American formal legal system possession of the land for more than thirty (30) One Thousand Three
One Thousand Three Hundred
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the
informal sector has not
become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent
of the informal lands are not
titled and registered. This is a
generalized phenomenon in
the so-called Third World. And
it has many consequences.
STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so
many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to
Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted
to title these people and have
not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that
none of the state systems in
Asia or Latin America can
gather proof of informal titles.
In Peru, the informals have
means of proving property
ownership to each other which
are not the same means
developed by the Spanish
legal system. The informals
have their own papers, their
own forms of agreements, and
their own systems of
registration, all of which are
very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the
countryside, from Indonesia to
Peru, and you walk by field
after field — in each field a
different dog is going to bark
at you. Even dogs know what
private property is all about.
The only one who does not
know it is the government. The
issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an
"informal law" which the Latin
does not know how to years. HaSEcA
recognize. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
H Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The
e Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
r designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
n Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of
a the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary
n evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness,
d Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
o testified that the property was originally belonged *
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
D great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
e — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban —
the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's
S death, his four sons inherited the property and
o divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's
t wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of
o all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
1 Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
currently in possession of persons and entities other Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
than the Philippine government. The petition, while Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further
to the applicability and scope of original manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I
registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing Velazco." 6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise
so, the Court confronts not only the relevant did not present any evidence to controvert the
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil application.
Code, but also the reality on the ground. The Among the evidence presented by Malabanan
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
as the problem of informal settlement it has issued by the Community Environment & Natural
spawned, has unfortunately been treated with Resources Office, Department of Environment and
benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the that the subject property was "verified to be within
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
to decide cases before us in accord with the Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Constitution and the legal principles that have Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO
developed our public land law, though our social 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
the endemic problems. in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of
I. which reads:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an WHEREFORE, this Court hereby
application for land registration covering a parcel approves this application for
of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang registration and thus places
Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang under the operation of Act
Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the otherwise known as Property
property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and Registration Law, the lands
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, described in Plan Csd-04-
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful 0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy
Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its
technical description now
forming part of the record of
this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name
of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes
final and executory, the
corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had
verified that the property was declared alienable
and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be
factored in the computation of the period of
possession. This interpretation of the Court of
Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling
in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with
the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
Republic v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down just
four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed
the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in
the first place since the requisite notice of hearing
was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the
controlling doctrine, especially when the property
in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with
respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to
the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the
period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12
and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on
oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable
and disposable land of the
public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of
June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient
that such classification occur
at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration
provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and
disposable be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land
established as agricultural in
character either because of its
use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to
the registration of the subject
land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration
Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their
respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate
that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum,
since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out
that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June
of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
same observation that the preferred interpretation
by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently absurd.
For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June
1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15
Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic 16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well
as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit
that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts
the land into private property, thus placing it under
the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them,
it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of
the application, the property had already been
"converted" into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners
cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect
to Section 14 (2) are more extensive. The OSG notes
that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to "patrimonial property", while Section 14 (2)
speaks of "private lands". It observes that the Court
has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14
(2) as a ground for application for registration, and
that the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further
submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive
period can run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public land notorious possession and
was declared alienable and disposable. occupation of alienable and
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with disposable lands of the public
respect to the particular factual circumstances domain, under a bona fide
surrounding the subject property and the ownership claim of acquisition of
thereof. ownership, since June 12, 1945,
II. or earlier, immediately
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property preceding the filing of the
Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the application for confirmation of
provision, reference has to be made to the Public title except when prevented
Land Act. HSEIAT by war or force majeure. These
A. shall be conclusively presumed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the to have performed all the
Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, conditions essential to a
governed the classification and disposition of lands Government grant and shall
of the public domain. The President is authorized, be entitled to a certificate of
from time to time, to classify the lands of the public title under the provisions of this
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or chapter. DEHcTI
mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its
the public domain are further classified according present wording in 1977 when the law was
to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073.
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites "alienable and disposable lands of the public
and for public and quasi-public uses. 21 domain". The OSG submits that this amendment
May a private person validly seek the registration in restricted the scope of the lands that may be
his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under
the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands"
Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" alienable and disposable lands of the public
through "judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of domain are a larger class than only "agricultural
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, lands".
supplies the details and unmistakably grants that Second, the length of the requisite possession was
right, subject to the requisites stated therein: changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
Sec. 48. The following immediately preceding the filing of the application"
described citizens of the to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The
Philippines, occupying lands of Court in Naguit explained:
the public domain or claiming When the Public Land Act was
to own any such land or an first promulgated in 1936, the
interest therein, but whose period of possession deemed
titles have not been perfected necessary to vest the right to
or completed, may apply to register their title to agricultural
the Court of First Instance of lands of the public domain
the province where the land is commenced from July 26,
located for confirmation of 1894. However, this period was
their claims and the issuance amended by R.A. No. 1942,
of a certificate of title therefor, which provided that the bona
under the Land Registration fide claim of ownership must
Act, to wit: have been for at least thirty
xxx xxx xxx (30) years. Then in 1977,
(b) Those who by themselves Section 48(b) of the Public
or through their predecessors Land Act was again
in interest have been in open, amended, this time by P.D. No.
continuous, exclusive, and 1073, which pegged the
 reckoning date at June 12, ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That agricultural purposes may be disposed of by possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
1945. . . . circumstance may have led to the impression that confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 given the notion that both provisions declare that it character of the property must have been
Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the
(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree repealed or mooted. That is not the case. establishes the substantive ownership of the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable
codified the various laws relative to the registration The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public possessor who has been in possession of the and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be
of property, including lands of the public domain. It Land Act and Section 14 of the Property property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) registered either under Section 14 (1) of the
is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration Registration Decree warrant comparison: of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of
of such lands of the public domain. The provision Sec. 48 [of the Public Land substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
reads: Act]. The following described the Public Land Act, as well provides the such an implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — citizens of the Philippines, corresponding original registration procedure for Petitioner suggests an
The following persons may file occupying lands of the public the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or interpretation that the
in the proper Court of First domain or claiming to own incomplete title. alienable and disposable
Instance an application for any such land or an interest There is another limitation to the right granted under character of the land should
registration of title to land, therein, but whose titles have Section 48 (b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act have already been
whether personally or through not been perfected or limits the period within which one may exercise the established since June 12, 1945
their duly authorized completed, may apply to the right to seek registration under Section 48. The or earlier. This is not borne out
representatives: Court of First Instance of the provision has been amended several times, most by the plain meaning of
(1) those who by province where the land is recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
themselves located for confirmation of reads thus: 1945", as used in the provision,
or through their claims and the issuance Section 47. The persons qualifies its antecedent phrase
their of a certificate of title therefor, specified in the next following "under a bonafide claim of
predecessor under the Land Registration section are hereby granted ownership". Generally
s-in-interest Act, to wit: time, not to extend beyond speaking, qualifying words
have been xxx xxx xxx December 31, 2020 within restrict or modify only the
in open, Sec. 14 [of the Property which to avail of the benefits words or phrases to which they
continuous, Registration Decree]. Who of this Chapter: Provided, That are immediately associated,
exclusive may apply. — The following this period shall apply only and not those distantly or
and persons may file in the proper where the area applied for remotely located. 25 Ad
notorious Court of First Instance an does not exceed twelve (12) proximum antecedents fiat
possession application for registration of hectares: Provided, further, relation nisi impediatur
and title to land, whether That the several periods of sentencia.
occupation personally or through their duly time designated by the Besides, we are mindful of the
of alienable authorized representatives: President in accordance with absurdity that would result if
and xxx xxx xxx Section Forty-Five of this Act we adopt petitioner's position.
disposable It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is shall apply also to the lands Absent a legislative
lands of the more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed comprised in the provisions of amendment, the rule would
public by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property this Chapter, but this Section be, adopting the OSG's view,
domain Registration Decree, which seems to presume the shall not be construed as that all lands of the public
under a pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing prohibiting any said persons domain which were not
bona fide the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert from acting under this Chapter declared alienable or
claim of that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. at any time prior to the period disposable before June 12,
ownership No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has fixed by the President. 24 1945 would not be susceptible
since June primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen to original registration, no
12, 1945, or who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and Accordingly under the current state of the law, the matter the length of
earlier. notorious possession and occupation of alienable substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may unchallenged possession by
SDTIaE and disposable lands of the public domain, under a be availed of only until 31 December 2020. the occupant. Such
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since B. interpretation renders
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14 June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public paragraph (1) of Section 14
(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in applying with the proper court for the confirmation Land Act, as amended and Section 14 (a) of the virtually inoperative and even
effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their of his ownership claim and the issuance of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted precludes the government
predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa the position that for one to acquire the right to seek from giving it effect even as it
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the registration of an alienable and disposable land of decides to reclassify public
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, the public domain, it is not enough that the agricultural lands as alienable
the public domain under a bona fide claim of which provides that public lands suitable for applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in and disposable. The
 unreasonableness of the
situation would even be
aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent
state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable
interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that it merely requires the
property sought to be
registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the
application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the
government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve
its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the
property has already been
classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an
intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14 (1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering
our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the declared alienable and disposable only in 1980.
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it,
dicta since the land registration proceedings and following the mindset of the dissent, the
therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed.
of the requisite publication of the notice of initial Not so.
hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn To prove that the land subject
Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's of an application for
acknowledgment that the particular line of registration is alienable, an
argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is applicant must establish the
indeed obiter. existence of a positive act of
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of the government such as a
Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again presidential proclamation or
stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the an executive order; an
date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as administrative action;
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and investigation reports of Bureau
should be excluded from the computation of the of Lands investigators; and a
period of possession. . ." That statement, in the legislative act or a statute.
context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. In this case, private
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura respondents presented a As correctly found by the
should again be considered as obiter. The certification dated November
application therein was ultimately granted, citing 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M.
Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by Inting, the Community
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of Environment and Natural
possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby Resources Officer in the
precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not Department of Environment
even apparent from the decision whether and Natural Resources Office
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to in Cebu City, stating that the
original registration following Section 14 (1), their lots involved were "found to be
position being that they had been in exclusive within the alienable and
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. Classification Project No. 32-A,
aCHDST per map 2962 4-I555 dated
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular December 9, 1980". This is
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value sufficient evidence to show
with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the real character of the land
the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), subject of private respondents'
since it precisely involved situation wherein the application. Further, the
applicant had been in exclusive possession under a certification enjoys a Ceniza, the application for registration was filed
bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. presumption of regularity in the
The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein absence of contradictory
was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any evidence, which is true in this
doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto case. Worth noting also was
provides the final word of the Court on Section 14 the observation of the Court of
(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit. Appeals stating that:
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished [n]o opposition was
from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the filed by the Bureaus
latter, the application for registration had been filed of Lands and Forestry
before the land was declared alienable or to contest the
disposable. The dissent though pronounces application of
Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet appellees on the
two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the ground that the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, property still forms
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which part of the public
involved a claim of possession that extended back domain. Nor is there
to 1927 over a public domain land that was any showing that the
lots in question are
forestal land. . . .
IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that
mere possession of public land
for the period required by law
would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title,
it did not err in ruling in favor of
private respondents as far as
the first requirement in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able
to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the
land subject of their
application.
Court of Appeals, private
respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land
even before the year 1927. As
a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not
show that this is one of them.
29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same
eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after
12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in
nearly six (6) years after the land had been
declared alienable or disposable, while in
Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years
before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from
Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to
belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis
with respect to Section 14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. —
The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for
registration of title to land,
whether personally or through
 their duly authorized acquired ownership through acquisition by prescription of private lands, conditions essential to a
representatives: prescription. Thus, even if including patrimonial property belonging to the Government grant and shall
possession of the alienable State. Thus, the critical question that needs be entitled to a certificate of
xxx xxx xxx public land commenced on a affirmation is whether Section 14 (2) does title under the provisions of this
(2) Those who have date later than June 12, 1945, encompass original registration proceedings over Chapter. (emphasis supplied)
acquired and such possession being patrimonial property of the State, which a private 37
ownership been open, continuous and person has acquired through prescription. This provision was repealed in 1977 with the
over private exclusive, then the possessor The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12
lands by may have the right to register reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time.
prescription the land by virtue of Section classified as alienable public land may be Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior
under the 14(2) of the Property converted into private property by reason of open, to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
provisions of Registration Decree. continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
existing Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529
laws. (2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion their registration bid primarily on that provision, and to Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it operates on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
concerning Section 14 (2), which we did even then where the evidence definitively establishes their would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in origins of the thirty (30)-year rule. there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
we nonetheless refer to it as material for further this case that we can properly appreciate the The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in Code — ordinary acquisitive prescription and
discussion, thus: nuances of the provision. 1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of the Public extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Did the enactment of the A. Land Act by granting the right to seek original Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted
Property Registration Decree The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions registration of alienable public lands through adverse possession. . . for thirty years, without need
and the amendatory P.D. No. on prescription as the possible basis for application possession in the concept of an owner for at least of title or of good faith".
1073 preclude the application for original registration under Section 14 (2). thirty years. Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year
for registration of alienable Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal The following-described period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
lands of the public domain, foundation for the application. It reads: citizens of the Philippines, unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal
possession over which All things which are within the occupying lands of the public basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on
commenced only after June commerce of men are domain or claiming to own prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
12, 1945? It did not, susceptible of prescription, any such lands or an interest under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material
considering Section 14(2) of unless otherwise provided. therein, but whose titles have difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
the Property Registration Property of the State or any of not been perfected or operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did
Decree, which governs and its subdivisions not patrimonial completed, may apply to the under the Civil Code.
authorizes the application of in character shall not be the Court of First Instance of the Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
"those who have acquired object of prescription. province where the land is by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
ownership of private lands by It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of located for confirmation of application the Civil Code provisions on
prescription under the the public domain are patrimonial in character, their claims and the issuance prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
provisions of existing laws." they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On of a certificate of title therefor, possession period immediately preceding the
DEcSaI the other hand, among the public domain lands under the Land Registration application for confirmation of title, without any
Prescription is one of the that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription Act, to wit: TDCaSE qualification as to whether the property should be
modes of acquiring ownership are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution xxx xxx xxx declared alienable at the beginning of, and
under the Civil Code. [ 30 ] itself proscribes private ownership of timber or (b) Those who by themselves continue as such, throughout the entire thirty (30)
There is a consistent mineral lands. caTESD or through their predecessors years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
jurisprudential rule that There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code in interest have been in open, basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
properties classified as concerning the acquisition of real property through continuous, exclusive and such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding
alienable public land may be prescription. Ownership of real property may be notorious possession and with respect to the present language of Section 48
converted into private acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, occupation of agricultural (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
property by reason of open, 32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) lands of the public domain, reference.
continuous and exclusive years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires under a bona fide claim of Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the
possession of at least thirty (30) possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35 acquisition of ownership, for at thirty-year possession period as basis for original
years. [ 31 ] With such When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration least thirty years immediately registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property
conversion, such property may Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have preceding the filing of the Registration Decree, which entitled those "who
now fall within the acquired ownership over private lands by application for confirmation of have acquired ownership over private lands by
contemplation of "private prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it title, except when prevented prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
lands" under Section 14(2), unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid by war or force majeure. These apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
and thus susceptible to basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is shall be conclusively presumed period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
registration by those who have the only existing law that specifically allows the to have performed all the prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation
the entire regime of prescription under the Civil
Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect
to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers
to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law
concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil
Code, in our interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is
no similar demand on our part in the case of
Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription". The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things
are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public
use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the
State, without being for public
use, and are intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of
the State, which is not of the
character stated in the
preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which
generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion
and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code
of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable
be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property?
After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all
things within the commerce of man are susceptible
to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may
be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states
that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It
is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when * it is
"intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared
alienable and disposable to the detriment of the
bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to
the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with
the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State,
although declared alienable or disposable, remain
as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.
The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution
and the laws in accordance with their language
and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which
is the province of the legislative branch. Congress
can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can
be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act
No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc.", is more commonly known as
the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the
sale of certain military reservations and portions of
military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law
mandates the President to transfer such military
lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to
own, hold and/or administer them. 41 The President
is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in
whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are
"alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions
of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the
subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes
the reservation that these lands are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or
"the development of national wealth" under Article
420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained
property of the public dominion under Article 420
(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under
the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such
lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial
because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation
that they are no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us
from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under
Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way
that possession during the time that the land was
still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent
rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2)? There is
no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of
prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the
Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between
the thirty-year period under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472,
and the thirty-year period available through Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation
to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under
the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472
is based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration
under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription
under the Civil Code should not apply as well to
Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status
of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to
other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code
when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the
Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework
we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on
prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of
the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about
by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which
are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a
person from acquiring patrimonial property of the
State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is
there any apparent reason to impose such a rule.
At the same time, there are indispensable requisites
— good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526,
527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires
some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just
title for the purposes of prescription "when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains:
ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for
its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would
have actually transferred
ownership if the grantor had
been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale
with delivery, exchange,
donation, succession, and
dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title
necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as
the owner and grantor, could not transmit
ownership to the possessor before the completion
of the required period of possession". 47 It is evident
that the OSG erred when it assumed that the
grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The
grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or
any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under
ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription,
the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has
been become patrimonial, the period of
prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed,
two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
person in possession for the periods prescribed
under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the
property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically
becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a
mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a
mode of confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, it is apparent that the registration system then
did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil
Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the
completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following
Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following
P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent
on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
though it arguably did not preclude such
registration. 50 Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons
who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with
the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14 (2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons
who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,
that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case,
as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must
also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property
of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by
which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership
of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the
case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is
no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence — the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular — is to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14
(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted.
For, every untitled property that is occupied in the
country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law
without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether
declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence,
and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality
on the ground. The law so far has been unable to
bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through
homestead or free patent, have proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the
grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title
has emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in
this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on
which they have lived and raised their families.
Many more have tilled and made productive idle
lands of the State with their hands. They have been
regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much
to be said about the virtues of according them
legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set
forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such
lands which in legal theory are lands of the public
domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This
could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to
ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into
every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the person's family. Once that
sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are
put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No.
179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)