204 Indian Penal Code (Sec.

Ill

(2) Probable consequence.—A probable consequence may be explained as an act which

is likely, or which can reasonably be expected to follow from another act. No man can be
allowed to say that he did not authorise an act of which he would have foreseen that
consequence. That is to say, an act is said to be the probable consequence of another act, if it
can reasonably be expected to take place from such an act.
A, instigates a child to put poison in the food of Z, and gives him poison for that
purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation by mistake puts the poison in the food
of V, who is sitting next to Z. Here, since the child was acting under the influence of A's
instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the
abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as though A had instigated
the child to put the poison in the food of Y. (sf<? Illustration (a)].
But, if an unusual or unexpected consequence of an act which a reasonable man cannot
be expected to foresee would follow from such an act, such consequence cannot be
described as a probable one. As such, the abettor would not be liable for the consequence of
such improbable acts. For instance, if A instigates B to burn Z's house and B sets fire to the
house and at the same time commit theft of property, though A would be guilty of abeting
the burning of the house, he is not guilty of abetting the commission of theft, for the theft
was a distinct act and not a probable consequence of the burning [see Illustration
(b)].
112. Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done.—
If the act for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding section is committed in
addition to the act abetted, and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor is liable to
punishment for each of the offences.
Illustration
A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence,
resists that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the
officer executing the distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress,
and the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for both
these offences; and, if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous hurt in
resisting the distress A will also be liable to punishment for each of the offences.
COMMENTS
Abettor liable to cumulative punishment—Section 112 extends the doctrine of
constructive criminality and makes provisions for cumulative punishment in cases covered
under section 111. The section states that the abettor would be liable to punishment both for
the offence abetted as well as for the offence that was the probable consequence of the
abetment, provided cumulative sentence could be passed in that particular case. For
instance, when A by putting B in fear of death induces B to burn a stock of com belonging
to Z, kept inside the house where Z is sleeping, A is liable both for abetting B to bum the
stock of corn and also for putting B under fear of death.1 The illustration attached to the
section clearly explains the principle underlying this section.
But if the act committed is not the probable consequence of the act abetted, the abettor
will not be responsible to the cumulative punishment. For instance, A abets B to assault C
and B kills C. A is not liable for abetment of murder, but only for abetment of hurt, 2 because
the later act cannot be stipulated as the probable consequence of the abetment of assault in
the particular situation.

1 Naivabali v. Emperor, 1928 Cal 752; Ghanshyam Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 100.
2 Queen v. Goluck Chand, (1866) 5 VVR (Cr) 75-76; Queen v. Doorgessur Surnnah, (1867) 7
YVR (Cr) 61.

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