Saint Louis University

School of Law

Case Digest Compilation in

Wills and Succession

Submitted to:

Atty. MA. Lulu Reyes

Submitted by:
Angeles, Bernard Allan

Atitiw, Victor

Banasen, Robert

Caoayan, Billy Brian

Lawagan, Guillermo

Molintas, Jose Mari

Nagpala, Carlo benedict

Navarro, Erwin

Pingawan, Carter

Banganan, Kristen Gay

De Meza, Phoebie

Hoggang, Kathrine
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,
- versus -
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual.

During his lifetime, he donated a parcel of land to his sister Amelia. Upon his death, his
siblings filed a petition for ―Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters
of Administration,‖. The also questioned the validity of the donation of the parcel of land
made by the decedent in favor of their sister. They prayed that the same be considered as
an advance legitime of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property of the donation is a valid donation inter vivos

RULING: Yes, The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a ―stranger,‖ chargeable against the free portion of
the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
to collation.

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 JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO,
FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 187056.September 20, 2010

ABAD, J.:

FACTS: Spouses G executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" the terms of which are as follows:
-It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shal qt56o]=-p9y6r3wq1
`123456l be respected by the surviving spouse.

-It is our will that J and E will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them.

-It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any
other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate
and where ever situated.

-It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and
administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation
shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.

ISSUE: Whether the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa , as in fact designated,
or actually a donation inter vivos

HELD: IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS.

That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not
controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the
essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and

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3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the
"distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors
plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration
of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation
simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership
of the donated property while they lived.

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance
should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as
to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

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 MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely,
LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M.
YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD, respondents.

G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: Decedent Conchita Cabatingan executed a Deed of Conditional Donation covering

one-half of her house and lot to her brother. Other conditional donations were also made in favor
of four others. The condition of which states that should the donee die ahead of the donor, the
donation shall automatically be rescinded and shall have no force and effect. Upon the death of
the donor, respondents sought the annulment of the Deed of Donations made in favor of the four
donees alleging that the latter through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan‘s fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of
donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis
causa.

ISSUE: whether or not the assailed donations are valid

RULING: No. Donee while the donor is still alive.‖ In determining whether a donation is one
ofmortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan‘s death. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖
admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime―

As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should
have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect. The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of
the donor and the done, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the
above-quoted provisions of law.
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Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of
donation null and void.

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 APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO
APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO,
respondents.

G.R. No. 106755. February 1, 2002

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS: A Basilisa Comerciante bought a house and lot located in San Antonio, Cavite. During
her lifetime, she executed a Deed of Donation in favor of her four surviving children who in turn
accepted the donation in the same instrument. Provided in the Deed was that it shall take effect
upon the death of the donor. Meanwhile, a separate instrument was also executed by the same
parties stipulating that ownership over the parcel of land subject of the donation shall be retained
by Basilia while still living. Sometime thereafter, Basilia sold the same to one of her daughters
Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Php 5,000.00. The latter then caused the cancellation of the TCT
and registered the property in her name.

The other heirs of Basilia filed a petition for annulment of the new TCT and the reconveyance of
the property alleging that the donation made in their favor was Inter Vivos by virtue of its
irrevocability clause. Thus, ownership was already transferred to them upon acceptance.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an effective transfer of the property to the donees upon their
acceptance of the donation

RULING: Yes, the irrevocable nature of a donation is the distinctive standard of an Inter vivos
donation. The Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter
vivos character of the donation. Said prohibition was an assurance of the enjoyment of the
beneficial use of the property by the donor during her lifetime. Thus, the intention is to convey
the naked ownership of the property only upon the donor‘s death.

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 HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-6600 . July 30, 1954

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Herein plaintiffs questioned the validity of the two notarial deeds of donations
executed by Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and
of his nephew Felipe Bonsato. They alleged that the same was obtained through fraud and
charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The
defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their
favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late
Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence,
misrepresentation or intimidation.The lower court sustained the validity of the deeds of donation.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s ruling and declared the donations
as null and void because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the
testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to
surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two justices,
however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter
vivos.

RULING: Whether or not the disputed donations are valid.

HELD: Yes. Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid
donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments).
Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present
that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and
followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne
vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.

ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor
of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil.,
633);

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(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed
by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership
of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation
that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to
be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa
where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive
or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

9|Page
 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special
Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA
D.PASCUAL,respondents.

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23,1990

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS: Deceden Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18, 1972.
He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters.On December 3,
1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for the administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a
motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles
thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966
executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the
estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be
excluded from the inventory.

The lower courts ruled that the donation denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA was
actually a donation inter vivos.

ISSUE: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

HELD: There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation
inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of
love and affection as well as recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the
donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for
the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the
intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after
the execution of the deed of donation.

10 | P a g e
RE: Contractual Succession

ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, respondents.
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS: On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the
probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed
were personal funds.

On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of
the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.

The trial court upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the
estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667, 731.66."

The Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent, held
that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did
not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,"
and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the
provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the conveyance in question is one of mortis causa, which should be embodied
in a will.

RULING: The conveyance in question is one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In
this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal
funds

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
11 | P a g e
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was
to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited
donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have
pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.

But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of
creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such
grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this
case.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for
such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on
wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.

Thus, the decision of the respondent appellate court was SET ASIDE.

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 Transmission/acquisition through Death

LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO,Petitioners,

- versus -
HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-
PRINCIPE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 165554 . July 26, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Herein respondents alleged that on February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan in the amount
of P140,000.00 from Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners‘ loan, Lauro executed a chattel
mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death, her heirs sought to collect from the
petitioners, to no avail. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the collection case.

Meanwhile,Filomena‘s heirs, authorized Cresencia to act as their attorney-in-fact through a Special Power
of Attorney. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed verbally and submitted a Compromise
Agreement to the courts where the petitioners admitted the loan accommodation extended to
Lauro. Petitioners however, raised the validity of the agreement contending that they were not
fully informed of the nature and consequences of the agreement and that Crescencia had no
authority to represent her co-heirs because Filomena‘s estate had a personality of its own.

ISSUE: Whether the SPA is valid

RULING: Yes. In Trinidad case, the heirs of Vicente Trinidad executed a SPA in favor of Nenita
Trinidad (Nenita) to be their representative in litigation involving the sale of real property covered by the
decedent‘s estate. As here, there was no specific authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement. When
a compromise agreement was finally reached, the heirs later sought to invalidate it, claiming that Nenita
was not specifically authorized to enter into the compromise agreement. We held then, as we do now,
that the SPA necessarily included the power of the attorney-in-fact to compromise the case, and that
Nenita‘s co-heirs could not belatedly disavow their original authorization. This ruling is even more
significant here, where the co-heirs have not taken any action to invalidate the Compromise Agreement or
assail their SPA.

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 Moreover, it is noteworthy that petitioners never assailed the validity of the SPA during the pre-
trial stage prior to entering the Compromise Agreement. This matter was never even raised as a ground in
petitioners‘ Motion to Set Aside the compromise, or in the initial Petition before the RTC. It was only
months later, in December 2002, that petitioners – rather self-servingly - claimed that the SPA was
insufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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 CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
- versus -
SATURNINO BALUS andLEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana
Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a
loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As
a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a
Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the
Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting
of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were
the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession
of the same to them.

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The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the
disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA
ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted
even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even
after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

RULING: The court is not persuaded.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it
was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the
trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor
of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any
dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence,
there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing
at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed
part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father.

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Re: Transmission Through Death

BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA M.

MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M.
ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M.
ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A.
ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.

G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS: On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left
five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.At the time of her death, Evarista was
survived by three sets of heirs, one of which is Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother.
On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late
Francisco de la Merced, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order", alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners,
who were fully aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private
respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-
third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of
Francisco.

The trial court dismissed the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and
cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the real properties of the
deceased Evarista. The trial court argued that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein
plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is admittedly an
illegitimate child of the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his
alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of the late Evarista Dela
Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that:An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

ISSUE: Whether Article 992 of the New Civil Code is applicable in the case.

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RULING: Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his
father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an
illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already
inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point
in the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code which provides that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of
the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse,
legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his
(Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an
heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late
Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.

The present case, thus, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his
late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been transmitted to his
father upon the death of Evarista. There is no legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito,
admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father's estate,
which estate includes a one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.

Thus, for lack of merit, the Petition wass DENIED and the Appealed Decision of the Court of

Appeals was AFFIRMED in toto

18 | P a g e
 NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 125835 . July 30, 1998

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Herein private respondents, Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that Natalia
Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a "CONTRACT TO SELL" a parcel of land at
P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant,
despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. They therefore prayed
for specific performance. Petitioner admits the existence of a contract however refuses to
perform her contractual obligation because she had realized the lack of approval from the probate
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and private respondents
without the requisite probate court approval is valid.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner in the case at bar entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself
as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for
the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash." These
representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when
she entered into the Contract to Sell. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the
moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share
the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract
to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in
the estate of her late father.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

19 | P a g e
 ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL,
ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Floraida C. Tupper, as
attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA
BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ and RAMONA PATRICIA
ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.

G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996

MELO, J.:

FACTS: On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. executed a

document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz
covering the estate of their late father as an heir of said decedent..

On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to intervenor-
appellant Catalina B. Mabanag for One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00)
Pesos after the latter has paid Three Hundred Thousand. On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et
al., filed a complaint for specific performance against the Coronels and caused the annotation of
a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. 327403.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants-heirs can validly sell the estate of the decedent.

RULING:When the "Receipt of Down Payment" is considered in its entirety, it becomes more
manifest that there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title to the buyer, but
since the transfer certificate of title was still in the name of petitioner's father, they could not
fully effect such transfer although the buyer was then willing and able to immediately pay the
purchase price. Therefore, petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their
names from that of their father, after which, they promised to present said title, now in their
names, to the latter and to execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn,
pay the entire balance of the purchase price.

The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance
which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers
themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the
purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely
presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there
would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and
consummated right there and then.
20 | P a g e
 Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers, after
compliance by the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell the property to the
latter. What may be perceived from the respective undertakings of the parties to the contract is
that petitioners had already agreed to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father,
completely willing to transfer full ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the
documents were then in order. It just happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title was
then still in the name of their father. the lower courts' ruling on this point.Thus, the petition was
DISMISSED and the appealed judgment was AFFIRMED.

21 | P a g e
DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO FANESA, petitioners,
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO
PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN
and ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 61584.November 25, 1992

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left Lot No. 1091 with an
area of 69,080 square meters. She begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan,
who also died in 1953, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P.
Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Donato executed on May 28,
1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
Sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public
auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer. On May 29,
1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.

On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on
January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against
petitioners to partition the properties plus damages. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed that she
acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor
by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership over the subject lot
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

RULING: When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of
ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the
time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent

22 | P a g e
estate. When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion
which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice
the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from
their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the
seller's pro-indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
land until it is partitioned.

The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa,
did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half
(1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the
respondents, her first cousins. The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the
co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the
records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the
existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary
expense. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a
vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial
redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not
vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision
does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a
mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the
redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her
co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due
her.

23 | P a g e
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband
ZALDYEVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by
herhusband BEDA UNGOS,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P.ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P.ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,
CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA andANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.

G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

TINGA, J .:

FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in leaving
several personal and real properties located in . He also left awidow, respondent Esperanza P.
Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the
herein respondents. On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada
discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the
Registry of Deeds issued new Certificates of Titles in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio,
Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents
also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank
of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement. On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration. On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint
for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of new Transfer Certificate of Titles
and Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan,
Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City. The RTC ruled indismissed the petition on the
ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. The
Court of Appeals sustained the RTC

24 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.

HELD: YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. Even if administration proceedings have already
been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules
on party representation. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young this Court recognized the legal
standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration
pending the appointment of an administrator. Even if there is an appointed administrator,
jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions,viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek
judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself. As the appellate court did not
commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to this Court is not
warranted.

The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED

25 | P a g e
 EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,
- versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO,SHERWIN TABANAO,
VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAODEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY
TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENTTABANAO,Respondents

G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in
a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of
the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia‘s withdrawal from
the partnership. Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles,
two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in
the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islandsand Prudential Bank.Throughout the
existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao‘s untimely demise in 1994,
petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao‘s heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of
the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership‘s finances. Consequently,
Tabanao‘s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment
of shares, division of assets and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack
of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. OnAugust 30, 1994, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether the heirs of Vicente Tabanao lack the capacity to sue.

RUlIN: NO. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their
own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao‘s

26 | P a g e
death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent .Whatever claims and
rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted (Civil Code, Art. 774). Moreover, respondents became
owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior
settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors
who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner‘s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court‘s
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
and the case isREMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, which
is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount that plaintiffs
therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to pay the same within a reasonable time,
provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the
trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-C.

27 | P a g e
Re: Object of Succession

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
G.R. No. L-770 . April 27, 1948

HILADO, J.:

FACTS: The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez,
rendered its decision granting the estate of Pedro FRAGRANTE WHO WAS PRIOR TO HIS
DEATH AN APPLICANT for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate
an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.The commission held that the estate of Fragrante is financially
capable and the best interest of the public will be best served by the grant of the certificate of
public convenience.

ISSUE:Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the
Public Service Act.

RULING: YES.The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The substitution of
a legal representative to the in the application of the deceased is valid.Rule 88, section 2,
provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for
the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such
actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased". If Pedro O. Fragante had not
died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application
before the commission to its final conclusion. In the instant case there would also be a failure of
justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the
proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment
amounting to P35,000.00.Our jurisdiction has also considered jurisprudence that show that the

28 | P a g e
estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their
heirs. The estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" for the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, he would have obtained
from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but
one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic
ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which
does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the
Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs..

29 | P a g e
 BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS: Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease
to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite.
On June 4, 1906, Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular
Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine
Commission. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he
had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, as the number of lots which a purchaser
could acquire under the law was limited, lots Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for
sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the
necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by
donation.These transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and noted in the proper registry
book. On April 24 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya fOr
P2,000 and on May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya also conveyed his right to lot No. 547 to Marcelina
Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450, On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya
executed a will devising lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya, lot No. 1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No.
1031 to Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, lot No. 1153 to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya,
lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and lot No. 547 (Exhibit Y) to Marcelina and
Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the
price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question except lot
No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products.

30 | P a g e
The executor of the deceased‘s estate Florentino Joya presented the will for probate and the will
was thus probated by the CFI of Cavite.
ISSUES: : (1) Were Cecilio Joya's conveyances of his interest in lot No. 1958 to Florentino Joya
and in No. 547 to the sisters Marcelina and Francisca Joya fraudulent?
(2) Were Cecilio Joya's legacies of lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153 and 2352 to the other
defendants null and void?
(3) Has the plaintiff-appellant, as the surviving spouse, exclusive right to all the lots
in question?
(4) In case she has, is she entitled to the possession and products thereof?
RULING: (1) NO.The law governing the transaction provides that the holder of a certificate of
sale of friar has a right to sell his interest therein, even before having fully paid the purchase
price and upon presentation of the certificate of transfer to the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands for registration, he is subrogated to all the rights of the holder of the certificate.It was
found by the court that the conveyances made by Joya were approved and registered in the
proper book hence in compliance with the provisions of the law.Hence the transferees were
subrogated to all of Cecilio Joya's rights to said lots, and there is nothing in the record to show
conclusively that said conveyances were fraudulently obtained

(2) YES. The legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were void. The lands, which are
the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong
to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left,
which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts.

(3) YES.Since Cecilio Joya's legacies in his will of lot No. 1031 to Delfin and Felicisima
Blancaflor, lot No. 1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No. 1152 to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, and
lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla are null and void, being contrary to the
provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120 which grants his widow, the herein plaintiff-appellant
the ownership of the lands purchased and not transferred by him during his lifetime, provided
that she complies with the legal requirements for the purchase of the same.

(4) YES.The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of the
aforementioned lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 and to their fruits, after deducting the
necessary expenses of preservation, cultivation and production

31 | P a g e
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, and it is ordered that Feliciano and
Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor return lots Nos. 1031, 1086,
1153, and 2352 to the plaintiff-appellant, Basilia Arayata, together with their products, or the
latter's equivalent in cash from the year 1920 until their restitution, deducting the necessary
expenses of cultivation, preservation, and production. Without any special pronouncement as to
costs, it is so ordered.

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES,
ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO
YANES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS: Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein
private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962
while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora
was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. The object of the controversy is two parcels of
lands registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros.One
of the lots left by Aniceto was later found in the possession of Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.Santiago sold the lots to Fuentebella
and a new TCT was issued.After Fuentebella died, his wife became the administrator.The widow
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.A new TCT was
also issued in favor of Rosendo Alvarez Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and
the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the
ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the

32 | P a g e
produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that
after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be
delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the
form of attorney's fees. The CFI ruled in favor of the Yaneses.However the execution was
problematic since the sheriff found out that Lot 773 was subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B;
that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that
Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the obligations of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the heirs without
violation of law and due process.
RULING: YES. It is a settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that rights and obligations of the
deceased are generally transmissible to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of
contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of
Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus
made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the
paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive."Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party‘s contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo
Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise
to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is
of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass
of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in
their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. CA decision appealed.

33 | P a g e
 RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS,
ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000
BUENA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim who died
intestate on 11 June 1994 whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings. Petitioner, as
surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a
joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the RTC of Quezon
aside City.The deceased left properties and in the amended petition,the widow sought to include
properties in the name of several corporations, private respondents Auto Truck Corporation,
Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company as part of the estate of the deceased.Likewise petitioner averred that not only the
properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the decedent‘s estate but also
the private respondent corporations themselves.

ISSUE: Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?

RULING: NO. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those
of the entities connected with it. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the

34 | P a g e
estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from
their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set
aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated
04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, inher capacity as

(a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the
Minor
children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in her Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse
and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado, Petitioners,
- versus -
EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE
LLENADO and REGISTER
OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City Metro Manila, Respondents.

G.R. No. 145736 . March 4, 2009

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: The subject of the controversy IS A parcel of land located consisting of 1,554 square
meters located in Barrio Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the names of
Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. V-1689.This land was once part of another lot owned and registered under the name
of their father, Cornelio Llenado.The latter leased Lot 491_D to his nephew Romeo Llenado foe
5 years renewable for another 5 years.Romeo in turn, executed an agreement with his cousin
Orlando Llenado whereby Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion
of the aforesaid lease contract with an additional agreement that at Orlando‘s option the lease can
be extended for another 3 years.Cornello and Orlando entered into another supplementary

35 | P a g e
agreement to amend the lease contract.A gasoline station was operated in the land.After the death
of Orlando in Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado (Wenifreda), took
over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot
249-D to his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale,
denominated as ―Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan,‖ for the sum of P160,000.00. Eduardo
informed the widow of his desire to take over the land,but despite repeated demands the widoe
refused.An unlawful detainer case was filed against Winifreda as administrator of the estate of
her husband.In her answer the widow cited that there was an agreement between Cornelio and
Orlando that while the lease was effective the transfer and conveyance of the subject lot by
Cornelio in favor of respondents Eduardo and Jorge, was fraudulent and in bad faith considering
that the March 31, 1978 Agreement provided that while the lease is in force, the subject lot
cannot be sold, transferred or conveyed to any third party; that the period of the lease was until
December 3, 1987 with the option to renew granted to Orlando; that the subject lot was
transferred and conveyed to respondents Eduardo and Jorge on January 29, 1987 when the lease
was in full force and effect making the sale null and void. The RTC found that upon the death
of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his rights under the lease contract were transmitted to his
heirs; that since the lease was in full force and effect at the time the subject lot was sold by
Cornelio to his sons, the sale violated the prohibitory clause in the said lease contract. Further,
Cornelio‘s promise to sell the subject lot to Orlando may be established by parole evidence since
an option to buy is not covered by the statute of frauds. Hence, the same is binding on Cornelio
and his heirs. The CA reversed the RTC holding that the death of Orlando did not extinguish the
lease agreement and had the effect of transmitting his lease rights to his heirs. However, the
breach of the non-alienation clause of the said agreement did not nullify the sale between
Cornelio and his sons because the heirs of Orlando are mere lessees on the subject lot and can
never claim a superior right of ownership over said lot as against the registered owners thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the deceased as lessee of the land was transmitted to the
hence the heirs of the lessor are bound by the lease contract.

RULING: YES. Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered into
by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not
transmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is,
therefore, generally transmissible to the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right
and, as such, the death of a party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights
and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to

36 | P a g e
respect the period of the lease. The same principle applies to the option to renew the lease. As a
general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run with the
land. Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while that
of the lessor are burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred and
imposed on the original parties.Hirsowever the records do not show that the heirs of Orlando
exercised the right to renew and extend the lease because at the time of said sale on January 29,
1987 the lease agreement had long been terminated for failure of Orlando or his heirs to validly
renew the same. As a result, there was no obstacle to the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to
respondents Eduardo and Jorge as the prohibitory clause under the lease contract was no longer
in force.

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.

G.R. No. 118248. April 5, 2000

YNARES SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy
with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with
purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted
from the signing of the Contract. In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as
consideration for the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve
formal written notice upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option.
The contract also provided that in case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual
possession of the premises. In such an event, the lease shall be for a period of six years,
renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee shall be P15,000.00 for the first six
years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of renewal.

On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was
exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the
month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender
possession of the property to petitioner. Petitioner thus opened Savings Account No. 1-04-
02558-I-1 with the China Banking Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome
and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as P6,000.00 reservation fees
for the months of February and March.

On April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Victor and the Register of Deeds.

37 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late
Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her
sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.

RULING: As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his
heirs." In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another,
and at his death the reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the
proper deed for reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the
legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have
inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.

It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear
provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity
of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had
and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him. Clearly, he
stepped into the shoes of the owner-lessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed
all the obligations of the lessor under the lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in the
form of rental payments. Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for the
annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both pleadings also alleged collusion between
him and respondent Santos which defeated the exercise by petitioner of its right of first refusal.

The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a
property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of
the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other
party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

38 | P a g e
 JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO
MENEZ, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 121940. December 4, 2001

FACTS: On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a
certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168 square meters
located in Rosario, Pasig City. A day after We issuance of TCT No. 436465, or on February 20,
1974, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr. In
December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. He consulted a lawyer but
the latter did not act immediately on the matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of
Loss was filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy of TCT No. 436465 was
issued. Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address appearing in the
title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for the ,registered owner in
Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban City, and in
Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search proved futile. On July 8, 1992 private
respondent filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner of
the contested lot, he showed the Deed of Absolute Sale. The petition was set for hearing and the
court's order dated July 10, 1992 was published once in Malaya, a nationally circulated
newspaper in the Philippines.During the hearing on September 3, 1992, only Menez and his
counsel appeared. The Register of Deeds who was not served notice, and the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor who were notified did not attend.

On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his evidence ex-parte. The
trial court granted his petition in its decision dated September 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads: On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the
abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her aunt,
Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was
the present occupant of the property and the heir of Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen
39 | P a g e
Reconstitution Proceedings'' on October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order
denying said motion.

ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to notice?

RULING: No. Petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the
memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that he is an heir
(nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant
thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of encumbrances. There was compliance by
private respondent of the RTC's order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation. This is sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large.

The court agreed with respondent court that the proscription under Com. Act No. 141 on sale
within the 5-year restrictive period refers to homestead lands only. Here the lot in dispute is not a
homestead land, as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said lot is owned by GSIS, under TCT
No. 10028 in its proprietary capacity. Moreover, as far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive
condition imposed by GSIS in its contract with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is concerned,
it is the GSIS and not petitioner who had a cause of action against private respondent. The GSIS
has not filed any action for the annulment of Exhibit "D", nor for the forfeiture of the lot in
question. In our view, the contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until
annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale
is binding upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one
of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest.

40 | P a g e
 JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines Internationl Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH
CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/
public officers acting for and in their behalf, respondents.
G.R. No. 146006 . February 23, 2004
CORONA, J.:
FACTS: Dr. Ortanez, an owner of a 90% of the subscribed capital stock of the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company. He left behind a wife, three legitimate children and five
illegitimate children. One of his legitimate children, Rafael Ortanez, filed a petition for letters of
administration on the intestate of Dr. Ortanez. On the other hand, his illegitimate children filed
an opposition to t he petition and prayed that a special administrator be appointed. Rafael and
Jose Ortanez were appointed joint special administrators of their father‘s estate. They submitted
an inventory which included among other properties 2,029 shares of stock in the Philinterlife.
Juliania Ortanez, claiming she owns 1,014 shares of stock as her conjugal share, sold her share to
Filipino Loan Assistance Group, which ownership was consolidated by FLAG for failure to
repurchase the same. Jose Ortanez, also acting in his personal capacity, claiming that he owned
the remaining as his inheritance share, sold said shares to FLAG and also failed to repurchase the
same. Prior to that, the wife and her two children entered into a memorandum of agreement for
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, partitioning the estate among
themselves.

41 | P a g e
Private respondent, Ma. Divina Ortanez-Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for the
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock which was opposed by Jose.
The intestate court on the one hand granted the motion of Enderes and appointed her as the
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. She then files a motion to declare the
memorandum of agreement void ab initio and declare the extra judicial settlement partial nullity,
and the deeds of sale void ab initio. All of which was opposed by Jose. The intestate court then
denied the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock and granted the annulment of the
memorandum of agreement. This was raised by way of petition to the supreme court which was
denied with finality for there was no legal justification for the extra judicial partition of the
estate.
As a result of the orders nullifying the sale, Enderes then filed a motion of execution of the
Orders of the intestate court. A copy was then served to petitioners who ignored the same.
Enderes also filed a motion asking that the name of Dr. Ortanez be reinstated in the stock and
transfer book which petitioners opposed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of shares of stock
between the legitimate heir and FLAG is valid.
RULING: An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted
to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication. This
means, only his undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In this case, the
wife and her sons sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG without court
approval, to the exclusion and extreme prejudice of other heirs. This is unlawful pending the
final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would
cause the other claimants to the estate. Court approval is necessary for the validity of the
disposition of the decedent‘s estate.
In addition, when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without any
approval of the probate court. Otherwise, it does not bind the estate and is null and void. Thus,
the subsequent sale by the wife and Jose to a third part, (FLAG) is void as it was also a result of
an invalid memorandum of agreement.

42 | P a g e
Re: Forced Succession

MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO

MANONGSONG, petitioners,
vs.
FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ,
CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ,
JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR.,
AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA
CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003

FACTS: The disputed property is a parcel of land owned by Spouses Agatona Guevarra
(―Guevarra‖) and Ciriaco Lopez who had 6 children. Subject parcel of land however was
unregistered but with improvements thereon in the name of one of the children, Filomena.
Milagros Manongsong, granddaughter of decedents, (―petitioners‖) filed a complaint alleging
that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article
494 of the Civil Code, petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.

43 | P a g e
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra‘s
death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there
were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente
Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez‘ sole
surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father‘s 1/5 share in the Property by right of
representation. Most respondents, aunts, uncle and cousins of respondent, entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement dated 12 September 1992 (―Agreement‖), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz
families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The
signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and
prayed further that ―those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those
who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion.
The Jumaquio sisters, daughters of Felomina on the other hand presented a
notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA executed by their great great grandmother in
favor of their mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged sale is valid and thus binds the co-heirs

RULING: Yes. The Court finds no basis for the trial court‘s declaration that the sale embodied
in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does
not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is
no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.

44 | P a g e
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES
JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA
JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL
JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD
ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES
ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE
JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.

G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed
by defendant parents in favour of their co-defendant children. The plaintiff children are claiming
that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were made and that the purported sale was
the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
of their legitime.

ISSUE: Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid? Yes.

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RULING: The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely
inchoate and vests only upon the parents‘ death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of
their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors. Compulsory heirs
have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only from the
moment of death of the decedent. There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their
parents. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall
be considered. The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the
decedent. Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will show that the Deeds of Sale
were all executed for valuable consideration. Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the
Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry
greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not
weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing that the findings of the lower
court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.[20] In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their
respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a
factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.

46 | P a g e
 J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, petitioner,
-versus-
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005

TINGA, J.:

FACTS: Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena , and after her
death, with Milagros Donio Teves. Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa
Teves Escaño and Emilio Teves . He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely:
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves, Jose Catalino Donio Teves , Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves.

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954)
square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the
name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among
the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." Milagros Donio, the

47 | P a g e
second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don
Julian.

The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property
owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was
to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given
other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas,
and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don
Julian, including Lot No. 63.

ISSUE: Whether the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian

RULING: The Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated 31 January 1964,
particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian‘s two sets
of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julian‘s) share in Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no
longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes
res judicata. Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa.

Nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like
the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in
favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the
Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact
location where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating
that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin."
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce
of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into
with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition intervivos
referred to in Article 1080.

48 | P a g e
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been opened at the
time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance,
prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.

The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore
aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is
made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of
course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for
after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities
of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here
after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate
succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be
given to each heir.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

49 | P a g e
 MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO GERVACIO
BLAS and LODA GERVACIO BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the
deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE
CHIVI, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-14070, 111 P 503, March 29, 1961

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They
had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, one
of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro
died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely,
Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in
1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos.

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At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and
Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan.
Maxima Santos does not appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.

On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his death on January 9,
1937, Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. At the time of the execution of said will,
Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the testator, and Avelina Pascual and others, were present.
Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the first marriage. The will was prepared by Andres
Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino Pascual. The testator asked Andres Pascual to
prepare a document which was presented in court as Exhibit "A". The reason why the testator
ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the properties that the testator had acquired
during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated and were not separated from
those acquired during the second marriage.

The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which
can serve as basis for the complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable
contract for lack of consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The court also
declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for the
execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.

Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue vehemently
that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the
unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because the same were
already included in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas
and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has
prescribed. This contention is correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the
conjugal properties that she and her husband may have required during their marriage although
no liquidation of such properties and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made,
no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Simeon Blas.

But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A". It
is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason his first marriage had not been liquidated;
that it was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the

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instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by Maxima
Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs'
witness Andres Pascual.

Issue:
Whether the condition stipulated involves a future inheritance

Ruling:
No. Exhibit "A" is not a contract on future inheritance. It is an obligation or promise made by the
maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband,
which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. The
conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December
26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her
husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker
would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That
the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the
old Civil Code.

The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined properties, existing at the time
of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as her
share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may
not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time
Exhibit "A" was executed.

It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271
of the Civil Code is " future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in
existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined
properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as
belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in
the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in
existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed.

The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the project of partition
in the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the project which

52 | P a g e
assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal properties bars their present action, is,
therefore, devoid of merit. It may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the validity
of the project of partition precisely because of the promise made by Maxima Santos in the
compromise Exhibit "A"; they acquised in the approval of said project of partition because they
were relying on the promise made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit
one-half of the conjugal properties that she was going to receive as her share in the conjugal
partnership upon her death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee,
administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the
properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case
No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all
said heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit
Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby
remanded to the court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the properties
hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file
adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every one of them in said
properties. Costs against the defendant- appellee Rosalina Santos.

ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,

- versus –
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE and
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN

G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Comandante alleged that sometime in 1998, she sought the help of
petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of petitioner‘s parents‘ lot. As petitioner could
not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to Comandante
sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her
parents‘ abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure

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Comandante‘s loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due
to interests. Respondent then filed a complaint against the spouses, petitioner‘s parents.

However, the spouses asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them. They claimed
that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of
Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the subject property. They also
contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine
Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of New York
where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner
anything. The Diazes also pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandante‘s personal
obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint
against them be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether future inheritance can be the subject of a contract of sale

RULING: No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For
the inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time
of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited
under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante‘s Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her
parent‘s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the
other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of
Comandante‘s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her
parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature.

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From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving
the former‘s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over
a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner‘s favor.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving
the former‘s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over
a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner‘s favor.

We similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that
same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative
of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and
Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer,
is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on
T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are
concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.

Re: No Impairment to the Legitime

ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
VILLALON, respondents.

G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999

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GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of
Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several
lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of
"Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.

On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1)
Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of
Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.

On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.

Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only
by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon.

Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of
the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,

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but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether there is a renunciation of legitime that may be presumed in the case.

RULING: None. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must
be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.

More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition

presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.

A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed
the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion,
it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.

Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.

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Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is
brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to
the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding
share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable,
what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature,
class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in
cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of
such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is reversed and
set aside. No costs.

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.

QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to
each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended
period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added
that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the
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deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order dated February 1, 1991.

ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?

HELD: No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:

- whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
- compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
- the testamentary capacity of the testator; and
- the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically
valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as
she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory
Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not
bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings.
Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to
forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue
had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear from the executory order that
the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must
pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is
no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer
of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo
praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will
had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules
of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next
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test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro
was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy
apply as correctly held by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-

ALFONSO, respondent.

G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses
Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.

60 | P a g e
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law
wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.

Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the
certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual.

After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half
sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-
59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4

On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged that the signature of her late father,
Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.

In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the
deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court.

ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father
by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?

HELD: No. The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina
Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the
time when Felicitas testified in 1991.

As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to
Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.

Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money
from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She
had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.

61 | P a g e
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income
of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no
other source of income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that
earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to

whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the
kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.

Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null
and void.

Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the
transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable
law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at
the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a
change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:

"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate
of the father and of the mother.

"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her
father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate
child.

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in
the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.

62 | P a g e
 REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.

G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001

PARDO, J.:

63 | P a g e
FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses
Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.Petitioners, on the other
hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza,
with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential
land, situated in Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his
daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.

After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half
sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-
59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with
damages.

ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father
by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?

RULING: The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent

statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property
was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single
witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause
or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother."The latter may freely
dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided."

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters20 at
the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a
change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her
father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate
child.

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The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir cannot be deprived of her share in
the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Thus, the petition was DENIED.

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 TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris,
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided
for substitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code;
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.

HELD: Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
66 | P a g e
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so.
It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more
than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any

additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to
favor Wanda.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as
to costs.

67 | P a g e
 MONICO CONCEPCION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PACIENCIA STA. ANA, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-2277 December 29, 1950

FERIA, J.:

FACTS: An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the
sale made by the late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with
the improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among others, that the
plaintiff is the only surviving legitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about
January 28, 1948, without issue and without leaving any will; that in her life time or on about
June 29, 1945, said Perpetua Concepcion, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to
defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels of land for a false and fictitious
consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands issued
under her name; and that the defendant has been in possession of the properties sold since the
death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of not less
than two hundred (P200) pesos.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of
action, because the deceased being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy and
dispose of them without further limitation than those established by law.

The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint
on the ground that "the plaintiff is not a party to the deed of sale executed by Perpetua
Concepcion in favor of the defendant. Even in the assumption that the consideration of the
contract is fictitious, the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendant. Under article 1302
of the Civil Code, "the action to annul a contract may be brought by any person principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby." The plaintiff is not bound by the deed of sale executed by the
deceased in favor of the defendant. He has no obligation under the deed."

ISSUE: Can the plaintiff as heir of the deceased contracting party can bring action to annul the
contract of sale under consideration.

HELD: No. The plaintiff's contention that a simulated or fictitious contract of sale with a false
consideration is null and voidper se, or is a contrato inexistente, not merely a contrato nulo, is not
correct. Article 1276 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the statement of a false
consideration in contract shall be ground for annulment," and article 1301 of the same code
provided for the limitation of actions for annulment of a contract.

As to the appellant's contention that under the law, action to annul a contract entered into with all
the requisites mentioned in article 1261 whenever they are tainted with the vice which invalidate
them in accordance with law, may be brought, not only by any person principally bound or who
made them, but also by his heir to whom the right and obligation arising from the contract are
transmitted. Hence if no such rights, actions or obligations have been transmitted to the heir, the
latter can not bring an action to annul the contract in representation of the contracting party who
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made it. In Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil., 340, this Supreme Court quoted with
approval the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 18, 1901, in which it was held that
"he who is not a party to a contract, or an assignee thereunder, or does not represent those who
took part therein, has under articles 1257 and 1302 of the Civil Code no legal capacity to
challenge the validity of such contract." And in Irlanda vs. Pitargue (22 Phil. 383) we held that
"the testamentary or legal heir continues in law as the juridical personality of his predecessor in
interest, who transmit to him from the moment of his death such of his rights, actions and
obligations as are not extinguished thereby."

The question to be resolved is, therefore, whether the deceased Perpetua Concepcion has
transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract under consideration in order that he
can bring an action to annul the sale voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a false
consideration.

We are of the opinion and so hold, that the late Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the
plaintiff any right arising from the contract of conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant,
and therefore the plaintiff cannot file an action to annul such contract as representative of the
deceased.

Even a forced heir of the deceased Perpetua Concepcion would have no right to institute as
representative of the decedent, an action of nullity of a contract made by the decedent to defraud
his creditors, because such a contract being considered illicit under article 1306 of the Civil
Code, Perpetua Concepcion herself had no right of action to annul it and recover the properties
she had conveyed to the defendant. But the forced heir could in such case bring an action to
rescind the contract under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code.

The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action of rescission is that the right to
the legitime is similar to a credit of a creditor. As the same Spanish author correctly states in
commenting on article 1291 of the Civil Code: "The rights of a forced heir to the legitime are
undoubtedly similar to a credit of a creditor in so far as the rights to the legitime may be defeated
by fraudulent contracts, and are superior to the will of those bound to respect them.

Therefore, as the plaintiff in the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua
Concepcion, can not institute an action to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article
1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into by the deceased with the
defendant.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

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Re: Compulsory/ Forced Heirs

SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEÑE and

their Children, namely: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON,
NEMIA T. SEGOVIA, NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE
T. MONTALVO, NORGEL S. TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON, SILVESTRE S.
TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO, NERLYN S.
TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM, Petitioners,
vs.
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, Respondents.

G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of land with an
area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly Barangay
San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land – planted to rice, corn, and
coconuts – was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespeñe (Alejandra), who had had two
marriages. The first marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco,
whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore
respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a
will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had
predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandra‘s
grandson.

The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after Spouses Nicanor
Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe (petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of their purchase
of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles.
The tug-of-war over the property between the petitioners and the respondents first led to the
commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum
and others not parties herein, namely: Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano
Mangilaya, charging them with stealing coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case.

After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged in its decision
dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed
their conviction on February 19, 1975, whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonia‘s defense
of ownership of the land.

On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI following the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioners herein

On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint
70 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not Victor is entitled to the property.

HELD: No. A decedent‘s compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the
decedent‘s estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code, viz:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)

Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her
daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of
representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right
created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were
living or if she could have inherited. Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to
the succession by law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra,
not Ciriaca.

The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor Tumbokon to the
effect that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had "bec[o]me automatically the heir" of
Alejandra "after the death of his wife," the wife being "the only daughter" and he "the only son-
in-law" a plain irrelevancy.

Thirdly, Victor Miralles‘ supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from Alejandra had no
competent factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale was incompatible with the
petitioners‘ anchor claim that he had acquired the land by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the
evidence that the petitioners adduced on the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting
the CA‘s rejection of the oral sale under the following terms:

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This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor
Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespeñe. This supposed sale was oral, one that
can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and
devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made,
who were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor
Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations
nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.

With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the
transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a consequence,
Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision rendered on May
15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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 LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and RAMON G. NICOLAS,respondents

G.R. No. 118449 ; February 11, 1998

FRANCISCO, J:.

FACTS: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of
spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are
Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and
their four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m.
located at Valenzuela, Bulacan In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela
property was ISSUEd to Estrellita. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to
Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu. In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from
Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes,
Parañaque using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining
amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and her
two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known
as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that
Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner
succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left
as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", with
Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of
the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and
Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Parañaque property. The total value of
the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela
and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). The settlement gave fifty percent
(50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except
Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount.
The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Parañaque property and the car and
were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heirs" in the said properties.

73 | P a g e
 On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife
(Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of
Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now
senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an
opposition dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's
guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others,
that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six
Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the court's
intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by
deceased Rafael to his children," Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of
Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the
collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon
stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower
of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita."

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten (10)
days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition
insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been
filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed
a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an
intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted
said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. Despite the Manifestation, Ramon,
through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated.

ISSUE: Whether or not a spouse of the deceased child of the deceased parent can participate in
the intestate estate proceedings of the latter

HELD: No. The attendant FACTS herein do not make a case of collation. The Supreme Court
find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.

With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no

74 | P a g e
personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation.

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a
property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is
provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the
case at bench, however, the Court note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property
between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the
concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the
probate court's jurisdiction. These ISSUEs should be ventilated in an appropriate action.

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature.
Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. The Court find
nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court,
nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. The Court
note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property.
The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of
the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate,
however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, by
Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and
petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of
Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for
the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does
not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is
improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent
during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived
any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property
may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was
Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be
allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.

75 | P a g e
Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding
purpose.

Re: Shares/ Legitime of Secondary Heirs

SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAÑOS,Petitioners,

- versus -

ROSCEF ZUÑIGA BERNARTE, CLARO ZUÑIGA, PERFECTO ZUÑIGA, and

CEFERINA ZUÑIGA-GARCIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 180997 November 17, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Subject of the controversy is a 238-square-meter lot. Petitioner-spouses Mariano and

Emma Bolaños (petitioner-spouses) purchased it from Cresencia Zuñiga-Echague (Cresencia) on
June 20, 2001. The sale was registered in the name of petitioner-spouses.

On October 30, 2001, respondents Roscef Zuñiga Bernarte, Claro Zuñiga, Perfecto Zuñiga, and
Ceferina Zuñiga-Garcia (Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint for declaration of partial nullity of
deeds of transfer and sale alleged that petitioner-spouses started demolishing their ancestral
home on the subject property and initiated the construction of a new building thereon, despite
pleas to desist from further destroying the ancestral home.

The complaint, in essence, alleged that: Roscef, et al., and Flavia and Cresencia are legitimate
half-blood brothers and sisters, all children of the deceased Roman Zuñiga, Sr. (Roman) from his
second and first marriages, respectively; during his lifetime, Roman owned a residential land
with improvements, identified in the Tax Declaration for the year 2000; Roman had the lot
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers, per a Sworn Statement
he executed in 1973, and filed with the then Assessor‘s Office, which issued Tax Declaration No.
2975; Roman died on August 9, 1976, and his heirs did not settle or partition the subject
property; on June 20, 2001, Flavia, without authority from the co-owners of the lot, executed a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over it in favor of Cresencia; Cresencia, in turn, also without
authority from the said co-owners, executed on the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of petitioner-spouses; on the basis of these notarized deeds, a Tax Declaration was
issued to petitioner-spouses as sole declared owners of Lot No. 1-P.

In her answer with cross-claim,Flavia denied the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Cresencia, and alleged that the subsequent sale made by the latter was
valid and effective only as to her aliquot share, but null and void as to the rest of the property

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ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid

RULING: Yes. The RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of
Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from his second marriage with
Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition among Roman‘s children, the lot was owned
by them in common. And inasmuch as Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her
aliquot share to Cresencia, the transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what
Cresencia sold to petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavia‘s share in the property that she
acquired by virtue of the notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-P. Therefore,
the restitution of the property in excess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.

Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the operative facts and the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of
deference and respect by this Court, except when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower court‘s inference from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5)
there is misapprehension of facts; and (6) the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of
the specific evidence on which they are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record.[24] Notably, none of these exceptions is attendant in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30,
2007 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
84452 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

77 | P a g e
 GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage,
they lived with Ma. Theresa‘s parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa‘s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that
Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred
that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Gerado is a legitimate child of Maria Theresa and Mario Gopiao.

RULING: Yes. It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this case – that the
appellant Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful
marriage with the appellee Gerardo since the so-called ―marriage‖ with the latter was void ab
initio. It was Gerardo himself who had established these facts. In other words, Ma. Theresa was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8,
1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‗marriage‘ between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo, but
is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, she is right in firmly saying that
Gerardo can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further,
Gerardo cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even
supposing the child to be his illegitimate child Art. 146, The Family Code); it would tend to
destroy the existing marriage between Ma. Theresa and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.

Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:

78 | P a g e
―The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.‖

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for one‘s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely
supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a
parent says it is.

Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of
his parents is legitimate.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Having only his best interests in mind, the Court uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.

As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
person‘s surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes
of the law, not related to him in any way.

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 MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, respondents.

G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on
November 13, 1989. He died intestate.

The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private
respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial
Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in
favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:

The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants,

whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the
contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent
and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who predeceased him, and whose estate had earlier been
settled extra-judicial, were without ISSUE and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one
Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related
to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.

On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged
reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.

The trial court then received evidence on the ISSUE of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the
deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private
respondents petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court
relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a legally adopted child of the deceased spouses Benitez

HELD: No. The Court are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to
establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on
record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous
as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while
still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared,
considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she
herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.

The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.

The Supreme Court says odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel
to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal
heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her
husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her properties when she dies, and
likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel),
since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir
unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.

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RE: SHARES/LEGITIME ( legitimate children and descendants)

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:: Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch
II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera.

From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora
Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15
years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista
Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void
ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false
entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the
mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false
and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter,
did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed
parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years
old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c)
Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto
would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared
void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be]
render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void,
invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from
the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.

TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of action,
it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
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ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of live birth is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of a
child regardless of the fact that the same is obtained by fraud or that it contained some
irregularities

RULING: No. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the
present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of
the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were
already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.

The circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records
and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented
to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed
birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at
such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which
states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was neither hers nor her husband
Eugenio's.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

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RE: Effect of Adoption

ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
VILLALON, respondents.

G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of
Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several
lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of
"Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.

On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1)
Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of
Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.

On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.

Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only
by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon.

Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of
the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
84 | P a g e
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether there is a renunciation of legitime that may be presumed in the case.

RULING: None. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must
be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.

More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition

presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.

A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed
the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion,
it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.

Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.

Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is
brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to
the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding
share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable,
what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature,
class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in
cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of
such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.

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 MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

GR Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.

Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving
children.

Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of practically
the same evidence. The Lower Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their
legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate
court affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the
deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.

ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.

RULING: A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive

heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
86 | P a g e
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

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 In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother‘s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name Astorga be
changed to ―Garcia,‖ her mother‘s surname, and that her surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to
―Catindig,‖ his surname.

On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.

Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioner‘s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.‖

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name

RULING: Yes. For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he
is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The

given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use
of surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate
or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow.
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As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as ―An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,‖ is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that ―the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters.‖ Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as
a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17
Article V of RA 8552.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie‘s continued use of her mother‘s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother‘s surname ―GARCIA‖ as her middle
name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

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 VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA
FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA
FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE
FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA
HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf
and as Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY
GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.

G.R. No. L-69679, 166 S 451, October 18, 1988

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao
Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the trial court's decision
finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the
late Esperanza Cabatbat.

The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition of the
estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her
estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the
possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat.

Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters,
Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased
brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza
and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal
adoption proceedings.

Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by
nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of
the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat.

Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial
court on October 25, 1984.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is legally adopted child of the deceased thus making her a
compulsory heir of the deceased, and the sole heir hereof

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RULING: No. As the Court pronounced, this is very strange and odd because the Registry
Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a patient on
May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics
case before or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948.

On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by
Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that
only one woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza
Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as
Baby Girl Lastimosa. Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate of defendant Violeta
Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26,
1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa.

Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's
child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child
by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but
with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the
widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of
Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of
the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the
Civil Code.

91 | P a g e
 VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a
will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and
the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix‘s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria‘s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed
as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD: It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be
affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or
one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to
intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator
because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is
not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any
right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly
provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the
adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
92 | P a g e
RE: Legitimate Parents and Ascendants

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

HELD: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition ―consists in the omission in the testator‘s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited‖. Disinheritance, in turn, ―is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law‖.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution
of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

WHEREFORE, upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review
is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
93 | P a g e
RE: Surviving Spouse

Lolita D. Enrico, petitioner

-versus-
Heirs of Eulogio B. Medinaceli, respondents

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were
married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogio‘s first wife
died on May 2004. On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died.

The respondents are Eulogio‘s heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was celebrated without a valid
marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception could not apply since Eulogio was a
bachelor for only 4 months.

Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as husband and wife for
21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner contended that it is only the
contracting parties while living can file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case. Petitioner Enrico
directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC.

ISSUE: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity.

HELD: No. SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed by
the heirs.

First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by the A.M. 02-11-10 of
the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3, 1988. The A.M. of the SC provides
that ―a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.‖ It is clear. Thus, the heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed!

Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition for declaration of
nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code.

What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can be collaterally
attacked; hence since they only seek to protect their property rights they can always impugn the
legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of their deceased father.
94 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to
challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

95 | P a g e
 FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They
migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in 1988.

Two (2) months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had a
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that the marriage
brought her embarrassment.

RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for being
bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope marriage.

HELD: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and Orlando
had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been divorced.

Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their
naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired American
citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which
must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the
kind of divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii)
which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the bond in
full force.

Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were married, and
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now provides that only the husband or the wife
may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity.

96 | P a g e
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent

Orlando‘s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents‘ marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio but reduce the amount of damages. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that Felicitas lacks legal
personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its
proper disposition. No costs.

97 | P a g e
 FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23,1954. Both of them
remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan,the respondent herewith. They were
blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972,when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared
as to who will be the intestate heirs.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the
petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of
petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who
obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their
national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the
divorce.Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded
therespondent‘s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration.

On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the
other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo
was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals that the case was decided
without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Blandina‘s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2) Whetheror not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

HELD: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at
the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already
an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their country‘s national law. Thus,
Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or
will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
98 | P a g e
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court

However emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

99 | P a g e
Re: Illegitimate children

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.

ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES
and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an
amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982.
Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962
and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein
private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the
compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate
of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.

The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
Complaint, to wit:

6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein
plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as
by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:

(a) Regular support and educational expenses;

(b) Allowance to use his surname;

(c) Payment of maternal bills;

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;

(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;

(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;

(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

100 | P a g e
 7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children
of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear
manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.

Petitioners denied all these allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate child of the deceased and thus, a
compulsory heir of the deceased

HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime
of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court herein adopt our
HELD in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. where it
held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and
such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since
it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the
minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent
Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code
and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the
vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since
private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule
provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction
over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the
passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

101 | P a g e
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.

G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline

and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G.
Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares
of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory
and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.

On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered
the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not children born out of lawful wedlock can claim to be illegitimate children
on the basis of a notarized document that they are such of the deceased thus making them
compulsory heirs of the deceased

HELD: NO. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

102 | P a g e
 There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance. This ISSUE, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an
action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B.
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

103 | P a g e
 MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: g On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138.

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima
Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.
Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael
C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to
private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping signed by their
counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that
his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that
private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his co-
heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in
exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation

RULING:No. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate

104 | P a g e
children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are
his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the
part of private respondents must fail.

nent the issue on private respondents' filiation, the Court agree with the Court of Appeals that a
ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence.

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents
from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, the Supreme Court find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release
and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of
financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be
construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.

105 | P a g e
 MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA
CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
- versus -
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL,
HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.

On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square
meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).

Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject
property and transferred its title to their names.

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of Title
and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of
the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs
No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private
respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance with the law of succession and
the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorney‘s fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of
Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on
31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932
to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July 1997, dismissing the
case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
106 | P a g e
Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that
petitioners‘ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision dated 22
July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal thru ―other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,‖ but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners are able to validly prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal

RULING: Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

―Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,‖ may consist of the child‘s
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child‘s name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the child‘s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation
in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born
on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909,
1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that
common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura

107 | P a g e
Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child.

In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to
refute the petitioners‘ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal. The foregoing
evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.

Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.

108 | P a g e
 HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA
PANGILINAN MARAMAG,

Petitioners,

- versus -

EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL

BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,Respondents.

G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: H The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife); (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the
proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious
and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be
satisfied first.

In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among others,
that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor of Odessa, while the rest of the
proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the
appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of P320,000.00 as
actual litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.

Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and
Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of
the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified
her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the
remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld
the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it
sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation
as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it

109 | P a g e
sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no
settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of
Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

ISSUE: Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the
concubine?

RULING: In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and
that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds
of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Eva’s share in the
proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus,
they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be
awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either
the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of
the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit
third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such
a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation
to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy
and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal
proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on
donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to
the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or
when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

110 | P a g e
 ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
VILLALON, respondents.

G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay.
On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner
herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of
"Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.

On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1)
Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of
Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.

On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.

Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only
by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four

111 | P a g e
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon.

Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of
the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether there is a renunciation of legitime that may be presumed in the case.

RULING: None. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must
be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.

More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition

presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.

A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed
the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion,
it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.

Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.

Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself,
which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and
reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a
112 | P a g e
corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is
an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of
the same nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the
impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in
the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.

113 | P a g e
 ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA,
TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA,
ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL
BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA,respondents.

G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: H Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-in-
law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva). They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva.

From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of
marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963. In
the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties
contested in this case.

Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.

On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial

partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate comprising a number of
the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000,
conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.

Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate and
annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santo Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 37. It was docketed as Civil Case No. SD-857 (SD-857). In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2)
respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the
exclusion of petitioners.

114 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not Angelina was Gonzales‘ illegitimate daughter

RULING : No. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the
illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the
assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of
Angelina Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein
as her father." The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.

However, a closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed
as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there
by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-
defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of
her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.

Under the circumstances, the Court hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent
Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot
inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the
extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.

Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their
property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code
which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married. According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose, no co-ownership exists between
parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang, we expounded on this doctrine by
declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

In Agapay, Miguel Palang and his paramour Erlinda Agapay bought a parcel of riceland in
Pangasinan which they registered in their names. However, because Agapay failed to prove that
she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, she could not rightfully claim co-
ownership over the same.

Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales between 1927
and 1963 which they registered in both their names. Following Agapay, these can only be
apportioned according to the actual contributions of each. Unfortunately, the records are devoid
of any evidence that Gonzales contributed anything to the acquisition of these properties.
Petitioners merely asserted that she acquired these properties through her own industry without a
shred of evidence to support the allegation. On the other hand, it was clearly demonstrated that
115 | P a g e
Villanueva was the municipal treasurer of Talavera for many years and therefore the lone
breadwinner. In accordance with Agapay, none of these four parcels of land should accrue to
petitioners.

There is only one parcel of land registered solely in Gonzales' name, which was acquired
between 1927 and 1963. This fact of registration created a conclusiveness of title in favor of the
person in whose name it was registered. In SD-857, although Villanueva sought to prove that he
alone had purchased the properties and that only he could have done so during the period of
cohabitation (since he was the sole breadwinner), he never actually challenged the validity of the
registration in her name. Thus the efficacy of the title in Gonzales' name remained unrebutted.
As Gonzales' sole property, this should accrue entirely to her heirs.

116 | P a g e
 OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.

G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he
had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an
order granting the petition and allowing the will.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was
directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court
a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After
the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not
acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will
and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced
by any other person in signing it.

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9
Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and
devisee of petitioner's properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2
million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without
a bond.

117 | P a g e
After the death of the testator, on April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his
name.

ISSUE: Whether or not a nephew is a compulsory heir of the deceased

HELD: No. The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral
relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the
decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the
private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's
estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first
time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records
show, not supported by evidence.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
"heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires
of the testator.

118 | P a g e
Re: Reserva Troncal

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ET. AL.,respondents.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on
June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children. The
real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who
were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter. Mrs.
Legarda executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic
will. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, one of the daughters of the testatrix,
filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and
not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are reservable properties under Article 891 of the
Civil Code.

RULING: In reserva troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the
said property came. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to
the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. Even during the
reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
119 | P a g e
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the
registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive. is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so
long as there are reservatarios existing. Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario
nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property."

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands
of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at
the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey
in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be
given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

120 | P a g e
 LEONA AGLIBOT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ANDREA ACAY MAÑALAC, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-14530, 4 S 1030, April 25, 1962

DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The allegations of the complaint are that the Aglibots inherited the property
subject matter thereof from their deceased niece Juliana Mañalac; that upon the death
of Anacleto Mañalac, father of Juliana, the defendants took possession of said
property, claimed it as their own and had since then appropriated for themselves all
the palay annually harvested therefrom amounting to 30 cavanes; that
nothwithstanding demands made upon said defendants by the Aglibots, they had
refused to surrender the property to the latter.

In their answer, after denying some material averments of the complaint, appellants
alleged substantially the following as affirmative defense: that the land in question
was purchased from Esteban Garcia by the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria
Aglibot for P1,000.00; that when Maria Aglibot died, only P300.00 of this amount
had been paid; that the remaining P700.00 was paid to the vendor during the marriage
of Anacleto Mañalac and appellant Andrea Acay; that Juliana Mañalac, the only
daughter of Anacleto and his first wife, died in 1920, while Anacleto died in 1942;
that upon his death, his widow, Andrea Acay, and their children acquired the property
in question as his sole legal heirs. Their answer likewise claimed the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees by way of counterclaim.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto Mañalac inherited from his
daughter, Juliana, as between appellees(sisters of Maria Aglibot, first wife of Anacleto
Mañalac), on the one hand, and appellants (Anacleto's second wife and their children),
on the other?

RULING: It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable
property in accordance with the provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code
(Art. 891 of the New Civil Code). Both parties now admit that the entire parcel
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10 belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot; that upon the death of the latter on
October 2, 1906, their only daughter, Juliana Mañalac, inherited one-half of the
property, the other pertaining to her father as his share in the conjugal partnership;

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that upon the death of Juliana Mañalac on October 2, 1920 without leaving any
descendant, her father inherited her one-half portion of said property.

In accordance with law, therefore, Anacleto Mañalac was obliged to reserve the
portion he had thus inherited from his daughter, for the benefit of appellees, Leona
and Evarista Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her
relative within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

Appellants' contention that the major portion of the purchase price of the land in
question was paid to the original owner, Esteban Garcia, after the death of Maria
Aglibot is rendered clearly untenable not only by the lack of sufficient evidence to this
effect but also by the very significant circumstance that the property was titled in the
name of Anacleto Mañalac "married to Maria Aglibot" — circumstance that strongly
indicates that said spouses had acquired full ownership thereof during the lifetime of
Maria Aglibot.

The remaining contention of appellants that the lower court should have ordered
appellees to refund to them 50% of the annual realty tax paid on the property cannot
be sustained, this matter having been raised by them for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is affirmed,

with costs.

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Re: Reserva Troncal – Elements

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

FACTS: Esteban Javellana, Sr., married Salustia Solivio on December 1916 or barely ten
months before his death. Salustia Solivio brought paraphernal properties to the marriage.
Salustia died on October 11, 1959, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban Jr.,
including a house and lot where she, her son, and her sister had lived. The titles of all the
properties were transferred in the name of Esteban Jr. During the lifetime of Esteban, he
expressed his plan to place his estate in a foundation to help the poor and deserving students
obtain a college degree to honour his mother. However, he died on February 26, 1977, single
and without issue. Petitioner and Private Respondent entered into an agreement to put all the
properties of the decedent to a foundation, just as planned by the decedent. Petitioner later filed
a petition to declare herself as the sole heir of the deceased on the ground that the properties of
the estate of the decedent came from her sister, mother of the decedent, and that she was the
decedent‘s nearest relative by degree on his mother‘s side. After being declared as such, she
proceeded to put up the foundation. However on August 7, 1978, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the declaration of petitioner as the sole heir claiming that she too, respondent,
was a heir of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property may be subject of reserva troncal?

RULING: No, the property of the decedent is not a reservable property. In order for a
property to be reservable, the property must be inherited by an ascendant from his descendant
which the descendant has acquired such property by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a
brother or sister, pursuant to Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

“ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came”

123 | P a g e
The decedent in this case is not an ascendant but a descendant of the origin of the property,
mother of the descedent, therefore the principle of reserva troncal does not find applicability in
this case.

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, vs.MANUELA

ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO

G.R. No. L-13386 . October 27, 1920

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: Juliana Nieva, married to Francisco Deocampo, is the alleged natural mother of the
plaintiff. Alfeo Deocampo is the son of Juliana. Juliana died on April 19, 1889 and her son
inherited parcels of land from her. Alfeo later died on July 7, 1890, therefore the parcels of land
was inherited by his father Francisco. Francisco later married defendant Manuela Alcala, of
which Jose Deocampo was born. Francisco died on April 15, 1914. Defendants took possession
of the parcels of land under the claim that Jose inherited the same ab intestate.

On September 30, 1915, plaintiff instituted an action for recovery of the parcels of land pursuant
to Art. 811 of the Civil Code. The trial court held that she was not entitled to the property as she
was an illegitimate relative of the decedent therefore reserve troncal would not apply.

ISSUE: Whether or not reserva troncal is applicable to an illegitimate relative within the third
degree?

RULING: No, reserva troncal is not applicable in this case because plaintiff is not a
legitimate child of Juliana and is thus barred pursuant to Article 943 of the Civil Code which
reads:―A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.‖

The Supreme Court held that the appellant is not entitled to the property left behind by
her natural brother, who inherited the property by operation of law, as she is expressly prohibited
to inherit pursuant to Article 943 of the Civil Code or the Iron Barrier Rule.

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FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: The stipulated facts are as follows:

―Plaintiffs are the defendant‘s legitimate grand aunt and grand uncles who have a common
ancestor, the late Balbino Tioco, who had a sister named Romana Tioco. Romana Tioco donated
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco during her lifetime. She died intestate in 1915 and was
survived by her husband Eustacio Dizon and their legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad. In
1928, Balbino died intestate leaving properties which was inherited by Faustino and Trinidad in
representation of their late mother, Toribia, who predeceased Balbino. In 1937, Faustino died
intestate, single and without issue, which was inherited by his father, Eustacio, as his sole
intestate heir subject to reserve troncal. Trinidad died intestate in 1939 and transmitted her rights
and interests in the parcels of land to her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay, subject to the
usufructuary of Primo Tongko, husband of Trinidad. Eustacio died intestate in 1965 and
survived only by his legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not all the relatives within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista as seems implicit in
Artcle 891 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No, Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entire reversionary property to the
exclusion of plaintiffs. Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the
prepositus, excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. As prescribed by law in
legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
125 | P a g e
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom
the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. The
Supreme Court held that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.

Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.,

vs. Intermediate Appellate Court et. al.

G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS: The stipulation of facts are as follows:

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants the two sets of properties subject of this
case. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties
above-mentioned. On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo.‖

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property to Mariquita H.
Sumaya which was subsequently sold to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on
December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred
and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
The parties admitted that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not
contain any annotation of its reservable character.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo,
Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul
Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of
deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above
mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they
claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

ISSUE:Whether or not it is a requirement to have the reserva troncal be annotated to bind

innocent purchasers?

HELD: Yes, citing Dizon and Dizon v. Galang the Supreme Court ruled that the reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value.

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However, In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the
Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of
the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo. Moreover, there is
sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the
properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale
executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya:

―That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of
the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by
the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in
accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to
(sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of
any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)‖

127 | P a g e
 BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, ET. AL.,respondents.

G.R. No. L-34395 19 May 1981

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was
survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children. The real properties left by
Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs
of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other
six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). She later died and her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are
reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. Without awaiting the resolution on
that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said
128 | P a g e
properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are reservable properties under Article 891 of the
Civil Code.

HELD: The properties that are in question were reservable properties in the possession of Mrs.
Legarda as the reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda. The reservable property
bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the
daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the
prepositus within the third degree.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus,
of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservor.

129 | P a g e
 MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
-versus-
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

ARELLANO, C.J.:

FACTS: Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22,
1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at
his father's death inherited the two parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and
without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother, Marcelina Edroso. She then filed for the registration and issuance of the titles of the lot
under her name.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the
right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel."

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could
only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.

HELD: Yes. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within
the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811).

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to

130 | P a g e
relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature
property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of
the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved
that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.

The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of
law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and
recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the
least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or
they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If
there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this
limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to
be effective. On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively
or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the
fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who
must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and
only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are
relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose
favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to
dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be
null and void.

131 | P a g e
 CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
-versus-
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by the deceased Saturnino Yaeso. With his first
wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while
with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. Upon the death of
Saturnino properties were left to all of his children, among which, Lot 3368 to Francisco.

Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother,
as his sole heir, executed the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she
sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina
Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 —
which was in their possession — the latter refused.

Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared the
property in their name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.

HELD: Yes. It is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon
Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants; it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13,
1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952.

132 | P a g e
This court has held in connection with this matter that reservista has the legal title and dominion
to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary
of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said
alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time
of the death of the reservista.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate
of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

MARTIN, J.:

FACTS: Jose Frias Chua sired three children with his first wife Patricia Militar, namely:
Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre, with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. In 1929,
Jose died. In the intestate proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, the one-half
(1/2,) portion of the subject property in this case, Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor
of Consolacion, the other half of the lot in favor of Juanito.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. Consolacion executed a
declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito and
transfer certificate of title covering the whole property was issued under her name. In 1966,
Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters. In 1966, Petitioners, Ignacio and Lorenzo, the two
surviving children from the first marriage of Juanito, filed the complaint praying that the one-
half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the
reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the
New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property complied with the requisites to be characterized as
reservable.

133 | P a g e
HELD: No. As explained by Manresa which this court quoted with approval in Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil 186, ―The transmission is gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return.‖ It matters whether the property transmitted be or not be the subject to any
prior changes; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably
put by an eminent Filipino commentator, ―the essential thing is that the person who transmits it
does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation.‖. It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was
means of hersditary succession and therefore gratuitous.

The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Company of New York the amount of P8, 971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias
Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the testate proceeding No.
4816. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed
by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which
originally belonged to Juanito has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do
not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did
not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion, died in March 1966. When the petitioners
therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very
much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2
undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered
to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of
Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua
and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.

134 | P a g e
135 | P a g e
RE: WILLS

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner

Vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

PURISIMA, J:.

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Aleja Belleza,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of a big tract of land. The Codicil, was duly probated and contained in
substance, among others; that as a condition of the devise, Dr. Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies to deliver (one hundred) 100 piculs of sugar (75 export sugar and 25 domestic
sugar) to Maria Marlinna Belleza, sister of the deceased; should Dr. Rabadilla die, his heir who
shall inherit the subject land shall also oblige to the annual delivery; that should the wish of the
deceased be not respected, Maria Marlinna Belleza shall immediately seize the subject lot and
deliver the same to the nearest descendant of the deceased who shall also have the same
obligation to deliver the 100 sacks of sugar to Belleza.

Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983.

On August 21, 1989, Belleza brought a complaint against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
alleging violation of the conditions of the Codicil, more specifically their failure to comply with
their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing despite repeated demands for compliance. She prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey / return the lot to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

Belleza and Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with respect to the annual delivery of the one hundred piculs of
sugar. However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property should revert back to the estate of the testatrix
Aleja Belleza as provided for in the codicil of her last will and testament.

HELD: Yes. Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable
settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and
whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed
to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
136 | P a g e
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the
fulfilment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

137 | P a g e
 MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
ESTEBANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondent.

G.R. No. 12099 October 30, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS: The deceased Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein
in part, among others; that he is leaving his properties to his wife Asuncion ―Oning‖ R. Reyes.
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three
witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Reyes died on May 12,
1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will.

The recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila,
and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased‘s natural children with Celsa Agape, namely
Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations:

a) That the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the
formalities of law; and

b) That Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the
time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because
the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was
never annulled. Thus Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with
Reyes was violative of public morals.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The trial court admitted the will of Reyes to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the
will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed provisions should be admitted as part of the last will and
testament of the deceased.

HELD: Yes. Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence,
documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion ―Oning‖ Reyes‘ marriage to the
testator was inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous
relationship, the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject
last will and testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not
sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.

138 | P a g e
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the
law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx
All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).

ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED and
the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

139 | P a g e
Re: Testamentary Succession

ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, Defendant-Appellant.
WILLARD, J.:

G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904

FACTS: The evidence in this case shows to the satisfaction of the court that the will of Doña
Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as
witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in
conformity with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament was executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law

RULING: The court held that there is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the
testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section
requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does
sign it, that it be signed by someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the
mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact that the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the
will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this
hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was
presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that
we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below
that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No
suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same
instrument. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the
counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they
treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then opposing.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual
debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be
charged against the appellants.

140 | P a g e
 Testate Estate of Isabel V. Florendo, deceased. TIRSO DACANAY, Petitioner and
Appellant,vs.PEDRO V. FLORENDO ET AL., oppositors and appellee.s

GR. No. L-2071 September 19, 1950

Ozaeta, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Isabel V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay executed a reciprocal will on October
20, 1940. Isabel V. Florendo having died, her surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is seeking to
probate said joint and reciprocal will, which provides in substance that whoever of the spouses,
joint testators, shall survive the other shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with an
agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of his or her
demise.

Relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of the said will on various
statutory grounds.After receiving from counsel for both parties written arguments, the trial court
ordered dismissing the petition for probate on the ground that said will is null and void ab initio
as having been executed in violation of article 669 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses may be probated in
view of the prohibition in article 669 of the Civil Code.

RULING: The court agrees with Tirso Dacanay‘s view, that the prohibition of article 669 of the
Civil Code is directed against the execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more
testators of their wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or
reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed.

The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more
persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit
of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. This is to prevent the more
aggressive spouse to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for those third
persons that he or she desires to favor. And where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing
as she does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and
paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.

Considering the wisdom of the provisions of article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed,
at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with

141 | P a g e
those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, the court believes and rules that said
article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant.

142 | P a g e
 PAULA DE LA CERNA ET. AL., petitioners
Vs
MANUEL REBACA POTOT ET. AL., AND THE HONORAABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

REYES, J.B.L,. J.:

FACTS: On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a
joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land
acquired during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela
Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any
child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands
aforementioned". Bernabe‘s died in 1939; the will was accepted to probate on October 31, 1939.

Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the
same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed.

The court declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of
joint wills in the Civil Code. On appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed,
on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and
conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of the deceased spouses is null and void for
being violative of the express provisions of law on joint wills

RULING: The final decree of probate entered in 1939 has a conclusive effect as to his last will
and testament. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon
the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors
judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Petitioners, as heirs
and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his
will to probate.

But the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de
la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was
then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. It follows that the validity of

143 | P a g e
the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined
and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

The undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and
not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to
exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of Gervasia.

WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA GR

No. 23763-R is AFFIRMED.

144 | P a g e
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES
AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 12099, October 20, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS: The deceased Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein
in part, among others; that he is leaving his properties to his wife Asuncion ―Oning‖ R. Reyes.
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three
witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan.

Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate
of the will.

The recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila,
and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased‘s natural children with Celsa Agape, namely
Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations:

a) That the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the
formalities of law; and

b) That Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the
time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because
the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was
never annulled. Thus Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with
Reyes was violative of public morals.

The trial court admitted the will of Reyes to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the
will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed provisions should be admitted as part of the last will and
testament of the deceased

RULING: Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary
or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion ―Oning‖ Reyes‘ marriage to the testator was
inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial
court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject last will and
testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to
145 | P a g e
destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the
testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force
and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).

ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby

AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

146 | P a g e
Re: Foreign Wills

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

ABAD, J.:

FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), anotherbrother of Ruperta, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta‘s
will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta‘swill should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it.Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta‘swill could be probated in the Philippines,
it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator‘s full
understanding of the consequences of such act.Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act
as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta‘s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for
leave to take their deposition, which it granted.On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to
submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta‘s U.S. will may be probated in
and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta‘s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTC‘s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

147 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

RULING: Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated
here.This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its
execution.They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent
proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has
been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance
with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alienwho is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta‘s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here.But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court.Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court.Contrary to petitioners‘ stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case.In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.cralawlibrary

148 | P a g e
 FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.
RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona Florentina Ralla, together with all their
children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses.

On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions of
which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November,
1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share
in the conjugal properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of the
four living children.

On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus executed a
new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will which he made on 1955
and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix
named in the will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
Oppositions thereto were filed by his children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned will of November, 1959 was validly executed thereby
validly revoking the previous will and codicil he executed.

HELD: Yes. Don Jesus is not forever bound for his previous holographic will and codicil as
such would remain revocable at his will. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: ―A will may be
revoked by the testator at anytime before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is
void.‖

There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic
will and codicil previously made.

Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the
will may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed
upon the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated.

149 | P a g e
The fact that testator did not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime, while his previous
holographic will and codicil were probated while he was alive does not mean said testator lacks
the requisite testamentary.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and
Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs against respondents.

150 | P a g e
 PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
- versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy. He and petitioner Paula Llorente were married on February 22, 1937. Lorenzo departed
for the United States while Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Camarines Sur. On November
30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship.

In 1945, Lorenzo visited Paula in the Philippines and discovered that she was pregnant and was
living in and having an adulterous relationship with Lorenzo‘s brother, Ceferino Llorente.

Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce
decree became final.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and sired three children with
her, namely; Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament and left all his property to Alicia and their
three children. On June 11, 1985, before the probate proceedings of the will could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.

Paula, claiming to be the surviving spouse, filed for letters of administration over Lorenzo‘s
estate in her favour contending:

Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente.

HELD: Yes. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. As, as a rule, issues arising from
these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

Intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found. True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

151 | P a g e
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light
of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
the decedent's national law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente‘s will and determination of the parties‘ successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.

152 | P a g e
 SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,
respondent.

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

QUIASON, J.:

FACTS: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York. They had three children. On
August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the
remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated". In
the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and
grandchildren, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. was the trustee. Dr. Cunanan appointed his wife as
executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.

Four days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan also executed her own last will and testament. The two
wills contained similar provisions pertaining to the situation where the spouses will die at the
same time and under the same circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of their deaths, then it shall be presumed that Dr. Cunanan predeceased his wife and
their estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption".

In 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted
their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two
wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County
of Onondaga, New York. The wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.

Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed for the
reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York.

The reprobate was not allowed because petitioner failed to prove the of New York on procedure
and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that
the law on succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has sufficiently proved the laws of New York on the
allowance of wills.

153 | P a g e
HELD: Yes. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will
only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:

"Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes."

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the
will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).

Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the
pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just
glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the
rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible
before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81
SCRA 393 [1978]).

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

154 | P a g e
 In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in
Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy.
During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had
several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he
had a son, petitioner Silvino Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the
second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate
of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and
signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will
before the hearing thereof. After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the
records of his father, a last will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the
deceased on January, 1931 and probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the
intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929
or the will executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the
Philippines.

HELD: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved.
The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established
by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy
were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the
order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or
allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged
probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
155 | P a g e
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of
allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.

156 | P a g e
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.

G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966

MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS: Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the state of California
but was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death.

He executed his last will and testament in Manila in 1951, which in substance provided for the
partition of his estate by payment of P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia who he claimed was not
in any way related to him, while the rest of the estate will be transferred Maria Lucy Christensen,
who he claimed was his only daughter.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia
insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen based on a prior Supreme Court decision on the matter. It was claimed
that the Philippine law should govern the estate of the deceased and that the distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one half of the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions of the will of the
deceased should be governed by the laws of the Philippines.

HELD: Yes. Art. 16 of the Civil code of the Philippines provides that the amount of
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The decision of the lower court sustained the contention of the executor that under the California
Probate Court, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.

The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that we should enforce
the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the laws of California as in
157 | P a g e
comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of the Civil Code, then we must enforce
the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained.

We therefore find that the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California.

158 | P a g e
 Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al.,

G.R. No. L-23678 06 June 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States". He had two marriages, with 5 legitimate children from his first wife Mary E. Mallen. 3
legitimate children from his second wife Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, which in substance
provided that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:

(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
Bellis, in equal shares.

On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

In 1964, two of the illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam filed their respective
opposition to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children, and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the decedent must prevail.

RULING: Art. 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate testamentary, successions, with regard to four items xxx (E) intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will.

As indication of legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
159 | P a g e
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

160 | P a g e
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) vs. The
Court of First Instance of Iloilo

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 29 March 1974

BARREDO, J.:

FACTS: The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as
that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In
their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them provided
mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after
funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) —
during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them
survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n),
devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.

Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed
special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and
real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living."
Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges
had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted
that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ...
all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter."

On December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges.

At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each
administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure
at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into
161 | P a g e
and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise.
Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began
acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial
court.

ISSUE: Whether the distribution of the estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines
or of Texas.

RULING: The question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of
Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of
these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers
and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it
appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of
Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-
fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In
other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be
actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than
as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which
have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

he estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but
this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that
Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the
Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two
issues, and the Court, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the
first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. The Court reiterates, however, that
pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, the Court‘s considered opinion is
that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could
not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of
their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the
resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be
less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus
what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article
16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately

162 | P a g e
applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account
already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in
predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs.
Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal
administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels however, that pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties
constituting her estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.

It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article
16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the
Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as already explained above, the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties,
considering that the Court found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of disposition
ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the
contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is
untenable.

163 | P a g e
Re: Testamentary Capacity

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States
until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village,
Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names
in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October
8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed
at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and
again on the left hand margin.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator‘s will, testified that
it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the
will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament.
After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary
public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had
prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator
and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the
testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and
every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise
explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on
June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the
formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The

164 | P a g e
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.

ISSUE: Was there a valid will?

HELD: The Petition has no merit.

We are not convinced. Fraud ―is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for the fraud, he would not have made.‖

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at
the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only
upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-
serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he
had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken ―the cudgels of taking
care of [the testator] in his twilight years.‖

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on
the will does not invalidate the document, ―because the law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.‖ More important, the
will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must
also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and
the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the
CA that ―the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.‖

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a ―grand conspiracy‖ in the commission of
a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit
from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary
are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
165 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
TRENT, J.:

FACTS: The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years
prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few
years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing
to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the
medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his
family.

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which
the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the
testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time
with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by
the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that
Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in
the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of
the testator and each other.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator
was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his
head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say
whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some
years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro
Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state
whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement
were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing
witness.

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his
opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state
in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the
testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.

166 | P a g e
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and
who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at
some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had
suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman
Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to
the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.

ISSUE: Was the will duly made?

HELD: We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for
a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was
the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no
doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his
mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include
from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the
question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.

The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his
life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his
mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution
of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the
execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He
seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several
hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the
proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are
those of a rational person.

167 | P a g e
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.

Estate of the deceased Isidra Abquilan. Atanasio Abquilan

-versus-
Feliciana Abquilan

G.R. No. L-24665 13 October 1926

STREET, J.:

FACTS: This court refused to legalize an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament
of Isidra Abquilan, the deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only
heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and
Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponent.

The denial was based on the finding of the trial court that the document propounded as the will
of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will
are forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He therefore
denied probate, and the proponent appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the purported last will and testament was executed by the deceased.

RULING: A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6, 1924, the date
when the will purports to have been executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a condition such
as to enable her to have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from
paralysis to celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for intelligent
participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as
signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the
conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely
demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to the
questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate
another will, which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to
the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was
undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the
deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in the act of making a will
impossible.

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 CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,
-versus-
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.

G.R. NO. 4445 18 SEPTEMBER 1909

CARSON, J.:

FACTS: The court admitted to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament
of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao,
the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers
and sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if
probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or
descending line.

The appellants alleged that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of
the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind
and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.

ISSUES: Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind and memory at the time of the
execution of his last will and testament.

RULINGS: That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time
of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the
fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of
asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in
no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the
evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the
will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels
of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who
wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his
property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
169 | P a g e
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heir in the ascending
or ascending line; that a bitter family quarrel had separated him from his brothers and sisters,
who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of
the Aglipayano church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters,
although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his
funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to
his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves are grown men
and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue
influence on the part of his wife, or in anywise corroborates contestants‘ allegation that the will
never was executed.

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 MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.

G.R. No. L-24569 26 February 1926

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was
in feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate of the
will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground
cited for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of
the execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was
under guardianship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the will.

RULING: The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its execution. The
Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the testator may be of old age, may
have been physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of memory,
had a guardian over his person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still possessed
that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to summon
his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms ―testamentary capacity.‖

171 | P a g e
 In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-39033 13 November 1933

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS: Testatrix Matea Abella of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San Fernando, La Union
accompanied by her niece, to consult a physician. While in San Fernando, she stayed in a
convent under the charge of Father Cordero. After two consultations with the physician, it was
found out that Matea was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.

Thereafter, Matea talked to Atty. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will. She
was then interviewed by the lawyer twice on separate days in the presence of four persons at the
convent where she was staying. During the interview, the testatrix even directed her niece to
bring her the documents in her trunk which she delivered to Atty. Reinoso.

After the will has been drafted in Ilocano, Macario Calug, one of of the witnesses, read the same
to her and she approved. The will was then copied clean and was again read to her and she
expresses her approval thereof but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to sign
the same suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was done in
the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other persons,
including Father Cordero. After the signing, Atty. Reinoso delivered the original copies of the
will to the testatrix.

On July 3,1932, Matea died of senile debility at the age of 88 years. Thereafter, a petition for
probate of Matea‘s will was filed. The petition was opposed by Marciana Abella, one of the
grounds cited was that the testator lacked testamentary capacity since the she was 88 years old
and was suffering from senile debility at the time she executed her will.

The probate court admitted the will to probate.

ISSUE: WON Matea Abella possessed the mental capacity at the time she executed her will.

RULING: The Supreme Court believed that based on the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will of the deceased showed that the testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so
blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding

172 | P a g e
thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor
deafness, nor poor memory is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his will.
The mere fact that in her will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she had already
donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most, it
constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain
donations.

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.

RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona Florentina Ralla, together with all their
children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses.

On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions of
which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November,
1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share
in the conjugal properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of the
four living children.

On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus executed a
new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will which he made on 1955
and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix
named in the will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
Oppositions thereto were filed by his children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the requisites
prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the testator during execution of his will.

RULING: Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his will. Between the
highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity and incapacity and while on one hand it
has been held that mere weakness of mind, or imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person from making a will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
173 | P a g e
enable him to know what he is about to do and how and to whom he is disposing his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity
does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU.

LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ VS. JOSE MA. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-19910 31 May 1971

FACTS: The testatrix, Maria Garniea Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of
France but a Filipino citizen residing in Spain where she died, childless and 84 years old. She
executed before a notary public in Madrid, an ‖open‖ will, instituting her niece Lirio
Pfannenschmidt, as her sole and universal heir. Lirion is one of the four children of Jose
Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband Ramon.

The probate of the will was opposed by Jose Maria Ramirez, the nephew of Maria‘s husband,
being the son of the half brother of Ramon.

The Trial Court denied the probate based on the number of letters written by Lirio in which she
used quite strong terms to describe the mental infirmity of the testatrix.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix had testamentary capacity during the execution of her last
will and testament.

RULING: The testatrix lack of testamentary capacity was sufficiently shown by the following:
(1) although present at her husband‘s death in 1956 and saw his body before burial, after such
burial. She went to her room and upon seeing his bed no longer there, she came out crying asking
where her husband was and saying she was going to look for him; (2) She was easily susceptible
to any suggestion from others, particularly those close to her, and after doing what she was told
would promptly forget all about it; (3) Her lack of memory for certain events and lack of
understanding and volition; and (4) That as early 1955, she was already suffering from pre-senile
dementia, a degenerative mental infirmity that was a progressive and irreversible process,
which condition was described by Lirio herself in her various letters duly admitted in evidence.

The cumulative effect of these leads to the definite conclusion that the testatrix was indeed
mentally incapacitated to make a will, that is, to know the nature of her estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

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 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners,
versus.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

G. R. No. 76648, 26 February 1988

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22,
1981 seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on
January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29, 1981 at
the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.

On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent
motion for appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives and
heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court appointed private respondent as Special
Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.

On June 29, 1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the
deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7
alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix
herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession
of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon
the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed
to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.

The court admitted the will to probate.

ISSUE:Whether or not the testator was of sound mind at the time of the execution of her last will
and testament

HELD: Yes. The fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her
real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound
mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in
intestate successor.
175 | P a g e
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have
been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to
disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of
neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The exercise of improper pressure
and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

Finally, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the respondent court- There
is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. The most authentic proof that
deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself
which according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence of significant
handwriting characteristics such as spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be
achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind/or under undue
influence or improper pressure when she executed the Will.

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Re: Forms of Wills

In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

GR. No. 13431, 12 November 1919

AVANCEÑA, J.:

FACTS: The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The opponents
appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and
under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants‘ contention, are defects whereby the probate
of the will should have been denied. Further, appellants alleged records do not show that the
testatrix knew the dialect which the will is written.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was
duly admitted to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal requisites
prescribed by law

HELD: YES. In requiring that each and every page of the will should also be signed on the left
margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act no. 2645 (which is
the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself)

177 | P a g e
to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator‘s disposition. But
when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator
and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin on the left margin of
said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute
took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have
referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But when all the dispositive parts of a will are
written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which the will is written, the
circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in the city of Cebu, and the
dialect in the locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which
contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by
the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.

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 In re estate of Piraso, deceased.
SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-28946, January 16, 1929

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Benguet,
denying the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.

The will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know thus the
proponent-appellant contends that the will is not valid for it was not written in a dialect
understood by the testator. The proponent-appellant further contends that the will should have
been in the Ilocano dialect, the dialect that is known to the testator.

The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:

1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in
the Ilocano dialect.

2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to
understand a will drawn up in said dialect.

3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.

The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as
follows:

The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and
could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should
have been written in that dialect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will herein is valid

HELD: NO. The fact that the will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did
not know, is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.

Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:

"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard
or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into

179 | P a g e
effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc.

Moreover, the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan
(40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where
he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, can not be applied in this case because, in the
instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the
deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof
that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorot dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano.

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 PRIMITIVO GONZALEZ Y LAUREL, applicant-appellee,
vs.
JOVITA LAUREL Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-19079, January 15, 1923

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased Maria Tapia. Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling
of the court below, alleging, among others, that court erred: 1. In holding that the supposed will
of the deceased Maria Tapia was executed with the solemnities prescribed by the law,
notwithstanding that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased; 2. In not
holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing in the will had been obtained through
deceit, surprise, fraud, and in an illegal and improper manner

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid for being written in a dialect not known to the testator.

Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and
signing the will

HELD: YES. The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog
region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. She requested Modesto Castillo
to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said
Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been
overthrown nor rebutted.

YES. With respect to the second issue, the preponderance of evidence established that the
will was executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud,
deceit, surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being then mentally
capacitated and free.

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 Suroza v. Honrado

A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981

FACTS: Mauro Suroza and his wife Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used
the surname Suroza. Agapito got married to Nenita and begot a child named Lilia. Agapito
became disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an
incompetent.

Meanwhile, a couple entrusted their child Marilyn to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend
of Agapito). The child was later delivered to Marcelina Suroza who brought her up as a supposed
daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito. Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old.
That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina
bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.

Upon learning of the existence of a testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's
estate, Nenita and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set aside the
order ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the
deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that
Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. In spite of the fact that
Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's
estate, he issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.

In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her
contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and
because it is written in English which is not known to her.

Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita.

ISSUE: Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to
the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses
did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?

HELD: Yes. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written
in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily
perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English
was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that
every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
182 | P a g e
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as
to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.

In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.

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Re: Requirement for Validity of Wills

GREGORIO MACAPINLAC, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO ALIMURONG, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-5149, March 22, 1910

ARELLANO, C. J.:

FACTS: Simplicia de los Santos, who was sick but in full possession of all her faculties,
executed her will. A rough copy of the said will was made up and when it was read to the
testatrix, the latter ordered an additional clause to be added thereto, in connection with a legacy
that she desired to make in favor of some of her old servants who and rendered good service.

After the rough copy was amended by the additional clause, a clear copy thereof was made up
and was again read to the testatrix, who approved it in all of its parts, and as she was unable to
sign, she requested Amando de Ocampo to sign for her and the latter wrote the following words
with his own hand. "At the request of the testatrix D.a Simplicia de los Santos, I signed —
Amando de Ocampo."

Immediately afterwards and also in the presence of the same testatrix and of each other, the
witnesses Jose Juico, Gabino Panopio, Eusebio dayao, Juan Angeles, Jose Torres, Alejo San
Pedro, and Gregorio Sangil signed at the bottom of the will. The day after the execution of such
will, the testatrix died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the form of signing for the testatrix "At the request of the testatrix Da.
Simplicio de los Santos, I signed: Amando de Ocampo," is in accordance with the requirements
of the law.

Whether or not the posterior insertion of the words 'For Simplicia de los Santos' affected the
validity of the will.

HELD: NO. It is shown by the evidence that the will was wholly written in the
handwriting of the subscribing witness, Gregorio Sangil, and at the foot thereof the following
words appear in a new paragraph and sufficiently apart:

At the request of the testatrix, Da. Simplicia de los Santos, I signed.

For Simplicia de los Santos. Amando de Ocampo.

Although the said words "For Simplicia de los Santos" was inserted subsequently, in the Court‘s
opinion, the signature for the testatrix as if she signed the will, and also the signature of the
witness who, at her request, wrote the name of the testatrix and signed for her, affirming the truth

184 | P a g e
of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies with the
provisions of section 618 of the Act.

And, as a question of law, it is claimed that the form of signing for the testatrix "At the request of
the testatrix Da. Simplicio de los Santos, I signed: Amando de Ocampo," is not in accordance
with the requirements of the law.

Regarding the first question, the trial court concluded that "the posterior insertion of the words
'For Simplicia de los Santos' can not affect the validity of the will."

Therefore, it can be considered as nonexistent, and the other as the only fore of signature by the
testatrix, the authenticity of which has not been impugned or which the trial court admits as
conclusive, and is only one taken into account in its findings of fact. Although the said words
"For Simplicia de los Santos" be considered as inserted subsequently, which we neither affirm
nor deny, because a specific determination either way is unnecessary, in our opinion the
signature for the testatrix as if she signed the will, and also the signature of the witness who, at
her request, wrote the name of the testatrix and signed for her, affirming the truth of this fact,
attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies with the provisions of
section 618 of the Act.

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 TOMAS GUISON, Petitioner-Appellant ,
vs.
MARIA CONCEPCION, Respondent-Appellee.
G.R. No. 2586, January 19, 1906
WILLARD, J.:

FACTS: Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. The last part
of the will is as follows:

Asi lo otorgo ante los testigosSeñoresAmbrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, de
Manila, Islas Filipinas, y por no yopoderfirmar, firma a mi ruego el mismo Feliciano Maglaqui,
en mi presencia y de los mencionadostestigos, quienestambiensuscriben, cadauno de ellos en
presencia de los otros y la mia.

(Firmado) FELICIANO MAGLAQUI.

(Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES.

(Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON.

(Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN.

NosotrosAmbrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, atestiguamosque Feliciano

Maglaqui, a ruego de la Sra. Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo y en presencia de la misma y la nuestra,
firmo el testamentoque antecede; y quecadauno de nosotros lo firmo en presencia de los otros y
de dichatestadora.

Manila, tres de Enero de mil novecientoscuatro.

(Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES.

(Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON.

(Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN.

Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will. The witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing
the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court
below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD: No. The will is not valid for failure of the person who was supposed to sign the will for
the testator, to indicate the name of the testator on behalf of whom he was signing.

186 | P a g e
The judgment of the court below refusing the probate of the will is affirmed and after the
expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case
remanded to the court below for execution. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui,
instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was
refused in the court below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto,
and the petitioner has appealed.

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 MARIANO LEAÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ARCADIO LEAÑO, objector-appellee..

G.R. No. L-9150, March 31, 1915

CARSON, J.:

FACTS: Cristina Valdes, testator, placed a cross opposite her name in the will. The said ―placing
of the cross‖ by the testator was done in the presence of three witnesses whose names are
attached to the attesting clause, and they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence
and in the presence of each other.

When the will was filed for probate, the trial judge declined to admit the instrument to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the placing of the cross opposite testator‘s name at the construction of
the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure

HELD: Yes. The Court is of the opinion that the placing of the cross opposite her name at the
construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that except where wills are signed by some
other person than the testator in the manner and from herein indicated, a valid will must be
signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi
has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the United States in construing
statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language identical with, or
substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code, which was taken from section 2349
of the Code of Vermont.

The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be reversed and the record remanded
to the court below, where judgment will be entered admitting the instrument in question to
probate in accordance with the prayer of the petitioner.

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 FREDERICK E. MOREY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAO LAYCO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-4067. November 29, 1951

WILLARD, J.:

FACTS: The will of Antero Mercado is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following
attestation clause:

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins
of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of
the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify
that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said
testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of
which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the
will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The herein petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross
written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is defective

HELD: YES. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required
by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been
held sufficient by this Court in previous cases such as De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil.,
104.

The cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado. After mature
reflection, the Court is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark because
the cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

What has been said makes it unnecessary for the Court to determine there is a sufficient recital in
the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses,
and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.

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190 | P a g e
 YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.

G.R. No. 6845, September 1, 1914

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition for the
probate of the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. Accompanying said petition and attached
thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased,
as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.

When called to testify, Severo Tabora testified among others, that he was not sure that he had
seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong sign the will because there were many people and there was a
screen at the door and he could not see; that he was called a witness to sign the second will and
was told by the people there that it was the same as the first; that the will was on a table, far
from the patient, in the house but outside the room where the patient was; that the will was
signed by Paez and himself; that Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he was not sure whether
Anselmo Zacarias signed the will or not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong could see the table on which the will was written at the time it was signed or not; that
there were many people in the house; that he remembered the names of Pedro and Lorenzo; that
he could not remember the names of any others; that the will remained on the table after he
signed it; that after he signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was lying; that the will
was left on the table outside; that Tomasa was very ill; that he heard the people asking Tomasa to
sign the will after he had signed it; that he saw Paez sign the will, that he could not remember
whether Anselmo Zacarias had signed the will, because immediately after he and Paez signed it,
he left because he was hungry; that the place where the table was located was in the same house,
on the floor, about two steps down from the floor on which Tomasa was.

During the trial, the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did
not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their
presence nor in the presence of each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was signed by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of
one another

HELD: YES. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof
and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps
below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located
upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was
lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the
rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses
191 | P a g e
and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the
one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary.
It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if
they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their
names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is
considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the
witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will
was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of
the room was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses
signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed
in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed
the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence
of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the
presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is
not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the
necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the
courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by
appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who
had that opportunity.

Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of
all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.

192 | P a g e
 SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,
versus.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.

G.R. No. L-30289, March 26, 1929

OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS: Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, her niece was designated
executrix. When Serapia presented the will for probate, Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the
deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapia was
appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. Sinforoso filed a motion asking
the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso,
be appointed in her stead.

The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but it was
nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in
her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that
his appointment would simplify the proceedings.

The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not
executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
Act No. 2645. The appeal raised the following: (1) that the person requested to sign the name of
the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not
mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the
will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but
only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the form required by law

HELD: YES. When the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator, the law is fulfilled
not only by the customary written signature but by the testator‘s thumb-mark. The construction
put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than
the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed'
is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.

In this case, the testatrix‘s thumb-mark appears in the center of her name as written by Serapia de
Gala on all of the pages of the will. It is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix
signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of
the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last
clause of the body of the will.

193 | P a g e
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the
will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is
without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.

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TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,
AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS
CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA
RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS
CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.

G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of
his life, executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano
Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. It was declared therein, among other things,
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera
and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.

The petitioners contend that the attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements
of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically
state the fact that the the testator signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the witnesses
and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late
Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the
Civil Code

HELD: YES. Article 805 provides that the attestation clause should state (1) the number of the
pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused
another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3)
that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and
that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another. Failure to state the said facts shall invalidate the will.

In the present case, the attestation clause, while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of
pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
195 | P a g e
Under Article 809, the defects and imperfections of a will, with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein, would not render a will invalid should it be proved
that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that
the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation
clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated
in the attestation clause of a will.

196 | P a g e
 In re the state of the deceased SOTERA BARRIENTOS. SAMUEL PERRY,
petitioner, respondent-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE ELIO, petitioner, respondent-appellee.

G.R. No. L-9089, January 5, 1915

ARAULLO, J.:

FACTS: When Sotera Barrientos, the wife of Samuel Perry died, two documents were
presented, each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the last will
and testament of the said deceased.

The first document was filed by Vicente Elio, son of Sotera‘s first husband, and her brother-in-
law; and the second was filed by Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. The court held that the
said two wills were true and authentic, but that the one executed on September 21, 1910, had
been revoked by the one subsequently executed on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the
probate of the first, the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will,
in favor of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and testament of the said
Sotera Barrientos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second will contains the real intent of the testator

HELD: NO. It is very doubtful whether the sick woman, in the condition in which she was,
understood what Matayabas read to her, nor can the fact of having said "yes" be accepted as an
absolute proof that she understood what was read, for, as the same witnesses testified, she made
this same reply to all the questions that were then put to her, an answer which could be
interpreted as being either approval and agreement in regard to those questions or indifference to
all that was happening about her

On the other hand it was Elio who, in his own house, in his presence and under his direction,
after having shown to the testatrix the rough draft prepared by him, had Santos Matayabas make
a clean copy of it and immediately after the document had been written invited the four witnesses
and with them and Matayabas went to Sotera Barrientos' house. There Elio took a large if not a
principal part in all that was done and in all that happened in the immediate vicinity of the
patient. Account must also be taken of the fact that Elio was the only person to be benefited by
the execution of the presented will, for, besides his appearing in that document as the sole
devisee of all the property of the testatrix, the statement appears in one of its clauses, as being
made by the testatrix, that her husband, Samuel Perry, had abandoned her in serious sickness —
a fact that was not proved — and that she revoked and annulled the testamentary provisions
previously made by her, which were no others than those contained in the document presented by
this same Perry for probate as the will of the said deceased and in which she instituted him as her
sole heir. There are, therefore, more than sufficient reasons for holding that the document
197 | P a g e
presented by Vicente Elio for probate as the will of Sotera Barrientos does not express her true
and spontaneous desires.

198 | P a g e
 GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. 1641, January 19, 1906

CARSON, J.:

FACTS: Probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, because
the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana,
one of the witnesses, did not sign the will in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the
witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The testator, calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed
his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present
when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in
his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a
witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed
as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the
room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in
position to sign the will as a witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was signed in the presence of all the witnesses

HELD: Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and
pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the
remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the
will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena.

The fact that Jena was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the
name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the
testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same
room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could
see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without
any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document
was in fact signed before he finally left the room.

199 | P a g e
 TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,
versus.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.
C.A. No. 8075, March 25, 1946

DE JOYA, J.:

FACTS: Severo Neyra died intestate leaving certain properties and two children, by his first
marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second
marriage. After the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased
father. Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants,
executed a will disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, making no provision in favor of her only sister of the
whole blood, Trinidad Neyra.

The two sisters got reconciled and executed a compromise agreement with respect to the
properties left by their father. Furthermore, in her new will and testament, Encarnacion named
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the attesting
witnesses

RULING: The court held that the said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her
bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the
documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the
attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case.

Teodora and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are children of legatees
named in the first will but eliminated from the second will. Their testimony that there could have
been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumb mark of testator was affixed to
the documents embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping in their presence; and that her
thumb mark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead within their view, is
absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It
violates all sense of proportion.

200 | P a g e
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed and
executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and
trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary
and mental capacity of the time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio
Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead
since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the
provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the
Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-
affirmed, without costs.

201 | P a g e
 In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

GR. No. 13431, 12 November 1919

AVANCEÑA, J.:

Facts: The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The opponents
appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and
under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants‘ contention, are defects whereby the probate
of the will should have been denied. Further, appellants alleged records do not show that the
testatrix knew the dialect which the will is written.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal requisites
prescribed by law

RULING: The Supreme Court held that In requiring that each and every page of the will should
also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other
evidently has for its object to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the
testator‘s disposition. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at
the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin on the left
margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin,
the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and
must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the
bottom.

As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which the will is written, the
circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in the city of Cebu, and the
dialect in the locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.

The will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the

202 | P a g e
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that
both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.

203 | P a g e
 EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia
and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants.
G.R. No. 15566, September 14, 1921
STREET, J.:

FACTS: When the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia was allowed by the court, an appeal
was instituted contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity
of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia contesting the validity of the will by
reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written
on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the marginal signature of the testator and the
witnesses to be on the left margin in order for the will to be valid

RULING: While the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their
names on the left margin of each and every page, so far as concerns the authentication of the
will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on
the left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other.

The will in herein case contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of
deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin
instead of the left. By the signing of every page of the will, every page and provision of the will
is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would
have been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be
exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the
signatures in one margin or the other.

It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will
be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.

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 VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-18979, 11 S 422, June 30, 1964

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of
the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased. Petitioner also filed a motion for the admission of
an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate
with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate
which he allegedly found only after the filing of the petition. Respondent then filed her
opposition; and she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator. The records
show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the
petition consists of five pages. While signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the
signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and
her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three of the original, admits that he
may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3was
signed in his presence.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the
testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as
the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed
through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the
provisions of the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of one of the instrumental witnessess‘ signature on a page of
the original copy of the will is fatal where the duplicate has the complete signatures of the
testator and all witnesses on every page.

RULING: The Court held that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will
spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public
who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents. Moreover,

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there is no adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither.
The failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial
of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only by the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by
testatrix and all three witnesses.

Furthermore, that the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely
through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the
will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

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 In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased.
RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants,
vs.
FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-21151, 46 P 922, February 25, 1924

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: In this case, the validity of the testator‘s will is questioned by the opponents of the will
on the following matters: (a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of
the will. (b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will. (c) He did not request anybody to
attest the document as his last will. (d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.(e) The
witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on
the part of the testator that they were signing his will. (f) The witnesses did not sign the
attestation clause before the death of the testator. (g) This clause was written after the execution
of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the will after the death of the testator. (h)
The signatures of the testator on page 3 of the will are not authentic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the requirements of law

RULING: The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the
testator, the latter's mind was perfectly sane and he understood it: that he signed all the pages of
the will proper, although he did not sign the page containing the attestation clause; that while he
did not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as
such in his presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request
the witnesses to attest his will.

It was also sufficiently established in the record that the testator signed the will in the presence
of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of
each other; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator; that
this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator signed the
will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, and that all the
four sheets of which the will was actually composed were kept together and are the very ones
presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures of the testator on page 3 of said will are
authentic.

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As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appeal
on the upper part of the sheet, but it does appear in its text. It is provided in the clause that the
will is ―of three sheet actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this sheet . . . .‖ It is clear
that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will, including said sheet, has
four sheets. This description contained in the clause constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. The law does not require that the sheet
containing the attestation clause only, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged. Consequently
this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from the validity of the will.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court proceed with the
probate of the will Exhibit A in accordance with law, without express pronouncement as to costs.

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 Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-1787, 81 P 429, August 27, 1948

TUASON, J.:

FACTS: The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate but was opposed by the
appellant alleging the following grounds to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged
will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the
execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced
age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law,
and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was
procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia
Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick.

The appellant also alleges that the trial court has committed an abuse of discretion when it
allowed the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the
language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the
opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate
sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant
believes, is a fatal defect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of pagination in a 2-page will is fatal

RULINGL: The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of
wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or the loss of any
of its pages. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet is supplied by other forms of
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. By their

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meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the
bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use
of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the
direction for the disposition of the marker's property.

The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto
Lopez is affirmed, with costs.

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 In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
GR. No. 13431, 12 November 1919

AVANCEÑA, J.:

Facts: The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The opponents
appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and
under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants‘ contention, are defects whereby the probate
of the will should have been denied. Further, appellants alleged records do not show that the
testatrix knew the dialect which the will is written.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was
duly admitted to probate.

Issue: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law

Ruling: In requiring that each and every page of the will should also be signed on the left margin
by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act no. 2645 (which is the one
applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to
avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator‘s disposition. But when
these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin on the left margin of said
sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took

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into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have
referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But when all the dispositive parts of a will are
written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which the will is written, the
circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in the city of Cebu, and the
dialect in the locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed
with costs against the appellants.

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 FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006

TINGA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The
will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state
the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The
said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery and that the true
purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by
oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all
centering on petitioner‘s right to occupy the properties of the decedent.3 It also asserted that
contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate
heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. She also argued that the will
was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent‘s
signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged.

Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that ―the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause‖ is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as ―the substantial compliance rule.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will is valid.

RULING: The court held that a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will
which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or

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decrease in the pages. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance
with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the
will. The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of
the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner
of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,
petitioner,
vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray died in 1943. Both died
without legitimate children. Respondent Abaja filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.

Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in
1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed
for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not
intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the
alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto,
Teodora and Elena Abada and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco
also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada
and Toray. The RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any
motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray‘s will became final and
executory. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that
the testator signed the will and it‘s every page in the presence of three witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation
clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws

RULING: The Supreme Court held that f Abada‘s will has an attestation clause. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that
three witnesses signed it. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in
permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure
of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. The
Court applied the liberal construction in the probate of Abada‘s will. Abada‘s will clearly show
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there
are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.

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With respect to the allegation that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
the testator and of each other, the Court has ruled that precision of language in the drafting of an
attestation clause is desirable. However, it is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 47644.

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TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,
AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS
CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA
RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS
CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of
his life, executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano
Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. It was declared therein, among other things,
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera
and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. , Mateo Caballero
himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament.

The petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testator's will on the
ground that the attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the third
paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the
fact that the the testator signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the witnesses and that
they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
and of each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament complies
with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.

RULING: Article 805 provides that the attestation clause should state (1) the number of the
pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused
another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3)
that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and
that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another. Failure to state the said facts shall invalidate the will.

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In the present case, the attestation clause, while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well as the number
of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other.

The defects and imperfections of a will, with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein, would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was
really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that
the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation
clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated
in the attestation clause of a will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to
forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will
and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the
matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed
with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.

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 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF
DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte,
(Branch III, Maasin), respondent.
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

Facts: The last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez, written in the Cebuano-Visayan
dialect consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses
and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

The petition filed for the probate of said will was denied by the trial court for want of a formality
in its execution.

Issue: For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that
the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and
in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?

Ruling: Under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

Attestation and subscription are two different things. Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done
which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists
as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same
paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the
testator. Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the
will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of
the will as embodied in the attestation clause.

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WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which
denied the probate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the
motion for appointment of a special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered
to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this
decision.

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 HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-18799, March 31, 1964

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed a petition for probate of the will of his deceased
wife Digna Maravilla. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and
executor. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla filed an opposition to the probate of the will,
on the ground that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the
attesting witnesses and of one another.

Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having
been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. They also filed with the court a
petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory
within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for
in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on
the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and
an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the
order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court
from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed
for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction is correct

RULING: We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from,
assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative
to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of
respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal
property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by
respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. The Court

221 | P a g e
of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted,
considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of
the special administrator.

Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated
in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal
estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already
held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In a number of cases
where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect,
recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire. Not
having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate, considering that the amount
involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant
case, which are merely incidental thereto.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another
one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator. Without costs.

222 | P a g e
 ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A.
DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES
MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF
DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF
BUENAVENTURA GUERRA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the
probate of the alleged will and testament and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila. Buenaventura
and Marcelina both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition alleging among others that they are the
legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that
the purported will and codicil subject of the petition were procured through fraud and undue
influence; that the formalities requited by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not
been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the
free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on
November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which was duly probated and not revoked or
annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified
to act as administration of the estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in
accordance with the formalities of the law

RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is ample and satisfactory evidence to prove that
the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears
positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero
The execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and
before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. There is no showing that the above-named
lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty.

The object of the formalities required is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. While the
opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their
occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the
authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the
attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses.
Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the
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presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a
Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

The fact that the only pictures available are those which show the witnesses signing the will in
the presence of the testatrix and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also
signed the will before the presence of the witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy
only of what they show and prove and not of what they did not speak of including the events
they failed to capture.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far its it
disallowed the probate of the will and codicil. With costs against respondents.

224 | P a g e
 In re will of Maria Roque y Paraiso, deceased.
CEFERINO ALDABA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-17304, May 22, 1922

VILLAMOR, J.:

FACTS: Maria Roque executed last will and testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of
Vicente Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who signed the attestation clause and each
of the four pages of the testament. When her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested
by Ludovico Roque on the ground that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with
the requirements and solemnities prescribed by law. He claimed that "That each and every folio
of the said testament is not paged correlatively in letter," and "that the said will lacks the
attestation clause required by law."

ISSUE: Whether or not the errors assigned by the appellant are correct

RULING: With regard to the claim that each of the folios of the said testament is not paged
correlatively in letters "one." "two," "three," etc., but only with the letters A, B, C, etc., the Court
is of the opinion that this method of indicating the paging of the testament is a compliance with
the spirit of the law, since either one of the two ways above-mentioned indicates the correlation
of the pages and serves to prevent the loss of any of them.

The court held that It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the
general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must
be fully complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by
this court

As to the attestation clause, although it appears that it is the testatrix who made the declaration
about the points contained in the ―attestation clause‖, since the witnesses, together with the
testatrix, have signed the said declaration, the Court is of the opinion said clause constitute a
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law with respect to an attestation clause.
Following, therefore, the view maintained by this court in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, supra, as regards the appreciation of the solemnities of a testament, we decide that the
judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellant.

225 | P a g e
 Fernandez vs. Vergel

G.R. No. L-21151 . February 25, 1924

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: In this case, the validity of the testator‘s will is questioned by the opponents of the will
on the following matters: (a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of
the will. (b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will. (c) He did not request anybody to
attest the document as his last will. (d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.(e) The
witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on
the part of the testator that they were signing his will. (f) The witnesses did not sign the
attestation clause before the death of the testator. (g) This clause was written after the execution
of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the will after the death of the testator. (h)
The signatures of the testator on page 3 of the will are not authentic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the requirements of law

RULING: The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the
testator, the latter's mind was perfectly sane and he understood it: that he signed all the pages of
the will proper, although he did not sign the page containing the attestation clause; that while he
did not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as
such in his presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request
the witnesses to attest his will.

It was also sufficiently established in the record that the testator signed the will in the presence of
the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of each
other; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator; that this
clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator signed the will,
and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, and that all the four
sheets of which the will was actually composed were kept together and are the very ones
presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures of the testator on page 3 of said will are
authentic.

As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appeal
on the upper part of the sheet, but it does appear in its text. It is provided in the clause that the
will is ―of three sheet actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this sheet . . . .‖ It is clear
that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will, including said sheet, has
four sheets. This description contained in the clause constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. The law does not require that the sheet
containing the attestation clause only, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged. Consequently
this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from the validity of the will.

226 | P a g e
Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet containing the
attestation clause, the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as
its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court
proceed with the probate of the will Exhibit A in accordance with law, without express
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

227 | P a g e
 Guerrero vs Bihis

G.R. No. 174144. APRIL 17, 2007

CORONA, J.;

FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent
Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC Quezon City. Respondent
Bihis opposed her elder sister‘s petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the
requirement of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her
children procure the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioner Guerrero was appointed special administratix. Respondent opposed petitioner‘s

appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the
will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the was
acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix‘s residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for
and in Caloocan City.

ISSUE: Does the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article
806 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. one of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial
will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This
formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other
words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.

The notarial law provides:

Section 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-
extensive in the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the
limits of his jurisdiction.

The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the
interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the
testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

228 | P a g e
 LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,
- versus
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTSL: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, he finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and lived in the house and
lot which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years after his arrival
from the United States, and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a
little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages wherein he left all of his properties to his wife Josefina. But the allowance to probate of
the will was opposed by Leticia Valmonte, one of the siblings of the deceased. One of the
grounds raised in the opposition was the mental capacity of the testator, alleging that at the time
of the execution of the will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind.

The trial court denied the probate of the will. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
court and admitted the will to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will

RULING: According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to
know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed
of, (2) the proper objects of the testator's bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
Applying this test to the present case, the Court finds that the appellate court was correct in
holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity.
There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
229 | P a g e
one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body,
or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person
may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or
unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

230 | P a g e
 AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973

ESGUERRA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed
the allowance of the will alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully
informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her
objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament. Hence this appeal by
certiorari which was given due course.

Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to
simpler terms, the question was attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary
public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public to acknowledge the will.

On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor
of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the
notary public acted as one of them.

FACTS: Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring
at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.

RULING: After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, the Court sustained
that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance
with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v.
Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front
231 | P a g e
or preceding in space or ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English
Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252;
Webster's New International Dictionary 2d. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front
of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit
such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he

would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity
of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of Code Commission p. 106-107), would
be thwarted.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the probate
of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz is declared not valid and hereby set aside.

232 | P a g e
 Garcia v. Vasquez

G.R. No. L-27200 April 30, 1970

REYES, J.B.L.;

FACTS: Testatrix Gliceria del Rosario, during her lifetime executed two wills: one on June 9,
1956 and another one on December 29, 1960. She died on September 2, 1956, leaving no
descendant, ascendant, brother or sister.

On September 17, 1965, the private respondent petitioned the 1960 will for private. This was
opposed by petitioner Garcia as a legal legatee in the 1956 will and by the other petitioners as
relatives within the fifth civil degree and legatees in the 1956 and 1960 wills

The instrumental witnesses of the 1960 will testified that the testatrix first read silently the will
before she signed it. However, the ophthalmologist who treated the eye of the deceased from
August 1960-1963 testified that her eyesight during that time was mainly for viewing distant
objects and not for reading print.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix is considered legally blind

RULING: The testimony of the ophthalmologist of the deceased who had a first hand
knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August 1960 to 1963 is a conclusion
which is inescapable that which the condition of her eyesight in August 1960, and there is no
evidence that it had improved by December 29,1960. This renders her blind for purposes of
Article 808. It is worth noting that the instrumental witnesses stated that she read the instrument
―silently‖ which is a conclusion and not a fact.

Where the testator is blind, the will, must be read to her twice as required by Article 808 of the
Civil Code. The reason for this is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may
be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Hence, failure to comply with
these requirements makes the will invalid.

WHEREFORE, the order of the court below allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria
A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. The petition in G.R. No. L-26615 being
meritorious, the appealed order is set aside and the court below is ordered to remove the
administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, and appoint one of the heirs intestate of the
deceased Dona Gliceria Avelino del Rosafrio as special administrator for the purpose of
instituting action on behalf of her estate to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late
Alfonso D. Precilla. And in Case G.R. No. L-26864, petition is dismissed. No costs.

233 | P a g e
 In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido
Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO
LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate
Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 74695, 226 S 347, September 14, 1993

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: Seventy nine year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling
Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate. As testified to by the three
instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the
execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent,
as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the
testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the
reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Meanwhile, Brigido's
holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977.

On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido
Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not
personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud
in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the
notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3
January 1979 by private respondent as executor. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition.
Subsequently, a Probate Order was issued. Upon appeal, it was contended that the deceased was
blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached
thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was
admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been
denied.

The Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that
Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming
his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both
documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate
court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial
234 | P a g e
compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was
served.

ISSUE: Was the double-reading requirement of Article 808 complied with?

RULING: Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be
read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator
the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything
is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and
the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not
twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single
reading suffices for purposes of the law. The Court sustained private respondent's stand. The
Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of
the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado
already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even
prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the
purpose of securing his conformity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has
remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

235 | P a g e
 RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been
executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal
beneficiary and executrix. The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein
petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following
grounds: 1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative; 2. that the same was not executed
and attested as required by law; 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second
alternative; 4. That the purported Will was procured through undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
The trial court disallowed the will. On appeal, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed and attested as required by law

RULING: The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by

the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that
the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon
a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to
believe his testimony."

In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown
to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have
a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies
must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.

We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced
prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that
they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.

236 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

In the matter of the testate estate of the deceased JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO.
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees,
vs.
ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
G.R. No. L-8774, November 26, 1956

MONTEMAYOR, J.

FACTS: Spouses Mariano Molo and Juana Juan, not blessed with children, took into their home
and custody Emiliana Perez-Molo-Peckson, a niece of Juana, and Pilar Perez-Nable a half sister
of Emiliana. Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to his
wife. Juana, his widow, died on May 28, 1950, leaving no forced heirs but only collateral, —
children and grandchildren of her sisters. She left considerable property worth around a million
pesos or more, and to dispose of the same, she was supposed to have executed on May 11, 1948,
about two years before her death, a document purporting to be her last will and testament,
wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her property to her two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar.

These two foster daughters, as Petitioners, presented the document for probate. The other
relatives filed opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the instrument in question
was not the last will and testament of Juana; that the same was not executed and attested in
accordance with law; that the said supposed will was secured through undue pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries therein; that the signature of the testatrix was secured by
fraud and that she did not intend the instrument to be her last will; and that at the time the
instrument was executed, the testatrix Juana was not of sound and disposing mind.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attesting witnesses in the will are qualified under the law

RULING: The Court is in favor of the probate of the will. Section 620 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure provides that any person of sound mind and of the age of 18 years or more, and not
blind, deaf dumb, and unable to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. The
relationship of employer and employee or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will does not
disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of
wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said
witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence.

A credible witness is one who is not disqualified to testify or who is competent to testify to the
fact of execution of a will. Hence, the law does not bar relatives, either of the testator or of the
heirs or legatees, from acting as attesting witnesses to a will.

237 | P a g e
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO
LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR,
ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
1
COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.

G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely:
Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a
petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his
heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has
been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971,
that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of P6,000, testator Melecio executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio
Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No.
T-21178.

Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only P5,000.
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for
the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado
allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic
will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment, being premised on the fact that
the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a joint decision allowing the probate of the holographic will
and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the
respondents to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption
price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from
December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is dated, as
provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code

238 | P a g e
RULING: The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit. The will has been dated in the
hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.The law does not specify a
particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the
date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present
in the subject will.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5, 000 representing the redemption
price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the
property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5, 000, they were actually selling
property belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell , rendering such sale null
and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5, 000, to immediately
regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners
therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5, 000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is
hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED
probate. The private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

239 | P a g e
 LEON DE JESUS, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EUSEBIA DE JESUS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R.No. L-16553, November 29, 1961

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Melecio de Jesus,
the widow Ines Alejandrino, administratrix, filed an inventory of the estate, including therein Lot
No. 931 of the Cadastral Survey of Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 155.9334 hectares
and covered by a TCT in the name of the deceased. Subsequently, Eusebia de Jesus, the
deceased's sister, filed a verified claim against the estate for the amount of P7,585.84. This claim
was never heard. Instead, the administratrix Ines Alejandrino, claimant Eusebia de Jesus, and the
heirs of Cirilo de Jesus, another brother also deceased, entered into a Stipulation of Facts
wherein administratrix Alejandrino recognized that Eusebia de Jesus and Cirilo de Jesus are co-
owners with the deceased Melecio de Jesus of Lot No. 931, and that said parcel was registered in
the sole name of the deceased only in trust for all the co-owners.

On the same day, administratrix Ines Alejandrino and claimant Eusebia de Jesus entered into
another agreement called "Supplementary Stipulation of Facts" wherein the latter agreed to
waive and renounce her money claim for P7,585.84 against the estate upon the approval and
becoming final of the aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Both agreements were, on the very
day of their execution, presented to the court for approval, on the ground that they "will conserve
the family filiation and attachment and will forestall any litigation between them"; and on the
day following, the probate court entered an order approving both agreements. Years later, Ines
Alejandrino was replaced by her son Leon de Jesus in the administration of the estate of Melecio
de Jesus.

As such administrator, and joining as plaintiff his mother, Ines Alejandrino, former
administratrix, Leon de Jesus filed in the lower court the present action, seeking to annul the
stipulations entered by the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino with the defendants Eusebia de
Jesus and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus on the theory that they are null and void for lack
jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on them, as well as for lack of the requisite
notices to all the interested parties, specifically the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming res judicata and prescription. The trial
court sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on
them, or lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased.

240 | P a g e
RULING: The probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve of the stipulations in
question, not only as an incident to its power to exclude any property from the inventory of the
estate of the deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which permits the probate
court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to
authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to the person or persons for whose
use and benefit it was so held.

Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the
administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust
only "after notice given as required in the last preceding section";

i.e., that. "no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose
has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has been
given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper" (sec. 8, Rule 90).

This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of
the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and
where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance
itself, is completely void.

As this question or notice would ultimately decide the validity of invalidity of the entire
proceedings in the probate court leading to the approval of the contested stipulations, plaintiffs-
appellants should be given the opportunity to prove their claim that no such notice was given
them. It proved, the claim would likewise dispose of the defense of prescription put up by
defendants in their motion to dismiss, for an action to set aside completely void proceedings is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by lapse of time.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the court below for answer and trial on the merits. Costs against defendants-
appellees.

241 | P a g e
 In re estate of MARIA CRISTINA G. CALDERON. BASILISA SALTERAS,
POTENCIANA DE LA CRUZ, in their own behalf, and BENIGNO CALDERON, as the
natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
LUCAS EUGENIO, as administrator of the said estate, and PETRONILA
EUGENIO, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-7856, December 26, 1913

TORRES, J.:

FACTS: The deceased was a Filipino citizen resident of the City of Manila where he owned real
properties assessed at P188,017.81. He traveled abroad for his health and temporarily resided in
France. Not feeling very well, but in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, he decided to
make his last will and testament on April 14, 1930, in Paris, France, with the assistance of
attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller and Henri Gadd.

On July 15, 1930, he died in Switzerland. The herein petitioner-appellee, Francisco Carmelo
Varela, filed a petition praying that said will be admitted to probate. Said petition was opposed
by the deceased's brother Jose Miguel, Angel, Jesus, Trinidad, Paula, Pilar and Maria, surnamed
Varela Calderon, although, later on, the first mentioned opponent withdrew his opposition giving
as his reason therefor that it was out of respect for the testator's wishes because the will was
executed in his own handwriting.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of the deceased Francisco Varela Calderon,
was a valid holographic will made and executed, in accordance with the laws of the French
Republic.

RULING: The original will was executed in the French language and had been written, dated
and signed by the testator with his own hand, with the exception of the attestation clause which
appears at the bottom of the document. This fact is proved by the testimony of the appellee and
his other witnesses, including the depositions, and is admitted by the appellants.

The petition for the allowance and probate of said will is based on the provisions of article 970 of
the French Civil Code which considers as a holographic will that which is made or executed,
dated and signed by the testator in his own handwriting without the necessity of any other
formality, and on section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force in this jurisdiction which
provides that a will made out of the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the
country in which it was made and which may be allowed and admitted to probate therein, may,
also be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands in the same manner and with the
same effect as if executed in the latter country.

242 | P a g e
As we have already said, it is an admitted fact that the will was written, dated and signed by the
deceased testator, for which reason, there is no doubt that it had been made and executed in
accordance with article 970 of the French Civil Code were it not for the attestation clause which
appears at the bottom of the document.

The appellants contend that the addition of said of clause has entirely vitiated the will, because it
ceased to be a holographic will, neither does it possess the requisites of a public or open will in
accordance with the French law. The court which originally took cognizance of the case decided
that such circumstance does not invalidate the will.

The Supreme Court concurs in said opinion and hold that a clause drawn up in such manner is
superfluous and does not affect in any way the essential requisites prescribed for holographic
wills by the French law, and, consequently, it has not invalidated the will nor deprived it of its
holographic character. In reaching this conclusion, we base our opinion not

only on the clear and conclusive provisions of article 970 of the French Civil Code and on the
decisions of the French Court of Appeals cited in the appelee's brief, but principally on the fact
established in the depositions made by practicing attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C.
Miller and Henri Gadd of Paris, France, who emphatically declared that the will in question did
not lose its holographic character by the addition of the aforementioned attestation clause and
that it may be allowed to probate in conformity with the French laws under which it had been
made and executed.

For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that Petronila
Eugenio, Filomena Calderon, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa
Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and Josefa Calderon are entitled to
receive pro rata the sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29, Calle
Anloague, now Juan Luna. No special finding is made as to costs.

243 | P a g e
 ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI,
Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be

the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole
heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in
substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the
proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil
Code.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alterations, insertions, and/or additions in the will affect its validity

RULING: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration
did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect
must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the
Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given
efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by
affixing her full signature.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
244 | P a g e
 SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He
contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not
its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will
was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814
of the New Civil Code

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted for probate

RULING: Respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is
erroneous.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New
Civil Code, thus:

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic
will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
245 | P a g e
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with
respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in

Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the
holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification
as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

246 | P a g e
 EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA
PATIGAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate
of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. They claimed that the
deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed
the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in
the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.

Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an
impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. They argued that the repeated dates
incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased
was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear
at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And
assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at
least three witnesses explicitly declares that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of
the testator is mandatory.

RULING: In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil
Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a
contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the
will is the genuine signature of the testator.

The Supreme Court is convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code
is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. It ruled that "shall" in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to
prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and

247 | P a g e
the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño
vda. de Ramonal.

248 | P a g e
 JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio
Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of
the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate.
It was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed
special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not
the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The
Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent
was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decedent‘s holographic wills may be admitted for probate.

HELD:Yes. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in petitioner‘s argument is that, as already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of
requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who
authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioner.

249 | P a g e
250 | P a g e
 TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E.
GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.

G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan
initiated a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented.
Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of
Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who
have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator

HELD: No. Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial
evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the
only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the
subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses
are available to authenticate.

The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the
oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at
hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one
of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important
ones, may go undetected.

Thus, the Court reached the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will.

Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.

251 | P a g e
252 | P a g e
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG,
intervenor.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla
Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule
75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it
was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509;
and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.

ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.

HELD: Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Pursuant to Article 811 of the
Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
execution has been proved. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy
is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by
other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the

253 | P a g e
lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion
for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her
petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

254 | P a g e
Re: Revocation of Wills

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE
MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Juana Juan Vda. de Molo sought the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by
the respondents, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case
was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered
decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the
same was executed in accordance with law.

Petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August
17, 1918. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds:
(1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will
has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently
revoked. But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and the
records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the
same was found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the
copies required for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition similar to the one
destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same grounds as those
contained in their former opposition.

The court issued an order admitting the will to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased which was
denied probate is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.

HELD:MIt is void. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be
given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two
different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake
as to his intention of dying testate.

255 | P a g e
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

256 | P a g e
 CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION EUGENIO,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL, objectors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
ARAULLO, J.:

FACTS: Simeona F. Naval executed a will on February 13, 1915. The will was presented for
allowance by the named executor. After hearing, the petition for allowance was denied on the
ground that said document was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and testament,
inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witnesses and the two witnesses did not
sign it in the presence of each other.

Thereafter, the nieces and legatees of the deceased filed in the same court for allowance of the
latter‘s will, another document executed by her on October 31, 1914. The petition for allowance
was opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval because of the existence of
another will of subsequent date executed during the lifetime of the deceased. Thus, said will has
been revoked by the subsequent will.

The court admitted the second document and ordered its allowance as the last will and testament
of the deceased. From said order, the opponents appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of October 31, 1914 has been revoked by that of February 13,
1915.

HELD: NO. In order that a former will may be revoked by operation of law by a subsequent
will, it is necessary that the latter should be valid and executed with the formalities required for
the making of wills.

The 1915 will was declared by the probate court invalid on the ground that it was not executed
with the requisites and formalities prescribed by law. Thus, the prior was not validly revoked.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellants.

257 | P a g e
258 | P a g e
 Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac died on the 2nd day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of
the Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918,
he executed a last will and testament. On January, 1922, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the
probate of that will. The probate was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa,
Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition for the probate of said will was denied
on the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and
testament.

On February 21, 1925, an action was commenced to secure the probate of the 1919 will. The
oppositors alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by
Miguel Mamuyac, (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the Mamuyac‘s
lifetime and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased.

The judge denied the probate of said will on the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920.

The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence
that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the
same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will was a mere
carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will in question was revoked by the testator.

HELD: Yes. There is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that
the will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the
revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. The fact that such cancellation or revocation
has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
259 | P a g e
knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was
not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the facts that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator
and the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the Court concludes that the conclusions
of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate
a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to
show that it has been revoked.

260 | P a g e
 In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased.
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922
VILLAMOR, J.:

FACTS: On July 19, 1918, Dona Josefa Zalamea, single, 60 years old, executed her last will
and testament with an attached inventory of her properties, in the presence of three witnesses,
who signed with her all the pages of said documents. She died on January 6, 1921, and, as the
record shows, the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed on January 19, 2001 an
application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of administration in
his favor.

An opposition was presented by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago
Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity
with the provisions of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters; nor was
there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the
presence of each other.

The CFI ordered the probate of the will, and the inventory, holding that both documents
contained the true and last will of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inventory may be probated despite the lack of attestation clause
therein.

HELD: YES. In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, Exhibit A-1,
and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea says:

"In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page containing the
signatures and the attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the inventory attached to
this will composed of ten folios in the presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea,
Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippine Islands, this 19th of July,
1918."

And the attestation clause is as follows:

"The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have affixed our
signatures, as well as the inventory of the properties of Dona Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read
to Dona Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter affixed her name to name the last, and each and
every page of this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our presence; and she declared
this to be her last will and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our respective
261 | P a g e
signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the will and the
inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P. I.

"GONZALO ABAYA,

"EUGENIO ZALAMEA,

"PEDRO DE JESUS."

In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, the
foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this
solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end
of the inventory.

262 | P a g e
 YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: On August 23, 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a
petition in the CFI, Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate. Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on August 11, 1909.
Accompanying said petition and attached thereto was alleged will of the deceased. The will was
signed by deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.

No further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the
said will and desired to intervene. They contended that the will dated the 11th day of August,
1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court was null. One of the reasons they laid down
is that before the execution of the said will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed
another will, with all the formalities required by law, on August 6, 1909.

The lower court found the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, which was
attached to the record, as the last will and testament of the said testator and admitted it to probate
and ordered that the administrator therefore appointed should continue as such administrator.
From that order, the objectors appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the August 11, 1909 revoked the August 6, 1909.

HELD: Yes. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute
the will of August 6, 1909. Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that
she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute a later will. She had perfect right,
by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last
moment of her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her
former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly
revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

One of the assigned errors was that the signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong in her first will
was not identical with that which appears in her second will, thus the inference that she had not
signed the second will. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa."
One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. If Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign the same, such will amount
263 | P a g e
to a signature. In the present case Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name,
did at least sign her given name "Tomas," and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

264 | P a g e
 ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI,
Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: On September 1, 1971, private respondent Gregorio K. Kalaw, claiming to be the sole
heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition for probate of her holographic
will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole
heir. Hence, petitioner Rosa K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging that the holographic will
contained alterations, corrections, insertions without the proper authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.

Rosa‘s position was that the holographic will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir.

The trial court denied probate. The court adjudged based on the NBI report that the handwriting,
the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same
person. It was the handwriting of the decedent. However, since the alterations and/or insertions
or additions were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix based on Article 814 of
the Civil Code, the court denied the will to be probated.

Gregorio moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, Rosa filed a petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,
should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.

HELD:

NO. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator
in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated
as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration
did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect
must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for nothing remains in the will after that which
could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard
265 | P a g e
the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

Petition dismissed. Assailed decision affirmed.

266 | P a g e
 Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: The purpose of this action was to obtain the probate of a last will and testament of
Miguel Mamuyac, who died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that on or about the
July 27, 1918, the deceased executed a last will and testament in January, 1922, to which
Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probate of that will. The probate of the same was
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac.
The petition for probate of said will was denied upon the ground that the deceased had on the
April 16, 1919, executed a new will and testament.

On February 21, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the probate
of the said 1919 will. To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon,
and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the
second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been
cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not
the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

The trial court denied the probate of the 1919 will upon the ground that the same had been
cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.

ISSUE: What is the concept of the presumption of revocation?

HELD: The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be
preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be
inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a
will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such
will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,

267 | P a g e
being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome
by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

268 | P a g e
 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DAMASA CRISOSTOMO. NAZARIO
TRILLANA, administrator-appellee,
vs.
CONSORCIA P. CRISOSTOMO, ET ALS, petitioners-appellants.

G.R. No. L-3378 August 22, 1951

FERIA, J.:

FACTS: Damasa Crisostomo executed a will on August 16, 1948. However, she executed
another will on October 19, 1948 revoking the former will. The appellants contend that the
lower court erred in denying their petition for relief from the judgment of January 5, 1949,
admitting to probate the will of October 19, 1948. They submit to the Court three propositions,
to wit: (a) "The judgment of January 5, was obtained through fraud;" (b) "The lower court failed
to perform its legal duty to set a date for proving the will of August 16, 1948;" and (c) "The
failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 jointly with the will of October 19
was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence."

ISSUE: Whether or not the revoked will of August 16, 1948 should be included in probate of the
subsequent will of October 19, 1948.

HELD: NO. The petitioners-appellants failed to show that the judgment of the lower court
probating the October 1948 will of testatrix was obtained through fraud thus the lower court did
not commit any error in denying the appellants' petition for relief under Sec. 2, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for the court to discuss and pass upon the other
propositions of the appellant.

"Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all persons.
The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such
party to be present at the date appointed for the probate of the will does not render the order of
probate void for "lack of due process."

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court shall set aside a date for proving a will even without petition
when it is delivered to the court having jurisdiction. The lower court was right in not setting a
date for proving the will of August 16, 1948, because this will was expressly and absolutely
revoked by the subsequent will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix, which was
filed for allowance on November 1, 1948, with the same probate court. According to the
attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16, 1948, was sent together with a writing
called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948, from Manila to the probate court
and said will must have been received by the Clerk of said Court on or after November 1, 1948,

269 | P a g e
the date when the subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate. It stands to reason that if
two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revokes expressly and absolutely the other,
the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would
be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is also allowed. The
revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.

In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants.

270 | P a g e
RE: allowance and disallowance of wills

HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P.

Llonillo, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 168156 December 6, 2006

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City
belonged to the spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The spouses sold the said lots to
their children Isabel and Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed eastern portion shall
belong to Isabel Cuntapay as evidenced by a notarized partition agreement. Isabel was first
married to Domingo Turingan, they had four children named Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria.
When the first husband died, Isabel married Rosendo Lasam. She had two children by him
named Trinidad and Rosendo.

In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the respondent who is the daughter of Abdon
Turingan, a son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The petitioner anchored their claim on
the disputed property on the purported will of Isabel Cuntapay whereby she bequeathed the said
property to Rosendo Lasam. The last will and testament relied upon was not probated.The
MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that they are the owners of the
property based on the alleged will of Isabel Cuntapay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the
petitioner‘s right to possess the subject lot.

HELD: No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be
relied upon to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot because, without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court…..

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any
time prior to the testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it
has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‗No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.‘"
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that "[b]efore any will can have
force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or
tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is
the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and
that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of

271 | P a g e
sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will." Moreover, the
presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated May 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80032 are AFFIRMED.

272 | P a g e
 SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 115925 August 15, 2003

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino are the
niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and 11
other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-owners of a
parcel of land.On November 20, 1951, Canuto had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots.
Lot 2-A and Lot 2-E were placed under Canuto‘s name. Three other individuals took the
remaining lots.

On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan.
Under the Kasulatan, Canuto sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion for P2,
250.00. The Kasulatan was duly notarized. Consolacion immediately took possession of Lots 2-
A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real
estate taxes.On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto executed an affidavit
affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion. They also attested that the lots their father had
sold to Consolacion were Lots 2-A and 2-E.

The Register of Deeds issued a transfer of certificate to Consolacion. On February 4, 1988,

Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse Ricardo Pascual for the
annulment or cancellation of TCT and damages. Remedios claimed that she is the owner of the
lots sold by Canuto to Consolacion because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalina‘s last
will and testament dated May 29, 1964. Remedios added that Consolacion obtained title to these
lots through fraudulent means. On the other hand, the petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of prescription.

The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering Remedios to pay petitioners.
The complaint filed by Remedios had already prescribed. The trial court further ruled that
Remedios has no right of action against petitioners because Catalina‘s last will from which
Remedios claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of the deceased should be probated first before the rights of the
parties to the case can be ascertained

HELD: Yes. The probation of the will is essential in order for Remedios to have a cause of
action against petitioners. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that ―[N]o will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.‖
Thus, until admitted to probate, a will has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder. And since the probate court has not admitted Catalina‘s last will, Remedios has not

273 | P a g e
acquired any right under the Last Will. Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to
seek reconveyance of Lots 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
January 1994 and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is DISMISSED.

274 | P a g e
 MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
ESTEBANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondent.

G.R. No. 12099 October 30, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS: Torcuato Reyes signed his will in the presence of three witnesses, Antonio Veloso,
Gloria Borromeo and Soledad Gaputa. In said will Julio Vivares was named executor and in his
default, Roch Alan Vibares. In the will the testator gave all his properties to Asuncion Reyes,
which was described by the testator as his ―wife‖.

Torcuato Reyes died and eventually Julio filed a petition for the probate of the will. There were
two families who opposed the probate. First, the children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo-
Manuel, Mila and Danilo. Second, the children of Torcuato with Celsa Agape- Lyn and Marites.

The oppositors alleged the following: (1) Reyes‘ Last Will and Testament was not executed and
attested in accordance with the formalities required by law; (2) Asuncion Reyes Ebarle, the wife
Torcuato acknowledged in his LWT, exerted undue and improper influence upon Reyes at the
time of the execution of the will; and (3) Torcuato Reyes can never be married with Asuncion
Reyes because Torcuato was married to Lupo Ebarle who was still alive and his marriage was
never annulled.

The probate court found out that the LWT was executed in accordance with the formalities of the
law; and also ruled that Asuncion and Torcuato were not married.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of the testator in the will that Asuncion is his wife is
sufficient to prove the fact of marriage

HELD: Yes. Justice Moreland said, “A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions
have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before
the court if full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That
was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so. x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s
having meant just what he said.”

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

275 | P a g e
 ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE
ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.

Mary Concepcion-Bautista for petitioner.

Santiago, Salunat and Agbayani for respondent Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut.

G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: SoteroBaluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to
Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his
estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene,
Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin,
all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not
mentioned in that will. Alfredo Baluyot, filed in the CFI of Quezon City a verified petition for
letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion
Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent‘s estate.

Lopez argued and showed proof that the widow was declared an Incompetent by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
The probate court instituted Mrs. Baluyut as the administrator of the estate, the lower court
ratiocinated that as the surviving spouse she has the preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it appointed
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix

HELD: Yes. While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should be
named administrator without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that
trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as
executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the
issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing should be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act
as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but
supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. It was held that a
hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors
a chance to contest the petition.

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It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. After the will is
probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance
of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate
court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in
this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

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 ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, PETITIONERS,
VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN
CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, AND TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. L-24742 OCTOBER 26, 1973

FACTS: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor
sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, and by his children of the
first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales.

On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration,
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964;
that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal
properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated
10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City
court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court
in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

The Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of
the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament.

RULING: The Court holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate
petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as
surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it
(the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the
278 | P a g e
intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of April 10,
1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter
free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of
the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of
jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15,
1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become
final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

279 | P a g e
 ISIDORA VENTURA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. AUREA CONSUELO FELIX,
ET AL., OPPONENTS-APPELLEES

G.R. No. L-8190 31 December 1913

FACTS: On the 17th of October, 1908, Isidora Ventura made a donation of the lands in dispute
in this action in favor of her grandchildren Aurea Consuelo, Filomena Natividad, Leonarda
Concepcion, and Paz Romana, all surnamed Felix, reserving to herself the life use of said
premises, she to be responsible to all taxes and ordinary repairs during the time of her
occupation. On the same day and within the same instrument the donation was accepted by the
recipients thereof. On the 18th of December of the same year the said Isidora Ventura,
notwithstanding the donation which had become effective theretofore in favor of her
grandchildren, sold the said lands to Ines Feliciano, reserving to herself the right to repurchase
the same. On the 30th of June, 1909 a proceeding having been commenced by Isidora Ventura to
register the title to said lands, decree was entered therein registering the title in her name, subject
to an incumbrance of P1,400 in favor of Concepcion Enriquez, and subject also to the sale with a
right to repurchase hereinabove mentioned. Before that decree became final a motion was made
for the revision thereof praying that it be vacated and that a new decree be issued registering the
title in the name of those to whom said Isidora Ventura had made the donation. To this motion
Isidora Ventura gave her full and free consent and in pursuance thereof the original decree was
vacated and a new decreed made and entered registering the title to the lands described therein in
the name of the donees.

The 18th of December, 1910, being the last day upon which the repurchase could be made by
virtue of the terms of the sale with a right to repurchase made between Isidora Ventura and Ines
Feliciano, said Isidora Ventura on the 9th of that month paid to Ines Feliciano the sum required
by said instrument for the redemption of the lands described therein. Upon receiving payment
said Ines Feliciano executed in favor of Isidora Ventura a resale of the premises described in the
sale with a right to repurchase, which was duly acknowledged before a notary public on the 18th
of February, 1911. Said instrument was presented to the registrar of titles for registration under
the Torrens Law, Registration thereof was refused and this proceeding was brought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Isidora Ventura is the absolute owner of the land in litigation.

RULING: The Court is clearly of the opinion that the Court of Land Registration correctly
decided the case.Isidora Ventura having made in due and legal form a donation of her lands to
the donees mentioned in the instrument, and said donation having been duly accepted in
accordance with law, title to the lands donated passed immediately to the donees subject to the
reserved life interest of the donor. From that time forward Isidora Ventura had no interest in the
lands other than that of a life tenant. She has no power to make an absolute sale of the lands in
question and, therefore, the sale with a right of repurchase executed in favor of Ines Feliciano on
December 18, 1908, was an act wholly beyond her power and conveyed nothing, so far as the
donees were concerned, to Ines Feliciano.

280 | P a g e
Nor did the fact that a decree in the Court of Land Registration was issued in favor of Isidora
Ventura registering title to said lands in her name confer any permanent rights or interest. That
decree before becoming final was vacated and set aside and another decree substituted in its
place wherein and whereby the title to the lands described therein was registered in the name of
the rightful owners. No benefits could be claimed, therefore, under the original decree either by
Isidora Ventura or by her alleged vendee Ines Feliciano. When, therefore, on the 9th of
December, 1910, Isidora Ventura paid to Ines Feliciano the purchase price of the lands as
provided in their contract of sale with a right to repurchase, she accomplished nothing more than
the payment of a personal debt which she owed, the payment of which in nowise affected the
lands in litigation. The title to such lands was not in Ines Feliciano nor did she have any interests
therein by virtue of the sale with a right to repurchase executed in her favor by Isidora Ventura.
As a necessary consequence, the instrument of resale executed by Ines Feliciano in favor of
Isidora Ventura was without force or effect so far as the title to the premises therein described
was concerned. Having no title or interest therein, she could convey or reconvey none to Isidora
Ventura.

281 | P a g e
 ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ROSARIO GUEVARA
AND HER HUSBAND PEDRO BUISON, RESPONDENT-APPELLEES

G.R. No. L-48840 29 December 1943

OZAETA, J.:

FACTS: It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently
with all the formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died. His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding
ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara,
his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to
him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the
purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in
her custody, presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to
prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter.
Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on
the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which
reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals
sustained that theory.

ISSUE: Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an
acknowledged natural daughter.

RULING: In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of
the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights
be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with
that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law
expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in
rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial,
without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his
property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal
notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will
presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it
could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
for reinvindicacion or partition.
282 | P a g e
 TESTAMENTARIA DEL FINADO REV. P. ELEUTERIO PILAPIL. ADRIANO
MENDOZA, APPELLANT, VS. CALIXTO PILAPIL Y OTROS, OPPOSITOR-
APPELLEE

G.R. No. L-47931 27 June 1941

DIAZ, J.:

FACTS: El P. Eleuterio Pilapil, siendo Cura de la parroquia de Mualboal de la Provincia de

Cebu, fallecio en la ciudad de este nombre el 6 de diciembre de 1935. No habiendose presentado
ningun testamento suyo despues de su muerte, por lo menos hasta principios de febrero de 1939,
su hermano Calixto Pilapil promovio el dia 6 de dichos mes y ano,el expediente de intestado No.
399 para pedir que fuesenombrado administrador de los bienes relictos de el. Recibida a prueba
la solicitud que habia presentado para elindicado fin, previas las publicaciones de los avisos
presritos por la ley, y oyendo el Juzgado previamente a los quecomparecieron para oponerse a la
misma, entre los cuales estaban el mismo apelado y Simeona Pilapil, el Juzgado se la concedio,
nombrandole acto seguido administrador de dicho Intestado. A los pocos dias, o sea el 4 de
marzo de 1939, el apelado promovio a su vez el expediente No. 407 de que antes se ha hecho
mencion, para pedir la legalizacion como testamento del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, del Exhibit
A que es el duplicado al carbon del Exhibit C. Hay entre las clausulas de dichos dos documentos.

ISSUE: Whether or not probate is necessary in the present case.

RULING: Indudablemente no le falto razon al Juzgado de Cebu para nombrar administrador

especial en el expediente No. 407, al apelado, porque en los documentos que alli se trataban de
legalizar como testamento y disposicion de ultima voluntad del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil, consta
el encargo expreso de que lo fuese. Ademas, no habia ni hay ninguna ley que prohiba a los
Tribunales que conocen de un expediente de testamentaria o de intestado, nombrar a mas de un
administrador; y, en el caso de que se trata ocurrio que se dejo sin efecto el nombramiento del
apelante como administrador, luego que se fundieron los dos referidos expedientes. Mas todavia;
si el proposito de los apelantes al proponer la cuestion de que venimos hablando, es dejar sin
efecto el nombramiento expedido a favor del apelado como administrador especial, vano es y
vano ha de ser dicho proposito, porque el insistir en el equivale a estar apelando de una orden del
Juzgado que nombra a un administrador especial; y la ley no permite apelacion contra ordenes de
dicha naturaleza. Es terminante la disposicion de ley que dice: "No se permitira la apelacion
contra el nombramiento de dicho administrador especial". (Art. 660, Ley No. 190.)

En adicion a todo esto debe decirse que, si hubo algun error en el nombramiento del apelado
como administrador especial, por la razon de que otro en propiedad ya estaba nombrado por el
Juzgado, el error, si tal puede llamarse, no ha sido de tal naturaleza que haya causado perjuicio
alguno a nadie, y menos a la Testamentaria del finado P. Eleuterio Pilapil.

Las raspaduras y alteraciones que se notan en los exhibits A y C constituyen unos hechos a los
que ahora, por primera vez, y en esta instancia, se quiere llamr la atencion, cuando ello debio
haberse hecho mientras la causa se hallaba todavia en el Juzgado de su procedencia. No podemos
tenerlos en cuenta en el presente estado de las actuaciones porque, suponiendo que entonces ya
283 | P a g e
existian, puede y debe decirse, aunque no lo dijo en terminos expresos el Juzgado de Cebu, que
considero que no viciaban dichos documentos; pues es presuncion juris tantum que "todos los
hechos relacionados con los puntos discutidos en un juicio fueron expuestos al juzgado y
apreciados por el". (Art. 334, par. 16, Ley No. 190.) Y no lo viciaron en efecto, porque se
desprende de las mismas circunstancias del caso, que se hicieron precisamente para poner las
cosas en su verdadero lugar. Los dos exhibits A y C fueron preparados por el finado P. Eleuterio
Pilapil en Mualboal donde era Cura Parroco, antes de ser transladado para ser tratado de su
enfermedad que le causo la muerte, al Southern Islands Hospital de Cebu, donde murio.
Fundandose el Juzgado en estos hechos qcion de los tres testigos instrumentales del documento
tuvo lugar de una manera casual, en ocasion en que los mismos fueron a visitarle a Eleuterio
Pilapil que estaba enfermo en el Southern Islands Hospital, y alli el hoy finado les rogo que
actuaran de testigos del documento que ya tenia entonces preparado".

284 | P a g e
 LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, FOR HERSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT OF VICENTE DOROTHEO AND JOSE DOROTHEO,respondents

G.R. No. 108581 8 December 1999

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare the Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will extrinsically valid is also intrinsically valid.

RULING: It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given
effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the
will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early
as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very
object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur
on the slothful. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur
herein.

285 | P a g e
 NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE AND AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioner,
VS.
GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFLOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. 126950 02 July 1999

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and
was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all
surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication and
hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order dated
March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras
Nufable.

However, one of the heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire property to DBP two months
prior to the settlement which property was eventually foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the
mortgagors, purchased said property from DBP.

The other heirs now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property to Nelson and the other three-
fourths to the other heirs.

Petitioners filed this present petition contending that the probate of the Last Will and Testament
of Edras Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Edras Nufable and its subsequent
probate pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson who
purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of DBP.

RULING: No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect the
title of Nelson. At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of Edras had
already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the

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purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of
Edras Nufable was admitted to probate, or that the settlement of the estate was approved. It is
also to be noted that it was the will of the decedent that the subject property should remain
undivided, although the restriction should not exceed 20 years pursuant to Article 870 of the
Civil Code.

Thus, Angel had no right to mortgage the entire property. His right to the property was limited
only to his one-fourth pro indiviso share. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only
alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned propert

287 | P a g e
 JUAN PALACIOS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MARIA CATIMBANG
PALACIOS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE

G.R.No. L-12207 24 December 1959

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Juan Palacio executed his last will and testament and availing himself of the provisions
of the new Civil Code, he filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its
approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio Palacio and
Andrea Palacio.

Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus
impairing her legitimate.

After the presentation of petitioner‘s evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities
provided by the Law for the validity of a will, the court issued an order admitting the will to
probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic
validity of the will and after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another
order declaring opposition to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will in so far as
it impairs her legitimate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will is proper.

RULING: Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has
been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the
opposition is to show that the opposition is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised in said proceeding but in a separate
action. This is especially so when the testator is still alive and has merely filed a petition for
allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.

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ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ AND
MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S.
LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES AND ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents

G.R. No. 108947 29 September 1997

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent, Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child spouses Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca while the other private respondents are the legitimate children of respondent
Rosalia.

Petitioners are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.

Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, Rosalia a petition for letters of
administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, who was at the time in
state of senility.

In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the
deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren,
namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further
that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2)
of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the
ownership of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as
a probate court.

ISSUE: Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a
probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to the
properties subject of such deeds.

RULING: As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its
assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in

289 | P a g e
this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title
only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that ―in a special proceeding for the probate of a will;
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in
the case at bar.‖ Jurisprudence teaches: ―[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate and which are claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.‖
Furthermore, the trial court parties‘ compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the ground that
the compromise agreement ―was not approved by the court,‖ is tantarmount to ―an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and
within the bounds of law.‖

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 JOSE RIVERA,petitioner
VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ADELAIDO J. RIVERA

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 15 February 1990

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of the town of Mabalacat named
Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio‘s estate. It
was opposed by Adelaido Rivera who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido
averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic
wills.

Adelaido filed a petition for probate of the two holographic wills this was opposed by Jose.

Adelaido was later on appointed special administrator. After trial, Jose was found not the son of
the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio
Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had 7 children
including Adelaido.

The holographic will was also admitted to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic wills are valid.

RULING: Yes. The respondent court considered them valid because it was found them to have
been written, dated, signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the 3 witnesses required under Article 811
because the authenticity of the will had not been in questioned. The existence and therefore the
authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera.

291 | P a g e
Jose opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido and claimed that they were spurious.
Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Art. 811 of the Civil
Code, provided as follows: in the probate of a holographic will it shall be necessary that at least 1
witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will
and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will contested, at least 3 witnesses
shall be required. The flaw in this argument is that as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is
not the son of the deceased Venancio whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger,
he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect
of requiring the 3 witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio who authenticated the
wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

292 | P a g e
 VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant ,
VS.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor appellee

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Maria Mortera died in 1955. She left a will, duly acknowledged before a notary public
and witnesses. The will stated that she freely executed the will with sound mind, good health.
Among the many legacies and devisees made in the will was one P20,000.00 to Rene Teodico,
husband of her niece Josefina Mortera. She also instituted Josefina as her sole and universal heir
to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Vicente Teodico filed a petition for probate of will before the CFI and a hearing was set.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testator, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, deceaseed brother of testator,
filed an opposition of the will alleging that: 1.) said will was not executed as required by law; 2.)
testator was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of the execution;
3.) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, however, allowed the oppositor to intervene as the
adopted child of Francisca. She amended her opposition, alleging the additional ground that the
will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because he was the physician who took
care of testator during her last illness.
Petitioner Teotico, together with Josefina, filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision on
the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico, while the oppositor filed a motion for
reconsideration on the decision decreeing the probate of the will. Both motions were denied.
Both appealed.

293 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the
nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
RULING: The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the
following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained
in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."

The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.

"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a
will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec.
625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid."

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 TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP, DECEASED. FAUSTO
E. GAN, petitioner appellant,
VERSUS
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor appellee

G.R. No. L-12190 30 August 1958

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS: It was stipulated that Felicidad AltoYap died of heart failure on November 20, 1951,
leaving properties in Pulitan, Bulacan and in the City of Manila. Fausto E. Gan, the petitioner
and appellant herein, filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by
the deceased on March 17, 1952. In order to justify his claim, he tired to establish the contents
and due execution of the will by the statements in open court of Felisa Enguerra, Primitivo
Reyes, Socorro Olarte, and Rosario Gan Jimenez, who testified that they have witnessed the
execution of the will in question as the same has been read to them when they happen to visit the
deceased when she was still at the UST Hospital. The petitioner, however, failed to present in
court a copy of the alleged holographic will.

On the other hand, her surviving spouse, Ildefonso Yap, the opposite and appellee herein,
asserted that the deceased had not left any will nor executed a testament during her lifetime.

The Court of First Instance rendered a decision refusing to probate the alleged will and thereafter
denied the motion for reconsideration submitted thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of Felicidad Alto Yap be probated.

RULING: It was held that in the probate of holographic will a copy thereof must be duly
presented in court in order to determine that the will has been written and duly authenticated by

295 | P a g e
the testator. Therefore, the failure to present a copy thereof will classify the same as lost or
destroyed. The court then held that the execution and the contents of the lost or destroyed
holographic may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect as the law
regards the document as a material proof of authenticity.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.

G.R. No. L-58509 7 December 1982

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS: This is a consolidated petition filed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
Treyes, Expidite Bonilla Frias, and Ephralm Bonilla, the oppositors and appelles herein,
opposing the petition filed by Marcela Rodelas, the petitioner and appellant herein, for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters of testamentary in
her favor. The latter presented in court an alleged copy of the said holographic will.

The probate court ordered the dismissal of appellant‘s petition for the allowance of the
holographic will of deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla on the ground that the alleged photostatic copy
of the will which was presented for probate, cannot stand in lieu of the lost original, for the law
regards the document itself as the material proof of the authenticity of the said will.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will that was lost or cannot be found be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.

RULING: The court held that if a holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy
is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in the said will as it is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

296 | P a g e
However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

RE: Production of Witnesses

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY AND MANUEL RAMONAL, PETITIONERS, VERSUS
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, AND EUFEMIA PATIGAS,
RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. L-123486 12 August 1999

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo, Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. De Ramonal, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died
on January 16, 1990.

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the
petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is
illegible. This gives an impression that a ―third hand‖ of an interested party other than the ―true
hand‖ of Matilde Seño Vda. De Ramonal executed the holographic will.

Respondent presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. However, the lower
court denied probate of the will for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the
holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. De Ramonal.

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RULING: The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will,
that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine
signature of the testator.

The Supreme Court was convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The SC ruled that ―shall‖ in a statue commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is consistent with the idea of discretion and the presumption is that the word
―shall‖, when used in a statue is mandatory.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that
they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, Clerk of
Court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely uidentified the record of said case
before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic was that of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance
of comparison was when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay during the cross-
examination to compare the documents having the signature of the deceased with that of the
holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

298 | P a g e
 ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
VERSUS
HONORABLE JUAN DE BORJA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN AND ADELAIDA JACALAN,
RESPONDENTS

G.R. No. L-21993 21 June 1966

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition against the court of
first instance of Bulacan for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss in especial proceeding
No. 1331 which said court is alleged to have taken cognizance of it without jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that the court has no jurisdiction to try the case due to the pendency of
another action for for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in
the court of First Instance of Rizal namely Special Proceedings no 3907. They contend that
since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 a.m. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 a.m. an the same date, the
latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support
thereof the case of Vda. De Borja vs. Jan.

The respondents, on the other hand, take the stand that the CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the clerk of court on March 4, 1963 and that
the case in this court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

299 | P a g e
ISSUE: When did the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the
will of the late father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963 even if no petition for its allowance was filed
until later, because upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps
to fix the time and place of proving the will and issued the corresponding notices conformably to
what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court. Accordingly, the use of
the disjunctive in the words ―when a will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of may
act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent‘s testament even if no petition for its allowance
is as yet filed.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the CFI of Bulacan ahead of any other that court
is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts even if it were a case of
wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. The disposition
presupposes that 2 or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of them, only one could be of proper venue yet the rule grants precedence to that court
whose jurisdiction is first invoked without taking venue into account.

Furthermore, 2 other reasons may be invoked against the petitioners, that is, (1.) Bad faith and
(2.) our system of civil law provides that intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to
the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

300 | P a g e
 TESTATE ESTATE OF GLICERIA A. DEL ROSARIO, DECEASED. CONSUELO S.
GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, PETITIONER-ADMINISTRATRIX,
-VERSUS-
SEVERINA NARCISO, ROSA NARCISO, JOSEFA NARCISO, VICENTE MAURICIO,
DELFEN MAURICIO, REMEDIOS NARCISO, ENCARNACIONNARCISO, MARIA
NARCISO, EDUARDO NARCISO, FR. LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE
PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS-DR. JAIME ROSARIO, ET. AL.,
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO-SARMIENTO, AND PASCUALA NARCISO-MANAHAN,
OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS

G.R. No.L-27200 18 August 1972

FACTS: A motion for reconsideration/new trial was filed by petitioner – appeal praying that the
decision of the court promulgated on April 30, 1970 disallowing the purported will of the
deceased Gliceria A. Del Rosario be reconsidered and set aside and the judgment of the trial
court admitting the same to probate be affirmed or in the alternative, that before finally resolving
the said issue of the probate of said purported will , this case be remanded to the court a quo in
order that further evidence be admitted relative to the factual question of whether or not the said
deceased could have read the said document on December 29, 1960, the date of the alleged
execution of her eyes then.

301 | P a g e
One of the ground alleged in the support of the present motion was the testimony of Dr. Jesus V.
Jamesis upon which the disallowance of the will was based, has no probative value because: (a.)
it is permissive upon a grave factual error; (b.) such testimony is contradicted by his own clinical
record; and (c.) it is glaringly superficial and evasive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner – appeals is meritorious, thus, a new trail
must be held.

RULING: A testament may not be disallowed just before the attesting witnesses declare in favor
of this legislation. What is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses although they must testify, that the will was or was not
duly executed in the manner required by the law because the proponent is not included by the
testimonies of the attesting witnesses.

Dr. Jamesis testimony was vague and that he testified mere opinion rather than his personal
knowledge. There would have been less difficulty in arriving at a safe conclusion as regards the
vital fact now in controversy, if he had only been more categorically and definite rather than
somehow ambiguous and equivocal in his testimony.

In the light of the points raised by appeal in her motion for reconsideration, that the best interest
of justice will be better served by reopening this case.

302 | P a g e
 PEDRO GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLANOSA AND ADOLFO
FORTAJADA, THE DECEASED PEDRO GALLANOSA BEING SUBSTITUTED BY
HIS LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY HIS ABOVE-NAMED WIDOW AND HIS CHILDREN,
ISIDRO GALLANOSA, AND LEDY GALLANOSA, AND GRANDCHILDREN NAMED
IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA AND ROSARIO BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, CHILDREN
OF THE LATE SIKATUNA GALLANOSA, SON OF PEDRO GALLANOSA,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, JUDGE OF BRANCH I OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON AND FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS,
et.al, RESPONDENTS

G.R. No. L-29300 21 June 1978

FACTS: Florentino Hitosis executed a will in Bicol dialect in 1938. He died on 1939. He is
survived only by his brother. Thereafter, a petition for probate of his will was filed. He
bequeathed his ½ share of the conjugal property to his second wife, Tecla, and should Tecla
predecease him, as was the case, it would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and
Corazon Grecia. He likewise bequeathed his separate properties to his protégé. The probate was
opposed by his brother, nephews and nieces. Subsequently, the will was admitted for probate.
Thereafter the testamentary heirs submitted a project partition wherein the properties therein
were distributed in accordance with the testator‘s will. The same was approved by the judge.

303 | P a g e
However, the heirs of Florentino‘s deceased brothers and sisters instituted an action for recovery
of the land alleging that they have been in continuous possession of the same. As the basis of
their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud, caused the simulation of
the document purporting it to be the last will and testament of Florentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the
will to recover the parcel of land subject of legacy therein.

RULING: Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the ―annulment‖ of a will. In order
that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound mind at the time when he executed the will and was
not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will the issue as
to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore. It was held in Austria vs.
Ventenilla that ―under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given to parties who are
displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals
in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an order admitting a will o probate will
be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal has taken
from an order probating a will, the heirs cannot, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings,
raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator.‖

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 IN RE WILL OF SILVESTRA BARON. VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, PETITIONER-
APPELLANT,
VS.
FAUSTINA BARON, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELEES

G.R. No. L-41947 29 December 1936

BUTTE, J.:

FACTS: That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the
said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was of sound and disposing mind, and not
acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to
dispose of her estate by will.The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the
deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time of
the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for
the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was
obtained by imposition and undue influence of the said Vivencio Cuyugan and fraudulent
confabulation between him and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who
affixed their signatures thereto.

305 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with law to be admitted for
probate.

RULING: An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the
formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of
the evidence passes to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to
show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the
document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for
any other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was executed under undue influence or
by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary capacity. The doctrine that where the testator
has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue
influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing
heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has
been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day
of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the
propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator
harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.
PASCUAL COSO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. FERMINA FERNANDEZ
DEZA, ET AL., OBJECTORS AND APPELLEES
G.R. No. 16763 22 December 1921

OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS: The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator
with Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros
by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelna
when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. It was shown that the testator, a married
man became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain and that he had illicit relations with her for
many years. She followed him when he returned to the Philippines and in close communication
until death of the latter. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the influence exercised by Rosario Lopez was of such character as to
vitiate the will.

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RULING: Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect the influence must be undue; to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as
to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. Such
influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will. While the same amount of influence may become undue when exercised by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by
a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testator‘s free agency.

While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not
appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency
and make him express the will of another rather than his own. He was an intelligent man, a
lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated
only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and
by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for her sacrifices she had made for
him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
RE: Institution of Heirs

ONESIMA D. BELEN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT,

VS.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA,
OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES

G.R. No. L-14474 31 October 1960

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: When Benigno Diaz died, his will together with the codicil he executed, giving a
legacy to Filomena Diaz, were admitted to probate. The proceedings were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee bank. Subsequently, Filomena
Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros , married with seven legitimate children and
Onesima, single. The latter filed a petition contending that the amount that would have
appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be divided equally only between

307 | P a g e
herself and Milagros, to the exclusion of the seven legitimate children of the latter. The court
denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property shall be divided equally only between the legitimate
children to the exclusion of the grandchildren.

RULING: Under Article 846 of the Civil Code, ―heirs instituted without designation of shares
shall inherit in equal parts.‖

The meaning of the word ‗descendants‘, when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take
property passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and decided that it means all
persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree and includes persons so
descended, even though their parents are living and that such descendants take per capita and not
per stirpes.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply
in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all
members therof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Artcile 846. So that the original legacy
to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.

ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MARIA

IGNACIA USON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES
G. R. NO. 8927 10 MARCH 1914

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS: The codicil to the will of Filomena Uson provided that all the property belonging to her
as conjugal property shall be the property if her husband; that in case the same exists at her
husband‘s death, her sisters and nieces named shall succeed her husband as heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property shall be divided equally between the living sisters and the
children of the deceased sisters.

RULING: It was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters
and nieces. The testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of

308 | P a g e
her heirs then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in
the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces
are referred to in no way different from the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different
from the sisters. Each one stands out as the other under exactly the same conditions. Moreover,
in the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her
will by name ―so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and
relatives.‖

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA AND LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO,

PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. ANDRES REYES, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL,
PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ AND
LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-23079 27 February 1970

CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz filed with the Court if First Instance of Rizal a petition for
probate, ante mortem of her last will and testament. However, the probate was opposed by
petitioners: Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria Benta, Laura Austria Mozo and others- nephews
and nieces of Basilia Austria. Their opposition was dismissed by the CFI and the probate was

309 | P a g e
allowed. The trial court decided that as per provisions in the will, the estate shall pass on to
Basilia‘s adopted children, namely: Perfecto, Isagani, Alberto and Luz all surnamed Cruz, as
declared assumed and legally adopted children of Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz.

After two years from the probate of the will, Basilia died, and Perfecto was appointed as
executor. Petitioners Ruben and the others filed an Intervention to Partition, contending that they
are the nearest of kin to the decedent, that Perfecto Cruz and siblings were not adopted in
accordance with law, thus, they are mere strangers and without right to succeed as heirs.

The trial court allowed the intervention, and for the meantime, the authenticity of he adoption
papers was debated upon. Ruben Austria referred it to the NBI, which said that it was genuine.
They again referred it to the Constabulary who said it is not authentic. Thus, the petitioners
moved to set for hearing the genuineness of the adoption papers. However, before the date of the
hearing, Benita Cruz filed an alternative relief, to confine the petitioner‘s intervention, should it
be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heirs made by Basilia in her will is based on false
cause, thus should be annulled.

RULING: No, the institution is valid and is not based on false cause.
Art. 850 provides for the Annulment of a Will based on a false cause:
cause for institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
cause must be shown to be false;
it appears in the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known of the falsity of the cause.

It can be inferred from the Will of Basilia that when she instituted her heirs, she was possessed
of testamentary capacity and the will was free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. Also, in her will, she does not specifically state the cause of her institution.
Therefore, in the absence of proof that there exists false cause in the institution of heirs, testacy
must be favored from intestacy, and the will must be given full express.

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IN RE ESTATE OF JOSE MACROHON TIAHUA. FRANCISCO BARRIOS,
ADMINISTRATOR-APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., HEIRS
APPELLANTS. IGNACIO MACROHON, APPELLANT.

G.R. No. L-29789 22 December 1928

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Jose Macrohon Tiahua included his adulterous son in his will, bequeathing upon him a
part of the estate, together with his nine legitimate children. The institution was opposed by
Eduarda Enriquez, surviving spouse of Jose Macrohon Tiahua and their children.

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The provision in the will reads as follows:‖ After all my debts, obligations, and funeral expenses
have been paid, I hereby bequeath and devise all my property, real, personal, and mixed, as
follows, to wit:
"One-half (1/2) pro indiviso of my whole estate to my wife Eduarda Enriquez, and the other half
(1/2) in equal parts pro indiviso to each of my children, including Fernando Quintas and Julia
Quintas, son and daughter, respectively, of my deceased daughter, Gregoria Macrohon, who
shall receive the portion corresponding to the share of my said daughter, that is, 1/44 for each of
the two."
Included among the children mentioned by the testator in said will, and to whom he gave the
one-half of the property corresponding to him from the conjugal partnership, is the herein
appellant Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son. Dividing this half, that is ten- twentieth parts
(10/20), among his nine legitimate children and his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, into equal
parts, each of them will be entitled to one-twentieth of the whole estate.

ISSUES: Whether or not the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a part of
his estate by will in favor of his adulterous son;
Whether or not the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua infringed the limitations prescribed by the
law in putting his adulterous son Ignacio Macrohon on the same footing as his legitimate
children by giving him a share equal to that of each of the latter

RULING: As to the first issue, YES, the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua had a right to dispose
of the free third of his estate. It is true that Article 845 of the Civil Code provides that
"illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be entitled to support
only," and therefore cannot demand anything more of those bound by law to support them, it
does not prohibit said illegitimate children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them,
something more than support, so long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law
permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (Article
808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over
that third to his illegitimate son who has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by
reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by
his behavior he has become unworthy of such consideration.

The second issue is answered in the NEGATIVE. The deceased did not infringe upon the rights
of his legitimate descendants. According to Article 808 of the Civil Code, the legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary estate of the father

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and of the mother, the latter being allowed to dispose of one of said two parts in order to give it
as betterment to their legitimate children or descendants.

In the present case the testator has not disposed of any of the two parts forming the legitime in
order to give it as betterment to any of his children, and the said legitime therefore remains
intact, and according to Article 806 of the same Code, is by the law reserved for the forced heirs
and the testator cannot dispose of it in any other way.
Hence, the nine legitimate children are entitled to two-thirds of said half, or two-sixths of the
whole, which, divided equally among them would give to each, two fifty fourths or one twenty-
seventh of the whole estate. When Jose Macrohon Tiahua, therefore, provided in his will that the
one-half of the conjugal property belonging to him was to be divided equally among his nine
legitimate children and one adulterous son, each to receive one-twentieth part, he did not go
beyond the limits provided by law for such cases, because, one-twentieth for each of his
legitimate children is more than each of his legitimate children should receive as his legitime,
which only amounts to one twenty-seventh. In other words, since Jose Macrohon Tiahua could
dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon,
and as he only gave a part of said free third to the latter, he did not infringe any legal prohibition
and his testamentary disposition to this effect is valid and effective.

TESTATE ESTATE OF FLORENCIA R. MATEO. PERFECTO GABRIEL,

PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., OPPONENTS-
APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. L-26545 16 December 1927

AVANCEÑA, C. J.:

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FACTS: Florencia Mateo executed her last will and testament on two used sheets of paper. It
was signed by her and three attesting witnesses. In the body of the will, she bequeathed all her
properties to her instituted heir, Tomasa Mateo, a niece. Nothing was instituted for her only
sister, Rita Mateo and to her other nephews and nieces.
Accordingly, Rita Mateo opposed the probate of the will, interposing that the testator was
affectionate to all her nieces and nephews during her lifetime, and that she, Rita Mateo, was in
good terms with her sister, thus must be instituted in the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was absolutely free in making all those provisions in favor of
Tomasa Mateo, and nothing for her sister, nephews and nieces.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is nothing strange in the wishes of the testator
not to leave anything for her sister. It is reasonable that the entirety of her estate was left to
Tomasa since according to evidence, Tomasa was taken by the testator when the former was only
three years old and had never been separated from her ever since.

In addition, as can be inferred, Florencia Mateo has no compulsory heirs; thus, she is free to
dispose of her property. Collateral relatives are merely intestate heirs.

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA EXECUTOR-APPELLEE, VS. ESTRELLA DIZON ET AL. ,

OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
No L-24561 30 June 1970
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:

FACTS: The testator, Agripina J. Valdez died in Angeles, Pampanga and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter

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named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent.

The deceased testator left a will written in Pampango dialect. In her will she named her
compulsory heirs with seven other legitimate grandchildren as her beneficiaries, amounting to
P1, 801,960.00. She divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties. The distribution is as
follows: (1) Estela Dizon-P98,474.80; (2) Angelina Dizon-P106,307.06; (3) Bernardita Dizon-
P51,968.17; (4) Josefina Dizon-P52,056.39; (5) Tomas Dizon-P131,987.41; (6) Lilia Dizon-
P72,182.47; (7) marina Dizon-P1,148,063.71; (8) Pablo Rivera, Jr.-P69,280.00; and (9) Lilia
Dizon and the other grandchildren-P72,540.00, having a total value of P1,801,960.01.

The last will and testament was admitted to probate, and Marina Dizon was appointed executor.
She filed the project of partition; however, oppositors Tomas Dizon and the others filed a
counter-project of partition.
The lower court approved the partition filed by Marina Dizon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator is correct in her distribution of properties to her compulsory
heirs and grandchildren.

RULING: Yes, the institution and partition made by the testator is correct. The testator expressly
provided for in her will that her property be divided in accordance with her dispositions, where
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. Such was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080
of the Civil Code, providing that ― Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.‖

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO AND VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,

PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 21, MANILA,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,

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VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY
D. SEANGIO-OBAS AND JAMES D. SEANGIO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 27 November 2006

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy
and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified
to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of
the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition.

RULING: A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng

Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus
applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, JULIAN L. TEVES,

PETITIONER VS. ANTONIO BALANSAG AND HILARIA CADAYDAY,
RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 141882 11 March 2005

316 | P a g e
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:During his lifetime, Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted marriage twice. First,
with Antonia Baena and second, with Milagros Donio Teves. In the first marriage, he had two
children, Josefa and Emilio. In the second marriage, he had four children, Maria, Jose, Milagros
and Pedro, all surname Teves. There was a property Lot No. 63 which was originally registered
under the names of Julian and Antonia (TCT 5203) forming part of their conjugal partnership.
After Antonia died, Lot No. 63 was among the properties involved in an action for partition. The
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties
of Don Julian. The Agreement showed that a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa
was to be owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage which
would remain undivided during his lifetime. The two children were given other properties. Lot
No. 63 was retained by Don Julian.

Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement provided that the properties now selected and
adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milgrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor
children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes
Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimate children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and
Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
Subsequently, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with
Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa
and Emilio also executed an instrument which constituted a supplement to the earlier deed of
assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of JLT
Agro. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, JLT Agro, Inc. sought the registration of
the subject lot in its name. A court issued an order canceling OCT No. 5203 in the name of
spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375
was issued in the name of JLT Agro. Since then, JLT Agro has been paying taxes assessed on the
subject lot.

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. Lot No. 63 was sold to
Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. After the death of Don Julian, Milagros Donio and her

317 | P a g e
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate where Lot No. 63 was allotted
to Milagros and her two children, Maria and Jose. Unaware that Lot No. 63 has been registered
under the name of JLT Agro, Inc., Antonio and Hilaria tried to register the deed of sale, but
failed. They filed a complaint to declare the title of JLT Agro, Inc. void which was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not future legitime be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of the owner of a property without resulting to preterition

RULING: The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant
to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the
death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated
to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of
succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest
by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was
at the time nonexistent and might never exist. At the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the
absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros
Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of
the compromise agreement.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will,
either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting
him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.
It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. Don Julian did
not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant
to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal
heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death; the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian‘s

318 | P a g e
heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is
unfounded.

Constantino C. Acain , petitioner vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court (Third Special
Cases Division), Virginia A. Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, respondents.

319 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 72706 27 October 1987
PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Constantitno, herein petitioner, filed for probate of the will of his decased brother
Nemesio and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that
Nemesio Acain died leaving a will bequeathing all his shares from the conjugal property to his
brother Segundo Acain. However, since Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the former‘s children
are claiming to be heir, with Constantino as the petitioner. The spouse and adopted child of the
decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the
wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed

ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of ―compulsory heirs in the direct line‖ thus their
omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.

RULING: Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned
there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same
cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the
petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he where a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear
case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will,
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters.

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez

320 | P a g e
 Eleuterio Neri, et al., petitioners
vs.
Ignacia Akutin and her children, respondents

G.R. No. L-47799 13 June 1941

MORAN, J.:

FACTS: Agripino Neri contracted two marriages wherein he had by his first marriage six
children named: Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second
marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named: Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria,
and Emma. Her daughter in the first marriage, Getulia, died a little less than eight years before
the death of Agripino, and was survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion,
Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. Clause 8 in a will left by Agripino was invoked by
petitioners, wherein the testator made the statement that the children by his first marriage had
already received their shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their
financial troubles.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that contrary to what the testator had
declared in his will [that all his children by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs of
the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties
during the existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin] but
with the modification that the will was valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator
could freely dispose of. It ruled that there is no preterition but disinheritance in this case.

Issue:Whether or not there exists preterition with respect to the children by the first marriage of
the decedent.

Ruling: There is preterition.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage
were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without
expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by
appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or

321 | P a g e
involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least
manifest.

Preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession except as to
"legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of
the Civil Code), In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the
testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828
of the Civil Code, and where no express provision therefore is made in the will, the law would
presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. In the will subject of this case, no
express betterment is made in favor of the children by the first marriage; neither is there any
legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The
whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the
heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the
testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his
property equally among all his children.

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 Remedios Nuguid , petitioner
vs.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, respondents

G.R. No. L-23445 23 June 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts: Remedios Nuguid filed a petition for the allowance a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid, her sibling, on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They anchored their
opposition on the ground that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir
of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

Issue:Were the parents of the decedent were preterited?

Ruling: Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid. And the will completely omits both of them, receiving nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition.

The will consisting of one sentence, institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing
more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. The nullity of the will is
complete; Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

However, the petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive legitimes, but that the institution of her as the universal heir is not invalidated, although
such inheritance would only have to be reduced.

Such contention is not well-taken. With reference to Article 814, which is the only provision
material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein
dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies. Institution of heirs is a bequest by

323 | P a g e
universal title of property undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. Again, institution of heirs cannot be taken as legacy.
Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang, petitioner vs.
Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and Bernardo S. Aseneta, respondents

G.R. No. L-57848 19 June 1982

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Soledad Maninang, petitioner herein, filed for probate the holographic will of the
decedent Clemencia Aseneta who died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. Said will left
all her property to the petitioner and contained a provision stating: ―I do not consider Nonoy as
my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.‖ Meanwhile, respondent Bernardo
Aseneta ―Nonoy‖, the adopted son mentioned in the will, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate
Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the adopted son was preterited or disinherited.

RULING: There is no preterition but valid disinheritance in the present case.

Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the
testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share
in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law. Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition
upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary".

Moreover, the effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different. Pretention under
Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This annulment is in toto,
unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance
shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person

324 | P a g e
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Otherwise stated, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived.
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Edward Christensen, deceased, Adolfo
Aznar,executor-appellee v. Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan et al.

No. l-24365 30 June 1966

MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS: Edward Christensen, whose estate is the subject of the present case, is a Californian
citizen domiciled in the Philippines, died leaving a will. The will was admitted for probate by the
Davao CFI where it has also declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural child of
the deceased. As to the partition of the deceased‘s estate, the Court of Appeals, upon appeal of
Helen, ruled that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by the Philippine
law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
provided by the said law.

A project of partition was submitted by the executor which was approved by the CFI, wherein
the properties of estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen, whom the testator
had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter, and Maria Helen Christensen Garcia, who
had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition
that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir
was annulled, and hence, the properties passed to both of them as if he died intestate.

ISSUES:
1. Was Helen preterited?
2. Should the estate pertain to her and to Helen in equal shares after deducting the
legacies, or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen equivalent to ¼ of the
entire estate?

Rulings:
1. No, Helen is not preterited. Preterition is the omission of the heir in the will at all or,
while mentioning him as father, son, etc., but not instituting him at all as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the testator‘s estate.

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 Whether the testator gave a legacy to a person whom he characterized as not related
to him, but later this person was judicially declared to be his acknowledged natural
child, the case is not a case of preterition but a case of completion of legitime. The
institution in the will would not be annulled, consequently, intestacy should not
follow.

2. The inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen. In order that the rights of a forced heir may
be limited to the completion of his legitime (instead of annulment of the institution of
heirs). It is not necessary that what has been left to him in the will ―by any title‖, as
by legacy, be granted to her in his capacity as heir. As successional rights are vested
as of the moment of death, the forced heir is entitled to the fruits and increments of
his legitime from the testator‘s death.

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 Zonia Solano, petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals et al. respondents

No. l-41971 29 November 1983

MELENCIO HERRERA,

FACTS: Bienvenido and Emetria Garcia, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
Solano, filed an action for recognition against him where the latter in his Answer, denied
paternity. During the pendency of the case, Solano died. Petitioner Zonia Solano was ordered
substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament
probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death. Zonia entered her formal appearance as a
substitute defendant claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her father, Solano, and
asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated will with the least
interference from the Garcias.

The Garcias, private respondents herein, filed their Reply to Zonia‘s Appearance Supplemental
Cause of Action impugning the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child with the
prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the decedent.

The trial court also declared that the Garcias are the illegitimate children of Dr. Solano.

Issue: Was the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano null and void as there was preterition
of the other heirs?

Ruling: Yes. The Garcias and Zonia were in the same category as illegitimate children; that
Zonia‘s acknowledgment as a natural child in a notarial document executed by Solano and
Trinidad Tuagnon was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, Solano was still
married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not
have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of Zonia‘s conception. That being the

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compulsory heirs, the Garcias were in fact, preterited from Solano‘s Last Will and Testament;
and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano is null and
void under Article 854 of the Civil Code.

As provided in the provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor of Trinidad
Tuagnon over the five parcels of land is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil Code,
and it should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.

Contrary to the conclusions of the court holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues,
the preterition of the Garcias should annul the institution of Zonia as heir only insofar as the
legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation.
It is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor Zonia with certain portions of his
property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her
favor should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely
dispose of. Since the legitime of the illegitimate children consists of ½ of the hereditary estate,
the Garcias and Zonia each have a right to participate therein in the proportion of 1/3 each.
Zonia‘s hereditary share will, therefore be ½ + 1/3 of ½ or 4/6 of the estate, while the Garcias
will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of ½ or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
*Substitution of Heirs- Fideicommissary

HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,

Petitioners,- versus -
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues
in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate by virtue of the
order of the CFI Manila and said court approved the project of partition presented by the
executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s will. As provided in her will Doña Margarita
Rodriguez‘s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income
from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.After almost 40 years
later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who
was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent‘s will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent‘s

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estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of the
the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by DOÑA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ can be dissolved .
RULING: YES. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries.
The trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned should be upheld however
after 20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct in moving for the dissolution
of the trust after the twenty-year period,but they are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of
the decedent. The last will and testament of the decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the
properties under the void clause.Hence the case is remanded to the lower court for the
determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the decedent where petitioners, and all
others claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their status.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trust approved by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872
is DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No.
51872 to determine the following:

1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s will, constituting

the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and
2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the nearest relative of the
decedent entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

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FACTS: P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in Manila, as the
final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said
plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant
Mariano Garchitorena.The la atter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due execution against the
husband of Ana Maria, Joaquin Perez Alcantara hence the deposited amount in La Urbana was
attached. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said
judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's
universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La
Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria
Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary
substitution.

RULING:There is a fideicommissary substitution.All the elements of this kind of substitution are

present:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was
instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the
whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the
"whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving
the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such
second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
As a consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the
plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the
testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit
with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her
nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of
the fideicommissary heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano
Garchitorena.

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 CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962

DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action for
partition against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel St.,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements
existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-
half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue
of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original owner, and
the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in
special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property,
but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action. It is admitted that
Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in
question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted
to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living
relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia
and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.Defendant appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called substitucion
vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.

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RULING: The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or
to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her
lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix —
her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.The appealed judgment is affirmed, with
costs.

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 TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.The administratrix submitted a project of
partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall
go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion"
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the
free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda, the companion of the deceased.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code;
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,

333 | P a g e
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the testamentary dispositions in favor of the heirs are valid and how
should the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez be partitioned.

RULING: YES.The dispositions to the widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory

heir is valid.The Court also upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a
real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.Hence the estate of the deceased shall be
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as
to costs.

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 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER
TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-
FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953.
He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on
August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated that as a reward
to his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services he is allowed to enjoy one-
half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to
act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo
Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one
among themselves.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of Vicente Aranas is valid.

RULING:YES.Vicente Aranas was intended as a usufructuary by the Testator and has the right
to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment
(or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either
the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the

335 | P a g e
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his
refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal
and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by
the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other
benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the
properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of
said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the
designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the
dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during
the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre. It was provided that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.And upon death of the instituted heir, the rights and obligations shall
pass to the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.The testator also provided in the will that should the property
be later sold, leased, mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to
respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die.The failure of the heir or the latter‘s
heirs to comply with the will of the decedent they shall be obliged to reconvey title over Lot No.
1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The said Codicil,was duly probated and admitted by the CFI of Negros Occidental. Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner),
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.The heirs did not comply with the intention
of the testator.Hence the sister of the deceased, Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza filed a

336 | P a g e
complaint to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.

ISSUE:Whether or nor there was modal institution.

RULING:YES,the heir Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted under a modal substitution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to
the succession. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of
the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-
interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.The testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.It is a general rule under the law on succession
that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death. Since the obligation was not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrix's near descendants.

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 LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of
FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,
executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife,
Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half
to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th , contained the institution of heirs. The 12th clause
of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from
the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor died on
March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter,
already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance
of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed
judicial administratrix. On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having
contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas
Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court,
with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".

338 | P a g e
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of
the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed
by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's
position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

ISSUE: How should the will of the Testator be interpreted.

RULING: The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of
the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. ART. 790. The
words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to
use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by
the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. In this case the testament of
Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the
possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by
the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's
"sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in
her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they
had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties
have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the
Administrator-appellee.

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 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case. Joseph G. Brimo is a Turkish citizen who was domiciled in the country.The judicial
administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. The partition in question puts into effect
the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil
Code. A perusal of Brimo‘s will provided that he desired to apply the laws of the Philippines to
his will and not the laws of Turkey. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property,
not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:Whether or not the condition to apply the laws of the Philippines to the probate of the
deceased‘s will is valid.

RULING:NO. The said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.

The condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one
to govern his testamentary dispositions.Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the oppositor. All of the remaining clauses of said

340 | P a g e
will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS
(Executrix), petitioner and appellee,
vs.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966
Vicente J. Francisco for oppositor and appellant.
J.T. de los Santos and R.M. Caluag for petitioner and appellee.

TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS

(Executrix), petitioner and appellee, vs.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the
deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and
a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces.
Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de
Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo
Garcia opposed to the probate of said will on grounds that the will was not executed in
accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima
Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and
that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.The
will likewise contained a "no contest and forfeiture" clause .

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ISSUE: (1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a
violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will; and
(2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid?

RULING:(1)NO. after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in
good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the
appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not be penalized for
rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been
admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her
property can now be effected.
(2) Fourteenth.—I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after each other, love and
help one another and accept with thanks what I have bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and
cherish the same. Any one of them who contests or opposes the probate of my will or the
carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit under my
will, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. This is
the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. However due to the non-violation of this
clause,th court did not bother to discuss the same.
ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee.

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

WILLARD, J.:

FACTS: The will of Consuelo Morente is the subject of the controversy in this case.It provided
that all the estate shall pass to the husband.The widower is commanded to not leave the brothers
of the deceased and not to marry anyone. The widow however, Gumersindo de la Santa, married
again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased,
filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second
marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be
annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed by
the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that

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holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena
Morente, appealed.
ISSUE:Whether or not the husband forfeited his legacy.
RULING:NO.by the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to
him by the first part of the will. The testatrix provided conditions but not attached to no none of
these orders is a clause that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him
by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's
sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the
property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again
he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the
disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that
if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the
testatrix. Hence the will provides no condition for the legacy and no condition should be implied
from the will itself.Petition denied.

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre. It was provided that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.And upon death of the instituted heir, the rights and obligations shall
pass to the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.The testator also provided in the will that should the property
be later sold, leased, mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to
respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY

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FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die.The failure of the heir or the latter‘s
heirs to comply with the will of the decedent they shall be obliged to reconvey title over Lot No.
1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

The said Codicil,was duly probated and admitted by the CFI of Negros Occidental. Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner),
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.The heirs did not comply with the intention
of the testator.Hence the sister of the deceased, Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza filed a
complaint to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.

ISSUE:Whether or nor there was modal institution.

RULING:YES,the heir Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted under a modal substitution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to
the succession. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of
the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-
interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.The testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.It is a general rule under the law on succession
that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were

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transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death. Since the obligation was not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrix's near descendants.

RE: COLLATION

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.

ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner, - versus -
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,Respondents.

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano
(Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. The
controversy centers on a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed
of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents

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assailed, ―may be considered as an advance legitime‖ of petitioner. The probate court found the
donation valid hence said property is subject to collation.The CA sustained the probate court‘s
ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

RULING:NO. Collation is defined as a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the

value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate and the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime to
secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free
portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Considering that
the decedent left no primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs and was only survived
by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime no
collation should take place. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to
any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid is
deemed as donation made to a ―stranger,‖ chargeable against the free portion of the estate.There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.Hence the
decedent‘s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note in favor of the FCCC .

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
346 | P a g e
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. When Edmund
defaulted in his payments, Union Bank, started demandingd payment from Florence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the obligations of their deceased father likewise passed to them along
with the properties.

RULING: No. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement,
were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty,
of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.

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Natividad P. Nazareno, Maximino P. Nazareno, Jr., petitioners,vs.Court of Appeals, Estate
of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr., Romeo P. Nazareno and Eliza Nazareno, respondents.

G.R. No. 138842 18 October 2000

FACTS: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete had five children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose,
Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. who are the petitioners, while the estate
of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. Aurea died in 1970
while Maximino, Sr. died in 1980.

During their marriage, Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea acquired properties. After the death of
Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance. Romeo was
appointed administrator of his father‘s estate.

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In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed
several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One
of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with
the consent of Aurea, to Natividad. He then filed for action for the nullity of such sale. He
presented evidence to show that the spouses never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and
that the latter was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He likewise presented the
Deed of Partition and Distribution executed by the spouses and duly signed by all of their
children, except Hose, who was then abroad, but represented by their mother, Aurea. Romeo
testified that, although the deed of sale executed by his parents in heir favor stated that the sale
was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not lots 10 and 11 belonging to Jose is subject to collation.

Ruling: Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to
Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad
because the latter was the only ―female and the only unmarried member of the family.‖ She was
thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she
intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was
thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an
implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is
transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part
thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance
with Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.

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 Eloy Imperial, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
Cesar Villalon, Jr., Teresa Villalon, Antonio Villalon, Augusto Villalon, Roberto Villalon,
Ricardo Villalon and Esther Villalon, respondents.

G.R. No. 112483 8 October 1999

FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
which he sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, Eloy Imperial. Petitioner and private
respondents admit that despite the contract‘s designation as one of ―Absolute Sale‖, the
transaction was in fact a donation. Two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Sale on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement.
Pending execution of judgment based on the compromise agreement, Leoncio died, leaving two
heirs – the petitioner herein, who is the acknowledged natural son, and the adopted son, Victor

350 | P a g e
Imperial. Victor died single and he was survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon,
who also died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa, respondents in this
case.

Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance and recovery of
possession seeking the nullification of the deed of absolute sale affecting the subject lot. The
lower court disposed of the case by adjudicating that the sale was indeed a donation and that the
same is inoofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor because when Leoncio died, he left no
property other than the 32,837 sq.m. lot. Considering that the property donated is 32,837 sq.m.,
one half of that becomes free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the donation to
defendant. The other half is where the legitime of the adopted son Victior has to be taken.

Issue:Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in computing the legitime of Victor based on the
area of the donated property.

RULING: No. The rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.

Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is
brought to collation.

Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In
the recent case of Vizconde vs.Court of Appeals that what is brought to collation is not the
donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for
this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence,
any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it
impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the
property donated on grounds of prescription and laches [it took private respondents 24 years
since the death of Leoncio to initiate the present case]. Thus, in this case where the collatable
property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in
property of the same nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value

351 | P a g e
of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or
securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public
auction. However, as mentioned, the Court grants the petition on grounds of prescription and
laches.

Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza, petitioners, vs. The

Honorable Court of Appeals, Alberta Zaragoza Morgan, respondents.

G.R. No. 106401 29 September 2000

FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano died without a will and was survived by his four children.
Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza.

On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance against petitioners Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, for delivery of her
inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that
she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged

352 | P a g e
that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The
shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but
without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not
conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an
American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary
succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering
these lots during her father's lifetime.

For their answer, petitioners admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on
the properties of their father. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to
convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she
became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father
during his lifetime.

The Regional Trial Court adjudicated Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering petitioners to
vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied by them to private respondent.
The Court of Appeals, rendered decision in favor of Private respondent.

ISSUE: Can collation be done in this case?

RULING:No, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of
inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore
be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes
were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share was in effect
questioning the validity of the deed of sale and consequently, the TCT in the name of the
petitioner. Could this be done? No. the petition is a collateral attack which is not allowed by the
Property Registration Decree.

353 | P a g e
 LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and RAMON G. NICOLAS,

G.R. No. 118449 ; February 11, 1998

FRANCISCO

FACTS: Estrellita is the daughter of Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicholas. Her siblings are
Antonio, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo. Antonio predeceased his parents and is survived by his
widow Zenaida and their four children. On May 22, 1979, Esrellita purchased a parcel of land
from Rafael for P135,000, which she later sold to Amelia Lim and Maria Chiu for P3.4M. In the
same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land and a car using the
proceeds of the prior sale. The balance of which was deposited in a bank. On June 30, 1991,
Estrellita and her daughters were killed. The NBI conducted investigations and found that

354 | P a g e
Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Thus, petitioner survived his daughters who died later than
their mother, Estrellita.

Petitioner executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-

Vizconde with Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents which provided for
the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and The
Parañaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving
all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" in the said properties. On
November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael‘s estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate
proceedings with the RTC of Caloocan, listing as heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, the decedent‘s
wife Zenaida and children of Antonio. Ramon, however filed an opposition dated March 24,
1993, praying that the property sold by Estrellita should be collated because the sale between
Rafael and Estrellita was actually a donation and not a sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Paranaque property should be collated with the other properties.

RULING: No, the records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. There is nothing to prove that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to
warrant collation. Pursuant to Article 1035, it is the duty of the plaintiffs to prove that the
donations received by Estrellita were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime
of hereditary portion to which they are entitled. The probate court's order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to
herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
Therefore, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does
not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. For even if collation would be proper, it
is not the Paranaque property that is to be collated, but should have been the same property given
by the decedent to the heir during his lifetime, which in this case is the Valenzuela property.

RE: Disinheritance

Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio, petitioners versus Hon. Amor
A. Reyes, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, et. al., respondents

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 27 November 2006

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio on September 21, 1988 to which petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia,
all surnamed Seangio, opposed. They contended that Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In
view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
355 | P a g e
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.

A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners before the
RTC on April 7, 1999. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take
precedence over special proceeding because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo‘s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.

ISSUE: Was there a valid disinheritance?

RULING: Yes. Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. The document, entitled Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo‘s intention of excluding his eldest son,
Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein.

Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that, for inheritance to be valid, the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for
the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.

Segundo‘s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter‘s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo it an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alffredo.

356 | P a g e
Isabelita S. Lahom, petitioner vs. Jose Melvin Sibulo, respondent

G.R. No. 143989 14 July 2003

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom decided to file a petition for
adoption of Jose Melvin Sibulo. Subsequently, an order granting the petition was issued. In
keeping with the court order, the civil registrar of Naga City, changed the name of Jose Melvin
Sibulo to Josde Melvin Lahom. Eventually, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption for the reason that respondent, despite the pleadings of said spouses, refused
to change his surname to Lahom to the frustrations of the spouses. In all the dealings and
357 | P a g e
activities he is Jose Melvin Sibulo. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone, has
yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and
would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption. To this Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition contending that the petitioner
had no cause of action.

ISSUES: Whether the adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always,
for a valid reason cause the forfeiture of his inheritance.

RULINGS: It was months after the effectively of RA 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code. Consistently, the court held that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree no longer could be pursued. However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal
ties of adoption, can always for a valid reason cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. Upon the grounds provided for by law, an adopter may deny to
an adopted child his legitime, and, by will, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

Jose Baritua and Edgar Bitancor, petitioners vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Nicolas
Nacario and Victoria ronda Nacario, respondents

G.R. No. 82233 22 March 1990

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS: Bienvenido Nacario, driving a tricycle along the national highway figured in an
accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by
petitioner Jose Baritua. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died and the
tricycle was damaged. No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter
negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company,
Incorporated (PFICI for brevity), Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario,
received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27,
358 | P a g e
1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever
discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted
in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving.
Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of
interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners.

About one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private
respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In their complaint, the
private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through
their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement,
they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason
thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private
respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and
instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is
entitled to it.

RULING: Yes. Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in
law as the persons authorized to receive payment. It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand,
the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido
was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-
interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in
settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of
their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere
estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.

The private respondents could not also, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his
funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their
deceased son.

359 | P a g e
Filomena Pecson, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al.,
Plaintiffs-appellants vs. Rosario Mediavillo, defendant-appellee

G.R. No. 7890 29 September 1914

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:

The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented for probate. Mr. Lorayes, an
attorney at law, opposed the legalization of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized
nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court had denied the opposition. The deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa
Manjares, likewise deceased.

360 | P a g e
Teresa, another daughter of Florencio, married Basilio Mediavillo, whom she had two children:
one of them is Rosario, who was disinherited by the testator and Joaquin, who died without
isssue but is represented by his father, Basilio. Teresa died. Joaquin died before the death of the
testator. Rosario is the only living child of Teresa and the latter‘s husband, Basilio, is also living.
Evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study
college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her
grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator stated in his will, he disinherited
her.

ISSUE: Was Rosario validly disinherited by his grandfather?

RULING: The disinheritance was invalid. Disinheritance of a lawful heir can only be made for
one of the causes expressly fixed by law. Such disinheritance can only be effected by a will in
which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. Article 850 of the
civil code provides that the reason for the disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the
testator. In other words, if the person disinherited shall deny the truthfulness of the cause of
disinheritance, he may be permitted to support his allegations by proof. The courts may inquire
into the justice of disinheritance, and if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that
part of the will may be pronounced null and void.

Taking into consideration of the tender years of Rosario and the fact that she very soon thereafter
lost the use of her mental faculties, the Court reached the conclusion that she was not responsible
for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.
Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could
not ascend, and for that reason Basilio can not inherit that share of the estate that would have
belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.

Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang, petitioners vs. Court of Appeals, Hon.
Ricardo l. Pronove, Jr., as Judge of the CFI of Rizal and Bernardo S. Aseneta, respondents

G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta, whose estate was the subject of this case, died single and without
issue leaving a will in which she disposed all of her properties to Da. Soledad Maninang. In the
said will, she did not acknowledge Bernardo or Nonoy as her adopted. The probate of the will
was opposed by herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, claiming to be the adopted son and
therefore the sole heir of the decedent. He further instituted an Intestate Case and move for the
dismissal of the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because
he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore intestacy should ensue.

361 | P a g e
The motion was granted by the lower court from which petitioner appealed claiming that the
courts inquiry should be limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will and that respondent
Bernardo was not preterited but effectively disinherited.

ISSUE: Whether under the terms of the decedent‘s will, private respondent had been preterited
or disinherited.

RULING: Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The conclusion of the lower court that
Bernardo has been preterited is not indubitable.

Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the
testator‘s will of the forced heirs either because they are not mentioned or though mentioned,
they ar4 neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance in turn, is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law.

Disinheritance is always voluntary, preterition is presumed to be involuntary. Preterition results

in the total annulment of the institution of heirs unless there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in favor of devises or legacies. In disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion
of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

RE: Legacies and Devises

Trusteeship of the Estate of Benigno Diaz y Heredia, deceased Bank of the Philippine
Islands, trustee. Soledad Robles, et. al., petitioners vs. Isabel Manahan de Santiago and
Nestor M. Santiago, oppositors and appellants

No. L-10111 31 August 1960

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS: Benigno Diaz Y Heredia, in his will, created a trust estate out of the properties not
otherwise disposed of. After the death of his wife, Diaz caused the preparation of a codicil. The
testator died and his will and codicil were accordingly probated. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in the will and the codicil, for
the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein.
362 | P a g e
 The trustee then petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for authority to sell all
the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. The property located at
Rosario, Binondo, Manila was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de Santiago.

Legatees Soledad Robles and her children filed a motion praying that the trustee be ordered to
deliver to them, in accordance with the will, 90% of the rentals collected from the property in
Rosario; which the trustee refused to deliver contending that upon authorization of the court of
the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected thereafter not
only from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the estate, constitute the
mass of the residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in accordance with the terms of
the codicil, that is, only 30% and not 90% to the heirs of Domingo Legarda.

The motion was granted by the court and directed the trustee to deliver to Soledad Robles and
her children, their shares in rentals

ISSUE: May the said legatees-appellees still demand their share of the rentals?

RULING: Yes. From the testamentary provisions of the will, the testator intended the
enjoyment by the legatees, of their respective legacies for the entire duration of the trust estate,
even when the specified properties are sold, the proceeds of which have been directed to be
invested in mortgages with interest, or in the purchase of other rental-bearing properties. The
legacies should therefore be viewed as one whole, continuing obligation based upon a judgment
(the will becomes binding upon probate) and the prescription period is ten years. The fact that
the rentals are to be delivered monthly, did not make each delivery a separate, distinct prestation.
Considering that the obligation terminated upon the sale of the said property on March 18, 1955,
the demand for complete delivery of the inheritance has not yet prescribed.

Brenda J. Debuque, Estrella L. Javelona, Rosendo L. Javelona, Jr., Arturo L. Javelona,

Ysmael L. Javelona, Vivian L. Javelona, Roberto L. Javelona and Eduardo L. Javelona,
petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Rafael Climaco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Silay City, Negros
Occidental, Renato Javelona, Edna Javelona, Edmundo Javelona, Erlinda Javelona, and
Lilia Liboon, Judicial Guard for the Minors, Camilo Javelona, Bonito Javelona, Belenda
Javelona, Armando Javelona and Edwin Javelona, respondents.
No. L-30634 27 August 1980

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS: On June 22, 1962, Rosendo Javelona, Sr. died intestate and left set of heirs. The first
consisting of his widow and their seven legitimates children and the second set consisting of his
illegitimate children.

363 | P a g e
 To avoid a protracted and expensive court litigation, the parties entered into an amicable
settlement compromise agreement whereby they agreed that the first set of heirs will receive
71.66% of the decedent‘s net estate which shall be equally divided among them, while the
second set of heirs will receive 28.38% of the net estate, likewise to be equally divided among
them. This was in accordance with the amended project of partition drawn by the judicial
administrator and the second set of heirs and approved by respondent Judge.

Brenda Javelona Debuque, the youngest legitimate heir, appealed the order after her
emancipation by virtue of her marriage to lawyer Jorge Debuque; the former had acquired most
of the interest of the other legitime. She prayed that the remaining balance belonging to the estate
be proportionately divided between the first and second set of heirs, alleging that because the
total balance exceeds the remaining cash deposit of the estate, payment to the two sets of heirs
should be proportionately reduced.

ISSUE: Who should be liable for the estate‘s losses due to the amounts they have taken and
have not restored to the estate?

RULING: When the parties entered into an amicable settlement-compromise agreement, they
made the agreement as between the two sets. Upon approval and finality of said agreement, the
two sets will again become co-owners of their respective shares as among themselves.
Legitimate heirs will be co-owners in equal shares of the 71.66% portion of the estate, while the
illegitimate heirs will be co-owners of their 28.38% portion until partition. Meanwhile, they are
governed by the pertinent laws of co-ownership and succession.

The members of the first set are solidarily liable for the estate‘s losses due to the amounts they
have taken and have not restored to the estate, pursuant to Article 927 of the New Civil Code.
This solidary liability should be understood to cover not only negligence but also fraud and
delay.

Misael P. Vera, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner

vs.
Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pasig, Rizal (Branch II); Magdalena Abanto and Camilo Eribal, as voluntary residual
heirs of the Estate of the deceased ElsieM. Gaches; Delia P. Medina, as attorney-in-fact of
said heirs; Bienvenido A. Tan, Sr., as Executor of the Estate of Elsie M. Gaches; Philippine
National Bank; Philippine Banking Corporation; The Overseas Bank of Manila; and
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, respondents

No. L-27745 18 October 1977

CASTRO, C.J.:

364 | P a g e
FACTS: Elsie Gaches died without a child. The deceased left a last will and testament wherein
she expressed that her properties be distributed to the persons named therein after payment of her
debts and funeral expenses. The herein respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan, Sr filed with the CFI a
petition for the probate of the said will and he was appointed as executor. On the other hand, the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue filed with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly
estate tax, inheritance tax, and income tax.

The voluntary heirs mentioned in the will were held responsible for all taxes of any nature which
may be due the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the
probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them

RULING: Under the provisions of Rule 90, Section 1, the distribution of the ascendants assets
may only be ordered under the following three circumstances namely, (1) when the inheritance
tax, among others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the
inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the nature enumerated therein, or (3) when the
payment of said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in the said rule has been provided
for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the inheritance due from the estate is
concerned were present when the questioned orders were issued in the case at bar; likewise, the
record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient bond has been filed to meet the outstanding
obligation.

The inheritance tax imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary disposition by the
predecessor, be charged to the account of each beneficiary, in proportion to the value of the
benefit received, and in accordance with the scale fixed for the class or group to which is
pertains: Provided, That in cases where the heirs divide extrajudicially the property left to them
by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell, transfer, mortgage, or encumber the same without
being the estate or inheritance taxes within the period prescribed in the preceding subsections (a)
and (b), they shall be solidarity liable for the payment of the said taxes to the extent of the estate
they have received.

365 | P a g e
 TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS
(Executrix), petitioner and appellee,
vs.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.

G.R. No. L-22797. September 22, 1966

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition for the probate of the last will
allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
Rosalina Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the devisees mentioned
in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas
de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of
366 | P a g e
said will on the grounds of undue and improper pressure and that Maxima was mentally
incapable of making a will at the time of its execution. After the probate court had received the
evidence for both the petitioner and oppositors, but before the latter could close their evidence,
Flora Blas on November 6, 1957 filed a manifestation that she is withdrawing her opposition to
the probate of the will.

Later, she joined the proponent of the will for probate praying for the delivery of a specific
fishpond as a specific devise. Rosalina filed an opposition citing that Flora had lost her right due
to the ―contest and forfeiture clause‖ found in the will whereby any one of the heirs who contests
or opposes the probate of the will or the carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to
receive any inheritance or benefit, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs
who have not opposed.

ISSUE: Has Flora Buenaventura lost her right to the device owing to the no contest and
forfeiture clause?

RULING: It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph
Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a
contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so
because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay atpag-bibigay-bisa" instead of
"pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa." This furnishes a significant index into the intention of the
testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary
provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest
which appellant brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done into the intention of the
testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out. Due to appellant's timely
withdrawal of her opposition to the probate of the will, it was as if there had been no opposition
by her at all, as far as the purpose underlying the aforestated clause is concerned.

RESOLUTION AMENDING THE DECISION:

Appellant-movant contends that she is entitled to and should be awarded, not only the
devised fishpond, but all the fruits or rents of said property from the death of the testatrix on
October 5, 1956 up to the time said property will be delivered to her. The provisions of law
regarding devised proper are emphatic in stating that a devise of a specific things includes its
fruits and income accruing after the testator's death, ordering that these shall be delivered with
the thing devised. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its
accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned.

The next argument is on appellant's claim to interest upon the fruits or rents. The rule is
that interest does not run, unless stipulated, where there is yet no delay (Arts. 1169, 2209, Civil
Code). And in settlement proceedings, there is no delay on the part of the administratrix until
after the court orders her to make delivery of the legacy or devise (Ongpin v. Rivera, 44 Phil.
808). In this case, the court a quo not having issued such an order, appellee has not incurred in
delay and is thus not liable for interest.
367 | P a g e
 DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

----------------------------------------

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA

REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

G.R. No. L-23638. October 12, 1967

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

368 | P a g e
FACTS: On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the CFI a
petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on
October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.
The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa
Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all
claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds
advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the
estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances
were finally set aside by the Supreme Court.

The CFI found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the issue of estoppel
and revocation until such time that the opportunity is presented. Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes
petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and
revocation be considered and resolved but were denied. The CA later ruled that the case had
become final and executor due to failure to appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Are the issues of revocation necessary to be immediately resolved by the CFI?

2. Had the 1930 will by Benedicta Reyes been impliedly revoked?

RULING:

1. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of
the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the
testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is
denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and
hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the
testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude
probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
2. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from
the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful
by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in
favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals
in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court
inReyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July
31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of
the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property
to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation

369 | P a g e
 being an exception, in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE
OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros
Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.

On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226,
contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil

370 | P a g e
should now be divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the
surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7)
legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera.

According to appellant, the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In
the present case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding
the seven grandchildren of said legatee.

ISSUE: Is the appellant correct in her contention?

HELD: As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial court's
interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in our
previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment will show that this Court left the
issue open at the time, contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of
the estate of Folimena Diaz was not the proper party to the raise the particular issue.

As the actual meaning of the provision —

El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes legitimos,

it is undeniable that but this clause the testator ordained a simple substitution (sustitucion vulgar)
with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first
poart of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):

Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs.

The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly
to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the
descendants nearest in degree?

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest
in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her
and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters,
grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis,
appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):

A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be

understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.

The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the
case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an

371 | P a g e
event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to
benefit the relatives closest to him.

But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously
does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and noot of
the testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer
to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each
legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to
those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a
preferred beneficiary.

Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various reasons
against this. The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal
commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of
representation does not operate.

The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest
relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of
them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator
who, in the selfsame clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto
hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos"
of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that he understood well
that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms.

We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to
apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended
all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original
legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and
grandchidren.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant..

372 | P a g e
 OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.

G.R. No. 140975 December 8, 2000

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on
alleged facts. The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as a collateral relative within the
fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her
intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is
defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the
question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court
issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the
absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation
of the proper law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.

Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal
aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a
first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.

ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent,
a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in
intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?

HELD:

The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to
govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations
of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of,
the system set out by the Code.

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines."

373 | P a g e
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
"raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and
succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would
have succeeded.

The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving
spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among
collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring
with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the
Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to
the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the
decedent.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

374 | P a g e
 OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased wit:

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased,

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that
of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don
Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise

375 | P a g e
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the
deceased, Don Andres Pascual.

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court
ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

376 | P a g e
377 | P a g e
 CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK
OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,respondents.

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942
was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo,
the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944,
while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.

On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said
Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria
Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to
him his share therein with legal interest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the properties in question are exclusive properties of private
respondents and that petitioner has not established his filiation.

HELD: To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents.

Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of
one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala
predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944,
survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by
right of representation.

In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that
his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.

Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We
have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree

378 | P a g e
of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend
credence to his tale.

This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff
but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and
Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence
showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that
plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is
claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. 4

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

379 | P a g e
 MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-
LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

CRUZ, J:

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to
wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate
by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the
same evidence.

ISSUES:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for
themselves to the exclusion of all others.

HELD:

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate

380 | P a g e
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree
of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming
the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from
adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the
decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge
cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting
parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed
by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of

381 | P a g e
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

382 | P a g e
 VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:

FACTS:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the
will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation
clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the
testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the
full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind
from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and
spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind
such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A.
Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left
the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix
also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

ISSUES:

(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in
question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the
portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

HELD:1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua,
et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would

383 | P a g e
be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Idem).

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will,
and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied
probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal
heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot
give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the
estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because
being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was
not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the
testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having
been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set
aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
384 | P a g e
was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be
set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision
is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

385 | P a g e
 MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982

VASQUEZ, J.:

FACTS: In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens
Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.

On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro
Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial
Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by
Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced
heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.

Petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of the
petitioners being their respective spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of
Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with
his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second
marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not
have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that private
respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly
pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to
share in his estate.

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the case valid?

HELD:We find the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious and
erroneous. Although the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he
had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract and not a
void one. This question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground for the annulment
of the contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent Severino
Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar
and as such entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased. This
is a most material point on which the parties have asserted conflicting claims. Understandably so,
inasmuch as the question of whether the question document is void or merely voidable depends
largely on such determination.

As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of
386 | P a g e
petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro
Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from
Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads
as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the
truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an
acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from
Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the
children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro
Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.

Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an
illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this
supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not
an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article
1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:

Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person.

It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the
nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived
them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be proved,
therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of
the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his
favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409,
par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code,
the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment
thereon. The private respondents shall pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

387 | P a g e
 EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA,
CAMILA, MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY, all surnamed
RAMIREZ, TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN, all surnamed PASSILAN, and
DOMINGO ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA and ANITA, all surnamed
LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO
MALLILLIN, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS: The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment
of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of
sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao
in favor of respondent Mallillin.

The respondent judge rendered a summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. The
judgment was based on the following findings:

The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence
or in substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one
Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda)
Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970
and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the
amended complaint); That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at
Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as
relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently
instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which
were hers by virtue of the extra- judicial partition, Annex "B", (paragraph 15, amended
complaint).

The motion to dismiss, particularly the motion is reiteration of defendant's previous motion for
summary judgment, contains as Page 2-A diagram of the family tree of the plaintiffs and the
defendant, showing that their common ancestor was Pablo Capiao ... As shown by the family,
tree or diagram, Julia Capiao deceased. who maintained extra-marital relations with one
Victoriano Taccad had one issue, the deceased Leogarda and/or Lutgarda Capiao married to
Raymundo Zipagan both having died without any children and/or immediate forced heir ...

388 | P a g e
The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an
illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family
name of her mother Julia CapiaO.

ISSUE:Are the petitioners‘ contentions correct?

HELD:We hold that the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus on the
ground that it had no appellate jurisdiction over the same. It should be noted that the petitioners
stated that they were appealing the main case to this Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
could not have exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus since it was
merely incidental to the main case.

In the case of Philippine Product Co. v. Court of Appeals (21 SCRA 874), we ruled:

Petitioner's submission that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed Before it is well taken. By statute (Section 30, Republic Act 296
[The Judiciary Act]) the Court of Appeals may only issue writs of certiorari and prohibition "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This phrase has been consistently interpreted to mean that
should the main case be appealed and the appeal fall under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals, then only can it act on said special civil actions concerning a matter
incidental to the main case. Otherwise, i.e., if the main case is not properly appealable to the
Court of Appeals, jurisdiction to act on the special civil actions would devolve on the Supreme
Court exclusively. (Miailhe v. Halili, 103 Phil. 639; Albar v. Carangdang, L-18003, Sept. 29,
1962; PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-18728, May 31, 1963; and Tuason v. Jaramino, L-18932-34,
etc., Sept. 30, 1963)

Furthermore, it is an established principle that the writ of mandamus may not be issued to control
the discretion of a judge or to compel him to decide a case or motion in a particular way, the writ
being available only to compel him to exercise his discretion or jurisdiction. (Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 220). The respondent judge,
therefore, cannot be compelled by such special civil action to approve the petitioners' appeal
which was perfected after the reglementary period to do so had expired. The petitioners contend
that the appellate court should have certified the petition to the Supreme Court, thus leaving the
resolution of the issues to this Court. Since the main case is manifestly without merit, the action
of the appellate court cannot be impugned. No considerations of substantial justice which would
warrant the exercise of equity powers exist in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioners.

389 | P a g e
 GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-
appellant.

G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 Of this marriage
there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic.
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.

On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were
born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901.
Silvestra Glorioso also died.

Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir.
Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino,
Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio
Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir
as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo
Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was
filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant
herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided
share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited
from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso

After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza
who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and
requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by
Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died
without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and
administration of the same to the defendants.

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ISSUE: What provisions are applicable in the case at bar?

HELD: We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar.

In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article

1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband
and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral
relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother
and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil
Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their
own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986,
this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or
nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship
to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is
provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which
provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and
nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the
deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402,
June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic,
her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004,
NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is,
that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9,
1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.

391 | P a g e
 BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO
ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the
latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO
ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate
of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO,
MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE
SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO,
together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in
1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if
any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her
daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22,
1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan
and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father,
Patricio.

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at
P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao was given the biggest fishpond
with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and
the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate
appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of
partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which
was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at
Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa
cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

392 | P a g e
Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond
business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs'
version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the
funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that
those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary
evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands
purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in
their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Was there an implied trust created by the parties?

HELD:There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part
of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no
constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and
Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of
justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano
vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this
case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho
and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its
reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the
lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-
in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt
jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs.
Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the
Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia
Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right
and personality to assil that donation.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

393 | P a g e
394 | P a g e
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of
her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in
Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was
survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-
sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito,
all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs
claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia
Ferraris.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance
or will the former be excluded by the latter?

HELD: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.

395 | P a g e
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent
is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded
only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts
may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.

396 | P a g e
 CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H.
ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.

G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by
alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being
their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their
late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly
executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife
of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.

ISSUE: Are respondents acknowledged children?

HELD: Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the
startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when
Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.

It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was
married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria
Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose
Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.

The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given
that he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and

397 | P a g e
Marian are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.

First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say
the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is
"deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as
to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's
death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate
has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling,
while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed
buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first
husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different.
Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was
Honoria Empaynado.

Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however,
that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased.
Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted
gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds
virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a
sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We
thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their
claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by
private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of
Ricardo Abad.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of
Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE.

398 | P a g e
 BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this
suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio
Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06
August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the
marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters,
covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan
Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and
Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his
name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled
the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her
as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con
Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land
covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or
on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

ISSUE: Who can inherit under the law?

HELD: Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does

399 | P a g e
not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the
presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is
explained by a noted civilist.

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey
v. Fabie and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court and De
la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. In Diaz, we have said:

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it
has ruled that where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the
legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is
a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is
animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but
must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir
of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption,
is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the
Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by
the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law
does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of
damages against the actor.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is
AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby
DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

400 | P a g e
401 | P a g e
 MAURICIO RAMIREZ, administrator of the estate of MOISES RAMIREZ,
deceased, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMEON BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-5075 December 1, 1909

ARELLANO, C. J.:

FACTS: The subject of this complaint is two fish ponds, left by Moises Ramirez on his demise,
and subsequently illegally sold. This action was brought for the purpose of having the sale
declared to be void, to secure the recovery of possession of the fish ponds, their restitution to the
administrator of the estate of the deceased owner, and indemnity for damages.

Moises Ramirez, who died intestate in February, 1900, was married twice. By the first marriage
he had five children, named Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia; by the second
marriage three, to wit, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel alone survives. At the time of
his death he left two fish ponds in the sitio of Tagalag, in the municipality of Polo, Province of
Bulacan, the specific details of which are described and admitted in the case. The two wives are
also dead.

The children of the first marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia, sold the two
fish ponds on the 28th of November, 1901, to Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran for the sum
of 1,100 pesos. The only surviving child of the second marriage, Isabel, was not a party to said
sale, hence the suit now filed by the administrator of the intestate estate to have the sale declared
null and void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez.

The two purchasers proved their purchase by two documents, one of which was a private and
other a notarial one executed for the purpose. When summoned to answer the complaint they
requested that the vendors be cited also, but the latter although so summoned did not appear at
trial.

ISSUE: Are the appellants correct in their contention?

HELD: In view of these considerations, the claim of the appellants is entirely legal that thirteen-
sixteenths should be apportioned among the children of the first marriage — to wit, eight as their
own, already inherited from their mother, Apolinaria Guillermo, and five subsequently inherited
from their deceased father, Moises Ramirez — and three-sixteenths should be the share of the
three children of the second marriage, which accrued to Isabel Ramirez.

Therefore, in the succession of Moises Ramirez that is now opened the whole of these fractional
parts can not be included, but only the eight which actually constitute his share in the community

402 | P a g e
of property maintained by him with his children of the first marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco,
Mauricia, and Ignacia, since the death of his first wife.

The above children of the first marriage, upon the death of Moises Ramirez, continued the
aforesaid community of property with their three half sisters and brother, Cirila, Isabel, and
Serapio; that is to say, now with Isabel, their share being thirteen-sixteenths, and that of Isabel
three sixteenths.

If Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez could lawfully alienate their
respective shares in the joint ownership of the two parcels of land sold to the defendants, Simeon
Bautista and Raymundo Duran, it is evident that the sale of thirteen-sixteenths of the said two
lands could not be void; the sale of the three-sixteenths which belonged to Isabel alone is illegal,
as alleged in the third assignment of error.

Therefore, the sale described in the public instrument of the 29th of November, 1901, of the
thirteen-sixteenths which belonged to the vendors is valid, and that of the three-sixteenths which
pertain to Isabel, who neither by herself nor by means of another took part in said sale is null.

Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran succeed to the vendors and are subrogated thereto in the
joint ownership of the two fish ponds sold; their shares are the same that were owned by the
vendors, that is, thirteen-sixteenths.

The whole of the two fish ponds can not pertain to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, but
merely the half that belonged to him and which at his death became a part of his intestate estate.

Intestate succession can not disturb the lawful holder in his possession of property, which it is
thought should constitute a part of the hereditary property.

Only in the event of a division of the common property, or upon dissolution of the community of
property now existing between the purchasers, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, on the
one hand and Isabel Ramirez on the other, can the fruits, rents, or benefits received, and the part
thereof, as well as of the expenses, corresponding to the coowner Isabel Ramirez in maintaining
the community, be considered, as well as of the rights and actions that may pertain to the
purchasers as against the vendors (who have taken no part in these proceedings), by reason of the
total consideration paid for the two properties, and other obligations which may have arisen
because of the sale.

The present cause of action and the complaint based thereon being limited to the recovery of the
two properties in question, and the restitution of the possession thereof to the administrator of the
intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, in consequence of the latter's hereditary succession, it is
evident that neither recovery of possession nor the restitution asked for can be granted, as the
defendants are the legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the greater portion
of the common property claimed.
403 | P a g e
In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should only be
affirmed in so far as it declares that the sale made by Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and
Ignacia Ramirez of the three-sixteenths parts belonging to Isabel Ramirez in the two fish ponds
claimed is null and void; in all other respects the said judgment is hereby reversed, without any
special ruling as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.

404 | P a g e
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-
appellees.

G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

BENGZON, C.J.:

FACTS:On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro
acquired several parcels of land located in that province.

About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito
U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in
the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of
her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito
and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta
Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless
of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving
spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children"
includes the singular "child."

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?

HELD: Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case,
it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate.
Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of
children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal
shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the
amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the
latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

405 | P a g e
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they
share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving
spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction
that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently
Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-
fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the

singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a
legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if
we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children,"

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent
when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-
half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate
child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in
Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession,
where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or
widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets
only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually
leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get
more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one
child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon
to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.

406 | P a g e
 JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR Represented by Salvador Upod
and Dolores Bautista, respondents.

G.R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz,
located at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a registered land in
the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948
while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses had two [legitimate] children,
namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962, while Catalina
Villar died on February 21, 1967. For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented by
Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar is represented by
Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs [herein respondents].
Defendant [herein petitioner], Jessie Pisueña, is the son-in-law of Agustin Navarra who was once
a [m]unicipal [m]ayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra died on October 30, 1958.

Plaintiffs [respondents herein] contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners, Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession of Lot No.
1201. However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948)
Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin
Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four (4)
hectares. On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix
Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in Spanish
captioned ―ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA‖ to evidence such sale was duly notarized
by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in his Notarial Register.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot belongs to the petitioners.

HELD: Yes. Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like ordinary registration
proceedings, they are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence. Thus, the
finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating inherited the lot in question from her mother
cannot be dismissed as an obiter, which is ―an observation made by the court not necessary to the
decision rendered.‖ Thus the lot is her paraphernal property.

As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra Unating did not leave any other
property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her
children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar. The two children were
407 | P a g e
entitled to two-thirds of their mother‘s estate, while the husband was entitled to the remaining
one-third. By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred
to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed
lot. However, they could not have disposed of their father‘s share in the same property at the
time, as they were not yet its owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate
interest in their father‘s share.

When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed
property, Felix and Catalina‘s inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in
them the title to their father‘s share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed to
Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force
at the time of Aquilino‘s death in 1953.

Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1201
became vested in Jessie Pisueña and his wife as successors-in-interest.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife, Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot.
No. 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz. The Register of Deeds of Capiz is
AUTHORIZED to cancel the Original Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and to
issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie
Navarra. No costs.

408 | P a g e
409 | P a g e
 JOVENCIO ARCENAS, NEMESIO ACAIN, and ROSA DIONGSON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO D. CINCO, Presiding Judge, Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and TEODORA VDA. DE ARCENAS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-29288 November 29, 1976

ANTONIO, J.:

FACTS: On August 11, 1966, respondent Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, widow of the deceased
Alfonso Arcenas, filed an action against Jovencio Arcenas, Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson
for the partial annulment of certain deeds of pacto de retro and or sale executed by her only son,
Jovencio Arcenas, in favor of Spouses Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson insofar as it
encroached upon her rights as co-owner; for the return to her of the possession of the portions of
the property taken from her by defendants, the accounting by defendants of her share of the
produce, and the partition of the properties by the segregation of the portion belonging to her.

The parties in the "Stipulation of Facts" were in agreement that Teodora Vda. de Arcenas had a
share in the said properties, they were in disagreement as to the extent of the share of said
widow. As a matter of fact, in the respective memoranda of the parties, there was a marked
disparity in the view of said parties as to the share of the surviving spouse, the widow insisting
on her claim to one-half (1/2) of the estate, while the other party was willing to concede to her
only one-fourth (1/4) of said estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teodora Vda. De Arcenas is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate.

HELD: Yes. Teodora Vda. de Arcenas is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate. This is in
accordance with the rule enunciated by this Court in Santillon v. Miranda, supra, to the effect
that when intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996 of the
Civil Code.

However each and every parcel should be physically divided and apportioned according to the
circumstances:

It appears to be the settled rule that in an action for partition, where it is practicable to make a
division of the property, "the generally if not universally recognized rule is that a court of equity,
on ascertaining that one of two or more tenants in common has made permanent and valuable
improvements on the property involved, will allot to him that portion on which the
improvements are located, or so much thereof as represents his share of the whole tract." Thus,
"in keeping with the familiar principle of equity jurisprudence requiring that one who seeks
equity must do equity, the rule has been generally adopted that a court of equity should take
improvements into account when decreeing partition, and should award to the cotenant in
410 | P a g e
possession who has necessarily and in good faith improved the common property and enhanced
its value at his own cost such equitable compensation as will leave only the value of the estate
without the improvements to be divided among the tenants in common."

ACCORDINGLY, certiorari is granted and respondent Court's Order of May 18, 1968 is hereby
set aside, with costs against the private respondent.

411 | P a g e
 In Re: Chanliongco

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977

FACTS: This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late
ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO. It appears from the records that at the time of his death on
July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of
service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case
against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he
received was P18,700.00 per annum.

Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco, and an only Intimate child Mario it appears
that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to
Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17
years of age, all the claimants are of legal age.

The above named filed the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government
Service System. From the records, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life
insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants. What, therefore, to be settled are the
retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as
the deceased's last employer.ch

The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over
to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his
retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue
to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate, as in
the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy.

ISSUE: How will the hereditary estate be accordingly divided?

RULING: There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is
distributed according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The
reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of
the primary compulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied.

In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the legitimate child would
deprive the illegitimate children of their legitimes. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the
proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate
children. Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an
acknowledged natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the
412 | P a g e
spurious child is 2/5 of that of the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged
natural child.

The rule cannot be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all
compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant
case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime. With respect to the
decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal properties
because of the rule that property "obtained by the work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of
them", is conjugal in character (Art. 1532, Civil Code).

It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave,
unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly,
one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is
to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the
retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation
for services rendered."

413 | P a g e
 EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA, CAMILA,
MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY, all surnamed RAMIREZ,
TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN, all surnamed PASSILAN, and DOMINGO
ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA and ANITA, all surnamed LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO MALLILLIN,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS: The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment
of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of
sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao
in favor of respondent Mallillin.

The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence
or in substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one
Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda)
Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970
and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the
amended complaint); That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at
Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as
relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently
instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which
were hers by virtue of the extra- judicial partition. The lower court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can inherit the properties in question.

HELD: No . The decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is clear
from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article
992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao they cannot inherit
from tier illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda
Capiao. As explained by Manresa, whom the private respondents cited:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged
it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no
right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this Article
943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties;
414 | P a g e
the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural
child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every
relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3rd ed., p. 110).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioners.

415 | P a g e
 Intestate Estate of Pablo C. Luce. PIO PORTEA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JACINTO PABELLON, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-1367 August 16, 1949

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon holding that
upon the death of Pablo Luce, "all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter
Cristeta Luce who survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour
after" the death of her father.

The appellant insists that, since there is no proof as to the definite time of the death of Pablo
Luce and his daughter Cristeta Luce, the law applicable is section 69, sub-section ii (5), of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court, under which it is presumed that, in the absence of any showing as to
which of two persons (who have perished in the same calamity) died first, the person between
the ages of 15 and 60 is presumed to have survived the person under 15 or over 60. In this
connection, it is alleged that Pablo Luce was 45 years old, whereas Cristeta Luce was only 13
years of age.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property of Luce is included in the intestate proceedings.

HELD: Yes. In the face of the factual conclusion of the trial court that Pablo Luce died half an
hour before Cristeta Luce died, which finding the appellant is now estopped to controvert and
which (in the opinion of the writer hereof) is furthermore supported by the evidence, the rule
cited by the appellant regarding the disputable presumption of survivorship cannot apply.

The appellant also contends that, even assuming that Cristeta Luce survived her father Pablo
Luce, her estate should still be adjudicated to the appellant who is the nephew of Pablo Luce.
Reliance is placed on article 925 of the Civil Code providing that the right of representation shall
always take place in the direct descending line but never in the ascending, and that in the
collateral line it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, whether they
may be of the whole or half blood. It is intimated that because the oppositors-appellees are not in
the direct descending line, but are only maternal grandparents of Cristeta Luce, they cannot
inherit by representation. Aside from the fact that the trial court correctly withheld any
adjudications as to the estate of Cristeta Luce, because it is not included in the intestate
proceedings instituted by the petitioner-appellant, said oppositors-appellees are claiming
inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce in their own rights as ascendants, and not merely
by right of presentation, it appearing that the said Cristeta Luce did not leave any legitimate
children or ascendants. (Arts. 935 and 937, Civil Code.)

416 | P a g e
 FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON, HERMINIA
BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA VICTORIA as Attorney-in-Fact,
ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION BARANDA, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

G.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: This case raises the all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy: an old woman dying
without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling over her properties like the
soldiers in Mount Calvary casting lots for the seamless robe of Jesus. The difference in this case
is that even before the owner's death, two of the claimants had already taken over her properties
by virtue of certain supposed transfers which are in fact that reason for this petition.

The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated "Bilihan ng Lupa" and
dated January 29 and February 3, 1977, under which Paulina L. Baranda, a widow, sold five
parcels of land to her niece, Evangelina Baranda, and a sixth parcel to her other niece, Elisa, also
a daughter of Pedro Baranda, Paulina's brother. The sales were made, according to the
documents, for the total consideration of P105,000.00 duly acknowledged as received by the
transferor from the vendees. Paulina herself would file suit against the sisters resulting in a
compromise agreement where the lands would be reconveyed to Paulina. The transfer was never
completed as Paulina died beforehand.

This was the factual situation when on April 26, 1982, the herein petitioners, claiming to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Paulina Baranda, filed a complaint against Evangelina and Elisa
Baranda in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the sale and the
reconveyance of the lots, with damages

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners bear legal standing in this case.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court rejected the fairy tale spun by the sisters on how they
obtained the purchase price. Considering that Paulina never had any intent to part with her
property. The Sale was void from the beginning and was assailable at any time.

It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct descendants or
ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived, however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro
and Teodoro, and several nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as
petitioners Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda Villarte, children of two
deceased brothers and a sister. The above- named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who
417 | P a g e
was not joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the children
of another deceased sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.

As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by
Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded
therefrom to their prejudice. This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are
the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the
deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided
that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate as in this
case. The deed of sale was annulled and the defendants were ordered to execute the necessary
instrument to transfer the lots in question to the estate of the late Paulina Baranda.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the trial
court is REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents.

418 | P a g e
 IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an
aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,
Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of
Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These
two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of
said Melodia Ferraris.

ISSUE: Whether or not nieces and nephews exclude uncles and aunts to inherit in the case.

HELD: Yes. An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three
degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted
by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art.
966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit
by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.

Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeedab intestato so long
as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

419 | P a g e
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO,
defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: This case involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs). Toribia Tioco died
intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho). In
1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.
In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as
his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal. In 1939
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate
descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her
mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of
whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels
of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of
said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and,
therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate
taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

ISSUE: Whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all
relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

420 | P a g e
HELD: No. Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass,
not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within
the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation
operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in
the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within
the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such. Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his
niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that
the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of
intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva"

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion
of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

421 | P a g e
422 | P a g e
 INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales,
a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea
C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of
about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

ISSUE: Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.

HELD: No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession
provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final
intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms our observation. If the legislature intended to

423 | P a g e
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

424 | P a g e
 CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and
EMILIANO CATANIAG, respondents.

G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein
private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private
respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989,
Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning[,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her
rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from
Simeon.

Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation which was issued in the name of appellee
David Rey Guzman. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the
two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and
Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subject lands in questions be the proper subject of succession.

HELD: Yes In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have
indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to
be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in
construction:

―ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece
of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does
not own any rural land.

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the
public domain, except only by way of legal succession.

If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers

it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the

425 | P a g e
transferee is rendered valid. Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private
Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

426 | P a g e
 In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier, SULPICIO RESURRECCION,

vs. AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-42539 ; October 23, 1936

AVANCEÑA (ponente)

FACTS: Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio Resurrection as her
universal heir and left a legacy in favor of her brother Gil Javier on October 18, 1932. She later
died on January 22, 1933 and her will was probated March 8, 1934. On October 12, 1933, the
probate court discovered that Gil Javier had already died prior to the making of the will. Thus, it
ordered that the legacy in his favor be reverted to the estate. The heirs of Gil Javier appealed the
court‘s resolution, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not a legacy made in favor of a person who was already dead before the will
was made is valid?

RULING: No, upon the institution as a legatee by the testatrix, Gil Javier lacked civil
personality due to his death thus he may not be capacitated to inherit by will. Further, he may not
also be represented because it takes place only during intestate inheritance and no right could
have been transmitted because he was already dead at the time of the making of the will. The
Supreme Court also observed that even if the testatrix knew that her brother was already dead,
her intention cannot be explained why she still left the legacy in favor of her brother and not of
her children thus the court cannot admit that it was her intention to leave the legacy to her
children.

427 | P a g e
 Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation

G.R. No. L-11964 ; April 28, 1962

Dizon (ponente)

FACTS: On June 16, 1953, an information was filed in the CFI of Manila against Alfonso
Pangilinan and Guillermo Chua for qualified theft. On Septmeber 18, 1956, Pangilinan and his
wife, Belen Sta. Ana, executed a Deed of Transfer wherein he ceded and transferred to China
Banking Corporation, his employer, a parcel of land registered in the name of his wife, Belen
Sta. Ana. The Deed of Transfer was executed for the satisfaction of the civil liability of
Pangilinan. On October 24, 1956, the deed was presented for registration to the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila but the transferee was an alien-owned thus barred from acquiring
lands in the Philippines. Thus, the matter was submitted to the Land Registration Commission
for resolution which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant, an alien-owned bank, can acquire ownership of a residential lot
by virtue of the deed of transfer.

RULING: No, the constitutional prohibition is absolute in its terms so much so that it may not
be liberally construed which reads:

―Save in cases of hereditary succession no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines. ―

The reason for this is manifestly the desire and purpose of the Constitution to place and keep in
the hands of the people the ownership over private lands in order not to endanger the integrity of
the nation. Inasmuch as when an alien buys land he acquires and will naturally exercise
ownership over the same, either permanently or temporarily, to that extent his acquisition
jeopardizes the purpose of the Constitution.

428 | P a g e
 SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA
GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO.

G.R. No. L-62952 ; October 9, 1985

GUTIERREZ, JR., (ponente)

FACTS: On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died leaving a duly executed will. Under the will, the
testator appointed Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. Further, the will
expressly stated that he was legally married to Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator and Sofia were married in Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to
his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire
estate and the free portion petitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will. The
legal wife, Rufina and her children filed an opposition. In 1976, the lower court denied the
probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate
will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is
evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court. The respondent court set aside the
decision of the declaring the will to be valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner pursuant
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner may validly inherit from the will.

RULING: No, the Supreme Court held that the will contained provisions which are dubious and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. The denial of petitioner of not having any
knowledge of the previous marriage was held to lack credibility as it was inherently improbable
for being contrary to the experience in common life and ordinary instincts which would prompt a
person to question why a woman would not bother to inquire if the man that she was going to
marry was already married to another, knowing that the testator already had children. The
prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation, which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in concubinage.

429 | P a g e
Re: Acceptance and Repudiation

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,

and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their
mother, REMEDIOS OANES

G.R. No. 163707 ; September 15, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO (ponente)

FACTS: On June 13, 1997, minors Karen and Kamille, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City, claiming that
they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died on October 29, 1992.
Sima Wei was survived by his spouse, Shirley Guy and several children. Petitioner argues that
the status of the private respondents should have been established during the lifetime of the
putative father pursuant to Art. 175 of the Family Code. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss, which a Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed
claiming that private respondents have already been paid thus they have already waived,
abandoned their claim. This was evidenced by a Release and Waiver of Claim dated June 7,
1993, which states that the private respondents have already received financial and educational
assistance.

ISSUE: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their successional rights.

RULING: No, the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios, and not the heirs
themselves, does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights because there can
be no waiver of hereditary rights without judicial approval. The waiver merely states that
Remedios received Php 300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters ―by way of
financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind…
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.‖

Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.
This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court‘s
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar respondents from
asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an
intent to abandon a right. Considering that the document did not specifically mention private

430 | P a g e
respondents‘ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his

Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH

G.R. No. 132964 ; February 18, 2000

BELLOSILLO (ponente)

FACTS: Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, died in 1968 survived by his spouse
Helen, an American citizen, and his son David Rey leaving properties located in Bulacan. On
December 29, 1970, the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of his estate. On
December 10 1981 and in August 9, 1989 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning,
transferring and conveying to her son David her interest on all the parcels of land subject matter
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman in the Philippines.

On October 18 1989 David acknowledged ownership over the parcels of land under the
Quitclaim of Helen by executing a Special Power of Attorney and empowered Atty. Lolita G.
Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. Later, the Office of the Solicitor General, based on
a letter it received from Atty. Batongbacal which informed them of a defect in David‘s
ownership, filed a Petition for Escheat against David Rey with prayer that the subject parcels of
land be forfeited in favor of the government.

ISSUE: Whether Helen validly repudiated her interest on the subject parcels of land.

RULING: No, the repudiation is not valid because Helen has already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she executed executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman on December 29, 1970, which divided and adjudicated between Helen and
David the two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial
settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share
and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. As the Article 1056
of the Civil Code provides, the acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is
irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that
vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears. Nothing on record shows that Helen's
acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated
her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon.
Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect
of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven
(11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect. Nevertheless, the
nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res
nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect
whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being

431 | P a g e
an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.

RE: Collation/Parification or Equalization

LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and RAMON G. NICOLAS,

G.R. No. 118449 ; February 11, 1998

FRANCISCO (ponente)

FACTS: Estrellita is the daughter of Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicholas. Her siblings are
Antonio, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo. Antonio predeceased his parents and is survived by his
widow Zenaida and their four children. On May 22, 1979, Esrellita purchased a parcel of land
from Rafael for P135,000, which she later sold to Amelia Lim and Maria Chiu for P3.4M. In the
same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land and a car using the
proceeds of the prior sale. The balance of which was deposited in a bank. On June 30, 1991,
Estrellita and her daughters were killed. The NBI conducted investigations and found that
Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Thus, petitioner survived his daughters who died later than
their mother, Estrellita.

Petitioner executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-

Vizconde with Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents which provided for
the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and The
Parañaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving
all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" in the said properties. On
November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael‘s estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate
proceedings with the RTC of Caloocan, listing as heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, the decedent‘s
wife Zenaida and children of Antonio. Ramon, however filed an opposition dated March 24,
1993, praying that the property sold by Estrellita should be collated because the sale between
Rafael and Estrellita was actually a donation and not a sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Paranaque property should be collated with the other properties.

RULING: No, the records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. There is nothing to prove that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to
warrant collation. Pursuant to Article 1035, it is the duty of the plaintiffs to prove that the
donations received by Estrellita were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime
of hereditary portion to which they are entitled. The probate court's order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to
herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
432 | P a g e
Therefore, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does
not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. For even if collation would be proper, it
is not the Paranaque property that is to be collated, but should have been the same property given
by the decedent to the heir during his lifetime, which in this case is the Valenzuela property.

FELIX ADAN vs. AGAPITO CASILI and VICTORIA ADAN,

C.A. No. 299 March 18, 1946

OZAETA (ponente)

FACTS: Felix Adan filed for the judicial partition of the estate of his deceased mother Simplicia
Nepomuceno against his sister Victoria Adan and her husband Agapito Casili. The estate of their
deceased mother composed of parcels of land. The defendant interposed the defense that the
parcels of land in question was ceded by the decedent to her daughter Victoria as her share in the
inheritance and that the plaintiff has already received his share of the inheritance which consisted
of money, livestock, palay, and real property. The trial court held that during the lifetime of their
mother, Felix received various sums for his expenses while studying surveying in Manila and
that one-half of which should be brought into collation.

ISSUE: Whether or not collation is proper in the present case.

RULING: Yes, pursuant to Art. 1042 of the Civil Code, the expenses incurred by parents in
giving their children a professional or artistic career may be brought to collation if the expenses
encroach upon the legitime or if the parents orders that the expenses should be collated. In this
case, the Supreme Court found that the expenses incurred by Felix had encroached upon the
legitime thus the expenses should be collated, one-half of the amount of the expenses would be
collated because the other half would be considered as expenses of the parents had Felix lived in
the house and company of his mother.

433 | P a g e
GLICERIA CARANDANG-COLLANTES and LUZ CARANDANG vs. FELIX CAPUNO,
LEONILA COSICO, LYDIA CAPUNO, DIOMEDES ALCANTARA, SIMEON CAPUNO,
DOMINGA COSICO, GERARDA COSICO, MARGARITA COCOLE, ANICETO
CAPUNO, ALBINA AQUINO and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-55373 July 25, 1983

GUERRERO (ponente)

FACTS: On April 8, 1970, Josefa Capuno died survived by Felix, Lydia and Simeon, all
surnamed Capuno, nephews and neice of Josefa. On February 8, 1971, private respondents filed
a petition for annulment of a donation inter vivos which was executed on March 6, 1970 by the
late Josefa in favour of petitioners. The donations consisted of four parcels of real property
located in San Pablo, Laguna. The petition was on the ground that the thumb mark appearing in
the deed of donation was not that of Josefa and that the same has been secured through undue
influence or fraud.

Petitioners however contended that the thumbmark was genuine and that the donation was based
on valuable consideration because the deceased has lived with petitioners and treated them as her
own blood relatives-in-fact as her own grandchildren. The trial court rendered a judgment that
the donations were null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the donation subject matter of the case is null and void

RULING: No. there is no proof to support that the donations were a forgery and that the
thumbmark was fictitious, neither by an expert nor by comparison of the thumbprint of Josefa.
The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the witnesses for the respondents were inherently
weak, they being biased and stand to benefit from the annulment of the donations, compared to
the testimony of the notary public who notarized the deed of donation. Thus, since the deed of
donation is a duly executed public instrument, it is presumed to be valid absence any proof of
fraud alleged by respondents. Neither is there any allegation or proof of concrete facts
constituting the supposed fraud. In fact, private respondents have not pointed what undue
influence or fraud they have alleged or proved in the case, the mere allegation that the donor and
the donees have no relations does not constitute nor show undue influence or fraud. Hence, the
second ground for annulment is clearly non-existent.

434 | P a g e
 BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL

G.R. No. L-26270 October 30, 1969

REYES, J.B.L (ponente)

FACTS: Sometime in 1917, Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao donated two lots to
their son Alejandra Dumlao in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifavia Mateo. After
the marriage, the couple took possession of the lots without transferring the title in their name. In
1923, Alejandro died. Bonifacia and her infant daughter lived with Cipriano who undertook the
farming of the donated lots. At the start, Cipriano was giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of
the harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share. This
prompted Bonifacia to resort to a legal action from where she obtained a judgment awarding to
her possession of the two lots plus damages. On July 31 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed
of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo
then sought the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of
possession of the properties from which she obtained a favorable judgment. The CFI of
Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the
Registry of Deeds, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner.

In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two
lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription,
having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the Court of Appeals in 1966 held
that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots exceeded his legitime and the disposable portion
that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Cipriano‘s other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein
petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether the donation is inofficious that would warrant such outright reduction.

RULING: No. The infirmity of the reduction lies in the fact that Article 908 of the new Civil
Code provides that to determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will. To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Before the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be
established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must
be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus
435 | P a g e
the donee‘s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be
seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the
deducted portion to the respondents.

RE: Partition and Distribution- Extrajudicial

J.L.T. AGRO, INC vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY

G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005

TINGA (ponente)

FACTS: Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages. The controversy involves Lot No. 63 of
the Bais Cadastre, originally registered in the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and first wife
Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for
partition and damages; the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter,
the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all
the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement ,the CFI decision
declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by
Don Julian and his children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during
the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63. In 1972, Don
Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities in favor of petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and
Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets
with the Assumption of Liabilities dated 31 July 1973,which constitutes a supplement to the
earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in
favor of petitioner. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.

ISSUE: Whether the partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is valid.

RULING: Yes, future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce
of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into
with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080. The first paragraph of Article 1080, provides the exception to the
exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things. Justice Edgardo Paras
opined that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the
Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require
the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of
acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode
will be intestate succession. Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of
the part to be given to each heir. Article 1080 of the Civil Code authorizes a testator to partition
436 | P a g e
and distribute inter vivos his propert which is revocable at any time by the causante during his
lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force
on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. The partition inter vivos of the
properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering
that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs
from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him

under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to
the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time
nonexistent and might never exist. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the
absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros
Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of
the compromise agreement.

437 | P a g e
 SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN

G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four
children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9,
1964, he died instestave, survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981 Alberta
Zaragoza-Morgan, filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda for delivery of her
inheritance and damages. She alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in
advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists
of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because
of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was
executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime. Petitioners, in their Answer,
admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on the properties of their
father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to
them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot 943
was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged
intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure
to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the
estate of their father during his lifetime.

ISSUE: Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties is valid.

RULING: Yes, hat a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced pursuant to Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory
heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061, ―Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.‖

Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of
inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore
be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
438 | P a g e
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes
were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. DE

CHAVEZ, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO CHAVEZ,
ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ

G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

GRIÑO-AQUINO (ponente)

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6
children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold
each their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of
sale were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter
sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued
for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later
decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their
mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Whether or not partition inter-vivos and sale based on such partition valid

RULING: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must
be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written,
and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime
of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista
Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed
in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had
already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter
vivos.

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RE: Partition and Distribution- Judicial

HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF

ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES, ANDRES MENESES,
FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES

G.R. No. 126996 February 15, 2000

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: Sometime in 1945 and 1947, Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died
intestate. Leoncia was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman.
During the marriage, spouses Aquino acquired various real properties. Sometime in 1989, the
heirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the
heirs of Cesario Velasquez due to the refusal of the latter to partition the conjugal properties of
the Spouses Aquino. The complaint allege that there was an agreement to divide the properties
equally between plaintiffs and defendant before the death of Leoncia however defendants
forcibly took possession of all the properties after the death of Leoncia.

ISSUE: Whether partition is the proper action in the instant case.

RULING: No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must
initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state,
an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject
property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint
the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. The Court
concluded that the action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be
partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no
longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no co-
ownership exist between private respondents the petition find no support.

440 | P a g e
RE: Partition and Distribution- When partition prohibited

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA

FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-
MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ

G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006

CORONA (ponente)

FACTS: On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in
favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land in the name of
Leandro Figuracion. The dispute arose when a dispute between petitioner and her sister Mary
over the Lot 707. Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento and upon his death his two daughters,
Agripina Adviento and Carolina inherited the property. On November 28, 1961, Agripina
executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina
died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her death, however, Carolina
adjudicated unto herself the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria.

In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten
years. Returning in 1981, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion
of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.

On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for partition, annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondent. On the other hand, respondents
took the position that Leandro‘s estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before
partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses
chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.

ISSUE: Can petitioner compel the partition at the moment of death of the decedaent?

RULING: No. Partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute. In a situation
where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she
and respondents are Leandro Figuracion‘s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the
CA that ―certain expenses‖ including those related to her father‘s final illness and burial have not
been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father‘s
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for
partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses
for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or
distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts,
as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate‘s obligations.
441 | P a g e
 PACIENCIA DE JESUS, FELINA DE JESUS, ELENA DE JESUS and MARIA DE
JESUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUSTINA S. VDA. DE MANGLAPUS, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-527, 28 May 1948

TUASON, J.:

FACTS: On April 12, 1944, Sixto de Jesus, from himself and as attorney-in-fact of his mother,
Natalia Alfonga, signed an instrument promising to sell their "interests and participation" in four
parcels of the land belonging to the testate estate of the deceased Gabino de Jesus and
"containing a total area of 730,652 square meters. On August 9, 1944, Sixto de Jesus and Natalia
Alfonga executed "a deed of absolute sale" of two of these parcels, then already allotted to them
as their shares in a plan of partition agreed upon among Gabino's heirs; and at the time of the
absolute sale the plan of partition had been submitted to the court for approval, and it was
approved on September 4, 1945.

The burden of appellant‘s argument is that before the partition was approved Sixto de Jesus' and
his mother's shares, lots Nos. 1292 and 1394, continued to be rights, interest and participation in
the estate subject to the right of repurchase by the other heirs under article 1067 of the Civil
Code. They contend that the sale of these two parcels was a sale of right and interests.

That Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga sold their rights, interests and participation in the said
Testate Estate of the late Gavino de Jesus (before the partition of the Estate), particularly, the two
parcels of land covered by O.C.T. Nos. 1292 and 1344 issued by the office of the register of
deeds of the Province of Batangas and referred to and described in the original complaint, to the
herein defendant, Justina S. Vda. deManglapus, for the sum of P106,997.87, in Japanese War
Notes.

That the plaintiffs only learned of the sale of the aforesaid rights, interests and participation of
Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga on September 4, 1945; and that upon learning thereof, the
plaintiffs demanded upon the defendant Justina S. Vda. deManglapus, within the period provided
for by law, to be subrogated to the rights, interests and participation purchased by said Justina S.
Vda. deManglapus from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga; but said defendant refused and
continues refusing the demands of the herein plaintiffs for subrogation.

ISSUE: Whether the conveyance made is in accordance with Art. 1067 of the Civil Code.

RULING: No. The allegation that the property in question consists of rights and interests of the
vendors in the estate is a conclusion of the general import. It is, the Court thinks, a mistake to
suppose that the insertion of this allegation brings the case within the provision of article 1067. A
conveyance by a tenant in common property marked out by metes and bounds in a partition does
not operate, contrary to the expressed declarations and intention of the parties, to convey an
442 | P a g e
estate in common instead on an estate in severalty. A general conclusion and allegation cannot
overcome the outstanding facts that the subject matter of the sale were two parcels of land which
has been segregated from the mass of property as the vendors' shares. In the face of this facts the
words "rights and interests" cannot be considered more than as a description or statement of the
source of the sellers' title to the two lots conveyed. After all, rights and interests have a broad
signification, and rights and interests in an hereditary estate may mean separate as well as
undivided shares therein.

In the second assignment of error, the appellants object to the defendants' statement in this
motion to dismiss, "that the deed of absolute sale was consummated or confirmed by the lower
court on September 4, 1945." It is said that this statement is not in the complaint and "was
imported by them (defendants) from the probate proceedings." It is alleged that the court below
made use this circumstances as a basis for dismissing the action. This error, if error it be,
however does not vitiate the general conclusion at which we have arrived, based alone on the
fact that a partition had been made and that the lost sold by Sixto de Jesus and his mother
specific parts of the estate adjudicated to them in the agreement.

The allegation that the property in question consists of rights and interests of the vendors in the
estate is a conclusion of the general import. It is, we think, a mistake to suppose that the insertion
of this allegation brings the case within the provision of article 1067. A conveyance by a tenant
in common property marked out by metes and bounds in a partition does not operate, contrary to
the expressed declarations and intention of the parties, to convey an estate in common instead on
an estate in severalty. A general conclusion and allegation can not overcome the outstanding
facts that the subject matter of the sale was two parcels of land which has been segregated from
the mass of property as the vendors' shares. In the face of these facts the words "rights and
interests" can not be considered more than as a description or statement of the source of the
sellers' title to the two lots conveyed. After all, rights and interests have a broad signification,
and rights and interests in a hereditary estate may mean separate as well as undivided shares
therein.

443 | P a g e
 ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES,
NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal
redemption over the subject property against petitioner Verdad who bought a residential lot from
the late Macaria Artega whom the former her traces title the latter being her mother-in-law, who
died intestate. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos
and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage
and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales,
and Aurora Rosales.

Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria's death,
died intestate without an issue.

In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela
Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their
interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. Upon learning of the sale,
Socorro tendered the amount of Php 23,000 to redeem the property. Petitioner,however, refused
to accept alleging that the current value at Php 80,000 should be paid instead of the offered
payment. There was failure to reconcile so it was submitted to the courts for decision. The trial
court dismissed on account of prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and recognized the right of private respondent to redeem the property.

Petitioner averred that Socorro Rosales has no right to redeem the inheritance right she being
merely the wife of the decedent‘s son.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to right of redemption of the inheritance
right

RULING: The SC ruled that Socorro can. It is true that respondent, a daughter-in-law (or, for
that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; 3 however,
Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate
but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mother's inheritance.

David Rosales, irrefutably, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956
her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon
became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which
444 | P a g e
included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow
Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession. On the other hand, Art. 1620. A co-
owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-
owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Thus , Socorro may redeem the
property sold to third persons by her co-heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

445 | P a g e
 FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.

JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Third Division, respondents.

G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

SECOND DIVISION

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of
unregistered land about 372 sq. meters, situated in the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of
Iloilo (Exhibits, p. 19). On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces,
grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and
Marcos. Thus, an extra-judicial partition was executed by the said heirs. Some of the heirs sold
their interests in the land to Spouses Calaliman. The other heirs, the herein petitioners, filed
against the spouses Calaliman for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land sold
to them. The RTC ruled in the plaintiffs‘ favor. CA reversed the lower court‘s ruling and
dismissed the petition due to plaintiff‘s failure to exercise their right of redemption on the
prescribed period.

ISSUE: whether or not the plaintiff failed to exercise their right to redeem within the period
prescribed by law

RULING: No. In the case at bar, the petitioners were not served notice of the sale by the private
respondents. The latter‘s contention that registration in the Register of Deeds is a sufficient
notice for the plaintiffs is flawed. Article 1088 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the
notice must be in writing and thus may not be impliedly presumed to have been satisfied by the
registration of the Deed with the Register of deed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the
decision of the trial court is REINSTATED with the modification that petitioners be awarded
damages, attorney's fees and costs in the amount prayed for.

SO ORDERED.

446 | P a g e
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-
LAVIÑA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and
NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents. xl-aw

[G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000]

JOSEFA CHAVEZ MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES ABAYA, petitioners, vs.

JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
xsc

G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS: Spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves died intestate in 1943 and 1944 respectively.
They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador
Chaves. In A partition was agreed upon under the administration of Angel Chaves. At the time
of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share was given to his only son,
Ramon. Subsequent to the partition, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his
share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to
Amparo.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid oral partition

RULING: The most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition is the
fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing
scheme in the oral partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.

Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims confirmed such prior
oral agreement as well as the petitioners‘ title of ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More
importantly, independent of such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are valid
contracts of waiver of property rights

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 VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.

G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS: Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut
land in Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It
is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. Sometime in May, 1951,
the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose,
they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses averred that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the
extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual
since no special power of attorney was executed by Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of
their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

ISSUE: What are the effects of the extrajudicial partition executed in 1951

RULING: The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951
is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among
heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of
the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or
other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need
not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein.

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Moreso, the extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual
interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts
existing against the estate which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of any
unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should
not be bound by their voluntary acts.

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 MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9,
CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: KKLThe late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children a
219-square-meter lot in Cebu City. Upon the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the property
should have been divided among their children with each child having a share of 36.50 square
meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.

Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square meters of Gregorio‘s
share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriaco‘s share and 12.17 square meters of Abundio‘s share
thereby giving her a total area of 97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square
meters. It turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private respondent in
this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square meters from Laurencia,
36.50 square meters from Gregorio "through Laurencia," 12.17 square meters from Abundio also
"through Laurencia" and 36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square
meters of the Alejandrino property.

However, Laurencia, the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters of the property, later
questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against private respondent
Nique.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the execution of extrajudicial settlement of estate as between the
parties in the case at bar?

RULING: The execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the
intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of
them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that
needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its
effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied
in a public document.

The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia evidence their intention
to partition the property. It delineates what portion of the property belongs to each other. That it
was not notarized is immaterial. It appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the
co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among his co-heirs."
Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing
his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her
intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to private respondent.

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Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that needs determination is whether or
not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to
a third party.

Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the
debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that
he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division
is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to
his use and enjoyment of the same.

Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro

indivisoportion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indivisoshare in
Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the
Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as
the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an
alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the
seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

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 EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON, petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 49286 August 16, 1947

PERFECTO, J.:

FACTS: DD Petitioners Eusebio Quizon and Flordeliza Quizon seek the annulment of the two
order of the CFI of Batangas. The second order issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one
issued on June 26, 1944 to the effect that petitioners should deliver 2/3 of the estate to Josefa
Mayo Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose Morada, unless they file a bond in the
amount of P2,000, pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a petition to the
court to approve the appeal bond of P60. Respondent judge fixed the appeal bond at P2,000. On
appeal, the SC declared the said bond excessive and arbitrary. May 9, Josefa filed a motion for
execution upon the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her share in the
fruits of the estate was left without guarantee. Respondent judge Issued an order on July 26. On
August 2, the Morada brothers filed a motion to amend the order of July 26. The court rendered
a decision on August 18.

The petitioners complained that the orders of July 26 and August 18 were sought to execute the
dispositive part of the decision of October 25, 1943.

ISSUE: Whether a court‘s decision declaring the heirs and their respective shares would now
warrant the delivery of such shares even before the filing and approval of a project of partition.

RULING: No. As the decision of October 25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of heirs
and of the shares each set of heirs was entitled to, and nothing was provided therein as to the
delivery of shares from one person to another, the respondent judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in ordering the execution of said decision by directing the delivery of said shares to
the heirs.

No law nor legal authority has been mentioned in respondent's answer in support of said orders
and none can be cited. The decision of October 25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of
heirs and of the shares each set of heirs was entitled to. Nothing was provided in said decision as
to the delivery of shares from one person to another. The orders of July 26, and August 18,
provided for the execution of something supposed to be executed by the decision of October 25,
1943, which in fact is not provided therein. Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of
shares to the heirs, when no project of partition has as yet been filed or approved.

On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings on the motion for
execution, on the amended record on appeal and on the motion for reconsideration. On July 14,
petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for execution alleging, among other reasons, that
the lower court had no power or authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting
the appeal and that said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be executed. On August
452 | P a g e
2, the Morada brothers presented a motion to amend the order of July 26, which was opposed to
by petitioners because, being in reality a motion for execution, it was filed days after the
amended record on appeal was approved on July 31, and that the presentation of said motion was
in violation of section 2 of Rule 39.

The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction when he
issued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders, purportedly to execute the
decision of October 25, 1943, provided for the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to
Josefa Mayo and later of two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers,
unless petitioners should file bond in the amount of P2,000. Neither law nor legal authority has
been mentioned in respondent's answer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The
decision of October 25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of heirs and of the shares each
set of heirs was entitled to. Nothing was provided in said decision as to the delivery of shares
from one person to another. The orders of July 26, and August 18, provided for the execution of
something supposed to be executed by the decision of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not
provided therein.

Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no project of partition
has as yet been filed and approved.

453 | P a g e
 CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ,
intervenors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947

TUASON, J.:

FACTS: Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria and Aquilina, and Pedro and Basilia are brother
and sisters who acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land known as lot
no. 120073 in Batangas. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel to Zacarias
Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the
combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition
alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters. After the sale, the
plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part
with the property. He instead resold the land to the intervenors.

The lower court ruled that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and
Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith.

On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is
particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to ZacariasAndal, the defendant, and
Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the
intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made
(time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.

After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now
important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her original
complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this
being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and
Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property.

On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was
called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her
sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for
continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses; that on 29th she brought
P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's
sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the
vendors for P970.

454 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether the partition was valid despite being not in public instrument.

RULING: Yes.

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced
to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the
transactions.

However, Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required
public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document
and registered has, in the Court‘s opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the
same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration
is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when,
as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion,
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by law.

455 | P a g e
 GREGORIO FAVOR, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRUDENCIO FAVOR HEIRS: EUFEMIO

FAVOR and AGUSTIN FAVOR, respondents.

G.R. No. 80821 February 21, 1991

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: Regino Favor died intestate leaving behind three sons. However, one of them died
single without issue thus leaving two heirs Gregorio and Prudencio. Gregorio filed a complaint
for partition against Prudencio and for the delivery of his inheritance. Private respondent moved
to dismiss on the ground that partition of their father‘s estate between them has been concluded
after their settlement in a Compromise Agreement acknowledged before a justice of peace.
Plaintiff assails the validity of the Compromise Agreement as a mode of partition of the estate of
their late father..

ISSUE: whether or not the COmpromise Agreement is binding as a means of partition between
the parties.

RULING: Yes. Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, it categorically provides that:

Every act which is intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.

As for its validity, the Supreme Court agree with the respondent court that the Compromise
Agreement must be upheld, the challenge to it not having been substantiated. A public
instrument enjoys the presumption of validity that has not been overcome by the petitioner in this
case with the full, clear and convincing evidence we have consistently required in similar cases.
2 The document appears to have been duly notarized, and by the then justice of the peace, and ex
officio notary public, of the town where it was executed.

WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 5391 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 41, for the partition, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, of the parcels of
land mentioned in Paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of the complaint. The rest of the
challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs to be shared by the petitioner and the private
respondents.

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EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE PALMA- FELICIANO,
ANGELINA DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN FELICIANO, TRINIDAD
VALIENTE, AND BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented by her son DOMINADOR T.
FELICIANO, Petitioners,

- versus -

PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO,ROSAURO FELICIANO, ELSA FELICIANO

AND PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 161746 September 1, 2010

FACTS:

457 | P a g e
 BALUS VS. BALUS

G. R. No. 168970, 15 january 2010

FACTS: Petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On January 3, 1979,
Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the
Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting
of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after
the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property
from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the
Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, TCT was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
ISSUE: Whether co-ownership by petitioner and respondents over the subject property persisted
even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even
after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
RULING: No.The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject
property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of
land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-
owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-
owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of
Rufo at any given point in time.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed
co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided
or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate

458 | P a g e
without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to
put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

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RE: Partition and Distribution- Nullity and Rescission

Non vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000

FACTS: Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a
house and lot located in Quezon City. When their parents died, petitioners and respondents,
children of the spouses, shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Quezon City property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca and
respondent Alicia after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the
two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute
ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by
the latter. Hence, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case
for partition.

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents — a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal share
of the property. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending, among others, that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.

ISSUE: Whether there was preterition in the partition which would warrant its rescission.

RULING: No. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their
execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative
of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a
constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments
remained completely valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 373646. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that
where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded
but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.

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