1. Pobre v.

Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

Antero J. Pobre, in his sworn complaint with invites the Court’s attention to the following
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor: 

“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. 

I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position of Chief Justice if I was to be surrounded
by idiots. 

I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.” 

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court. 

Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against
the lady senator. 
In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the said statements. 

She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. 

According to her, the purpose of her speech, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. 

She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the
Judicial Bar Council  which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the
soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. 

She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief
Justice. 

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.” 
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña,
Jr. v. Pendatun, said: “Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. 

As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for
“it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that
he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” 

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. 

Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. 

The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

2. Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Facts: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59.

He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his

parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.

It was stated in the House Resolution No. 59 that Sergio Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege
speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” (President Garcia). There, he claimed to have
been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things” at
premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the
gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential
office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.

The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was
authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it,
and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.

Meanwhile, the special committee continued
Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend
disorderly behavior and acting on such report,
House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty
from office for fifteen months.
to perform its task, and after giving
himself, found him guilty of serious
the House approved on the same day
as recommended, and suspending him

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension.

Issue: Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted

parliamentary immunity for speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their
words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than
Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

3. ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v . HON. O. PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et
al .

FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that
evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court
to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to
be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court
to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
b. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to
allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator
c. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal
treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That
the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the
stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is
uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
“regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” 

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior
term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty
conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may
be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate
of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner
to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February
2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath
of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial
court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.

Gimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)

FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban,
of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:
No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned
publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to
say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized
to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
5. Trillanes v. Marigomen

Facts:

Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate

Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on
Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City
Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related
anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials.

Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee
(SBRS) hearing on P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto
Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice President Jejomar
Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-hectare estate in Barangay
Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay, about 150
hectares of which have already been developed, with paved roads, manicured lawns,
a mansion with resort-style swimming pool, man-made lakes, Japanese gardens, a
horse stable with practice race tracks, an extensive farm for fighting cocks, green
houses and orchards.

According to petitioner, Mercado related in said hearing that because VP Binay's wife
would not allow the estate's developer, Hillmares' Construction Corporation (HCC),
to charge the development expenses against VP Binay's 13% share in kickbacks from
all Makati infrastructure projects, HCC was compelled to add the same as "overprice"
on Makati projects, particularly the Makati City Hall Parking Building.

Petitioner averred that private respondent (Antonio Tiu) thereafter claimed

"absolute ownership" of the estate, albeit asserting that it only covered 145
hectares, through his company called Sunchamp Real Estate Corporation
(Sunchamp), which purportedly entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with a certain Laureano R. Gregorio, Jr. (Gregorio, Jr.), the alleged owner of the
consolidated estate and its improvements.

Petitioner further averred that private respondent testified before the SBRS on the so-
called Hacienda Binay on October 22 and 30, 2014, and at the October 30, 2014
hearing, the latter presented a one-page Agreement dated January 18, 2013 between
Sunchamp and Gregorio. On its face, the Agreement covered a 150-hectare property
in Rosario, Batangas and showed a total consideration of P400 Million, payable in
tranches and in cash and/or listed shares, adjustable based on the fair market value.
The Agreement likewise ostensibly showed that Gregorio is obligated to cause the
registration of improvements in the name of Sunchamp and within two years, to
deliver titles/documents evidencing the real and enforceable rights of Sunchamp, and
the latter, in the interim, shall have usufruct over the property, which is extendible.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during
gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and in reply
to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim over the estate, he
expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents, private
respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of
the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

On October 22, 2014, private respondent (Antonio Tiu) filed a Complaint for
Damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV, for the
latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014,
specifically his repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP
Binay.

Private respondent alleged that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in various

businesses primarily in the agricultural sector, and that he has substantial
shareholdings, whether in his own name or through his holding companies, in
numerous corporations and companies, globally, some of which are publicly listed. He
averred that because of petitioner's defamatory statements, his reputation was
severely tarnished as shown by the steep drop in the stock prices of his publicly
listed companies, AgriNurture, Inc. (AgriNurture) (6% drop), of which he is the
Executive Chairman, and Greenergy Holdings, Inc. (Greenergy) (10% drop), of
which he is the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer.

He further averred that such statements were not absolutely privileged since they
were not uttered in the discharge of petitioner's functions as a Senator, or
qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, nor constitutive of
fair commentaries on matters of public interest.

 
 Answer with Motion to Dismiss:

1.  Private respondent failed to state and substantiate his cause of action since
petitioner's statement that private respondent was acting as a "front," "nominee" or
"dummy" of VP Binay for his Hacienda Binay is a statement of fact.

a.  Private respondent was unable to prove his alleged ownership of the
subject estate, and that Mercado had testified that VP Binay is the
actual and beneficial owner thereof, based on his personal knowledge
and his participation in the consolidation of the property.

2.  His statements were part of an ongoing public debate on a matter of public concern,
and private respondent, who had freely entered into and thrust himself to the forefront
of said debate, has acquired the status of a public figure or quasi-public figure.
For these reasons, he argued that his statements are protected by his constitutionally
guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of expression and of the press.

3.  His statements, having been made in the course of the performance of his duties as a
Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution.

a.  Citing Antero J Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, petitioner

argued that the claim of falsity of statements made by a member of
Congress does not destroy the privilege of parliamentary immunity, and
the authority to discipline said member lies in the assembly or the voters
and not the courts.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion (to Set Special and Affirmative Defenses for
Preliminary Hearing) on the strength of Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for
dismissal provided in the same rule, as may have been pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer.

Private respondent opposed the motion on the grounds that the motion failed to
comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court on motions, and a preliminary
hearing on petitioner's special and affirmative defenses was prohibited as petitioner
had filed a motion to dismiss.

RTC: Denied Motion to Dismiss premised on special and affirmative defenses in his
answer. Denied MR.

Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, assailing public
respondent's May 19, 2015 and December 16, 2015 Orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Private respondent points out that:

1.  the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

2.  petitioner cannot invoke parliamentary immunity as his utterances were made in
various media interviews, beyond the scope of his official duties as Senator, and
that

3.  the constitutional right to free speech can be raised only against the government,
not against private individuals.

Ruling:

1. Hierarchy of Courts should have been observed

The power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not exclusive to
this Court. The Court shares the jurisdiction over petitions for these extraordinary writs
with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.

Settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which the trial
and appellate courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary immunity
raised by petitioner. The Court is, thus, unconvinced that petitioner has presented an
"exceptionally compelling reason" to justify his direct application for a writ of certiorari
with this Court.

2. Petitioner’s statements in media interviews are not covered by the

parliamentary speech or debate privilege

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private

respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called
Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary
and committee hearings in the Senate.

With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the
privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of
its committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It
cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official
discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not
part of or integral to the legislative process.

The Speech or Debate Clause under the 1935 Constitution "was taken or is a copy of
sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States." Such immunity has
come to this country from the practices of the Parliamentary as construed and applied
by the Congress of the United States.

The U.S. Supreme Court's disquisition in United States v. Brewster on the scope of
the privilege is of jurisprudential significance:

A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in

Congress in relation to the business before it.

They are performed in part because they have come to be expected by

constituents, and because they are a means of developing continuing support
for future elections. Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are
political in nature, rather than legislative

the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those things "generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
 business before it,

only acts generally done in the course of the process of enacting legislation
were protected.

the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a
part of the legislative process - the due functioning of the process.

the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity
of the legislative process.

It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the
lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in
Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." To
participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of any
lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process
of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in
media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit of
the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution.

3. Jurisdiction lies with courts, not the Senate

P: Pobre case asserts that authority to discipline a member of Congress lies in the
assembly or the voters and not the courts

SC: Pobre case held that courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.

Statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or criminal
responsibility will not foreclose judicial review.
 

4. Preliminary hearing was not warranted

P: preliminary hearing on his special and affirmative defenses is necessary to allow

him to present evidence that will warrant the immediate dismissal of the Complaint.

SC: Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed.
Section 6, however, must be construed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule,
which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits deferment of such
resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary
hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because such
defenses should have already been resolved.

In this case, however, petitioner's motion to dismiss had not been resolved when
petitioner moved for a preliminary hearing. As public respondent stated in the assailed
May 19, 2015 Order, the motion did not contain a notice of hearing and was not
actually heard. Even so, a preliminary hearing is not warranted.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that private respondent failed
to state and substantiate his cause of action, arguing that the statement he made
before the media, in which he described private respondent as a "front" or "dummy" of
former VP Binay for the so-called Hacienda Binay, was one of fact.

By raising failure to state a cause of action as his defense, petitioner is regarded as

having hypothetically admitted the allegations in the Complaint.

5. Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action

Private respondent filed his Complaint for moral and exemplary damages pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes an injured party to file a civil action
for damages, separate and distinct from the criminal action, in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries.

Private respondent averred that such imputation, unprivileged as it was uttered

outside of petitioner's legislative functions, actually discredited him and tarnished his
reputation as a legitimate businessman, and caused him sleepless nights, wounded
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and social humiliation. The statements,
presumed to be malicious and so described by private respondent, were also alleged
to have been made public through broadcast and print media, and identified private
respondent as their subject. Hypothetically admitting these allegations as true, as is
required in determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, private
respondent may be granted his claim.

6. Defense of lack of cause of action requires a full-blown trial

A perusal of petitioner's defenses and arguments, as above outlined, at once reveals

that the averments were grounded on lack of cause of action. In fact, by pleading in
his Answer that private respondent failed to "substantiate" his cause of action,
petitioner effectively questioned its existence, and would have the trial court inquire
into the veracity and probative value of private respondent's submissions.

Distinguished from failure to state a cause of action, which refers to the insufficiency
of the allegations in the pleading, lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the factual basis for the action. Petitioner, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,
clearly impugned the sufficiency of private respondent's basis for filing his action for
damages.

Dispositive Portion: petition dismissed.

6. Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

EUGENIO PUYAT v. HON. SIXTO de GUZMAN 

 FACTS:
An election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was
held. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warranto proceedings, questioning the election. The Acero Group claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.

The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Sec 11, Art VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and
SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by
the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.

May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales 10

shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to
run for election as a Director.

The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.

May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase,
the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of
10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.

The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the
said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

 Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig)
against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior.

 The Court issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the
stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court, on November 6, 1979, resolved to
consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of
the Constitutional provision

HELD:

We are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel
before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the
event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective.
All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the
proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.

 In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez falls within the ambit
of the prohibition contained in Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

7. AVELINO V CUENCO
Jose Avelino v. Mariano Cuenco
Facts:
• On February 1949, Senator Tañada (Tañada) requested that he will do a
privilege speech before the senate, which was approved by the senate. 
• On the day of his speech: o Before the start of the session he and Senator
Sanidad filed a resolution (Resolution 68) with the Senate Secretary enumerating
charges against the then Senate President Avelino (Avelino) and ordered an
investigation  
o The Resolution basically stated that the then Senate President was
supporting graft and corruption 
(check dissenting opinion of Perfecto J. in the full text for full text of said resolution)  
• 22 of the 24 senators attended the session so there was quorum o Except
Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senators were present.  
• Senator Tañada’s speech was delayed in view of dilatory tactics from the camp
of Avelino  o Senate President Avelino did not go to the session floor immediately, he
only went there at 11:35 AM 
(instead of 10AM) o Avelino did not immediately open the session, but instead
requested a copy of the resolution submitted by Tañada and Sanidad and he read
slowly and carefully said resolution 
o When session was started, Tañada was further delayed by a request that (1) roll
be called and (2) Minutes of the previous session be read first, both of which had along
established practice of being dispensed with.  
o After the minutes was read, Avelino refused to recognized Tañada. 
• Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech but Avelino, then presiding, continuously ignored him. 
o After Tañada repeatedly insisted on being recognized, Avelino announced that he
would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously
recognized by him. 
• Some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-
arrangement.  
o At about the same time Senator David moved for adjournment of session. 
o Sanidad opposed the adjournment of the session which was seconded by
Senator Cuenco who moved that it be submitted to a vote.  
• Another commotion ensued.  o Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandoned
the Chair, hurriedly walked out of the session hall with his allied senators (a total of 10
left).  
o 12 Senators were left.  
• After the Walk-out, Senator Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, took the
Chair and proceeded with the session  o Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be
made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.  
o Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that Cuenco be designated to
preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.  
• Tañada, after being recognized by Cuenco, was then finally able to deliver his
privilege speech and submitted his motion (Resolution 68) for approval thereof. It was
unanimously approved.  
• Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, declaring the position of Senate
President vacant and designating Cuenco as acting Senate President. It was
unanimously approved. 
• Senator Cuenco took his oath and the next day President of Phil recognized him.
(Pres. Quirino) 
• Avelino filed a petition for asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate
President and oust Cuenco.  
  
ISSUES/HELD:
 
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? NO  
 
• In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, such power
should not be interfered with by the judiciary.  
• The selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.  
• The proper remedy of Avelino lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court.  
• The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply,  o The situation is not where
two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning
as such, (as in said Werts case).  
o In this case, there is presently only one Philippines Senate  
• Moreover, the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to Cuenco makes it
advisable, to adopt the handsoff policy. 

Was there a quorum? YES   

 
• Among the 6 justices voting to dismiss the case, 2 did not want to give their
opinion since the SC has no jurisdiction. The remaining 4 said that there was quorum. 
• The session started with a quorum (22), a minority of ten senators may not, by
leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met
with their unanimous endorsement.  
o In short, since it started with a quorum, the rump session  was a continuation of that
session with a valid quorum.  
• Even if the rump session would be held not to be a continuation of the session
with a valid quorum, there was still a quorum because: 
1. The minutes say so 
2. At the beginning of such session there were at least 14 senators 
3. The absence of Senator Confesor (in the US), would mean 12 senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators 
• When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members.  
o Majority is more than half. Since one senator was out of the country at that time,
you don’t include him in the number of senators to determine majority so 24-1=23 total
senators.  
§ From reading the concurring & dissenting opinions, meaning nito, if you are out
of the country, di ka macontact, or incapacitated or whatever, you won’t be included in
the total number of senators for the purpose of counting majority/quorum or kung 2/3 or
¾ of the senate etc. 
§ J. Feria: Quorom is based on actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of
the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to
compel its members to attend the session. 
o Since there were 12 senators, 23/2=11.5 = there was majority.
(paraphrased)  
• So, it’s a majority of the “House” (those available=23), not a majority of the
“members” (all 24). 
• Moreover, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members. 

8. Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals
of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the
prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court
is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the
resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled
bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification."
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

9. Morales v. Subido (G.R. No. L-29658 Feb. 27, 1969)

Facts: The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank
in the said police force despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally
appointed as chief of police of Manila which became vacant upon the resignation of the
former chief of police, Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968.

The resondent Commission of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his
designation but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational
and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is
that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other
persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill the
vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act.

Morales filed a petition for mandamus before the Court to compel the respondent to
include him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila for the
consideration of the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a
college degree under the statement of the aforementioned rule: “has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years”

The SC denied the petition. 

The present case is a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.

According to petitioner, Sec 10 of Police Act of 1996 originated in the House of

Representative as HB 6951. The provision reads: 

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has
served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or
higher.

It was thereafter transmitted to the Senate where at the behest of Senator Francisco
Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to
make the provision read:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has
served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the
phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank
of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school
graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law
course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the
Rodrigo amendment was retained.

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended
at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third
reading. 

(Yung sa naging law, nawala yung phrase “who has served the police department of a
city” so ang di na siya eligible)

In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the
different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. 

The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum signed by

an employee in the Senate bill division, which would make it appear that the omission
— whether deliberate or unintended — of the phrase, "who has served the police
department of a city” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only
in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading
thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof;

It is for this reason that the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner is qualified for the position of chief of police of manila 

Ruling: No.

The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of
government. As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office of
the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is
exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect
due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The
investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress. After all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.

It was not until 1947 that the question was presented Mabanao v. Lopez-Vito,  and we
there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts".
This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution despite the fact that the vote
of three-fourths of the members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to
approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account
of the suspension of some members of the House of Representative and the Senate

Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt there might
have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view of the
dissent of three Justices in Mabanag,  was finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision
in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for the Court, the then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion said:

Furthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
(Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias
vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that
in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. 
All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.

10. DANTE LIBAN VS. RICHARD GORDON G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, et al. were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. They filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as
“Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate”
against respondent Richard J. Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors during his incumbency as Senator of the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of
Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their
argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when
he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

ISSUE:
Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution

HELD:
The Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office
or an office in a GOCC. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. The PNRC in itself is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-
funded, and privately-run charitable organization controlled by a Board of Governors
four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Thus, respondent Gordon did not
forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his
incumbency as Senator [as there is no incompatibility between the two positions.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended, is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC “as a private corporation” since Section 7, Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution stated that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless
such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants
to be a private corporation.

Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270 (2011)

FACTS: 
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were
Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first
regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
 
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
 
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.
 
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May
2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the
enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.
 
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153
questioning the validity of said laws.
 
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM
to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term onSeptember 30, 2011.
 
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote
and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9094 in order to become effective.
 
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of
the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative"
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under
the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
 
ISSUE: 
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
 
HELD: 
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The
Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that
the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to
achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA
No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No.
7166 to be held in May 2013).
 
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
 
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of
office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
 
 
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this
is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
 
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x
xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
 
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the
classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly
devoted to Local Government.
 
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or
of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners
claims of grave abuse of discretion.
 
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and
local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being
as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.
 
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a
question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
 
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option
that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with
respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years
as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
 
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized
that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.

 City of Davao v. GSIS

Facts:

1.  On 8 April 1994, the GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of
Public Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties located in
Matina and Ulas, Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes for the years
1992 to 1994 totaling P295,721.61

a.  The auction was subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension

allowed by Davao City for the payment of delinquent real property
taxes.

2.  On 28 July 1994, the GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on
three parcels of land owned by the GSIS.

a.  Another Notice of Public Auction was received by the GSIS on 29

August 1994, setting the date of auction sale for 20 September 1994.

3.  On 13 September 1994, the GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus And/Or Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Davao City.

a.  It also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The case
was raffled to Branch 12, presided by Judge Maximo Magno Libre.

4.  On 13 September 1994, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order for a
period of twenty (20) days, effectively enjoining the auction sale scheduled
seven days later.

5.  Following exchange of arguments, the RTC issued an Order dated 3 April
1995 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction effective for the duration of the
suit.

RTC Decision: notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code,

the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes.

·        The RTC conceded that the tax exempting statute, P.D. No. 1146, was
enacted prior to the Local Government Code.

·        However, it noted that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in
order that the tax exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future
enactments, namely:

o   (1) that Section 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and

 o   (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of
exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the
solvency of the GSIS fund.

·        Denied MR

Petitioner’s Arguments:

1.  Exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, was effectively
withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly
Sections 193 and 294 thereof. These provisions made the GSIS, along with all
other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes.

2.  Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code, even special laws, such as PD
No. 1146, which are inconsistent with the Local Government Code, are repealed
or modified accordingly.

GSIS’ Arguments:

1.  the requisites for repeal are laid down in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as
amended

2.  It stresses that it had been exempt from taxation as far back as 1936, when its
original charter was enacted through Commonwealth Act No. 186

3.  This Court had previously recognized the "extraordinary exemption" of GSIS in
Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of Manila, and such exemption has
similarly been affirmed by the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the
President in the aforementioned issuances also cited by the RTC.

4.  Had it been the intention of the legislature to repeal Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146
through the Local Government Code, said law would have included the
appropriate retraction in its repealing clause found in Section 534(f). However,
said section, according to the GSIS, partakes the nature of a general repealing
provision which is accorded less weight in light of the rule that implied repeals
are not favored.

5.  Notices of Assessment, Warrants and Notices of Levy, Notices of Public

Auction Sale and the Annotations of the Notice of Levy are void ab initio.

 
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in upholding the tax-exempt status of GSIS
in contravention of the mandate under the LGC - YES

Ruling:

PD 1146, Section 33 exempts the GSIS from all taxes. However, PD 1981
amended PD 1146 stating the following:

“Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to

the contrary, such as the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1931 and
other similar laws that have been or will be enacted, unless this section is
expressly and categorically repealed by law and a provision is enacted to
substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an
essential factor for the solvency of the fund.”

PD 1931 effectively withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted to GOCCs.

There is no doubt that the GSIS which was established way back in 1937 is a
GOCC, a fact that GSIS itself admits in its petition for certiorari before the RTC.
It thus clear that Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 expressly withdrew those
exemptions granted to the GSIS.

Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that
as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local
government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section
232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may
impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.

 
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or
judicial persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn
upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the
LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the
properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234
further qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes
are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all
others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of
the LGC. Moreover, even as to real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first
paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of
such property has been granted to a taxable person for consideration or
otherwise.

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the
effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted
to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958,
has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the
petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234,
but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said
section is qualified by Sections 232 and 234.

This Court, in Mactan, acknowledged that under Section 133, instrumentalities

were generally exempt from all forms of local government taxation, unless
otherwise provided in the Code. On the other hand, Section 232 "otherwise
provides" insofar as it allowed local government units to levy an ad valorem
real property tax, irrespective of who owned the property. At the same time, the
imposition of real property taxes under Section 232 is in turn qualified by the
phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted." The exemptions from real
property taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which specifically states that
only real properties owned "by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions" are exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly,
instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions under Section 234.

 
The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively
imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future
legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering
that it is a lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may
operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws.
Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter
should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.

It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the

legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.
Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best
senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their
allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades
dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times.

There are other reasons that guide us to construe the Local Government Code
in favor of the City of Davao’s position. Section 5 of the Local Government
Code provides the guidelines on how to construe the Code’s provisions in
cases of doubt

a.   Power of LGU – liberally interpreted in its favor

b.   A tax ordinance strictly construed against LGU

c.        Tax exemption construed strictly against the person claiming

Dispositive Portion: GSIS tax-exempt status withdrawn by LGC

13. Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

FACTS:  

 • This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale
of beer and cigarettes.

• Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.  

o They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are “constitutionally mandated”
so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

• The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September
16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed
to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. 

• The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier,
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento
was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn
for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded. 

• Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did.  

• Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation:  

• the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996,
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system;  

• the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;  
 • the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996
as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and  

• the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions

differ on three points, to wit:  

o in the audio-sound recording the word “approved,” which appears on line 13

in the three other versions, cannot be heard;  

o in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word “no” on line 17
appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times;
and  

o the published version does not contain the sentence “(Y)ou better prepare
for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,” which
appears in the other versions. 

• Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference

committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.  

• Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable.

• Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of
the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court’s power
under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in
view of the changed membership of the Court. 

ISSUE/ HELD:  .

Did Congress commit  grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240? NO.   

• (MAIN DOCTRINE) First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to
have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules
of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.

o Petitioner’s argument:  

§ They do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
 Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum.

§ They contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable.

o But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.

o In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over
our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

• Second.  While Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations.

• Third. No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee
report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal
voting.

o Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was “railroaded.”
They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved.

o The manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved was by is based in legislative practice.  

§ It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs
Code were approved.

o Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure

of the House with which the Court should not be concerned.  

§ To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum.  
 § Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of
a quorum.  

• The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly—especially when the

quorum is obviously present—for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.  

§ Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of

the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence
of a quorum.

o At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners
in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day.  

§ No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner

by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did
not participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings.Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report
but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting
had been conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the
conference committee report.

• Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. 

16. U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 729)

Facts: Juan Pons, Gabino Beliso and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of
illegal importation of opium from Spain into the islands of the Philippines onbaord Lopez
y Lopez steamer. 

They were tried separately and each were found guilty of the crime charged and were
sentenced accordingly. 

Juan Pons filed this present appeal contending that the last day of the special session
of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the
28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and
void.

Issue: Whether or not Act 2381 is valid

Ruling: Yes.

Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of
law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether
the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date
of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. 

From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as
those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.

The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

14 Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 644 SCRA 741 (2011)

Facts:

·        15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a

privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege
speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the
2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the ₱200 million appropriated
for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from
Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-
Way (ROW), and another ₱200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5
road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly
called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation
covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in
Parañaque City.

·        He inquired from DBM Sec about the double entry and was informed that it
was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated
that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to
Senator Manuel Villar, then the Senate President.

·        Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706 which provides for:

 The Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate the conduct of senate
president Manuel B. Villar, Jr. For using his position of power to influence public
officials in relocating the c-5 road extension project to deliberately pass thru his
properties, and to negotiate the overpriced purchase of road rights of way thru
several properties also owned by his corporations redounding in huge personal
financial benefits for him to the detriment of the Filipino people, thereby resulting
in a blatant conflict of interest.

·        The Resolution was then referred to the Committee on Ethics and

Privileges which was composed of the petitioners of this case.

·        On Nov 2008, Sen Enrile was elected as the Senate President.

·        The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson
as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren
Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority.

·        Sen. Villar delivered a privileged speech stating that he would answer the
allegations against him not on the Ethics Committee but on the floor.

·        Sen. Lacson delivered another privileged speech that due to the accusation
that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case,
Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion
was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
abstentions.

·        Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:

o   The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of
Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection;

o   The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the
investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against
Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of
the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the
Constitution

o   The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process
clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which]
require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13

·        Respondent argued:

o   The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an

indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be
 archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined
or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;

o   There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent

Committee;

o   Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;

o   The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;

o   The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners

failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

o   It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly

behavior;

o   The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political

question which exclusively pertains to Congress

o   The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion;

o   The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and
adopted[,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern
adjudicatory hearings.14

Issues with Ruling:

1.      Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition. NO

SC: Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court.
While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of
P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on
the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting
Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not
of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation

2.      Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort. NO, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply
to this case.

SC: The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely
legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not
 an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. As to the invocation of separation of
powers, the Court is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere
invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the
resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. The
Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.

3.      Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s
right to equal protection; NO

Petitioners: the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose
of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further
allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against
any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.

SC: The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct,
rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members
shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges."However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the
Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation
about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction
of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee.
Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he
would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics
Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee
of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and
approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.

4.      Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of
the Constitution NO

SC: Considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy
that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the
adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.
  

The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has
been recognized and affirmed by this Court under Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution states. This has been construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its
own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to
amend its own rules.

5.      Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required for their effectivity. YES, in this case.

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

the Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as
such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution which mandates:

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of
the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.

In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only
members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its
disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:

Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself
provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus,
even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of
 the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly
mandate their publication.

The Court also noted several differences in the Rules of the Senate Committee on
Ethics and Privileges and the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with
requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this
case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.

The SC granted the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee
on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only
upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

15. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)
Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of
R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No.
8180 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to
the deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No.
8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum
products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180
since the imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of
others in the oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of
Article VI of the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique
Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt
Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is
unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order
declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is
arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the
Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15
of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among
Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled
by the court) and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain
direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
 
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.
 
Held:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition. The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three
major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A.
No. 8180 to be considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore,
the executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject.
Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of the deregulation of
the downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate the one
title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power
are the completeness test and the sufficiency test.  The completeness test demands
that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches
the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test demand an adequate
guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test.
It also laid down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far
as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the
sufficiency test.
 
Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O. No.
372 void.

17.  PANGILINAN VS. CAYETANO G.R. No. 238875

Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

FACTS:
On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest

against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the

exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or

inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested

parties to said case.

Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are

sitting in the tribunal?

Decision: 

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both

Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended

that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and

authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it

held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ...

shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that
1
Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that the constitutional

provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a

representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to

Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an

unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from

participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to

the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator

sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the

same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if

sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty

that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn

of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented

from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of

which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by

no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the

Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that

would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment

thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections

when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the

Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the

substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be

sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication

in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and

Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before

said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal

interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What

we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral

Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and

that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the

power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition

of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within

law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein

petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

 
In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako

Reyes challenges the constitutionality of several provisions of the 2015 Revised

Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In particular,

petitioner questions (1) the rule which requires the presence of at least one

Justice of the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum; (2) the rule on

constitution of a quorum; and (3) the requisites to be considered a member of

the House of Representatives.

Facts:

1.  Petitioner alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases before the

HRET. They are (1) Case No. 13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L.

Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No. 130037 (Eric D. Junio

v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes).

2.  On 1 November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).

Petitioner arguments:

1.  Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it gives the Justices,

collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceedings by simply absenting

themselves from any hearing.

2.  2015 HRET Rules grant more powers to the Justices, individually, than the
 legislators by requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to

constitute a quorum. Petitioner alleges that even when all six legislators are

present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body and cannot act as an

Executive Committee without the presence of any of the Justices.

3.  The rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by

conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.

4.  Quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it

requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the

Tribunal.

a.  The four Members are not limited to legislators and may include the

other two Justices.

b.  In case of inhibition, a mere majority of the remaining Members shall

be sufficient to render a decision, instead of the majority of all the

Members.

5.  Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015 HRET Rules

unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC).

a.  Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as the

2011 Rules of the HRET, a petition may be filed within 15 days from

the date of the proclamation of the winner, making such proclamation

the operative fact for the HRET to acquire jurisdiction.

b.  However, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules requires that to be

 considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there should

be (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of

office.

c.  Rule 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules states that election protests should

be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of

actual assumption of office, whichever is later

d.  Rule 18 provides that petitions for quo warranto shall be filed within

15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual

assumption of office, whichever is later

e.  This would allow the COMELEC to determine whether there was a

valid proclamation or a proper oath, as well as give it opportunity to

entertain cases between the time of the election and June 30 of the

election year or actual assumption of office, whichever is later.

HRET Arguments

1.  It has the power to promulgate its own rules that would govern the

proceedings before it

2.  Requirement rests on substantial distinction because there are only three

Justice-members of the Tribunal as against six Legislator-members.

3.  Requirement of four members assures the presence of at least two

Legislator-members to constitute a quorum

4.  Requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was incorporated in the
 Rules to maintain judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests and

because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function.

5.  Petitioner's allegation that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules gives the Justices

virtual veto power to stop the proceedings by simply absenting themselves

is not only speculative but also imputes bad faith on the part of the Justices.

6.  HRET only has jurisdiction over a member of the House of Representatives.

In order to be considered a member of the House of Representatives, there

must be a concurrence of the following requisites:

(1) a valid proclamation;

(2) a proper oath; and

(3) assumption of office.

Issues: Whether the following provisions of the 2015 HRET Rules are

constitutional:

1.  Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a

quorum;

2.  Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17; and

3.  Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69.

Ruling: Petition has no merit

#1 & 3: Presence of at least one Justice-member to Constitute a Quorum

 
In accordance with this organization, where the HRET (Sec 17, Art 6) is

composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court and six members of the

House of Representatives, it is clear that the HRET is a collegial body with

members from two separate departments of the government: the Judicial and

the Legislative departments.

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the

purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the

legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an

independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and

appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long

felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations

which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to

provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view,

a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally

represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and

further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three

justices of the Supreme Court.

It is clear from the foregoing deliberations of the convention that the main

objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment,

first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each

House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the

disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To

achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely:

(a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the

second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each

House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in

the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that

partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases,

and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and

(b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of

representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence

of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal

with judicial temper.

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices

but rather maintains the balance of power between the members from the

Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935

and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone

down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the

impression that party interests play a part in the decision-making process.

Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice

and four members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even
when all the Justices are present, at least two members of the House of

Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it

would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to

convene and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This would

render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935 and

1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed,

petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices

because under the same rule, it is possible for four members of the House of

Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the

2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices indispensable members to

constitute a quorum but ensures that representatives from both the Judicial

and Legislative departments are present to constitute a quorum. Members from

both the Judicial and Legislative departments become indispensable to

constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible for all

the Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings

simply by absenting themselves, is speculative. As pointed out by the HRET,

this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without any basis, on the part of the

Justices.

The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also

provides that "[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its

Chairman." This means that only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As

such, there should always be one member of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all
three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme Court will

designate another Justice to chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

P: It violates EPC

SC: It does not. In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction

between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the House of

Representatives. There are only three Justice-members while there are six

Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid classification. The

classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of

members from both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the government to

constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution.

Ambiguity of Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69

P: In case where there are only 5 constituting a quorum whereby at least 1 of

the Members present thereat inhibit, a majority of the remaining four may

validly render a decision. In an extreme case where the 4 of the 5 present

inhibit, the Rule allows that the decision of the remaining 1 member shall be the

decision of the Tribunal.

 
SC: The ambiguity referred to by petitioner is absurd and stems from an

erroneous understanding of the Rules. As pointed out by the HRET in its

Comment, a member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is disqualified from

participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for the purpose

of having a quorum. In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court

and the House of Representatives have the authority to designate a Special

Member or Members who could act as temporary replacement or replacements

in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibit from a case

or are disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election

contest when the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to

petitioner's claim that a member who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit

in the deliberations to achieve the required quorum.

Actions of the Executive Committee

The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee

"shall be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding

meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation." Hence, even if only three members

of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and even if all these three

members are Justices of the Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the

confirmation by the entire Tribunal or at least five of its members who

constitute a quorum. The confirmation required by the Rules should bar any

apprehension that the Executive Committee would commit any action arbitrarily
or in bad faith. In addition, the Rules enumerated the matters, requiring

immediate action, that may be acted upon by the Executive Committee. Any

other matter that may be delegated to the Executive Committee under Rule 6(c)

(3) has to be decided by the entire Tribunal.

Qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives and Date of Filing

of Election Protest

Petitioner’s Arguments:

·        HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

o   Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,

and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

o   Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for the requisites to be

considered a member of the House of Representatives, as follows: (1)

a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.

o   In addition to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the time for the filing of

an election protest within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or

the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later.

o   These Rules will allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction between

the time of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of the

election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is

 later.

o   Further, the requirements of a valid proclamation and a proper oath

will allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until there is an

actual assumption of office.

SC: However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series

of 2018, dated 20 September 2018, the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the

2015 HRET Rules.

The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with

respect to the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a

petition for quo warranto, respectively, in order to further promote a just and

expeditious determination and disposition of every election contest brought

before the Tribunal[.]"

Dispotive Portion: Petition dismissed.

Laws:

Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in Between

Regular Meetings. -

(a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at

the call of the Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The presence of at

least one (1) Justice and four (4) Members of the Tribunal shall be necessary to

constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the next Senior Justice

shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present shall take the

Chair.

(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in

attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may

constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for the

meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to

confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is

present.

(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any

three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who may

sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters requiring

immediate action by the Tribunal:

1. Any pleading or motion,

(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage

or injury to the rights of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action

concerned;

(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of
the adverse party, such as one for extension of time to comply with an

order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a prohibited

pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and

(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other

similar pleading from any of the parties or their attorneys;

2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations

of the appropriations of the Tribunal; and

3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business

of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.

Rule 69. Votes Required. - In resolving all questions submitted to the Tribunal,

all the Members present, inclusive of the Chairperson, shall vote.

Except as provided in Rule 5(b) of these Rules, the concurrence of at least five

(5) Members shall be necessary for the rendition of decisions and the adoption

of formal resolutions, provided that, in cases where a Member inhibits or

cannot take part in the deliberations, a majority vote of the remaining Members

shall be sufficient.

 
This is without prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Court or the House of

Representatives, as the case may be, to designate Special Member or Members

who should act as temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one

or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibits from a case or is disqualified

from participating in the deliberations of a particular election contest, provided

that:

(1) The option herein provided should be resorted [to] only when the required

quorum in order for the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the election

contest, or in making the final determination of the case, or in arriving at

decisions or resolutions thereof, cannot be met; and

(2) Unless otherwise provided, the designation of the Special Member as

replacement shall only be temporary and limited only to the specific case where

the inhibition or disqualification was made.

Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of

Representatives.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper

oath; and (3) assumption of office.

  

Rule 17. Election Protest. - A verified election protest contesting the election or

returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any

candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for

the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year or the

date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later.

xxxx

20.  Bondoc v. Pineda (1991)  

FACTS:  

• Marciano M. Pineda was affiliated with Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc was affiliated with Nacionalista Party (NP).

o The 2 were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the 4 th
District of Pampanga.  

• Pineda was proclaimed as the winner in the election.  

o Bondoc filed a protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET).

o NOTE: HRET is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are SC Justices, and

the remaining 6 are members of the House chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations

• HRET rendered a decision declaring Bondoc won over Pineda by 23 votes.  o

LDP members of the Tribunal insisted on a recount of the ballots cast in
some precincts.

o The recount delayed the finalization of the decision by 4 months. The

reexamination and reappreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing
Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.  
 • Cong. Camasura (LDP) voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman
Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc as the winner of the election contest. (NOTE:
Camasura did not vote for his fellow LDP member) o Cong. Camasura told his
‘Chief’, Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Secretary General) the final tally in the Bondoc
election protest.

o He also told him that he voted for Bondoc because he is "consistent with
truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's
agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by
the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot,” despite Bondoc
being a member of the rival partylist.

o This act of Cong. Camasura ‘stirred a hornets nest’ in the LDP.

• LDP began plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the
Tribunal.  o On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc election contest,
Cong. Camasura was expelled from the LDP.  

o It was alleged that (1) he and another Cong. Bautista helped to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Danding Cojuangco; (2) he invited LDP members in
Davao del Sur to join said political party of Cojuance; and (3); and that
those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but
also constitutes as a complete betrayal to the cause, objectives, and
loyalty to LDP.  

o The LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.

o Such expulsion of Camasura from the LDP led to him being removed from
the HRET.

• House of Representatives then decided to withdraw the nomination an Electoral

Tribunal.  

ISSUE/HELD:

Can the HRET change the party’s representation in the HRET to defeat the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest
pending?—NO!  

• SC held that the independence of the HRET is guarded by the framers of the
Constitution. o Its proceedings would be considered a farce if the House of
 Representatives, or the majority party, may shuffle and manipulate the political
component of the HRET, to serve the interests of the party in power.  

• The House issued a resolution removing Cong. Camasura for disloyalty to the LDP
because he voted in favor of Bondoc, a member of the rival party.

o Said resolution is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the

HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.  

o To sanction such interference by the House in the work of the HRET would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone
NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may
as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.  

• SC further held that disloyalty to his party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.  

o SC held that as judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-

partisan. (IMPT!) o They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong.  

o Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not

valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.  

o In this case, in expelling Cong. Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
“conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House committed a grave abuse of discretion.

o Such act of the House is an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution.  

o SC ultimately held that its resolution of expulsion of Camasura is null and

void.  

• SC also held that an expulsion of Cong. Camasura violates his right to security of
tenure.  o Members of the HRET, as the “sole judge” of congressional election
contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution.

Does the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case at hand?—YES!

• Bondoc filed this petition in order to protect his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House. SC held that it cannot be deaf to his plea for relief,
 nor indifferent to his charge that the House had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Cong. Camasura from the HRET.  

o Bondoc seeks recourse with the SC, as guardian of the Constitution, to

exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as
the party aggrieved by the action of the House.  

o SC must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be
the highest official of the land or the Government itself.”

• SC held that the decision of the House withdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Cong. Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution.

• SC ordered that Cong. Camasura be reinstated to his position as a member of the

HRET. 

21 Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, 211 SCRA 315 (1991)

Facts:

·        In a Resolution issued by the SC, Melchor Chavez was disqualified from running
for the Office of Senator in the May 1992 elections.

·        Petitioner Francisco Cahvez filed an urgent motion with the Comelec to:

o   disseminate through the fastest available means this Court's Resolution dated
May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors,
city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6)
accredited political parties and the general public

o   order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed
in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and "to count all
votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez

·        Comelec issued a Resolutions which resolved to delete the name of Melchor

Chavez from the list of qualified candidates

·        However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner
as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified
candidates.

·        According to petitioner, the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function

under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall
be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of
said candidate.
·        Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either
declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).

·        Comelec issued a directive over radio and TV ordering all "Chavez" votes to be
credited in favor of petitioner.

·        Petitioner contends that the radio and TV announcements did not reach the BEI at
the 170,354 precincts nationwide. As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in
favor of petitioner.

·        Comelec issued another Resolution ordering those votes which have been
declared astray or invalidated, be counted for the petitioner.

·        But according to the petitioner, this had been futile.

·        Petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter
to

o   implement its resolution

o   to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the National Capital

Region involving some 80,348 precincts and to scan for the "Chavez" votes
for purposes of crediting the same in his favor

o   make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass

o   to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

·        Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus

before the SC

·        Petitioner claimed that suppose there were 10 votes for Chavez that were
invalidated. There would be 1.7M votes nationwide, the result of which will affect the
24 senatorial candidates.

·        Sen. Aquino filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Comment in Intervention
praying for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not
allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.

Issue: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case. NO

Ruling: The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor
Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the
Court's function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of the
Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of
its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative
functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure to implement its own resolution is
undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference.
 The petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the
controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving
local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-
proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives. What is allowed is the correction of
"manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought
to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that "(t)he Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the
Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members. This
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving,
as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As aforesaid,
petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

22. Lerias v. House Electoral Tribunal, 202 SCRA 808 (1991)

Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the UPP-
KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May
11, 1987 elections. 
In her certificate of candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Ynigues Lerias". Her
maiden name is Rosette Ynigues. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the
administration candidate for the same position.

During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass
from the Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground
that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates who received the two (2)
highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y.
Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively.

In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of
Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy
would be the one to be included in the canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939
votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes.
But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass
contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as
basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the
members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were
made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the
certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the
nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no
objection.

Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying
that the Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the
certificate of canvass for Libagon.

At the scheduled hearing, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then counsel for Lerias, agreed to use
the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic
and genuine. A similar reservation was made by counsel for Mercado.

The Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when opened it
showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10, 18
and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100 votes less than what she received
as shown in the provincial board of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass.

RULING:
In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes
of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves.
But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns
would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and
election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting
centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting
disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide
reports of the results of the voting. Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET
must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so only upon the most
convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And, conformably
to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered
with, who should submit proof of this allegation. 

Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself' except only in the
cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not
present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as
secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not
been met.

Besides this certificate of canvass had been disowned by the chairman and members of
the municipal board of canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified since their
signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the number of votes
credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411.  

The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its copy of the
certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this
Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive. The HRET must be
referring to the following portion of the decision of this Court—"Public interest demands
that pre-proclamation contests should be terminated with dispatch so as not to unduly
deprive the people of representation, as in this case, in the halls of Congress. As the
Court has stressed in Enrile v. Comelec, and other cases, the policy of the election law
is that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the
law's desire that the canvass and proclamation should be delayed as little as possible.
The powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature and
the question of fraud, terrorism and other irregularities in the conduct of the election
should be ventilated in a regular election protest and the Commission on Elections is
not the proper forum for deciding such matters; neither the Constitution nor statute has
granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of
elections returns to look beyond the face thereof 'once satisfied of their authenticity'. We
believe that the matters brought up by petitioner should be ventilated before the House
Electoral Tribunal. Unlike in the past, it is no longer the COMELEC but the House
Electoral Tribunal which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications' of the members of the House of Representatives. "In opting to go by
the COMELEC copy which on its face did not show any alteration, the COMELEC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion, specially since both parties agreed to the
COMELEC using its own copy (Copy No. 3). 

"Accordingly, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order issued on July 23, 1987 is hereby LIFTED effective
immediately." 

23. Jalosjos v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 192474 June 26, 2012)

Facts: In May 2007, Romeo M. Jaloslos, Jr., petitioner ran for Mayor in Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte and won. While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del
Norte, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. In September 2008, he began occupying the same.

After 8 months of on May 6, 2009, Romeo Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay for the transfer of his voter's
registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Dan Erasmo, opposed. After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos’
application and denied Erasmo’s opposition. 

Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters
of Precinct 0051F before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim
(MCTC).

After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of
registered voters in question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.

Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which
affirmed the MCTC Decision.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted
his application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the
result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village’s voters list
pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010
National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or
cancel his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint
resolution, dismissing Erasmo’s petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.
 
While Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En
Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos’ winning the elections
for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. He was proclaimed
winner on May 13, 2010.
 
Thereafter, the COMELEC En Banc granted Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration and
declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement
since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte,
he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay
Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari. In G.R. 192474, Jalosjos
challenges the COMELEC’s finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and
its denial of his right to due process, citing Roces v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. In G.R. 192704, Erasmo assails the COMELEC En Banc’s failure to annul
Jalosjos’ proclamation as elected Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay despite his declared ineligibility.

Subsequently, the Court ordered the consolidation of the three related petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the
question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification for running for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has
been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

Ruling: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. 

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of
the HRET.
 
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had
already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his
qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for
the HRET to consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in
declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have
jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his proclamation
also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the
HRET.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474, REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc’s order dated June 3, 2010,
and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division resolution dated February 23,
2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr. Further, the
Court DISMISSES the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of jurisdiction
over the issues they raise. 

SO ORDERED.

24. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and RENATO J. UNICO, Respondents. G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007

Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25

FACTS:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the
amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and
citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because
of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013
the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and
on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to
run for office

Discussion:

Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath
of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court
approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he
made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner
reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude   that the
petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile
in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the
said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA.
Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.

1.      Vilando v. HRET

Facts:

1.  In the May 14, 2007 elections, Jocelyn Limkaichong filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

2.  On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062 issued on
May 18, 2007.

3.  On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of
Representatives.

4.  Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation

of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
which reached the Court.

5.  The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against
Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia
Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41).
These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari
filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution
issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against
her.

6.  On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong,
reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other
petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way
of a petition for Quo Warranto.

7.  On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong
before the HRET which were consolidated.

a.  They assert that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for
the office she was elected and proclaimed.

b.  She was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship
of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

c.  They invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of

Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into
the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
8.  For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that

a.  she is a natural-born Filipino citizen

b.  the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and
in order and had already attained the status of res judicata.

c.  the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a

collateral attack.

9.  HRET: Dismissed both petitions; declared Limkaichong not DQ’ed

10.   Hence this petition for certiorari on the following grounds:

a.  Petition for quo warranto does not operate as collateral attack on the
citizenship of Limkaichong’s father since her father’s certificate of
naturalization is of no force and effect from the very beginning, hence,
there is actually nothing being attacked or assailed

b.  Limkaichong cannot derive PH citizenship from her mother given that
at the time of her birth, her mother is not already a Filipino citizen

c.  HRET can look into the eligibility of Limkaichong even if as incident
thereto, it would mean looking into the validity of the certificate of
naturalization

Ruling:

Petition moot and academic

It should be noted that Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the

First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already
expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been
rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term.

Citizenship may be questioned at anytime

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the
Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position
finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and
academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The question on
Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did
run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

Limkaichong not DQ’ed to sit as member of HRep

1) Quo warranto petition a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s

father

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should

be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over
cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than
the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This
constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization

proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of
respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose.
To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also
a blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be
affected or who are not parties in this case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that "a collateral attack against
a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face
or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals." Under the present
situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face.

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July
9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized
Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November

9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution.

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a

naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino
father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the

subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a
Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong
is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

 
 2) Limkaichong can derive PH citizenship from her mother

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a
duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to
prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily,
Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence
to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that

he is not a Filipino citizen. Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act
3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred
to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public
document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained
therein

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a

repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of
alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that
an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not
an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such
express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Dispositive Portion: Petition is denied.

27. Robles v HRET

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates
for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City 1978
Elections. Robles was proclaimed the winner.

2. January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET.

 a. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan
City were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and
irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting
of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns.

b. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320
contested precincts.

3. On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer, He alleged the lack of residence
of protestant (Santos) and the late filing of his protest.

4. On August 15, 1988, HRET issued an ORDER …

a. Setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on

September 1, 1988 and;

b. Directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts

which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

5. On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts,

representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated.

6. On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision.

While on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest.

7. No action was made by HRET on both motions filed by Robles and Santos.

8. Then, on September 14, 1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest.

9. On September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos' motion to Recall and

Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of
Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal.

10. On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others,
granted Santos' urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest.
11. On September 20,1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation
praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to
Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated as a Motion for Reconsideration
of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988.
12. On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on
Robles' "Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to
Motion to Recall Withdrawal" and ordered the suspension of the resumption of
revision scheduled for September 26, 1988.
13. On January 26,1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
denied Robles' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
 14. PETITIONER ROBLES’S MAIN CONTENTION: When private respondent
Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion
to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its
jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered
the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of
the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON House of Representative Electoral Tribunal lost jurisdiction over the
Electoral Protest when Protestant Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest.-NO

RULING: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not
by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated
(Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held:
We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw
Protest on Unrevised Precincts" effectively withdrew the precincts referred to therein
from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal
retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective
only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the
Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny
Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient
authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained.
Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had not
been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have
the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts
were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent Motion to
Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to allowing the refiling of
protest beyond the reglementary period.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions
pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they
may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to
respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and again
been upheld by Us in many cases.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue.
Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center
mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested
the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being
irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The
right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement
to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that
any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the
popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its
functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of
words.
 It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with
public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the
elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to
what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant
petition is DISMISSED.

28 Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 (1938)

Gerardi Morrero v. Juan Bocar and the Auditor General

Facts:

·        Petitioner Gerardo Merrero and respondent Juan L. Bocar were candidates for
membership of the national assembly from the third district of the Province of Samar.

·        the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed the election of respondent Bocar with a
total of 5,213 votes as against 4,350 vote cast for the petitioner Morrero.

·        Bocar took the oath of office on November 15, 1935.

·        Morrero filed with the Electoral Commission a protest alleging, among other things:

o   Bocar he was not thirty years of age or over as required by Article VI, section 2, of the
Constitution at the time of his election as Member of the national assembly; nor will he
have attained the age required by the said Constitution at the beginning of his term of
office

o   Bocar was, therefore, ineligible for election and to assume office as Member of the National
Assembly.

·        Morero prayed:

o   Declare Bocar ineligible to be a member of the National Assembly

o   Declare him (Morero) as the elected official

·        Electoral Commission: Dismissed the petition

Issue: WON the court may review the decision of the Electoral commission and "issue
an order prohibiting the respondent Auditor general from passing in audit or authorizing
in any way the disbursement of funds of the national Assembly as emoluments for the
respondent, Juan L. Bocar, and declaring that the latter is without right to continue
holding the office of member of the National Assembly from the 3rd district of Samar.
Ruling: NO. Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly." The language of this
provisions is clear. It vests in the Electoral Commission exclusive jurisdiction to pass
upon the qualifications of a member of the national Assembly. The judgment rendered
by the commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law.

The decision involved in this proceeding was rendered by the Electoral Commission
after due hearing. It held "that Juan L. Bocar was, under the Constitution, elected
Member of the National Assembly for the third district of Samar." This decision is final
and beyond the authority of this court to review.

30. Angara v. Electoral Commission

Facts: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as
member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3,
1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.
The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted
on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however
denied his motion.

Issue: Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly

Ruling: [The Court DENIED the petition.]

No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

30. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the
candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned
the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino
citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any
property in Samar.
 
ISSUE/s:
 
1.)    Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.)    Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.)    WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
 
RULING:
 
1.)    Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no
denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the
power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2.)    Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from
China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan
took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the
Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born
Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.)    Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The
domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar.  Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the
residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
 
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

31. JOSE M. VELOSO, applicant, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS

OF THE PROVINCE OF LEYTE, composed of the provincial fiscal et. al., and THE
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE PROVINCE OF SAMAR,
composed of the provincial fiscal et. al., respondents. G.R. No. 15620 | 1919-07-10

Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992)

Facts: As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed

by the following by parties: LDP – IS, NPC – 5, Lakas – 3. Applying the

mathematical formula agreed by parties they are entitled to twelve seats. On the

organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight

senators for Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected on the

nomination of Osmeña.

Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12

senators in the Commission?

RULING:

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on

Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as

not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and

therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the

requirements that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional

representation of the resulting fractional membership of the political parties

represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the

political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two

halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation

because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the

fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a

representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to

disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party

with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can

by sheer force of number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a

proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in

effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain

the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under

such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to

confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission

on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the

same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of

any political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided

that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the

Commission on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng

vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to

be able to have a representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that

any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the

Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent Senator Tañada.

We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:

1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected

senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.

2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a

political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally

claims seat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators

to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that

the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators

and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution

requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under

Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in

Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while congress is in session, at the

call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers

and functions herein conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of

the Constitution, Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on

Appointments, provides as follows:

Sec. 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall meet at either

the session hall of the Senate or the House of Representatives upon call of the

Chairman or as the Commission may designate. The presence of at least thirteen

(13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at

least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either

house. . . .

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence

of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives

in order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of

Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their composition is expressly

specified by the Constitution. Among these are the Supreme

Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on Election, 15 Commission

on Audit. 16 They perform their function so long and there is the required

quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments

may perform its functions and transact it s business even if only ten (10) senators

are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for equal

membership from the Senate and the House of Representatives in the

Commission on Appointments, the senators on the one hand, and the

representatives, on the other, do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along

party lines. Even if Senator Tañada would not be able sit in the Commission on

Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be represented in the Commission

by congressman Ponce Enrile who has become a member of the LP. On the other
hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political party in order to fill up the two

vacancies resulting from this decision.

Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always twelve (12)

senators in the Commission on Appointments, the instant situation cannot be

rectified by the Senate in disregard of the rule on proportional representation.

The election of senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the

Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a

violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and

election by the LDP majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the

Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of

discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command

of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not

merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law

and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and

jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, We declare the election of Senator

Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on

Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional

representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the

Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said

respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from assuming,

occupying and discharging the functions of members of the Commission on

Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate President Neptali Gonzales,

in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to

desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and from

allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as members of said

Commission.

SO ORDERED.

Daza v. Singson

FACTS 

1.  After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the HOR apportioned its
12 seats in COA among several political parties (Lakas ng Bansa, PDP
Laban, the Liberal Party, etc).

2.  Petitioner Raul Daza was chosen as representative of the Liberal Party (LP).

3.  Sep 16, 1988 – Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) reorganized. 24

LP members transferred to LDP. (17 LP members, 159 LDP in all)

4.  HOR withdrew COA seat of petitioner and gave this to the newly-formed
LDP. 

5.  Dec 5, 1988 – HOR elected new set of representatives with original
members except petitioner. Singson added as additional LDP member.

6.  Jan 13, 1989 – Petitioner challenged his removal from COA and the
assumption of his seat by respondent. Court issued TRO.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1.      W/N petitioner can be removed from COA (if HOR reorganization and
COA representation changes are valid)

Both parties are invoking Cunanan v. Tan (see Notes)

Petitioner: LDP is not a permanent political party because not yet registered
in accordance with Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5), in relation to other Constitution
provisions. Also, LDP not yet stable and should survive in a general
congressional election.
 Respondent: Reorganization at any time is allowed to reflect any changes in
the political alignments, but changes should be permanent.

Court: COMELEC granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political
party (Aug 28, 1989), weakening petitioner’s argument. Petitioner’s contention
that the party should pass the test of time not acceptable because under this
theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the
HOR/Senate would still not be entitled to representation in COA as long as it
was organized only recently – LDP’s 157 members would have no COA and
HRET representation.

   Petitioner’s contention that the party must survive general congressional

election: LDP has passed that test. It has the biggest following in HOR.

   HOR has authority to change its representation in the COA to reflect

at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of
its membership.  Such changes must be permanent and do not include
temporary alliances/factional divisions not without permanent shifts of
allegiance.

2.                W/N question raised by petitioner is political in nature

Respondent: Issue is beyond the jurisdiction of Court

Court: Court has competence to act on the matter. What is involved is the
legality and not the wisdom of the act of HOR removing the petitioner from
COA. Even if it was, Court can still resolve it under expanded jurisdiction.

3.                W/N respondent has been improperly impleaded

Court: NO. Singson technically correct in saying that he did not cause Daza’s
removal, but this case is treated like a petition for quo warranto for the
petitioner is questioning the respondent’s right to sit as COA member. 

Furthermore, where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the

transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.”

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition DISMISSED. TRO lifted. Respondent was validly elected in COA.

 
DOCTRINE

Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution:

“There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the

Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
the case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule
by a majority vote of all the Members.”

RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON

         The Commission on Appointments is a body of the Congress of the Phils.

provided by the Constitution (see Doctrine). It confirms certain appointments of the
President. The members are: Senate President, ex-officio Chairman, 12 Senators and
12 HOR members.

Reorganization of the COA is valid when it is based on the proportional

representation of the political parties in the HOR (Sec 18, Art VI Consti).
Additionally, please see Court holding in #1 issue (bold text).

OTHER NOTES

1. Cunanan v. Tan – about 1961 HOR elections. Allied Majority was formed by
some Nacionalista Party members with Liberal Party because they were not
contented with the House leadership. This caused reorganization of the chamber
and also affected House representation in COA (3 Nacionalista members in COA
replaced by their Allied Majority colleagues). Petitioner’s ad interim appointment
as Deputy Admin. of Reforestration rejected by COA and replaced by
respondent. Cunanan came to SC, contending that rejection of his appointment
was null and void because Commission was invalidly constituted.

Court agreed. Allied Majority temporary combination – Nacionalista defectors in Allied

Majority had not disaffiliated from their party. COA reorganization was invalid because it
was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in HOR.

34. Madrigal v. Villar

FACTS:
1. In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their
respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA).

2. Contingent in the Senate to the CA, only one representative of the Liberal Party
(LP) was seated as member (Sen. Mar Roxas).

3. Contingent to the House of Representatives to the CA, no representative of the

Liberal Party was seated as a member.

4. Petitioners of the First Petition went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia
to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia
merely said that he would study their demand.

5. On September 3, 2007, petitioner in the first petition, Representative Tañada,

requested from the House of Representatives leadership one seat in the CA for
the Liberal Party. To his request, Representative Neptali Gonzales II begged the
indulgence of the Liberal Party "to allow the Legal Department to make a study
on the matter."

6. Representative Tañada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary

General of the HoR the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to
include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution. Representative Tañada also brought the matter
to the attention of then Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since
there were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the
party should be represented in the CA.

7. However as of October 15, 1007, no report or recommendation was proffered by

the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or
recommendation on the matter within three days.

8. Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the HoR informed
Representative Tañada that the department was constrained to withhold the
release of its legal opinion because the handling lawyer was directed to secure
documents necessary to establish some of the members’ party affiliations.

9. Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition by petitioner
former Senator Franklin M. Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), against
then Speaker De Venecia et.al, raising the following issues:

a. WOR the LP is entitled to one seat in the CA

b. WOR the respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in depriving the LP the
constitutional entitlement to 1 seat in the CA and
 c. WON as a result of grave abuse of discretion of the respondents the writ
prayed for in the petition shall be issued to nullify the current composition
of the CA

10. Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Aspiras filed their Comment and
moved for the dismissal of the petition on based grounds:

a. Power to elect members to the CA belongs to each house of congress

pursuant to the constitution

b. The constitution does not require that the commission must have complete
membership in order that it can function. What the constitution requires is
that there must at least be a majority of all the members of the
commission for it to validly conduct its proceedings and transact its
business.

11. Speaker De Venecia and Representative Defensor filed their Comment and
moved too for the dismissal of the petition on ff grounds:

a. The acts complained of do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

b. The LP does not possess the requisite number of members that
would entitle the party to a seat in the commission on
appointments.
c. The petitioners failed to exhaust the remedies available to them.

12. Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate
letters of April 17, 2008 to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles,
claimed that the composition of the Senate  and HoR contingent in the CA
violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. She
requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the
meantime, "all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance as the same may be
construed as illegal and unconstitutional."

13. By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal again wrote Senator Villar saying
that it is imperative that the serious constitutional questions that I have raised be
settled before the plenary acts on this endorsement made by Sen. Mar Roxas to
appoint Rolando Andaya as Secretary of Committee on Budget and
Management.

14. By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised Senator Madrigal in view of the
written comment of Sen. Arroyo that complaints in the election of the members of
the CA shall be addressed by the body that elected them, Sen. Villar said that
copies of her letters were given to the Senate Secretary to include the same in
the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.

15. Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2, 2008 addressed to Senator Villar,

reiterated her request that all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the
reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents.
 16. Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008 the second petition, G.R. No.
183055, against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President et al alleging
that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in failing to comply with the constitutional requirement of
proportional party representation of members of the CA and in continuously
conducting hearings despite the unconstitutional composition of the CA.

17. Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, later filed on August 15, 2008 a
Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition,33 alleging that with the
designation of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party as a
member of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA in replacement of
Representative Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, their petition had become moot
and academic.

ISSUES:

1. WON Sen. Madrigal has the legal standing to file the petition.

2. WON Sen. Madrigal failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort. Each House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or
changing the composition of its own contingent to the CA.

RULING:

1. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the
act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political
party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban
possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.

2. Senator Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of

Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates
that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to
court.

Following the ruling in Pimentel, it cannot be said that recourse was already had in the
House of Representatives. Furnishing a copy of Petitioner’s letter to the Senate
President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the
primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Further, it is the Members of the House who claim to have been deprived of a
seat in the Commission on Appointments that must first show to the House that they
possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the Commission on
Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel, demanding seats in the Commission on
Appointments for Congressmen, who have not even raised the issue of its present
composition in the House, is not Senator Madrigal’s affair.
 

It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator
Madrigal’s letters to the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of Business of the
Session of the Senate to address her concerns. Senator Madrigal’s filing of the second
petition is thus premature.

WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No.
180055 is GRANTED. The Petition is WITHDRAWN. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is
DISMISSED.

35 Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160

Mary Conception Bautista v. Senator Jovito Salionga, Commission on Appointments,

Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Huma Rights and Hesiquio Mallillin

Facts:

·        Aug 1987: Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista was appointed by then Pres. Cory
Aquino as the ACTING Chairman of CHR.

·        Realizing that there was a need for a permanent chairman and members of the
CHR, the President permanently appointed Atty. Bautista as the Chairman of the
Commission in 1988.

·        By virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President

that she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of
the President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office.

·        Petitioner Bautista took her oath before SC CJ Fernan.

·        She then discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of CHR.

·        January 1989: the Commission on Appointments requested Bautista to submit to

the Commission certain connection with the confirmation of her appointment.

·        Bautista wrote a letter to the Senate President Jovito Salonga (Chairman of

Commission on Appointments) that the CHR is an independent office and
appointments are not subject to the confirmation of the CHR. The Commission on
Appointments has no jurisdiction under the Constitution to review appointments by
the President of Commissioners of the Commission on Human Rights

·        The Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautitsta’s “ad interim

appointment” in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
 ·        the President had designated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case
which had been elevated to the Supreme Court.

·        Petitioner: CO Appointments has no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm

and review her appointment.

Issue: WON the appointments by the President in the CHR need to be confirmed and
reviewed by the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling: No.

·        When Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's designation as

Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same
appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon
the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately
thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President.

·        There is no new or further appointment could be made to a position already filled by a

previously completed appointment which had been accepted by the appointee, through
a valid qualification and assumption of its duties.

Respondent COmmission: The president may voluntarily submit the appointment to

the CO Appointment for confirmation.

·        SC: The mischief in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion
that the President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power
boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they are placed by the
Constitution.

·        The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional
Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom,
exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on
Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident
constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of
appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter acting
through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is to
disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution
has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the
President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over
 other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of
political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained.

·        when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to
make without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive's
voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and
the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

·        EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION

ON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN
APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989

o   when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to

the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the
advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the
performance of her duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential
act of appointment to the subject position which, under the Constitution, is
to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which,
upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of
office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her,
indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no
vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment
could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this
day.
 

Respondent Mallillin: with or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,

petitioner Bautista, as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, can be removed
from said office at anytime, at the pleasure of the President; and that with the
disapproval of Bautista's appointment (nomination) by the Commission on
Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal by the President and her
replacement with respondent Mallillin Thus, according to respondent Mallillin the petition
at bar has become moot and academic.

·        SC: No. The case is not moot and academic. Respondent Mallillin relied on EO 163-A
which provides that the tenure in the CHR shall be at the pleasure of the President.
Previous of EO 163-A was EO 163, which provides for the term of office which 7 years
without reappointment. The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for,
 pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee in the Civil Service may be
removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4), and
this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make the tenure
of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter
with blanket authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his term.

·        The Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and
created by the Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights-and
vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights,
pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures
therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in
office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the
President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared
unconstitutional.

·        Petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the

Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President
on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be
removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can
be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process
properly safeguarded.

36. Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992

(1) This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715,
stating:

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners

shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the
nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor
Arbiters and

Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of

the Secretary of Labor and

Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

(2) Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue
in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments
to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite
 passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of such appointments.The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16,
Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of appointments extended by the president to governmentofficers
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution whoseappointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by
RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of
no legal force and effect.

RATIO:

(1) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:

(A) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

(B) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.

(2) It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what
it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would
want it interpreted.

30. Arnault v. Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950)

Facts: In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for P4.5M
and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate amount of P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was
paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as payment for his interest
 in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnault, Burt's representative in the
Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount, he
encashed P400,000, which he eventually gave to an undisclosed person as per Burt's
instructions.

It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both
estates were already owned by the Philippine Government, so there was no need to
repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's interest in both estates amounted to only
P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure to pay off his previous
loans. 

A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philippine Government
was duped and who ultimately benefited from the assailed transaction. One of the
issues pursued was to whom did Arnault give the cash amounting to P400,000.
Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the person, initially because he couldn't
remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his being cited for contempt.
He was thereafter held in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the
person he gave the P400,000 to. 

Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be
freed from imprisonment. 

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.

2. Whether or not the Senate can impose punishment beyond the legislative session.

3. Whether or not Arnault can invoke the right against self-incrimination as an excuse in not
answering the question he is being asked in the Senate.

Ruling: Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down some general principles
of law: 

• The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But despite

similarities in the basic structure of government, one essential difference is that the
Philippine legislative department is more powerful than its US counterpart, in the sense
that the latter shares power with the congresses of individual states. 

• The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate

auxiliary to the legislative function of the Philippine congress. Although there are no
express provisions in the constitution that invest either the House or the Senate with the
power to conduct investigations and exact testimony, such power is implied. 

1. Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary, especially in the conduct of inquiries
that fall within the Senate's jurisdiction (see [b] above). With this in mind, it is not a
requirement that each and every single question asked of witnesses necessarily be
material to the case. This is so because the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
 action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of
the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of
such information elicited from a single question. 

2. In the instant case, the resolution holding Arnault for contempt was issued on May 15,
1950. He was subsequently detained for 13 days, or beyond the legislative session of
Congress, which session ended on May 18 of the same year. Arnault claimed that his
continued detention had no legal basis, since the body that issued the resolution had
already been dissolved by law. But the Court ruled that the Senate is a continuing body
and does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. As such,
there is no time limit to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may be constitutionally exerted.

3. No, the Court held that Arnault's invocation of the right against self-incrimination has no
basis. Arnault failed in discharging his duty of providing frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority -- a violation of the State's right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict
with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative,
the former must give way to the latter.

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED.

38. PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., Petitioners, MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R.

MARCOS, Co-Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C.
FARIÑAS,  G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018

FACTS:

The House Rules railroaded to initiate the inquiry. A Referral of House Resolution
No. 882 from the Committee on Rules to the Committee on Good Government and the
scheduling for hearing on 02 May 2017 all took place on 16 March 2017, without the
conduct of preliminary determination before the Committee on Rules (for determination
of whether it is the proper subject of legislative inquiry) and before the respondent
Committee on Good Government (for determination of jurisdiction over the subject
matter)

The subpoena ad testificandum for petitioners Ilocos 6 to appear at the hearing

scheduled on 16 May 2017 were only served on them on 15 May 2017 - one (1) day
prior to the scheduled hearing, instead of at least three (3) days as required under
Section 8 of the House Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Despite lack of sufficient notice, the Committee of Good Government and Public
Accountability cited petitioners Ilocos 6 in contempt for failure to appear at the 16 May
2017 hearing. The conditions of confinement are degrading and inhuman - effectively a
continuing psychological torture inflicted on the Ilocos 6. The Ilocos 6 were not provided
food and mattresses and beddings. The detention was a stock room with very poor
ventilation and turned hastily into a detention room.
 These conditions evince the coercive nature of the interrogation as evidenced by
statements of Respondent Fariñas during the inquiry on May 29, 2017 that petitioners
will be detained until the House of Representatives resumes its session in July 24,
2017. A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Petitioners Ilocos 6 before the
Courts of Appeals where a “Writ of Habeas Corpus” was issued. Subsequently, an
"Order of Release" was issued to the Ilocos 6 after posting bond but said order was not
served because the process server was denied entry to the House of Representatives. 

Worse, the leadership of the House of Representatives, specifically House

Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez, openly flouted the authority of the Court of Appeals, stating
publicly that the House of Representatives would not recognize the orders of the Court
of Appeals and even threatened to abolish the Court of Appeals through a legislation
originating from the House of Representatives. In the end, with the Committee,
specifically Respondent Fariñas unsatisfied with their answers to the questions raised
by the Committee, the Ilocos 6 were ordered back into detention, until they were ready
to answer the queries of the Committee in a manner that it deemed satisfactory.

While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners
and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition. In opposition, respondents
maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas Corpus are two separate remedies
which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-exist in a single petition. Further,
respondents argue that the issuance of a writ of Amparo is limited only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances which are not extant in the instant
case.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo while petition for habeas corpus is
pending is proper?

HELD:

No.  While there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition for
habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo,117 the peculiarity of the then pendency of the
Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate. The privilege of the writ of Amparo is
confined to instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant
Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of
Amparo is dismissible.

Bengzon v. SBRC

FACTS 
 1. Jul. 30, 1987: The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and others for the alleged sale of 36  corporations
to the Lopa Group, alleging that they violated Sec. 5 of RA 3019. Petitioners
herein were impleaded as defendants in the case.
2. Sept. 13, 1988: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
privilege speech on the floor regarding an alleged takeover of the FMMC Group
of Companies by Ricardo Lopa, encouraging the Senate to look into a possible
violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
3. Acting upon Sen. Enrile’s speech, the Sen. Blue Ribbon Committee began an
investigation into the matter, subpoenaing petitioners and Lopa to testify.
o Lopa declined to testify, saying that he may “unduly prejudice” herein
petitioners in the Sandiganbayan case.
o Petitioner Bengzon also refused to testify, invoking his right to due
process and averring that the publicity arising from the committee inquiry
may affect his and other petitioners’ rights.
4. The Committee suspended its inquiry and directed petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which it issued Resolution
6 rejecting petitioners’ plea to be excused from testifying.
4. Petitioners then filed with the SC the instant petition for prohibition with a prayer
for TRO and/or injunctive relief, averring that the Committee, in requiring them to
appear and testify in its inquiry, “acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose, in a clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights”, and
causing them damage, prejudice, and injury.
4. Jose S. Sandejas, also a defendant in the Sandiganbayan case, filed with the SC
a motion for intervention, which it granted.

ISSUE with HOLDING

Procedural Issue: 

1. W/N the SC has jurisdiction to inquire into the Committee’s motives in conducting
legislative investigations: Yes
 The SC has jurisdiction to inquire into the scope and extent of the Committee’s
powers to conduct inquiries into private affairs in aid of legislation.

Substantive Issues:

1. W/N the Sen. Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has no valid legislative purpose:
Yes
 Background of Sen. Enrile’s privilege speech: Sen. Enrile published a letter in
various newspapers claiming that Lopa took over the FMMC Group of
Companies. Lopa then wrote to Sen. Enrile denying the allegations. Sen. Enrile,
 taking advantage of his privilege hour, delivered a speech encouraging an
investigation into Lopa.
 Said privilege speech, which the Committee acted upon pursuant to Sec. 4 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, contains no
suggestion of legislation.
o According to Sec. 1 of the aforementioned Rules, inquiries may only be
made when there is legislation to be made or reexamined.
 The Committee’s inquiry was intended to find out whether or not petitioners and
Lopa violated RA 3019, which is not within the jurisdiction of Congress. Besides,
there was already a case filed before the Sandiganbayan, which had rightful
jurisdiction over it.
o If the inquiry is pursued, it would violate the doctrine of separation of
powers by giving judicial powers to the legislature.

2.                W/N the Committee’s inquiry violates petitioners’ right to due process: Yes

 The Committee, in requiring petitioners to appear before it despite the existence

of a case filed against them in the Sandiganbayan, violated petitioners’ rights
against self-incrimination.
 Because of the identical nature of the Sandiganbayan case (wherein petitioners
are defendants) and the committee inquiry, testifying before the Committee could
incriminate petitioners in the Sandiganbayan case.
 Right against self-incrimination may be invoked not only in criminal proceedings,
but also in other types of suit, provided that they are analogous to a criminal
proceeding. (Cabal v. Kapunan)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is

hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and
produce evidence at the said inquiry.

41. Standard v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions, and

Currencies (2007)

 FACTS:

 • 2005, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance of

Wealth” in the Senate. o This privilege speech was based on a letter from Atty.
Bocobo.  
 o The letter denounced Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation
Code (SRC).  

o The letter urged the Senate to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to

prevent future fraudulent activities in the future.

• Even before the privilege speech, Senator JPE had already introduced P.S.
Resolution No. 166 or the proposal “to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
into the illegal sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by

Standard Chartered Bank.”  o A provision states that, “WHEREAS, there are

complaints against Standard Chartered Bank whose actions have reportedly
defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of billions of pesos through the sale
of unregistered securities in the form of high-risk mutual funds falsely
advertised and marketed as safe investment havens”

o Other clauses in the preamble state that there are various violations of the
General Banking Act of 2001, and the SRC. 

• In lieu of this, an initial hearing was set to investigate, in aid of legislation.  

• Standard submitted a letter to the Senate Committee contending that there were
pending court cases involving the same issues in the legislative inquiry.

o They argued that these pending cases posed as a challenge to the

jurisdiction of Senate Committee to proceed with the inquiry.

• Nonetheless, the investigation commenced.  

o Sen. Enrile inquired who among those invited were present and who were
absent, and a subpoena be issued for the latter.

o Sen. Enrile also requested the DOJ, through the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, to issue a Hold Departure Order against them and/or include
them in the Bureau’s Watch List.  

• The hearing was adjourned but subpoenas were still served to Standard.  

o They were also later served with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces
tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set at a later
date. Hence, this petition.  

• Standard cited the case of Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.  

o Standard contended that since the issue of whether SCB-Philippines

illegally sold unregistered foreign securities has already been filed with the
courts.  
 o Because of this, the Senate Commitee would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in these courts if the they pursued with the
investigation.

o There were 3 cases pending the CA, 2 criminal cases in RTC Pasig/MTC
Makati, and 1 civil case.

ISSUE/HELD: 

Can the Senate Committee proceed with the inquiry, in aid of legislation, despite
the cases pending in court?— YES! The Senate Committee can proceed with the
inquiry.  

  

• SC held that Standard’s argument is misplaced.  o In the case of Bengzon,

considering that there is a pending case in Sandiganbayan, the issue was
whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate on the matter that
would create the possibility of conflicting judgments.  

o SC held that the inquiry into the same issue would be an encroachment on
the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.  

• The only similarity of the present case to Bengzon is that both have pending cases
in court.

However, in Bengzon, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee had no

jurisdiction because according to the SC, the intended inquiry was not in
aid of legislation.  

o Also, in Bengzon, SC held that the speech of Senator Enrile did not suggest
any contemplated legislation. It merely called upon the Senate to look into
possible violations of RA 3019.  

o In the present case of Standard, the inquiry was made in aid of legislation.

• SC held that the mere filing of a criminal/administrative complaint before a

court/quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation.  

o P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry
as found in its last three

 
 

‘Whereas clauses’.  o The unmistakable objective of the investigation was

“to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities.”

o It is important to consider that Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to

immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent
the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.” 

o Mere filing of a complaint should not bar the Senate from exercising this
power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy
to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy
of by simply filing a criminal/administrative complaint. 

o In the landmark case of Arnault v. Nazareno, SC held that “the power of

inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information recourse must be had to others who possess it.”  

• SC further held that the right to privacy in “in-aid of legislation” inquiries is

not absolute. o Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution guarantees respect for the
rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation. However, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to defeat a legitimate
congressional inquiry.

o In the case of Sabio v. Gordon, SC held that the right of the people to
access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the
right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. SC rationed that the right to
privacy is not absolute when there is an overriding compelling state interest. 
o Also in the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the SC used the rational basis
relationship test. SC held that there is no infringement of the individual’s right
to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose.
This was to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating
banking transactions can adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities.

o In other words, there must be a compelling state interest to trump over the
right to privacy.

 
 • SC also held that Standard cannot claim that they were singled out by the
Senate Committee.  o The SEC and BSP officials were subjected to the
same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the
illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines.  

o SC held that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies,
in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent
activity.

• SC held that the inquiry was NOT made in aid of collection. (Not really
related) o Standard contended that the inquiry conducted by the Senate
Committee was in “aid of collection.” o They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel
Baviera were only seeking a friendly forum so that they could recover their
investments from SCB-Philippines. SC held otherwise.

o Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of
recovering his investment.  o Baviera was not a “complainant” but merely a
witness in the investigation and was only invited to testify on the alleged
illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. He was only
a victim

• With regard the contempt powers of the Senate, SC held the same to be valid.
(Not really related) 

SC held in previous cases that Congress and its committees possess

contempt powers.  

o The exercise by Congress of the power to punish contempt is based on the

principle of selfpreservation. As the branch of the government vested with
the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its
authority and punish contumacious acts against it.

Such power is sui generis. It attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions, but to
the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. 

42 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations (March 2008)
Facts:
·        April 2007: the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of approximately P16 Billion Pesos.
 ·        This project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
·        In connection with this NBN Project, various resolutions were introduced in the
Senate:
P.S. Res. Senator Resolution directing the Blue Ribbon Committee And The
No. 127 Aquilino Q. Committee On Trade And Industry To Investigate, in aid of
Pimentel, Jr legislation, the circumstances leading to the approval of
the broadband contract with ZTE and the role played by
the officials

P.S. Res. Senator Mar Resolution urging Pres. GMA to cancel the ZTE Contract
No. 144 Roxas

P.S. Res. Senator Resolution directing the Committee On National Defense

No. 129 Panfilo M. And Security to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation into
Lacson the national security implications of awarding the national
broadband network contract to the Chinese firm

Senate Senator Mar Bill Amending the GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

Bill No. Roxas REFORM ACT
1793

Senate Senator Mar Bill amending the OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT

Bill No. Roxas ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996
1794

Senate Senator AN ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO

Bill No. Miriam INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
1317 Defensor AGREEMENTS.
Santiago
·        Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
·        Petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25,
2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was
"out of town" during the other dates.
·        Businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
·        It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the
Chinese Government.
·        On Sept. 26, petitioner testified before the respondent Committees for 11
hours.
 o   He disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project.
o   He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
o   However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege".
o   In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.
·        Respondent issued a subpoena against the petitioner requiring him to appear
him again.
·        Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The letter stated that
in pursuant of the SC ruling on Senate v Ermita, the questions mentioned were
covered by executive privilege. The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
·        Petitioner Neri did not appear on the Nov. 20 Hearing.
·        The Joint Committee sent a show cause letter to Petitioner Neri.
·        Petitioner Neri submitted a letter stating that his non-appearance was ordered
by the President, the questions were covered by executive privilege and
requested that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so
that he may be adequately prepare for the hearing.
·        Petitioner Neri filed before the SC a petition for certiorari assailing the show
cause letter.
·        Respondent Committed issued an Order citing Petitioner Neri in contempt of
respondent Committee.
·        Petitioner Neri moved for the reconsideration of the Order. He insisted that he
has not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He
emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent
Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He
also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According
to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show
cause Letter "through the issuance of declaration of contempt" and arrest.
·        SC issued a Status Quo Ante Order.
·        Petitioner contended that:
o   Respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt Order were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
o   emphasized that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the
President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita
 ·        Respondents argued that:
o   (petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation
conducted in aid of legislation
o   there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege
o   there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's arrest
o   petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
·        On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151,
revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She
advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Issues:
1.  are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
2.  did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?
 
Ruling:
The SC discussed first the difference between:
Sec. 21, Art. VI Sec. 22, Art. VI

The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The heads of department may upon their
own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either
House, or as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall
be submitted to the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When
the security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

Power to conduct inquiries in aid of Power to conduct question hour

legislation

Legislative function Oversight function

 Can compel appearance of executive Cannot compel appearance
officials
 
1.  The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by
Executive Privilege.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is
based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But,
the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
Despite the revocation of EO 464, the concept of EP is not in any way privileged
because it has Constitutional underpinnings. In Senate v Ermita, substantial potion of
EO 464 was held unconstitutional. In Executive Sec. Ermita’s letter, EO 464 was never
mentioned.
In In Re: Sealed Cases, the US CA ruled that there are 2 kinds of executive
privilege.
presidential communications privilege deliberative process privilege

communications, documents or other advisory opinions, recommendations

materials that reflect presidential decision- and deliberations comprising part of a
making and deliberations and that the process by which governmental
President believes should remain decisions and policies are formulated.
confidential

applies to decision-making of the to decision-making of executive officials

President 

rooted in the constitutional principle of on common law privilege

separation of power and the President's
unique constitutional role

presidential communications privilege Not applicable

applies to documents in their entirety, and
covers final and post-decisional materials
as well as pre-deliberative ones

presidential communications privilege is  

always subject to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege.
        The officials covered by the PCP are only those functions that form the core of
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as "quintessential and non-
delegable Presidential power," such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and
removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive
ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc. Also, Courts
ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets, identity of government informers in some circumstances, and
information related to pending investigations. An area where the privilege is highly
revered is in foreign relations.
         The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject
of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President
is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
 
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow
provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
         In this case, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above
elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the
"operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
         With regard to third element, the claim of EP is subject to balancing against other
interest. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the
presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing
interests of the political branches of the government "in the manner that preserves the
essential functions of each Branch." Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for
the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita
 ruled that the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
         Respondent Committees claimed that the grant of EP to the petitioner violates
the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern. The SC did not
agree with this. Petitioner Neri already testified for 11 hours and manifested his
willingness to answer more except those covered with EP. The right to public
information, like any other right, is subject to limitation as may be provided by law.
These limitations are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, Article 229 of the
Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
         The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former
cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to
information.

The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked. Jurisprudence teaches that for
the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter." A formal and proper claim of
executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their
confidentiality. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. Also, as held further
in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal
department.
 

2.      Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the

Contempt Order in view of 5 reasons:

A.     there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt
Order suffers from constitutional infirmity.

B.     respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted
the need for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this requirement is
imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be
so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are
respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of
Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent
Committees did not send him an advance list of questions.

C.     only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present
during the deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
 of Legislation provides that: "The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members,
may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the
Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the
Committee or any of its members."

D.     Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

E.     Contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate.

44. Senate v. Ermita (495 SCRA 170)

Facts: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten
the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among
others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to
the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting
since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464 is constitutional

Ruling: To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed
the two different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section
22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of

Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department
heads’ appearance is merely requested. 

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section
22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in

Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A

legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions
to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”.
This is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts,
and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be
exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b)
should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes
E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested information is privileged. 
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke
executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be
resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their
absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the
President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the
invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. 

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own

judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking
the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive
privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are
declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.

45. In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO
L. SABIO v.HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al., G.R. No. 174340 17
October 2006

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners  to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1:
“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence
in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.”

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not
only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.  Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees
and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal.  The Court’s high  regard  to  such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that   “the power
of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault  that  “the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation,  is a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”Considering these jurisprudential
instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b)
exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry.  This
cannot be countenanced.  Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption.   The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad,  encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.”
PCGG belongs to this class. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is
not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms
that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or
its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution
because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of
inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of  public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the
policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of  access to public information
(Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

48. Rodriguez v Gella

Facts:

1. On August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already passed upon the status of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, 1941, "declaring a
state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and
authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency."
2. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25,
1946 (when the Congress convened in special session) according to Chief
Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in
effect concluded that the powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn
as to matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on which the latter had
demonstrated its readiness or ability to act.
3. Executive Orders No. 62 (1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (1948)
regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (1949) the first appropriation funds for the
operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the
second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were
therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671
had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same
subjects.
4. In the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive
Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first (EO No.
545)appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works,
and the second (EO 546) setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic
action and other calamities.

ISSUE: WON EO No. 545 and 546 is valid, as both have been issued on the
premise that the President still possess the legislative power in time of an
emergency.

RULING: Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1)
the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of
the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be
assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it
be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the
result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept
the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted
only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved
the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That
emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is
confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to
open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a
resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their
loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the
President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution
may be delegated to him in time of war." When President Quezon said "in time of
war", he undoubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671
was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of
war or (2) other national emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title
and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other
national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes
such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the
typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the
last world war but were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At
any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let
the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress
had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers
delegated to the President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos.
545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial
notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving
acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and
many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress
must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself
and to withdraw the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have
powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of
special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do
directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the
President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse
or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise
such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally
functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any
 residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and
overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to
exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest
and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed to
establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. The
framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war
or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the
Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient
procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should
not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the
wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void,
and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting,
and expending the public funds set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.

49 Araneta v Dinglasan
Facts:

L- Executive Order No. 62: J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in

2044
and L- regulates rentals for houses
2756 and lots for residential buildings
the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violation of the provisions of this Executive
Order, and prays for the issuance of the
writ of prohibition to the judge and the city
fiscal.

L- Executive Order No. 192: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of

3055 mandamus to compel the Administrator of
aims to control exports from the the Sugar Quota Office and the
Philippines. Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both
officials refuse to issue the required export
license on the ground that the exportation
of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden
by this Executive Order.
 L- Executive Order No. 225, which
3054 appropriates funds for the
operation of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines
during the period from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950, and for
other purposes
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an
elector, and president of the Nacionalista
Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines
from disbursing money under this Executive
Order.

L- Executive Order No. 226, which Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer

3056 appropriates P6,000,000 to and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the
defray the expenses in respondents from disbursing, spending or
connection with, and incidental otherwise disposing of that amount or any
to, the holding of the national part of it.
elections to be held in
November, 1949

·        In sum, petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly
issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act.

·        CA 671 provides that in pursuant of Art. VI, Sec. 26 of the Constitution and due to the
existence of war between the US and other countries to which the Philippines is
involved, the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations deemed
necessary to carry out the national policy.

·        Some of the president’s powers are:

o   to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches,
departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities
o   to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth
o   to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
existing
o   to continue in force laws and appropriations
o   to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in
existence
o   to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof
o   to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur
in overdrafts
 o   to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of
debts
o   to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the
authority.

·        CA 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness.

Issue: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

Ruling: YES

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness.
The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished,
the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of
the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to
interpretation.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof
should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or
scope." The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question
intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency.

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view.

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671.
Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in
full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when
Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be
two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other’s actions. Even if the emergency powers
of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated.

Also, the Court used contemporaneous construction, the Court used the
statements of Pres. Quezon where he stated that  Act No. 671 was only "for a certain
period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote
automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they
denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after
the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to
be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate."
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

51. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331)

"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit,
derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular
enterprise."

Facts: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory
relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public
works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. 

Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate
of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the
municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition
that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names
of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to
write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. 

The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the
feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of
RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio.
Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of
donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved
the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in
RA 920 are constitutional.

Ruling: It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not
the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does
not justify their aid by the use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of
the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.

In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon
whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by
congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not
cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.

52. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993
(227 SCRA 703)

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the
grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be
as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD
1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House
Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke
Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution

providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-

controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private
gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public
in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

55.Gonzales v. Macaraig (1990)

FACTS:

 
• On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. o It eliminated or decreased certain
items included in the proposed budget submitted to the President.  

• The bill was presented to the president for consideration and approval.  o The
President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep.
Act No. 6688.  o In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55,
a "General Provision," were vetoed. 

• Senate then issued a resolution stating, “That the Senate express its sense that
the veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and without any force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55
remains.”  

• Hence this petition, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the

Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from
implementing Rep. Act No. 6688.

o Section 55: Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of

Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by
Congress:  

§ No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the

Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of
the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act
shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes by augmentation.  

§ An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the

President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved
by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this Act”

• According to the President, the provisions are in violation of Section 25(5) of Article
VI of the Constitution:  o If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

o These persons cannot even augment savings in other items of their

respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of
urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services
and infrastructure projects.  
 • Arguments of Petitioners before the SC: o The line-veto power of the president is
limited to items and not provisions. She exceeded her authority when she
vetoed provisions of the bill.  o When the president objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill

o The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would amount to legislation, and

o The power of augmentation under Article VI, Section 25(5) has to be

provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.  

ISSUES/HELD:

Does the President have the power to veto “provisions” of an Appropriations

Bill? – YES 

• Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution refers to two kinds of veto by the
President: o Paragraph 1 refers to the general veto power of the President
and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.  

o Paragraph 2 is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto

power.  

§ It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an

appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.  

§ As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of
an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the
executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill
does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of the same item. • Even if the
article is silent as to the veto of a provision, the extent of the
President’s power to veto as previousl defined under the 1935
Constitution has not changed:

o Court discussed the development and changes that happened from the
Organic Act, to the 1935 Constitution, 1973 Constitution and up to the
present.  
 o During the Organic Act and the 1935 Constitution, a provision may be
vetoed by the President.  o However, during the 1973 Constitution,
reference to the veto of a provision was eliminated.  

o However, as stated, notwithstanding the elimination, the extent of the power

of the president has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso
merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of
a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.  

Can the President veto a provision without vetoing an entire bill? – YES 

• SC held that this interpretation:

o Not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a
bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the  

o Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill

shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that
any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.  

o In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an

Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.

HOWEVER, even assuming that the provisions are beyond the executive power to
veto, SC believes that Section 55 is not a provision in the budgetary sense of the
term.  

• Under the Constitution a provision should relate specifically to some “particular

appropriation”. Section 55 falls short of this requirement.  

o First, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive

appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill.

o Second, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the

face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the
original recommendations made by the President and to the source
indicated by petitioners themselves.
 o Third, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 is actually an inappropriate
provision that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s
veto power.

Is Section 55 a condition/restriction and thus beyond the veto power? – NO   

• Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be
spent; and that in addition to distinct items of appropriation, the Legislature may
include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions
on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed
to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand.  

• However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the
term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate
legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a
connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures o Using the test of appropriateness, section 55 is an inappropriate
condition. While they appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually
general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate
legislation.

o Section 55 partakes of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings:

in other words, a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an
appropriation bill.  

So is the veto valid? YES 

• When Section 55 prohibited the restoration or increase by augmentation of

appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, it impaired the constitutional
and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any
item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and
efficiency.  

• These are non-appropriation items, an appropriation being a setting apart by law of

a certain sum from the public revenue for a specific purpose.  
 • It is more of a substantive expression of a legislative objective to restrict the power
of augmentation granted to the President and other key officials.  

o It is actually a matter of general law and more properly the subject of a

separate legislation that will embody, define and delimit the scope of the
special power of augmentation from savings instead of being
inappropriately incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act. 

56 Philconsa v. Enriquez (1994) 

FACTS:

 
•         Case is about the General Appropriations Bill of 1994. Its special provisions
are being challenged because of claims that Congress and the President have
exceeded their respective powers and that the President acted with abuse of
discretion in his veto power. 
•         Dec. 17, 1993 – both Houses of Congress passed and approved the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 (GAB) o    As passed, the GAB imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President
o It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects
in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets 
•       Dec. 30 – President signed GAB into law: RA No. 7663 – GAA of 1994 o   
On the same day, Pres. Delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions

               o No step was taken in either Congress

•       Petitions assail the following provisions and sought for
writs of prohibition and mandamus: o        Countrywide
Development Fund provision, 
o    the special provision on Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses
o    the special provision on Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion
allocated for DECS
o    The constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on
Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),
(e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUC's) o The constitutionality of the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service. o the veto on four
 special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) o
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
•         Because of the novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the
Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate
Justice Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as Amicus Curiae.

 
ISSUES/HELD:

 
Are the assailed provisions constitutional?

Provision Constitutionality Ratio

•        The power of appropriation
1) Countrywide Constitutional carries with it the power to
Development specify the project or activity to
Fund Petitioners claim that the be funded under the
power given to the members appropriation law.
provision  of Congress to propose and
identify the projects and •        The CDF is explicit that it
-identifying or activities to be funded by the shall be used "for
specifying the Countrywide Development infrastructure, purchase of
pork barrels Fund is an encroachment by ambulances and computers
the legislature on executive and other priority projects and
power, since said power in activities and credit facilities to
an appropriation act is in qualified beneficiaries.." It was
implementation of a law. Congress itself that determined
the purposes for the
appropriation. The Executive
just implements it
•        The authority given to the
members of Congress is only
to propose and identify projects
to be implemented by the
President – merely
recommendatory. The
President still examines
whether the porposals 
•        In the GAA, there’s a budget
2) Realignment Constitutional for both Houses. Each member
 of Congress is allotted with his
of   own operating expenditure a
Petitioners argue that under proportionate share of the
Operating sec. 25(2), the Senate appropriation for the House to
Expenses  President and the Speaker of which he belongs. 
-allows a member the House of
of Congress to Representatives, but not the •        If he does not spend for one
realign his item of expense, the provision
individual members of
allocation for in question allows him to
Congress, are the ones
operational transfer his allocation in said
authorized to realign the
expenses to any item to another item of
savings as appropriated.
other expense expense.
category •        Under this special provision,
the members of Congress
only determine the necessity
of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for
their operating expenses.
They are in the best position to
do so because they are the
ones who

      know whether there are

deficiencies in other items of
their operating expenses that
need augmentation. 
• However, it is the Senate
    President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall
approve the realignment.
Before giving their stamp of
approval, these two officials will
have to see to it that:
•        (1)The funds to be
realigned or transferred
are actually savings in
the items of
expenditures from which
the same are to be
taken; and
•        (2)The transfer or
realignment is for the
purpose of augmenting
the items of expenditure
 to which said transfer or
realignment is to be
made.
3) Highest Constitutional • citing Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,
Priority for   the SC said that Art. XIV, sec.
Debt Service Petitioners argue that 5(5) [providing that the State
Congress cannot give debt shall assign the highest
service (P86.3B) the budgetary priority to education]
highest priority in the GAA, is only directory. 
especially compared to the
appropriated amt to DECS
(P37.7B)

Are the President’s vetoes on the following provisions valid?  

Vetoed Provision Veto valid?  Ratio 
Special Provision
Debt VOID, part but •        The special provision that
 
on Ceiling of the provides for the payment of foreign
veto is and local debts sets a ceiling: any
sustained payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject
to the approval of the President with
the concurrence of Congress and
that in no case shall it be used to
pay for liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators. 
•        Petitioners claim that the
President cannot veto the Special
Provision on the appropriation for
debt service without vetoing the
entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for
said purpose. 
•        The said provisions are germane
to and have direct connection with
item on debt service. 
•        As appropriate provisions, they
cannot be vetoed without vetoing
the entire item/appropriation.
•        HOWEVER, the veto on the
proviso therein requiring that
"any payment in excess of the
amount herein, appropriated shall
 be subject to the approval of the
President” is sustained because
the vetoed provision is
considered an “inappropriate
provision”
•        Pres. vetoed the provision
because the GAA is not the
appropriate way. The vetoed
provision is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O.
No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these
laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
•        SC found that such provision if
not vetoed would in effect repeal
the Foreign Borrowing Act
making the legislation as a log-
rolling legislation.
Special provision on Valid •        said provision allows for the use of
Revolving Funds   income & creation of revolving fund
for for SCU’s. 
SUC’s •        The provision for Western Visayas
State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges
was vetoed by the Pres, but similar
provisions on government agencies
were allowed.
•        This is because those agencies
have been enjoying the privilege by
virtue of special laws. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law.
•        SC ruled that the veto is valid for it
is in compliant to the “One Fund
Policy” – it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Special provision on VOID • The President vetoed this provision on
70% the basis that it may result to a
(administrative)/ breach of contractual obligations.
30% (contract) The funds if allotted may result to
ratio for road abandonment of some existing
maintenance contracts. 
 •
    SC ruled that this Special Provision in
question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of
a veto. 
• It is not alien to the appropriation for
    road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended – 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.  
• The Constitution allows the addition
    by Congress of special provisions,
conditions to items in an expenditure
bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which
they relate so long as they are
“appropriate” in the budgetary sense. 
Special provision on VOID • Special Provision which requires that
purchase of all purchases of medicines by the
medicines by AFP. AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National
Drug Policy of the Department of
Health is an "appropriate" provision. 
• It is a mere advertence by Congress
    to the fact that there is an existing
law, the Generics Act of 1988, that
requires "the extensive use of drugs
with generic names through a rational
system of procurement and
distribution." 
• The President believes that it is more
    prudent to provide for a transition
period for the smooth implementation
of the law in the case of purchases by
the AFP, as implied by Section 11
(Education Drive) of the law itself. 
•
    This belief, however, cannot justify his
veto of the provision on the purchase
of medicines by the AFP.
Special provision on Valid • As reason for the veto, the President
prior approval of stated that the said condition and
Congress for • prohibition violate the Constitutional
purchase of mandate of non-impairment of
 military contractual obligations, 
equipment and if allowed, “shall effectively alter
  the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all
military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP”. 
• Any provision blocking an
    administrative action in implementing
a law or requiring legislative approval
of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. 
•
    Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions.
Special provision on Valid •
use of savings to The provision allows the Chief of Staff
augment AFP • to augment pension funds through the
pension funds use of savings. 
  According to the President, the grant
of retirement and separation benefits
should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved
for the purpose pursuant to Section
29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. 
•
    Moreover, he stated that the authority
to use savings is lodged in the
officials enumerated in Section 25(5)
of Article VI of the Constitution. 
•
    SC retained the veto per reasons
provided by the president.

 
•         Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision: the provision which Congress can
include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation,
is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from
an item. 
•         To be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other
 laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments.

 
Did the President exceed its veto-power when it imposed conditions that the
deactivation of CAFGU (which Congress has appropriated funds for) should be
done in accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace and
order situation in the affected localities? – No. 

 
•         SC does not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at one in 1994. 
o But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper
vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-inChief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU's to be amended. 

   •    Again: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or

amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758.
• Doctrine of Impoundment: refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever
reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type. 
o SC refrained from passing judgment on the constitutionality of
“impoundment”. However, it applied the doctrine of inappropriate provision
as a way out. 

 
Do the conditions imposed by the President on the appropriations for the SC,
OMD, COA, CHR violate the independence and fiscal autonomy of these entities?
– No. 

 
• The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the
implementation of the items on which the said conditions were imposed, should
be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies.  

               o       They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time
of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
• There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall
be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. 
 o The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his
constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed

 
Separate Opinions

 
•         PADILLA, J. (Concurring) o I disagree with the majority's pronouncements
which would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in the
appropriations act based on the contention that such are "inappropriate
provisions." Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a
provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto
power of the Executive.
•         VITUG, J. (Concurring) – on pork barrel o I agree that it lies with Congress to
determine in an appropriation act the activities and the projects that are desirable
and may thus be funded. Once, however, such identification and the
corresponding appropriation therefor is done, the legislative act is completed and
it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with exclusive responsibility
and authority, to see to it that the legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot
subscribe to another theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing
the law, the Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may
delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a coequal,
independent and coordinate branch.
o    Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the individuals
that comprise it, in any action or decision that can bind it, or be said to
have been done by it, under its constitutional authority. Even assuming
that overseeing the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process,
one that I find difficult to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its
members, that must exercise that function.

I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his
colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. I
see no legal obstacle, however, in their making, just like anyone else, the proper
recommendations to, albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the President for the
purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible.

58. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912)

Ponente: Malcolm, J. ; Petitioners: Juan Bengzon ; Respondents: Secretary of

Justice and Insular Auditor
Rule of Law:

●  Act No. 4051, Section 7. "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office
during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the
provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be
entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act."

●  Section 19 of the Organic Act and Article VI, Section 11 (2) of the 1935
Constitution. "The Governor-General (or President, in the ’35 Consti) shall have
the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the
object."

Doctrine: The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by
the Legislature.

Facts:

●  Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan.

●  Act No. 3899 compelled him to cease holding such position upon reaching the
age of 65 on Jan 14, 1933.

●  He applied for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but was told that he wasn’t entitled
thereto.

●  Act No. 4051 (An Act to Provide for the Payment of Retirement Gratuities to
Officers and Employees of the Insular Government…) was approved by the
Governor-General, exercising his veto powers on section 7. The Philippine
Legislature accepted the veto.

Issues and Holding:

Is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill on which the Gov. Gen. or President can exercise
his right to veto?

YES. It is with regard to the appropriation of funds in the Insular Treasury. Moreover, a
section of the Act provides for the qualification that the President’s veto of one portion
thereof should not affect the rest of the un-vetoed sections. Such anticipation of the
President’s veto implies the existence of such power to veto.

The legislature, by not opposing such veto, expressed acquiescence thereto.

Ruling: The veto of section 7 of Act No. 40151 was VALID.

Separate Opinions:

Villa-Real, J., dissenting

 ●  An appropriation bill is composed of several items of appropriation and not one
which only contains one item.

●  Act No. 4051 is a gratuity law, appropriating only the necessary sum to pay the
granted gratuities. None but one section of the Act contains anything about
appropriation of funds.

o      The Chief Executive then has no veto powers over Act No. 4051, it not
being an appropriation bill.

●  The section with regard to the disapproval of the Chief Executive of one section
not affecting the others cannot validate such unconstitutional exercise of the veto
power.

59. LIM vs. PACQUING [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]

FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949
(R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements
Board (GAB). On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor
To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
For Other Purposes.”

On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting
By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms
Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai.
The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC
assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:
 NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional. Presumption against
unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771
has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of
ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R.
No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.  And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents.
(Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Casco Philippine Chemical Co v. Gimenez

Casco Chemical files petition for review assailing Auditor General’s denial of Casco’s
claim for refund for marginal fees imposed upon foreign exchange importation of urea
and formaldehyde.  Auditor claims that urea and formaldehyde is different from “urea
formaldehyde” used in Sec 2 of RA 2609. Court rules in favor of Auditor.

FACTS: 

1. July 1, 1959 - Central Bank issued Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25
% on foreign exchange transactions, pursuant to RA 2609 or Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law.

2. Nov and Dec 1959 - petitioner Casco (manufacturer synthetic resin glues) bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde (raw materials) and paid
a margin fee aggregating Php33,765.42

3. In May 1960, Casco made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of
Php6,345.72 as margin fee.

4. Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank (dated Nov 3,1959)
declared that separate importation of urea and formaldehyde are exempt from marginal
fees. 

5. Relying on above resolution, petitioner sought the refund of the first margin fee, and
soon after, for the second sum. 

5. The CB issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refunds but the Auditor
of the Bank refused to approve said vouchers, on the ground that the exemption
granted by the Monetary Board for separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is
not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of RA 2609 providing for
the non-imposition of margin fees upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation
of:

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of ply-wood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” 

ISSUES:

1. W/N “urea” or “formaldehyde are exempt by law from payment of margin fee.

HOLDING:

No. Importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from margin fee
imposition.

- Petitioner: The term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea” AND

“formaldehyde”.

- SC: As concluded from the statement of the Commissioner of the National Institute of
Science and Technology, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, which are articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin.

- Petitioner: The bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and”
between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde”, and the members of Congress intended
to exempt the said chemicals. To support this view, Casco cited the statements made
on the floor of the Senate.

- Individual statements made during the consideration of the bill do not reflect the view
of the Senate, much less the intent of the House.

- It is settled that the enrolled bill – which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of
“urea and formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. (Enrolled Bill
Theory)

- If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
Congress and approved by the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, the remedy
is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree

VERDICT: Decision appealed from is affirmed.

 

*Enrolled Bill Theory - Under the enrolled bill rule, once an election for the adoption of
a statute is held, the procedural method by which the measure was placed on the ballot
cannot be challenged with a lawsuit since judicial inquiry into legislative procedure is
barred as an intrusion into the internal affairs of the lawmaking body. In addition, this
rule enhances the stability of statutory enactments. Citizens can reasonably rely on the
legality of filed enactments. As a result, an enrolled bill is the most authoritative source
of statutory law in a jurisdiction.

62. Mabanag v Lopez Vito

Facts:
1.Petitioners are eight senators seventeen representatives, and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party while defendants
are COMELEC, PH treasurer, Audit Gen. and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.
2.3 senators and 8 representatives (plaintiffs) had been proclaimed by a majority vote of
the COMELEC as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections in
1946. 
3.The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. 
4.Likewise, for the same reason, since election, the 8 representatives were not allowed
to sit in Congress, except to take part in the election of the Speaker although they had
not been formally suspended. 
5.A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the HoR but not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
6.As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
(considered) within the computation of the necessary 3/4 vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. 
7.If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary 3/4 vote in either branch
of Congress.
8.Hence, a petition for prohibition was filed to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto
9.Respondent assails the SC’s jurisdiction relying on the conclusiveness on the courts
of an enrolled bill or resolution

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case.- NO

RULING:  In Coleman vs. Miller, it held that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by Congress of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from
the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other.  Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise
of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard
public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than
into that of a ratification

Proposal and Ratification, both political questions. In a US case, it held that the
Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional
amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the
States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts." In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions
of a type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a
"political question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has committed
it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of . . .
government." 

AS TO ENROLLED BILL…

It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by
the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it
would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very
delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts could not
rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the
journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be
found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie
evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it
might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never
become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of
the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court
whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.

In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question

of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of section
1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution. 
63 Arroyo v. De Venecia

Certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA8240 amending certain

provisions of RA8240  “sin tax”, petitioner questions the validity of said law because of a
procedural infirmity done in its passage- an alleged ”lack of quorum” to which the Court
ruled cannot simply overthrow the validity of a legislative enactment

Important People:
Petitioners: Rep Arroyo, Osmena, Lagman, Zamora, Tanada members of the HR
Respondents: De Venecia-Speaker HR,  Daza-Deputy Speaker HR, Albano-Majority
Leader,  Executive Secretary, Sec of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
Petition is filed by Rep Arroyo et al, for violation of the Rules of the House in the
passage of RA 8240;
1. Sept 12, 1996- HB 7198 (later RA8240) transmitted to Senate
2. Nov 17, 1996- approved with amendments on third reading by Senate
3. Bicameral Conference Committe was mandated to reconcile conflicting
provisions of the proposed bill
4. Nov 21, 1996- it was reported out by the Bicam Conference, a sponsorshio
speech was made by Rep Javier
5. Rep Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum, Rep Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. Rep Daza, declared the presence of quorum
6. Rep Arroyo declared that he will raise a question as to the presence of a quorum
but up until hi interpellation was done he did not do so
7. The bill was signed by Speaker of the House and President of the Senate and
certified by respective secretaries of both Houses
8. The enrolled bill was signed by President Fidel V. Ramos into law Nov22, 1996

Petitioners claim that there were 4 different versions of transcripts of the interpellation of
Rep Arroyo, which differed in 3 points. However, to expediate the proceedings of this
case the one published in the newspapers are accepted by both parties as evidence of
what transpired Nov 21, 1996;

Petitioners' argumento
1. RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the Rules of the
House and that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art VI Sec 16(3)
Consti
2. Certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious
3. Specifically Rep Arroyo assigns these following violations to the respondents"
a. Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, [the Chair, in
submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or
nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; 
b. Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albano-s motion to approve or ratify; 
c. Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albano-s motion and afterward declared the report approved;
and 
d. Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion.

Solgen's arguments for respondents: separation of powers and enrolled bill doctrine
1. SC not proper forum for enforcement of Rules of the House
2. No point in reconsidering/ abandoning enrolled bill doctrine
3. Rules of the House were observed upon passing RA 8240

Respondents' comment
1. Denies spurious certification allegation
2. Under journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by petitioner is barred

Issue:
Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240

Ruling:
1. What were violated were merely internal rules of procedure of the HR, not
constitutional reqs for the enactment of a law.

The Court finds that there was really no LACK of QUORUM but that Rep Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Jurisprudence has it, both here and abroad, that courts have no power to inquire into
allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its rules, in
the absence of showing that there was VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS or RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

McDonald vs State: "The Courts cannot declare an act of legislative void on account of
non-compliance with rules of procedure made by the legislative itself to govern its
deliberations"

SC further notes eparation of powers " Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests."

2. While Article VIII Section1 Consti, broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas normally left to the political departments be decided, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those
which arise in the filed of foreighn relations.
The case does not present  a situation in which a branch of the government acted
beyond the constitutional limits of its power as to warrant the exercise of Art VIII S1

3. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law was railroaded. However, no rule of
the HR has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, Solgen, has pointed at that it
has basis in legislative practice and not a unique one.  Ie Logal Gov Code 1991 was not
approved via viva voce.

House rules are not statutory no a constitutional req, therefore substantial compliace is
enough.

Consti requires yeas and nays to be recorded only on 1 last reading and third reading of
a bill, 2 at the request of 1/5 of the members present, 3 repassing a bill over the veto of
the pres.

Of the 111 members present is uch date of passing of subject law 111 members were
present but only 5 cntend against such procedural issue.

4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HBill 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and President of the Senate and certification of the respective secretaries of the
Houses , that it was was passed on Nov 21, 1996 are conculsive of its enactment.

In this case there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of
the presiding officers of both houses that a bill has been duly passed.

The enrolled bill doctrine as a rule of evidence is well established.

Petitioners rely only on the change of the membership of the Court to abandon the
enrolled bill doctrine.

Dispositive Portion: PETITION DISMISSED.

Dissent by PUNO:
Concurs in the result
I Issues raised are justiciable issues contrary to main opinion
cites a lot of jurisprudence confirming the jurisdiction of the courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules

1. Art 8 Sect 1 consti, extended certiorari power to reject political questtion defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.
2. Dissent from the majority insofar as it has relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to
justify dismissal of the petition
3. Enrolled bill theory originated from England where parliament is supreme, Englad
Adheres to the conclusiveness of the bill
 4. Enrolled bill doctrine is also being abandoned in the US

Tan v. Del Rosario (237 SCRA 324)

 Facts:

1.  Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

 2.   Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the

following provisions of the Constitution:

 ·         Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

·         Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

·         Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

 3.  Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority
in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title
of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the
Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title
actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The
Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended.
Petitioners also contend it violated due process.

 5.  The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

6.  The Court has given due course to both petitions.

 Issues:
1. Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process
2. Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR

Ruling: 

1. No. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No
such transgression is so evident in herein case.
 a) Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the
standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization
is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class.

 b) What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly
shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of
individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.

2. No. RA 7496 does not impose tax on single proprietorships and professionals
differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Such
system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496.
Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly
situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.

Also, the Court clarifies that a general professional partnership is not itself an income
taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax
exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their
distributive shares of partnership profits as provided in Section 23 of the Tax Code.

There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his
profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership with others in
the exercise of a common profession. Under the present income tax system all
individuals deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably
the same manner and under a common set of rules.

The phrase "income taxpayers" is an all embracing term used in the Tax Code, and it
practically covers all persons who derive taxable income. Partnerships no matter how
created or organized, are subject to income tax which, for purposes of the above
categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so legally
contemplated as, corporations.

Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the
above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the
extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their
non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or
after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance
the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Guingona Jr. v. Carague

This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget authorized by PD No. 81 as
amended by PD No. 1177 and PD No. 1967. It was assailed for being violative of
Section 5 Article XIV of the Constitution. The aforementioned PDs were also assailed
for being violative of Section 29 (1) Article VI of the Constitution. In the end, the Court
ruled to uphold the constitutionality of all PD’s and declared them to be still operative
until expressly repealed by subsequent laws.

IMPORTANT PEOPLE (not really material to the case outside of locus standi)

Petitioners: Senators Teofisto Guingona and Aquilino Pimentel

Respondents: DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague

FACTS 

1. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No.
6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
2. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81,
entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No.
1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. WON the petitioners (who are all senators) have Locus Standi. - YES.
  There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed,
even a taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.

2.                WON the case is a purely political question. - NO

 In Gonzales the Court stated:

 The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.

3.                WON THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION

1990 BUDGET IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE
CONSTITUTION. - NO.

 Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution: ”(5) The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain
its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfilment.”
 The reasoning behind this constitutional is to rectify the situation wherein the
economic welfare of public schoolteachers always ended in failure causing the
mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to other careers including
menial jobs in overseas employment.
 While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to
"insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available
talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. The budget for
education has tripled since 1985. This is a clear compliance with the
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education. Congress is
certainly not without any power to provide an appropriation that can reasonably
service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that
said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

 
4.                WON PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 ARE STILL
OPERATIVE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. - YES

 Petitioners: PDs became functus oficio when Marcos was ousted. When new
Constitution was ratified and the legislative power was restored to Congress, a
new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation (absent at that
time) is needed. 
 Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
 Thus, they are inconsistent with: Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
 Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law
is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly
stated.

5.                WON THE AFOREMENTIONED PD’S ARE VIOLATIVE OF SECTION

29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION. - NO

 Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
 An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that
the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all
foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be
made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of
periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the
periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance. Also
mentioned are the benefits of flexible execution enumerated by the OSG (ie
taking advantage of market value of securities)

6.                WON there is undue delegation of legislative power present. - NO

 The Court in People v Vera: The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made."
 Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when
 it reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its
enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been given
the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion
essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
 Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be
paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the
amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in
the decrees. 

Government budgetary process:

1. Budget preparation: For the executive and covers the estimation of the budget to
be proposed.
2. Legislative authorization: For the legislative wherein they deliberate or act on the
proposed budget of the President.
3. Budget Execution: For the executive wherein the budget is operationalized.
4. Budget Accountability: Evaluation of actual performance.

Our constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact or "specific appropriation
made by law. More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or
prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

70. Lung Center v. QC (2004)  

 FACTS: 
 
• Lung Center is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on January 16, 1981
by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of a parcel of land: 
o Located at Quezon Ave. cor. Elliptical Road, Central District, QC, approximately
121k sq. m. 
o Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center
of the Philippines o A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for
canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. 
o Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building is vacant and
idle, while a big portion on the right side is being leased for commercial purposes to a
private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center 
• Lung Center accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical
services to out-patients, both paying and nonpaying. Aside from its income from paying
patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.  
• On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were
assessed for RPT in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of QC.
Accordingly, Tax Declarations were issued for the land and the hospital building. 
• Lung Center filed a Claim for Exemption from RPT with the City Assessor,
predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. Lung Center’s request was
denied. 
• A petition was filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon
City (“LBAA”) for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. 
• LBAA: Dismissed the petition and held the petitioner liable for RPT 
• Central Board of Assessment Appeals (“CBAA”): LBAA's decision was affirmed
on appeal. It ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real
properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. • CA:
Affirmed the decision of the CBAA. Thus, petitioner brought it to the SC via Petition for 
• Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 
• Arguments of Lung Center:  o It is a charitable institution within the context of
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which is not altered by the fact that it
admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the
land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical
practitioners from which it derives income to be used for operational expenses. 
o For the years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of
the hospital's 282-bed capacity, 60% thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients. 
o It receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable
institution. 
o The "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean "solely." 
o Even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it
is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the 1987 Constitution. 
• Argument of the City:  o It failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the
said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  
o It failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in
the hospital are reserved for indigent patients. The respondents further assert, thus: 
§ That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression is
that it is pay-patient and required to pay a certain amount as deposit. 
§ That even if a patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with high
hospital bills. And, without these bills being first settled, the poor patient cannot be
allowed to leave the hospital or be discharged without first paying the hospital bills or
issue a promissory note guaranteed and indorsed by an influential agency or person
known only to the Center; That even the remains of deceased poor patients suffered the
same fate. 
§ Moreover, before a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient,
one must undergo a series of interviews and must submit all the requirements needed
by the Center, usually accompanied by endorsement by an influential agency or person
known only to the Center. 
 
ISSUE/HELD: 
 
Is Lung Center a Charitable Institution? – YES 
 
• To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the
elements which should be considered include: o the statute creating the
enterprise,  o its corporate purposes,  o its constitution and by-laws,  o the
methods of administration, o the nature of the actual work performed,  o the
character of the services rendered,  o the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and  
o the use and occupation of the properties. 
• The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out
a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or
private advantage. 
• Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the
high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. 
• The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of
Incorporation, thus: o Secure the well-being of the people by providing them
specialized health and medical services. 
o Promote general health of the community 
• Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in
general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without
discrimination. 
• As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such
and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients,
whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government. 
o As long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable
object which it is intended to achieve; and  
o no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution.  
• In this case: o The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund
and must be devoted to public trust purposes. 
o Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner
does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation
is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. 
• The petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the
subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation
of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations. 
 
Are the properties of the Lung Center exempt from Real Property Tax? – Some.
Portions of its property leased to private entities are not exempt since these are not
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  
 
• The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
power.  
• For "lands, buildings, and improvements" of the charitable institution to be
considered exempt, the same should not only be "exclusively" used for charitable
purposes; it is required that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such
purposes o Exclusive - as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred
from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively."  
§ If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used
for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or
"principal use" cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing
violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.  
o What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable
purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purposes for which the charitable institution is organized.  
o It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of
whether the property is used for tax exempt purposes 
Hence, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the
hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other
hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used
for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

69. OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS

220 SCRA 703

GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard
which implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down
fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956,

as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve
the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which
proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the
reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The
petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and
invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since
a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such
amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by
the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB
under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD:

 None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they
are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF
as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review
of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund."    With regard to the alleged undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard
by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to
protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.

Araullo v. Aquino (G.R. No. 209287)

This case is a consolidation of nine (9) cases, assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and in relation to this, National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 and
related issuances of the DBM in the implementation of DAP. This issue exploded when
the topic of the Congressional pork barrel was still fresh in the public mind. Belgica vs.
Executive Secretary was just filed with the Supreme Court [which is subsequently
declared unconstitutional (November 19, 2013)].

 IMPORTANT PEOPLE
·         Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada – delivered the privilege speech on September
25, 2013 which prompted the DBM to issue a public statement and bring to the
public consciousness the DAP
·         Araullo, Maria Carolina – Chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan; G.R.
No. 209287
·         Secretary Florencio Abad – Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM)

 FACTS
1. September 3, 2013 – Belgica, et. al. and Villegas filed an Urgent Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Immediate issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
 funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion
 
2. September 25, 2013 – Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered his privilege speech stating
that some senators received Php 50 Million each as incentive for impeaching Chief
Justice Corona.
 
3. Secretary Abad responded through a public statement explaining that the funds
released were based on the Senators’ letters of request for funding and explained
further that these funds were part of the DAP designed by the DBM to ramp up
spending to accelerate economic expansion (they also made claims in their website
regarding DAP and where it comes from).
 
4. DBM cited the following as legal bases for DAP’s use for savings:
a. Section 25(5) Article VI, 1987 Constitution
b. Section 39 (Authority to use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292
(Administrative Code of 1987)
c. General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013 provisions on the
following:
                                                  i. Use of savings
                                                 ii. Meaning of savings
                                                iii. Priority in the use of savings
d. For the use of the unprogrammed funds, DBM cited provisions in the GAA
2011-2013 as legal bases

 5. Nine (9) petitions assailing the constitutionality are filed within days.

 6. The Court consolidated these cases to form the case at hand.

 7. Oral arguments were held on November 19, 2013 and the Court directed DBM Sec.
Abad to submit the following:
a. List of savings brought under DAP sourced from:
                                                  i. Completed programs
                                                 ii. Discontinued or abandoned programs
                                                iii. Unpaid appropriations for compensation
b. Certified copy of the President’s directive dated June 27, 2012 referred
to in NBC 541
c. All circulars and orders issued in relation to DAP

8. In compliance, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) (government’s counsel)

submitted seven (7) evidence packets (please see Other Notes for the complete list of
packets)

 OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE BUDGET SYSTEM

 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

 ·         Financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed from the
creation of the State
·         To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty, the government
must perform vital functions that require public expenditures

 
·         The Philippine Budget System is greatly influenced by western public financial
institutions (Spain and US colonized us before)

 
·         The Philippine Budget System is guided by two principal objectives:
(1)   To carry on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan
developed in accordance to the Constitution and prevailing statutes and
sound public management
(2)   To provide for periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of
Government so that the enlightened citizenry and persons entrusted with
the law can determine the adequacy of the budget actions taken and the
financial position of the Government

 
·         Jones Law (1916) [Budget Office within Department of Finance] →  1935
Constitution (budget policy, procedure established, strengthened by EO 25 –
Budget Commission) + CA No. 246 (1 st budget law – line item budget framework)
→ RA No. 992 Congress introduces performance-budgeting and enhanced the
role of the Budget Commission → 1973 Constitution PD 1177 and 1405 (the
latter created the Ministry of Budget) → EO 711 (Office of Budget and
Management - OBM) → EO 292 (DBM)

 THE BUDGET CYCLE

 Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two:

(1)   Capital Expenditures or outlays
·         Expenses whose usefulness last for more than one year
·         Add to the assets of government including investments in the capital of
government-owned or controlled corporations and subsidiaries
·         Usually infrastructure
(2)   Current operating expenditures
·         Purchases of goods and services for current consumption
·         Benefit from this does not extend beyond fiscal year
·         Has two (2) components:

                                          i. Personal services (PS) – basically salaries of

government employees

                                         ii. Maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE)

 Public expenditures can also be grouped according to function:

(1)   Economic development expenditures

(2)   Social services or social development expenditures

(3)   General development or general public services

(4)   National defense

(5)   Public debt

 Or according to nature of funds:

(1)   General fund

(2)   Special fund

Public revenues are generally derived from the following sources:

(1)   Tax revenues

(2)   Capital revenues

·         Examples: Sales of fixed assets or scrap thereof, Sale of public lands

etc.

(3)   Grants

·         Like grants from Asian Development Bank, World Bank etc.

(4)   Extraordinary income

·         Example: repayment of loans by GOCCs

(5)   Public borrowing

·         Proceeds of repayable obligations with interest from domestic and

foreign creditors.

THE NATURE OF DAP

 A.     DAP WAS A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH

 ·         Focus on transparency and efficiency in the Administration resulted in a
decelerated government project implementation and payment schedule

·         Economic situation paved the way for DAP as a stimulus package to

fast-track public spending and push economic growth

·         Invests in high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from “savings”

within the year

·         Accelerate by:

§ Streamlining implementation process through clustering of

infrastructure projects of DPWH and DepEd

§ Front loading of Public Private Partnerships related projects

·         DAP was partially successful

§ Contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by 4 th QTR 2011

§ Strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year

§ Infrastructure rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 38% growth

as of September 2013

·         PAPs under DAP chosen based on their

§ Multiplier impact (The multiplier effect is an economic term

referring to how an increase in one economic activity can cause an
increase throughout many other related economic activities) on
economy and infra development

§ Beneficial effect on the poor

§ Translation to disbursements

B.    HISTORY OF DAP AND SOURCES OF DAP FUNDS

·         October 12, 2011 - Earliest document regarding its inception is the

memorandum from Sec. Abad to the President seeking the approval to
implement DAP

§ The memorandum contained a list of funding sources for a total of

Php 72.11 Billion as well as the projects to be funded

·         December 12, 2011 – Requesting omnibus authority to consolidate the

savings and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011
 § On utilization of pooled savings: “…to pool savings/ unutilized
balances in FY 2010 last November 25, 2010.”

§ Requested omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/

unutilized balances and realignment

§ Requested approval for the proposed additional projects identified

for funding

·         June 25, 2012, September 4, 2012, December 19, 2012, May 20, 2013,
and September 25, 2013 - Identical requests for authority to pool savings
(all approved by PNoy)

·         NBC No. 541 says:

§ President has authorized withdrawal of unobligated allotments of

agencies with low levels of obligations as of June 30, 2012 both for
continuing and current allotments

§ Covers:

1.     Capital Outlays

2.     MOOE

3.     PS

§  The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover unidentified programs, projects,

activities of the department/ agencies reflected in the DBM list

§  Listed funds that were exempted

§  NGAs shall continue to undertake procurement activities short of award notwithstanding

the implementation of the withdrawal policy until the end of the third quarter
(September) (in layman’s terms: you can go on buying things, but just don’t award it to
the winning bidder yet. Wait for funds, there will be money, don’t worry)

§  If agencies cannot provide budget accountability reports in time, the DBM will use the
agency’s latest report available as basis for the withdrawal of allotment (since this is not
updated

§  All released allotments in FY 2011 which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012
shall be immediately considered for withdrawal

§  Withdrawn allotments may be:

·         Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/

OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn (take
note of this – it means they aren’t really “savings” in the strictest
 sense since they can still be used for the same project i.e. the project
has not been abandoned or discontinued or completed)

·         Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs

and projects

·         Used to augment existing programs and projects of ANY agency

and to fund priority programs and projects NOT CONSIDERED
IN THE 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented
in the current year

 
ISSUES AND RULING
 I.              Procedural Issues

 a.             WHETHER OR NOT certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of DAP, NBC 541 and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing DAP

 ·       YES. Court says all petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies (Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus)

·       The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are broader in scope and reach and
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction as well as set right, undo, and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of Government even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

·       This is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 65 of the rules of court.

·       Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials

b.             WHETHER OR NOT there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination

 ·       YES. There is an actual controversy ripe for judicial determination.

·       The Court quotes Belgica vs. ES Ochoa

o    xxx is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

opposite legal claims…there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence…a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it…”
 ·      The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of
DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal
rights.

·      They meet the “ripeness” requirement since these allegedly unconstitutional

acts acts were already being implemented by the DBM. Moreover, DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds.

·      In addition, the fact that funds have been allocated or utilized give rise to an
actual controversy

·      Respondents claim that since DAP has been discontinued, the challenges are
now moot and academic. The Court says: the discontinuing of DAP did not
moot the challenges to its constitutionality. because it falls under all exceptions
for mootness to be disregarded: (1) there was a grave violation of the constitution,
(2) the case involves a paramount public interest, (3) the constitutional issue raised
here requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and
the public and (4) this case is capable of repetition yet evading review (there is
nothing to stop the DBM from re-implementing DAP).

c.             WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners have standing

 ·      yes PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI. The issuance and implementation
of DAP and issuances involved illegal disbursements of public funds.

·      Except for PHILCONSA, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as tax
payers and thus have an interest in further dissipation of public funds.

·      PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal
standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.

·      IBP stands by its avowed duty to work for the rule of law and civic duty as the
official association of lawyers in this country.

·      In any case, the Court adds that these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire nation (so procedural technicalities can be
waived).

II.             Substantive Issues

 a.             WHETHER OR NOT DAP violates Section 29 Article VI of the 1987

Constitution[1]
  ·       NO. DAP WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE HENCE, NO
APPROPRIATION LAW WAS REQUIRED TO ADOPT OR IMPLEMENT IT.

·         DAP was only a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending the

adoption of which was by virtue of the authority of the President to ensure laws are
properly executed.

·         It is the Executive playing its role as the main actor during the Budget Execution
Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute laws including GAAs

·         Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or implement DAP

·         Thus Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1)
Article VI of the Constitution

b.            WHETHER OR NOT DAP, NBC 541 and all other executive issuances
implementing DAP violate Section 25(5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution [2]:

 ·      Yes the violated section 25(5) article VI of the constitution.

·       To discuss this, we follow the three (3) requisites set out in Section 25(5) of
Article VI:

(1)        There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices.

(2)        The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the

appropriations of their respective offices; and

(3)        The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices.

 (1)   First requisite: there is a law authorizing the president to transfer funds
within his office

 ·         this requisite is not met. gaa OF 2011 AND 2012 LACKED VALID (FAITHFUL
TO THE CONSITUTION) PROVISIONS TO AUTHORIZE TRANSFER OF FUNDS
UNDER THE DAP, HENCE THE TRANSFERS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

·         Section 25(5) is not a self-executing provision and must have a law implementing it.
Generally this is the GAA.

·         A reading of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs show that its provisions were textually
unfaithful (hehe) to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase “for their respective
 offices[3]” and literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in
the GAAs even if the item belonged to another office and thus contravene the
Constitution

·         Thus these provisions cannot be used by the Executive to claim authority to transfer
appropriations.

·         The missing phrase was inserted in the 2013 GAA, however, even with a valid law
for the authorization of transfer of funds, there are still two more requisites to be met

 (2)   SECOND REQUISITE: The funds to be transferred are savings generated

from the appropriations of their respective offices – WHERE THERE ACTUALLY
SAVINGs?

 ·         Petitioners claim that the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated

allotments were not ACTUAL savings within the context of Section 25(5) Art. 6 of the
Constitution.

·         Petitioners also argue that “savings” should be understood to refer to the excess
money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that
needed to be paid have been paid and they insist that savings cannot be realized with
certainty in the middle of the fiscal year.

·         Petitioners also say that “slow-moving” PAPs could not be savings as they actually
have not been abandoned yet (remember the note earlier in NBC 541)

·         The OSG represents that “savings” meant “appropriations balances” – the difference
between the appropriation authorized by Congress (the Program Amount in the GAA)
and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation.

·         To ascertain the meaning of savings, there are four principles:

(1) Congress wields the power of the purse and therefore chooses how the
budget shall be spent.

(2) The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs which

Congress allocated for.

(3) To make the power of the President to augment operative under the GAA,
Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution.

(4) Savings should be actual, something real and substantial. Not possible,
potential or hypothetical.

·       This interpretation prevents the Executive from transgressing Congress’ power

of the purse.
·       Definition of savings in the GAAs reflected this interpretation. Savings are any
programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation which are:

(1)   Still available after the completion/ final discontinuance/ abandonment for
which the appropriation is authorized

(2)   Appropriation balances from unpaid compensation and vacant positions/ LOA
without pay

(3)   Appropriations balances realized from improved systems/ measures in

implementation

·       The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under DAP came from
“pooling unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services which
will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects,
and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings.”

·       There is no clear legal basis for this declaration of DBM and their treatment of
unreleased or unallotted appropriations as savings.

·       THUS THE SECOND REQUISITE IS NOT MET. The Court says: these
items have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be
generated – they haven’t even reached the agency to which they were allotted
to under the GAA. These do not fall under the definition of savings reflected in
the GAA (items 1 to 3 aforementioned).

·       Thus, unobligated allotments cannot be indiscriminately declared as savings

without first determining whether any of the three instances stated earlier existed.
This means that DBM’s withdrawal of the unobligated allotments disregarded
the definition of savings under the GAAs.

·       The GAA has a 2-year validity, however DBM declared that 2013 shall have a
one year validity to force the agencies to plan properly and expedite expenditures.
This means that DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low
levels of obligations to fund fast-moving projects meant a complete disregard for
the 2-year validity of the budgets for 2011 and 2012 (and the 1-year validity for
the 2013 budget). This is because if you’re an agency, and you wanted to use the
unobligated budget you have left from last year to fund a project for this year, you
can’t anymore because DBM has withdrawn it and distributed it to faster moving
projects.

·       The respondents insist that these were being withdrawn upon the instance of
the implementing agencies based on their own assessment that they could not
obligate these allotments. However, the Court states that the withdrawals were
upon the initiative of the DBM itself, based on the text of NBC 541. (Personal
Note: I guess the DBM was not able to show evidence to back up their claim
because this is isn’t entirely true, the agency always has a chance not to allow DBM
 to withdraw their unobligated funds – and can always write a letter to get back the
funds that DBM has withdrawn – as long as they do it as early as possible)

·       The petitioners claim that the retention of these funds were akin to
impoundment and that there was no law authorizing the withdrawal of the
unobligated allotments.

·       The Court says: The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments

and pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal
support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal cannot be considered as
impoundment as they entitled only the transfer of funds and not the retention
or reduction of appropriations

·       The Court adds: relevant to remind that the balances of appropriations

that remained unused at the end of the year are to be reverted to the General
Fund (Treasury). This is the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of EO
292.

·       The Executive cannot circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased

appropriations

·       and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.

 (3)    third requisite: The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices

 ·       THIS REQUISITE IS NOT MET AS SOME OF THE SAVINGS POOLED UNDER

DAP WERE ALLOCATED TO PAPS THAT WERE NOT COVERED BY ANY
APPROPRIATION IN THE PERTINENT GAA. This means that the Executive seemed
to be specifying the PAPs where the money shall be spent – which is the power of the
purse that resides in Congress alone.

·       An example was the Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation

(DREAM) Project under the DOST which when broken down did not have an item
for personnel services and capital outlays, only for MOOE.

·       Aside from transferring funds to the DREAM project exceeding by almost

300%, DAP allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays which
Congress did not appropriate for in the first place.

·       AGAIN, PROOF OF NON-COMPLIANCE TO THIS REQUISITE ARE THE

CROSS BORDER AUGENTATIONS FROM SAVINGS WHICH ARE CLEARLY
PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. SECTION 25(5) ARTICLE VI ONLY
ALLOWS AUGMENTATION WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE OFFICES STATED
THEREIN.

·       During the oral arguments, Secretary Abad stated the following instances
wherein cross-border transfers/ augmentations transpired:
 (1)               Request from the House of Representatives for e-library funds
(Legislative Library and Archives Building/ Congressional e-library) (they lacked 43
Million). The HoR were constrained to finish this project because COA informed
them that failure to do so will cause serious deterioration of the building and
equipments therein. They wrote to the President requesting for an
augmentation of that item, which was granted.

(2)               Request from the Commission on Audit for their good governance
programs. The COA needed IT equipment and consultants and litigators to help
with their audit work and they requested funds form the Executive Department.
When the President saw that it was important for the Commission to be
provided those equipment, the request was granted.

(3)               President made available to the Commission on Elections the savings

of his department upon their request for funds.

 c.            WHETHER OR NOT the release of unprogrammed funds under DAP was
in accord with the GAAS[4]

 ·         DBM avers that there are three instances wherein unprogrammed funds can be
availed of:

(1)   Revenue collections exceeded original revenue targets proposed in the

BESF submitted by the president to congress

(2)   New revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally
considered in the BESF

(3)   Newly approved loans for foreign assisted projects secured

·         no. the release of unprogrammed funds were not in accord with the gaaS. The
Court rules that there are only TWO instances when the unprogrammed funds
can be released (which are bolstered by the texts in the 2011 and 2012 GAA and
more clearly by GAA 2013)[5]

·         The controversy arises due to the difference in the interpretation of the phrase
“revenue collections must exceed the original revenue targets.” DBM construes this as
to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue in the BESF, the condition
is complied as long as one source of revenue exceeds its target.

·         The petitioners, on the other hand (and the Court sides with them on this) take the
phrase to mean the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target
in the BESF.

·         This requirement should be construed in light of the purpose of the unprogrammed

funds – as standby appropriations to support additional expenditures. In the even that
the revenue collections exceed targets, the government shall have more than enough to
 cover additional expenditures – thus the unprogrammed funds can be dispensed with
and disbursed.

·         Following the DBM’s definition would create “fake surplus” since exceeding targets in
one revenue stream did not necessarily mean that the government indeed had
exceeded revenue targets as a whole.

d.            WHETHER OR NOT DAP violates:

 (1)      Equal Protection Clause

·       Petitioners say that DAP practiced undue favoritism in favor of select

legislators in contravention of this clause when it released funds upon their request.

·       They add that no reasonable classification was used in distributing funds under
DAP.

·       COURT: THIS ALLEGATION LACKS FACTUAL BASIS. Claims are

unsupported with relevant data. On the discrimination against legislators: cannot
warrant a finding of contravention of the equal protection clause. The denial of
equal protection can only be raised by the parties who suffer it, and in these cases,
none of the legislators brought to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred and explain why there was a denial in their situation. Ruling on
this will cause the Court to speculate. Guesswork and speculation cannot overcome
the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed executive act.

 (2)     System of checks and balances

·       Petitioners claim that the system of checks and balances was compromised
because some legislators were forced to be silent about the issues and anomalies
surrounding DAP when they were given funds from it

·       The President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation vested in the
Congress because of NBC No. 541

·       COURT: EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ON THE INFRIGEMENT OF THE

DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS HAVE RESOLVED THIS ISSUE.

 (3)     Principle of public accountability

·       Petitioners insist that DAP is repugnant to this principle because the legislators
relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive and exhibited a reluctance
to inquire into DAP’s legality

·       COURT: WE HAVE HELD THAT DAP AND ITS IMPLEMENTING

ISSUANCES WERE POLICIES AND ACTS THAT THE EXECUTIVE COULD
 PROPERLY ADOPT AND DO IN THE EXECUTION OF GAAs to the extent that
they sought to implement strategies to ramp up and accelerate the economy
of the country.

e.             WHETHER OR NOT factual and legal justification exists to issue a

temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain implementation of DAP, NBC 541
and all other executive issuances implementing DAP

 ·         COURT: THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT SHALL APPLY. A blanket

TRO should not be applied.

·         It is said that a legislative or executive act is declared void for being unconstitutional
cannot give rise to any right or obligation. But the Court asks: should we not recognize
the need to except from the rigid application of the rule the instances in which the
void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible result? This is answered
by the doctrine of operative fact.

·         This doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or act prior to the determination of
its constitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always
be erased. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

·         This doctrine’s application to DAP proceeds from equity and fair play.

·         The Court cites the following cases to support its position:

o Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

§  “Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive

act, certain acts or transactions were made in good faith…which
cannot be just set aside or invalidated by its subsequent
invalidation.”

o Tan v. Barrios – court held that despite invalidity of military courts over
civilians, certain operative facts should be acknowledged to have existed
so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused

o Olaguer v. Military Commisssion

·         “The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations, but
can also be applied by analogy to decisions made by the President or agencies under
the executive department. In the interest of justice and equity, this doctrine can be
applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive
branch. It can be applied to acts and consequences resulting from the reliance not only
on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decision or
orders from the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not mindful
 that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice,
equity and fairness.”

·         DAP yielded undeniable positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the
country. Not applying this doctrine would result in the undoing of worthy results such as
infrastructure and would result in the most undesirable wastefulness.

·         Justice Brion: Operative fact can only apply to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP but not to the
authors, proponents, and implementors of DAP unless there are concrete findings of
good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals.

 DISPOSITIVE PORTION

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and
DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory
definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the
relevant General Appropriations Acts.

De la Cruz v. Ochoa

Antecedent Facts:

Given the intimate connection between this case and Jacomille v. Abaya, supra, we
adopt and reiterate the summary of the factual antecedents rendered in Jacomille v.
Abaya

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) is the primary

policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating, and
administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion,
development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation
and communications systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient, and reliable postal,
transportation and communication services. One of its line agencies is the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) which is tasked, among others, to register motor vehicles
and regulate their operation.

In accordance with its mandate, the LTO is required to issue motor vehicle license
plates which serve to identify the registered vehicles as they ply the roads. These
plates should at all times be conspicuously displayed on the front and rear portions of
the registered vehicles to assure quick and expedient identification should there be a
need, as in the case of motor vehicle accidents or infraction of traffic rules.

Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization
Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle
registrants. On February 20, 2013, the DOTC published in newspapers of general
circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license
plates for the MVPSP

On February 25, 2013, the DOTC Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) issued BAC
General Bid Bulletin No. 002-2013 setting the Submission and Opening of Bids on
March 25, 2013.

On February 28, 2013, the first Pre-Bid Conference was held at the offices of the BAC.

On March 6, 2013, BAC General Bid Bulletin No. 003-2013 was issued, amending
paragraph 1 of the Invitation to Bid

As the only eligible bidders, their financial proposals were then opened to reveal that
JKG-Power Plates made the lowest offers. For Lot 1, JKG-Power Plates proposed to
supply the MV License Plates for a total of ₱1 .98 Billion, while Industrias Samar't-
Datatrial offered it at P2.03 Billion. On the other hand, for Lot 2, JKG-Power Plates
aimed to supply the MC License Plates for a total of ₱l.196 Billion, while Industrias
Samar't-Datatrial's offer was at ₱l.275 Billion.

On July 22, 2013, the DOTC issued the Notice of Award to JKG-Power Plates.
 

Despite the notice of award, the contract signing of the project was not immediately
undertaken. On February 17, 2014, the DOTC issued the Notice to Proceed to JKG-
Power Plates and directed it to commence delivery of the items within seven (7)
calendar days from the date of the issuance of the said notice.

On March 11, 2014, the Senate Committee on Public Services, pursuant to Resolution
No. 31, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported delays in the
release of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and tags by the LTO.

On April 4, 2014, JKG-Power Plates delivered the first batch of plates to the DOTC/LTO

The COA ultimately issued Notice of Disallowance No. 2015-001-101-(l4) dated July
13, 2015 stating therein that it had disallowed the advance payment of P477,901,329.00
to JKG Power Plates for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle plates on the ground
that the transaction had been irregular and illegal for being in violation of Sections
46(1) and 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; Sections 85(1) and 86 of
the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-
12 dated October 27, 2004; and the implementing rules of the Government
Procurement Reform Act.

On September 1, 2015, the petitioners instituted this special civil action. Initially, the
Court consolidated this case with G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille). However, the cases
were deconsolidated and treated separately because G.R. No. 212381 raised legal
issues centering on the procurement of the MVPSP but this case raised issues
referring to the implementation of the MVPSP.

Petitioner Arguments:

1.      The transfer of the appropriation for the Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's
Licensing Regulatory Services under the GAA 2014 and the application and
implementation of said transferred appropriation to the L TO-MVPSP is
unconstitutional.

2.      The fact that L TO-MVPSP does not appear as an item under the Motor Vehicle
Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in effect deprives the
 President of its veto powers under Section 27 .(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
and must be declared as unconstitutional.

3.      The public expenditure in the amount of [₱]3,186,008,860 for the LTO-MVP SP in
the absence of an appropriation under the GAA 2013 and GAA 2014 is
unconstitutional.

The court issued a TRO enjoining the release and distribution of the license plates for
both motor vehicles and motorcycles.

OSG Arguments

1.      The OSG argued that 2014 GAA did not contain an appropriation for the MVPSP
and

2.      DOTC Secretary lacked authority to transfer funds

KG-Power Plates Arguments:

1.      The legality of the MVPSP had been settled by the Court in its decision and
resolution in G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille); and

2.      The Court could not yet rule on the propriety of Notice of Disallowance No. 2015-
001-101-(14) because it was still pending review by the COA.

Abaya (former Secretary of DOTC) Arguments:

1.      Jacomille case constituted stare decisis

2.      Requisites for judicial review not present

3.      P4.4B under the description Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing
Regulatory Services in the 2014 GAA included the allocation for the implementation
of the MVPSP

4.      The use of the amount appropriated under the 2014 GAA to implement the
MVPSP did not violate the Constitution.

Issues:
1.      Whether or not the 2014 GAA included an appropriation for the implementation of
the MVPSP

2.      Whether or not the use of the appropriation under 2014 GAA for the
implementation of the MVPSP was constitutional

Reply to Consolidated Comment by Petitioners:

1.      There was no sufficient appropriation in the 2013 GAA when the public bidding for
the MVPSP was conducted;

2.      Any discussion on the funding of the MVPSP under the 2014 GAA had no bearing
in reality on the MVPSP that was bid in 2013 without sufficient appropriation; and

3.      The principles of stare decisis and res judicata did not apply because the ruling in
G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille) was still pending reconsideration at the time when this
case was commenced.

Ruling: There was an appropriation and such use was constitutional

1) The decision in GR No. 212381 (Jacomille) constituted stare decisis

In Jacomille v. Abaya, the Court, upholding the legality of the procurement of the
MVPSP, opined that whatever defects had attended its procurement were "cured" by
the appropriation for the full amount of the project under the 2014 GAA.

Even if G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille) focused on the legality of the procurement of the
MVPSP because of the inadequacy of the funding for the project under the 2013 GAA,
the Court nonetheless determined and declared therein that the 2014 GAA contained an
appropriation for the MVPSP, and held that the MVPSP could be validly implemented
using the funds appropriated under the 2014 GAA. With G.R. No. 212381 (Jacomille)
having thus fully examined and definitively ruled upon the existence of sufficient funding
for the MVPSP, both for procurement and implementation, the pronouncement therein
on the applicability of the appropriation under the 2104 GAA for the MVPSP - a question
of law – now constituted stare decisis that precluded further contention on the same
matter.

 
2) The implementation of thee MVPSP was properly funded under the
appropriation for Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory
Services in the 2014 GAA; hence, no unconstitutionally transfer of funds took
place

Pursuant to its legal mandate, the LTO formulated and adopted the MVPSP in order to
supply new standardized license plates for all motor vehicles. LTO Memorandum
Circular No. (MC) VPT-2013-177226 outlined the underlying purposes behind the
MVPSP.

The Court holds that the appropriation for motor vehicle registration naturally and
logically included plate-making inasmuch as plate-making was an integral component of
the registration process. Plate-making ensured that the LTO fulfilled its function to "aid
law enforcement and improve the motor vehicle registration database."

The records of the hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance confirmed that
the purpose for the increase in the LTO's 2014 budget was the implementation of the
MVPSP.

Considering that Congress appropriated ₱4,843,753,000.00 for the MF02 (inclusive of

the requested increase of ₱2,489,600,100.00) for the purpose of funding the LTO's
MVPSP, the inescapable conclusion is that the 2014 GAA itself contained the direct
appropriation necessary to implement the MVPSP. Under the circumstances, there was
no unconstitutional transfer of funds because no transfer of funds was made to augment
the item Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services to
include the funding for the MVPSP.

3) The item Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory

Services did not constitute a lump-sum appropriation

Under the system of Performance Informed Budgeting, the PAPS are grouped or
aligned into the Major Final Outputs (MFOs). However, the groupings do not mean that
there are no longer any line-items. As explained in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, line-
items under appropriations should be "specific appropriations of money" that will enable
the President to discernibly veto the same.

 
In Araullo v. Aquino III, the Court has expounded the term item as the last and
indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the
expense category or allotment class.

As gleaned from the Details of the FY 2014 Budget, the MFOs constituted the expense
category or class; while the last and indivisible purpose of each program under the
MFOs were enumerated under the Details of the FY 2014 Budget. In particular, the
specific purpose provided under the MF02 was an appropriation for a Motor vehicle
registration system. Such specific purpose satisfied the requirement of a valid line-item
that the President could discernibly veto.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari
and prohibition; and DECLARES the use of the appropriation under Motor Vehicle
Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the General Appropriations
Act of 2014 for the implementation of the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization
Program of the Land Transportation Office of the Department of Transportation as
CONSTITUTIONAL.

TRO lifted.