Cherie Ann Lim

AB Foreign Service, 302 March 24, 2018

International Political Economy Sir Jumel G. Estrañero

The Political Economy of maritime interests in South China Sea and its
implications on the Philippine maritime security

I. Introduction/Abstract
The South China Sea includes an area of several hundred little islands, stones
and reefs. It is an area with about a portion of the world’s oil tankers shipments pass
through its waters, has rich marine resources, historically exploited by various nations in
the region like China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines
that has overlapping claims to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. 1 Tensions
originate from several, linked disputes that are cumulative in their impact. The quest of all
these countries for natural resources to sustain economic growth over its resource-rich
resources, serves as the principal driver. 2
The Philippines has asserted claims over Scarborough Shoal as well as some of
the island within Spratly’s which are known collectively as the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG). The Philippines is thoroughly interested in maintaining maritime security, upholding
freedom of navigation and assuring that disputes are settled peacefully.3
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines initiated its arbitration proceedings with the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in The Hague, Netherlands, to clarify its opposing
claims with China in the South China Sea. Despite the fact that China concluded that it
would not participate in the proceedings, the arbitration proceeded in its absence in
accordance with the arrangement of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). On July 12, 2016, by a unanimous decision of the five members of the tribunal,
the award on both jurisdiction and the merits was issued. However, despite this legal
victory, China’s position on the arbitration has been firm and clear that can be considered
as “non-acceptance, non-participation, non-recognition and non-execution, with its
continuous construction and installation of “artificial islands” in the South China Sea. 4

1. Bader, Jeffrey, Lieberthal, Kenneth and McDevitt, Michael. "Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective." The
Foreign Policy Brief, August 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/south-china-sea-
perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf.
2. “South China Sea: Background Note.” EU – Asia Centre. Accessed February 28, 2018. https://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
3. Glaser, Bonnie S. “Conflict in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2015.
https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/.../CPM_Update_South_China_Sea_.pdf.
4. Wang, Wen. "Debunking the Myths of the South China Sea." Special Issue on the South China Sea Arbitration:
Responses and Implications, July 2016, 16-17.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusSouthChinaSeaArbitration.pdf.
 In talks of Philippine maritime security, different situations and events continue to
cause implications on it. Nonetheless, the government has been doing efforts and actions
to lessen the implications and to strengthen and promote the Philippine maritime security
from different external threats.
This paper will discuss the nature of maritime interests in South China Sea by
discussing the different maritime claims of different countries in the disputed area. It also
describes the strategic and economic environment of the South China Sea by examining
the positions of claimants to secure their presence in the area. Lastly, it will discuss what
the importance of the maritime interests is, what and how the maritime security of the
Philippines is affected and how will the Philippines promote its maritime interests.
II.
A. Statement of the Problem
Based on the given information, this paper intends to answer the following research
questions:
1. What are the core interests of the Philippines in the South China Sea?
2. What has the Philippines done to promote its interests in the South China Sea?
3. What are the implications of the maritime interests of other parties towards the
Philippine maritime security?
4. How will the Philippines pursue and protect its maritime interests without overlapping
the maritime interests of various nations within the region?

B. Methodology
This study employs descriptive methodology. The researcher used data and
information from readily accessible sources such as news articles, online journals,
dissertations, and other internet sources to critically assess the situation and make a
substantive conclusion with a well-grounded foundation which allowed the researcher to
discuss the considered status of features in the South China Sea, potential claims of
some nations with their recent developments and policies within the region, and how will
it affect the Philippine maritime security.
III. Review of Related Literature

Figure 1.1 Maritime claims in the South China Sea5

The South China Sea, a huge sea of 1.4 million square miles that contains about
a third of the world’s shipping that pass through its waters, it also contains vast amount
of resources like fish, minerals, oil and even natural gas. There are four island groups in
the South China Sea: the Pratas islands, the Paracel, the Spratlys and Scarborough
Shoal.6 Throughout the sea are scattered small land features that falls into two main
groupings, namely the Paracel Islands in the northern part and Spratly Islands in the
southern part.
Timeline of South China Sea dispute (change)
The dispute within South China Sea is arguably an intractable issue, having
developed for a considerable length of time, that shows a security risk to the region but
for which no peaceful settlement is in sight. At the point when the issue initially arose,
nobody could predict the direction it would take. In present time, the fact that the tensions
escalate every now and then to a level that may lead to military tensions and conflicts,
reflects the complexity of the issue and the strength of the responsibilities and
commitments of the member states to ensure their national interests.7
In 1947, The Republic of China distributed the first map including the “nine-dash
line” circling around the entirety of the South China Sea and asserting claims on water

5. Infographic: Surveying territorial claims in the South China Sea. In South China Morning Post. May 30, 2015.
Accessed March 15, 2018. http://www.scmp.com/infographics/article/1813128/infographic-surveying-territorial-
claims-south-china-sea.
6. See supra, note 1.
7. Rustandi, Cdre. Argus. “Evolution of the South China dispute.” The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for
ASEAN to enhance its policies in order to achieve resolution.April 2016, 2.
www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Rustandi_IPSP.pdf.
adjacent to Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam that creates a significantly-changed
regional environment. 8
In 2009, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam filed papers with the United
Nations Commission on the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), formalizing
their lawful claims to control over parts within the South China Sea. Also in the same year,
China had set out its claims in formal notes to the UN Secretary General.
In 2011, former US Secretary Hillary Clinton coined the term “pivot” to depict the
US foreign policy shift towards a focus on Asia.
In 2012, tensions arose between China and Vietnam over their rival claims.
Vietnam passed a law which designated both the Paracel and Spratly Islands as part of
the country and requires all foreign ships passing through the South China Sea notify
their authorities. However, the law was disregarded by China. 9
In April of the same year, the Philippine naval forces blocked twelve Chinese
fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal, finding what they view as illegally fished marine
life on board. In several months, the Philippines and China had a standoff, however when
it was over, China had effectively established full de facto control of the shoal. And in
September, former Philippine president Benigno Aquino declared the country’s western
maritime territory as the “West Philippine Sea”.
In 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration of China’s maritime claims
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea at The Hague, the Netherlands. However, China refused to partake
in the arbitration. Halfway in the light of its conflict with China in Scarborough, the
Philippines moved ahead with its claim under UNCLOS. During this period, no progress
was made towards agreeing a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
In 2014, as shown by satellite photos, Chinese vessels dredged sand to build
the submerged Mischief Reef into an island. Former US President Barack Obama visited
Manila to sign the 10-year US-PH Enhanced Defense Co-operation Agreement. China
also moved an oil rig owned by the China National Petroleum Corp. close to Paracel
Islands, prompting anti-Chinese protests to erupt in Vietnam that would harm businesses
with ties to China. Vietnamese boats that were sent to the area were fended off by the
Chinese ships, and in July, at last, China removed the rig from the area. Also in that year,
the US and Philippines conducted a joint military exercise near Scarborough Shoal.10
In 2015, another satellite images uncovered the China’s construction of large
airstrip on reclaimed land on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys Islands, in which they
insisted that it was built for non-military purposes, however, doubts and fears were
expressed that China might impose an “air defense zone” in the area. October of the
same year, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction to consider the case filed by

8. Lockett, Hudson. "Timeline: South China Sea dispute." July 12, 2016. Accessed March 9, 2018.
https://www.ft.com/content/aa32a224-480e-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.
9. Lunn, Jon, and Arabella Lang. “The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update”, July 2016, 8.
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7481/CBP-7481.pdf.
10. See supra, note 8.
the Philippines against China in 2013 and consider it as admissible. In spite of that,
Chinese government condemned the decision, dismissing the jurisdiction and repeating
its opposition to any third-party settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea. 11
This South China Sea issue has resulted into extensive implications for maritime
security, peace, and stability in the region. Coastal states’ interests are focused on
maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty, and the right to exploit the resources within
the region, while many other countries’ interests are focused to ensure their sea lines of
communications (SLOCs) and to satisfy their geopolitical strategies.12 The countries who
are involved in the dispute have been fortifying their military capabilities, and some
likewise exploring legal approach. Moreover, there are efforts to reduce tensions through
means of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 13
Positions and claims of countries/organization and their activities14
Countries like the Philippines, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia
have their own sovereignty claims over some of these land features and water, resulting
into conflicts of claims. Growing concerns about security and resources have prompt
much of the tension, and pursuit of national interests in these countries spit fire on the
waters. 15
People’s Republic of China
China has claimed that for the last 2000 years, Paracel and Spratlys islands and
Scarborough shoal are both integral part of the Chinese territory as it is reconfirmed by
their 1947 map which is mostly known as the map of the nine-dash line, enclosing an
area covering 90% of the South China Sea. China maintained ambiguity to claim full
sovereignty, making it more difficult for other parties to pursue their claims. 16 As an
example, it have considered the arbitration started by the Philippines as “unjust and
unlawful” and declared that the tribunal ruling is “null and void and has no binding force”
over the Chinese islands and reefs, hence UNCLOS should not apply.
China did not take part of the international arbitration but only by states that are
directly concerned. It has conducted joint development projects over some of the disputed

11. Lunn, Jon, and Arabella Lang. "2.4 2015.” The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update, July 2016, 10.
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7481/CBP-7481.pdf.
12. Rustandi, Cdre. Argus. "The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in order
to achieve resolution." April 2016, 1. www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Rustandi_IPSP.pdf.
13. Lunn, Jon, and Arabella Lang. "The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update." July 2016, 4.
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7481/CBP-7481.pdf.
14. “Positions of Stakeholders.” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 1.
https://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
15. gewirtz, Paul. “Limits of Law in the South China Sea.” May 2016, 2. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Limits-of-Law-in-the-South-China-Sea-2.pdf.
16. O'Rourke, Ronald. "China’s Approach to Disputes." Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, December 12, 2017, 25-27. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
islands in South China Sea and has strict adherence to Declaration on Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea wherein parties agree to seek agreement on a Code of Conduct.17
Vietnam
Vietnam, in conformity with UNCLOS, also possess sovereignty over Paracel
and Spratly Islands. Vietnam strictly focus on the implementation of Declaration of
Conduct between ASEAN and China on 2002, hoping there would be a launch of official
talks on a Code of Conduct among ASEAN members and China. Former Prime Minister
Dung of Vietnam, called for the completion of the ASEAN-led Code of Conduct, in
avoiding sea confrontations and in this manner, encouraging a “peaceful settlement on
the premise of international law, not threats of force.” 18 Although Hanoi has taken
significant steps in previous years to define its claims in line with UNCLOS, those
developments have not been taken into consideration.19
Taiwan
Since 1947, the government of Republic of Taiwan has claimed sovereignty over
the South China Sea. In the present, it maintains control on more than two of the sea’s
most strategically positioned naturally formed islands, Pratas Island (Dongsha Dao) and
Itu Aba Island (Taiping Dao). The two areas have long civil military facilities like airstrips,
docks and radars. These islands adds to the legitimacy of Taiwan’s sovereignty claims
and help guaranteed the security of vital sea lines of communication that connects
Taiwan’s ports to the Middle East and Europe. Like all other island nations, Taiwan is also
dependent on free access to the sea for its survival. 20
Malaysia
Malaysia has determined much of its boundaries with the archipelago of both
Indonesia and the Philippines.21 Malaysia, in observance of UNCLOS, claims territory
that falls within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and to the few islands within the
Spratlys. Malaysia called for claimants to initiate dialogues and co-operation in the
establishment of Code of Conduct and have called them for jointly development of
resources, in waters claimed by their territory and Thailand as an example, to avoid
conflict and prevent “extra-regional states” from becoming involved.22

17. “People’s Republic of China.” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 2.
https://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
18. “Vietnam.” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 3. https://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
19. Poling, Gregory B. " Identifying the Claims: Vietnam." The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the limits of the
Maritime Dispute, July 2013, 13. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
20. Easton, Ian. “Challenges Facing Taiwan in the South China Sea”, October 17, 2016.
http://www.project2049.net/documents/Challenges%20Facing_Taiwan%20in%20the_South%20China%20Sea.pdf
21 Poling, Gregory B. " Identifying the Claims: Malaysia." The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the limits of the
Maritime Dispute, July 2013, 8. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
22. “Positions of Stakeholders: Malaysia.” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 1.
https://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
Brunei Darussalam

In compliance of UNCLOS, Brunei claims territory within its exclusive economic

zone (EEZ).23 Their claim to legality is based on three things: (1) two British Orders in
Council in 1958 which defined its maritime boundaries with Malaysia; (2) the boundary
extension as an EEZ out to 200 nautical miles, as declared in 1982 and accepted by
Malaysia in 2009; and (3) in accordance to its 1988 official map, the extension of those
boundaries for an extended continental shelf, approximately 60 nautical miles farther. So
far, evidence has not presented for its claim of Brunei for an extended continental shelf,
but its intention to do so was declared in 2009.24

Indonesia

Indonesia has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) generated from the Natuna
Islands which has overlapped China’s “nine-dash-line claim” in the South China Sea. In
this case, Indonesia formally demands that it is not a claimant. 25 The waters in the
disputed areas is vital for fishery and is a home to large natural gas reserves.

Indonesia’s approach towards the South China Sea dispute under President
Jokowi, has moved from that of a dynamic player in efforts to look for a peaceful solution
to the broader disputes, to one primarily centered on ensuring its own particular interests
around the Natuna Islands without provoking and offending China. In addition,
Indonesia’s reluctance to more openly challenge the dashed line exhausts international
efforts to push back against the far reaching claims of China, even as it allows Indonesia
to stay away from troublesome conversations with China. 26
The Philippines
As established by the Paris Treaty, the Philippines maintained the lines based
on the treaty and treated them as if they were a claim to territorial waters. The position
was in urgent need of progress, as such claim is only possible within 12 nautical miles of
a country’s shores. Same was valid of the randomly drawn box surrounding the Kalayaan
Group of Islands in the Spratlys.
Luckily, Manila opened it to the same charges it was leveling against Beijing, as
it recognized that the illegality of its own claims was undermining its situation in the South
China Sea. To remedy this, it passed its landmark baselines law in 2009. In clarifying the
claims of the Philippines, the law took two critical steps towards it:

23. “Positions of Stakeholders: Brunei.” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 3.
https://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
24. Poling, Gregory B. "Identifying the Claims." The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the limits of the Maritime
Dispute, July 2013, 7-8. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
25. See supra, note 14.
26. Connelly, Aaron L. “Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone.” , December 2016, 3-4.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Connelly%2C%20Indonesia%20in%20the%20South%
20China%20Sea.pdf
 1. That Manila claims a 12-nautical mile sea territory and an EEZ of about 200
nautical miles from straight territorial baselines between coordinates enumerated in the
law. It is significant that the Philippines’ baselines, though not above reproach, have not
drawn the charges of illegality that Vietnam’s and China’s have.
2. The law get rid of the “Kalayaan box,” declaring that, although Manila still lays
claim to the islands and other features within it, it does so only via UNCLOS’ “Regime of
Islands.” This implies that the claims of the Philippines are only the waters generated by
the land features within the Kalayaan Group, not all the waters in the former box. Manila
has not defined which features are above water at high tide and therefore generate a 12-
nautical mile territorial sea or which, if any, also create an EEZ and continental shelf by
meeting the UNCLOS definition of an “island.”
The 2009 baselines law resulted into a much clearer legal maritime claims of the
Philippines in the South China Sea.27
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines initiated an arbitration proceeding with the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, Netherlands, in clarifying its
conflicting claims with China on the disputed territories in South China Sea.28
Three years, July 12, 2016, after the Philippines initiated proceedings against
China under the UNCLOS on 2013, five judges on the Arbitral Tribunal finally rendered
their long-anticipated judgement in a “unanimous award”. In essence, at the expense of
China’s claims of historic rights behind the infamous nine-dash line, the claims of the
Philippines on the South China Sea have been supported.29
United States of America
In East Asia, US has no territorial or resource claims but it has stated by Hillary
Clinton at the 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi, “United States has a national interest in
freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for
international law in the South China Sea.” The US has defense treaties with Japan and
the Philippines, thus it may get drawn into a contention between either of them and China.
It has stated that the US will accept “no unilateral attempt to change the status quo.”
Despite the fact that it requires the peaceful settlement of dispute within the international
law, the US has not yet ratified the UNCLOS. During the 2012 Joint EU and US
articulation on the Asia-Pacific region, it encouraged both China and ASEAN “to advance
a Code of Conduct and to determine territorial and maritime disputes in a peaceful,
diplomatic and cooperative solutions.” 30

27. Poling, Gregory B. "Identifying the Claims: The Philippines." The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the limits
of the Maritime Dispute, July 2013, 9-10. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
28. "The Philippines’ Submissions." Special Issue on the South China Sea Arbitration: Responses and Implications,
July 2016, 2. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusSouthChinaSeaArbitration.pdf.
29. “Editorial Notes” Special Issue on the South China Sea Arbitration: Responses and Implications, July 2016, 1.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusSouthChinaSeaArbitration.pdf.
30. “The US” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 2. https://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
 In the immediate outcome of the decision of the ruling, the US welcomed the
decision as a vital step towards a peaceful determination of the dispute, and noted that
as the ruling was lawfully binding, it is expected that the Philippines and China to abide
by it. 31
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN has promoted multilateral talks among nations without settling the issue of
sovereignty on the disputed islands. In 2002, China joined in signing a Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea that conferred all parties to those
territorial disputes to “reaffirm their respect and commitment to the freedom of navigation
in and over flight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized
principles of international law” and to “resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes of these
countries by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.” Since then,
ASEAN has endeavored to promote a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea
but has failed to secure unanimity among countries. 32
On the outcome of the Tribunal’s award, an ASEAN statement could not be issued
owing to the absence and lack of consensus. In spite of the fact that the South China Sea
issue will continue to dominate ASEAN’s agenda for some time to come, it ought not to
come to define the entirety of ASEAN and ASEAN – China relations. 33
European Union (EU)
EU has a major interest for the South China Sea due to its part for trade and
investments in the region. The EU stressed the importance of “freedom of navigation” in
the South China Sea and urged the parties to peacefully resolve disputes in accordance
with international law, especially the UNCLOS. The EU also recommended in the
guidelines to take consider of the previous examples and offered to share experience and
understanding if wished by the contending parties. 34
Moreover, EU does not take sides in the South China Sea disputes, but it stands
for international order, in respect and application of UNCLOS, for a peaceful settlement
of the disputes and to support ASEAN’s bid to come up with a Code of Conduct (CoC).
They have been consistent in this position and is reflected in the High Representative’s
diverse statements on the region, as well as in the EU’s guidelines and plan of activities
in relation to East Asia and ASEAN. As noted over, EU as a political-security actor in Asia
in terms of maritime security cooperation, staked much of its credibility through the
ASEAN-EU High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security.35

31. Storey, Ian J. “What does the Ruling Mean for US-China Relations?” Special Issue on the South China Sea
Arbitration: Responses and Implications, July 2016, 15.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusSouthChinaSeaArbitration.pdf.
32. “Positions of Stakeholders: ASEAN” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 1.
https://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
33. See supra, note 30.
34. “The EU” South China Sea: Background Note, n.d. Accessed on March 6, 2018, 1-2. https://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/documents/.../pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.
35. “European positions.” Maritime Security: Belgium’s interests and options, March 21, 2017, 18.
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2017/04/Egmont-GRIP-Maritime-Security.pdf?type=pdf
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establish a
comprehensive legal framework in governing all activities and uses of the world’s oceans
and seas. It also defines the limits of a country’s territorial seas, from which they can
explore and exploit maritime resources. In 1982 in Montego Bay of Jamaica, UNCLOS
was adopted after nine years of negotiations. In November 16, 1994, it was entered into
force and as of January 2015, 166 countries and European Union (EU) have been part of
the convention. The Philippines is the 11th country that has ratified the convention. The
convention compelled its parties to bring its maritime claims and national laws into
conformity with the rights and obligations under the Convention. Under the principle of
the international law, a State cannot use its domestic law as an excuse not to comply with
its obligations under an international treaty to which it is a party. It also mandates the
members to promote the development and transfer of marine technology “on fair and
reasonable terms and conditions, with regards on the legitimate interest of all.
All parties to the Convention are obligated to settle their disputes concerning the
application of the Convention through peaceful means. For arbitration, disputes are
coursed through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea under the UNCLOS to
the International Court of Justice. In case of the Philippines’ maritime dispute with China
in the South China Sea, matters related to it are dealt through the Office of the President
and the Department of Foreign Affairs.
These are some of the key features of the Convention:
* Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the
right to establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign
vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters;
* Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and
interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight
lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; the waters between the
islands are declared archipelagic waters where States may establish sea lanes
and air routes in which all other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage
through such designated sea lanes;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and
exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area
of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200
nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances; 36

36. "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982." Oceans and Law of the Sea: United
Nations. 2013. Accessed March 13, 2018.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.
Philippine Maritime Territories, Jurisdictions and Boundaries

Fig 1.2 Territorial waters of the Philippines37

The Philippines is an archipelagic state situated in Southeast Asia and is
composed of more than 7,000 islands and other features. The Philippines claims
Scarborough Shoal, which is also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Philippines also
claims some of the Spratlys, referred by the Philippines as Kalayaan Group of Islands,
which are also claimed as whole or part by China, Taiwan, Malaysia and Vietnam. 38
Laws that are enacted by the Congress characterized the baselines of the territorial
sea of the Philippine archipelago. In the 1935 Constitution, the baselines of the
Philippines have been defined. In the early 1970s, President Ferdinand Marcos formally
established the Municipality of Kalayaan through Presidential Decree No. 1596 which
reaffirmed and formalized the country’s long standing interest in Kalayaan Group of
Islands. The Republic Act No. 3046 as amended by Republic Act No. 5446. On March
10, 2000, Republic Act No. 9522 was approved that amended both laws and defined the
archipelagic baselines as “Regime of Islands” (section 2). This definition is in uniform with
Article 121 of the UNCLOS, where the Philippines took an active part. In an article by
Rodolfo Severino entitled “Clarifying the New Philippines Baseline Law” (Republic Act No.
9522) which expressed that the purpose of the law is mainly to correct the existing
baseline act and to “define the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines.” The baseline
does not extend to Spratlys or to Scarborough, both of which China and Vietnam claim

37. Territorial waters. Wikipedia. Accessed on March 13, 2018

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters#/media/File:Ph_Territorial_Map.png
38. United States Department of State. Limits in the Seas No. 142 Philippines: Archipelagic and other Maritime
Claims and Boundaries, September 15, 2014, 2-3. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231914.pdf.
in their territory, while the Philippines claims a part of what are called the “Spratlys and
all of Scarborough Shoal.”39
To explain further, in the Article 1 of the Philippine Constitution, it provides that “the
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” 40 The
Philippines stated upon signing the Laws of Sea (LOS) Convention in 1982 and again
ratifying in 1984 that the concept of internal waters under the Philippine Constitution is
similar to the concept of archipelagic water that is under the LOS Convention. Countries
like US have protested this understanding and in response, the Philippines stated that it
intends to harmonize it domestic legislation with the provisions of the Conventions and it
will abide by the provisions of the said Convention. 41
Philippine Maritime Interests
The Philippine has demonstrated its long-standing interest towards the disputed
islands such as Scarborough Shoal, Spratlys Island, Kalayaan Group of Island are vital
for its national security and for the economic survival of the country. They are all critical
to the Philippine territorial integrity and security against external threats, keeping in mind
the country’s strategic location, history of foreign invasions and its fragmented geographic
setup which makes it vulnerable to external intrusion from the seas.
Maritime transportation is of critical important to the Philippines in which we relied
upon for distributing and importing essential goods as well as carrying the country’s export
commodities. There are also various estimates that these islands are very rich in marine
life that can attract local as well as foreign tourists which will serve as a tourist hotspot.
They are also essential for the sustenance of country’s security on account of its rich
fisheries and fish breeding areas, as well as for the Philippines’ food security. The
livelihood and economic welfare of the people from the coastal communities are
dependent to all our marine waters. These areas are also vital to energy security since
they are known to have a great deposit of untapped petroleum reserves as well as mineral
deposits. 42
These maritime interests cannot be discussed without referencing the maritime
territories, jurisdiction as well as the boundaries of the country. For long decades, the
country has faced legal dilemma regardless of whether it ought to redefine its maritime

39. Ong, Milagros Santos. “Update: Philippine Legal Research”, March 2015.
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Philippines1.html.
40. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, published Feb. 11, 1987, available at:
http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/.
41. Declaration of the Republic of the Philippines in response to Australia’s Objection to the Declaration of the
Philippines upon Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed at Dec. 10, 1982,
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxi-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en
42. Baviera, Aileen, S.P. and Batongbacal, Jay. "The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction
Disputes from a Filipino Perspective." April 15, 2013, 11. http://ac.upd.edu.ph/acmedia/images/books-
monographs/FINAL_West%20Phil%20Sea%20Primer_UP_15_July_2013.pdf.
jurisdiction in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). 43
Philippine arbitration case vs. China
After the Philippines presented its arguments in the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in The Hague, Netherlands, a 501-page decision in favour of the Philippines was declared
on July 12, 2016. China’s nine-dash line maritime claim was invalidated by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) and concluded that the said claim lacks legal basis and that
China’s claim is excessive and encroaching the Philippine’s 200-nautical mile EEZ. The
PCA held that China violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines in its EEZ by
interfering with fishing and exploration of petroleum, as well as the construction of artificial
islands. The obligation of the Chinese authorities to stop Chinese fishermen from
harvesting endangered species in the South China Sea, have not been fulfilled.
And despite the ruling affirming Philippines’ right to the South China Sea, with
China’s refusal to accept the verdict, the dispute between both parties still stands. The
Philippines, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, expressed its faith in international
cooperation and law to promote and protect its right and interests. 44
Philippine Maritime Security
In the Philippine National Marine Policy of 1994, Maritime Security is broadly
defined as the “state in which the country’s marine assets, maritime practices, territorial
integrity and coastal peace and order are protected, conserved and enhanced”. This
extensive and comprehensive meaning of maritime security, simply and briefly stated,
would encompass all aspects of comprehensive security for the country which includes
soft security non-traditional maritime security issues. The Philippines has focused more
on its maritime security in recent times, this comprehensive maritime security can be
classified into two: (1) Traditional maritime security, that refers to hard security and
addressed through hard power, and (2) Non-traditional maritime security that refers to
soft security and in regard to ocean governance. 45 It also represents an underlying
attempt of the country to move towards an integrated management and sustainable
development of the coastal and marine areas through participative strategy and decision
making process. It also deals with the extent of the country’s territory, management of the
marine economy as well as the protection of the marine environment. 46

43. Wardhani, Lynda K., Patrick Hasjim, and Rudjimin. "Philippines’ Maritime Policy." March 7, 2016. Accessed
March 11, 2018. https://rudjimin.wordpress.com/2016/03/07/philippines-maritime-policy/.
44. "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)." Department of Environment and Natural
Resources: International Agreements on Environment and Natural Resources. March 8, 2018. Accessed March 13,
2018. http://intl.denr.gov.ph/index.php/database-un-conventions/article/14.
45. Enconmienda, Alberto A. "The South China Sea Issues and Related Core Interests of the Philippines." 2017.
Accessed March 3, 2018.
https://www.academia.edu/33812548/The_South_China_Sea_Issues_and_Related_Core_Interests_of_the_Philipp
ines.
46. See supra, note 42.
Strengthening the Philippine Maritime Security
Former President Aquino III endorsed a “comprehensive border protection” of the
Philippine territorial, contiguous and EEZ. 47 Meanwhile in Duterte’s administration, where
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has embarked a joint maritime law enforcement operation
with the Chinese Coast Guard in accordance to the President’s instruction. 48
Like some of the Southeast Asian neighboring countries, the Philippines has also
placed an emphasis on the development of its maritime security. The country has been
working on to enhance maritime security. In fact, the country has recently purchased a
fighter jet from Korea and 11 patrol ships from Japan. Japan has also leased five aircraft
for training purposes. According to Philippines Defense Secretary Delphin Lorenzana, the
country has been buying ships from neighbor countries like Indonesia and that the country
would invest US$2.3 billion for the second phase of military modernization which will
improve the country’s “very weak” defense capabilities. 49 Aside from that, an Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed by former Defense Secretary
Voltaire Gazmin and former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg. The
agreement allows U.S. forces to enhance infrastructures that can be jointly use by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. It also includes bringing U.S. tactical units and their
equipment to all allied base in East Asia to plan as well as exercise missions that are
possible for crisis and conflict situations. 50
Next example is the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership that was issued in
2011. In 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have visited the Philippines that was
widely seen as a sign of the continuing enhancement of Philippines-Japan relations. With
the increasingly complex and uncertain security scene by emerging power shift in the
region, as well as the manifesting tensions surrounding disputes in the South China Sea,
the close ties between Philippines and Japan are strengthened. Hence, both countries
agreed to cooperate enhancing both of their maritime domain awareness, engage in
training activities and exercises and coordination of measures in managing maritime
tensions at multilateral level. 51 Another example is the India-Philippines bilateral maritime
exercise which was a reminder of the ongoing defense cooperation between the two
countries in the maritime domain. 52 ASEAN has also been part of strengthening the

47. Salvador, Alma Maria O. "Perspectives on Duterte’s Security Policy - Bluebeard." July 12, 2016. Accessed on
March 3, 2018. https://www.ateneo.edu/news/research/perspectives-duterte%E2%80%99s-security-policy-
blueboard-alma-maria-o-salvador.
48. Rider, David. "PCG hosts SEACAT." Maritime Security Review, August 22, 2017. Accessed March 11, 2018.
http://www.marsecreview.com/2017/08/pcg-hosts-seacat/.
49. "ASEAN’s new arms race: nations scramble to rearm as concerns over security grow." ASEAN Today. January
14, 2017. Accessed March 15, 2018. https://www.aseantoday.com/2017/01/aseans-new-arms-race-nations-
scramble-to-rearm-as-concerns-over-security-grow/.
50. De Castro, Renato Cruz. "Enhancing Philippine Maritime Security." December 23, 2014. Accessed March 11,
2018. https://amti.csis.org/enhancing-philippine-maritime-security-in-the-21st-century/.
51. Galang, Mico A. "Strengthening Manila’s Maritime Security Posture in the South China Sea: The Role of the
Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership." NDCP Executive Policy Brief, October 12, 2017. www.ndcp.edu.ph/wp-
content/uploads/.../3.%20EPB%20re%20PH-Japan_v11.pdf.
52. Parameswaran, Prashanth. "India-Philippines Coast Guard Exercise Spotlights Maritime Cooperation."
December 7, 2017. Accessed March 11, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/india-philippines-coast-guard-
exercise-spotlights-maritime-cooperation/.
Philippine maritime security in its efforts to address maritime security threats in the
Southeast Asia region. 53
Although there are maritime security cooperation and processes of diplomatic
negotiations with the neighboring countries to define the country’s maritime borders and
jurisdiction, the dispute remains to be one of the security challenge to the Philippines’
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Implications on Philippine Maritime Security
China’s land reclamation and expansion
China has reinforced its maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea by
employing a range of diplomatic, administrative, economic and military tactics in
expanding an effective control over the disputed territories. It has also tried to deter other
states in reinforcing their claims at China’s expense. Around 2014, it has conducted land
reclamation as well as installation construction over the feature of Spratlys Islands
including Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef,
Mischief Reef and Hughes Reef. 54
With the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” that will enhance the economic development of
China from 2011-2015, the Chinese government states that China intends to “exploit and
utilize marine resources rationally and to actively develop the marine oil and gas, marine
transport, marine fishing, and coastal travel industries”, and has demonstrated the
commitment to promote its maritime economy. China has also been pioneer in sending
research vessels oceanic routes. As its maritime expansion program does not stop, they
are also intensifying security and patrol activities, as well as to increase its military
presence in the area by deploying ships and aircrafts that puts more coercive pressure
on its small neighboring nations. To secure the maritime interests such as petroleum,
natural gas and fishing resources is important for that it provides immense space and
abundant resources in the sustainable development of China. 55
On 2017, according to a security think tank that released satellite images showing
China’s land reclamation, despite China saying it has stopped years ago, it still continues
to expand its artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea. And as stated by the Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), as Beijing claims most of the sea and has been
transforming the reefs of Spratlys and Paracel into islands, wherein they install military
aircraft and missile systems. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the reported on the
sidelines of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Manila
that China has completed its reclamation activities years ago and the ongoing reclamation

53. Zhen, Sun. "ASEAN Framework to Enhance Maritime Security in Southeast Asia." Accessed March 13, 2018.
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Sun-Zhen-ASEAN-Framework-to-Enhance-Maritime-
Security.pdf.
54. Yamaguchi, Shinji. "Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea”. China Perspectives,
September 1, 2016. Accessed March 12, 2018. http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/7022.
55. Masafumi, Iida. "Maritime Expansion by China as it Pursues Changes in Order”, n.d. Accessed March 12, 2018.
https://www.spf.org/media/upload/6-1_MaritimeExpans_EN.pdf.
activities are not owned by them, referring it to others. AMTI claims that Wang’s
statements were false by revealing the satellite pictures on its website. 56
Since then, military and non-military vessels of China have regularly undertaken
activities to strengthen their de facto control of the area. It has doubled down on
expanding regional military footprint without adopting unnecessarily provocative military
postures, as well as to mark its presence and to intimidate non-Chinese fishermen in the
Southeast Asia. 57
Chinese illegal fishing activities
Within South China Sea, Chinese fishing fleets dominates the number. The fact
that China has recently opened a fishing port on the island of Hainan providing space for
800 fishing vessels that is expected to reach 2,000. It has been predicted that the fishing
port will play an important role in safeguarding the China’s fishing rights in the South
China Sea. Chinese fishermen have destroyed vital coral reefs in search of valuable giant
clams, although that this kind of practice appears to be slowing at the present. 58Such
coastal states like Indonesia, has been on a strong track of blowing up and sinking illegal
fishing vessel, even Malaysia appears to follow so. 59 Philippines also secures Chinese
fishermen’s whereabouts by capturing them.
Threats by use of force in SCS
From the past years, there have been series of confrontations between Chinese
vessels and coast guard ships of countries like the U.S. and Vietnam. In 2014, tensions
remain high in the long-standing attempted blockade of the Chinese navy over the
Philippine marine who were stationed on the Second Thomas Shoal and China’s
interdiction of Philippine fishermen who were entering the Scarborough Shoal. 60 During
the same year, stand-off between China and Vietnam over the Chinese’s decision on an
oil rig in the disputed waters of South China Sea escalated when coast guard ships of the
two countries rammed with one another. There are lot of incidents that reflects on the
escalation of the dispute between two countries. It is when a Chinese vessel fired a water
cannon against a Vietnamese ocean inspection ship and when a Chinese vessel rammed

56. AFP. "South China Sea dispute: Beijing is still expanding artificial islands, reveals Asian think tank." August 11,
2017. Accessed March 12, 2018. http://www.firstpost.com/world/south-china-sea-dispute-beijing-is-still-
expanding-artificial-islands-reveals-asian-think-tank-3919567.html.
57. Singh, Abhijit. "Arbitration on the South China Sea – Implications for Maritime-Asia." January 31, 2017.
Accessed March 13, 2018. http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/arbitration-on-the-south-china-sea-
implications-for-maritime-asia/.
58. Southerland, Dan. "The Real South China Sea Crisis Everyone Is Missing." March 27, 2017. Accessed March 13,
2018. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-south-china-sea-crisis-everyone-missing-19922.
59. Malasig, Francis R. "Fishing, not oil, is at the heart of the South China Sea dispute." August 16, 2016. Accessed
March 13, 2018. https://theconversation.com/fishing-not-oil-is-at-the-heart-of-the-south-china-sea-dispute-
63580.
60. Herscovitch, Benjamin. "A Balanced Threat Assessment of China’s South China Sea Policy." August 28, 2017.
Accessed March 15, 2018. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/balanced-threat-assessment-chinas-
south-china-sea-policy.
and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat. So far, naval assets from either side have been
involved in either exchange. 61
With China’s history of using force in advancing its maritime claims in the South
China Sea, the likelihood of having a large-scale military conflict between China and some
of the claimant states in ASEAN is low, but the risk of accidents and small-scale conflicts
which can escalate into military confrontation will remain. 62
Arms races between involved states
With the on-going maritime disputes in the South China Sea, claimants like
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand have
emphasize the need to increase military modernization due to China’s assertive
behaviour in the territorial disputed waters. However, according to some observers, this
action may lead these countries to engage in a military build-ups due to their concerns
and uncertainties on China and over what the future may hold. 63 Several Southeast Asian
countries are going on arms spending sprees as well as buying new tanks, helicopters,
fighting jets and submarines. Various studies provides doubt on the existence of a causal
link between the increased spending on defense and the outbreak of military conflict, the
defense upgrading that taking place in Southeast Asia adds to the growing regional
tensions. 64

61. Panda, Ankit. "Chinese, Vietnamese Coast Guard Boats Collide." June 4, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2018.
https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinese-vietnamese-coast-guard-boats-collide/
62. See supra, note 59.
63. Mohammed, Hafiizh Pg Hashim, Ak. "An Arms Race in Southeast Asia: The Claims and Realities." July 2016.
Accessed March 15, 2018. https://kyotoreview.org/yav/southeast-asia-arms-race/.
64. Heiduk, Felix. "Is Southeast Asia really in an arms race?" East Asia Forum. February 21, 2018. Accessed March
15, 2018. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/21/is-southeast-asia-really-in-an-arms-race/.
IV. Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation of Data
Country Claimed islands Conflicting country/s
with same claim
China Paracel, Spratlys, Natuna Vietnam, Philippines,
and Scarborough Shoal Indonesia, Malaysia,
Brunei, Taiwan
Vietnam Paracel and Spratlys China, Philippines and
Taiwan
Malaysia few islands of Spratlys China, Brunei and
Philippines
Brunei Darussalam few islands of Spratlys China, Malaysia and
Philippines
Indonesia Natuna Islands China and Taiwan
The Philippines Spratlys and Scarborough China, Taiwan and
Shoal Vietnam
Taiwan Pratas Island and Itu Aba China, Philippines and
Island (Spratlys) Vietnam
Table 1. Maritime claims of countries in the South China Sea
In this table, we can see the disputes that involves maritime claims on islands.
China has the most maritime claims among the countries in the disputed area, having
most of the conflicting countries to have same claims. Meanwhile, Spratlys Island has
been the most claimed islands in the South China Sea. The maritime interest in the South
China Sea has focused on laying claims to the bodies of water as well as the islands as
it contains rich natural resources. These resources are all essential for economic
development and sustenance. Claimant countries like Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Vietnam and the Philippines has asserted rights and have seen interests on disputed
islands such as the Scarborough Shoal, Spratlys Island, Kalayaan Group of Island.
It has been a long standing interests for the Philippines to that they are all vital
for the national security and the economic security. At the same time, they are all critical
to its territorial integrity and security against external intrusions or threats. The claims of
the Philippines on these maritime interests contributes to the country’s marine
transportation, it will also serve as a tourist hotspot that will contribute to the country’s
tourist economy, as well as an active fish breeding areas that can contribute to the
livelihood of people who are dependent on fishing and lastly, energy security that are all
essential for the Philippines in which they relied upon for the sustenance of the country’s
economy and development.
Because of the conflicting interests and claims, there have been disputes that is
along with the history of the South China. The disputes involves the actors of the different
claims within the area and one of them is the Philippines. The Philippines has been
complying with its domestic laws and international laws in the attainment of its maritime
interests in the South China Sea. Other actors like U.S., ASEAN and EU have been part
in maintaining the peaceful environment among state actors involved. But with the
visibility of threats and the lack of agreements or talks within the region, the conflicting
interests of claimant countries has the potential to lead to a serious international disputes.
There are big possibilities that it will happen, because there are already incidents where
countries like Vietnam and China have been involved in confronting ships with one
another. With such small confrontations, even though the Philippines is not directly
involved, it can still affect the maritime security of the country. As the Philippines claim for
its own maritime interests that is essential for the economic and security survival of the
country, with the growing tensions and involvement of overlapping claims gives
implications with the country’s maritime security.
Implications on the Philippine maritime security not only revolves with the
disputes, but also with the following factors like China’s land reclamations, illegal fishing
of Chinese fishermen, use of force and the increasing militarization among the nations.
The following implications affects not only the country’s maritime security, but the peace
and stability of the country is affected as well.
Although the government of the Philippines has defined and implemented laws
that declares its boundaries and jurisdictions over its internal and external waters, these
domestic policies and laws are not enough to support and protect the maritime security
of the country against the external threats. But in the case of the tribunal result which
favored the Philippines, it has been essential in the promotion of our maritime interest in
South China Sea. Also, the Philippines has to rely more on its allies like U.S and other
strategic and enhance defense cooperation in the maintenance of our security especially
within the external waters of the country. And at the same time, it will contribute in
strengthening our military power in effort to defend and protect our maritime interests.
There are challenges and opportunities at the same time for the advancement of
the Philippine interests, but it needs a comprehensive and strategic approach, strong
domestic capability, an effective diplomatic relations among claimants and to sustain a
united politics for strengthening policy implementations.
V. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation
The significance of South China Sea, in terms if geo-strategy as well as having
the vast amount of resources like fish, minerals, and natural gas, maritime interests and
claims from countries like Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China has resulted
into a long-time implications in maritime security, peace and order, stability, that might not
only affect the maritime security of the Philippines but also the security of other claimant
countries as well. As these countries are focused in pursuing and attaining their own
interests, tendencies are the interests of each and every one might overlapped with the
interests of the others, resulting into several tensions and disputes.
Other actors like ASEAN, EU and U.S. have no maritime interest claims but has
their own interests like Freedom of Navigation, to promote Code of Conduct and interests
because the trade and investment in the region.
The Philippines has demonstrated a long-standing interest on the disputed
islands such as the Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands and Kalayaan Group of Islands.
These islands are all vital and critical to the country’s economy and security. But due to
our current strategic location and fragmented setup, it makes us more vulnerable to the
threats especially intrusions.
For the Philippines, the continuing militarization within the region, specifically the
China and its expansionist strategy to enforce its claims, remains a big concern on its
maritime security. The country has become more vocal about the China’s increasing
assertiveness in the South China Sea, by means of the legal process such as the filing of
arbitration, maintaining the military presence of its armed military forces and the
government applies defense diplomacy with China. Not only being vocal but also in order
to promote its own interests, the Philippines has participated and agreed on agreements
and partnerships with strong nations like U.S., Japan, India and even the China.
Over the time, tensions will surely continue for a considerable time. Tensions in
maritime claims and interest provides challenges at the same time opportunities for the
enhancement of the Philippine interests as well as having a negotiable and peaceful
resolution for the disputes.
Therefore, the Philippines needs to improve its comprehensive and strategic
approach in creating or applying policies with regards to the South China Sea considering
that the national interest of the country is at stake and that the flow and actions within the
regional environment will affect how the government prioritize the allocation of its efforts
and resources. The Philippines also needs a strong capability in terms of defense and
law enforcement, might as well in enhancing its science and technology that will help in
developing an active maritime resource development programs. Lastly, the Philippines
must also have programs that will raise the archipelagic consciousness and identity of the
Philippines and all the Filipinos as a united maritime nation.
VI. References

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