RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON FORCIBLE ENTRY

[ G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 ]

MA. LUZ TEVES ESPERAL, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUZ TROMPETA-ESPERAL AND
LORENZ ANNEL BIAOCO, RESPONDENTS.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical
possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

Records reveal that petitioner was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the
existence of all the elements of forcible entry. While it may be true that respondents occupied the
property before 2012, it was without the knowledge of petitioner and respondents voluntarily left the
premises after the latter learned of petitioner's ownership. More importantly, petitioner was already in
prior peaceful occupation of the subject property when respondents forcibly entered it by using a bolt
cutter, evicted the tenants therein, changed the padlocks, and placed a rent signage in front of the
property. These were the acts of respondents that prompted petitioner to file a forcible entry case.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that their entitlement to possession over the subject property
is based on their ownership rights as evidenced by an Affidavit of Acceptance for the Foreclosure of the
Mortgage of Real Property dated March 15, 2005 executed by Pablo. The Court stresses that the issue of
ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of
possession to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without
ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.Contrary to the conclusions of the RTC, the Court
deems it inappropriate for the ejectment court to dwell on the issue of ownership considering that
respondents' claim of ownership could not establish prior possession at the time when the subject
property was forcibly taken from petitioner.

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by
force, violence or terror, not even by the owners.Assuming arguendo that herein respondents are the real
owners of the subject property, they had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or
forcibly eject petitioner's tenants from the subject property. Their employment of illegal means to eject
petitioner by force in entering the subject property by destroying the locks using bolt curt replacing the
locks, and prohibiting the tenants to enter therein made them liable for forcible entry since prior
possession was established by petitioner.
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G.R. Nos. 225353-54, August 28, 2019

RHEMA INTERNATIONAL LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., V. HIBIX, INC.,

REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, YOSHIMITSU TAGUCHE, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules provides the basis for the institution of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, to wit:

Sec. 1. Who May Institute Proceedings, and When. – Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
 Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful
deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.[23]

Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto;
not legal possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.[24]

For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required.
However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under
Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.

In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when
Rhema wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case for forcible
entry against Rhema. It was proven that on August 29, 2008, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any
court order, retook possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession of the
property from June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008.

In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court held that:

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and
criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the
law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take
the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the
authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding
need to quell social disturbances.[26]

Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over the
property. The remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry against
Rhema. Instead, Hibix went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to wrestle possession
back from Rhema. This is tantamount to putting the law into one’s hands, which is the evil sought to be
avoided by the special civil action of forcible entry.

In Drilon v. Guarana,[27] the Court stated that, to wit:

It must be stated that the purpose of an action for forcible entry is that, regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of
restitution, the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope
such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain
possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This
is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer
which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone to obtain what he claims is his.[28]

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[ G.R. No. 224549. August 07, 2017 ]

SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH PETITIONERS, VS.
JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN, RESPONDENT.
It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute.[60] The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or
possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be
possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue.[61] In forcible
entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was
deprived thereof by the defendant.

xxx

At this juncture, the Court finds it proper to dispel petitioners' mistaken notion that their possession
should be tacked onto that of Alvarez who allegedly occupied the property since 1974. In Nenita Quality
Foods Corporation v. Galabo,[68] the Court clarified that tacking of possession only applies to
possession de jure, or that possession which has for its purpose the claim of ownership, viz.:

True, the law allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be
deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however,
pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required
for acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate - possession in forcible entry suits
refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.[69] (Emphases supplied)

As earlier stated, possession de jure is irrelevant because the only question in forcible entry - as it is here
- is prior physical possession or possession de facto.

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G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015

MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO AND HIS WIFE
REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondent.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged
that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the
unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that in those cases, possession
of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by
unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of the
property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the
land, except when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it.

It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to utilize the language of the statute; i.e., to state that the
person has been deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. A statement of
facts showing that dispossession took place under those conditions is sufficient. Still, the complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

In the present case, petitioner argues that the Complaint failed to allege prior physical possession, and
that the CA skirted the issue of the sufficiency of the allegations therein. Instead, the appellate court
allegedly addressed only the principal issue of who had the better right to possess the subject property.

It can be readily seen from the Decision of the CA that it squarely addressed the issue of the sufficiency
of the Complaint’s allegations.  Thus, contrary to the RTC’s findings, the CA found that the Complaint
had sufficiently alleged respondents’ prior physical possession and petitioner’s entry into the property
by stealth. Moreover, it differed with the RTC’s finding that the case was not for forcible entry.

The CA discussed these issues as follows:

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as “ejectment”. From a reading of the
 allegations of the subject Complaint, we find that the action is one for forcible entry. Petitioner
alleged that he is the owner of the property registered under TCT No. T-24503; that the
possession thereof by respondent on 1 September 2001 was pursuant to an alleged Memorandum
of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario Enciso, without the authority and consent of
the petitioner; and that he has served written demands, dated September 2001 and 24 October
2001, but that respondent refused to vacate the property. According to petitioner, the Complaint,
which was filed on 13 June 2002, was filed within one year from the occupation of the property.

xxxx

Petitioner likewise contends that prior to the disputed possession of respondent, he and his family
used the property as their “rest house/vacation place” after their hard day’s work in Metro
Manila. He avers that his possession is anchored on TCT No. T-24503. Notably, respondent
acknowledged the existence of the muniment of title presented by petitioner. In relation thereto,
noteworthy is the fact that respondent has shown no document evidencing proof of ownership
over the subject matter except for the unnotarized documents of conveyances executed between
her and Don Mario Enciso Benitez and Don Mario Enciso Benitez and petitioner. The fact that
the deeds were not notarized nor acknowledged before a notary public raises doubt as to the
probative value of said documents. On this matter, evidentiary value weighs in favor of
petitioner.

As regards petitioner’s supplication for restoration of possession which is based on his and his
family’s use of the subject property prior to the inception of the controversy, the rule is that
whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right. From a reading of the records, it is evident that the petitioner had addressed
the element of prior physical possession.

Having established prior possession, the corollary conclusion would be that the entry of
respondent – and her subsequent possession of the contested property – was illegal at the
inception. Respondent’s entry into the land was effected without the knowledge of petitioner,
consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth.

The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical possession by
respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by petitioner was without
their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the CA that contrary to those of
the RTC that the case was an action for ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria, the case was
actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.

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G.R. No. 204926               December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO
DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical
possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of
the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of possession
or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated
in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case."

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases31 that while prior physical possession
is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is
evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by
the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan,which surprisingly was relied on by the
CA, also stressed this doctrine.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like.The reason for this exceptional rule
is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.It is sufficient that petitioner was able to
subject the property to the action of his will.Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of
these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he
promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

xxx

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal
disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what
he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can speedily settle
actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.

As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that
petitioner had sufficiently complied with them. Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession of
the property by stealth.The complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the one year
reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry by respondent to the property on
October 31, 2006.

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[G.R. No. 170575, June 08 : 2011]

SPOUSES MANUEL AND FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONERS, VS. GERRY

ROXAS FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENT.

The allegations in petitioner's Complaint constitute judicial admissions. 

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991,
without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for
several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.  Petitioners thus conclude
that respondent's possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4.  Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.  x x x

"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with
the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with." Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions
of the plaintiff and binding upon him." "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject
property without their consent and authority and that respondent's use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that

"what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought."

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry
vis-á -vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the
party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.

"The words 'by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth' shall include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom." "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right."

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."The employment of force, in this
case, can be deduced from petitioners' allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the
subject property without their consent and authority.

"'Stealth,' on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to
gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"while strategy connotes the
employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.The CA found that
based on the petitioners' allegations in their complaint, "respondent's entry on the land of the petitioners
was by stealth x x x."However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing
in the instant case as the entry of the respondent  into the property appears to be with the knowledge of
the petitioners as shown by petitioners' allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities
behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff's nephew, then the vice-
mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or
contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the
foundation using their property."To this Court's mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and
not for unlawful detainer.

"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.""[W]here the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab
initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject
property without any contractual or legal basis.Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows
that respondent's possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of
petitioners' complaint is one for forcible entry - that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor
by a person who has entered without right."Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no
tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent's possession was illegal at the inception.

Corollarily, since  the deprivation  of  physical possession,  as  alleged in

petitioners' Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that
the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit
for unlawful detainer.