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Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
EGaN G. GUBA
YVONN AS. LINCOLN
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y.
S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms that case for a renewed interestin qualitative approaches,
currently are competing, or have until recently com- it became clear that the metaphysical assumptions
peted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in undergirding the conventional paradigm (the "re-
informing and guiding inquiry, especially qualitative ceived view") must be seriously questioned. Thus
inquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory the emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, their
and related ideological positions, and constructiv- assumptions, and the implications of those assump-
ism. We acknowledge at once our own commitment tions for a variety of research issues, not on the
to constructivism (which we earlier called "natural- relative utility of qualitative versus quantitative
istic inquiry"; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); the reader methods. Nevertheless, as discussions of para-
may wish to take that fact into account in judging digms/methods over the past decade have often be-
the appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis. gun with a consideration of problems associated
Although the title of this volume, Handbook of with overquantification, we will also begin there,
Qualitative Research, implies that the term qualita- shifting only later to our predominant interest.
tive is an umbrella term superior to the term para-
digm (and, indeed, that usage is not uncommon), it
is our position that it is a term that ought to be
reserved for a description of types of methods. From The Quantitative/Qualitative
our perspective, both qualitative and quantitative Distinction
methods may be used appropriately with any re-
search paradigm. Questions of method are secon-
dary to questions of paradigm, which we define as Historically, there has been a heavy emphasis
the basic belief system or worldview that guides the on quantification in science. Mathematics is often
investigator, not only in choices of method but in termed the "queen of sciences," and those sci-
ontologicallyand epistemologicallyfundamentalways. ences, such as physics. and chemistry, that lend
It is certainly the case that interest in alternative themselves especially well to quantification are
paradigms has been stimulated by a growing dissat- generally known as "hard." Less quantifiable are-
isfaction with the patent overemphasis on quantita- nas, such as biology (although that is rapidly
tive methods. But as efforts were made to build a changing) and particularly the social sciences, are
AUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful critiques of an earlier
draft of this chapter.
105
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108 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Inquiry paradigms define for inquirers what it a question of methods; methods must be fit-
is they are about, and what falls within and out- ted to a predetermined methodology.
side the limits of legitimate inquiry. The basic
beliefs that define inquiry paradigms can be sum-
marized by the responses given by proponents of These three questions serve as the major foci
any given paradigm to three fundamental ques- around which we will analyze each of the four
tions, which are interconnected in such a way that paradigms to be considered.
the answer given to anyone question, taken in any
order, constrains how the others may be answered.
We have selected an order that we believe reflects Paradigms as Human Constructions
a logical (if not necessary) primacy:
We have already noted that paradigms, as sets
of basic beliefs, are not open to proof in any
1. The ontological question. What is the form conventional sense; there is no way to elevate one
and nature of reality and, therefore, what is over another on the basis of ultimate, founda-
there that can be known about it? For example, tional criteria. (We should note, however, that
if a "real" world is assumed, then what can be that state of affairs does not doom us to a radical
known about it is "how things really are" and relativist posture; see Guba, 1992.) In our opin-
ion, any given paradigm represents simply the
"how things really work." Then only those
most informed and sophisticated view that its
questions that relate to matters of "real" exist- proponents have been able to devise, given the
ence and "real" action are admissible; other way they have chosen to respond to the three
questions, such as those concerning matters of defining questions. And, we argue, the sets of
aesthetic or moral significance, fall outside the answers given are in all cases human construc-
realm of legitimate scientific inquiry. tions; that is, they are all inventions of the human
2. The epistemological question. What is the mind and hence subject to human error. No con-
nature of the relationship between the knower struction is or can be incontrovertibly right; ad-
or would-be knower and what can be known? vocates of any particular construction must rely
on persuasiveness and utility rather than proof in
The answer that can be given to this ques- arguing their position.
tion is constrained by the answer already What is true of paradigms is true of our analyses
given to the ontological question; that is, not as well. Everything that we shall say subsequently
just any relationship can now be postulated. is also a human construction: ours. The reader can-
j So if, for example, a "real" reality is as- not be compelled to accept our analyses, or our
I 'i sumed, then the posture of the knower must arguments, on the basis of incontestable logic or
;1 be one of objective detachment or value indisputable evidence; we can only hope to be per-
freedom in order to be able to discover "how suasive and to demonstrate the utility of our position
,I
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for, say, the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln,
things really are" and "how things really
1 1989; House, 1977). We do ask the reader to sus-
j work." (Conversely, assumption of an ob- pend his or her disbelief until our argument is com-
jectivist posture implies the existence of a plete and can be judged as a whole.
"real" world to be objective about.)
3. The methodological question. How can the
inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding
out whatever he or she believes can be known? The Basic Beliefs of Received
Again, the answer that can be given to this and Alternative Inquiry Paradigms
question is constrained by answers already
given to the first two questions; that is, not just We begin our analysis with descriptions of the
any methodology is appropriate. For example, responses that we believe proponents of each
a "real" reality pursued by an "objective" in- paradigm would make to the three questions out-
quirer mandates control of possible confound- lined above. These responses (as constructed by
ing factors, whether the methods are qualita- us) are displayed in Table 6.1, which'consists of
tive (say, observational) or quantitative (say, three rows corresponding to the ontological, epis-
temological, and methodological questions, and
analysis of covariance). (Conversely,selection
four columns corresponding to the four paradigms
of a manipulative methodology-the experi- to be discussed. The term positivism denotes the
ment, say-implies the ability to be objective "received view" that has dominated the formal
and a real world to be objective about.) The discourse in the physical and social sciences for
i 'i : methodological question cannot be reduced to some 400 years, whereas postpositivism repre-
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groups holding the constructions. Constructions it can be apprehended only imperfectly and
are not more or less "true," in any absolute sense, probabilistically; to
but simply more or less informed and/or sophis-
3. critical theory's historical realism, which
ticated. Constructions are alterable, as are their
associated "realities." This position should be dis- assumes an apprehendable reality consist-
tinguished from both nominalism and idealism ing of historically situated structures that
(see Reese, 1980, for an explication of these sev- are, in the absence of insight, as limiting and
eral ideas). confining as if they were real; to
4. constructivism's relativism, which assumes
Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist. multiple, apprehendable, and sometimes con-
The investigator and the object of investigation flicting social realities that are the products
are assumed to be interactively linked so that the
of human intellects, but that may change as
"findings" are literally created as the investiga-
their constructors become more informed
tion proceeds. The conventional distinction be-
tween ontology and epistemology disappears, as and sophisticated.
in the case of critical theory. Again, the dashed
line of Table 6.1 reflects this fact.
It is the ontological position that most differentiates
constructivism from the other three paradigms.
Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.
The variable and personal (intramental) nature of
social constructions suggests that individual con- Epistemology
structions can be elicited and refined only through
interaction between and among investigator and We note the move from
respondents. These varying constructions are in-
terpreted using conventional hermeneutical tech-
niques, and are compared and contrasted through I. positivism's dualist, objectivist assumption
a dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distill that enables the investigator to determine
a consensus construction that is more informed "how things really are" and "how things
and sophisticated than any of the predecessor really work"; to
constructions (including, of course, the etic con-
2. postpositivism's modified dualist/objectivist
struction of the investigator).
assumption that it is possible to approximate
(For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt, (but never fully know) reality; to
Chapter 7, this volume.) 3. critical theory's transactional/subjectivist as-
sumption that knowledge is value mediated
and hence value dependent; to
4. constructivism's somewhat similar but broader
Cross-Paradigm Analyses transactional/subjectivist assumption that sees
(Rows of Table 6.1) knowledge as created in interaction among
investigator and respondents.
Having noted briefly the positions that propo-
nents of each paradigm might take with respect to It is their epistemological positions that most dif-
the three paradigm-defining questions, it is useful ferentiate critical theory and constructivism from
to look across rows to compare and contrast those the other two paradigms.
positions among the several paradigms.
Methodology
Ontology
We note the move from
Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, we
note the move from
1. positivism's experimental/manipulative meth-
odology that focuses on verification of hy-
I. positivism's position of naive realism, as- potheses; to
suming an objective external reality upon 2. postpositivism's modified experimental/
which inquiry can converge; to manipulative methodology invested in critical
2. postpositivism's critical realism, which still multiplism focusing on falsification of hy-
assumes an objective reality but grants that potheses; to
-L
112 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Ethics extrinsic; tilt toward deception intrinsic; moral tilt intrinsic; process tilt
toward revelation toward revelation;
special problems
3. critical theory's dialogic/dialectical meth- implicitly or explicitly, these positions have im-
odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre- portant consequences for the practical conduct of
viously held constructions; to inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of find-
4. constructivism's hermeneutic/dialectic meth- ings and policy choices. We have elected to dis-
Ii cuss these consequences for ten salient issues.
odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre- The entries in Table 6.2, which consists of four
viously held constructions. columns corresponding to the four paradigms and
I
ten rows corresponding to the ten issues, summa-
i'
., rize our interpretation of the major implications.
The reader will note that the first four issues
Implications of (inquiry aim, nature of knowledge, knowledge
I' . Each Paradigm's Position accumulation, and quality criteria) are among those
on Selected Practical Issues deemed especially important by positivists and
(Rows of Table 6.2) postpositivists; they are therefore the issues on
Ii, I which alternative paradigms are most frequently
attacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics)
Differences in paradigm assumptions cannot be are issues taken seriously by all paradigms, al-
dismissed as mere "philosophical" differences; though conventional and emergent responses are
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114 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
fact (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build- ity (paralleling internal validity), transferability
ing block that, when placed into its proper niche, (paralleling external validity), dependability (paral-
adds to the growing "edifice of knowledge." When leling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling
the facts take the form of generalizations or cause- objectivity) (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985);
effect linkages, they may be used most efficiently and the authenticity criteria of fairness, ontologi-
for prediction and control. Generalizations may cal authenticity (enlarges personal constructions),
then be made, with predictable confidence, to a educative authenticity (leads to improved under-
population of settings. standingofconstructionsof others), catalyticauthen-
ticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity
Critical theory. Knowledge does not accumu- (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The
late in an absolute sense; rather, it grows and former set represents an early effort to resolve the
changes through a dialectical process of historical quality issue for constructivism; although these
revision that continuously erodes ignorance and criteria have been well received, their parallelism
misapprehensions and enlarges more informed to positivist criteria makes them suspect. The
insights. Generalization can occur when the mix latter set overlaps to some extent those of critical
of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, theory but goes beyond them, particularly the two
and gender circumstances and values is similar of ontological authenticity and educative authen-
across settings. ticity. The issue of quality criteria in constructiv-
ism is nevertheless not well resolved, and further
Constructivism. Knowledge accumulates only in critique is needed.
a relative sense through the formation of ever more
informed and sophisticated constructions via the
hermeneuticaUdialectical process, as varying con- Row 5: What is the
structions are brought into juxtaposition. One im- role of values in inquiry?
portant mechanism for transfer of knowledge from
one setting to another is the provision of vicarious Positivism and postpositivism. In both these
experience, often supplied by case study reports (see paradigms values are specifically excluded; in-
Stake, Chapter 14, this volume). deed, the paradigm is claimed to be "value free"
by virtue of its epistemological posture. Values
are seen as confounding variables that cannot be
Row 4: What criteria are allowed a role in a putatively objective inquiry
appropriate for judging the (even when objectivity is, in the case of postpo-
., 1, goodness or quality of an inquiry? sitivism, but a regulatory ideal).
,
, I
i Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriate Critical theory and constructivism. In both these
criteria are the conventional benchmarks of "rigor": paradigms values have pride of place; they are
internal validity (isomorphism of findings with seen as ineluctable in shaping (in the case of
reality), external validity (generalizability), reli- constructivism, creating) inquiry outcomes. Fur-
ability (in the sense of stability), and objectivity thermore, even if it were possible, excluding val-
(distanced and neutral observer). These criteria ues would not be countenanced. To do so would
depend on the realist ontological position; with- be inimical to the interests of the powerless and
out the assumption, isomorphism of findings with of "at-risk" audiences, whose original (emic) con-
reality can have no meaning, strict generalizabil- structions deserve equal consideration with those
ity to a parent population is impossible, stability of other, more powerful audiences and of the
cannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenon inquirer (etic). Constructivism, which sees the
if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec- inquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of the in-
tivity cannot be achieved because there is nothing quiry process, is more likely to stress this point
from which one can be "distant." than is critical theory, which tends to cast the
inquirer in a more authoritative role.
Critical theory. The appropriate criteria are his-
torical situatedness of the inquiry (i.e., that it takes
account of the social, political, cultural, economic, Row 6: What is the
ethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied situ- place of ethics in inquiry?
i !.
ation), the extent to which the inquiry acts to erode
ignorance and misapprehensions, and the extent to Positivism and postpositivism. In both these
which it provides a stimulus to action, that is, to the paradigms ethics is an important consideration,
transformation of the existing structure. and it is taken very seriously by inquirers, but it
is extrinsic to the inquiry process itself. Hence
Constructivism. Two sets of criteria have been ethical behavior is formally policed by external
proposed: the trustworthiness criteria of credibiI- mechanisms, such as professional codes of con-
... . ... _. ---..
115
rO''''''ing Pa,""igm,in Q=litati" R",a~h
' duct and human subjects committees. Further, the tively engaged in facilitating the "multi voice"
\ realist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro- reconstruction of his or her own construction as
vides a tilt toward the use of deception, which, it well as those of all other participants. Change is
is argued in certain cases, is warranted to deter- facilitated as reconstructions are formed and in-
mine how "things really are and work" or for the dividuals are stimulated to act on them.
sake of some "higher social good" or some "clearer
truth" (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978).
Row 8: What are the implications
Critical theory. Ethics is more nearly intrinsic of each paradigm for the
to this paradigm, as implied by the intent to erode training of novice inquirers?
ignorance and misapprehensions, and to take full
account of values and historical situatedness in Positivism. Novices are trained primarily in
the inquiry process. Thus there is a moral tilt that technical knowledge about measurement, design,
the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous mean- and quantitative methods, with less but substan-
ing of "fully informed consent") rather than de- tial emphasis on formal theories of the phenom-
ceptive. Of course, these considerations do not ena in their substantive specialties.
prevent unethical behavior, but they do provide
some process barriers that make it more difficult. Postpositivism. Novices are trained in ways
paralleling the positivist mode, but with the addi-
Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to this para- tion of qualitative methods, often for the purpose
digm also because of the inclusion of participant of ameliorating the problems noted in the opening
values in the inquiry (starting with respondents' paragraphs of this chapter.
.j
existing constructions and working toward in-
creased information and sophistication in their Critical theory and constructivism. Novices must II
constructions as well as in the inquirer's construc- first be resocialized from their early and usually .1
tion). There is an incentive-a process tilt-for intense exposure to the received view of science. ~~
revelation; hiding the inquirer's intent is destruc- That resocializationcannot be accomplished without
tive of the aim of uncovering and improving con- thorough schooling in the postures and techniques
structions. In addition, the hermeneuticaUdialec- of positivism and postpositivism. Students must
tical methodology itself provides a strong but not come to appreciate paradigm differences (summa-
infallible safeguard against deception. However, rized in Table 6.1) and, in that context, to master
the close personal interactions required by the both qualitative and quantitative methods. The
methodology may produce special and often sticky former are essential because of their role in car-
problems of confidentiality and anonymity, as rying out the dialogic/dialectical or hermeneuticaU
well as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba & dialectical methodologies; the latter because they
Lincoln, 1989). can playa useful informational role in all paradigms.
They must also be helped to understand the social,
political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender his-
Row 7: What "voice" is mirrored tory and structure that serve as the surround for their
in the inquirer's activities, inquiries, and to incorporate the values of altruism
. especially those directed at change? and empowerment in their work.
Critical theory. The inquirer's voice is that of Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents of
the "transformative intellectual" (Giroux, 1988) these two paradigms, given their foundational
who has expanded consciousness and so is in a orientation, take the position that all paradigms
position to confront ignorance and misapprehen- can be accommodated-that is, that there exists,
sions. Change is facilitated as individuals develop or will be found to exist, some common rational
greater insight into the existing state of affairs structure to which all questions of difference can
(the nature and extent of their exploitation) and be referred for resolution. The posture is reduc-
are stimulated to act on it. tionist and assumes the possibility of point-by-
point comparisons (commensurability), an issue
Constructivism. The inquirer's voice is that of about which there continues to be a great deal of
the "passionate participant" (Lincoln, 1991) ac- disagreement.
116 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Critical theory and constructivism. Proponents cal theory and constructivism will continue to
of these two paradigms join in affirming the basic play secondary, although important and progres-
incommensurability of the paradigms (although sively more influential, roles in the near future.
they would agree that positivism and postpositiv-
ism are commensurable, and would probably agree
that critical theory and constructivism are com-
mensurable). The basic beliefs of the paradigms Conclusion
are believed to be essentially contradictory. For
constructivists, either there is a "real" reality or
there is not (although one might wish to resolve The metaphor of the "paradigm wars" described
by Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn. De-
this problem differently in considering the physi- scribing the discussions and altercations of the
cal versus the human realms), and thus construc-
tivism and positivismlpostpositivism cannot be past decade or two as wars paints the matter as
more confrontational than necessary. A resolu-
logically accommodated anymore than, say, the
ideas of flat versus round earth can be logically tion of paradigm differences can occur only when
accommodated. For critical theorists and con- a new paradigm emerges that is more informed
and sophisticated than any existing one. That is
structivists, inquiry is either value free or it is not;
most likely to occur if and when proponents of
again, logical accommodation seems impossible.
Realism and relativism, value freedom and value these several points of view come together to
boundedness, cannot coexist in any internally con- discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctity
sistent metaphysical system, which condition of of their views. Continuing dialogue among para-
digm proponents of all stripes will afford the best
consistency, it is stipulated, is essentially met by
avenue for moving toward a responsive and con-
each of the candidate paradigms. Resolution of
genial relationship.
this dilemma will necessarily await the emer-
We hope that in this chapter we have illustrated
gence of a metaparadigm that renders the older,
the need for such a discussion by clearly deline-
accommodated paradigms not less true, but sim-
ating the differences that currently exist, and by
ply irrelevant.
showing that those differences have significant
implications at the practical level. Paradigm is-
Row 10: Which of the sues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought
to go about the business of inquiry without being
paradigms exercises hegemony over clear about just what paradigm informs and guides
the others? That is,
his or her approach.
which is predominantly influential?
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Handbook
of
ualitative
esearch
NormanK. Denzin
YvonnaS. Lincoln
editors
SAGE Publications
International Educational and Professional Publisher
Thousand Oaks London New Delhi
106 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
sents efforts of the past few decades to respond in their proponents about their definitions, mean-
a limited way (that is, while remaining within ings, or implications. Thus our discussion should
essentially the same set of basic beliefs) to the be considered tentative and subject to further re-
most problematic criticisms of positivism. The vision and reformulation.
term critical theory is (for us) a blanket term We will first look down the columns of Table
denoting a set of several alternative paradigms, 6.] to illustrate the positions of each paradigm
including additionally (but not limited to) neo- with respect to the three questions, following with
Marxism, feminism, materialism, and participa- a look across rows to compare and contrast the
tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itself positions of the paradigms.3 Limitations of space
usefully be divided' into three substrands: post- make it impossible for us to develop our asser-
structuralism, postmodernism, and a blending of tions in any depth. The reader will be able to find
these two. Whatever their differences, the com- other evidence, pro and con, in other chapters of
mon breakaway assumption of all these variants this volume, particularly in Chapters 7-] 1.
is that of the value-determined nature of inquiry-
an epistemological difference. Our grouping of
these positions into a single category is a judg-
ment call; we will not try to do justice to the Intraparadigm Analyses
individual points of view. The term constructiv- (Columns of Table 6.1)
ism denotes an alternative paradigm whose break-
away assumption is the move from ontological
realism to ontological relativism. These positions Column]: Positivism
will become clear in the subsequent exposition.
Two important caveats need to be mentioned. Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive re-
First, although we are inclined to believe that the alism"). An apprehendable reality is assumed to
paradigms we are about to describe can have exist, driven by immutable natural laws and mecha-
meaning even in the realm of the physical sci- nisms. Knowledge of the "way things are" is con-
ences, we will not defend that belief here. Accord- ventionally summarized in the form of time- and
ingly, our subsequent comments should be under- context-free generalizations, some of which take
stood to be limited to the social sciences only. the form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in
Second, we note that except for positivism, the principle, converge on the "true" state of affairs.
paradigms discussed are all still in formative stages; The basic posture of the paradigm is argued to be
no final agreements have been reached even among both reductionist and deterministic (Hesse, ]980).
.~ ~. - .. ... ... .. ----
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Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 113
quite different. Finally, the last four issues (voice, some of the more radical stances in the criticalist
training, accommodation, and hegemony) are those camp hold that judgment about needed transfor-
deemed especially important by alternative pro- mations should be reserved to those whose lives p
ponents; they represent areas on which the re- are most affected by transformations: the inquiry
ceived view is considered particularly vulnerable. participants themselves (Lincoln, in press).
The entries in the table are based only in part on
public positions, given that not all issues have Constructivism. The aim of inquiry is under-
been addressed by all paradigms' proponents. In standing and reconstruction of the constructions that
some cases, therefore, we have supplied entries people (including the inquirer) initially hold, aiming
that we believe follow logically from the basic toward consensus but still open to new interpreta-
metaphysical (ontological, epistemological, and tions as information and sophisticationimprove. The
methodological) postures of the paradigms. To criterion for progress is that over time, everyone
take one example, the issue of voice is rarely formulates more informed and sophisticated con-
addressed directly by positivists or postpositivists, structions and becomes more aware of the content
but we believe the entry "disinterested scientist" and meaning of competing constructions. Advocacy
is one that would be given by those proponents and activism are also key concepts is this view. The
were they to be challenged on this matter. inquirer is cast in the role of participantand facilitator
An immediately apparent difference between Ta- in this process, a position that some critics have
ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the former faulted on the grounds that it expands the inquirer's
case it was possible to make a distinct entry for every role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and
cell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerable competence (Carr & Kemmis, 1986).
overlap within rows, particularly for the positivist
and postpositivist columns. Indeed, even for those
issues in which the entries in those two columns are Row 2: What is
different, the differences appear to be minor. In the nature of knowledge?
contrast, one may note the major differences found
between these two paradigms and the critical theory Positivism. Knowledge consists of verified hy-
and constructivist paradigms, which tend also to potheses that can be accepted as facts or laws.
differ among themselves.
We have formulated the issues as questions, Postpositivism. Knowledge consists of nonfal-
which follow. sified hypotheses that can be regarded as probable
facts or laws.
u
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~.
I
worlds within worlds, unending, each with its own Hesse, E. (1980). Revolutions and reconstructions in
paradigms. Infinitesimals have their own cosmologies." the philosophy of science. Bloomington: Indiana
3. It is unlikely that a practitioner of any paradigm University Press.
would agree that our summaries closely describe what House, E. (1977). The logic of evaluative argument. Los
he or she thinks or does. Workaday scientists rarely Angeles: University of California, Center for the
have either the time or the inclination to assess what Study of Evaluation.
they do in philosophical terms. We do contend, how- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolu-
ever, that these descriptions are apt as broad brush tions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
strokes, if not always at the individual level. Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions
(2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lincoln, Y. S. (1991). The detached observer and the
passionate participant: Discourses in inquiry and
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