PILZ-PNOZ X Safety Relay Application

PNOZ X safety relays
Application examples for project configuration –

PNOZ X safety relays with plug-in connection terminals
Application Manual – June 2009 edition

Why does Pilz offer more?
Because the integrality

of our business activities
E T E S O L UTI
is what sets us apart. PL O
M
N
CO
S
Excellent Professional
Components Services
Pilz is a solution supplier for all automation
functions. Including standard control func-
tions. Developments from Pilz protect man, FO
N
machine and the environment. That’s why R IO
SA
all our experience and knowledge goes into FE AUTOMAT
individual products as well as consistently Exclusion of liability
sophisticated system solutions.
We have taken great care in compiling our
application manual. It contains information
• Sensor technology
about our company and our products. All
• Control technology
statements are made in accordance with the
• Networks current status of technology and to the best
• Drive technology of our know-ledge and belief. However, we
• Operator and cannot except liability for the accuracy and
visualisation systems entirety of the information provided, except
• Software in the case of gross negligence. In particular
• Consulting and engineering it should be noted that statements do not
• Training Support – have the legal quality of assurances or assu-
Pilz is a family business Technical help round the clock! red properties. We are grateful for any feed-
Appropriate services relating to individual that’s closer to its customers back on the contents.
components and independent generic Technical support is available from Pilz
services guarantee that our customers Pilz has a tradition as a family-run company round the clock. This service is provided June 2009
obtain customised automation solutions, all stretching back 60 years. Real proximity to free of charge beyond standard business
from one source. customers is visible in all areas, instilling hours. All rights to this publication are reserved by
confidence through individual consultation, Pilz GmbH & Co. KG. We reserve the right to
You can find more details about Pilz flexibility and reliable service. You can reach our amend specifications without prior notice.
and your products and services on the international hotline on: Copies may be made for the user’s internal
Internet: We are your contact, guide and competency purposes. The names of products, goods
leader en route to an optimum automation • +49 711 3409-444 and technologies used in this manual are
• www.pilz.com solution. • support@pilz.com trademarks of the respective companies.
Safe Automation
Solution supplier for safety and standard
Pilz offers a universal concept for solutions Sensor technology, used in conjunction
that can be applied right across industry. with Pilz safe control technology, offers a
Whether you need safety or standard control coordinated, complete solution that's
functions, machine or plant, centralised or economical, approved and safe. The focus
decentralised, a single product or a total is always on the protection of man and
solution: With Pilz you will definitely find a machine, in compliance with the standards
solution for your automation function. and regulations.
Are you looking for a flexible solution for Drive technology provides overall solutions
your automation functions? for automating your machinery. From
controller operation through to movement
• PMD: Electronic monitoring relays such of highly dynamic drives, including all safety
as voltage or true power monitors, for aspects.
example.
Operator and visualisation systems
• PNOZ: Safety relays for simple plant and provide diagnostic and visualisation devices,
machinery with up to 4 safety functions. plus control and signal devices as part of
Safe monitoring of e-stops, safety gates the Pilz solution. The focus is always on fast,
and light curtains/light grids, for example. simple configuration. Machine downtimes
are clearly reduced thanks to the overall
• PNOZmulti: The safety circuit is created diagnostic concept PVIS.
using a simple configuration tool.
Applicable from 4 safety functions. Software includes system software, user
software and software tools. Here you'll find
• PSS: Programmable control systems for the right tool for every task. From product-
use on complex machinery or distributed related software to diagnostic software,
plants, to monitor safety-related through to the PAScal Safety Calculator.
functions and/or for complete machine
control. Services in the field of machinery safety
are covered holistically by Pilz. From risk
• Industrial communication: Transfer input/ assessment through to ESPE inspection.
output signals and control data reliably Pilz also offers a comprehensive range of
and safely. training courses and seminars, covering
generic issues relating to machinery safety
as well as Pilz products.
Contents
Standards and Directives 1.0
Standards and directives 1.1
Application Examples 2.0
Emergency stop applications 2.1
Safety gate applications 2.2
ESPE applications 2.3
Muting applications 2.4
Service 3.0
Pre-sales/after sales, Your partner for practical training, 3.1
Business terms and conditions
Standards and Directives
Contents Page

European directives and position of the standards in Europe 1.1-2
Risk assessment 1.1-4 1.1
Legal regulations outside Europe 1.1-5
and standards for functional safety
Safety-related parts of control systems – 1.1-6
General principles for design in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1
Functional safety and legal position of EN/IEC 61508 1.1-8
Functional safety in accordance with EN/IEC 62061 1.1-9
Risk parameters and categories in accordance with EN 954-1/EN ISO 13849-1 1.1-11
Pilz GmbH & Co. KG, Felix-Wankel-Straße 2, 73760 Ostfildern, Germany, Telephone: +49 711 3409-0, Telefax: +49 711 3409-133, E-Mail: pilz.gmbh@pilz.de 2009-06
1.1-1
European directives and position of the standards in Europe
Incorporation of the directives into domestic law (using Germany as an example)
European directives nied by a declar-ation of conformity. With a Key engineering directives: • Low voltage equipment (2006/95/EC)
declaration of conformity the manufacturer • Personal protective equipment (89/686/EEC)
The concept of a single European internal confirms that his product meets all the re- • General product safety (2001/95/EC) • Cable cars (2000/9/EC)
1.1
market in terms of the “New Approach” can quirements of the European directives that • Health and safety (89/391/EEC)
be traced right back to the start of the 70s: relate to his product. This means he can • Use of work equipment (89/655/EEC) The directives are addressed to member sta-
The low voltage directive is the first piece of launch and sell his product within the scope • Lifts (95/16/EC) tes, who are obliged to incorporate the Euro-
European legislation to take into account the of the EU without consideration of any natio- • Waste electrical and electronic equipment pean directives into domestic law. In Germany
approach towards harmonisation of a com- nal regulations. (2002/96/EC) this is normally achieved through the device
mon single market. • Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) safety law.
(2004/108/EC)
Products that are covered by one or more • Devices for use in potentially explosive
of the following directives have to apply a areas (ATEX) (94/9/EC)
CE-mark, i.e. the product must be accompa- • Machinery (98/37/EC) / (2006/42/EC)
1.1-2
European directives and position of the standards in Europe
1.1
A standards have priority over all others EN ISO 12100 Safety of machinery
and deal with essential safety require- EN 1050 Risk assessment
ments for machinery
A
B1 standards deal with aspects EN 954-1 Safety-related parts
of safety EN 574 Two-hand controls
B2 standards deal with safety
devices
B1, B2 EN 418 Emergency stop equipment
C standards deal with EN 12415 Turning machines
C
specific types or groups EN 422 Blow moulding machi
of maschinery EN 692 Mech. presses
Standards pyramid
Position of the standards in Europe do not regularly have to be adapted to the directives. The regulatory authorities would in the Official Journal of the EU (e.g. on the
state of technology; member states can use therefore need to prove that a manufacturer Internet). Standards in Europe are subdivided
The legal position of standards is discussed their own legal system for incorporation and did not meet the legal requirements. into what are termed A, B and C standards.
again and again. Inside Europe, i.e. within manufacturers are free to select the ways in
the scope of the European directives that which they implement the requirements of However, should a manufacturer deviate
are subject to the CE-marking obligation, the directive. from the harmonised standards, he himself
a manufacturer is not bound by standards must prove how he has met the essential sa-
or other specifications. He simply needs to So what are the benefits of applying the fety require-ments. This is generally done via
comply with the health and safety require- standards? With so-called harmonised a hazard analysis. In practice one would en-
ments of the directive(s). The associated standards with presumption of conformity, deavour to apply the harmonised standards,
benefits of a division between standards and there is a shifting of the burden of proof, i.e. unless the products concerned are highly
legislation are obvious: It is easier for legis- if manufacturers apply these standards, it innovative and no harmonised standards
lators to agree on the essential requirements is presumed that they will also comply with yet exist. The standards for which this “pre-
than on technical details. Also, the directives the specific requirements of the European sumption effect” applies can be researched
1.1-3
Risk assessment
Risk assessment
Under the terms of the machinery directive,

a machine manufacturer must assess the ha-
zards in order to identify all the hazards that Start
apply to his machine. He must then design
and construct the machine to take account
of his assessment. This requirement also ap- Determination of the
limits of the machine Lifecycles, limits application area,
plies to operators who act as manufacturers training level, other groups of people,
etc.
under the terms of the machinery directive.
For example, this may occur with machines Hazard identification
Annex A of EN 1050
that are interlinked or for machinery that has Risk analysis point 4, EN 292-1
been upgraded and substantially modified. etc.
Risk assessment
Risk estimation
EN ISO 14121-1 contains “Principles for Extent, probability, group of people,
human factors, reliability of the safety
risk assessment” on machinery. These ap- function, possibility of defeat, etc.
proaches can be called upon as part of a Risk evaluation
comprehensive analysis. EN ISO 13849-1 ex-
pands on EN ISO 14121-1 with regard to the Hazard removed?
assessment of safety-related parts of control Is the Yes Protective measures appropriate?
User information sufficient?
machinery End
systems. safe?
No
The hazards emanating from a machine may
be many and varied, so for example, it is Risk reduction
necessary to consider not just mechanical 1.1
hazards through crushing and shearing, but
also thermal and electrical hazards and ha-
zards from radiation. Risk reduction is there-
fore an iterative process, i.e. it is carried out
before and during the planning phase and Iterative process in accordance with EN ISO 14121-1
after completion of the plant or machine.
1.1-4
Legal regulations outside Europe and standards for functional safety
Legal regulations outside Europe tain certification process. Machinery and any control systems. Irrespective of the techno-
corresponding technical accessories under- logy, this applies for the whole chain from
The situation is somewhat different in the USA: go a type approval test through a European the sensor to the actuator. The risk graphs
people there are mainly familiar with two types notified body, for example. This test is gene- and corresponding risk parameters can be
of standards: ANSI (American National Stan- rally recognised by a Russian-based appro- used to estimate the potential risk for danger 1.1
dards Institute) and OSHA (Occupational Safe- vals body. From the point of view of safety, zones on machinery. The category is then
ty and Health Administration). the same requirements apply as in Europe. established without the use of risk-reducing
measures.
OSHA standards are published by the state China, on the other hand, has introduced
and compliance is mandatory. ANSI stan- CCC certification. Similar to the position in
dards, on the other hand, are developed by Russia, technical products are subject to
private organisations and their application is mandatory certification through a national ap-
generally not absolutely essential. However, provals body in China. In addition, production
ANSI standards can still be found included sites are inspected. If a technical device falls
as part of a contract. Beyond that ANSI with the scope of the product list, which is
standards are being taken over by OSHA. subdivided into 19 categories, certification is
You can also still come across the NFPA mandatory, otherwise it will be necessary to
(National Fire Protection Association), which supply a type of “declaration of no objection”
developed NFPA 79 as a counterpart to EN from a national notified body.
60204-1, for example. The OSHA standards
can be compared with the European direc- Japan is currently in a transition period: The
tives. Unlike the European directives, OSHA plan is for Japan to adopt the European “new
standards are more involved with formulating approach” – in other words, to keep stan-
technical specifications than abstract re- dards and legislation separate. At the mo-
quirements. ment the international ISO and IEC standards
are being directly incorporated into national
The legal basis in the USA can be seen as a legislation, which is why people are currently
mix of product standards, fire codes (NFPA), confronted with frequent amendments to
electrical codes (NEC) and national laws. Lo- laws and lengthy implementation periods.
cal government bodies have the authority to
monitor that these codes are being enforced Standards for functional safety
and implemented.
Different standards may be called upon to
Russia and the CIS states have implemented observe functional safety on control sy-
GOST-R certification for some years now, in stems, depending on the application. In the
other words, technical devices that fall within area of machine safety, EN ISO 13849-1 is
a specific product area must undergo a cer- the main standard named for safety-related
1.1-5
Safety-related parts of control systems –
Determination of the required Performance Level (PL r)

Low risk
Required Performance Level PLr

S Severity of injury
S1 = Slight (normally reversible injury)
S2 = Serious (normally irreversible injury, including death)
F Frequency and/or exposure to a hazard

F1 = Seldom to less often and/or the exposure time is short
F2 = Frequent to continuous and/or the exposure time is long
Starting point
P Possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting the harm for evaluation
P1 = Possible under specific conditions of safety
P2 = Scarcely possible functions
contribution to
risk reduction High risk
Safety-related parts of control systems Components/devices require the following Risk assessment in accordance with EN Parameters S, F and P are used on the risk
– General principles for design in accor- safety parameters: ISO 13849-1 graph to determine the required performance
dance with EN ISO 13849-1 level (PLr) for a safety function. The selection
• Category (structural requirement) Risk assessment is an iterative process, i.e. it of parameters is no different to the procedure
As the successor standard to EN 954-1, • PL: Performance level will need to be carried out more than once. The used in EN 954-1 (1996). However, the result 1.1
EN ISO 13849-1 is based on the familiar ca- • MTTFd: Mean time to dangerous failure risk must be estimated and the performance is no longer a category but a PL.
tegories. Equally, it examines complete safety • DC: Diagnostic coverage level defined for each hazard on which the risk
functions, including all the components in- • CCF: Common cause failure is to be reduced through control measures.
volved in their design. EN ISO 13849-1 goes The risk is estimated through consideration
beyond the qualitative approach of EN 954-1 The standard describes how to calculate of the severity of injury (S), the frequency and
to include a quantitative assessment of the the performance level (PL) for safety-related duration of exposure to the hazard (F) and the
safety functions. A performance level (PL) is parts of control systems, based on designa- possibility of avoiding or limiting the harm (P).
used for this, building upon the categories. ted architectures. EN ISO 13849-1 refers any
deviations to IEC 61508.
1.1-6
Safety-related parts of control systems –
Performance Levels (PL) Probability of a

in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 dangerous failure
per hour [1/h]
a 10-5 < PFH < 10-4 1.1
b 3 x 10 < PFH < 10 111
-6 -5
c 11110-6 < PFH < 3 x 10-6

d 10-7 < PFH < 10-6
e 10-8 < PFH < 10-7
Performance level examined. A com-ponent’s MTTFD value is

usually provided by the manufacturer. The
The performance level (PL) classifies 5 levels standard provides tables and check lists for
of probability of failure. The table shows the calculating the other values.
relationship between PL and the probability Relationship between categories DC, MTTFd and PL
of dangerous failure per hour PFHD). It is also possible to calculate the achieved PFH/h-1
PL of an SRP/CL. The probability of dange-
Once the required PL has been established, rous failure of all the blocks that combine to 10-4
the PL achieved by the safety function (SRP/ form the safety function is added up: a
Performance Level
CL) is calcu-lated. To do this the SRP/CL can 10-5
be divided into logical blocks, such as input, PFHSystem =
b 3 years
logic solving and output for example. PFHInput + PFHLogic + PFHOutput
3 x 10-6
The PL achieved by an SRP/CL must be at c
Logic least as high as the PL required by the safety 10 years
Input solving Output 10-6
function.
If this condition is not met, the safety func- d 30 years
When using a designated architecture or an tion must be implemented differently. 10-7
architecture of similar structure, the achieved 100
e MTTFoc = low, MTTFoc = medium, MTTFoc = high years
PL can be calculated graphically using the
bar chart. To do this the architecture of the 10-8
Cat. B Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 2 Cat. 3 Cat. 3 Cat. 4
SRP/CL in divided into categories. MTTFD DCavg DCavg DCavg DCavg DCavg DCavg DCavg
and DCavg are also required. From Category = none = none = low = med. = low = med. = high
2 onwards, the CCF will also need to be
1.1-7
Functional safety and legal position of EN/IEC 61508
Functional safety with EN/IEC 61508? What is the legal status of EN/IEC 61508?
Machinery sector Medical sector
EN/IEC 61508 is regarded as a generic safe- As EN/IEC 61508 is not listed in the Official
ty standard, which deals with the functional Journal of the European Communities for im-
safety of electrical, electronic and program- plementation as a European directive, it lacks
mable electronic systems, irrespective of the the so-called “effect of presumption”, so if the IEC61
620
application. standard is used on its own, a control system IEC04
623
designer cannot presume that the relevant re-
One of the main tasks of EN/IEC 61508 is quirements of the specific European directive
to serve as a basis for the development of have been met.
application-oriented standards. Standards’
committees are currently busy in the areas
of machine safety with EN/IEC 62061, and
process safety with EN/EC 61511. IEC08
615
These sector-specific standards are intended
Transport sector
to continue the principle approaches of EN/
IEC 61508 and to implement the requirements
for the relevant application area in a suitably
practical manner.
IEC11
615 IEC13
615
1.1
Process sector Power station sector
Sector standards from EN/IEC 61508
1.1-8
Functional safety in accordance with EN/IEC 62061
Risk assessment and determination of required Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Class Cl Frequency Probability of hzd. Avoidance

Consequences S 3-4 5-7 8-10 11-13 14-15 and duration Fr event Pr P 1.1
Death, losing an eye 4 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3 £ 1 hour 5 Very high 5
or arm
Permanent, 3 OM SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 > 1 h £ 1 day 5 Likely 4
losing fingers
Reversible, 2 OM SIL 1 SIL 2 > 1 day £ 2 wks 4 Possible 3 Impossible 5
medical attention
Reversible, first aid 1 OM SIL 1 > 2 wks £ 1 year 3 Rarely 2 Possible 3
> 1 year 2 Negligible 1 Likely 1
AM = Other measures recommended
Functional safety of safety-related elec- Risk estimation is an iterative process, i.e. it The required SIL is assigned using the table
trical, electronic and programmable elec- will need to be carried out more than once. above, where Cl = Fr + Pr + Av.
tronic control systems in accordance with The risk must be estimated and the SIL de-
EN/IEC 62061 fined for each hazard on which the risk is to
be reduced through control measures. The
EN/IEC 62061 represents a sector-specific risk is estimated through consideration of
standard under EN/IEC 61508. It describes the severity of injury (Se), the frequency and
the implementation of safety-related electrical duration of exposure to the hazard (Fr), pro-
control systems on machinery and examines bability of occurrence of a hazardous event
the overall lifecycle from the concept phase (Pr) and the possibility of avoiding or limiting
through to decommissioning. Quantitative the harm (Av).
and qualitative examinations of the safety
functions form the basis.
1.1-9
Functional safety in accordance with EN/IEC 62061
The following parameters are required in

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Probability of a assessing hardware safety integrity:
in accordance with EN IEC 62061 dangerous failure
per hour [1/h] λD: Dangerous failure rate
No special safety requirement 10-5 < PFH < 10-4 T1: Proof test
T2: Diagnostic test interval
1 (1 failure in 100 000 h) 3 x 10-6 < PFH < 10-5111
DC: Diagnostic coverage
1 (1 failure in 100 000 h) 11110-6 < PFH < 3 x 10-6 β: Common cause failure
2 (1 failure in 1 000 000 h) 10-7 < PFH < 10-6
The calculated probability of failure (PFHD) of
3 (1 failure in 10 000 000 h) 10-8 < PFH < 10-7 each SRECS must be less than the probabi-
lity of failure required by the safety function.
The required probability of failure, depending
on the SIL, can be taken from the table. If
SIL assignment Requirements for hardware safety integrity, this condition is not met, the safety function
comprising must be implemented differently.
The safety integrity level (SIL) classifies three
levels of probability of failure. The table • Architectural constraints for hardware The achieved SIL can only be as high as the
shows the relationship between SIL and the safety integrity lowest SILCL (SIL Claim Limit) of a sub-
probability of dangerous failure per hour • Requirements for the probability of system involved in performing the safety
(PFHD). dangerous random hardware failures function.
The SRECS (safety-related electrical control plus requirements for systematic safety inte-
system) is divided into subsystems. The sub- grity, comprising
systems are assigned to actual devices. The
SIL must be defined for each subsystem. • Requirements for avoidance of failures and
1.1
• Requirements for the control of Safe failure Hardware fault Hardware fault Hardware fault
The probability of a dangerous failure is cal- systematic failures. fraction (SFF) tolerance tolerance tolerance
culated by adding the probabilities of failure 0 1 2
of all the subsystems of the SRECS:
< 60 % Not allowed SIL 1 SIL 2
PFHD = PFHD1 + .... + PFHDn 60 % < 90 % SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
The selection or design of the SRECS must 90 % < 99 % SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3
always meet the following minimum require- 99 % SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3
ments:
1.1-10
Risk parameters and categories in accordance with EN 954-1/EN ISO 13849-11)
Risk parameters Category B be designed so that their safety function(s) are Category 3
checked at suitable intervals by the machine
S = Severity of injury: Basic category with no special requirements control system. The safety function(s) must Safety-related parts of control systems must
1 = Slight (normally reversible) injury = “good industrial standard” be checked: at the machine start-up and prior be designed so that a single fault in any of
2 = Serious (normally irreversible) injury, in- to the initiation of any hazardous situation; these parts does not lead to the loss of the 1.1
cluding death Category 1 periodically during operation, if the risk as- safety function.
sessment and the kind of operation show that Whenever reasonably practicable, the single
F = Frequency and/or exposure to the hazard: Safety-related parts must be designed and it is necessary. fault shall be detected at or before the next
1 = Seldom to quite often and/or exposure constructed using well-tried components and demand upon the safety function.
time is short well-tried safety principles. This check may be initiated automatically
2 = Frequent to continuous and/or exposure or manually. Automatically, for example, the This does not mean that all faults will be de-
time is long Well-tried means: the components have been check may be initiated by a signal generated tected. The accumulation of undetected faults
widely used in the past with successful results from a control system at suitable intervals. can lead to an unintended output signal and a
P = Possibility of avoiding the hazard: in similar applications, or they have been ma- The automatic test should be provided by hazardous situation at the machine.
1 = Possible under specific conditions nufactured using principles that demonstrate preference. The decision about the type of
2 = Scarcely possible its suitability and reliability for safety-related test depends on the risk assessment and Category 4
appli-cations. the judgement of the end user or machine
builder. If no fault is detected, operation may Safety-related parts of control systems must
Starting point for
Example: safety switch with forced-opening be approved as a result of the test. If a fault be designed so that a single fault in any of
risk estimation
Categories contacts. is detected, an output must be generated to these parts does not lead to a loss of the
initiate appropriate control action. A second, safety function; the single fault must be de-
Well-tried safety principles are circuits that are independent shutdown route is required for tected at or before the next demand upon the
Categories
constructed in such a way that certain faults this. safety functions (e.g. immediately at switch
can be avoided by the appropriate arrange- Notes: In some cases Category 2 is not ap- on, at the end of a machine operating cycle).
ment or layout of components. plicable because the checking of the safety If this detection is not possible, then an ac-
function cannot be applied to all components cumulation of faults shall not lead to a loss of
Example: avoiding a short circuit through ap- and devices. Moreover, the cost involved the safety function.
propriate separation, avoiding component fai- in implementing Category 2 correctly may
lures that result from overdimensioning, using be considerable, so that it may make better
the failsafe principle (on switching off). economic sense to implement a different ca-
Risk graph from EN 954 tegory.
Note: The occurrence of a fault can lead to In general Category 2 can be realised with
the loss of the safety function. electronic techniques. The system behaviour
Categories in accordance with EN 954-1 allows the occurrence of a fault to lead to the
Category 2 loss of the safety function between checks;
The control system requirements derived from the loss of the safety function is detected by 1)
Only applicable until November 2009.
the risk graph are specified as follows: Safety-related parts of control systems must the check. Replaced by EN ISO 13849-1
1.1-11
Emergency stop applications
Contents Page

PNOZ X3P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.1-2
PNOZ X3.10P – Automatic reset after power supply failure PL d of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 2 of EN 62061 2.1-8
PNOZ X9P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.1-11
2.1
PNOZ X10.11P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.1-17
PNOZ X10.11P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.1-23
PNOZ XV1P – Safe standstill of a drive PL d of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 2 of EN 62061 2.1-29
4.1
Pilz GmbH & Co. KG, Felix-Wankel-Straße 2, 73760 Ostfildern, Germany, Telephone: +49 711 3409-0, Telefax: +49 711 3409-133, E-Mail: pilz.gmbh@pilz.de 2009-06
2.1-1
PL e of EN ISO 13849-1, SIL 3 of EN 62061
PNOZ X3P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated
for evaluation by a PLC. relay PNOZ X3P (K18) (machine 2, Slave). ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
Features The positive-guided N/C contacts on in the input circuit are detected.
Start/reset contactors K22 and K23 are connected to ` An fault on the device does not lead to
` Dual-channel operation with detection The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K14, machine 1) the feedback circuit S13/S14 on the safety the loss of the safety function.
of shorts across contacts can be started by pressing reset button S14 relay PNOZ X3P (K21) (machine 3, Slave). ` The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K14) can be
` Series connection of two E-STOP if: started when the input circuit at K14 is
pushbuttons ` E-STOP pushbuttons (S12, S13) have CAUTION! closed first, followed by the reset button
` Interlinked machines (Master-Slave), not been operated and The FL monitoring from machine 2 S14. This avoids an unwanted reset
galvanically isolated ` The relays on the contact expander and 3 (Slave) is not passed to before the input circuit is closed or as a
` Monitored reset machine 1 (Master). It is detected by result of the reset button being
4.1
module PZE X5P (K15) have de-energised
` Contact expansion through PZE X5P and the operator on start-up. overridden.
and positive-guided contactors ` Contactors K16 and K17 have de- ` E-STOP pushbuttons may be connected
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- energised. Safety assessment in series if it’s possible to predict that
pansion The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K18, machine 2) ` The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K14), the only one E-STOP pushbutton will be
is started automatically if: contact expander module PZE X5P (K15) operated at a time. The category is
` The safety contacts on K15 are closed and contactors K16 and K17 must be restricted to 3 with series connection.
Description and installed in a single mounting area
` Contactors K19 and K20 have de- (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
E-STOP function energised. short across the output (machine 1).
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons S12, The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K21, machine 3) ` The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K18) and 2.1
S13 is operated, machine 1 (Master) plus is started automatically if: contactors K19 and K20 must be
machines 2 and 3 (Slaves) are stopped. ` The safety contacts on K15 are closed installed in a single mounting area
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons is and (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay ` Contactors K22 and K23 have de- short across the output (machine 2).
PNOZ X3P (K14) is opened and the safety energised. ` The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K21) and
contacts on K14 open. This interrupts the contactors K22 and K23 must be
input circuit on the contact expander Feedback circuit installed in a single mounting area
module PZE X5P (K15) and contactors K16 The positive-guided N/C contacts on (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
and K17 de-energise. The safety contacts on contactors K16 and K17, the feedback loop short across the output (machine 3).
the PZE X5P open. This also interrupts the from contact expander module PZE X5P
input circuits on the safety relays PNOZ X3P (K15) and the reset button S14 are Pilz products
(K18 and K21). Their safety contacts open connected to the reset/feedback circuit S33/
and contactors K19, K20, K22 and K23 de- S34 on the safety relay PNOZ X3P (K14) Number Description Order number
energise. (machine 1, Master). 3 PNOZ X3P 777 313
The safety relays PNOZ X3P (K14, K18, K21) The positive-guided N/C contacts on 1 PZE X5P 777 150
and contact expander module PZE X5P contactors K19 and K20 are connected to 2 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
(K15) have diagnostic outputs for display or the feedback circuit S13/S14 on the safety
2.1-2
5.1-
Safety-related characteristics in EN ISO 13849-1 Performance Level Safety-related parts

accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 of the control system
Safety function 1-2: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PITestop)
Prerequisites:
via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3P K14)
` Common cause failure (CCF): Actuator (contactors K16, K17)
Requirements are considered to be met
(must be tested on implementation)
` Mission time: 20 years
Logic (PZE X5P K15)
` Operating interval (electromechanical Logic (PNOZ X3P K18)
components): Actuator (contactors K19, K20) 2.1
- Sensor: One operation per week
- Actuator: Two operations per week via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3P K14)
` Characteristic data of contactors K16, Logic (PZE X5P K15)
K17, K19, K20, K22, K23: Logic (PNOZ X3P K21)
B10d: 2,000,000 Actuator (contactors K22, K23)
Please note the further requirements of EN ISO 13849-1, e.g. requirements for avoiding systematic faults.
4.1
2.1-3
Safety-related characteristics in EN 62061 Safety Subsystems

accordance with EN 62061 Integrity Level
Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PITestop)
Prerequisites:
control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3P K14)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1-2): Actuator (contactors K16, K17)
` Proof test interval: 20 years
` Operating interval (electromechanical
(SRCF 3-4): Logic (PZE X5P K15)
components):
Logic (PNOZ X3P K18) 4.1
Actuator (contactors K19, K20)
- Actuator: Two operations per week
` Characteristic data of contactors K16, control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3P K14)
K17, K19, K20, K22, K23: (SRCF 5-6): Logic (PZE X5P K15)
B10d: 2,000,000 Logic (PNOZ X3P K21)
Dangerous failure rate: 65% Actuator (contactors K22, K23)
Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
2.1
2.1-4
5.1-

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2.1-7
PL d of EN ISO 13849-1, SIL 2 of EN 62061
PNOZ X3.10P – Automatic reset after power supply failure
Start/reset CAUTION!
Features The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K12) can be When the supply voltage is
started by pressing reset button S13 if: switched on and when voltage is
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` E-STOP pushbuttons (S10 ... S12) have returned after a power failure, the
of shorts across contacts not been operated and outputs are activated automatically.
` Series connection of three E-STOP ` Contactors KM1 and KM2 have de-
pushbuttons energised. Pilz products
` Automatic reset after power supply
failure (voltage return) Feedback circuit
` Manual reset after E-STOP
Number Description Order number 4.1
The positive-guided N/C contacts on 1 PNOZ X3.10P 777 314
` Contact expansion through positive- contactors KM1 and KM2 are monitored in 1 PZW 774 042
guided contactors the safety relay’s reset/feedback circuit S13- 3 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- S14.
pansion
Safety assessment
` The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K12) and
Description contactors KM1 and KM2 must be
installed in a single mounting area
E-STOP function (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons (S10 short across the output. 2.1
... S12) is operated, the input circuit on the ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K12) is in the input circuit are detected.
interrupted and the safety contacts open. ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
Contactors KM1 and KM2 de-energise. loss of the safety function.
When voltage is returned (after failure of the ` The device can be started if reset button
24 VDC supply voltage), the safety contact S13 is closed.
(momentary contact) on the safety timer ` E-STOP pushbuttons may be connected
PZW (K13) switches on. The safety relay in series if it’s possible to predict that
PNOZ X3.10P (K12) restarts automatically. only one E-STOP pushbutton will be
The pulse time is set via the rotary switch on operated at a time. The category is
the safe timer PZW (K13). restricted to 3 with series connection.
The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K12) has a
diagnostic output for display or for
evaluation by a PLC.
2.1-8
5.1-
PNOZ X3.10P – Automatic reset after power supply failure

Safety function 1-3: Machine shut down PL d Sensor (PITestop)
Prerequisites:
via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3.10P K12)
` Common cause failure (CCF): Logic (PZW K13)
Requirements are considered to be met Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
` Mission time: 20 years Please note the further requirements of EN ISO 13849-1, e.g. requirements for avoiding systematic faults.
components): 2.1
- Actuator: Three operations per week
` Characteristic data of contactors KM1, KM2:
B10d: 2,000,000

Prerequisites:
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 %
control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X3.10P K12) 4.1
(SRCF 1-3): Logic (PZW K13)
(must be tested on implementation) Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
` Operating interval (electromechanical Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
components):
- Actuator: Three operations per week
B10d: 2,000,000
Dangerous failure rate: 65%
2.1-9

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2.1-10
Start/reset ` The contact expander module PZE 9P

Features The safety relay PNOZ X9P (K1) can be (K10) and contactors K11 and K12 must
started by pressing reset button S2 if: be installed in a single mounting area
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` E-STOP pushbuttons (S1, S3 ... S5) have (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
of shorts across contacts not been operated and short across the output (machine 4).
` Series connection of four E-STOP ` Contactors K2 and K3 have de-energised ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
pushbuttons and in the input circuit are detected.
` Interlinked machines (Master-Slave), ` The relays on the contact expander ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
galvanically isolated modules PZE 9P (K4, K7, K10) have de- loss of the safety function.
` Monitored reset energised and ` The safety relay PNOZ X9P (K1) can be 2.1
` Contact expansion through PZE 9P and ` Contactors K5, K6, K8, K9, K11 and K12 started when the input circuit at K1 is
positive-guided contactors have de-energised. closed first, followed by the reset button
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- S2. This avoids an unwanted reset before
pansion Feedback circuit the input circuit is closed or as a result of
The positive-guided N/C contacts on the reset button being overridden.
contactors K2, K3, K5, K6, K8, K9, K11 and ` E-STOP pushbuttons may be connected
Description K12 are monitored in feedback circuits Y1- in series if it’s possible to predict that
Y2 of the respective safety relays and only one E-STOP pushbutton will be
E-STOP function contact expander modules. The feedback operated at a time. The category is
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons S1, circuits are interlinked. restricted to 3 with series connection. 4.1
S3 ... S5 is operated, machine 1 (Master)
plus machines 2 ... 4 (Slave) are stopped. Safety assessment Pilz products
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons is ` The safety relay PNOZ X9P (K1) and
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay contactors K2 and K3 must be installed in Number Description Order number
PNOZ X9P (K1) is interrupted, the safety a single mounting area (control cabinet) in 1 PNOZ X9P 777 609
contacts on K1 open and contactors K2 and order to exclude a short across the output 3 PZE 9P 777 140
K3 de-energise. All the input circuits on the (machine 1). 4 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
contact expander modules PZE 9P (K4, K7, ` The contact expander module PZE 9P
K10) will also be interrupted due to the open (K4) and contactors K5 and K6 must be
safety contacts on K1 (machine 1, Master). installed in a single mounting area
Their safety contacts open and contactors (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
K5, K6, K8, K9, K11 and K12 de-energise. short across the output (machine 2).
` The contact expander module PZE 9P
(K7) and contactors K8 and K9 must be
installed in a single mounting area
(control cabinet) in order to exclude a
short across the output (machine 3).
2.1-11

Prerequisites:
Logic (PZE 9P K4)
components):
Actuator (contactors K5, K6) 4.1
- Actuator: Four operations per week Logic (PZE 9P K7)
` Characteristic data of contactors K2, K3, Actuator (contactors K8, K9)
K5, K6, K8, K9, K11, K12:
B10d: 2,000,000
Logic (PZE 9P K10)
2.1
2.1-12
5.1-

Prerequisites:
(SRCF 5-8): Logic (PZE 9P K4)
components): Actuator (contactors K5, K6)
- Sensor: One operation per week 2.1
- Actuator: Four operations per week
` Characteristic data of contactors K2, K3, (SRCF 9-12): Logic (PZE 9P K7)
K5, K6, K8, K9, K11, K12: Actuator (contactors K8, K9)
B10d: 2,000,000
4.1
2.1-13

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2.1-16
PNOZ X10.11P – Interlinked machines, galvanically isolated
and contactors K20 and K21 de-energise. Safety assessment

Features The input circuit on the safety relay PNOZ ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K15) and
X10.11P (K15, machine 1) is interrupted, the contactors K16 and K17 must be
` Dual-channel operation with detection safety contacts on K15 open and contactors installed in a single mounting area
of shorts across contacts K16 and K17 de-energise. (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
` Monitored reset short across the output (machine 1).
` Interlinked machines, galvanically isola- Start/reset ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K19) and
ted The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K14) can be contactors K20 and K21 must be
` Separate reset on each machine started by pressing reset button S13 if E- installed in a single mounting area
` Contact expansion through positive- STOP pushbutton S12 has not been (control cabinet) in order to exclude a 2.1
guided contactors operated. short across the output (machine 2).
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K15) is ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
pansion started automatically if the safety contacts in the input circuit are detected.
on K14 (machine 1) and K18 (machine 2) are ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
closed and contactors K16 and K17 have loss of the safety function.
Description de-energised. ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K14) can
The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K18) can be be started if the input circuit at K14 is
E-STOP function started by pressing reset button S15 if E- closed first, followed by the reset button
When the E-STOP pushbutton (S12) is STOP pushbutton S14 has not been S13.
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay operated. The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K18) can 4.1
PNOZ X10.11P (K14, machine 1) is (K19) is started automatically if the safety be started if the input circuit at K18 is
interrupted, the safety contacts on K14 contacts on K18 (machine 2) and K14 closed first, followed by the reset button
open. The input circuit on the safety relay (machine 1) are closed and contactors K20 S15. This avoids an unwanted reset
PNOZ X10.11P (K15, machine 1) is and K21 have de-energised. before the input circuit is closed or as a
interrupted, the safety contacts on K15 open result of the reset button being
and contactors K16 and K17 de-energise. Feedback circuit overridden.
The input circuit on the safety relay PNOZ The positive-guided N/C contacts on
X10.11P (K19, machine 2) is interrupted, the contactors K16, K17 and K20, K21 are Pilz products
safety contacts on K19 open and contactors monitored in feedback circuits Y1-Y2 of the
K20 and K21 de-energise. respective safety relays. Number Description Order number
When the E-STOP pushbutton (S14) is 4 PNOZ X10.11P 777 750
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay 2 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
PNOZ X10.11P (K18, machine 2) is
interrupted, the safety contacts on K18
open. The input circuit on the safety relay
PNOZ X10.11P (K19, machine 2) is
interrupted, the safety contacts on K19 open
2.1-17

Safety function 1: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PITestop S12)
Prerequisites:
` Common cause failure (CCF): Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K15)
Requirements are considered to be met Actuator (contactors K16, K17)
components):
Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K19) 4.1
- Actuator: Two operations per week via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K18)
` Characteristic data of contactors K16, Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K19)
K17, K20, K21: Actuator (contactors K20, K21)
B10d: 2,000,000
Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K15)
Please note the further requirements of EN ISO 13849-1, e.g. requirements for avoiding systematic faults. 2.1
2.1-18
5.1-

Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PITestop S12)
Prerequisites:
control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K14)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1): Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K15)
(must be tested on implementation) Actuator (contactors K16, K17)
components): (SRCF 2): Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K19)
- Sensor: One operation per week Actuator (contactors K20, K21) 2.1
- Actuator: Two operations per week
` Characteristic data of contactors K16, control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K18)
K17, K20, K21: (SRCF 3): Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K19)
(SRCF 4): Logic (PNOZ X10.11P K15)
4.1
Classification in accordance with EN 954-1
Depending on the application area and its
respective regulations, this connection example
is suitable for applications up to Category 4
of EN 954-1.
2.1-19

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2.1-20

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2.1-22
Start/reset ` The contact expander module PZE 9P

Features The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K25) can be (K35) and contactors K36 and K37 must
started by pressing reset button S17 if: be installed in a single mounting area
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` E-STOP pushbuttons (S16, S18 .. S20) (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
of shorts across contacts have not been operated and short across the output (machine 4).
` Series connection of four E-STOP ` Contactors K27 and K28 have de- ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
pushbuttons energised and in the input circuit are detected.
` Interlinked machines (Master-Slave), ` The relays on the contact expander ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
galvanically isolated modules PZE 9P (K26, K29, K32, K35) loss of the safety function.
` Monitored reset have de-energised and ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K25) can 2.1
` Contact expansion through PZE 9P and ` Contactors K30, K31, K33, K34, K36 and be started when the input circuit is closed
positive-guided contactors K37 have de-energised. first, followed by reset button S17. This
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- avoids an unwanted reset before the
pansion Feedback circuit input circuit is closed or as a result of the
The positive-guided N/C contacts on reset button being overridden.
contactors K27, K28, K30, K31, K33, K34, ` E-STOP pushbuttons may be connected
Description K36 and K37 are monitored in feedback in series if it’s possible to predict that
circuits Y1-Y2 of the respective safety relays only one E-STOP pushbutton will be
E-STOP function and contact expander modules. The operated at a time. The category is
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons (S16, feedback circuits are interlinked. restricted to 3 with series connection. 4.1
S18 ... S20) is operated, machine 1 (Master)
plus machines 2 ... 4 (Slave) are stopped. Safety assessment Pilz products
When one of the E-STOP pushbuttons is ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K25) and
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay contactors K27 and K28 must be Number Description Order number
PNOZ X10.11P (K25) is interrupted, the installed in a single mounting area 1 PNOZ X10.11P 777 750
safety contacts on K25 open and contactors (control cabinet) in order to exclude a 4 PZE 9P 777 140
K27 and K28 de-energise. All the input short across the output (machine 1). 4 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
circuits on the contact expander modules ` The contact expander module PZE 9P
PZE 9P (K26, K29, K32 and K35) will also be (K29) and contactors K30 and K31 must
interrupted due to the open safety contacts be installed in a single mounting area
on K1 (machine 1, Master). Their safety (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
contacts open and contactors K30, K31, short across the output (machine 2).
K33, K34, K36 and K37 de-energise. ` The contact expander module PZE 9P
(K32) and contactors K33 and K34 must
be installed in a single mounting area
(control cabinet) in order to exclude a
short across the output (machine 3).
2.1-23

Prerequisites:
Logic (PZE 9P K29)
components):
Actuator (contactors K30, K31) 4.1
- Actuator: Four operations per week Logic (PZE 9P K26)
` Characteristic data of contactors K27, Logic (PZE 9P K32)
K28, K30, K31, K33, K34, K36, K37: Actuator (contactors K33, K34)
B10d: 2,000,000
Logic (PZE 9P K26)
Logic (PZE 9P K35)
2.1
2.1-24
5.1-

Prerequisites:
components): Actuator (contactors K30, K31)
- Sensor: One operation per week 2.1
- Actuator: Four operations per week
` Characteristic data of contactors K27, (SRCF 9-12): Logic (PZE 9P K26)
K28, K30, K31, K33, K34, K36, K37: Logic (PZE 9P K32)
Logic (PZE 9P K35)
4.1
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2.1-28
PNOZ XV1P – Safe standstill of a drive
Start/reset Pilz products

Features The safety relay PNOZ XV1P (K1) can be
started by pressing reset button S2 if: Number Description Order number
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` E-STOP pushbutton S1 has not been 1 PNOZ XV1P 777 601
of shorts across contacts operated and 1 PITestop Set1.1 400 410
` Monitored reset ` Contactors K2 and K3 have de-energised.
` Safe standstill of a drive after E-STOP
` Contact expansion through positive- Feedback circuit
guided contactors The positive-guided N/C contacts on
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- contactors K2 and K3 are monitored in the 2.1
pansion safety relay’s feedback circuit S33-S34.
Safety assessment
Description ` The safety relay PNOZ XV1P (K1) and
contactors K2 and K3 must be installed in
E-STOP function a single mounting area (control cabinet) in
When the E-STOP pushbutton (S1) is order to exclude a short across the
operated, both the drive and the supply to output.
the drive are shut down after a delay time. ` Earth faults in the input circuit are
When the E-STOP pushbutton (S1) is detected. 4.1
operated, the input circuit on the safety relay ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
PNOZ XV1P (K1) is interrupted, safety loss of the safety function.
contact 13-14 on K1 opens immediately and ` The safety relay PNOZ XV1P (K1) can be
triggers a “fast stop” at the drive controller started when the input circuit at K1 is
A1. closed first, followed by reset button S2.
The delay-on de-energisation safety contact This avoids an unwanted reset before the
37-38 switches off contactors K2 and K3 input circuit is closed or as a result of the
after a delay. In this way, the drive controller reset button being overridden.
A1 is isolated from the energy supply ` The delay time set for the safety relay
(mains) after a delay. The delay-on de- PNOZ XV1P (K1) must be longer than the
energisation time is set on the safety relay. maximum braking time on the drive
regulator A1.
2.1-29
PNOZ XV1P – Safe standstill of a drive

Safety function 1: Machine shut down PL d Sensor (PITestop S1)
Prerequisites:
via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ XV1P K1)
(must be tested on implementation) Please note the further requirements of EN ISO 13849-1, e.g. requirements for avoiding systematic faults.
components): 4.1
- Actuator: One operation per week
` Characteristic data of contactors K2, K3:
B10d: 2,000,000

Prerequisites: 2.1
control function via E-STOP Logic (PNOZ XV1P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1): Actuator (contactors K2, K3)
` Proof test interval: 20 years Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
components):
- Actuator: One operation per week
B10d: 2,000,000

of EN 954-1.
2.1-30
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2.1-31
Notes
2.1
4.1
2.1-32
Safety gate applications
Contents Page

PNOZ X2P – PSEN 1.1p safety switch PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.2-2
PNOZ X2.8P – Connecting three PSEN cs2.1p in series PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.2-5
PNOZ X3.10P – PSEN me2/2AS and PSEN me1S/1AS PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
with guard locking SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.2-9
PNOZ X3.10P – Connecting two PSEN cs2.1p in series PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.2-13
2.2
4.2
Pilz GmbH & Co. KG, Felix-Wankel-Straße 2, 73760 Ostfildern, Germany, Telephone: +49 711 3409-0, Telefax: +49 711 3409-133, E-Mail: pilz.gmbh@pilz.de 2009-06 2.2-1
PNOZ X2P – PSEN 1.1p safety switch
Feedback circuit Pilz products

Features The positive-guided N/C contacts on
contactors K2 and K3 are monitored in the Number Description Order number
` Dual-channel operation with detection safety relay’s reset/feedback circuit S33- 1 PNOZ X2P 777 303
of shorts across contacts S34. 1 PSEN 1.1p-10 504 210
` Monitored reset
` Contact expansion through positive- Safety assessment 4.2
guided contactors ` The safety relay PNOZ X2P (K1) and
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- contactors K2 and K3 must be installed
pansion in a single mounting area (control cabinet)
in order to exclude a short across the
output.
Description ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
in the input circuit are detected.
Safety gate function ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
The opening and closing of a safety gate is loss of the safety function.
signalled to the safety relay PNOZ X2P (K1) ` The device can be started when the input
via the contacts on the safety switch PSEN circuit is closed first, followed by reset
2.2
1.1p (S1). The contacts on the safety switch button S2. This avoids an unwanted reset
S1 are opened as soon as the safety gate is before the input circuit is closed or as a
opened. This interrupts the input circuit and result of the reset button being
the safety contacts on the PNOZ X2P (K1) overridden.
open. Contactors K2 and K3 de-energise. ` Increased protection against
manipulation is required for hazardous
Start/reset machinery such as presses. In this case
The safety relay PNOZ X2P (K1) can be we recommend the use of two PSEN
started by pressing reset button S2 if: 1.1p safety switches.
` The safety gate is closed and
` The contacts on safety switch S1 are
closed and
` Contactors K2 and K3 have de-
energised.
5.1-
PNOZ X2P – PSEN 1.1p safety switch

Safety function: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN S1)
Prerequisites:
when a safety gate is opened Logic (PNOZ X2P K1)
components):
- Sensor: Two operations per hour
- Actuator: Two operations per hour
` Characteristic data of contactors K2, K3: 2.2
B10d: 2,000,000

Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PSEN S1)
Prerequisites:
control function when a safety gate is opened Logic (PNOZ X2P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF): Actuator (contactors K2, K3)
` Proof test interval: 20 years Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity. 4.2
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

of EN 954-1.

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PNOZ X2.8P – Connecting three PSEN cs2.1p in series

Features The safety relay PNOZ X2.8P (K8) can be
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The safety gates are closed and 1 PNOZ X2.8P 777 301
of shorts across contacts ` The semiconductor outputs on safety 3 PSEN cs2.1p 540 100
` Series connection of 3 coded safety switches S11 ... S13 are closed and
switches PSEN cs2.1p ` Contactors K9 and K10 have de-
` Manual reset energised.
` Contact expansion through positive-
guided contactors Feedback circuit
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- The positive-guided N/C contacts on
pansion contactors K9 and K10 are monitored in the
safety relay’s feedback circuit S12-S34.
2.2
Description Safety assessment

Safety gate function contactors K9 and K10 must be installed
The opening and closing of several safety in a single mounting area (control cabinet)
gates is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ in order to exclude a short across the
X2.8P (K8) via the semiconductor outputs output.
on the coded safety switches PSEN cs2.1p ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
(S11 ... S13). The 3 safety switches are in the input circuit are detected.
connected in series. ` A fault on the device does not lead to the 4.2
The semiconductor outputs on one of the loss of the safety function.
safety switches S11 ... S13 are opened as ` Please note: When several coded safety
soon as the respective safety gate is switches PSEN cs2.1p are connected in
opened. These semiconductor outputs series, the delay-on de-energisation time
interrupt the input circuit on the safety relay increases in direct proportion to the
PNOZ X2.8P (K8) and the safety contacts number of interconnected safety
open. Contactors K9 and K10 de-energise. switches.
The coded safety switches PSEN cs2.1p ` Increased protection against
(S11 ... S13) have a diagnostic output to manipulation is required for hazardous
display or evaluate the switch status via a machinery such as presses. In this case
PLC. we recommend the use of two PSEN
cs2.1p safety switches (per safety gate).
PNOZ X2.8P – Connecting three PSEN cs2.1p in series

Safety function 1-3: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN S11)
Prerequisites:
when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN S12)
` Common cause failure (CCF): Sensor (PSEN S13)
Requirements are considered to be met Logic (PNOZ X2.8P K8)
(must be tested on implementation) Actuator (contactors K9, K10) 4.2
` Operating interval (electromechanical Please note the further requirements of EN ISO 13849-1, e.g. requirements for avoiding systematic faults.
components):
- Actuator: 6 operations per hour
B10d: 2,000,000

2.2
Prerequisites:
control function when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN S12)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1-3): Sensor (PSEN S13)
(must be tested on implementation) Logic (PNOZ X2.8P K8)
` Proof test interval: 20 years Actuator (contactors K9, K10)
components): Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
- Actuator: 6 operations per hour
B10d: 2,000,000

of EN 954-1.
5.1-

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PNOZ X3.10P – PSEN me2/2AS and PSEN me1S/1AS with guard locking
diagnostic output for display or for Pilz products

Features evaluation via a PLC.
Number Description Order number
` Dual-channel operation with detection Start/reset 1 PNOZ X3.10P 777 314
of shorts across contacts The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K1) can be 1 PSEN me1S/1AS 570 000
` Safety gate switches with separate ac- started by pressing reset button S3 if: 1 PSEN me2/2AS 570 200
tuator and guard locking device ` The safety gate is closed and
` Second safety switch with separate ` The contacts on safety switches S1 and
actuator S2 are closed and
` Monitored reset ` Contactors K2 and K3 have de-
` Contact expansion through positive- energised.
guided contactors
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- Feedback circuit
2.2
pansion The positive-guided N/C contacts on
contactors K2 and K3 are monitored in the
safety relay’s feedback circuit S33-S34.
Description
Safety assessment
Safety gate function ` The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K1) and
The opening and closing of a safety gate for contactors K2 and K3 must be installed
technical processing purposes is signalled in a single mounting area (control cabinet)
to the PNOZ X3.10P safety relay (K1) via the in order to exclude a short across the
contacts on the safety switches PSEN output. 4.2
me1S/1AS (S1) and PSEN me2/2AS (S2). ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
Guard locking on safety switch (S1) can be in the input circuit are detected
released via pushbutton (S4). ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
The technical processing purposes are not loss of the safety function.
safety-related. For example, there is no ` The device can be started when the input
safe standstill monitoring. circuit is closed first, followed by reset
button S3. This avoids an unwanted reset
The contacts on safety switches S1 and S2 before the input circuit is closed or as a
are opened as soon as the safety gate is result of the reset button being
opened. This interrupts the input circuit on overridden.
the safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K1) and the ` When the safety switch is released, the
safety contacts open. Contactors K2 and K3 safety gate can be opened. Hazardous
de-energise. movements must not overrun or the safety
The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K1) has a distance must be an appropriate length.
PNOZ X3.10P – PSEN me2/2AS and PSEN me1S/1AS with guard locking

Safety function: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN me1S/1AS S1)
Prerequisites:
when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN me2/2AS S2)
(must be tested on implementation) 4.2
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2.2
Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PSEN me1S/1AS S1)
Prerequisites:
control function when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN me2/2AS S2)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF): Logic (PNOZ X3.10P K1)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

of EN 954-1.
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PNOZ X3.10P – Connecting two PSEN cs2.1p in series
Start/reset ` The device can be started when the input

Features The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K7) can be circuit is closed first, followed by reset
started by pressing reset button S7 if: button S7. This avoids an unwanted reset
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The safety gates are closed and before the input circuit is closed or as a
of shorts across contacts ` The semiconductor outputs on safety result of the reset button being
` Series connection of 2 coded switches S8 and S9 are closed and overridden.
PSEN cs2.1p safety switches ` Contactors K8 and K9 have de-
` Monitored reset energised. Pilz products
guided contactors Feedback circuit Number Description Order number
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- The positive-guided N/C contacts on 1 PNOZ X3.10P 777 314
pansion contactors K8 and K9 are monitored in the 2 PSEN cs2.1p 540 100
safety relay’s feedback circuit S33/S34.
2.2
Description Safety assessment

Safety gate function contactors K8 and K9 must be installed
The opening and closing of several safety in a single mounting area (control cabinet)
gates is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ in order to exclude a short across the
X3.10P (K7) via the semiconductor outputs output.
on the coded safety switches PSEN cs2.1p ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
(S8, S9). The 2 safety switches are in the input circuit are detected.
connected in series. ` A fault on the device does not lead to the 4.2
The semiconductor outputs on one of the loss of the safety function.
safety switches S8 or S9 are opened as ` Please note: When several coded safety
soon as the respective safety gate is switches PSEN cs2.1p are connected in
opened. These semiconductor outputs series, the delay-on de-energisation time
interrupt the input circuit on the safety relay increases in direct proportion to the
PNOZ X3.10P (K7) and the safety contacts number of interconnected safety
open. Contactors K8 and K9 de-energise. switches.
The coded safety switches PSEN cs2.1p ` Increased protection against
(S8, S9) and the safety relay PNOZ X3.10P manipulation is required for hazardous
(K7) each have a diagnostic output to machinery such as presses. In this case
display or evaluate the switch status via a we recommend the use of two PSEN
PLC. cs2.1p safety switches (per safety gate).
PNOZ X3.10P – Connecting two PSEN cs2.1p in series

Safety function 1-2: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN S8)
Prerequisites:
when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN S9)
(must be tested on implementation) 4.2
components):
- Actuator: Four operations per hour
B10d: 2,000,000

2.2
Prerequisites:
control function when a safety gate is opened Sensor (PSEN S9)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1-2): Logic (PNOZ X3.10P K7)
components):
- Actuator: Four operations per hour
B10d: 2,000,000

of EN 954-1.
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ESPE applications
Contents Page
ESPE applications
PNOZ X2.9P – PSEN op4F-s light curtain PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.3-2
PNOZ X3P – PSEN op4F-s light curtain PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.3-6
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.3-10
PNOZ X8P – PSEN op4F-S light curtain PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.3-14
SIL 3 of en 62061 2.3-18
2.3
4.3
ESPE applications
PNOZ X2.9P – PSEN op4F-s light curtain
Start/reset ` The device can be started when the input

Features The safety relay PNOZ X2.9P (K1) can be circuit is closed first, followed by reset
started by pressing reset button S2 if: button S2. This avoids an unwanted reset
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The light curtain is not interrupted and before the input circuit is closed or as a 4.3
of shorts across contacts via light curtain ` The semiconductor outputs on safety result of the reset button being
` Monitored reset light curtain B1/B2 are closed and overridden.
` Light curtain with semiconductor output ` The relays on the contact expander
` Contact expansion through PZE X4P module PZE X4P (K2) have de-energised Pilz products
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- and
pansion ` Contactors K3 and K4 have de- Number Description Order number
energised. 1 PNOZ X2.9P 777 300
1 PZE X4P 777 585
Description Feedback circuit 1 PSEN op4F-s-14-090 630 605
The positive-guided N/C contacts on
Light curtain function contactors K3 and K4 are monitored in the 2.3
The interruption of light curtain PSEN op4F-s safety relay’s feedback circuit S12-S34. The
(B1/B2) is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ feedback circuit on safety relay K1 is linked
X2.9P (K1) via the two semiconductor to the feedback circuit on the contact
outputs on receiver B2. expander module K2.
The semiconductor outputs on the safety
light curtain’s receiver B2 are opened as Safety assessment
soon as the light curtain is interrupted. This ` The contact expander module PZE X4P
interrupts the input circuit on the safety (K2) and contactors K3, K4 must be
relay PNOZ X2.9P (K1) and the safety installed in a single mounting area
contacts open. The contact expander (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
module PZE X4P (K2) and contactors K3 short across the output.
and K4 de-energise. ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
The top and bottom DIP switches on the in the input circuit are detected via the
receiver B2 must be set at the same light curtain.
position. For the light curtain to reset ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
automatically, number 4 on both DIP loss of the safety function.
switches must be switched to ON. ` A single fault in the light curtain is
detected.
5.1-
ESPE applications

Safety function: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN op4F-s B1/B2)
Prerequisites:
when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X2.9P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): is interrupted Logic (PZE X4P K2)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000
2.3
Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PSEN op4F-s B1/B2)
Prerequisites:
control function when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X2.9P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF): is interrupted Logic (PZE X4P K2)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2
of EN 954-1.

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ESPE applications
PNOZ X3P – PSEN op4F-s light curtain
evaluation via a PLC. button S1. This avoids an unwanted reset

Features before the input circuit is closed or as a
Start/reset result of the reset button being
` Dual-channel operation with detection The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K1) can be overridden. 4.3
of shorts across contacts via light curtain started by pressing reset button S1 if:
` Monitored reset ` The light curtain is not interrupted and Pilz products
` Light curtain with semiconductor output ` The semiconductor outputs on safety
` Contact expansion through PZE X5P light curtain B1/B2 are closed and Number Description Order number
and positive-guided contactors ` The relays on the contact expander 1 PNOZ X3P 777 310
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- module PZE X5P (K2) have de-energised 1 PZE X5P 777 150
pansion and 1 PSEN op4F-s-14-090 630 605
` Contactors K3 and K4 have de-
energised.
Description
Feedback circuit 2.3
Light curtain function The positive-guided N/C contacts on
The interruption of light curtain PSEN op4F-s contactors K3 and K4 are monitored in the
(B1/B2) is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ safety relay’s feedback circuit S33-S34. The
X3P (K1) via the two semiconductor outputs feedback circuit on safety relay K1 is linked
on receiver B2. to the feedback circuit on the contact
The semiconductor outputs on the safety expander module K2.
light curtain’s receiver B2 are opened as
soon as the light curtain is interrupted. This Safety assessment
interrupts the input circuit on the safety ` The contact expander module PZE X5P
relay PNOZ X3P (K1) and the safety (K2) and contactors K3 and K4 must be
contacts open. The input circuit on the installed in a single mounting area
contact expander module PZE X5P (K2) is (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
interrupted and the safety contacts open. short across the output.
Contactors K3 and K4 de-energise. ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
The top and bottom DIP switches on the in the input circuit are detected via the
receiver B2 must be set at the same light curtain.
position. For the light curtain to reset ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
automatically, number 4 on both DIP loss of the safety function.
switches must be switched to ON. ` A single fault in the light curtain is
The safety relay PNOZ X3P (K1) and contact detected.
expander module PZE X5P (K2) have ` The device can be started when the input
diagnostic outputs for display or for circuit is closed first, followed by reset
5.1-
ESPE applications

Prerequisites:
when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X3P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): is interrupted Logic (PZE X5P K2)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000
2.3
Prerequisites:
control function when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X3P K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF): is interrupted Logic (PZE X5P K2)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2
of EN 954-1.

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ESPE applications

` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The light curtain is not interrupted and 1 PNOZ X3.10P 777 314 4.3
of shorts across contacts via light curtain ` The semiconductor outputs on safety 1 PSEN op4F-s-14-090 630 605
` Monitored reset light curtain B1/B2 are closed and
` Light curtain with semiconductor output ` Contactors K5 and K6 have de-
guided contactors
safety relay’s feedback circuit S33/S34.
Description
Safety assessment 2.3
Light curtain function ` The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K4) and
The interruption of light curtain PSEN op4F-s contactors K5 and K6 must be installed
(B1/B2) is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ in a single mounting area (control cabinet)
X3.10P (K4) via the two semiconductor in order to exclude a short across the
outputs on receiver B2. output.
The semiconductor outputs on the safety ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
light curtain’s receiver B2 are opened as in the input circuit are detected via the
soon as the light curtain is interrupted. This light curtain.
interrupts the input circuit on the safety ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
relay PNOZ X3.10P (K4) and the safety loss of the safety function.
contacts open. Contactors K5 and K6 de- ` A single fault in the light curtain is
energise. detected.
The top and bottom DIP switches on the ` The device can be started when the input
receiver B2 must be set at the same circuit is closed first, followed by reset
position. For the light curtain to reset button S5. This avoids an unwanted reset
automatically, number 4 on both DIP before the input circuit is closed or as a
switches must be switched to ON. result of the reset button being
The safety relay PNOZ X3.10P (K4) has a overridden.
evaluation via a PLC.
5.1-
ESPE applications

Prerequisites:
` Common cause failure (CCF): is interrupted Actuator (contactors K5, K6)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000
2.3
Prerequisites:
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF): is interrupted Actuator (contactors K5, K6)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2
of EN 954-1.

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Features The safety relay PNOZ X8P (K1) can be
` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The light curtain is not interrupted and 1 PNOZ X8P 777 760 4.3
guided contactors
safety relay’s feedback circuit Y1-Y2.
Description
Light curtain function ` The safety relay PNOZ X8P (K1) and
The interruption of light curtain PSEN op4F-s contactors K2, K3 must be installed in a
(B1/B2) is signalled to the PNOZ X8P safety single mounting area (control cabinet) in
relay (K1) via the two semiconductor outputs order to exclude a short across the
on receiver B2. output.
relay PNOZ X8P (K1) and the safety loss of the safety function.
energise. detected.
position. For the light curtain to reset button S1. This avoids an unwanted reset
automatically, number 4 on both DIP before the input circuit is closed or as a
switches must be switched to ON. result of the reset button being
The safety relay PNOZ X8P (K1) has a overridden.
evaluation via a PLC.
5.1-
ESPE applications

Prerequisites:
when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X8P K1)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000
2.3
Prerequisites:
control function when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X8P K1)
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2
of EN 954-1.

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` Dual-channel operation with detection ` The light curtain is not interrupted and 1 PNOZ X10.11P 777 750 4.3
guided contactors
pansion The contacts on contactors K12 and K13
are monitored in the safety relay’s feedback
circuit Y1-Y2.
Description
Light curtain function ` The safety relay PNOZ X10.11P (K11) and
The interruption of light curtain PSEN op4F-s contactors K12, K13 must be installed in
(B1/B2) is signalled to the safety relay PNOZ a single mounting area (control cabinet) in
X10.11P (K11) via the two semiconductor order to exclude a short across the
outputs on receiver B2. output.
relay PNOZ X10.11P (K11) and the safety loss of the safety function.
energise. detected.
position. For the light curtain to reset button S11. This avoids an unwanted
automatically, number 4 on both DIP reset before the input circuit is closed or
switches must be switched to ON. as a result of the reset button being
overridden.
5.1-
ESPE applications

Prerequisites:
components):
B10d: 2,000,000
2.3
Prerequisites:
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2
of EN 954-1.

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Notes
2.3
4.3
Muting applications
Contents Page
Muting applications
PNOZ X4 – T-Muting with PSEN op4B-T PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.4-2
PNOZ X4 – L-Muting with PSEN op4B-L PL e of EN ISO 13849-1,
SIL 3 of EN 62061 2.4-6
2.4
24.5
Muting applications
PNOZ X4 – T-Muting with PSEN op4B-T
4.5
Both the muting sensors in B3 (A and B) Feedback circuit ` The device can be started if the input
Features must be operated consecutively within 4 s The positive-guided N/C contacts on circuit is closed first, followed by reset
for muting to start. Muting is ended if just contactors KM1 and KM2 are connected to button S3. This avoids an unwanted reset
` Dual-channel operation with detection one muting sensor in B5 (A and B) is active. feedback loop Y1/Y2 on safety relay PNOZ before the input circuit is closed or as a
of shorts across contacts via light curtain If the travel direction is reversed, both the X4 (K1). result of the reset button being
` With integrated muting sensors and muting sensors in B5 (A and B) must be overridden.
muting lamps operated consecutively within 4 s for muting Safety assessment ` The muting sensors (B3 and B5) must be
` Muting possible in two directions (T- to start. Muting is ended if just one muting ` The safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1) and tested at appropriate intervals: an
Muting) sensor in B3 (A and B) is active. contactors KM1 and KM2 must be activated muting function must be
` Automatic reset on light curtain The required muting configuration can be installed in a single mounting area deactivated within an appropriate time
` Monitored reset on PNOZ set using the DIP switches on the receiver (control cabinet) in order to exclude a period (no continuous muting).
` Light curtain with semiconductor B2 (see operating instructions for PSEN short across the output. ` The actuators (contactors) must be 2.4
output op4B-T). ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts switched off periodically for fault
` Contact expansion through positive- A muting lamp is also integrated within the in the input circuit are detected via the detection.
guided contactors light curtain for use with the muting light curtain. ` The override switch must be operated
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex- function. A flashing lamp indicates that the ` A fault on the device does not lead to the periodically for fault detection.
pansion muting function has been activated loss of the safety function.
successfully. ` A single fault in the light curtain is
If the simultaneity requirement (4 s) of the detected.
Description muting sensors in B3/B5 is exceeded, the
semiconductor outputs are switched off and Pilz products
AOPD function the light curtain goes to a fault condition.
The interruption of the light curtain is The override function (S2) can be used to Number Description Order number
signalled to the safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1) clear material from the protected field (see 1 PNOZ X4 774 730
via the two semiconductor outputs on operating instructions for PSEN op4B-T). 1 PSEN op4B-T-3-080 630 702
receiver B2.
The semiconductor outputs on the safety Start/reset
light curtain’s receiver B2 are opened as The safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1) can be started
soon as the light curtain is interrupted. This by pressing reset button S3 if:
interrupts the input circuit on the safety ` The muting sensors have not been
relay PNOZ X4 and the safety contacts open. activated and
Contactors KM1 and KM2 de-energise. ` The semiconductor outputs on the safety
light curtain (B1/B2) are closed and
Muting function ` Contactors KM1 and KM2 have de-
Correct switching of the muting sensors energised.
must allow the protected field to be
interrupted without shutting down the plant.
5.1-
Muting applications
PNOZ X4 – T-Muting with PSEN op4B-T

Safety function 1: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN op4B-T)
Prerequisites:
when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X4 K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): is interrupted Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
Safety function 2: Temporary suspension of a PL e Sensor/Logic (PSEN op4B-T)
safety device
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2.4
Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PSEN op4B-T)
Prerequisites:
control function when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X4 K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1): is interrupted Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
Safety-related Temporary suspension of a SIL 3 Sensor/Logic (PSEN op4B-T)
control function safety device
(SRCF 2):
components):
- Actuator: Two operations per hour Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
B10d: 2,000,000

24.5
of EN 954-1.

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Muting applications
PNOZ X4 – L-Muting with PSEN op4B-L
4.5
Both the muting sensors in B3 must be Start/reset ` Earth faults and shorts between contacts
operated consecutively within 4 s for muting The safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1) can be started in the input circuit are detected via the
Features
to start. The muting function is maintained by pressing reset button S3 if: light curtain.
for 4 s after muting sensor “A” is released. ` The muting sensors have not been ` A fault on the device does not lead to the
` Dual-channel operation with detection
After this time the muting function switches activated and loss of the safety function.
of shorts across contacts via light curtain
off and the safety light curtain returns to ` The semiconductor outputs on the safety ` A single fault in the light curtain is
` With integrated muting sensors and
normal mode. light curtain (B1/B2) are closed and detected.
muting lamps
` Contactors KM1 and KM2 have de- ` The device can be started if the input
` Muting possible on leaving the danger
CAUTION! energised. circuit is closed first, followed by reset
zone (L-Muting)
You should also secure the area button S3. This avoids an unwanted reset
` Automatic reset on light curtain
around the light curtain outside the Feedback circuit before the input circuit is closed or as a
` Monitored reset on PNOZ
danger zone, with a safety fence for The positive-guided N/C contacts on result of the reset button being 2.4
` Light curtain with semiconductor
example, so that nobody can access contactors KM1 and KM2 are connected to overridden.
output
the danger zone during the 4 s feedback loop Y1/Y2 on safety relay PNOZ ` The muting sensors (B3) must be tested
period in which the muting function X4 (K1). at appropriate intervals: an activated
guided contactors
is maintained. muting function must be deactivated
` Feedback circuit to monitor contact ex-
Safety assessment within an appropriate time period (no
pansion
The required muting configuration can be ` L-configuration muting is suitable for continuous muting).
set using the DIP switches on the receiver applications in which the object is to be ` The actuators (contactors) must be
B2 (see operating instructions for PSEN transported out of the danger zone. switched off periodically for fault
Description
op4B-L). ` The safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1) and detection.
A muting lamp is also integrated within the contactors KM1 and KM2 must be ` The override switch must be operated
AOPD function
light curtain for use with the muting installed in a single mounting area periodically for fault detection.
The interruption of the light curtain is
function. A flashing lamp indicates that the (control cabinet) in order to exclude a
signalled to the safety relay PNOZ X4 (K1)
muting function has been activated short across the output.
via the two semiconductor outputs on
successfully.
receiver B2.
If the simultaneity requirement (4 s) of the Pilz products
The semiconductor outputs on the safety
muting sensors in B3 is exceeded, the
light curtain’s receiver B2 are opened as
semiconductor outputs are switched off and Number Description Order number
soon as the light curtain is interrupted. This
the light curtain goes to a fault condition. 1 PNOZ X4 774 730
interrupts the input circuit on the safety
The override function (S2) can be used to 1 PSEN op4B-L-3-080 630 704
relay PNOZ X4 and the safety contacts open.
clear material from the protected field (see
Contactors KM1 and KM2 de-energise.
operating instructions for PSEN op4B-L).
Muting function
Correct switching of the muting sensors
must allow the protected field to be
interrupted without shutting down the plant.
5.1-
Muting applications
PNOZ X4 – L-Muting with PSEN op4B-L

Safety function 1: Machine shut down PL e Sensor (PSEN op4B-L)
Prerequisites:
when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X4 K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): is interrupted Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
Safety function 2: Temporary suspension of a PL e Sensor/Logic (PSEN op4B-L)
safety device
components):
B10d: 2,000,000

2.4
Safety-related Machine shut down SIL 3 Sensor (PSEN op4B-L)
Prerequisites:
control function when the safety light curtain Logic (PNOZ X4 K1)
` Common cause failure (CCF): ß = 2 % (SRCF 1): is interrupted Actuator (contactors KM1, KM2)
Safety-related Temporary suspension of a SIL 3 Sensor/Logic (PSEN op4B-L)
control function safety device
(SRCF 2):
components):
- Actuator: Two operations per hour Please note the further requirements of EN 62061, e.g. requirements for systematic safety integrity.
B10d: 2,000,000

24.5
of EN 954-1.

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Notes
2.4
4.5
Service
Contents Page
Service
Pre-sales/after sale
Professional services 3.1-2
Your partner for practical training
Customised training concepts 3.1-3
Delivery and payment- 3.1-4
terms
3.1
3.1-1
Service
Pre-sales/after sales
Professional services
Risk Assessment Plant Assessment Certificates and Approvals

Assessment of the hazards and Analysis and assessment of the Pilz is certified to DIN ISO 9001.
risks on plant and machinery, safety-related condition of your International approvals and
based on norms and standards. plant and machinery. Proposal of certification from recognised test
basic recommendations for improvement. houses confirm our products’ suitability for
worldwide use.
Safety Concept 3.1
Based on the risk analysis, ap- Training and Education Internet
propriate protective measures A wide range of seminars and Our homepage at www.pilz.
can be selected and a safety training courses on machinery com provides the latest informa-
concept drawn up. safety helps to communicate the tion, electronic shopping, direct
fundamentals for minimising risk and assur- dialogue and enquiry functions as well as
Safety Design ing your success. extensive download options.
As part of the safety design, Pilz
produces detailed documenta- Technical Support
tion regarding the implementa- Our engineers can support you E-Business
tion, taking into account the safety concept. in the selection, use and appli- The focus of Pilz’s E-Business
cation of our products. They are activities is to strengthen cus-
We can provide consulting and engineering, System Implementation in constant contact with customers from the tomer orientation through the
training and support, from the project con- Pilz undertakes all the tasks widest range of areas and industrial sectors use of new media and to increase added
figuration phase through to commissioning. required to implement a project: and are happy to answer your queries at any value via a supplementary business model
component selection, prepa- time. for Business-to-Business.
ration of circuit diagrams, programming, con-
trol cabinet, installation, commissioning. Worldwide Representatives
E-Mail: Our worldwide network of
Safety Validation support@pilz.com subsidiaries and sales partners
All the relevant safety-related ensures comprehensive sup-
documents are examined, check 24-hour hotline: port and assistance with your questions and
lists are created and the plant +49 711 3409-444 problems.
and machinery checked.
CE Marking Supply and Repair Service

Co-ordination and implementa- From a fast, economical repair
tion of all the activities neces- through to a long supply guaran-
sary for the CE conformity of tee to safeguard your investment
plant and machinery. – always expect more from Pilz.
3.1-2
Service
Your partner for practical training
Customised training concepts
Benefit from the expertise of one of the Whether you need a basic seminar or an ad-
leading brands in automation technology vanced course, we can help to prepare you in-
dividually in the best way possible for everyday
As a result of many years’ experience, work work situations. We will happily do this at your
with the standards’ committees and tho- premises, directly on the machine.
rough expertise in the area of safe automa-
tion technology, Pilz is the ideal partner for More information on our complete seminar
practical training. Pilz offers a large number program, conditions of registration and se-
of seminars and courses on the widest range minar venues can be found on the Internet,
of subjects to both manufacturers and users where you also have the opportunity to regi-
alike – worldwide, in various languages, to ster directly online:
the samed standard. For example:
• www.pilz.com
• General safety-related issues
• New machinery safety standards Why not find out more about our attractive
• Programming and maintenance range of training courses!
• Error evaluation and diagnostics
3.1
3.1-3
Service
Terms of delivery and payment
3.1
The terms of delivery and of payment of the

respective Pilz company with whom a sales
contract is closed are applied. As a rule this
is the Pilz company that places the order.
Please select the legal contract partner from
the order confirmation.
3.1-4
AT CH ES IE MX PT
© Pilz GmbH & Co. KG, 2009

2-6-2-0-002, 2009-07 Printed in Germany
Pilz Ges.m.b.H. Pilz lndustrieelektronik GmbH Pilz lndustrieelektronik S.L. Pilz Ireland Industrial Automation Pilz de México, S. de R.L. de C.V. Pilz Industrieelektronik S.L.
Sichere Automation Gewerbepark Hintermättli Safe Automation Cork Business and Technology Park Automatización Segura R. Eng Duarte Pacheco, 120
Modecenterstraße 14 Postfach 6 Camí Ral, 130 Model Farm Road Circuito Pintores 170 4 Andar Sala 21
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Telephone: +43 1 7986263-0 Telephone: +41 62 88979-30 Spain Telephone: +353 21 4346535 Mexico Telephone: +351 229407594
Telefax: +43 1 7986264 Telefax: +41 62 88979-40 Telephone: +34 938497433 Telefax: +353 21 4804994 Telephone: +52 55 5572 1300 Telefax: +351 229407595
E-Mail: pilz@pilz.at E-Mail: pilz@pilz.ch Telefax: +34 938497544 E-Mail: sales@pilz.ie Telefax: +52 55 5572 1300 E-Mail: pilz@pilz.es
Internet: www.pilz.at Internet: www.pilz.ch E-Mail: pilz@pilz.es Internet: www.pilz.ie E-Mail: info@mx.pilz.com Internet: www.pilz.es
Internet: www.pilz.es Internet: www.pilz.com.mx
AU CN IT RU
Pilz Australia Pilz Industrial Automation FI Pilz ltalia Srl NL Pilz Russia
Safe Automation Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Pilz Skandinavien K/S Automazione sicura Pilz Nederland Mjachkovsky bulvar d.31/19 office 2
Suite C1, 756 Blackburn Road Safe Automation Safe Automation Via Meda 2/A Veilige automatisering Moscow 109469
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Australia No. 457 Wu Lu Mu Qi (N) Road 00400 Helsinki Italy 4130 ED Vianen Telephone: +7 495 346 4110
Telephone: +61 3 95446300 Shanghai 200040 Finland Telephone: +39 031 789511 Netherlands E-Mail: pilz@pilzrussia.ru
Telefax: +61 3 95446311 China Telephone: +358 9 27093700 Telefax: +39 031 789555 Telephone: +31 347 320477 Internet: www.pilzrussia.ru
E-Mail: safety@pilz.com.au Telephone: +86 21 62494658 Telefax: +358 9 27093709 E-Mail: info@pilz.it Telefax: +31 347 320485
In some countries, InduraNET p®, Pilz®, PIT®, PMCprotego®, PMI®, PNOZ®, Primo®, PSEN®, PSS®, PVIS®, SafetyBUS p®, SafetyEYE®,
Internet: www.pilz.com.au Telefax: +86 21 62491300 E-Mail: pilz.fi@pilz.dk Internet: www.pilz.it E-Mail: info@pilz.nl
SafetyNET p®, the spirit of safety® are registered, protected trademarks of Pilz GmbH & Co. KG. Text and graphics in this leaflet are
E-Mail: sales@pilz.com.cn Internet: www.pilz.fi Internet: www.pilz.nl SE
Internet: www.pilz.com.cn Pilz Skandinavien K/S
BE LU JP Safe Automation
Pilz Belgium FR Pilz Japan Co., Ltd. NZ Energigatan 10 B
Safe Automation DE Pilz France Electronic Safe Automation Pilz New Zealand 43437 Kungsbacka
Bijenstraat 4 Pilz GmbH & Co. KG 1, rue Jacob Mayer Shin-Yokohama Fujika Building 5F Safe Automation Sweden
9051 Gent (Sint-Denijs-Westrem) Felix-Wankel-Straße 2 BP 12 2-5-9 Shin-Yokohama 5 Nixon Road Telephone: +46 300 13990
Belgium 73760 Ostfildern 67037 Strasbourg Cedex 2 Kohoku-ku Mangere Telefax: +46 300 30740
Telephone: +32 9 3217570 Germany France Yokohama 222-0033 Auckland E-Mail: pilz.se@pilz.dk
Telefax: +32 9 3217571 Telephone: +49 711 3409-0 Telephone: +33 3 88104000 Japan New Zealand Internet: www.pilz.se
simply intended to give an overview of the system. No responsibility accepted for errors or omissions.
E-Mail: info@pilz.be Telefax: +49 711 3409-133 Telefax: +33 3 88108000 Telephone: +81 45 471-2281 Telephone: +64 9 6345350
Internet: www.pilz.be E-Mail: pilz.gmbh@pilz.de E-Mail: siege@pilz-france.fr Telefax: +81 45 471-2283 Telefax: +64 9 6345352
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Internet: www.pilz.jp Internet: www.pilz.co.nz Pilz Emniyet Otomasyon
BR Ürünleri ve Hizmetleri Tic. Ltd. Şti.
Pilz do Brasil DK GB Kayışdağı Cd. Beykonağı Plaza
Automação Segura Pilz Skandinavien K/S Pilz Automation Technology KR PL No:130 K:2 D:2
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Internet: www.pilz.com.br Internet: www.pilz.dk Telefax: +44 1536 460866 Telefax: +82 2 2263 9542 E-Mail: info@pilz.pl
E-Mail: sales@pilz.co.uk E-Mail: info@pilzkorea.co.kr Internet: www.pilz.pl US CA
Internet: www.pilz.co.uk Internet: www.pilzkorea.co.kr Pilz Automation Safety L.P.
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Telefax: +1 734 354 3355
Please refer to our homepage E-Mail: info@pilzusa.com
for further details or contact our Internet: www.pilz.us
headquarters.
Pilz GmbH & Co. KG

Felix-Wankel-Straße 2
73760 Ostfildern, Germany
Telephone: +49 711 3409-0
Telefax: +49 711 3409-133
E-Mail: pilz.gmbh@pilz.de
Internet: www.pilz.com

PILZ-PNOZ X Safety Relay Application

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PILZ-PNOZ X Safety Relay Application

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PNOZ X safety relays

Application examples for project conﬁguration –

Application Manual – June 2009 edition

Because the integrality

Standards and Directives 1.0

Standards and directives 1.1

Application Examples 2.0

Emergency stop applications 2.1

Safety gate applications 2.2

ESPE applications 2.3

Muting applications 2.4

Standards and Directives

Incorporation of the directives into domestic law (using Germany as an example)

C standards deal with EN 12415 Turning machines

Under the terms of the machinery directive,

Determination of the required Performance Level (PL r)

Required Performance Level PLr

F  Frequency and/or exposure to a hazard

Performance Levels (PL) Probability of a

c 11110-6 < PFH < 3 x 10-6

Performance level examined. A com-ponent’s MTTFD value is

Sector standards from EN/IEC 61508

Risk assessment and determination of required Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

Class Cl Frequency Probability of hzd. Avoidance

AM = Other measures recommended

The following parameters are required in

Emergency stop applications

Safety-related characteristics in EN ISO 13849-1 Performance Level Safety-related parts

Safety-related characteristics in EN 62061 Safety Subsystems

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Safety-related characteristics in EN 62061 Safety Subsystems

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