from any “liabilities, damages, suits, claims or judgments”
arising from the latter’s use of the motor vehicle.32 Whether petitioner would
act against SUGECO based on this provision is its own option.
The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to
the chaos that may result if registered owners or operators of vehicles are
freed from such responsibility. Petitioner pays the price for its failure to obey
the law on compulsory registration of motor vehicles for registration is a pre-
requisite for any person to even enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on
public roads.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12,
2003 and Resolution dated February 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.