THIRD DIVISION

ANTERO J. POBRE, A.C. No. 7399

Complainant,
Present:

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,

Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO, VELASCO, JR.,
Respondent. NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members
of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the
lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he
should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy
purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. [3] The disciplinary authority of
the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on
the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that
her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the
first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case,
the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

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 Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to
stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to
maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. [7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the
Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being
considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary
immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal
wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or
Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with
her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is,
thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory
words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that
provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to
promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

xxxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty
of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The
Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in
the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or
good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection
with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them. [16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority
on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent
manner.
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 The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act
of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so,
even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution
pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew
that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside
the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules
dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided
imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the
public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court
of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. [21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard
that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied
admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, DISMISSED.

SECOND DIVISION

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G.R. No. 80390 March 27, 1998

CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and ANGELICA M. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTOR FORTUNADO, respondents.

MARTINEZ J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated January 24, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case
No. 262, which reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July 31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed by respondents.

The facts are not disputed:

Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are the registered owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No.
7-3041 and T-1929, both registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the
Traders Commercial Bank (now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the amount of P370,000.00.

On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal
Bank, among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mortgage.

On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision3, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:

1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P24,550.00 plus legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and
to pay the costs.

2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgage which is attached as Annex "B" of the complaint to be declared
null and void and, ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel the said mortgage at the back of
TCT No. T-1929, Book I, Page 8 and TCT No. T-3040, Book I, Page 96 of said Register of Deeds.

II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaint of Defendant Traders Commercial Bank:

1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay the Traders Commercial Bank jointly and
severally the amount of P578,025.23, inclusive of interest and other bank charges as of April 30, 1971, and,
thereafter, plus all interest and bank charges until full payment is made and, to pay to the bank the amount
of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.

The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in this manner:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by eliminating paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the
decision of the lower court declaring the real estate mortgage in favor of the Traders Commercial Bank null and void. The
decision is affirmed in all other respects.4

On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the mortgage to petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said assignment,
petitioner on March 19, 1984 wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for non-payment of the
loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, a complaint for
cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction against petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 262.

After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary judgment which was granted by the court. Consequently, on July 31, 1985, the
trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. In its decision, the trial court delved on the issue of prescription of a mortgage action.

Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the principal loan has already been paid, the mortgage, which is an accessory contract,
should likewise be extinguished.

On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, of the summary judgment of July 31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered
and modified to read:

Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out a preponderating case against the
defendants.

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 And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining order of the Court in the case on April 23, 1984 is hereby
converted into a preliminary injunction and by these presents made permanent. The City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L.
Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M. Bautista are hereby permanently restrained from conducting a public auction sale of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby further ordered to cancel
Entry No. 451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.) on file with his office. No pronouncement as to damages or
attorney's fees.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Resolution6 on August 28,1987, forwarding the case to this Court for resolution
reading thus:

Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty. Ramon Gonzales' motion to the sound discretion of this Court and
considering the unrefuted allegation of the said motion that there were no documentary or testimonial evidence which were
the basis of the questioned decision but mere admissions of the parties, the questions raised on appeal become mere questions
of law, over which the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction.

On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review contending that the trial court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in
declaring that he has no right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in declaring the temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary
injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.

We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their respective Memoranda on August 31, 1988.

On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real
estate mortgage has already been released by the Traders Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of the Release of
Real Estate Mortgage,7 and that the petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8 Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of the petition.

On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said Manifestation. However, the copy of
the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices, 9 with the postmaster's remark "moved." In
view of this development, the Court considered the resolution as served. 10

Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss the petition for having been rendered moot and academic.

The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has the right to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage is no longer necessary in
view of the release of the mortgage as shown in the certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose would be served by passing on the merits of the
petition. Any ruling in this case could hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. 11

However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court of the death of petitioner, a duty
mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides in part, to wit:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3 could not be effected.

We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address which accounts for his failure to comment on the
manifestation of respondents relative to the death of petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage.

Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than
those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby
REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such omission in the future will be dealt with severely.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

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G.R. No. L-27396 September 30, 1974

JESUS V. OCCEÑA and SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V. BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C. Ogan,
Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol, Intervenor.

Jesus V. Occeña and Samuel C. Occeña in their own behalf.

Hon. Paulino S. Marquez for and in his own behalf.

I.V. Binamira for and in his own behalf as intervenor.

ANTONIO, J.:p

In this petition for certiorari with mandamus, petitioners seek (1) to nullify the order of respondent Judge Paulino S. Marquez of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol, Branch I, in Sp. Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in relation to petitioners' claim for partial payment of
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, dated November 2, 1966, fixing at P20,000.00 petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the period March
1963 to December 1965," and directing its immediate payment minus the amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second order, dated
January 12, 1967, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and modifying the November 2, 1966 order by deleting therefrom the above-quoted phrase;
(2) to direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of P30,000.00 minus the amount of P4,000.00 already advanced to
them by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorney's fees to which they are entitled, in case no agreement
thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.

The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty.
Jesus V. Occeña and Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occeña, and they had been representing the said
executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased
father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash
was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution of the corpus and income of the
estate was made to the heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the estate and inheritance taxes were completely settled by the
executrix and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to them of P30,000.00, as
part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits
of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs, Lily Ogan Peralta, William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the motion until after
the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five of the seven
instituted heirs, namely, Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas Ogan Occena, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan Gibson, filed with the court a
Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and recommending approval
of petitioners' motion.

Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved, petitioners filed a second Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys' Fees, dated July 5,
1966, praying for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the matter was, however, deferred in an order
dated August 6, 1966, upon the request of the Quijano and Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of heirs William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until after all
the instituted heirs shall have agreed in writing on the total attorney's fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966,
asking the court to reconsider its deferment order and praying that payment to them of P30,000.00 be approved on the understanding that whatever amounts
were paid to them would be chargeable against the fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be petitioners' total fees.

On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000.00.
Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but
also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.00.

Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the entire attorney's fees to which they are
entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The reasons given by petitioners in support of their contention
are: (1) the motion submitted by petitioners for the court's resolution was only for partied payment of their attorney's fees, without prejudice to any
agreement that might later be reached between them and the instituted heirs on the question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the
question of total attorney's fees; (2) considering that the only question raised by petitioners for the court's determination was that of partial attorney's fees,
they never expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have the opportunity to prove to total
fees to which they were entitled, and, hence, they were denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to the estate, five had agreed to petitioners' motion
for partial payment to them of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, while the remaining two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent
Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of the case, but the amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is entitled cannot be
determined on the sole basis of the records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration; and (5) contrary to respondent Judge's
opinion, the mere fact that one of the attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a ground for denying the said attorneys the right to the
fees to which they are otherwise entitled.

Only Judge Paulino S. Marquez is named respondent in the present petition, for, according to petitioners, "no proper party is interested in sustaining the
questioned proceedings in the Lower Court."

In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is
already a final order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occeña is the husband of executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña, hence, Samuel
Occeña's pecuniary interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) one reason why
respondent Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that there are
miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the
estate; (d) co-executor I. V. Binamira should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is the
duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is herself an
heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to
avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. As
special defenses, respondent Judge alleged that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; that mandamus cannot control the actuations
of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; and that no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to
administer the estate frugally.

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On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that
since petitioners Samuel C. Occeña and Jesus V. Occeña are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña, the latter cannot be
expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate,
Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a
resolution of August 9, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of August 9, 1967 and an Opposition to "Motion for Leave to
Intervene," contending that Atty. Binamira ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29, 1965. On August 15, 1967, Atty. Binamira filed
Intervenor's Opposition to Petition (answer in intervention) traversing the material averments of the petition.

On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Exicutrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On September 18, 1967,
intervenor filed Intervenor's Comments on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 9, 1961. On September 21, 1967,
petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for Contempt asking this Court to hold intervenor in contempt of court. We required intervenor to comment
thereon. On October 9, 1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition for Contempt. Invervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and
Counter Petition, asking this Court to dismiss petitioners' motion for indirect contempt and instead to hold petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for gross
breach of legal ethics. We deferred action on the contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January 15, 1968. Intervenor I. V. Binamira
filed an Answer to Supplemental Petition. This was followed on February 12, 1968, by another Petition for Contempt, this time against one Generoso L.
Pacquiao for allegedly executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid intervenor I. V. Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate falsehoods,
which affidavit intervenor attached to his Answer to Supplemental Petition. On the same date, February 12, 1968, petitioners filed against intervenor a Second
Supplemental Petition for Contempt. On February 19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners' Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence Supporting Charges.

We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions for contempt.

The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may
be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or
administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order
to collect his fees is to request the administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal
capacity, and not as administrator,1 or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested
parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration.2 Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will
have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition
directly with the probate court.

There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see
to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated. 3 This rule, however, does not authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as
trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the latter
opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services. Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.

What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for the executrix for
the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had manifested conformity to
petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the total amount for Executrix's fees and
attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such conformity, and without affording petitioners the
opportunity to establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00
the entire attorney's fees of petitioners.

In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:

The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by Atty. Samuel Occeña, within each given period, is easily visible
from them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this Court's orders as to attorney's fees.

Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on October 28, 1965 were as a result of compromise and were with the
written consent of all the heirs and of all the signatories of the compromise agreement of October 27, 1965. That is not so with respect to
Atty. Occeña's thirty-thousand peso claim for fees; and so, this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The record can
reflect what an attorney of record has done.

In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper
amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
correctable by certiorari. Evidently, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of the record alone considering that there are other factors necessary
in assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much
larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not. 4

It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in support of their fees do not appear in the records of the case. For instance, they claim
that in connection with their legal services to the executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C. Occeña had been travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from
1965 to March, 1967, and from Davao to Cebu and Manila from 1963 to March, 1967, and that in fact he and his family had to stay for almost a year in
Dumaguete City. These claims apparently bear strongly on the labor, time and trouble involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should
have been subject to a formal judicial inquiry. Considering, furthermore, that two of the heirs have not given their conformity to petitioners' motion, the need
for a hearing becomes doubly necessary. This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant petitioners' prayer for the release to them of
the amount of P30,000.00 as partial payment of their fees.

II

As stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false
averments in this Court.

We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of intervenor, and, on the basis of the evidence, We conclude that intervenor I. V. Binamira has
deliberately made false allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice, to wit:

1. To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., intervenor
submitted as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage" which he made to appear was signed by Atty. Vicente de la

7|Page
Serna and the executrix. The certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows that what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage
is in reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed by the parties.

2. Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated that in December, 1965, the executrix, without the court's approval or of the co-executor's
consent, but with petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. out of the estate's funds. The record shows that
only P50,000.00 was loaned to the company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and that the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed
among others, by intervenor, and approved by the court.

3. To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occeña and his wife, the executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that less than a month after
the loan of P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel C. Occeña was elected president by directors of his own choosing
in the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the executrix loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The certification of the
corporate secretary of the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner Samuel C. Occeña was not the president of the
company at the time, nor did he act as president or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la Serna. This last fact is also shown in
intervenor's own Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition.

4. In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari, he stated that contrary to the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax return of the estate that
an estate "income of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no such distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition
(Annex E-Contempt) shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income of the estate.

5. To discredit petitioner and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be filed with the court the
executrix's verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the estate certain loans granted to petitioner Samuel C. Occeña in the sum of P4,000.00 and to
the executrix various sums totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan to his daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show
that the said sums totalling P10,000.00 were in reality partly given to her as a gift and partly for the payment of certain furniture and equipment.

6. Intervenor, in Order to further discredit petitioners and the executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for
Reconsideration that the executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all that he was entitled to under the compromise agreement. The receipt
dated October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occeña, lawyer for
the executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all claims and fees against the Estate, pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27, 1965."

7. In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he signed Atty. Occeña's prepared
receipt without receiving payment, trusting that Atty. Occeña would pay the amount in full, but later Atty. Occeña withheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384
for P8,000.00 drawn in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by intervenor I. V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he
acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount of P8,000-00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo ... ." Anent the sum of P15,000.00 in cash,
Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the Opposition for Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate court) shows that intervenor, as
movant, himself had alleged that "no check was issued to movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included in purchasing Manager's check No.
55398 for the Clerk of Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form
part of the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a receipt signed by Atty. Samuel C. Occeña (Annex K-11-Contempt)
which forms part of the record in the court below.

8. In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor denied the truth of petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily and willingly extended
the sum of P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit. In the Opposition to Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration
of Order of February 19, 1966, dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had, however, admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart ... in the
nature of help," he had "willingly extended as a favor and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.

9. To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occeña that he stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to attend to the affairs of the estate, intervenor, in
his intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to
teach in Silliman University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex V-Contempt) is,
however, to the effect that their "records do not show that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña was teaching at Silliman University or employed in any other capacity in
1963, or at any time before or after 1963."

The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made false allegations in his
pleadings.

We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to
mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be
characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the
contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law,
he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or
unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made
these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.

The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not been substantiated by evidence,
and they must, therefore, be dismissed.

We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to
intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having
been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees
petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to
pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.

Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2152. April 19, 1991.]

TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R. VIOLA, Respondent.

8|Page
 SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; NOT A RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.

2. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF ATTORNEYS; FIRST DUTY OF LAWYERS IS NOT TO THEIR CLIENTS BUT TO THE COURTS. — It cannot be gainsaid that candidness,
especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to
their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property
involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters
not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before
the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he
offered no explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and
that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor
General and the complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the Respondent.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYER’S OATH AND CANON 22 OF THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, VIOLATED BY RESPONDENT. — It is clear to the Court that
respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the
court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a]
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to the
law itself.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990 1 addressed to this Court, complainant Teodoro I. Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other appropriate penalty
upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, a member of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice.

The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with
Civil Case No. 3330-M 2 filed sometime in 1966 with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Bulacan against Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia
dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, 3 respondent alleged, on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad
Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications Nos. V-1284 and 2807 covering portions of public land situated in Barrio
Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and that lease contracts 4 had been executed in their favor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Respondent prayed in the complaint that his clients (the Alvendias) be declared "bona fide lessees of the land in controversy . . . ." 5 In an Order
dated 2 October 1969, 6 the CFI dismissed the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M for non-appearance of the Alvendias.

On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the foreshore fronting the Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan . . . is hereby withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be called the Bulacan Fishing Reservation." 7 (Emphasis
supplied)

It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was part of the communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470.

On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application for Original Registration of Title 8 in Land Registration Case ("LRC")
No. 3711-M with the then CFI of Bulacan praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be registered in the name of the spouses Alvendias.
Respondent alleged in the Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of the land, they having acquired the same from one Teresita
Vistan by sale sometime in 1929.

It is petitioner’s contention that respondent, in filing the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating that his clients were
the owners of the property applied for despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere lessees of the land in controversy as so described in the
complaint respondent had filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and
unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar.

In his Answer, 10 respondent alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title was originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said
lawyer withdrew his appearance therein, respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he believed his clients had the right
to apply for the registration of the land; and that assuming his clients did not in fact have any such right, the court where the Application for Original
Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this complaint for disbarment was filed prematurely.cralawnad

Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer. 11

In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the complaint for disbarment. In said Motion, he alleged — for the second time — that he was not
the original lawyer who filed the application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty. Montesclaro. Respondent further alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty. Montesclaro when he took over, even went to the extent of verifying from the Bureau
of Lands if the application was proper. The Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it was. He was informed that judicial
application for registration is one of the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being ‘alienable and disposable.’ There are, however, other means of
obtaining the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the present action for land registration.

Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the original lawyer when said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your respondent, hence, was
in good faith when he took over the land registration case, subject matter of this present administrative investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to Dismiss to the Solicitor General.
9|Page
In a Report 13 dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of the land in question.
However, respondent does not deny that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M
wherein he alleged that the Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why
his submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that the Alvendias were
permittees and later the lessees of the same property.

It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in the land registration case. As proven by complaint, respondent has
willingly aided and consented in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and
member of the bar. 14

It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It
cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that
expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times
that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all
and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. 16

In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated
that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. What does matter is that
respondent, who, as a member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was
incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than
that he had not originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really believed his clients
were entitled to apply for registration of their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the complainant that
those excuses do not exculpate the Respondent.chanrobles law library

It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that" [t]he
conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prescribing that" [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him
as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding
duty to the court and to the law itself.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics
(now the Code of Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

EN BANC

10 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-28131 February 28, 1972

CHAN KIAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARSENIO ANGSIN [A. A. Industrial Chemical Supply], defendant-appellee.

Ramon Encarnacion, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.

Galang and Garcia for defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Manila, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving a pure question of law.

The appellate court's resolution of certification of September 19, 1967 gives the following backgrounder on the facts of the case: .

Plaintiff's complaint before the CFI of Manila alleges, among other things, that on July 23, 1962, he entered into an agreement with
defendant whereby, for and in consideration of the purchase price of P300.00 per drum, or a total of P120,000.00 which he received from
defendant on the same date, he sold to defendant, for delivery on August 23, 1962, 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and that on
August 23, 1962, he was ready to deliver the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate but defendant refused to accept delivery and insisted
on the return of the P120,000.00 because the price of the said merchandise had already fallen in the local market, hence said complaint
prays that defendant be ordered to receive from plaintiff 400 drums of monosodium glutamate, with damages.

Arising from the same transaction is Criminal Case No. 67752, People vs. Chan Kian (herein plaintiff) before the same court, wherein
herein defendant is the complainant, who accuses herein plaintiff with estafa involving the same 400 drums of monosodium glutamate
and the sum of P120,000.00.

On defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, which was opposed by plaintiff, and in view of the pendency of both criminal and
civil cases between the same parties and over the same subject matter, the lower court ruled that the trial of the criminal case should
take precedence over the civil case, "not only because the procedure provided for the prosecution of offenses is more adequate than civil
procedure, but because the judgment which may be rendered in the criminal action may dispose of the civil action." The lower court also
opined that giving preference to the criminal case would avoid multiplicity of suits and the possibility of a conflict of decision on the same
issues, for it would be anomalous if the civil case is decided in favor of plaintiff and thereafter he gets convicted in the criminal case.
Concluding that "only if the criminal case is tried first and the accused is acquitted would it be proper for him to continue with this civil
case," the lower court finally said that this ruling is in accordance with Paragraph (c)of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court providing that
"after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted."

The appellate court then recited plaintiff-appellant's grounds of appeal:

Appealing the order of dismissal to this Court, plaintiff contends "That the lower court erred in giving due course to the motion to dismiss
filed by defendants-appellee" on the following grounds: .

(1) That the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 107, Section 1, have no application in the case at bar; .

(2) That civil case No. 52247 is a prejudicial question to the resolution of Criminal Case No. 67752; .

(3) That assuming arguendo that the provisions of Rule 107 is applicable, the proper remedy is not Motion to Dismiss.

After the submittal in September and October, 1963, of the parties' briefs, the appellate court found no question of fact and that "the only issue is the
correctness of the order of dismissal which is one of law,"1 and ordered the elevation of the record to this Court.

Since the present case involved only plaintiff-appellant's appeal from the lower court's dismissal order of his civil case No. 52247 for specific performance,
and the parties made no reference to what had transpired meanwhile to the criminal case for estafa, No. 67752 against plaintiff as accused pending before
another branch, Branch XVIII of the same lower court presided by Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., 2 the Court resolved to send for the records of the criminal case.

The Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown that the principal issue raised
on appeal by herein plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the order dismissing his civil complaint against the complainant in the criminal
case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal case should take precedence over the civil case, has become moot and academic. This is so because in the
meantime long before this case was certified to this Court by the appellate court on September 19, 1967, the trial of the criminal case had proceeded and
terminated with a judgment of conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by Judge Kapunan of Branch XVIII, which in turn was reversed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals as per its decision of June 18, 1965.

The record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 thus shows the following sequence of events:

1. Judge Kapunan had denied a similar motion on the part of the accused (herein plaintiff) to suspend the criminal proceedings, ruling in his order on February
2, 1963 that the civil case did not present a prejudicial question, besides citing Judge Arca's prior order of January 28, 1963 dismissing the civil case. 3

2. The accused (herein plaintiff) questioned Judge Kapunan's order by seeking an injunction from the Court of Appeals in a case docketed as CA-G.R. No.
31915-R, entitled "Chan Kian, petitioner vs. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Arsenio Angsin, respondents." The
appellate court, through its special fifth division, promulgated on July 13, 1963 its decision ruling that "respondent judge correctly denied petitioner's motion
to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 67752 of the Court of First Instance of Manila" 4and final judgment was entered on September 10, 1963.5

3. The criminal case thus proceeded to trial and on July 10, 1964, Judge Kapunan promulgated his decision dated July 9, 1964 finding the accused (therein
plaintiff) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing him to serve an indeterminate penalty ranging from not less than ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as minimum, to not more than fourteen (14) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P120,000.00 and to pay the costs. 6

11 | P a g e
4. On appeal, the appellate court, through its special first division approved the Solicitor-General's recommendation for acquittal and reversed Judge
Kapunan's judgment of conviction and instead acquitted the accused (plaintiff herein of the charge against him, per its decision of June 18, 1965 7 and final
entry of the said judgments was made on June 29, 1965. 8

The majority of the division held "that the transaction between complainant Arsenio Ang Sin and appellant Chan Kian that led to the execution of Exhibit A
was one of purchase and sale with advance payment of the purchase price of P120,000.00 for 400 drums of "Vetsin". There was, therefore, no obligation on
the part of appellant to return the said amount to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that appellant was ready and willing to deliver the 400 drums of
"Vetsin" as agreed upon and hence he did not, under the circumstances of this case, incur any criminal liability." Enriquez, J. as a minority disagreed with the
majority's holding on the nature of the transaction but nevertheless held that "(U)nder the facts therefore neither misappropriation nor conversion has been
shown. The absence of such essential element precludes the existence of criminal liability" and likewise voted for the acquittal of the accused. And they were
also unanimous that the drop in the price of the monosodium glutamate was the reason for complainant's failure to take delivery thereof on the agreed
deadline and for the precipitate filing of the criminal complaint on the day immediately following thereafter.

None of the above developments of record in the criminal case has been brought to the attention of the appellate court or of this Court in the present appeal by
the attorneys for the parties, except for the mention in appellee's brief of the appellate court's decision denying plaintiff's petition for a writ enjoining Judge
Kapunan from proceeding with the criminal case, supra.9

The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in truth and
candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the above developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal issue at bar moot and
academic, 11 this case would then have been disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to the prompt
disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus
dissipated.12

At any rate, it is clear that the civil case filed by plaintiff-appellant should merely have been suspended, not dismissed although without prejudice, by the
lower court under the Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee concedes as much, stating that the dismissal without prejudice is in effect a suspension pending the
outcome of the criminal case.

Now that the criminal case has already been resolved, the lower court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the case accordingly remanded to it.

On March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff-appellant, issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff "to sell at the best price obtainable, under the
supervision of the Clerk of this Court or his representative, the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate subject of this case, now stored in the bodega of the
General Packing Corporation, and to deposit with this Court the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the storage fees and other necessary expenses." As per
report of the Clerk of Court, this Resolution has not been implemented to date, due according to plaintiff's explanation of December 9, 1971, to the very low
price being offered for the article. With the present disposition of this case, this matter has become moot, without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling his motion
anew with the lower court.

ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for proper
trial and disposition on the merits. With costs against defendant-appellee.

EN BANC

12 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973

LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners,

vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.

Ortile Law Office for petitioners.

Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith
by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn duty to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its
resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice
and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case1 pending before it below.

Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the
Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be able to
prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of
such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.

Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for
extension of ten days from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got
sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just
recovered from his ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to
finish the comments for the respondents."

Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the
required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to pressure of work in his
office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on
December 28, 1972.

The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment
notwithstanding the numerous extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court as per its resolution of April
12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the
required comment.

Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing professional
commitments," he requested his clients "to have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of the
said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."

Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty.
Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical
certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26,
1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December 12,
1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio
Cañeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and
prepare the answer because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me."

Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Cañeda, president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc.
supporting his belated claim now that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and delivered
the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the
statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)."

Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time
it happened to him, and that if given an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal,
and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted
and without blinking an eye — notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at the time — that he "be given an
opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the respondents."

Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation,
opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition be considered
submitted for resolution by the Court.

In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent court in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse decision on the merits being
the merits being the proper and adequate remedy.

The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be unsatisfactory.

13 | P a g e
Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his
clients at his instance because of his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of credence because it is
contrary to the facts of record:

— In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment,
and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;

— In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just
recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"

— In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and cited
"pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a clean copy" — which comments never
came to be submitted to this Court;

— His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for
sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline on January 12,
1973;

— Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty.
Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Cañeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between December 23-26, 1972) he
advised Cañeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Cañeda got back the records of the case from him;

— He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be
"finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months — and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7, 1973
asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had
utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and

— He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the
required comment was filed within the last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his assurance that the final draft
was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation.

The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment
nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a
considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation
that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents
submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which according to his motion
of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a
further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude
manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

In Pajares vs. Abad Santos2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action."

It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct
themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients.

The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an
attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or
false statement of false statement of fact or law."3

The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of
justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and
time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity
and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned."4

Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated
extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the
canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part."

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined
to act in a spirit of leniency.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of
notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice
of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank.

EN BANC

14 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico
del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court,
virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in
the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution
dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only
justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the
enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a
criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising
from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case
No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred
pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago
O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by
petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the
ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and
that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica
and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate
Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment
rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust
judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language
cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of
court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly
Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will
he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain
from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to
explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.

On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not
making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of
the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting
the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against
Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not
like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as
in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation
of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated
threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's
client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the
Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by
insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will
succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's
reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was
under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse,
there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it
is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of
P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable
15 | P a g e
Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution
dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico
del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del
Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R.
No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his
complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is
the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat,
although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating
from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of
law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed
to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the
Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then,
filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished
me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M.
Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a
view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to
Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R.
No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that
of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we
might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo
on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If
the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled
that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really
uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in
G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for
disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R,
became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his
manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed
with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex
"B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the
Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be
fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies"
(Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its
contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973.
On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are
rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be
fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of
human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous
contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic
and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have
his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely
correct and those of others are all wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of
Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting
Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a
period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure
which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily

16 | P a g e
correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the
Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable;
that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided
for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could
have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of
arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:

The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in
the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a
justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in
the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of
the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the
Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We
may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the
practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with
honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice
of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution
of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount
importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he
may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should
give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues
involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a
plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or
assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to
secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect.
We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the
court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C.
F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in
turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding
and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The
intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and
the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with
intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are
superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements
without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend
that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be
wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of
change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the
practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by
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voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future
will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as
implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further
orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

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 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto,
Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.

RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:

After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention
statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion
that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum
for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).

b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the
page).

c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in
the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).

MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and
Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:

d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used
by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in
the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).

The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated
January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The
appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according
to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor
of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:

(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.

(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of
this nature.

(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the
benefit of the favored party.

(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it
was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.

(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all
bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.

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 (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
decision manifests.

(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.

On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this
Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable.
Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client
would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of
the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of
unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to
proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of
moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is
also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence?
Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the
motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further
elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.

On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his
rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief
Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial
ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.

On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic)
now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."

In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and
were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient
basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.

On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the
charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and
10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor
General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."

We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14,
1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear
in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned
down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner
in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.

On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21,
1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he
gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.

A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special
appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and
contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the
borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in
the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due
process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine

20 | P a g e
 Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation
is made.

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice
hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the
ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing
and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.

Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in
writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not
be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton
Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be
heard by this Court."

On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to
sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help
him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads'
desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.

On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for
reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They
then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While
Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The
motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was
approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.

In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has
not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common
practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat.
In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.

On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt
incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of
the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that
it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother
is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further
removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment.
He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not
be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."

It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made.
He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because
his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities"
who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment
is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be
the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to
ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many
of our government officials are just amoral?"

Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit
themselves.

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

21 | P a g e
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells
out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.'
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold.' "

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus has it been said
of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 4

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an
attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice,
oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is
wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-
known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying
ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the
law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade
the administration of justice8— is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses
petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners."
He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to
say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion
of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10

Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw
language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu
proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For,
inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected
with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11

We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala
without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not
participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.

5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought
should be read thus —

SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be
submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
22 | P a g e
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a
common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was
intentionally omitted.

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected.
More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied
in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a
party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to
effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer
of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it
was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read
the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced
him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with
Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even
started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago
before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the
lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not
yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice.

9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against
respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For,
this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond.,
contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not
taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000,
and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and

2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against
Morton F. Meads who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment
or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

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 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42032 January 9, 1976

IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, Makati, Rizal; THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL, Pasig, Rizal; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV, Pasig, Rizal; and MARCIANO P. STA. ANA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for release from confinement of a person who has served his sentence. 1 It i s on such a doctrine
that reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this application for the issuance of such a writ. It is undisputed that while the information against
petitioner charged him with the commission of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to one of serious physical injuries. It
is to such lesser offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon
him the penalty of four months and one day of arrests mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly
served by November 10, 1975, considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding, the petition alleged that he was not
set free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison term imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P.
Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal Case No.
15289, a 'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)' alleging as a ground that the 'father of the victim, Gilberts
Valenzuela, informed the movant (respondent Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason
the undersigned will file an amended information. 3 Then came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the following day, November 20, 1975, the respondent
Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his decision
therein had already been executed, and, further, even assuming that the respondent Judge could still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the
Fiscal's motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought to be
deprived, still [he] persisted in acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all minding that your petitioner, while
maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent Judge, is still entitled to due process of law and to some justice; ...." 4 There was a motion for reconsideration, but
it was fruitless. 5 Hence this petition.

On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on Friday, December
12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ not later than the aforesaid date. The Court further Resolved: (a) to set this case for
hearing on Monday, December 15, 1975 at 10:30 a.m.; and (b) to [grant] the motion of petitioner to litigate as pauper in this case." 6 On the date set for
hearing, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado filed his return, worded as follows: "1. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already been ordered
released by this court per order dated December 11, 1975, in view of the fact that Trial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. has not as of this time filed the amended
information for Homicide after the death of Florante Valenzuela, the offended party in this case, notwithstanding his motion entitled 'Motion to Order the
Warden to hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia dated November 19, 1975, ...; 2. That in view of the release from custody of Manuel de Gracia, the present
petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic. ..." 7 Fiscal of Rizal, did likewise. The return stated: "1. That the Respondent Marciano P. Sta. Ana,
Jr., the Assistant Provincial petitioner is not in his custody or power although, as alleged in the petition, it was upon his motion that the respondent Judge
issued the Order ... ordering the warden to hold the release of the accused (herein petitioner). 2. That the reason for his said motion ... is, as stated therein, that
he was informed of the death of the victim and he was going to file an amended information. 3. That because of the necessity for immediate action so as to
avoid the accused being released so that he could be held to answer for a crime of homicide, and in the honest belief at that time that the proper remedy was
the filing of an amended information for homicide, the undersigned filed the motion on said ground. The information concerning the death of the victim was
given to the undersigned by the victim's father only on November 19, 1975, the last day of confinement of the accused. However, after being able to study the
applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned concluded that the proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had already
been rendered on the first information, but the filing of a new information for homicide upon the authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v.
Manolong, and It is similar cases. 8

As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of the following tenor was adopted by this Court:
"When this case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Salvador N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant Provincial 'Fiscal Marciano P. Sta.
Ana, Jr. and Major o Maristela appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the Court Resolved (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr.
to file a [return] of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the hearing of this case
on the aforesaid date and time. 9 It should be stated likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela assured the Court that petitioner had been release What was
declared orally by him was thereafter set forth in writing in accordance with his return dated December 16, 1975: II That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the
Provincial Warden received a commitment order issued by Judge Reynaldo Honrado, dated 16 September 1975, ...; IV. That by virtue 6f that commitment
order which the petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to Makati Municipal Jail, on Sept.
18, 1975, to service his prison term thereat pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 29 as said prisoner is classified as Municipal prisoner; V That the petitioner
was brought back and confined again to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla, Executive Judge
CFI Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, ...; VI. That on December 12, 1975, the Office of the Provincial Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of First Instance
of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge Reynaldo Honrado, directing him to release Manuel de Gracia, the petitioner in this case; VII. That by virtue of odd order
... and the Order of Release, ... the undersigned respondent released on said date the petitioner as evidenced by certificate of discharge from prison and that is
the reason why he cannot produce the body of said person before this Honorable Court; VIII That he was not able to make the return of the writ immediately
on the ground that he was at that time confined in the hospital, and he was d only on December 13, 1975." 10 There was likewise a return of the writ on such a
date on behalf of respondent Cresencio T. Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was therein declared: "1. That the petitioner was not in his custody
when he received copy of the petition as the petitioner was transferred to 'the Rizal Provincial Jail on December 3, 1975, as he was going to be charged with
the crime of homicide and 'therefore, his confinement has to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of said transfer, respondent Municipal Warden
could not produce the body of the 'petitioner before this- Honorable Court."11

On the morning Deeember 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither
petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru counsel, respectfully manifests that he has
already been released from confinement, for which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic .... 12 It would appear, therefore, that
with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in
judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for
hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. it suffices to call his attention to
such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed for being moot and academic.

24 | P a g e
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO
GAYUTIN, respondents.

Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.

Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital;
Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private
respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without
affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-
Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.

On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-
163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the
petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by
said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).

On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo,
pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said
motion.

On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition,
Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and
to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-
ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise
violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the
implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing
subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).

On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September
1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).

On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22,
1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner
Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo
ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached to Rollowithout paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).

In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:

25 | P a g e
 It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present controversy was
the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually
occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons
acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22,
1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The
authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been
met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials
or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt
(Attached to Rollo without pagination).

The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office
of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993,
pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law."

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the
departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he
cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine, censure, or
prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners
was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
"suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of
terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
[1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public
officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In
turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of
respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges
should be preventively suspended.

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461;
Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the
public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the
procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution.
Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and
objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

26 | P a g e
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for
which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind.
522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).

In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:

Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor
General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.

The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the
chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."

Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."

However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975
(P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and
employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).

The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau"
after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation
by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent
should be placed under preventive suspension.

In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary conference and even after
petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that
assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other departments
and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before
he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension
meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).

There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of
guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No.
2260.

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint.
In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3,
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the
private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the
administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents
submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348). Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw
and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the
Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the
preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact
such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by
said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel
(Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459
[1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice.
Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

27 | P a g e
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of
the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 491-MJ October 30, 1980

PRIMITIVO SANTOS, ET Al., petitioners,

vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE ARTURO E. CRUZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed to the then Secretary of Justice, the complainant, PrimitivoSantos charged Municipal Judge
Arturo E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge for having intervened with and/or prevented the
complainant in filing cases in the Municipal Court of Bulacan. 1

The then Secretary of Justice referred to Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz the complaint of Primitivo Santos for immediate comment. 2

In his comment dated November 22, 1972, the respondent Judge denied the charges. 3

The complaint was referred to the Executive District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at Malolos for investigation, report and recommendation. 4

In her Report dated August 23, 1973, District Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome made the following findings:

The complaint of Primitivo Santos, therefore, was the only one that stood for hearing.

On the first paragraph of the letter-complaint, it was adduced by the testimony of Roberto G. Garcia, a police corporal of Bulacan,
Bulacan, who brought the police blotter subpoenaed for containing the following entry:

June 1, 1972. — Sa ganap na ika-10 ng umaga ay nagsadya sa himpilan si Gng. Leonila Rodriguez-Santos at ipinagsumbong si Teresita
Cruz sa ginawang pagmumura at pagsasara ng daanan sa kusina ng kanilang tindahan. Nagbigay ng kusang loob na pahayag si Leonila
Santos kay. ... Walang saksi naiharap si Gng. Santos kaya pinagpayuhang magbalik at kailangan din ang pahayag ng saksi. (two charges:
slander & closing of the "daan").

that as a standard operating procedure, he gave the statement to his Chief and no other entry shows that the complainant returned to the Police Headquarters.
Judge Cruz is here wrongfully blamed for the failure of its filing, as the portion where a complainant's jurat should be, was not signed by Judge Cruz, but
complainant Primitivo Santos could not state that his wife ever appeared before Judge Cruz to execute the oath nor was any evidence presented that the same
was ever forwarded to Judge Cruz. The latter seems to be blamed for a failure which was not of his own making and no evidence appears that Judge Cruz had
moved heaven and earth to prevent the filing of aforesaid offenses in the Municipal Court of Bulacan.

On the sixth paragraph of the letter-complaint, the only testimony of Primitivo Santos on which his suspicion that Judge Cruz was
interfering with a criminal case filed by Teresita Cruz was he saw Judge Cruz enter the room where an investigation was being conducted
in a case between him and Teresita Cruz and the latter was saying: "Hindi totoo 'yan, nandyan sa labas si Judge Cruz," and when he
looked, Judge Cruz was there. Yet, the case was admittedly dismissed upon the complainant's instance. Primitivo Santos believed that the
case being investigated by the Fiscal's Office would also fall within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Bulacan where Judge Cruz
presides and so he mistakenly believed that Judge Cruz's presence amounted to following up the case.

The last paragraph containing the last ground for the complaint is trivial and does not need further comment. The testimony of Primitivo
Santos has failed to confirm that Judge Cruz ever said the words complained of : "Bakit, UTUSAN MO BA KAMI RITO SA JUZGADO!" but
admitted that he signed the pleading to undertake service on his lawyer.

The letter-complaint asks that Judge Cruz voluntarily inhibit himself from trying Civil Case No. 250 and allow another judge to hear it,
and Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings. 5

A careful review of the records of this case shows that the investigating Judge correctly found that the complainant was not able to prove the charges of
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.

However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the formal investigation conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent judge, while
cross-examining the witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you want to go Mr. Cano". This language of
the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge and deserves administrative penalty.

WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the charge of partiality but is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge by uttering
intemperate language during the trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary and warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

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SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano
Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in
the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who
was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and
Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary
for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a
bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself
with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded
and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with
Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.

Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily
mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real
motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives
for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant
acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict
it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody
saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What
the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he
stabbed himself.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with
which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

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 EN BANC

A.C. No. 288-J June 19, 1974

GAUDENCIO S. URBINA and VEDASTO B. GESMUNDO complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

After the Court's resolution of February 6, 1974 dismissing the complaint "for failure to make out a prima facie case without prejudice to respondent's filing a
separate administrative complaint for unwarranted harassment against complainant Atty. Vedasto B. Gesmundo as sought in respondent's comment," there
were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the verified Joint motion for suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of
court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December 27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial
Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent * and (b) the 1st Indorsement dated
December 5, 1973 and received on January 9, 1974 of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President referring for comment
complainant Gesmundo's letter of October 31, 1973 submitting his "objection to re-appointment" of respondent judge, both of which were referred to
respondent for comment as per the Court's resolution of February 19, 1974.

In respondent's comment of March 8, 1974, he submitted the ten-page dismissal dated March 5, 1974 by the acting provincial fiscal of Laguna of complainant
Urbina's criminal complaint against respondent for "Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment" wherein the fiscal correctly ruled that "(The decision of the
respondent that is claimed to be unjust is now pending appeal. The question therefore of whether or not it is unjust is sub-judice. It would not be proper for
this Office at this time to determine whether or not the said decision is unjust," and that assuming that he as a mere fiscal and a non-judicial officer could pass
in judgment upon the justness or unjustness of respondent's decision complained of as unjust by the losing party (who has appealed the same to a higher
court), there was no basis for concluding that the respondent judge knew that his judgment was unjust. Not only does he believe that his judgment is just and
correct; his view that a probate court cannot decide questions involving title or ownership of real properties is well supported by the long line of decisions of
the Supreme Court cited in his comment." (at pages 9-10)

Respondent convincingly denies as pointless the alleged threat thru Atty. Esguerra against complainant Urbina's life to compel him to withdraw his charges in
this administrative complaint since there would remain another complainant in the person of Atty. Gesmundo.

Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former client (Urbina) who
alone filed the criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent bears no ill will against him and if he feels
aggrieved by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary appeal to the higher courts as he has already done." Respondent categorically denied having
made any threats whatsoever against Urbina, directly or through another, confident as he was (although harassed) that the criminal complaint would
ultimately be, as in fact it was, dismissed by the fiscal for being without basis in law and in fact.

Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of Atty. Esguerra, stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest that the pending appeal
rather than the criminal complaint for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was his proper recourse against respondent's adverse decision, and
unqualifiedly stating that he never made any threats nor went to Urbina's house and that "The statements I allegedly made as stated in the affidavit of
Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips."

While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part of complainant and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the factual background of the
administrative complaint which it has already dismissed previously for not making out a prima facie case and from the baselessness of the criminal complaint
for allegedly "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has also been correctly dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of threats cannot
be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on complainant's bare assertion as against the respondent's categorical denial supported by Atty. Esguerra's affidavit.
In the light of ordinary human conduct and experience, it is difficult to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have been extremely foolhardy
and pointless for respondent to have asked Atty. Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The Court finds respondent's comment to be
satisfactory and will not subject respondent to further needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due course to the complaint-motion, as insisted
by complainant in his reply to comment.

It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative complaints against judges of inferior courts that they should do so
after proper circumspection and without the use of disrespectful language and offensive personalities, so as not to unduly burden the Court in the discharge of
its function of administrative supervision over inferior court judges and court personnel. The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures
against erring judges, including dismissal and suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers
should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled litigants of unfounded or
frivolous charges against inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a means of harassing judges whose decisions have not
been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate disciplinary action as officers of the Court.

The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing
of malice or gross ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict complained of (and now pending review
on appeal) is far from erroneous.

ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.

The clerk of court is directed to furnish Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President with a copy of this resolution as well as
of the previous resolution of February 6, 1974, by way of reply to his 1st indorsement dated December 5, 1973.

SO ORDERED.

30 | P a g e
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.

Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover
certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums
of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August
25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and
lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ
of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and
Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the
replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and
sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and
from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded.
On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled
the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the
Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time,
lifted the restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was
denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-
27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-
G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the
properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No.
Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.

1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter
lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in
part, the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal
properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal
properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of
the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-
interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband.
The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the
relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a
writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance
31 | P a g e
of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for,
here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ
of possession was issued, and even up to the present.

4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question
that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the
levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the
auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was
only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot
be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to
raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago.
This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title
when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does
not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.4

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would
prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity
does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties
during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison,
have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The
respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and
from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what
we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of
his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.
A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the
disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil
case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;

(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new
parties-defendants;

(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional
new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);

(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and

(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied
was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have
already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which
was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.

32 | P a g e
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of
action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the
Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there
was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties
for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser
is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec.
23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agoo.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As
the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily
fail.

The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the
services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the
properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20%
annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale;
that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties
in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who
acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo
(40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the
validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression
upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if
the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be
levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original
complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago
and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in
the custody of the Clerk of Court.

33 | P a g e
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg for petitioner.

Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul or set aside the order of respondent Judge Antonio Masaquel, dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No.
13258 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner Domingo V. Austria guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine of
P50.00.

The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not disputed. Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against
Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land — one parcel being located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in the province of Pangasinan.
On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land in question and ordering the
defendant to vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the
immediate execution of the judgment — which motion was granted by respondent Judge on May 31, 1963 — and, upon the plaintiffs' having posted a surety
bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.

On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in the practice of law before his
appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, the
defendant, through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963 respondent Judge granted the stay of
execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant. The petitioner likewise
had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8, 1963; but
upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963, pending the
approval of the defendant's amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment and, over the vigorous objection of
plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion on November 7, 1963. The hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964.

Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw
respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case
upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request
because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of
Court. Thereafter, when the case was called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said hearing:2

APPEARANCE:

ATTY. DANIEL C. MACARAEG:

appeared in behalf of plaintiffs. (After the case was called)

COURT:

Your client is here?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is he?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

He is here, Your Honor.

COURT:

What is your name?

PLAINTIFF:

Domingo Austria, sir.

COURT:

You are one of the plaintiffs in this case?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

34 | P a g e
Yes, sir.

COURT:

Atty. Macaraeg approached me in chambers requesting me to disqualify myself in hearing this case. Did you authorize Atty. Macaraeg to approach
me verbally to disqualify myself from hearing this case because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

Is that your reason why you requested Atty. Macaraeg to approach me, requesting me to disqualify myself simply because the lawyer of the other
party was my assistant?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

All right. Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my
former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the question?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

The Court hereby finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are hereby ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

With due indulgence of this Honorable Court — I have learned, after I have conferred with you in chambers, another ground of the plaintiffs for
their requesting me to ask for the disqualification of Your Honor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant rumor coming from the
defendant Pedro Bravo himself that he is boasting in San Carlos that because he has a new lawyer, that surely he is going to win this case.

COURT:

Why did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if that is true or not?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

And maybe, that is why the plaintiffs requested me to approach Your Honor because of that rampant rumor that Pedro Bravo is spreading.

COURT:

You mean to say because of that rumor, you are going to doubt my integrity?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

As for me, I entertain no doubt, Your Honor.

COURT:

Your client expressed openly in Court his doubts on the integrity of the Court simply based on rumors and that is a ground for contempt of court, if
only to maintain the faith of the people in the courts.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Taking into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we cannot expect from them the thinking of a lawyer, I am most respectfully praying
that the Order of this Court be reconsidered.

COURT:

Denied. Your client should pay a fine of P50.00. We will hear this case this afternoon.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Yes, Your Honor.

35 | P a g e
The respondent Judge forthwith dictated the following order:3

Before this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, counsel for the plaintiffs, approached the presiding Judge of this Court
in his chambers and manifested the desire of his clients for the Judge to disqualify himself from trying the above-entitled case for the reason that
counsel for the defendant, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the Judge of this Court while he was still engaged in the practice of
law. To this manifestation of Atty. Macaraeg, the Presiding Judge informed the latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute a legal ground
to disqualify the Presiding Judge of this Court, from trying this case.

When the above-entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding Judge called on one of the plaintiffs who was present, namely, Domingo Austria,
and inquired from the latter if it was true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify
himself from trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said Judge. To this query Domingo Austria
answered in the affirmative. When he was also asked as to whether the said Domingo Austria has lost faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the
Presiding Judge of this Court simply because of his former association with the defendant's lawyer, said Domingo Austria likewise answered in the
affirmative.

The Court considers the actuation of the plaintiff Domingo Austria, in the premises, as offensive, insulting and a reflection on the integrity and
honesty of the Presiding Judge of this Court and shows his lack of respect to the Court. The said Domingo Austria is not justified and has no reason
to entertain doubts in the fairness and integrity of the Presiding Judge of this Court, simply because of the latter's former association with
defendant's counsel. For this reason and in order to maintain the people's faith and respect in their courts — the last bulwark in our democratic
institutions — the Presiding Judge declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.

The Court found from the manifestation of plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Macaraeg that the basis of the statement, of Domingo Austria that he has lost his
faith in the Presiding Judge of this Court is the rumors being circulated by the defendant Pedro Bravo that he will surely win in the present case
because of his new lawyer, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat. The Court believes that rumors of the sort do not serve as a sufficient basis or justification for the
plaintiff Domingo Austria to insinuate bias and partiality, on the part of the Court and to express openly his loss of faith and confidence in the
integrity, fairness and capability of the Presiding Judge of this Court to perform his sworn duty of upholding and administering justice, without fear
or favor, and by reason of which this Court denied the verbal motion to reconsider filed by counsel for the plaintiff Domingo Austria, finding him
guilty of contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open Court this 10th day of February, 1964, at Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under protest. Having been punished summarily for direct contempt of court, and the remedy
of appeal not being available to him, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Court.

It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and circumstances attendant to the hearing of the Civil Case No. 13250 on February 10, 1063, he had not
committed an act of contempt against the court and the respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion when he
declared petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine of P50.00 as a penalty.

After a careful study of the record, We find merit in this petition.

The respondent Judge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of court. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether or not the petitioner was guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, or had committed an act of disrespect
toward the court or judge.4

The respondent Judge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, as offensive, insulting, and a reflection on his integrity and honesty and a
showing of lack of respect to the court. The respondent Judge considered that the petitioner was not justified and had no reason to entertain doubts in his
fairness and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel was his former associate.1äwphï1.ñët

We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It is our considered view that when the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further
trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner did so because he was
impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and that
the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself
from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the
fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule
137.5

The apprehension of petitioner regarding the probable bias of respondent Judge does not appear to be groundless or entirely devoid of reason. The
respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond they were already
placed in possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the latter was given back the
properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge over the opposition of
petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by respondent Judge in spite of the
vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his adversary, the defendant Pedro
Bravo, had been boasting in San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.

We believe that the petitioner — the layman that he is — did not take a belligerent or arrogant attitude toward respondent Judge. What he did was to request
his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, to approach respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case on the new trial, precisely in
order that respondent Judge might not be embarrassed or exposed to public odium. There is nothing in the record which shows that when respondent Judge
refused to disqualify himself, the petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If the request of petitioner for respondent Judge to disqualify himself
came to the knowledge of the public it was because respondent Judge himself brought up the matter in open court.

While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the case pending in the court of
said judge, in the case now before Us We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his
chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance
with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the
circumstances that led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of petitioner to
36 | P a g e
disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for any
one to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party litigant desires or suggests the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is
understood, without saying it in so many words, that said litigant — having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or
counsel — feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his former connection and he may unwittingly
render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while it may be conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or
counsel there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request can not constitute contempt of court if done honestly and in a
respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request to
respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.

The following observation of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dizon, is relevant to the question before Us:

Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of respondent judge does not fall under any one
of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied
upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot
disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an
impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover,
second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the
integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside in a case
in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. supra) . . . . 6 (Emphasis supplied).

It is in line with the above-quoted observation that this Court, in amending the Rules of Court, added the second paragraph under Section 1 of Rule 137, which
provides that a judge in the exercise of his sound discretion may disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid grounds other than those specifically
mentioned in the first paragraph of said section. 7 "The courts should administer justice free from suspicion or bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties litigants
might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum." 8

Respondent Judge declared petitioner in contempt of court after the latter answered "Yes, sir" to this question of the judge: "Do you doubt the integrity of the
presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the
question?" We believe that petitioner had not committed an act amounting to contempt of court when he made that answer. The petitioner had not
misbehaved in court, or in the presence of respondent Judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. Neither did the petitioner act in a manner that was
disrespectful to respondent Judge. When petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question asked by respondent Judge, petitioner simply expressed his sincere
feeling under the circumstances. In order that a person may be summarily punished for direct contempt of court, it must appear that his behavior or his
utterance tends to obstruct the proceedings in court, or constitutes an affront to the dignity of the court. As stated by this Court, "Contempt of court
presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court . . . ."9

We commend the zeal shown by respondent Judge in his effort to protect his own integrity and the dignity of the court. We are constrained to say, however,
that he had gone a little farther than what was necessary under the circumstances. We are inclined to believe that respondent Judge felt offended when
petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question adverted to in the preceding paragraph. But the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the court when he
gave that answer. It would have been unfair to respondent Judge had petitioner answered "No, sir," because then he would not be sincere with the court, and
he would be inconsistent with the request that he made through his counsel for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing the case. When
respondent Judge asked that question, he necessarily expected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner gave him the truthful answer. We are
not persuaded that in so answering petitioner meant to be disrespectful, offensive or insulting to respondent Judge. Nor do We consider that in so answering
petitioner meant to cast reflection on the integrity and honesty of respondent Judge. We believe that in so answering the petitioner was simply manifesting
the misgiving of an ordinary layman about the outcome of his case that is going to be tried by a judge who has been closely associated with the counsel for his
adversary. The petitioner would never have expressed that misgiving of his had respondent Judge not asked him in open court a question that evoked that
answer. A judge can not prevent any person — even a litigant or counsel in a case before him — to entertain in his mind an opinion about him as a judge.
Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would be different if a person would
deliberately and maliciously express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to malign and discredit the judge. In the case now before Us
We believe that petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that petitioner was simply moved by a
desire to protect his interests in the case pending before the court, presided by respondent Judge. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts
of justice are presided by judges who are free from bias and prejudice — and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so expresses himself
truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an
honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the
dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties. And a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that
are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from
trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if the grounds upon which they based
their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn
insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court. 11 And this
liberal attitude of the courts is in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail." 12 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. 13

Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in
direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under
protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so ordered.

37 | P a g e
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970

EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO, ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ, EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL., respondents.

Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.

Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS), Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V.
Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March
18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court
whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to try the case against the petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that
earlier, on March 23, a complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula (who claimed to have been wounded in
the incident) against some of the herein petitioners. The proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be decided. On June 23, 1969 this
Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court.1

The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial, but no sooner had the proceedings resumed than another
hitch developed. This came about as the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn came to this Court, seeking relief against certain
orders of the general court-martial.

It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following
the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.

Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col.
Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col. Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the petitioners' position that for each specification each
accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly
tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and that with respect to the specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is
entitled to one peremptory challenge." They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the other hand the court-
martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.

The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory
and for cause. They allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an issue against
the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they
contend that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each specification.

On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the
meantime, restrained them from proceeding with the case.

In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's
president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court. As a preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the
ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial, "except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction
of the person and subject matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced," and that at any rate
the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them within the military justice system.

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their
proceedings are not open to consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give
rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.3 This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely,
whether in overruling the petitioners' challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the exercise of the corrective
powers of this Court. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to this Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. Nor
will the fact that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review considering that the questions raised are questions of law.4

And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. As already
stated, the petitioner Martelino challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of what had come to be referred to as the
"Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their case. The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of
the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to
Senator Aquino "massacre victims were given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone to Corregidor and
"found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the
training operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily
loaded against the administration." The petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and that, in overruling their
challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial committed a grave abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard v. Maxwell.8

38 | P a g e
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme
Court found that shortly after the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police
officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and
pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." In reversing his conviction, the Court said:

Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total of
the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With
such an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his
deliberations. The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the
processes of the average man. ... Where one's life is at stake — and accounting for the frailties of human nature — we can only say that in
the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet the constitutional standard. 9

Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial publicity. 10 In the earlier case of Shepherd v.
Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity, the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection of the jury, although
to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of
the court charged with defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and
uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury. 12

In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of
them, was similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The
"interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank
robbery, kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly
moved for a change of venue but their motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had requested that jurors be
excused for cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory challenges, but these challenges for cause had been denied by the trial judge. In reversing his
conviction, the Court said:

[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had
been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to
be charged. For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of
people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial — at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court
proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 13

In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of due process.

The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without injustice to the person immediately concerned," basing its
position on the fact that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this must be shown in order to invalidate a conviction
in these circumstances. The State paints too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found instances in which a showing of
actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State
involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently lacking in due process. 14

In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court observed a "carnival
atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the
trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused
defense counsel's other requests that the jury be asked whether they had read or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances,
we assume that some of this material reached members of the jury." The Court held:

From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due
process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent
evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should
continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition sequestration of the
jury was something the judge should have sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a
new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as
to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of
disciplinary measure. 15

In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what
was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here
is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either
by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have
subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative
decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.

At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been
unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished
the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has
since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

II

Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for
cause." The general court-martial originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was entitled to only one peremptory challenge.
Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that the defense was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to
exercise their right to challenge on the ground that this Court had earlier restrained further proceedings in the court-martial.

39 | P a g e
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven
charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand, argue that "for each specification jointly tried, all
of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and that with respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with
two other specifications, "since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general court-
martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.

We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.

We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true meaning, intent and scope of Article of War 18. As will
hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory challenge. The number of specifications and/or charges,
and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a common trial, are of no moment.

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense
Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine
Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically
inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of
War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory
challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December 17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific
on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was
amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged
except for cause."

By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be used before, during, or
after challenges for cause, or against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or against a new member if not previously utilized in
the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith excused from duty with the court-martial.

The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. 18

As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitae,
allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all,
which is called a peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are
justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons: 1) As every one must be sensible, what sudden impression and unaccountable prejudices
we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend his life)
should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice even without
being able to assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set
aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from
which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19

The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court is obtained, the
constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. ... 20

As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 21 irrespective
of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. Three overriding reasons compel us to this
conclusion.

First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged
by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively the members of the court
may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because
the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it
follows necessarily that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge.

Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges
a determinant. Reference is made by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their argument that for each specification jointly tried all of the
accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and with respect to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory
challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S. military law, and it is unmistakable from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or
common trial, unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22

Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the
defense, should be construed to mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate to Prosecute; Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21
(Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action), 29 (Closed Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities — Effect of), unequivocally
speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is denied.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. .

40 | P a g e
 FIRST DIVISION

JOHN SIY LIM, A.C. No. 5653

Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

ATTY. CARMELITO A. Promulgated:

MONTANO,
Respondent. February 27, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas
See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.[1]

It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.[2] The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A.
del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant
herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the
plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable
mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.

The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate
court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision
of the trial court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-
appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161
from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for attorneys fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear showing that the action taken by
plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith. There should be no penalty on the right to litigate. [3]

The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the
ruling of the CA and denied the petition.[4] Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.[5]

On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance[6] as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
131 in Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,[7] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
the decision on the present case had already become final and executory.

2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment
as stated in the decision sought to be enforced.

3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per
decision and the same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said obligation.

4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[8]

On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint[9] for nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance,
maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).

Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126[10] issued an Order[11] in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for
Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision
without Writ filed by respondent counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit[12] dated March 20, 2002,
complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves the same parties, the same causes
of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542. Thus, the complainant prayed that the respondent be disbarred and/or suspended from the
practice of law for his gross misconduct, on the following allegation:

6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil
Case No. C-19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his
lawyers oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey
the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory
decision of our court.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff
therein, he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and
relief, and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or
reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on his professional appreciation that his client had
a good case.

In his Reply,[15] the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the
old complaint; and the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam did not merit
consideration.

On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[16]

41 | P a g e
 On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea. Only the counsel for the respondent
appeared at the mandatory conference held onSeptember 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the
mandatory conference and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.

The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the
respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months suspension from the practice of law.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since
(a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision
had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and
Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree that respondent is administratively liable.

In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final
and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he was not the original counsel of his clients and that when he filed the
subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title, deserves scant consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and
executory decision on his clients rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.[17] Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.[18] Thus, the following requisites should concur:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x x[19]

The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial
identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the
first case, is sufficient.[20] Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.[21] This was what respondent resorted to in
order to give some semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that

the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[22] effectively determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of
sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. [23] The filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished
as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with
all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. [24]

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By
his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule 12.04[26] of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice. [27]

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede
or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this
practice clogs the court dockets.[28]
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution,
to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. [29]

WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This
Decision is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

42 | P a g e
 [A.C. No. 5474. August 28, 2003]

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to
the standards of a lawyers conduct set in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case
virtually abandoned his clients cause.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case,
for the latters failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case.

The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged
the services of the respondent to represent him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and
80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the repair of the house of the defendants in the case. [1] The case went its course,
but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of exhibits. [2] Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the
trial court issued an Order the full text of which reads as follows:

When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr.,
counsel for the plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the Court.

Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary
exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days within which to comment and/or oppose
the admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.

On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer
of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10) days within which to
formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the
defendant.

Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of documentary exhibits for the
plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence
submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon
further motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further prosecute this case.

Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant
on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.[3]

The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file a verified Affidavit-Complaint[4] dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the
respondent with this Court, wherein he also alleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated the
services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals of the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent
finally handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the complainants wife.

In a Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed
to file his comment despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the respondents comment and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [6]

Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.[7] Hence, the averments made, as well as the
evidence submitted by the complainant, are undisputed.

Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for negligence and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely. The salient portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the Investigating Commissioner are as follows:

Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiffs Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26
February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10 of complainants Affidavit) reads:

....

It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondents client, herein complainant.Respondent Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the
Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation
to complainant as the latters counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, and respondents dereliction of this
duty has prejudiced the interests of respondents client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondents obligation to take all measures to protect the
interests of his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility but it was respondents negligence or omission which
has caused damage to such interests.[8]

In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondents disregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He
exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence
and lack of respect for the authority of this Court.

The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial
court several extensions of time: first, an extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10)
days from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must

43 | P a g e
also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven
(27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3) months and nine
(9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits. [9] The respondent did not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his inaction.

Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

....

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

....

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

....

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his
utmost learning and ability and to give entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But
he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the
respondents mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest, adversely affected the confidence of the community in
the legal profession and eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity
to the courts and his clients.[10] This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in
representation of their causes.

We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[11] to wit:

Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:

"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[12]

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation
of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. [13] Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. [14] Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.

The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the recommended penalty
commensurate with the offense committed.

In Aromin v. Boncavil,[15] this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive.

The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v.
Saquilabon[16] constitutes inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilaboncase, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the respondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones,[17]Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,[18] Spouses
Rabanal v. Rabanal[19] for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality
hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34369 September 30, 1974

44 | P a g e
ANTONIO VILLASIS, MATERNIDAD V. VILLASIS and SANTIAGO ORENDAIN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEUTERIO VILLASIS and LAURA S. VILLASIS, respondents.

Augusto A. Kimpo for petitioners.

Silvestre Untaran, Jr. for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

The Court in dismissing the petition and affirming the appellate court's dismissal of petitioners-appellants' appeal for failure to file appellants' brief finds that
petitioners have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their counsel's
utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same.

The case originated in the Antique court of first instance where after due trial judgment was rendered in favor of respondents-plaintiffs upholding their action
for quieting of title with recovery of possession and damages.

Petitioners-defendants appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of Appeals. On June 25, 1970, petitioners as appellants received notice through their
counsel Benjamin M. Valente to submit the appellants' brief within the reglementary forty-five day period to expire on August 9, 1970.

On August 10, 1970 (the last day of the reglementary period, August 9 being a Sunday), petitioners' counsel, Atty. Valente, filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel due to his having been employed as technical assistant in the Supreme Court, with a prayer that appellants' newly engaged counsel be given sufficient
time to file their brief. Said new counsel, Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, filed on August 18, 1970 his appearance with the appellate court.

On August 27, 1970, the appellate court received respondents-appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal dated August 5, 1970 for appellants' failure to file their
brief within the reglementary period.

On September 12, 1970, the appellate court required both counsels of appellants, Atty. Valente (whose withdrawal it held in abeyance until he filed a proper
motion in verified form with the signed conformity of the clients as per its resolution of August 18, 1970) and Atty. Tayco to comment on the dismissal motion.

Withdrawing counsel Valente filed his manifestation dated September 28, 1970 alleging inter alia that he had not received a copy of the dismissal motion and
could not therefore comment thereon and submitting therewith the signed conformity of his clients to his withdrawal and reiterating his prayer for the court
to grant his withdrawal and to grant appellants sufficient time to file their brief. New counsel Tayco filed no comment whatsoever.

The appellate court granted withdrawing counsel's motion to withdraw per its resolution of October 9, 1970 but meanwhile issued no resolution on the
appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal.

On June 25, 1971 or after the lapse of more than eleven (11 months or to be more exact, 319 days) without appellants having filed their brief at all, the
appellate court's special sixth division1 issued its resolution granting the dismissal motion and dismissing the appeal on the ground stated by appellees in
their motion that appellants had failed to file their brief within the reglementary 45-day period.

It was only then that new counsel Tayco apparently stirred from almost a year of inaction and filed a motion dated July 13, 1971 for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the appeal on the ground that he as new counsel had not received the notice to file brief. The appellate court per its resolution of August 17, 1971
denied the motion for reconsideration, pointing out that "Attorney Tayco's appearance was entered [on August 18, 1970] after the period for filing brief had
already expired [on August 10, 1970]."2

New counsel Tayco filed a second motion for reconsideration on September 10, 1971 still without having filed appellants, brief, which the appellate
court3 denied per its resolution of October 6, 1971.

Hence, the present appeal by certiorari wherein petitioners are represented by their third counsel, Atty. Augusto A. Kimpo vice Atty. Tayco.

The appeal is patently without merit.

New counsel Tayco's claim in his motion for reconsideration that he had not received the notice to file brief borders on the frivolous. Such notice to file brief
had been received by his predecessor-counsel Atty. Valente and is binding on him as the successor. A new counsel who accepts a case in midstream is
presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in the record prior to his takeover. It is
noteworthy that Atty. Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to file brief had been duly served on Atty. Valente and that the period would
expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty. Valente had asked in his two withdrawal motions that he (Tayco) as new counsel be granted "sufficient time" to file
the brief.

Here the notice to file the brief had been received on June 25, 1970 to expire on August 10, 1970. The appellate court did not dismiss the appeal at appellees'
instance for failure of appellants to file brief until one year later as per its resolution of June 25, 1971 or until almost eleven months after the expiration of the
reglementary period on August 10, 1970.

The appellate court gave appellants all the time and opportunity to duly prosecute their appeal by filing their brief in the interval to no avail. It asked both
counsels per its resolution of September 12, 1970 (which in effect granted appellants the sufficient time asked by Atty. Valente in his withdrawal motion to file
their brief) to comment on the dismissal motion but withdrawing counsel Valente claimed he could not file any comment as he had not received the motion
while new counsel Tayco ignored the court's resolution and filed no comment and filed no brief!

Even going by new counsel Tayco's mistaken notion that he was entitled to a new notice to file brief, the appellate court's resolution of September 12, 1970
requiring his comment on the motion to dismiss appeal for failure to file appellant's brief was tantamount to such notice and he should then have prepared and
filed the brief within forty-five days thereafter. But as already pointed out, he never filed the appellants' brief during the interval of almost 11 months that the
appellate court took before it finally dismissed the appeal per its resolution of June 25, 1971. During all this period and even during the three months that
followed when he filed two motions for reconsideration, he presented no earnest of prosecuting the appeal by at least filing the brief even at that late date but
contented himself with a perfunctory prayer in his motion that "appellants be allowed to file their brief."!

45 | P a g e
The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their
inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect in not having filed
their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even claim ignorance of the appellate court's notice to file brief since it had
required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly they must have ascertained
from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal — which accounts for Atty. Valente's repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the
granting of sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to their appeal
and did file the brief.

The case of Alonso vs. Rosario4 cited by petitioners is clearly inapplicable. There, appellants had filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss their appeal (filed
by appellee just five days after the notice to file brief was served) asking that they be allowed to file the brief after notice of denial of the motion, and when the
appellate court denied both the dismissal and the extension, they moved for reconsideration and for at least 15 days to file their brief, but the court therein
both denied reconsideration and dismissed the appeal as well for failure to file brief within the reglementary period. Within five (5) days of such dismissal,
appellants nevertheless filed their brief. This Court in reinstating the appeal held that "the period consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss
should be excluded from the period given to petitioners to submit their brief, and if this is done, the brief submitted by them on April 17, 1957 may be deemed
presented in due time."

It is manifest that there are two basic differences in this case: here, the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed precisely on the ground of failure to file the brief
after the expiration of the 45-day reglementary period and no question of suspension of the period arises, whereas there, the appellee questioned appellants'
right to appeal when only 5 days of their 45-day period had elapsed such that the rule5 that a motion to dismiss "interrupts the time to plea" was applied by
this Court by analogy; and here, petitioners-appellants never filed their brief while there appellants immediately filed their brief within 5 days of notice of
dismissal of their appeal.

It may parenthetically be noted that aside from petitioners' bare assertion of merit in their appeal, the Court has not been shown that to reinstate the appeal
would serve any purpose and not just be a futile waste of time, since petitioners have never submitted their brief nor their proposed assignment of errors
against the trial court's verdict. To cap it all, petitioners in praying for a reversal of the appellate court's dismissal of their appeal, pray that they be given an
extension of fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision within which to file the appellants' brief (at last!). Such laches and lassitude on their part serve but to
confirm the correctness of the appellate court's dismissal of their appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is dismissed with costs against petitioners.

FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES MANUEL A. AGUILAR G.R. No. 157911

and YOLANDA C. AGUILAR,
Petitioners, Present:

46 | P a g e
 PANGANIBAN, CJ.,
Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 19, 2006

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The sad and lamentable spectacle that this case presents, that is, the execution of a final and executory decision forestalled by perpetual dilatory
tactics employed by a litigant, makes a blatant mockery of justice. The Court cannot countenance, and in fact, condemns, the outrageous abuse of the judicial
process by Spouses Manuel A. Aguilar and Yolanda C. Aguilar (petitioners) and their counsel.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] dated October 29,
2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849 which dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari, and the CA Resolution[2] dated April 29, 2003
which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The procedural antecedents and factual background of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1979, petitioners obtained a P600,000.00 loan from the Manila Banking Corporation (respondent), secured by a real estate mortgage
over their 419-square meter property located at No. 8 Pia St., Valle Verde, Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 11082. When petitioners
failed to pay their obligation, the mortgaged property was extra-judicially foreclosed. Respondent was the winning bidder at public auction sale on May 20,
1982. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on June 23, 1982.

Subsequently, on May 30, 1983, instead of redeeming the property, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure sale of the property
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City (RTC Branch 165), docketed as Civil Case No. 49793. While the case was pending, the parties entered
into a compromise agreement.[3]

Under the Compromise Agreement dated January 23, 1987, the petitioners admitted the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure and agreed to
purchase the property from respondent for P2,548,000.00. Parties agreed that the amount of P100,000.00 shall be payable upon execution of the agreement
and the balance of P2,448,000.00, which shall earn twenty-six per cent (26%) interest per annum, shall be payable in eighteen installments from February 23,
1987 to July 27, 1988. They further agreed that in case of default: (a) all outstanding installments and/or interest thereon shall be immediately due; (b)
petitioners shall immediately vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to respondent; (c) respondent shall be entitled to register all documents needed
to transfer title over the property in their favor; and, (d) respondent shall be entitled to ask for the execution of the judgment or an ancillary remedy necessary
to place it in possession of the property. On January 30, 1987, RTC Branch 165 adopted and approved the Compromise Agreement. [4]

Petitioners failed to pay the balance of P2,448,000.00 within the eighteen-installment period from February 23, 1987 to July 27, 1988. A year and
three months later, or on October 20, 1989, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987.[5]

On November 28, 1989, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the motion and issuing a writ of execution: (a) directing petitioners to immediately
vacate the property and surrender possession to the respondent; (b) directing the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II to register any and all documents
needed to transfer title over the property to respondent and to issue a new certificate of title respondents favor free from any liens, adverse claims and/or
encumbrances; (c) issuing a writ of possession in respondents favor to place it in possession of the property. [6]

However, on January 22, 1990, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for deferment of the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31, 1990
because petitioners have a pending proposal for the settlement of their judgment debt.[7] The manifestation was with the conformity of respondents. [8] On
January 24, 1990, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the motion and holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31,
1990.[9] However, no settlement was reached by the parties during the period.

One year and four months later, petitioners still failed to settle their judgment debt. Consequently, respondent filed on December 2, 1991 a
Manifestation reiterating its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. [10] On December 5, 1991, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the manifestation
and directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987. [11]

To evade the implementation of the writ, petitioners filed on December 20, 1991 an Ex-Parte Motion to Recall the Courts Order dated December 5,
1991 claiming that their obligation was novated by the Letter dated June 7, 1991 from respondents Statutory Receiver.[12] In said letter, respondents Statutory
Receiver approved the purchase of the property on installment basis over a three-year period at an interest rate of twelve per cent (12%) with P481,265.00 due
on September 30, 1991, P481,265.00 due on September 30, 1992, and P724,064.79 due on September 30, 1993.[13]

On December 2, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution manifesting that the Letter dated June 7,
1991 did not novate the Decision dated January 30, 1987 but was a mere accommodation of the petitioners request for a liberal mode of payment of their
account and petitioners still failed to comply with such approved mode of payment. [14]

On December 14, 1992, petitioners filed their Comment and Manifestation praying for a humanitarian and liberal judicial dispensation since that they
have been paying their obligations to respondent despite delay due to financial restraints for family subsistence and their childrens educational expenses.[15]

On February 1, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation praying for resolution of the pending incidents. [16] On March 3, 2000,
petitioners filed their Opposition claiming that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bars execution, by mere motions, of judgment which is more than five
years old. On March 14, 2000, respondent filed its Reply stating that the peculiar circumstances of the case warrant its exclusion from the scope of said Rule.

On March 20, 2000, RTC Branch 165 issued its Order which resolved the pending motions with the Court. With respect to petitioners ex-parte motion
to recall, the Court said that for failure to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and considering the nature of petitioners
motion, it treated petitioners motion as a mere scrap of paper. [17] As to respondents motion for issuance of a writ of execution, it granted the same, holding that
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not apply since the delay in the execution of the judgment was due to petitioners who made several alternative
payment proposals, requested several extensions of time to pay their account, filed dilatory motions and pleadings and it would be a blatant injustice to allow
them to profit from the delays they deliberately caused to escape completely and absolutely the satisfaction of their admitted and confessed obligation by sheer
literal adherence to technicality.[18]

47 | P a g e
 On March 30, 2000, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration[19] but RTC Branch 165 denied it in its Order dated May 30, 2000.[20]

On June 20, 2000, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal[21] but RTC Branch 165 denied it in its Order dated August 21, 2000 on the ground that an order
of execution is not appealable.[22]

Thereafter, petitioners filed a six-page Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144719, reiterating that the Decision
dated January 30, 1987 can no longer be executed on mere motion since it is more than five years old. [23]

In a Resolution dated October 11, 2000, the First Division of this Court denied the petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and failure
to show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule. [24] Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality in its Resolution dated December 11, 2000. [25]

Since the Resolution in G.R. No. 144719 became final and executory on January 16, 2001, RTC Branch 165 issued a writ of execution on February 19,
2001 to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987.[26] On February 23, 2001, the Sheriff issued a Notice for Compliance of the said writ. [27]

Undaunted by their previous setbacks, petitioners filed on March 6, 2001 in RTC Branch 165 an Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Execution
insisting anew on their novation and prescription theories. [28] They also moved for consignation of the amount of their obligation under the Letter dated June 7,
1991 of respondents Statutory Receiver.

On March 14, 2001, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Order to Divest Plaintiffs Title and to Direct the Register of Deeds to Transfer Title to
Defendant[29] based on Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 19, 2001, respondent filed its Opposition (to petitioners Omnibus
Motion) and Motion to Cite Plaintiffs in Contempt claiming that the Omnibus Motion is nothing but petitioners desperate attempt to thwart or delay the payment
of their obligations and they should be declared guilty of indirect contempt for their improper conduct calculated to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice.[30]

On May 2, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition.[31] While RTC Branch 165 Presiding Judge Marietta A. Legaspi denied the motion
for inhibition in her Order dated June 5, 2001, she voluntarily inhibited herself from further participating in the case to show that she has no interest
therein.[32] Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[33] to no avail.[34] The case was re-raffled and was assigned to
Branch 268 presided by Judge Amelia C. Manalastas.

On September 17, 2001 and January 4, 2002, respondent filed two Motions to Resolve Pending Incidents.[35] Despite the fact that Judge Manalastas
has not actively participated in the case since she has not acted on the pending incidents, petitioners filed on February 5, 2002 a Motion for Inhibition. [36] A day
later, on February 6, 2002, Judge Manalastas granted the motion for inhibition.[37] Thus, the case was again re-raffled and was assigned to Branch 167 presided
by Judge Jesus G. Bersamira. On February 13, 2002, respondent filed again a Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents. [38]

On March 22 and 26, 2002, both parties filed separate Urgent Motions to Resolve the case. [39] Subsequently, petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 be marked as their exhibit.[40] RTC Branch 167 in its Order dated April 30, 2002 admitted the exhibit over the objections
of respondent.[41]

On May 24, 2002, RTC Branch 167 rendered its Omnibus Order denying the Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of execution and for consignation, as
well as the motion to cite petitioners in contempt and the ex parte motion for an order to divest petitioners title to respondent. It held that there was no novation
because there was no incompatibility between the Letter dated June 7, 1991 and the Decision dated January 30, 1987 with the former only providing for a more
liberal scheme of payment and grant of reduced interest; that petitioners claim that respondents receivership and the Letter dated June 7, 1991 are supervening
events which rendered the execution unjust and impossible is unavailing since there is nothing on record to indicate that such circumstances resulted in
unfairness and injustice to petitioners if execution of judgment is carried out; that petitioners claim that the judgment could no longer be executed by mere
motion after the five-year period had elapsed from its finality is specious since any interruption or delay occasioned by petitioners will extend the time within
which the judgment may be executed by motion.[42]

No motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners. Accordingly, RTC Branch 167 issued a Writ of Execution on July 4, 2002.[43] On July 23,
2002, the Sheriff issued the Notice for Compliance of the said writ. [44]

Petitioners filed on July 26, 2002 a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71849.[45] They reiterated that the Decision dated
January 30, 1987 cannot be executed by mere motion filed on February 1, 2000 since more than five years have elapsed.

On October 29, 2002, the CA denied the petition for certiorari.[46] It held that since the delays were occasioned by petitioners own initiative and for
their own advantage, the five-year period allowed for the enforcement of the judgment by motion have been interrupted or suspended.

On November 13, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[47] but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated April 29, 2003.[48]

Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN IN THIS CASE CONSIDERING
THAT MORE THAN FIVE (5) YEARS, NAY, MORE THAN TEN (10) YEARS, HAD ELAPSED SINCE THE DECISION BASED ON
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE HAVE
TRANSPIRED AFTER THE DECISION HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY THAT WARRANTS AND CALLS FOR STAY OR
PRECLUSION OF EXECUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE LETTER-APPROVAL OF THE STATUTORY RECEIVER OF RESPONDENT
PARTAKES OF AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE WHICH HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY UPHELD BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE LETTER APPROVAL OF THE STATUTORY RECEIVER
NOVATED THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND DECISION BASED ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE EQUITIES OF THE CASE FAVOR HEREIN
PETITIONERS.[49]

Anent the first ground, petitioners reiterate that under Section 6 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, the execution of the judgment by mere motion was barred
by prescription, given that more than five years had lapsed since the Decision dated January 30, 1987 became final and executory and they cannot be faulted for
the delay as they have done nothing that warrants the conclusion that they employed unscrupulous machinations and dilatory tactics.

As to the second ground, petitioners argue that respondents receivership is a supervening event that rendered execution of the Decision dated January
30, 1987 impossible, if not unjust; that since a bank under receivership is relieved of its obligation to pay interest on the deposits of its depositors, they
(petitioners) are also not obliged to pay interest on a loan due it and interest shall commence again only after respondents resumption of banking operations.

On the third ground, petitioners maintain that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondents Statutory Receiver novated the Decision dated January
30, 1987 considering the substantial differences in their principal terms and conditions.

48 | P a g e
 On the fourth ground, petitioners aver that the acceleration clause provision of the Compromise Agreement is iniquitous and void for being violative
of morals and public policy.

In their Comment, respondent contends that the present petition should be dismissed outright because it is barred by res judicata or the final
judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 144719 and petitioners engaged in forum-shopping by deliberately failing to state that they previously filed G.R. No. 144719
where the issue of prescription was raised. Even if the petition is given due course, respondent argues that execution of the Decision dated January 30, 1987 is
not barred by prescription; that respondents receivership and the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondents Statutory Receiver are not circumstances that would
render the execution of the judgment unjust, inequitable or even merit a stay of execution; that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondents Statutory Receiver
did not novate the Decision dated January 30, 1987 since there was no intent to novate petitioners judgment obligation.[50]

In Reply, petitioners argue that res judicata is not applicable since the minute Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 144719: (a) does not operate as
adjudication on the merits, (b) was not rendered with jurisdiction over the
parties; and (c) involved different subject matters and causes of action.[51]

In the Resolution dated May 15, 2003, upon motion of petitioner, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from
this Court.[52]

The petition is bereft of merit.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that the petition for certiorari before the CA should have been dismissed outright since petitioners failed to file a motion
for reconsideration from the RTC Omnibus Order dated May 24, 2002. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)

The plain and adequate remedy referred to in the rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or order. The purpose for this requirement is to
grant an opportunity for the court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case[53] without the intervention of a higher court.[54] Thus, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a
special civil action for certiorari.
While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the rule, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved,[55] none of these exceptions apply here.

In the present case, the petitioners not only failed to explain their failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, they also failed to show
sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. A motion for reconsideration is not only expected to be but would actually have provided an
adequate and more speedy remedy than the petition for certiorari.[56] Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners
own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration.[57]

In any case, even if petitioners procedural faux pas is ignored, their contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their favor.

Petitioners are barred from raising the issue on the prescription of execution of the decision by mere motion under the principle of the law of the
case, which is the practice of courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.[58]

The law of the case on the issue of prescription of the execution of the decision by mere motion or applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court has been settled in the Order dated March 20, 2000 of RTC Branch 165. Upon denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, they erroneously sought
review with this Court which dismissed their petition for review on certiorari for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to show special and
important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule.[59] This Courts Resolution became final and executory on
January 16, 2001. Thus, petitioners are bound thereby. The question of prescription has been settled with finality and may no longer be resurrected by
petitioners. It is not subject to review or reversal in any court, even this Court.

The CA failed to consider this principle of law of the case, which is totally different from the concept of res judicata. In Padillo v. Court of Appeals,[60] the
Court distinguished the two as follows:
x x x Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereas res
judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In the 1975 case of Comilang v. Court of Appeals
(Fifth Division.), a further distinction was made in this manner:

The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The
doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact,
although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or
general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.[61]

To elucidate further, res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same
cause.[62] The four requisites for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.[63] The fourth requisite is wanting in the present case. There is only one case
involved. There is no second independent proceeding or subsequent litigation between the parties. The present petition concerns subsequent proceedings in
the same case, with petitioners raising the same issue long settled by a prior appeal.

On the matter of forum shopping, while the Court has held that forum shopping exists only where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to resjudicata in another,[64] it must be recalled that the doctrines of law of the case and res judicata are founded on a
public policy against reopening that which has previously been decided.[65] Both doctrines share the policy consideration of putting an end to litigation.[66] Thus,
the principle of forum shopping should apply by analogy to a case involving the principle of law of the case.

Moreover, although forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by
appeal or certiorari, in another, or when a party institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
49 | P a g e
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, [67] the peculiar circumstances attendant in this case bate
out a situation akin to forum shopping - there is only one court involved, RTC Pasig City, but the issue of prescription was ultimately resolved by two different
branches thereof Branches 165 and 167.

Petitioners first raised before RTC Branch 165 the issue of prescription of the execution of the decision by mere motion. Said RTC Branch 165 ruled
against petitioners and the courts order thereon became final and executory. Petitioners raised the issue again in an Omnibus Motion with the same RTC Branch
165. However, they moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge hearing the issue not only once, but twice, both motions
granted in their favor and the case was successively raffled and assigned to two different branches of RTC Pasig, first to Branch 268 and then to Branch 167,
which ruled against petitioners.

Through the motions for inhibition of the presiding judges and the assignment of the case to different branches of the same court, petitioners sought
to obtain from one branch a ruling more favorable than the ruling of another branch. They deliberately sought a friendly branch of the same court to grant them
the relief that they wanted, despite the finality of the resolution of one branch on the matter. This is a permutation of forum shopping. It trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. [68]

Be it remembered that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rules against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of
two separate, and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party-litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in
several different fora until a favorable result is reached. This would make a complete mockery of the judicial system.[69]

As to petitioners arguments on the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement, respondents receivership as a supervening
event, and novation of the Compromise Agreement by the Letter dated June 7, 1991, the Court holds that these were raised as mere afterthought. If petitioners
sincerely believed in the merits of their arguments, they should have raised them at the earliest opportunity and pursued their ultimate resolution. However,
petitioners did not.

Petitioners are barred from raising arguments concerning the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement since they only raised
it for the first time before the CA in their Petition for Certiorari[70] in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849. To consider the argument raised belatedly in a pleading filed in the
appellate court, especially in the executory stage of the proceedings, would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.

In addition, after adopting and agreeing to the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, petitioners cannot be permitted to subsequently
make a complete volte face and attack the validity of the said agreement when they miserably failed to comply with its provisions. Our law and policy do not
sanction such a somersault. What's more, petitioners also failed to comply with the reduced purchase amount and interest rate granted in the Letter dated June
7, 1991. They can hardly evoke judicial compassion.

On the arguments relating to the effect of respondents receivership, petitioners brought this matter for the first time in RTC Branch 165 in their
Omnibus Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years after respondent was placed under receivership and was ordered to close operation in 1987. The belated
invocation of such circumstance speaks strongly of the staleness of their claim.

Besides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their obligation when respondent was placed
under receivership. When a bank is placed under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new loans or to
accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the
bank.[71] Thus, petitioners obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under receivership. The respondents receivership is an
extraneous circumstance and has no effect on petitioners obligation.

On the claim of novation, petitioners raised it for the first time before RTC Branch 165 in their Ex-Parte Motion to Recall the Courts Order dated
December 5, 1991[72] but they did not pursue the matter after their ex-parte motion was denied. They did not raise said issue in their motion for reconsideration
or in their first petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 144719. Thus, they are deemed to have abandoned their claim of novation. They
cannot be allowed to revive the issue as it is offensive to basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Moreover, the Court cannot see how novation can take place considering that the surrounding circumstances negate the same. The established rule
is that novation is never presumed; it must be clearly and unequivocally shown. [73] Novation will not be allowed unless it is clearly shown by express agreement,
or by acts of equal import. Thus, to effect an objective novation it is imperative that the new obligation expressly declares that the old obligation is thereby
extinguished or that the new obligation be on every point incompatible with the new one. [74]

In the present case, there is no clear intent of the parties to make the Letter dated June 7, 1991 completely supersede and abolish the Compromise
Agreement adopted and approved by the RTC in its Decision dated January 30, 1987. Petitioners were merely granted a more liberal scheme of payment and
reduced rate of interest but the conditions relating to the consequences of default in payment remained, such that when petitioners failed to comply with the
approved mode of payment in the Letter dated June 7, 1991, respondents were entitled to call for enforcement of the Decision dated January 30, 1987 and eject
petitioners from the property. The well-settled rule is that, with respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, the obligation is not novated by an instrument
that expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones, or the new contract merely
supplements the old one.[75] Hence, there is no merit to petitioners claim of novation.

Without a doubt, the present case is an instance where the due process routine vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut devise meant to
perpetually forestall execution of an otherwise final and executory decision. Aside from clogging court dockets, the strategy is deplorably a common course
resorted to by losing litigants in the hope of evading manifest obligations. The Court condemns this outrageous abuse of the judicial process by the petitioners
and their counsels.

It is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there
must be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid and final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, then
unscrupulous litigants will multiply to the detriment of the administration of justice. [76]

The Court reminds petitioners counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly administration of justice
must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.[77]

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants and counsels that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in the
present case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.

Verily, by the undue delay in the execution of a final judgment in their favor, respondents have suffered an injustice. The Court views with disfavor
the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the final decision and orders in the present case. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. [78]Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught
the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.

50 | P a g e
 WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849
are AFFIRMED. The status quo order issued by this Court on May 15, 2003 is LIFTED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig City, is directed to issue the
corresponding writ of execution and the Sheriff of the court is ordered to enforce the same to its ultimate conclusion.

Triple costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.

51 | P a g e
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to
costs.

The appellant makes the following assignments of error:

The trial court erred:

1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng
Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.

2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for
P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.

3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.

4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.

5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up
to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said judgment.

6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more
than fully paid even discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property.

7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to
avoid having a case with the appellant bank.

8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint with costs.

On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case
No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs.
The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with
the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.

Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine
National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net

Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was
credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.

In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274
in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground
that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.

In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The
alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows:

P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su
derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del
Banco Nacional; ¿quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? — R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos
veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el señor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses
mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"

P. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era encargado de este asunto.

P. ¿Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? — R. Era encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al señor
Pecson. Entonces hable al señor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.

Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.

Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.

JUZGADO. Que la termine.

52 | P a g e
 TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus
bienes para cubrir sus deudas.

P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," ¿a que bienes se referia el ? — R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de
Paco.

P. ¿Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.

P. Pero este Exhibit 1, ¿a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco.

P. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No recuerdo.

P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, ¿le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? — R. Al
Banco Nacional.

P. ¿Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el señor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco
Nacional? — R. No recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.

P. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?

Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.

JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.

P. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?

SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.

Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.

JUZGADO. Puede contestar.

Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.

R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas
mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.

P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, ¿recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del
Banco? — R. Nada, absolutamente.

When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered
that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not remember.

One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend
of the defendant was interested in buying it.

The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial.

With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the
same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the
active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he
should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of
his client.

Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit
1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have
required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some
evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished
to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale.

Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was
authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by
such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement.
The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full
amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest
thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.

EN BANC

53 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-6294 February 10, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONCIO BALLENA, defendant-appellant.

Buencamino, Diokno, Mapa, Buencamino jr., Platon and Lontok for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

On the 21st of September, 1909, there was tried in the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Masbate criminal case No. 163, entitled "United States vs.
Ana Ramirez," in which the defendant was charged with the crime of perjury. The basis of this prosecution was the false testimony given by the defendant in a
certain criminal case tried in that court wherein one Ciriaco Pellejera was defendant, charged with homicide, in that the said Pellejera did, by means of blows,
cause the death of the husband of Ana Ramirez. In this homicide case Ana Ramirez was called as a witness, and, after being duly sworn, testified that her
husband died of fever and that during his illness, which lasted more than two weeks, she observed no contusions or other injuries on his body. She denied
having testified under oath before the provincial fiscal in the town of Dimasalang, contrary to her testimony in this case, and she also denied having been in
the house of one Jose Largo for the purpose of testifying with reference to the death of her husband. Whereas, as a matter of fact, she did testify, under oath,
before the said fiscal, in that town, that her husband died as a direct result of the blows inflicted by Pellejera and that his death occurred within three days
after having received these blows. Ana Ramirez was found guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly.

In the trial of this perjury case on Estefania Barruga, mother of the defendant Ana, was a witness for the defendant, and at the instigation of one Leoncio
Ballena she testified that the fiscal, Señor Bailon, at the time he was in Dimasalang making the investigation into the cause of the death of Ana's husband,
attempted to rape her daughter Ana, and asked for the hand of the girl in marriage, but she did not desire to accept this proposition of the fiscal because he
was a married man.

Subsequently thereto, and on the 29th of September, 1909, the fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of that province against the said
Leoncio Ballena, charging him with the crime of subornation of perjury. Upon this complaint the defendant was duly tried, found guilty, and sentenced to six
month's imprisonment, to pay a fine of P500, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment is case of insolvency, to the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and to pay the costs. From this sentence and judgment the defendant appealed, and now insists that the testimony by given by Estefania Barruga in that
perjury case was immaterial to the issues involved therein. If this contention be true, the defendant is not guilty.

There are certain well-defined and indispensable requisites which must be established in every case of subornation of perjury before an accused person,
charged with the commission of this crime, can be convicted. Every essential element constituting the crime of perjury must be established by competent
testimony. The prosecution must show the nature of the proceedings in which the alleged perjury was committed, the court, or officer, in which, or before
whom, the false oath was taken; that the witness was duly sworn; that the testimony was material, and false; that the defendant knowingly and willfully
procured another to swear falsely, and that the witness suborned did testify under circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury.

In the case at bar the record shows beyond any question of a doubt that the witness Barruga, after being duly sworn, did knowingly and willfully testify falsely
in a criminal case before a duly constituted tribunal; that this witness so testified at the instigation of the defendant Ballena; and that the defendant knew that
the testimony given by the witness Barruga was false. The witness so informed the defendant. Notwithstanding this information, the defendant strongly
insisted that by the witness Barruga testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only was to save her daughter from imprisonment. The
defendant not only knowingly and willfully induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears from the record that he was an enemy
of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial. So the only question to be determined is, as we have said, Was the testimony of
Barruga material to the issues involved in that criminal case against her daughter for perjury? Materiality is an essential element in the crime of perjury. (U.
S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.) It, therefore, necessarily follows that materiality is likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of subornation of perjury,
as the latter is derived from the former.

The term 'material matter' means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact,
or circumstance, which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any
witness who testifies. (Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Estraña, supra.)

In the criminal case in which the witness Barruga gave that false testimony, the main question involved was whether or not Ana Ramirez testified before the
provincial fiscal that her husband died as a result of the blows inflicted by Ciriaco Pellejera, as she had testified in the trial of the case against Pellejera that she
did not so testify before the fiscal. It is clear that the false testimony of Ana Ramirez against Pellejera was material. In the trial of the case against Ana for
perjury there was presented a question of fact as to whether or not Ana testified, under oath, before the fiscal in that investigation that her husband did in fact
die as a result of the wounds inflicted by Pellejera. The court found this to be true. It was important to know whether or not the fiscal, at the time Ana testified
before him, attempted to rape her or asked her mother for permission to marry her. If the fiscal had committed these acts they would have constituted a
strong circumstance showing the innocence of Ana. The fiscal was the moving party in the perjury case and it was upon his sworn complaint that Ana was
prosecuted. If he should have attempted to prosecute Ana after having committed these acts the court would not only have disbelieved the fiscal, testifying as
a witness, but it would have looked upon the whole prosecution as a fabrication.

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant. So
ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg for petitioner.

Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent.
54 | P a g e
ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul or set aside the order of respondent Judge Antonio Masaquel, dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No.
13258 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner Domingo V. Austria guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine of
P50.00.

The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not disputed. Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against
Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land — one parcel being located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in the province of Pangasinan.
On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land in question and ordering the
defendant to vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the
immediate execution of the judgment — which motion was granted by respondent Judge on May 31, 1963 — and, upon the plaintiffs' having posted a surety
bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.

On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in the practice of law before his
appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, the
defendant, through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963 respondent Judge granted the stay of
execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant. The petitioner likewise
had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8, 1963; but
upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963, pending the
approval of the defendant's amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment and, over the vigorous objection of
plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion on November 7, 1963. The hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964.

Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw
respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case
upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request
because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of
Court. Thereafter, when the case was called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said hearing:2

APPEARANCE:

ATTY. DANIEL C. MACARAEG:

appeared in behalf of plaintiffs. (After the case was called)

COURT:

Your client is here?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is he?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

He is here, Your Honor.

COURT:

What is your name?

PLAINTIFF:

Domingo Austria, sir.

COURT:

You are one of the plaintiffs in this case?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

Atty. Macaraeg approached me in chambers requesting me to disqualify myself in hearing this case. Did you authorize Atty. Macaraeg to approach
me verbally to disqualify myself from hearing this case because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

55 | P a g e
 COURT:

Is that your reason why you requested Atty. Macaraeg to approach me, requesting me to disqualify myself simply because the lawyer of the other
party was my assistant?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

All right. Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my
former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the question?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:

Yes, sir.

COURT:

The Court hereby finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are hereby ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

With due indulgence of this Honorable Court — I have learned, after I have conferred with you in chambers, another ground of the plaintiffs for
their requesting me to ask for the disqualification of Your Honor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant rumor coming from the
defendant Pedro Bravo himself that he is boasting in San Carlos that because he has a new lawyer, that surely he is going to win this case.

COURT:

Why did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if that is true or not?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

And maybe, that is why the plaintiffs requested me to approach Your Honor because of that rampant rumor that Pedro Bravo is spreading.

COURT:

You mean to say because of that rumor, you are going to doubt my integrity?

ATTY. MACARAEG:

As for me, I entertain no doubt, Your Honor.

COURT:

Your client expressed openly in Court his doubts on the integrity of the Court simply based on rumors and that is a ground for contempt of court, if
only to maintain the faith of the people in the courts.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Taking into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we cannot expect from them the thinking of a lawyer, I am most respectfully praying
that the Order of this Court be reconsidered.

COURT:

Denied. Your client should pay a fine of P50.00. We will hear this case this afternoon.

ATTY. MACARAEG:

Yes, Your Honor.

The respondent Judge forthwith dictated the following order: 3

Before this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, counsel for the plaintiffs, approached the presiding Judge of this Court
in his chambers and manifested the desire of his clients for the Judge to disqualify himself from trying the above-entitled case for the reason that
counsel for the defendant, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the Judge of this Court while he was still engaged in the practice of
law. To this manifestation of Atty. Macaraeg, the Presiding Judge informed the latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute a legal ground
to disqualify the Presiding Judge of this Court, from trying this case.

When the above-entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding Judge called on one of the plaintiffs who was present, namely, Domingo Austria,
and inquired from the latter if it was true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify
himself from trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said Judge. To this query Domingo Austria
answered in the affirmative. When he was also asked as to whether the said Domingo Austria has lost faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the

56 | P a g e
 Presiding Judge of this Court simply because of his former association with the defendant's lawyer, said Domingo Austria likewise answered in the
affirmative.

The Court considers the actuation of the plaintiff Domingo Austria, in the premises, as offensive, insulting and a reflection on the integrity and
honesty of the Presiding Judge of this Court and shows his lack of respect to the Court. The said Domingo Austria is not justified and has no reason
to entertain doubts in the fairness and integrity of the Presiding Judge of this Court, simply because of the latter's former association with
defendant's counsel. For this reason and in order to maintain the people's faith and respect in their courts — the last bulwark in our democratic
institutions — the Presiding Judge declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.

The Court found from the manifestation of plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Macaraeg that the basis of the statement, of Domingo Austria that he has lost his
faith in the Presiding Judge of this Court is the rumors being circulated by the defendant Pedro Bravo that he will surely win in the present case
because of his new lawyer, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat. The Court believes that rumors of the sort do not serve as a sufficient basis or justification for the
plaintiff Domingo Austria to insinuate bias and partiality, on the part of the Court and to express openly his loss of faith and confidence in the
integrity, fairness and capability of the Presiding Judge of this Court to perform his sworn duty of upholding and administering justice, without fear
or favor, and by reason of which this Court denied the verbal motion to reconsider filed by counsel for the plaintiff Domingo Austria, finding him
guilty of contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00.

SO ORDERED.

Given in open Court this 10th day of February, 1964, at Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under protest. Having been punished summarily for direct contempt of court, and the remedy
of appeal not being available to him, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Court.

It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and circumstances attendant to the hearing of the Civil Case No. 13250 on February 10, 1063, he had not
committed an act of contempt against the court and the respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion when he
declared petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine of P50.00 as a penalty.

After a careful study of the record, We find merit in this petition.

The respondent Judge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of court. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether or not the petitioner was guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, or had committed an act of disrespect
toward the court or judge.4

The respondent Judge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, as offensive, insulting, and a reflection on his integrity and honesty and a
showing of lack of respect to the court. The respondent Judge considered that the petitioner was not justified and had no reason to entertain doubts in his
fairness and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel was his former associate.1äwphï1.ñët

We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It is our considered view that when the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further
trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner did so because he was
impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and that
the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself
from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the
fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule
137.5

The apprehension of petitioner regarding the probable bias of respondent Judge does not appear to be groundless or entirely devoid of reason. The
respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond they were already
placed in possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the latter was given back the
properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge over the opposition of
petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by respondent Judge in spite of the
vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his adversary, the defendant Pedro
Bravo, had been boasting in San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.

We believe that the petitioner — the layman that he is — did not take a belligerent or arrogant attitude toward respondent Judge. What he did was to request
his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, to approach respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case on the new trial, precisely in
order that respondent Judge might not be embarrassed or exposed to public odium. There is nothing in the record which shows that when respondent Judge
refused to disqualify himself, the petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If the request of petitioner for respondent Judge to disqualify himself
came to the knowledge of the public it was because respondent Judge himself brought up the matter in open court.

While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the case pending in the court of
said judge, in the case now before Us We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his
chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance
with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the
circumstances that led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of petitioner to
disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for any
one to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party litigant desires or suggests the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is
understood, without saying it in so many words, that said litigant — having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or
counsel — feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his former connection and he may unwittingly
render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while it may be conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or
counsel there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request can not constitute contempt of court if done honestly and in a
respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request to
respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.

The following observation of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dizon, is relevant to the question before Us:

57 | P a g e
 Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of respondent judge does not fall under any one
of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied
upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot
disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an
impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover,
second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the
integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside in a case
in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. supra) . . . . 6 (Emphasis supplied).

It is in line with the above-quoted observation that this Court, in amending the Rules of Court, added the second paragraph under Section 1 of Rule 137, which
provides that a judge in the exercise of his sound discretion may disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid grounds other than those specifically
mentioned in the first paragraph of said section.7 "The courts should administer justice free from suspicion or bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties litigants
might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum." 8

Respondent Judge declared petitioner in contempt of court after the latter answered "Yes, sir" to this question of the judge: "Do you doubt the integrity of the
presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the
question?" We believe that petitioner had not committed an act amounting to contempt of court when he made that answer. The petitioner had not
misbehaved in court, or in the presence of respondent Judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. Neither did the petitioner act in a manner that was
disrespectful to respondent Judge. When petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question asked by respondent Judge, petitioner simply expressed his sincere
feeling under the circumstances. In order that a person may be summarily punished for direct contempt of court, it must appear that his behavior or his
utterance tends to obstruct the proceedings in court, or constitutes an affront to the dignity of the court. As stated by this Court, "Contempt of court
presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court . . . ." 9

We commend the zeal shown by respondent Judge in his effort to protect his own integrity and the dignity of the court. We are constrained to say, however,
that he had gone a little farther than what was necessary under the circumstances. We are inclined to believe that respondent Judge felt offended when
petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question adverted to in the preceding paragraph. But the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the court when he
gave that answer. It would have been unfair to respondent Judge had petitioner answered "No, sir," because then he would not be sincere with the court, and
he would be inconsistent with the request that he made through his counsel for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing the case. When
respondent Judge asked that question, he necessarily expected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner gave him the truthful answer. We are
not persuaded that in so answering petitioner meant to be disrespectful, offensive or insulting to respondent Judge. Nor do We consider that in so answering
petitioner meant to cast reflection on the integrity and honesty of respondent Judge. We believe that in so answering the petitioner was simply manifesting
the misgiving of an ordinary layman about the outcome of his case that is going to be tried by a judge who has been closely associated with the counsel for his
adversary. The petitioner would never have expressed that misgiving of his had respondent Judge not asked him in open court a question that evoked that
answer. A judge can not prevent any person — even a litigant or counsel in a case before him — to entertain in his mind an opinion about him as a judge.
Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would be different if a person would
deliberately and maliciously express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to malign and discredit the judge. In the case now before Us
We believe that petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that petitioner was simply moved by a
desire to protect his interests in the case pending before the court, presided by respondent Judge. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts
of justice are presided by judges who are free from bias and prejudice — and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so expresses himself
truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an
honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the
dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties. And a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that
are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from
trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if the grounds upon which they based
their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn
insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court. 11 And this
liberal attitude of the courts is in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail." 12 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. 13

Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in
direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under
protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so ordered.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5469. August 10, 2004]

RICARDO A. FORONDA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, respondent.

58 | P a g e
 DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant disbarment case arose when Ricardo A. Foronda, acting as attorney-in-fact for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and Concepcion D. Alcaraz, filed a
verified Letter-Complaint[1] dated June 29, 2001 with the Office of the Bar Confidant charging Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero with abusing procedural rules to defeat
the ends of substantial justice by filing appeals, complaints and petitions to frustrate and delay the execution of a judgment.

The Antecedents

The complainant alleged that his principals, Ramona and Concepcion Alcaraz, filed Civil Case No. Q-44134 entitled Concepcion Alcaraz, et al. v. Romeo
Coronel, et al. for specific performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. The case involved a parcel of land which the
defendants therein sold to the Alcarazes, and, thereafter, while the case was pending, to Catalina Balais-Mabanag. Assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag,
and with the respondent as their lawyer, Catalina intervened in the case.

On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision[2] in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that
parcel of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, together
with all the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances and once accomplished, to immediately deliver said document of sale to
plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby cancelled and declared to be without any
force and effect. Defendants and intervenor, and all other persons claiming under them, are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and deliver
possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim for damages and attorneys fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors, are hereby
dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.[3]

The Mabanag Spouses, through the respondent as their counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 23000. In its
Decision[4] promulgated on December 16, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Unsatisfied with the judgment of the appellate
court, the respondent elevated the matter to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 103577. The petition for review was dismissed, and the judgment appealed from
was, likewise, affirmed in toto in the Courts Decision[5] dated October 7, 1996.[6] The Court found that the questioned sale of the parcel of land between therein
petitioners and Mabanag on February 18, 1985 was correctly upheld by both courts below.

Thereafter, according to the complainant, the respondent, acting for and in behalf of his clients, the Mabanag Spouses, filed several cases[7] questioning
the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 103577. The complainant contended that the multiple pleadings and actions pursued by the respondent indicate that he
violated his oath as an officer of the court and breached the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The complainant thereafter prayed that the instant
complaint be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for proper investigation and action.[8]

The Respondents Defense

The respondent, for his part, filed a Motion to Cite Complainant and Counsel in Contempt Without Prejudice to Disciplinary Action Against
Counsel,[9] alleging that in an attempt to cause disrepute, dishonor and to cast aspersion on him, the complainants counsel virtually published and made known
publicly the instant administrative case against him by filing a Manifestation in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
80. According to the respondent, this grossly violated the confidentiality in administrative proceedings.[10]

In his Comment,[11] the respondent did not deny that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 was already final and executory, as it had already been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in their respective decisions. The respondent put forth the following arguments to justify the dismissal of the
instant complaint:

A. THE SUBSEQUENT CASES FILED INVOLVED LEGITIMATE AND VALID RESORT TO JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND REMEDIES; HENCE, THERE IS NO
BASIS FOR THE CHARGE THAT THE RESPONDENT COUNSEL HAS ABUSED PROCEDURAL PROCESSES TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE.

B. THE COMPLAINT MUST AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

C. THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS PREMATURE CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTERS RAISED THEREIN ARE STILL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN
PENDING CASES; HENCE, ITS OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATELY CALLED FOR AND WARRANTED. [12]

The respondent was vehement in denying that he abused legal processes and remedies, as the issues raised in the subsequent actions he filed were valid
and meritorious, the resolution of which were indispensable for the orderly administration of justice. Thus:

It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and remedies available and to invoke all pertinent provisions of the law and rules, to protect the interest
of a client in order that justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is not only the right of a counsel to do so but rather, it is his bounden and sacred
obligation as an officer of the court and as an advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of a client within the bounds of law.

Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-91-31268, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which is the first complaint, what was challenged therein is the eligibility
of Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, to own urban commercial lands, within the ambit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, considering that she is not a Filipino citizen or at
least, she does not appear nor was she alleged to be so. Evidently, therefore, this is not intended to forestall the execution of the judgment which must be
executed, pursuant to the rules that is, in accordance with the dispositive portion thereof. Otherwise stated, the execution, if it must be undertaken, must be
made in accordance with and consistently (sic) the dispositive portion thereof. It is well settled that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed
in the dispositive portion of the decision.

59 | P a g e
As shown in the earlier narrations, the foregoing case is presently on appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals and is still pending thereat, up to the
present.

With regards to the petition for certiorari filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 4770 (sic), whereby a decision was
already rendered and such decision is already final and executory, the issues therein disposed as raised, pertinently pertained to the questioned and assailed
Orders of the trial court which granted the writ of execution, upon motion of parties who are purportedly the principals of the complainant and his
counsel. After the denial of the said petition and the finality of the judgment of such denial, partial execution ensued and was not of course, even attempted to
be forestalled by the herein respondent counsel and his clients.

However, the execution being undertaken later on was shown to have been exceeded when, despite the fact that there is no showing that the parties who were
supposed to execute a deed of absolute sale pursuant to the dispositive portion of the subject decision being sought to be implemented, had refused or at least
failed, after demand, to so execute and perform the foregoing acts, the trial court ordered its branch clerk of court to perform the said acts. In fact, it was
pointed out that it does not even appear that the other parties whose acts are sought, were already served with the writ of execution; hence, the trial courts
act was without basis and/or premature. Nevertheless, the trial courts branch clerk of court notwithstanding, proceeded as in fact, executed the deed of
absolute sale in favor of the Alcarazes. This act of the trial court, with due respect, unduly created chaos and confusion, which are antithetical to its function
for an orderly administration of justice and the fair approximation thereof.

The matter was, thereafter, complicated further, when despite the fact that the citizenships of the Alcarazes were not indicated in the deed of absolute sale
which appears to have been presented with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the said Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the client of the herein
respondent counsel and issued a new title over the subject property in favor of the Alcarazes and in order to validate and to give a semblance of legality or
color to the validity of the issuance of the said title, by making it appear that the Alcarazes are Filipino citizens, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION OF
THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN THE SUBJECT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, nevertheless, indicated in the new title that the Alcarazes are Filipinos.

Thus, the herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client and to protect their interest, this time, was constrained to institute a petition with the Honorable
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, whereby they assailed the jurisdiction of the trial judge in decreeing the foregoing execution of acts not
included in the disposition portion of the decision being sought to be executed and to perform acts within the exclusive competence and direction of the
Register of Deeds pursuant to Providential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Board Registration Decree. This case is still pending with the Honorable
Court of Appeals up to the present; hence, it is misleading for the complainant to even insinuate that a decision thereon is already final, which, of course, as
shown in the earlier discussions, are farthest from the truth.

While all of the foregoing issues were still pending as they are still pending up to the present, the complainant and counsel, purportedly sold and transferred
the subject property, using the title being assailed and questioned in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, to a third person, one Emelita Mariano, with the purported deed of
absolute sale being notarized by the same counsel of the herein complainant, Atty. Oscar R. Ferrer, who is representing the Alcarazes in the abovesaid cases;
hence, he cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the said cases and the issues involved therein which cast questions on the said title and, thus, rendered
the purported transfer or sale fatally defective.

True to his duty to his client and as an officer of the court and in order to maintain the integrity, dignity and orderliness in the administration of justice, herein
respondent counsel, filed in behalf of his client, the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396, on February 15, 2001, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, for the annulment of the title issued in favor of the third person, Emelita L. Mariano, for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale to her and
Damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

When no temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction were issued by the trial court, herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client,
availed of the legally available remedy of a special civil action of certiorari, assailing on jurisdictional/grave abuse of discretion grounds, the refusal and/or
failure of the trial court to issue the prayed for preliminary injunctive reliefs, among others. Thus, respondent, as counsel for his client, filed with the
Honorable Court of Appeals, on July 24, 2001, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, which is still pending resolution of the said Honorable Court up to the present. [13]

The respondent also alleged that the complainants failure to disclose the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 in the certification against non-forum
shopping in the case at bar was in gross violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of this, the respondent reasoned, the complaint
should be dismissed.

Finally, the respondent averred that the instant administrative case is premature, considering that there are still issues to be resolved in the pending
cases. As such, no cause of action could accrue against him. The respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed for utter and palpable lack of merit.

In his Compliance and Comment,[14] the complainant asserted that there was no malice nor inaccuracy resorted to in the filing of the complaint against
the respondent. The complainant averred that he was constrained to file the instant complaint out of exasperation, if not desperation, upon the instruction of
his principals, so as to stop the respondent from continuing with his dilatory and obstructionist strategies to deprive them of their rights already confirmed by
the courts, from the RTC to the Supreme Court. Thus:

In order to stall the execution of the favorable decision obtained by my principals Concepcion Alcaraz and her daughter Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as early
as March 1, 1989, in Civil Case No. Q-44134, respondent acting in behalf of his clients, went to this Court three (3) times in said case and several times also to
the Court of Appeals on appeals, petitions for certiorari, etc.

Although respondent admits the fact that the subject decision of the court a quo is already final and executory, he insists that the issues in the other cases are
indeed different. He argues in his comment that the issue in his petition (Annex 2 to Comment) pertained to the issuance of a writ of execution to implement
the abovesaid final and executory decision. This is plain hair-splitting aimed to muddle the issues and ultimately mislead the Honorable Court. [15]

The Recommendation of the Integrated Bar Of The Philippines (IBP)

Commission On Bar Discipline

On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-237, finding that the foregoing recommendation of the Commissioner
was fully supported by the records, as well as the applicable laws. The Board found that the respondent violated Rule 12.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his suspension for one (1) year.

The Courts Ruling

60 | P a g e
 At the outset, the Court would like to stress that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.[16] As we held in the leading case of In
re Almacen:[17]

Neither purely civil not purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. .[18]

As such, the instant complaint cannot be dismissed as prayed for by the respondent.

We agree that the respondent is administratively liable.

The respondent, by his own admission, filed multifarious petitions, motions and actions concerning the sale of the property in question, after the Court
already ruled in G.R. No. 103577 that the said sale was correctly upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. He, thereafter, filed two other initiatory pleadings
before the RTC of Quezon City, namely, Civil Case No. Q-97-31268 and Civil Case No. Q-01-43396. The same matter subject of the original complaint was elevated
to the Court of Appeals no less than four (4) times: CA-G.R. CV No. 65124, CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, CA-G.R. CV No. 75911, and CA-G.R. SP No. 55576. And from
there, the matter was again brought before this Court twice: G.R. No. 135820 and G.R. No. 153142. [19]

We concur with the following observations made by IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala in her Report and Recommendation dated October 3,
2003:

The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his clients in all the complaints, appeals, petitions and motions he has filed is the question of non-
eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines and the nullity of the sale between Alcaraz and the Coronels. These issues have already
been passed upon and upheld by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, the First Division of the
Court of Appeals observed that Mabanags counsel, (respondent herein) has questioned the non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the
Philippines for the nth time although as early as 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710 had already affirmed the lower courts ruling that
the petitioner is not the proper party to question the eligibility of Alcaraz to own property in the Philippines. The petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld the right of Ramona Alcaraz as one of the vendees in the deed of sale. The Supreme Court passed judgment on her
capacity to buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, Entry of Judgment was already issued by the Supreme Court on 2 January 1997.
However, petitioner has succeeded for more than five (5) years now to hold at bay the full implementation of the judgment in point. Likewise, in
dismissing the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client before RTC QC Branch 83 docketed as Case No. Q-97-31268 entitled Mabanag vs. Patricia
Ramona Alcaraz, et. al. to declare Patricia Alcaraz ineligible to acquire real property, the court observed that for failure of the plaintiffs to get a favorable
decision of the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution by disqualifying herein defendant. (Emphasis ours).

In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP [No.] 65783, a pertinent portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads While lawyers owe (sic) entire devotion to the
interest of their clients right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice they should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
a judgment or misuse the court processes (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 622).[20]

It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The
essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when
he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.[21]

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by
impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.[22] Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who
files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only
such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.[23]

We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget
that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[24]

In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He
also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule 12.04[26] of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.

We find that the IBPs recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to the respondents transgression. He
shall thus be meted a two-year suspension from the practice of law, effective immediately.

WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, respondent Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years. The respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this
Decision be included in the respondents files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996]

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CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J. HONRADA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division; HONORABLE ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Special Prosecutor; HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his official capacity as Ombudsman; and
TEOFILO GELACIO, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; MAY BE INITIATED AND CONCLUDED BY DIFFERENT INVESTIGATORS.
- Petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not recommended by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but
by another one who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the investigation. There is no basis for petitioners claim that the resolution was prepared by one
who did not take any part in the investigation. What happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being able to finish the
hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another and by necessity the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the
case. Such an arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what is important is that the judge who decides does so on
the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CERTIFICATE; VALUE NOT DIMINISHED BY FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE THAT HIS CERTIFICATE WOULD
BE USED IN EVIDENCE. - That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case
No. 1393 is not proof that Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit repudiated
what he had earlier stated. Judge Ario never denied his earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never reached the arraignment stave, because
having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until March 17,
1986 and in fact the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case. The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence,
much less in the criminal cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not retract his previous
Certification that there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his
certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the value of the certificate.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; RETRACTION OF AFFIDAVIT MADE IN VIOLATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, INADMISSIBLE. - There is
nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public documents)
on Atty. Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has important bearing in this case. Otherwise she
did not cite the confession as proof of the falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in violation of
attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.

4. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS BETWEEN A JUDGE AND A PARTYS COUNSEL, NOT A GROUND. - Mere divergence of
opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing
the case on the ground of bias and partiality.

5. ID.; ACTIONS; MERE FILING OF SEVERAL CASES BASED ON THE SAME INCIDENT, NOT FORUM-SHOPPING; TEST. - The mere filing of several cases based
on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential
facts, and circumstances.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT TRANSACTIONS, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT FORUM SHOPPING; CASE AT BAR.
- Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases
was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is that the several cases involve essentially different
facts, circumstances and causes of action. Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco,. Agusan del Sur, was for perjury,
based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which
was filed in the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure the approval of his free patent
application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records
pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts
that are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents of these cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration ifl
Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396. Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances from
those involved in the other, though related, cases. Although they arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve
different issues. It is well settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law or that the same act may give rise
to criminal as well as administrative liability. As such, they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the
accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.

7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR FILING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
- Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v.
Vasquez that only this Court has the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against them
for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of separation of
powers. But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative
liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative
complaint.

8. ID.; ID.; POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGE CANNOT JUSTIFY PROHIBITION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IF THERE IS
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. - That the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard.
Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans resolution was
reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violan. We cannot say that, in
approving the resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed an abuse of their discretion.

9. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; PURPOSE. - A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause.

10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL HARASSMENT; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. - To warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary
writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here,
the prosecution is handled by the Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution
by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged, much less shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the national
prosecution service. To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the private complainant, is acting in bad
faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and disrepute. For it
is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine
objectively and impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is essentially his province.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Rolando A. Suarez & Associates for petitioners.

Esmeraldo I. Guloy for private respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

62 | P a g e
 This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of the Ombudsman,
denying petitioners motion for the reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed against petitioners and to restrain the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.

The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23, 1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Charged with petitioner
Paredes, Jr., who was then the provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J. Honrada, clerk of court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso Sansaet, counsel of petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 1393 of the MCTC.

In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with petitioner Paredes, Jr. and the latters counsel Atty. Sansaet, certified
as true a copy of a Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes on July 9, 1985, showing that an arraignment had been
held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and issued a certification dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. In support
of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of the MCTC to the effect that Criminal Case No. 1393 had never reached the
arraignment stage before it was dismissed on motion of the prosecution.1

A preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao. Petitioners and Atty. Sansaet, as respondents in the case, filed their respective counter-affidavits. Paredes, Jr. denied the charges. He alleged that
their filing was politically motivated and that the complainant, Teofilo Gelacio, was being used by his political enemies to harass him. For his part, Honrada
maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 as certified by him. His claim was corroborated by Atty. Generoso Sansaet, who
stated in an affidavit that he was present during the arraignment, being the counsel of Paredes, Jr. Sansaet called Judge Arios Certification, denying that there
was an arraignment, the product of a faltering mind.2

Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, but before it could be acted upon, Atty. Sansaet, one of the
respondents, retracted his earlier statement to the effect that Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned before the case against him was dismissed. In an Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991, Sansaet claimed that there was really no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada
made false certifications which were used to support the dismissal (on the ground of double jeopardy) of Criminal Case No. 13800 which was then pending
against Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan.3

As a result of this development, Paredes, Jr. and Honrada, were required to comment. Paredes, Jr. claimed that the Sansaets aboutface was the result of
their political estrangement.4 For his part Honrada insisted that an arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1393 had indeed been held and that in making the
certifications in question he stated the truth.

On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, recommended
on February 24, 1992 that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Her recommendation was indorsed by Deputy
Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, Who, upon the recommendation of Erdulfo Querubin of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
approved the filing of three informations for falsification of public documents against Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet with the Sandiganbayan.5 The cases
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.

On July 9, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the informations. Their motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of August 25, 1992, as was
the motion for reconsideration they subsequently filed.

Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the cases. They complained (1) that the resolution, recommending the filing of the cases, was not prepared
by Public Prosecutor Axalan, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, who allegedly had no hand in the
investigation; (2) that Violan relied solely on the retraction of Atty. Generoso Sansaet and the Certification of Judge Ciriaco C. Ario and disregarded evidence in
favor of petitioners; and (3) that Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin, who reviewed Violans recommendation, could not be expected to act fairly because he was
the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 13800 in connection with which the allegedly falsified records were used and in fact appealed the dismissal of the case to
this Court.6

Although these grounds were the same ones invoked by petitioners in their motion to quash, which the Sandiganbayan had denied, the Sandiganbayan
nonetheless directed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the cases. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman required complainant, the herein
respondent Teofilo Gelacio, to comment on petitioners Motion for Reinvestigation.

In a resolution dated December 9, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor recommended denial of petitioners motion. He noted that the
matters raised in the motion were the same ones contained in petitioners motion to quash which had already been denied and that in fact a cursory examination
of the resolution of GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan shows that the existence of a prima facie case has been duly established and the same was reviewed by
SPO III Erdulfo Querubin and also the approval of Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez. He held that as no newly-discovered evidence or denial of due process had
been shown, there was no basis for petitioners request for a reinvestigation.

Montemayors recommendation was approved by Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. Accordingly the Sandiganbayan
set the cases for trial.

The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction was then filed to enjoin the trial of the criminal cases. Petitioners pray that:

(1) Upon the filing of this petition and before its final resolution, to issue a temporary restraining order immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan, Second
Division, to cease and desist from proceeding with the scheduled hearing of this case;

(2) After due hearing, to adjudge that respondents Honorable Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto and Honorable Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez have
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing and approving the questioned resolution dated December 9, 1992 and
ordering said resolution denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation be annulled and set aside;

(3) To adjudge that the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, is without jurisdiction to try Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 all of which are apparently
intended as political harassments against the herein petitioners, particularly as against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., and prohibiting the said court from proceeding
(with) the hearing of the said cases on January 15, 1993, and likewise ordering the said court to dismiss the said cases, with costs against respondents and
Teofilo Gelacio; and

(4) To issue a writ of injunction, thereby making the restraining order permanent, and prohibiting the respondents and complainant Teofilo Gelacio from
committing any act or acts tending to harass and to inflict further damage and injury to petitioners, such as but not limited to the continuation and further
prosecution of said Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793.

Petitioners contend (1) that their constitutional right to due process was violated at various stages of the preliminary investigation; (2) that the
prosecutors closed their eyes to the fact that in filing the cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio engaged in forum-shopping; and (3) that the cases were filed
for political harassment and there is in fact no prima facie evidence to hold them answerable for falsification of public documents. 7

I.

Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not recommended by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, but by another one who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the investigation.
63 | P a g e
 Petitioners contention has no basis in fact. It appears that the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by Teofilo Gelacio was initially conducted
by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao in the investigation of graft cases. Axalan prepared
a resolution. The records do not show what his recommendation was. What is clear, however, is that no action had been taken on his recommendation in view
of the fact that Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases, retracted an earlier statement he had given to the effect that petitioner Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1393 before the case was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet now claimed that no arraignment had been held after all.
This new development required the reopening of the investigation (in fact Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to comment on the retraction), the
reevaluation of the evidence, and the preparation of a new resolution. Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare a report, which she did.

Violans recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who then referred the matter to Special
Prosecution Officer Ill Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred in the recommendation of Violan but suggested that, instead of one, three separate
informations for falsification of public documents be filed against respondents (Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet), considering that three documents were
involved.

On June 26, 1992, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the recommendations of Violan and Querubin. Accordingly three cases were filed against
petitioners with the Sandiganbayan, where they were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.

There is thus no basis for petitioners claim that the resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in the investigation. What happened here
is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another and by necessity the
decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due
process. For what is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing
of that case from the beginning.

Petitioners nonetheless charge that GIO II Violan and Prosecutor Querubin did not have such cold neutrality of an impartial judge to be trusted to conduct
a fair investigation. According to petitioners, Violan gave credence to the Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario when the fact is that Judge Ario
subsequently executed an affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, in which he explained that he issued the said certificate without expectation that the same would
be used as evidence in any case and that the use of said certificate . . . is against [his] conscience. Worse, it is contended, Violan considered the Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications executed by Atty. Sansaet, which she should have disregarded because it was made in violation of the confidentiality of attorney-
client communication under Rule 130, 24 (b) of the Rules of Court. As for Prosecutor Querubin, they claim that he is the same prosecutor who had handled the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800 against petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan and after its dismissal, sought review in this Court and, therefore,
he was biased against petitioners.

That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that
Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit repudiated what he had earlier stated. In
his Affidavit he merely stated:

1. That I am the incumbent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge in the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-Rosario-Bunawan, Agusan
del Sur;

2. That I am the same Ciriaco C. Ario who issued a certificate in Criminal Case No. 1393 entitled Pp. vs. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. which certificate was
used as evidence in administrative complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, in the Administrative Complaint No. A.M. P-90-396 and Criminal
Complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, incumbent Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Atty. Generoso S. Sansaet before the Ombudsman
under Criminal Case No. OBM-MIN-90-0053 (sic) entitled Teofilo Gelacio vs. Mansueto J. Honrada, et. al.;

3. That honestly, the said certificate was issued without my expectation that the same be used as evidence in any case and I be a witness;

4. That the use of said certificate as evidence in the above-mentioned cases is against my conscience, more so upon discovery that the cases aforesaid
are known to me to be politically motivated and involves [sic] big time politicians in Agusan del Sur about whom I am not at liberty to name
names for security reason;

5. That in view of all the foregoing, I am not interested to testify in any investigation to be conducted in connection thereof, either in the
administrative or criminal proceedings.

Thus, Judge Ario never denied his earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never reached the arraignment stage, because having learned that
Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action until March 17, 1986 and in fact the fiscal
later moved for the dismissal of the case.

The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan,
is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not retract his previous Certification that there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393.
If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his certificate would be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the
value of the certificate.

Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty. Sansaet proof that GIO II Violan was biased against petitioners. Petitioners contend that Sansaets
confession was privileged and that Violan herself acknowledged that the affidavit of retraction might be inadmissible in court.

In the first place, there is nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that petitioners were probably guilty of
falsification of public documents) on Atty. Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has important bearing
in this case. Otherwise she did not cite the confession as proof of the falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was
made in violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of
retraction.

Moreover, the admissibility of this piece of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to determine in the event it is used by the prosecution. It is
untenable to ascribe bias and partiality to the investigator because she considered this retraction in her resolution of the case. Even if she relied on it mere
divergence of opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from
hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality. 8

As for Prosecutor Querubin, simply because he was the one who handled the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800, in connection with which the
documents allegedly falsified were used by petitioners, is not a reason for supposing he could not act fairly. As any other counsel in a case, it was his duty to act
with full devotion to [his clients] genuine interests, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.9 It
cannot be casually assumed that because of his engagement in that case he had lost his objectivity to such an extent that he forsook his duty to see to it that
justice was done and not to act out of vindictiveness.

Indeed, Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private attorney. In the familiar terminology, he is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done. 10 It may therefore be assumed that he was merely performing an official duty
and that nothing personal was involved in his recommendation to prosecute the cases.

Above all, it should be stressed that the decision to charge petitioners in the Sandiganbayan was the decision not only of one person but of all those who
in one way or another were called upon to act in the cases, namely: Graft Investigation Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda,
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto. Indeed, Querubins only contribution to the process was to suggest the filing of three
separate informations of falsification of public documents against petitioners.

64 | P a g e
 II.

The second ground for the petition is that the Office of the Ombudsman closed its eyes to the fact that in filing these cases, complainant Teofilo Gelacio is
guilty of forum-shopping and that his purpose for the filing of the cases is simply political harassment. To buttress their contention, petitioners call attention to
the factual background of the cases.11

According to petitioners, way back in 1984 private respondent Teofilo Gelacio charged petitioner Paredes, Jr. with perjury on the ground that in 1975
Paredes, Jr. made false statements in an affidavit which he used in support of his application for a free patent. As already noted, the case which was filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and docketed there as Criminal Case No. 1393, was dismissed on March 24, 1986 upon motion of the
prosecution.

On October 28, 1986, Teofilo Gelacio filed another complaint against petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the acting governor of the province. The complaint was
for violation of 3 (a) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1976 petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, unduly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Land Inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jrs) application for a free patent.
According to petitioners, this case involved the same application for a free patent of petitioner Paredes, Jr., which was the subject of Criminal Case No. 1393.

The information was filed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13800. Petitioner
Paredes, Jr. moved to quash the information, but the court denied his motion. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. It was in connection with this motion
that the procurement of allegedly falsified documents, now the subject of prosecution, was made by petitioner Paredes, Jr. The documents were used to support
his motion for reconsideration.

On August 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its previous resolution and dismissed Criminal Case No. 13800, although on the ground of
prescription. The Office of the Ombudsman sought a review of the action of the Sandiganbayan, but its petition was dismissed by this Court on July 3, 1992 in
G.R. No. 101724. The motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution was likewise denied.

As an offshoot of the execution of these documents, two cases were filed by Teofilo Gelacio: (1) an administrative complaint (A.P. Case No. P-90-3 96) for
falsification of public documents which was filed with this Court against Mansueto Honrada, the clerk of the MCTC who made certifications and (2) a complaint
for falsification of public documents, initially filed as OMB-MIN-90-0053 with the Office of the Ombudsman and eventually as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792,
and 17793 in the Sandiganbayan, against the petitioners and Atty. Generoso Sansaet.

The first case was dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. But with respect to the second complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Violan found probable
cause to proceed against petitioners and against Atty. Sansaet and so recommended the filing of a case against them. Her recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman on June 26, 1992, although upon the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Querubin three separate informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Earlier on July 29, 1991, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, executed an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications in which he stated that,
contrary to his previous affidavit, there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393.

A. Petitioners contend that these cases should be dismissed, being merely the latest in a series of cases which arose out of the same alleged incident - i.e.
that of allegedly having induced the land inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jr.s) land application, 12 for having been filed in violation of the rules on forum-
shopping. Petitioners cite the following statement in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission:13

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. . . A violation of this rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or the
party concerned.

The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed
involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances. 14 Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against the same defendant
and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is
that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of action.

Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, was for perjury, based on false statements allegedly made in
1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed in the Sandiganbayan, although based
on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as Provincial
Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure the approval of his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present
cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an
administrative case against petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents of
these cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.

Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances from those involved in the other, though related, cases.
Although they arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well settled that a single act may offend
against two or more distinct and related provisions of law 15 or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. 16 As such, they may
be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.

Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v.
Vasquez17 that only this Court has the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against them for
their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.

But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for
falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec,18 the dismissal of an administrative
case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

Petitioners assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the
administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the Court administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa.19

B. As final argument, petitioners allege that the complaint in Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793 was filed by political enemies of petitioner
Paredes, Jr. merely to harass him and that there is in fact no probable cause to support the prosecution of these cases. Petitioners cite the following which
allegedly indicate that the charges below have merely been trumped up:

(1) The affidavit of Agusan del Sur District Citizens Attorney Lou Nueva, stating that then Congressman Democrito O. Plaza instructed Atty. Leonardo
Cadiz to secure a certification from Judge Ciriaco C. Ario that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393, threatening that if the judge refused to
give the certification, he (Congressman Plaza) would do everything against

Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, including reviving certain cases against Judge Ario;20 and (2) The affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, of Judge Ario in which he stated
that he did not expect that the certificate which he had previously issued would be used in evidence and that the use of the certificate in the cases below was
against his conscience, because the cases were politically motivated and he was not going to testify in any investigation concerning such certificate.21 At the
same time petitioners seek to minimize the retraction of Atty. Sansaet by ascribing political motivation for its execution. Petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr. claims
that Sansaets obsession has been to win in an election and that his loss to petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the May 11, 1992 congressional elections was Sansaets sixth

65 | P a g e
defeat. As for private respondent Teofilo Gelacio, petitioners say he is a political leader of Democrito Plaza. They claim that in 1991 Atty. Sansaet changed
political affiliation and allied himself with Democrito Plaza and Teofilo Gelacio.

Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the clerk of court with respect to an arraignment allegedly held on July 9, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 1393
is conclusive and cannot be altered by Atty. Sansaets claim to the contrary. They cite what is now Rule 132, 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which provides
that public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a
criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held during which
petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans
resolution was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violn. We cannot say that,
in approving the resolutions of two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed an abuse of their discretion.

Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. As explained
in Young v. Office of the Ombudsman:22

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of these instances were
enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,23 as follows:

a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95)

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil.
304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al. L-38383, May 27 1981, 104 SCRA 607)

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202)

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil 62)

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil 556; Yu Co Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
389)

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140)

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960)

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA
G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; cf Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577).

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash on that ground has been denied; (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-
59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-
6374, August 1, 1953) (cited in Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed).

But none of these instances is present here.

What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge Ario. These are matters for the trial
courts appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to
determine the existence of probable cause.24 As we explained in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan,25 this function involves only the following:

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. (Words and Phrases, Probable
Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of
the charge.

Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown
that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Although it is intimated that Petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged,
much less shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the national prosecution service.

To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the
case26 or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and disrepute. 27 For it is only if he does so may
the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his office to determine objectively and impartially the
existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is essentially his province.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

66 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151081. September 11, 2003]

TOP RATE CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. PAXTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND BAIKAL REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FORUM SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. [1] It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. [2] What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts
and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the
suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.[3]

In the instant case, we probe what is perceived to be a blatant demonstration of forum shopping, outrageous abuse of judicial process and gross disrespect
for the authority of this Court.

For a flashback on the factual backdrop of this case: Five (5) civil actions involving the ownership of Lots Nos. 5763 and 5765 -New situated in Salawag,
Dasmarias, Cavite, were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite.[4] One of the complaints was filed by respondent Paxton Development Corporation against
petitioner Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., and against respondent Baikal Realty Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for declaration
of nullity of the Torrens Title for Lots Nos. 5763-A and 5763-B as part and parcel of Lot No. 5763, docketed as Civil Case No. 1124-95, with prayer for
damages. TOP RATE was represented in this civil case by the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 13 March 1998 the trial court rendered a Joint Decision on the five (5) civil actions, which included Civil Case No. 1124-95 -

x x x declaring Paxton Development Corporations TCT No. T-557274 which covers and describes Lot No. 5763 (5763-A and 5763-B) and TCT No. T-559147
which covers and describes Lot No. 5765-New as the lawful and valid certificates of title evidencing the lawful ownership of Paxton Development Corporation
over said lots and improvements thereon x x x x declaring Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc.s TCT No. T-147755 for Lot 5763-A and TCT No. T-
147756 for Lot 5763-B as null and void and of no force and effect x x x x directing Top Rate x x x to peacefully surrender possession of these lots to Paxton, in
the event that they are in possession of said lots x x x x directing the Register of Deeds for the province of Cavite to cancel the aforementioned titles of Top
Rate x x x x[5]

TOP RATE and the other parties in the five (5) civil cases, Baikal Realty Corporation and Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation, filed their respective notices of
appeal from the Joint Decision,[6] docketed as CA-G.R. No. CV-60656. TOP RATE was represented in the appeal by the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma.
Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 21 May 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on the various appeals affirming in toto the Joint Decision of the trial court.[7]

On 28 June 2001 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision where it was represented by the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil
L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[8] In due time, the other party-appellants followed suit.[9] Despite notice PAXTON did not file its Comment,[10] while BAIKAL as
one of the appellants moved on 27 November 2001 for the early resolution of the pending motions for reconsideration. [11]

On 14 December 2001 the appellate court promulgated a Resolution denying all motions for reconsideration.[12]

On 26 December 2001 TOP RATE through a Manifestation informed the Court of Appeals that it filed on 21 December 2001 by registered mail
a Manifestation and Motion of even date which was attached as annex thereof.[13] The Manifestation and Motion prayed -

x x x x 2. That due to compelling reasons, the Resolution dated December 14, 2001 be RECALLED and SET ASIDE x x x x 4. That thereafter, this Honorable
Court squarely resolve on the merits the issues raised by Toprate, Baikal and Hi-Tone in their separate Motions for Reconsideration; and 5. That the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Toprate and the reliefs prayed for therein be granted.

The Manifestation and Motion was signed and filed in behalf of TOP RATE by the same counsel of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through lawyers
Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[14]Incidentally, on 14 January 2002 the Court of Appeals received the Manifestation and Motion from the postal
service.[15]

On 7 January 2002, despite the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 pending with the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review from the adverse CA Decision and Resolution. The motion was signed by TOP RATEs counsel of record Gana &
Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[16] Furthermore, the motion contained a Verification/Certification under
oath executed by one Alfredo S. Hocson, President of TOP RATE, that -

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court
within five days from notice thereof.

It may be observed that the Verification/Certification did not mention the pending Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court
of Appeals.

Earlier, the other appellants BAIKAL and HI-TONE filed before this Court their respective motions for extension of time to file a petition for review of the
adverse CA Decision and Resolution.[17]

On 30 January 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the
Court of Appeals x x x.[18] Also in separate Resolutions of even date, this Court denied the motions for extension of time to file petition for review separately filed
by BAIKAL and HI-TONE on the identical ground - for lack of showing that petitioner has not lost the fifteen (15) - day reglementary period to appeal x x x it
appearing that the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed judgment is not stated in the motion.[19]

67 | P a g e
 On 4 February 2002, regardless of the denial of its motion for extension of time to file petition for review, and the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December
2001 still to be resolved by the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court its Petition for Review assailing the CA Decision of 21 May 2001 and Resolution of
14 December 2001, and praying that

x x x the Decision dated May 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 be set aside and a new one issued x x x confirming TOP RATEs lawful
ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B, Imus Estate, as well as the validity and authenticity of its TCT Nos. T-147755 (Lot 5763-A) & T-147756 (Lot 5763-B),
both issued by the Cavite Register of Deeds x x x x Declaring as absolutely null and void and no force and effect Paxtons TCT No. 557274 (Lot 5763), Serapio
Cuencas 1995 TCT 541994 (Lot 5763), and Baikals TCT 542566 (Lot 5763-B) x x x x Awarding TOP RATE the damages as prayed for in the Answer. [20]

The Petition for Review dated 4 February 2002 was signed by the same law office of Gana & Manlangit through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer
E. Manlangit.[21] The petition included a Secretarys Certificate executed by TOP RATE Corporate Secretary Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana stating thus -

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation elevate to the Supreme Court the adverse resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656
entitled Paxton Development Corporation v. Top Rate Const. & General Services, Inc., et al., and Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. The Estate and/or Heirs of Serapio
Cuenca, et al. and that its President, Arch. Alfredo S. Hocson be authorized to represent the Corporation and sign the Petition for Review on Certiorari and all
the pleadings to be filed therein.[22]

The petition also contained a Verification/Certification signed under oath by TOP RATE President Alfredo S. Hocson declaring in relevant parts

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court
within five days from notice thereof.[23]

For the second time, TOP RATEs Verification/Certification did not state that its Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 was then still pending
with the Court of Appeals.

On 18 February 2002 BAIKAL filed with this Court a Manifestation and Motion alleging that it opts to wait for whatever decision the x x x Court of Appeals
may render in the x x x Manifestation and Motion filed [with the Court of Appeals] by Top Rate Construction and General Services, without prejudice, however,
to such remedies as may be available to [Baikal Realty Corporation] in case of an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals.

On 6 March 2002 this Court resolved to deny TOP RATEs Petition for Review for petitioners failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to
file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002.[24]

On 15 March 2002 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of this Courts Resolution of 30 January 2002 by granting Top Rates timely filed motion for
extension of time, and requiring the respondent PAXTON to comment on the timely filed Petition for Review on Certiorari. [25] The motion, which was signed
again by the same Gana and Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit, did not mention the Manifestation and
Motion of 21 December 2001 awaiting decision in the Court of Appeals.[26]

Surprisingly, on 3 April 2002, TOP RATE filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 contending that
the filing of its petition before this Court was premature. For the first time, TOP RATE bared to this Court the existence of its Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001 pending in the Court of Appeals which had allegedly superseded its Petition for Review filed with this Court as the Manifestation and Motion was
taken up by a Division of Five of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.,
with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Mariano C. del Castillo as additional members. [27] The Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
on Certiorari prayed for the withdrawal of TOP RATEs petition for review without prejudice to its refiling in the future if warranted.

On 24 April 2002 this Court denied with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 30 January 2002, and noted without action
its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. It also appears that the denial of the motions for extension of time to file petition for
review separately filed by BAIKAL and HI-TONE had become final and executory.[28]

Meanwhile, on 22 April 2002 the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals resolved to defer action on the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December
2001 until after the Supreme Court has acted on [Top Rates] Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari.[29]

On 31 May 2002, apparently in response to the above-mentioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with the appellate court
a Manifestation informing the Division of Five that it may now proceed to resolve TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 in light of
the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 24 April 2002 which noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari of
2 April 2002.[30] The Manifestation was signed by TOP RATEs lawyer of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through the same lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana
and Elmer E. Manlangit.[31]

On 3 May 2002 this Court made an entry of judgment for its Resolution of 6 March 2002 denying TOP RATEs Petition for Review on Certiorari.[32]

On 2 August 2002, notwithstanding the previous denial with finality of TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review and its Petition
for Review itself, the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision granting the appeal of TOP RATE and modifying the Joint
Decision of RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, thus -

(1) TOPRATE is hereby declared to be the true and lawful owners (sic) of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B, and the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 147755 for Lot
No. 5763-A, and 147756 for Lot No. 5763-B, issued in the name of defendantappellant TOPRATE, are hereby proclaimed to be valid and lawfully issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cavite; and (2) The Cavite Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel PAXTONs Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-557274 for Lot
5763 of the Imus Estate, and any and all titles issued covering the subject properties, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect (underscoring and
emphasis in the original).[33]

Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos penned a Dissenting Opinion averring that the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 of TOP
RATE should have been dismissed since it was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Sec. 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[34]

On 23 August 2002 PAXTON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.[35] This was followed on 13 September 2002 by a Partial Motion
for Reconsideration filed by BAIKAL.[36]

On 22 October 2002 the Court of Appeals received a Letter of Transmittal from the Judicial Records Office of this Court directing the Clerk of Court of the
appellate court to return the records of [the instant case] to the x x x court of origin and to submit to this Court proof of such remand, both within five (5) days
from notice hereof.[37]

On 8 November 2002 TOP RATE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment through the same Gana & Manlangit Law Office as
represented by Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[38]

On 9 December 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and required TOP RATE and its counsel to show cause why
they should not be held liable for forum shopping within five (5) days from notice. [39]
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 On 27 January 2003 TOP RATE represented by its President Alfredo S. Hocson and its lawyer Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil
L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit filed their Complianceasserting that they had no intention to commit the abhorrent and detestable practice of forum shopping;
assuming that there was forum shopping, they did so neither willfully nor deliberately but solely to protect the interest of TOP RATE as shown by the filing of
the Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 as soon it was certain that their Petition for Review on
Certiorari was premature; the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals could have been denied as a prohibited second
motion for reconsideration, and with such denial TOP RATE would have also lost its period to file an appeal by certiorari to this Court; and, finally, neither litis
pendentia nor res judicata would have arisen in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still review the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of
Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001.[40]

On 4 February 2003 TOP RATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution dated 9 December 2002, praying that its motion to recall entry of
judgment be granted.

In the meantime, on 27 March 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution directing its Clerk of Court to return the records of this case to the
court of origin, without however making any ruling on what the court of origin would be executing as the final and executory decision, nor any statement on the
status of PAXTONs Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.[41] This Resolution seems to be a belated response to the Letter of Transmittal coming
from the Judicial Records Office of this Court directing the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals to return the records of the instant case to the trial court.

On 3 April 2003 PAXTON filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the 27 March 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals purportedly setting aside
its Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, although nothing in that Resolution validated PAXTONs submission.

On 6 May 2003 PAXTON filed another Manifestation with this Court alleging that TOP RATE moved for the issuance of a writ of execution with RTC-Br. 21
of Imus, Cavite, which was signed this time by a certain Atty. Carmelo M. Mendoza in behalf of TOP RATE.

On 16 June 2003 this Court issued a Resolution denying with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 9 December 2002 which
in turn denied petitioners urgent motion to recall entry of judgment, and further requiring TOP RATE to comment on the twin Manifestations of PAXTON.

In its Comment dated 18 July 2003, TOP RATE asserted that nowhere was it stated in the 27 March 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that the
appellate court was invalidating its Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, and that since the filing of its Petition for Review with this Court was premature, the
subsequent dismissal thereof did not set aside the Amended Decision, which allegedly stands as the decision to be executed by the trial court.

The issues to be resolved herein are: (a) whether Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., and its counsel Gana & Manlangit Law Office through
Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of forum shopping, and whether such transgression is willful and deliberate; (b) whether Attys.
Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and, (c) whether the Amended
Decision of 2 August 2002 may be reversed and set aside in the instant proceedings for being void on its face.

We have no doubt that Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. and its lawyer Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L.
Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of forum shopping.Although TOP RATE as principal party executed the several certifications of non-forum
shopping, Attys. Gana and Manlangit cannot deny responsibility therefor since Atty. Manlangit notarized the certifications and both of them definitely knew
the relevant case status after having invariably acted as counsel of TOP RATE before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and this Court.

Clearly, in seeking to reverse the 13 March 1998 Joint Decision of the trial court and the 21 May 2001 Decision of the appellate court and to perfect
ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B upon similar causes and the same reliefs, TOP RATE and its lawyers committed forum shopping when they resorted
simultaneously to both this Court by means of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Court of Appeals through their Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001. This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of their twin devious strategies, and shows not only their lack of faith in this Court in its
evenhanded administration of law but also their expression of disrespect if not ridicule for our judicial process and orderly procedure.

Furthermore, while TOP RATE and its counsel moved to withdraw their Petition for Review for whatever such maneuver was worth, they did so only after
they had been rebuffed in this Court. In doing so, they themselves proved that their coordinated actions were carried out purposely to increase their chances of
securing a favorable decision. As has been held, a party is said to have sought to improve his odds of obtaining a sympathetic decision or action where after an
unfavorable decision has been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts, he seeks to abandon the adverse proceeding and
concentrate his attention on the remaining case. [42]

The instant case is similar to E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority.[43] In E. Razon, Inc., petitioners after filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the Supreme Court filed an hour later a similar petition before the Regional Trial Court and, having been assured
of a favorable action by the latter court, then sought the withdrawal of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forum-shopping, the Court
holding that (t)he acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts
and abusing their processes.[44]

What aggravates the transgression perpetrated by TOP RATE and its lawyers is that they deceived the highest court of the land. In all the certificates of
non-forum shopping they presented to this Court, they did not reveal the existence of their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 which they
claimed was still pending before the Court of Appeals. They divulged this secret only after their motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and
their Petition for Review on Certiorari were denied by this Court, and only after they had filed their motion for reconsideration of such denials.

If TOP RATE and its counsel genuinely believed that their recourse to this Court was premature, why then did they still ask for a reconsideration of
the Resolutions denying their motion for extension and Petition for Review? Evidently they were venturing on two (2) fronts, and presumably simply awaiting
auspicious word or two on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 before finally disclosing their real intent.

Worse, in their attempt to extricate themselves from the prejudicial Resolutions of this Court, TOP RATE and its counsel had the temerity to ask for the
withdrawal of their Petition for Review, again on the insolent assertion that their resort to this Court was premature. For the record, it took them four (4) months
from 21 December 2001 when they filed their Manifestation and Motion up to 3 April 2002 when they submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review on Certiorari, to concoct the theory of prematurity!

To be sure, there is no merit in the claim that the Petition for Review initiated by TOP RATE and its lawyers was premature. TOP RATE and its lawyers are
estopped from claiming that this initiatory pleading was premature for it was their unwavering representation before this Court that the Court of Appeals had
already rendered a final and appealable decision when they filed their motion for extension of time and ultimately their Petition for Review. The filing of such
petition presupposes the finality of the judgment subject of appeal.

In any event, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (which is a restatement of Sec. 8, Rule 9, of the old Revised Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals) explicitly provides that (n)o motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a
petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for
reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned. Verily, although a motion for reconsideration is still before the Court of Appeals, the motion
is deemed vacated once the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked.

The lawyers of TOP RATE are not excused from engaging in forum shopping for the reason that their clients interests were then paramount. On the
contrary, this assertion coming as it does from their Compliance of 25 January 2003 in reply to our show cause order, very well confirms the identical causes
and their reliefs of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 as both were calculated to quash the adverse
decisions of the Court of Appeals.

It bears stressing that a lawyer truly worth his oath pledges allegiance not only to his clients but also to society, the legal profession and the courts, for
the clients cause is not all encompassing nor perpetually overriding. Moreover, if their purpose in filing the Petition for Review even while the Manifestation and
Motion was pending with the Court of Appeals is to protect some entitlements of TOP RATE, are they implying that the Supreme Court is incapable of defending
such asserted right? But the court a quo can? We certainly cannot unfold our compassionate mantle in this instance, and instead, we must lay our disciplinary
hand to strike down the reprehensible ploy employed by TOP RATE and Attys. Gana and Manlangit.

69 | P a g e
 TOP RATE and its lawyers cannot rectify their forum shopping by arguing that litis pendentia and res judicata would not have arisen in the instant case
since the Supreme Court may still review the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December
2001.

This argument is patently misplaced. For precisely, the concurrent pleadings of TOP RATE and its lawyers exhibit the element of litis pendentia and res
judicata alleged by them to be absent, i.e., the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in any event and regardless of which party is
successful, since the action of this Court on the Petition for Review will surely bind the other pending action on the same cause in the court a quo. Moreover, how
can this Court still resolve on appeal such subsequent decision when it has already decided with finality the same cause upon which the later decision was
supposedly based? The purported review by this Court of the ensuing decision would have been barred by res judicata. Incidentally, in Crisostomo v. Securities
and Exchange Commission[45] where forum shopping was detected, the infringing cases were filed with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

We also rule that the forum shopping pulled off by TOP RATE and its lawyers is willful and deliberate. As reflected in the Secretarys Certificate authorizing
the President of TOP RATE to file the necessary pleadings in court to question the adverse decisions of the Court of Appeals, Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana as TOP
RATE Corporate Secretary attested to the collective desire to file the Petition for Review even while the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 was still
pending with the Court of Appeals.

In addition, the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals which prayed for the same reliefs as the Petition for Review before this Court was
deemed filed as early as 21 December 2001, yet its existence was disclosed to this Court only on 3 April 2002 when TOP RATE and its lawyers submitted
their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari. What is more, this underhanded sense of honesty was triggered only after the
adverse Resolutions of this Court were promulgated. Prior to this confession, TOP RATE as abetted by its lawyers executed certificates of non-forum shopping
in its motion for extension of time to file petition for review and its Petition for Review itself, which contained no reference to the filing or pendency of
the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals. In fact, even as TOP RATE moved to reconsider the denial of its motion for time and Petition for
Review, there was no mention whatsoever of its existence.

We also keenly observe how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit instigated the Court of Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and
Motion of 21 December 2001, thereby consummate and realize the fruits of their forum shopping, when they nonchalantly alleged in one of
their Manifestations before the Court of Appeals that the appellate court may already proceed to resolve TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motiondespite their
knowledge that their Petition for Review had been denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition was not granted.

Obviously, under the foregoing state of facts, forum shopping was crafted willfully and deliberately with the sole objective of endorsing whichever
proceeding would yield favorable consequences to TOP RATEs interests.

On the second issue, we hold that Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and Manlangit Law Office, counsel of record of TOP
RATE, are administratively liable for grotesque violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In arriving at this conclusion, we strongly note how Attys.
Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit prompted the Court of Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 and thereby
complete the process of forum shopping, despite their knowledge that their Petition for Review had been denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw
such petition was not granted.

Under Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, willful and deliberate forum shopping constitutes direct contempt of court and a cause for
administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum shopping is found. [46]

The lawyers of record of TOP RATE, as all other lawyers, should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes their oath of office.

A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and legal processes;[47] shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening the confidence in the legal system;[48] shall observe the rules of procedure and not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice;[49] shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause;[50] shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness;[51] shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law; [52] and, shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client x x x x[53]

This Court has time and again warned counsel of litigants not to abuse court processes, especially not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs
the court dockets. Regrettably, TOP RATEs counsel of record failed to internalize and observe with due regard the honorable tenets of the legal profession and
the noble mission of our courts of justice.

In previous cases[54] the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in forum shopping ranged from severe censure to suspension from the
practice of law. In the instant case, the suspension of Attys. Gana and Manlangit from the practice of law for six (6) months from finality of
this Resolution should make them realize the seriousness of the consequences and implications of their abuse of judicial process and disrespect for judicial
authority.

Finally, on the third issue, this Court has no choice but to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 2 August
2002 for being void on its face. To be sure, the instant proceeding is a collateral attack on such decision since the issue of its validity is involved in this action
only as a mere incident.[55] Of course, this attack is proper only when the assailed judgment is null on its face, as where it is patent that the court which rendered
the judgment in question has no jurisdiction.[56] Parenthetically, forum shopping is consummated although the court in which one of the suits was brought has
no jurisdiction over the action.[57]

In Macabingkil v. Peoples Homesite and Development Corporation[58] we held that a collateral attack is proper against a challenged judgment which is void
upon its face or where the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. The nullity must be shown from the averments of the questioned
decision or the documents in the record itself, and not upon mere errors of judgment but on the ground that the court had no power or authority to grant the
relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or both.[59] A proceeding for contempt of court is an appropriate collateral vehicle for declaring a
judgment void, provided that the aforementioned requisites for such action are present. [60]

When the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, TOP RATE had already filed with this Court its
motion for extension of time to file petition for review and thereafter its Petition for Review. What is worse, even before the Amended Decision was handed down,
this Court had already denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the Court of
Appeals x x x x; thereafter denied its Petition for Review for petitioners failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to file petition in the resolution of
30 January 2002; and, denied with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the adverse Resolutions, as well as noted without action its Manifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court of Appeals has lost jurisdiction to rule on the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001. As earlier
mentioned, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals bluntly affirms that no motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the
movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or
motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned. As the jurisdiction of this Court had been
summoned, it was too late in the day for the appellate court to act upon the Manifestation and Motion and enter a new decision on the merits.

Our ruling in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals[61] is instructive. In that case, the trial court granted plaintiff a writ of preliminary injunction
against defendants, which the latter challenged before the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the immediate lifting
thereof. While the certiorari petition to review the writ was still pending in the appellate court, defendants filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the
writ, offering to post a counterbond for that purpose. As prayed for, the trial court dissolved the writ and denied plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals upon being apprised of the trial courts action dismissed the petition for certiorari for having become moot
and academic.

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 The issue in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. was whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary injunction even after the same
had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review. This Court ineluctably ruled

The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for determination of the propriety of its
issuance x x x the trial court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could not interfere with or preempt the
action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ x x x whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift
the writ x x x Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether the writ x x x should be annulled or continued had been
elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter x x x x They improperly tried to moot
their own petition in the Court of Appeals - a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court x x x x Judicial
courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ x x x and defer to the better judgment of the Court of Appeals the determination of whether the
writ should be continued or discontinued x x x x The private respondents application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ x x x that was pending
review in the Court of Appeals was a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower courts proceeding being void for
lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and the petition to annul the writ x x x should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping x x x x[62]

The absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo is manifest not only from the voluminous rollo compiled by the Court of Appeals but also from
the four corners of the Amended Decision. From the case record, we will find copies of TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review,
its Petition for Review, the adverse Resolutions of this Court denying the motion for extension of time to file petition for review and the Petition for
Review itself. The case record also informs us of the denial with finality of TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the unfavorable Resolutions of this Court as
well as the noting without action of its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. From these circumstances alone, we can clearly infer
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to promulgate the Amended Decision.

Moreover, in the 22 April 2002 Resolution of the Division of Five, action on the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 was deferred until after
the Supreme Court has acted on [Top Rates] Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari. [63] This implies that the appellate court
was well-aware that TOP RATE had summoned the authority of this Court. Finally, in the Dissenting Opinion which forms an integral part of the Amended
Decision, there are unmistakable references to the Petition for Review which was filed with this Court while the Manifestation and Motion was still pending in
the Court of Appeals

On April 24, 2002 this Court deferred action on appellant TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2001 x x x due to the pendency in the
Supreme Court of TOP RATEs Motion to Withdraw the Petition for Review on Certiorari it earlier filed therein x x x x On June 7, 2002 this Division received a
copy of the Supreme Courts Resolution dismissing with finality TOP RATEs Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution dismissing TOP RATEs Petition for
Review x x x x

Undoubtedly, we can nullify the Amended Decision in the instant case since the dearth of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule upon the Manifestation
and Motion can be plainly discerned not only from the case record but also from the text of the assailed decision itself.

WHEREFORE, we Resolve to (a) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-60656
and REINSTATE its Decision of 21 May 2001 (affirming in totothe Joint Decision of 13 March 1998 of the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite); (b) DECLARE Attys. Luis Ma.
Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and Manlangit Law Office as well as its client Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc.,
in CONTEMPT of this Court and DIRECT Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana, Atty. Elmer E. Manlangit and Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., to each pay
a fine of P10,000.00 within five (5) days from finality of this Resolution; and, (c) SUSPEND from the practice of law Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit for six (6) months effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that any future violation of their duties as lawyers will be dealt with more
severely.

Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. shall PAY double costs in this instance.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the Bar records of Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit, and served upon the Court of Appeals,
the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite, the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper dissemination among its chapters
all over the country, and for whatever appropriate action they may deem proper to take under the premises.

SO ORDERED.

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 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78569 February 11, 1991

EARTH MINERALS EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MALACAÑANG, MANILA, BUREAU OF MINES DIRECTOR
BENJAMIN A. GONZALES, AND PHILZEA MINING AND DEV. CORP., respondents.

Domingo G. Foronda and Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Fortunato F. L. Viray, Jr. for private respondent Philzea Mining & Development Corporation.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking the reversal of the decision 1

dated June 27, 1986 and resolution2

dated May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary in O.P. Case No. 3023. The decision and resolution set aside the orders of the Minister of Natural
Resources and Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated November 7, 1985 rendered in MNR Case No. 6353 and July 23, 1985 rendered in Mines Sp. Case No.
V-183, respectively, that upheld petitioner's action to cancel/rescind the mining contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite Mining Co.,
Inc. and private respondent Philzea Mining and Development Corporation.

The antecedent facts and the proceedings that spawned the instant case, are as follows:

Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (Zambales Chromite, for short) is the exclusive owner of ten (10) patentable chromite mining claims located in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. On September 11, 1980, Zambales Chromite, as claim-owner, on one hand, and Philzea Mining and Development
Corporation (Philzea Mining, for short, herein private respondent) as operator, on the other, entered into a "Contract of Development, Exploitation and
Productive Operation" on the ten (10) patentable mining claims (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 120). During the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc.
(Earth Minerals, for short, herein petitioner) submitted a Letter of Intent on June 30, 1984 to Zambales Chromite whereby the former proposed and the latter
agreed to operate the same mining area subject of the earlier agreement between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining (Annex "D", Rollo, p. 111). On August
10, 1984, Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals concretized their aforementioned Letter of Intent when they entered into an "Operating Agreement" (Annex
"E", Rollo, p. 112) for the latter to operate the same mining area. Consequently, the same mining property of Zambales Chromite became the subject of
different agreements with two separate and distinct operators. On November 29, 1984, petitioner Earth Minerals filed with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences (BMGS, for short) a petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining, pursuant t Section 7, P.D. 1281 which
provides, inter alia:

Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration,
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining operators;

(b) . . . .

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions
thereof.

In its petition, Earth Minerals alleged, among others, that Philzea Mining committed grave and serious violations of the latter's contract with Zambales
Chromite among which are: failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite ores; failure to pay ad valorem taxes; failure to put up assay buildings and
offices, all resulting in the non-productivity and non-development of the mining area.

On December 10, 1984, Philzea Mining filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Earth Minerals is not the proper party in interest and that the petition
lacks cause of action. The motion to dismiss was, however, denied by the BMGS in an order dated January 24, 1985 holding that "there appears some color of
right" on Earth Minerals to initiate the petition for cancellation (Annex "G", Rollo, p. 120). A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by
the BMGS in an order dated March 4, 1985. Thereafter, Philzea Mining elevated the case to then Ministry (now Department) of Natural Resources (MNR, for
short) which in its order of April 23, 1985 dismissed the appeal for the reason that the order of the BMGS was an interlocutory order that could not be the
proper subject of an appeal.

On May 2, 1985, Philzea Mining appealed to the Office of the President the order of MNR dated April 23, 1985. During the pendency thereof, Earth Minerals
filed with the MNR a motion for execution of the MNR order of April 23, 1985.

On May 30, 1985, the MNR issued an order directing the BMGS to conduct the necessary investigation in order to hasten the development of the mining claims
in question (Rollo, p. 93). In compliance therewith, the BMGS on June 7, 1985, ordered the private respondent Philzea Mining to file its answer to Earth
Mineral's petition for rescission. Philzea Mining moved to reconsider but the motion was denied.

72 | P a g e
Philzea Mining did not submit its answer. Accordingly, the BMGS resolved the petition for rescission on the basis of documents submitted ex parte by herein
petitioner. Finding that Philzea Mining grossly violated the terms and conditions of the mining contract between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite, the
BMGS rendered a decision on July 23,1985, cancelling said mining contract, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, this Office finds and so holds that the Operating Agreement dated September 11, 1980 executed by and between
Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining should be, as is hereby cancelled. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the
mining area subject of the instant case and turn over the possession thereof to the claimowner and/or herein petitioner. (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 130).

Aggrieved by the decision of the BMGS, Philzea Mining, aside from filing a notice of appeal to the MNR on July 29, 1985, also filed a petition for certiorari with
the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on July 30,1985, docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715, to annul or set aside the decision of the
BMGS.

On November 4, 1985, the Office of the President promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR dated April 23,
1985, on the ground that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and cannot be the subject of an appeal (Annex "L", Rollo, p.
137).

On November 7, 1985, the MNR on the other hand, issued another order this time dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the BMGS dated
July 23, 1985.

On November 18, 1985 Philzea Mining appealed the aforementioned November 7, 1985 decision of the MNR to the Office of the President.

Meanwhile, on December 26,1985, the then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition filed by Philzea Mining in AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715.

Back to the appeal of Philzea Mining to the Office of the President, the disputed decision dated June 27, 1986 was issued by the then Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, dated November 7 and July 23, 1985,
respectively, are hereby set aside. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 92).

A motion for reconsideration dated July 12,1986 (Annex "U", Rollo, p. 190) was filed by petitioner Earth Minerals which, however, was denied by the then
Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig in his resolution dated May 5, 1987, which reads in part:

Wherefore, the instant motion for reconsideration by appellee Earth Minerals is hereby denied for lack of merit and the Decision of this Office dated
June 27, 1986 is hereby reiterated. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 98).

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of the Court dated July 1989, the Court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition and (b) to require the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 382).

The principal issues in the case at hand are as follows: (a) whether or not the appeal of the private respondent Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR
dated November 7,1985 to the Office of the President was made out of time and (b) whether or not the petitioner Earth Minerals is the proper party to seek
cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite.

The petitioner contends that the last day to appeal the decision of the MNR dated November 7, 1985 fell on November 16, 1985, that is five (5) days from the
date of its receipt by the private respondent on November 11, 1985 and since the notice of appeal dated November 15,1985 was filed on November 18, 1985,
the appeal was taken beyond the five-day reglementary period.

Public respondent counters that the ground invoked by the petitioner is too technical in view of the fact that November 16, 1985 was a Saturday and the
following day (November 17, 1985) was a Sunday.

The Court, in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. (154 SCRA 49 [1987]) resolved the same issue in this wise:

Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Sec. 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended.

The same law provides:

Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday — Where the day or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be
done on the next succeeding business day.

Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this Court in accordance therewith has invariably held that in case the last day
for doing an act is a legal holiday, the last day for doing the same, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day (Gonzaga v. De David,
110 Phil. 463 [1960]; Calano v. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247 [1957]; Austria et al. v. Solicitor General, 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).

In the case under consideration, as the next working day after November 16, 1985 was November 18, 1985 — a Monday, it is evident that the private
respondent's appeal was filed on time.

Be that as it may, the private respondent's appeal within the reglementary period to the Office of the President does not help them much in the instant case.

The public respondent argues that the petitioner Earth Minerals is not the proper party to file the petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales
Chromite and Philzea Mining citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract takes effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.

The contention is untenable.

Indeed, a contract takes effect only between the parties who made it, and also their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Article 1311, New Civil Code). Since a contract may be

73 | P a g e
violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant must be
parties to said contract. In relation thereto, Article 1397 of the Civil Code lays the general rule that an action for the annulment of contracts can only be
maintained by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. The rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in Teves v.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (23 SCRA 1141 [1968]) held that a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which
could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. This exception to the rule has been applied in Banez v. CA (59 SCRA 15
[1974]; Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]; Dilson Enterprises Inc. v. IAC, 170 SCRA 676 [1989]).

Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining, not as a party to the contract but because his
rights are prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and detriment to the rights and interest of petitioner stems from the continued existence of the
contract between Zambales Chromite and private respondent Philzea Mining. Unless and until the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining is
cancelled, petitioner's contract with the former involving the same mining area cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own obligations and derive
benefits under its contract. The Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences in his order denying Philzea Mining's motion to dismiss the petition for cancellation of the
operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite stated:

From the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, i.e., the Letter of Intent and Operating Agreement between Zambales Chromite and
Earth Minerals, it may be gleaned that, at least, there appears some color of right on the part of petitioner to request for cancellation/rescission of
the contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining.

Moreover, the record amply shows that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources was supported by substantial
evidence. As found by the Bureau of Mines in its decision dated July 23, 1985, the violations committed by Philzea Mining were not only violations of its
operating agreement with Zambales Chromite but of mining laws as well.

In affirming the abovementioned decision, the Minister of Natural Resources made the following statements:

Moreover, the appellant by filing a Manifestation on October 1, 1985 wherein it prayed that the decision appealed from be reviewed motu propio by
this Office, is an implied admission that it has no justification whether in fact or in law, for its appeal; otherwise, it could have specified them in the
appeal memorandum that it is bound by law to file. (p. 142, Rollo)

In such cases, the Court has uniformly held that, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
[1940]). Still in later cases, the Court continued that such finding will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission v. Lood, 162 SCRA 762 [1984]; Atlas Consolidated v. Factoran, Jr., supra).

The decision, therefore, of the Deputy Executive Secretary reversing the decisions of the Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Mines cannot be
sustained. This is in line with the pronouncement of the Court that the factual findings of the Secretary should be respected in the absence of any illegality,
error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which was proved by the public and private respondents (Heirs of Santiago Pastoral v. Secretary of Public Works and
Highways, 162 SCRA 619 [1988]).

Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the records show that on July 29, 1985, after Philzea Mining had filed its notice of appeal to MNR from the July 23,
1985 decision of the BMGS, it also filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court on July 30, 1985, docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715
praying for the annulment of the same July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS. When the MNR rendered its November 7, 1985 decision affirming the July 23, 1985
decision of the BMGS, private respondent Philzea Mining, notwithstanding the pendency of its petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court,
filed its notice of appeal to the Office of the President from the said decision of the MNR stating therein that its appeal was "without prejudice to the pending
petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715" (Rollo, p. 80).

The foregoing facts show a case of forum shopping.

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable court ruling (Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. Nos. 89095 and 89555, November 6, 1989).

One last point, the motion to dismiss filed by Philzea before this Court on September 5, 1989, on the ground that the petition has become moot and academic
in view of the expiration on August 10, 1989 of the five (5) year term contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals executed by August 10, 1984
should be denied.

The contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals provides, inter alia:

5. Others.

A. During the existence of this agreement, Earth Minerals is free to look for, and negotiate with, an interested party who is financially capable of
operating the CLAIMS on a much bigger scale . . . and in connection therewith, may assign this agreement in favor of said party; . . . .

In view of such provision, Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite jointly entered into a "Mining Agreement", dated June 16, 1988, with Acoje Mining Co., Inc.,
the salient provisions of which reads:

ZCMC and EMEI jointly desire to protect Acoje from any and all claims (present or future) against it (Acoje) with respect the title and/or possession
of the PROPERTIES and this protection against all claims of third parties or entities during the life of this Mining Agreement is one of the main
considerations why Acoje agreed to enter into this Agreement.

Sec. 1. . . . provided, however, that EMEI obligates itself to continue representing its interest as party in the aforesaid cases pending with the
Supreme Court. (Annex "1", Rollo, p. 397).

The mining agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, on one hand, and Acoje Mining, on the other, expressly recognizes the pendency of the
case at bar, so that herein petitioner Earth Minerals has the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, and during the effectivity of such Mining
Agreement, both Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite are under obligation to assure peaceful possession of the mining properties from the claims of third
parties.

74 | P a g e
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby GRANTED; (b) the decision dated June 27, 1986 and resolution dated
May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and (c) the orders of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated July
23, 1985 and Minister of Natural Resources dated November 7, 1985 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43866 May 30, 1988

PETRONIO COLLADO and ROMUALDA COLLADO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. HAROLD M. HERNANDO as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Abra, JUANITO F. GO, MAY V. GO, AGRIPINO BRILLANTES and
JULIANA B. BRILLANTES, respondents.

Paterno Aquino for petitioners.

Agripino A. Brillantes for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the facts are in dispute and, thus, a trial should have been conducted by respondent judge to ascertain the true facts.
A finding of grave abuse of discretion is therefore inevitable. But for reasons to be stated later, this Court is constrained to hold that, under the circumstances,
the writ of certiorari shall not issue.

From the record, the following may be deduced.

On January 16, 1976, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against private respondents, alleging that they were the owners
of a parcel of residential land situated in Bangued, Abra described and declared under Tax Declaration No. 23174 in the name of petitioner Romualda Mailed
Collation petitioners having purchased the same from Bonifacia Collada on March 20, 1952 and since then had been in the possession of the land until
November 1975, when private respondents spouses Go occupied the same.

In their answer, private respondents claimed that the land formerly belonged to Maria Barreras who sold it in 1942 to respondents-spouses Brillantes who
since then took possession thereof until November 1975 when they sold the land to the spouses Go.

Following a pre-trial conference, respondent judge issued a pre-trial order dated March 17, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by Atty. Agripino Brillantes and in behalf of his co-defendants, they are hereby given a period of 15 days from
today to submit their documentary evidence in support of their defense and Atty. Paterno Aquino for the plaintiffs is likewise given a
period of 15 days from today to submit their additional documentary evidence, after which, with or without said documentary evidence,
the pre-trial conference is closed and terminated and that the parties by representation of their respective counsels finally agreed to
submit the case for decision, hence, this Court, thereafter, shall consider the same submitted for decision. [Rollo, p. 17].

Said order also stated:

This court therefore ordered the parties to agree ion some undisputed facts already appearing in their pleadings and they agreed as follows:

1. That the parties have the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the parties agreed that the property in question is a residential denial land located in the poblacion of Bangued, Abra, bounded on
the north by Maura Felisco; on the east by National Road; on the south by Federico Villamor before but now Benjamin Aznar; and on the
west by Wenceslao Valera de Banez according to the plaintiffs, and Presentacion Bersamin according to the defendants;

3. That the approximate area of the residential lot in question is, according to the plaintiff, 207 square meters, while according to the
defendants, it is 300 sq. meters, more or less;

4. That the party who will lost (sic) in this case shall pay for attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 to the winning party. [Rollo, pp.
13-14.]
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 xxx xxx xxx

This court further inquired from the plaintiffs, thru counsel, Atty. Paterno Aquino, if what is (sic) the subject matter of the oral evidence they
would intend to present in this case and Atty. Aquino statedthat the land in question originally belonged to Andres Collado, now deceased,
who had been in actual, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner for a period of
more than 30 years including the possession of his predecessor in interest; that after the death of Andres Collado, the property was
inherited by Bonifacia Collado who continued the possession in the same manner as that of Andres Collado in the concept of owner; that
in 1952, said Bonifacia Collado executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Petronio Collado and Romualda B. Mailed covering the land
in suit. . . that since the time of the purchase up to the present, they have been in actual, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of
the land in question in the concept of absolute owner and that they have paid the realty taxes ...

... .This court likewise asked the defendants, thru Atty. Brillantes, the nature or subject matter of their oral evidence and he informed the
court as follows:

That the property in question formerly belonged to Maria Barreras having been in possession of the property for more that 20 years
before 1942; that the same Maria Barreras sold the said property to the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Agripino Brillantes; that the document of
sale was notarized by the late Atty. Abraham Cardenas and it was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra but all
public records were burned during the bombing of the town of Bangued on March 10, 1945 so that said document is not now available;
that the vendees Agripino Brillantes and Juliana Balmaceda-Brillantes occupied the property physically by allowing Julia Bigornia and
Jose Bambilla to stay on the lot until it was sold to the herein defendants Juanita F. Go and May Valera-Go on October 1, 1975; that after
the property was sold to the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanito F. Go, the house of Jose Bambilla and Julia Bigornia was removed and
another house of strong materials was construed by defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanita F. Go valued at P110,000.00 but is still incomplete;
that the lot in question has been mortgaged by the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanito F. Go with the Development Bank of the Philippines in
the amount of P44,000.00; that Andres Collado and Maria Barreras were common-law husband and wife as they were not legally married
and that Bonifacia Collado never occupied the property because she had not been in Bangued for a long time now but defendant Agripino
Brillantes was informed that said Bonifacia Collado is presently in Manila. [Rollo, pp. 14-16; Emphasis supplied].

On April 21, 1976, the trial court rendered judgment, without trial on the merits, dismissing the complaint on the basis of the documentary evidence
submitted for marking and the manifestation of the parties respective counsels as to what they intend to prove through the oral evidence they will present.

On April 30, 1976, petitioner filed in the trial court a "Motion for Modification of Order and To Set Aside Judgment" alleging that their counsel made no
representation agreeing to consider the case submitted for decision. The court denied the motion in an order dated May 14, 1976 for lack of interest to
prosecute the same as petitioners and their counsel faded to appear during the hearing on the motion. Petitioners moved to reconsider the order but the same
was denied.

Hence, petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari with this Court to annul the pre-trial order dated March 17, 1976 issued by respondent
judge as well as his decision dated April 21, 1976, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

In a resolution dated June 2, 1976, the Court commented that it was "not inclined to sanction the rendition of a judgment based on nothing more than mere
representations of the parties of what they intend to prove, without actually presenting their oral evidence,. particularly where, as in the instant case, it is
evident that their factual theories contradict each other." [Rollo, P. 45]. This observation was reiterated by the Court in resolutions dated August 4, 1976
[Rollo, p. 56] and October 6, 1976 [Rollo, P. 76].

Subsequently, in his rejoinder received by the Court on August 25, 1976, respondent judge manifested to the Court that petitioners had appealed his decision
to the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 58-65-]. This fact was not disclosed by petitioners in their petition. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 59738R.

After petitioners waived their right to file a memorandum, private respondents adopted respondent judge's rejoinder as their memorandum and respondent
judge filed his memorandum, the case was submitted for decision on February 7, 1977. In the meantime, the Court of Appeals had been regularly inquiring
from that Tribunal about the status of the instant case [Rollo, p. 90, et seq.]

There is no dispute that the procedure followed by respondent judge in hearing and deciding the case was not in accord with the procedure prescribed by the
Rules of Court. The pertinent section of the Rules of Court could not be more specific:

Sec. 2. Agreed statement of facts. — The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon the facts involved in the litigation, and require
judgment of the court upon the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence.

If the parties can agree only on soon of the facts in issue, trial shall be held as to the others. [Rule 30; Emphasis supplied]

As the parties have already agreed on some facts, trial should have been held on the disputed factual issues. Respondent judge, however, adopted a procedure
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. In lieu of hearing the testimonies of the witnesses of the parties on the disputed facts, he proceeded to render a decision
on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the parties for marking as exhibits and their respective counsel's manifestation regarding the gist of
the testimonial evidence they intend to introduce during the trial. The exhibits have not yet even been formally offered, much less admitted in evidence. Thus,
they could not be considered by the court [Rule 132, Sec. 35].

However, in spite of the irregularity of the procedure followed by respondent judge, this Court holds that the issuance of the writ of certiorari is not proper.

A more fitting factual backdrop that would call for the reiteration of the rule that essential to the issuance of the writ of certiorari is that there be no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the petitioner [Rule 66, Sec. 1] could not be found. In that case, the
emergency requisite to the issuance of the writ does not obtain. The remedy of appeal is available, as in fact an appeal was filed by petitioners in the Court of
Appeals.

Perhaps this is the reason for petitioners' failure to state in their petition the jurisdictional allegation that "there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

This Court frowns upon petitioners' omission in not disclosing to the Court that an appeal had been filed in and was pending before the Court of Appeals.
Information on the existence and status of the appeal only came out in respondent judge's rejoinder. Thereafter, unable to deny its existence, petitioners
reasoned out "that the present civil action has not become moot and academic by said appeal because the appeal is still pending before the Court of Appeals
and a long way to termination of the same including possible appeal from said court to this Court. On the contrary, the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for
in the present special civil action would render moot and academic the aforesaid appeal." [Rollo, p. 71]. This is a classic case of forum-shopping which this Court
definitely cannot and will not countenance. What aggravates petitioners case is that they chose to trifle with the highest court of the land.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Counsel for petitioners, Atty. Patemo Aquino, is ADMONISHED for forum-shopping and with the jurisdiction
of this Court. He is WARNED that any further misconduct wig be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be appended to the record of Atty.
Aquino.

Respondent judge is REMINDED to comply faithfully with the procedure provided in the Rules of Court. Let a copy of this decision be appended to his record.

As the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 59738-R is pending in the Court of Appeals, and said Court has desisted from acting on the case before it pending disposition of
the case by this Tribunal, let a copy of this Decision be immediately sent to the Court of Appeals to enable said Court to dispose of the case with deliberate
dispatch.

Treble costs against petitioners.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar,
and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691[1] has divested Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section
261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public
school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the
cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen,
Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.

c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor only.

In an Order[2] issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the
cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, [3] the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in
each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the
same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to
hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or
fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated

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 thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6)
years.

The two motions[4] for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal
Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, [5] the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public
respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles,
Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged
orders of public respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.

In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged
orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the
imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its
provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not
more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.[6] It reads as follows:

SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private
respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-
military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of
not less than one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals[7] that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific
provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto
mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; [8] and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[9] as
amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a
certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the
general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means
be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from
the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any,
to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law,[10] to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself,[11] to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.[12]

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 Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his
reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration[13] he filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case
of Alberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses
relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be
punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the
special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over
criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded
jurisdiction.(Underscoring ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower
courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the
Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception
exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election
offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election
Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691 does
not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as
indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume
245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or
rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the
decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [14] mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August
1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases
with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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