y FORUM
A Theoretical Foundation
Keywords
economic damage index (EDI)
epistemology of science
global warming potential (GWP)
impact assessment
ISO 14042
life-cycle assessment (LCA)
Address correspondence to:
Edgar G. Hertwich
Institute for Product Design and
Industrial Ecology Programme
Norwegian University of Science and
Technology
Kolbjørn Hejes vei 2b
7491 Trondheim, Norway
hertwich@design.ntnu.no
http://design.ntnu.no/ansatte/hertwich/
© Copyright 2000 by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Yale
University
Volume 4, Number 1
for Life-Cycle Assessment
Recognizing the Role of Values
in Environmental Decision Making
Edgar G. Hertwich*
Energy & Resources Group
University of California
Berkeley, CA USA
James K. Hammitt
Center for Risk Analysis
Harvard School of Public Health
Boston, MA USA
William S. Pease
School of Public Health
University of California
Berkeley, CA USA
y
Summary
The presence of value judgments in life-cycle impact as-
sessment (LCIA) has been a constant source of contro-
versy. According to a common interpretation, the
international standard on LCIA requires that the assess-
ment methods used in published comparisons be “value
free.” Epistemologists argue that even natural science rests
on “constitutive” and “contextual” value judgments. The
example of the equivalency potential for climate change,
the global warming potential (GWP), demonstrates that
any impact assessment method inevitably contains not only
constitutive and contextual values, but also preference val-
ues. Hence, neither life-cycle assessment (LCA) as a whole
nor any of its steps can be “value free.” As a result, we sug-
gest a more comprehensive definition of objectivity in LCA
that allows arguments about values and their relationship
to facts. We distinguish three types of truth claims: factual
claims, which are based on natural science; normative
claims, which refer to preference values; and relational
claims, which address the proper relation between factual
* Now at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
Journal of Industrial Ecology 13
y FO RUM
knowledge and values. Every assessment
method, even the GWP, requires each
type of claim. Rational arguments can be
made about each type of claim. Factual
truth claims can be assessed using the sci-
entific method. Normative claims can be
based on ethical arguments. The values of
individuals or groups can be elicited using
various social science methods. Relational
claims must follow the rules of logic. Rela-
tional claims are most important for the
development of impact assessment meth-
ods. Because LCAs are conducted to sat-
isfy the need of decision maker s to
consider environmental impacts, relational
claims about impact assessment methods
should refer to this goal. This article intro-
duces conditions that affect environmen-
tal decision making and discusses how
LCA—values and all—can be defended
as a rational response to the challenge of
moving uncertain scientific information
into the policy arena.
y
Introduction
The field of life-cycle assessment (LCA) is
engaged in a long-standing debate about values
and the relationship of values and science in en-
vironmental analysis. LCA, a method used to
comprehensively assess environmental effects of
product choices1 from the generation of the raw
materials to the ultimate disposal of wastes, is
motivated by the desire to authoritatively deter-
mine the least-damaging alternative. Due to the
presence of dissimilar impacts and the need to
focus the analytical effort, preference values al-
ways enter the analysis, and so LCA results are
not as value free as one might wish. Instead of
treating LCA as a scientific tool that is flawed
because of the presence of values, we suggest
that LCA is a decision support tool that not only
aggregates information but passes judgment re-
garding the importance of different environ-
mental impacts. In this article, we develop a
theoretical foundation for LCA that outlines
LCA’s nature, including its inherent power and
14 Journal of Industrial Ecology
Figure 1 The four steps of life-cycle assessment
(LCA) according to SETAC . (Fava et al. 1993).
limitations, and provides a basis for developing
LCA methods and evaluating LCA results. We
focus on impact assessment, the subject of the
current controversy, but similar arguments apply
to allocation and the selection of system bound-
aries in inventory analysis.
LCA is commonly described as a four-step
process, as illustrated in figure 1. In goal defini-
tion and scoping, the problem and the intentions
of the assessment are defined. The units of com-
parison are chosen, as well as the type of impacts
that should be considered. In inventory analysis,
information about emissions and resource use
during the life cycle of the product is collected.
In impact assessment, these emissions are com-
pared and aggregated. The last step, interpreta-
tion and improvement assessment, includes an
assessment of uncertainties and key assumptions,
as well as recommendations for actions.
Figure 2 outlines the structure of life-cycle
impact assessment (LCIA). Impact assessment in
LCA builds on a life-cycle inventory, which lists
the emissions and resource uses that occur at dif-
ferent stages in the life cycle of a product. In the
classification step, these stressors are assigned to
different impact categories. In the characteriza-
tion step, the stressors listed in each category are
compared and aggregated to a single category in-
dicator. In the valuation step, the category indi-
cators are combined to produce an assessment of
overall environmental performance.2
Inventory analysis, classification, and charac-
terization are commonly treated as “objective”
scientific or technical analysis, and have been
 FO RUM y

Figure 2 Life-cycle impact assessment is commonly characterized as a three-step procedure that

determines the overall environmental performance of a product based on a life-cycle inventory. In the
classification step, similar stressors are assigned to the same impact categories. In the characterization step,
the stressors in a single category are compared and aggregated. In the valuation step, category indicators
are compared to each other. The global warming potential (GWP) and the human toxicity potential (HTP)
are characterization methods for the categories of climate change and toxic effects in humans.

the focus of method development. There has
been relatively little research addressing the
LCA steps that are seen as value laden. Only re-
cently have researchers started to more system-
atically address value questions in inventory
analysis as well as in the valuation and charac-
terization steps of impact assessment (Finnveden
1997; Heijungs 1998; Hofstetter 1998; Newell
1998; Tukker 1998; Lundie and Huppes 1999;
Scheringer 1999).
We argue that the dichotomy of value-free and
value-laden parts of impact assessment is artificial
and hampers the development of characterization
methods. Characterization methods invariably in-
corporate preference values, as we will show in the
example of the global warming potential (GWP).
More and more, LCA is using impact assessment
methods that combine characterization and valu-
ation, such as the environmental priority sytem
(EPS) and the Eco-Indicator 99 (Goedkoop and
Spriensma 1999; Steen 1999). If LCA is seen not
as a disinterested aggregation of facts, but as part
of the decision-making process, consistent criteria
for the evaluation of LCA methods and results can
be developed. These criteria, as well as the meth-
ods and results developed in accordance with
them, can be defended as objective because they are
developed in a process of intelligent, systematic debate.
They are rational because they better meet the needs of
the decision maker, that is, they are superior for
achieving the goals of the assessment.3 We begin
our analysis by revisiting the values debate and
showing how values and science are inseparably
intertwined. We argue that the presence of value
judgments does not impede our ability to reason
about product choice or to compare different en-
vironmental stressors. We must distinguish among
arguments about facts, arguments about what we
should care about, and arguments about how facts
relate to our concerns. Next, we investigate the

Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA 15

y FO RUM
specific conditions of environmental decision
making. We argue that the public nature of
environmental problems and the complexity and
uncertainty of environmental processes funda-
mentally constrain how comparative assessments
are conducted. Any environmental assessment is
necessarily imperfect (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990;
Scheringer 1999). Ultimately, arguments in life-
cycle assessment should refer back to LCA’s pur-
pose in decision making. An imperfect assessment
is more likely than no assessment at all to lead to
better-informed decisions.
The Values Debate
LCA has been developed as an analytical tool
to address the environmental impacts of products
or services. In policy making and corporate deci-
sion making, LCA results have been treated as
facts. In recent years, however, the LCA commu-
nity has come to realize that life-cycle assessment
involves value judgments. Value judgments were
at first acknowledged as part of the “valuation”
stage of impact assessment (Fava et al. 1993). In
this last step of impact assessment, the equiva-
lency potentials representing different impact cat-
egories are combined to form a single indicator of
environmental harm. It is now acknowledged that
value judgments are also present in other LCA
stages. “LCIA is not the strictly technical process
even in the traditional classification and charac-
terization stages (Owens et al. 1997, 6).” Value
judgments are necessary to define different impact
categories and to develop equivalency potentials.
The presence of value judgments, especially in
the characterization step of impact assessment,
poses a significant problem for LCA researchers.
After recognizing the presence of value judg-
ments in the categories of eutrophication, acid
deposition, photochemical oxidants, and toxic
effects, Owens and colleagues (1997, 66) assert
that “aggregation from a number of equivalency
models is not technically valid.” In their view,
this lack of technical validity impedes the ability
of LCA to establish meaningful differences
among different products.
The current draft of the international stan-
dard for life-cycle impact assessment developed
by the International Standards Organization
(ISO 14042) allows the use of equivalency po-
16 Journal of Industrial Ecology
tentials that contain value judgments only for
comparative assessments internal to a company
or for public statements about a single product
that are not comparative. 4 Published compari-
sons of different products, so-called comparative
assertions, must be based on assessment methods
that are “scientifically and technically valid.”
The aggregation of category results into a single
indicator through a valuation step is not allowed
for comparative assertions.
One of us (Hertwich) has attended a negoti-
ating session for the standard, at which time it
was apparent that most delegates defined scien-
tific validity as the absence of value judgments.
At one point, the head of an important delega-
tion even demanded that LCA results be repro-
ducible across different cultures. The demand for
scientific validity paradoxically ensures that
many established impact assessment methods are
ruled out as unscientific. According to Udo de
Haes and colleagues (1999), a lack of scientific
validity also affects the human toxicity potential,
a key equivalency potential for impacts of toxic
releases on human health. Because of this re-
quirement, the consideration of many important
environmental concerns is not allowed when de-
cisions are to be based on the ISO standard.
The negotiations for international LCA stan-
dards received much attention and intense in-
dustry participation because of the potential
trade implications of the standards. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) refers to the ISO
standard for the development of methods to dis-
tinguish between justified environmental poli-
cies and those that constitute nontariff trade
barriers and, therefore, violate the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This
reliance on the ISO standard by the WTO
means that product policies set by national gov-
ernments must use the ISO 14040 series. With
the present standard, product policy is not al-
lowed to use characterization methods that do
not pass the test of scientific and technical va-
lidity as it is currently defined.
In a comment to the delegates negotiating
ISO 14042, Hertwich and Pease (1998) argued
that it was inappropriate to limit the use of infor-
mation by excluding information that is not
solely justifiable by natural science. The exclu-
sion of information relating to toxic emissions,

for example, will invariably lead to undesirable
decision outcomes. Hertwich and Pease criti-
cized language that calls for the minimization of
value judgments and argued that LCA should be
based on a framework that integrates scientific
and normative elements.
The chair of the ISO committee on LCA
standards along with a number of key delegates
responded to these criticisms by arguing that the
LCA standards presented a good and workable
basis for life-cycle assessment (Marsmann et al.
1999).
Hertwich & Pease express the concern
that the 14042 document imposes ex-
treme constraints and limitations on
LCA and LCIA, especially for the case of
comparative assertions. They character-
ize the language used in the committee
draft as being natural science biased and
accuse the committee of ignoring in-
sights from academic disciplines that ad-
dress value questions.
In fact, much of the effort of this docu-
ment has been to separate natural sci-
ence-based analysis from the use of social
science based value judgment. The mem-
bers of the subcommittee are well famil-
iar with the advances in social science in
developing valuation methods, and rec-
ognize the need for such techniques in
decision making and communication.
However, we are also very much aware
that the application of these techniques
by different groups can yield dissimilar
results, due to differences in priorities,
opinions and social values. When com-
paring the environmental performance of
two products, applying the value system
of one group to the decision making of
another group (as for example, in inter-
nationally traded goods) is inappropriate
and discredits the outcome of an LCA.
The argument of Marsmann and colleagues is
based on the assumption that natural science
and value judgments can be neatly separated.
Specifically, it assumes that value judgments can
be divided into (1) normative statements that
reflect the goal of the analysis and are defined by
the client at the outset, and (2) judgments that
Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA
FO RUM y
are used during the final “interpretation and
weighting” step of impact assessment. This as-
sumption is wrong, because value judgments en-
ter the method development of category-specific
equivalency potentials. This can be demon-
strated by analyzing the GWP, an equivalency
potential that the ISO negotiators consider to be
scientifically and technically valid.
The GWP was developed to compare and ag-
gregate the emissions of greenhouse gases for the
purpose of developing a policy response to global
climate change. The GWP is based on the incre-
mental infrared (IR) absorption that results from
an increase in the concentration of a GHG. To
calculate the GWP, one needs to develop sce-
narios for the future emissions of GHGs. The
IPCC assumes constant concentrations of
GHGs. Because the lifetimes of the GHGs are
not equal, one also needs to decide on how to
compare the increase in IR absorption occurring
at different times. The official GWP integrates
the IR absorption across time up to 20, 100, or
500 years and ignores increased IR absorption
that occurs after this time horizon (Hammitt et
al. 1996; Schimel et al. 1996).
We use the idea of a cause-consequence
chain, or—as the Society for Environmental
Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC) has called
it—an impact web, to investigate the character-
ization of greenhouse gas emissions (figure 3).
Following Holdren (1980), we have divided the
causal chain into five elements (Hertwich et al.
1997). The first element of an impact chain is a
stressor (emission or resource use). The second
element is an insult, a change of natural material
flows or a disruption of the natural state, for ex-
ample, an increased amount of sulfate particles
in the air. The third element is an environmen-
tal stress, for example, a sulfate dose presented to
our lungs or the decrease of a lake pH value in
response to acid rain. The fourth element is a
consequence resulting from the stress, for ex-
ample, respiratory disease in response to sulfate
particle exposure or fish death in response to
acidification. The last element is the value lost,
for example, the treatment cost and lost work
days resulting from a respiratory disease or the
decrease in the recreational value of a lake that
can no longer be used for fishing. The impact
web, as outlined in figure 3, consists of many dif-
17
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Figure 3 The impact web describing the connection between stressor and value lost, based on the
cause-consequence chain proposed by Holdren (1980). The left side shows the terms that are used to
describe an impact web. The right side presents the example of acid precipitation and a number of its
impacts. Each level in the web can be described as being caused by the previous level, and the relationship
is described by natural or social processes.

ferent impact chains that result in different types
of impacts, which occur at different times in dif-
ferent locations, and which affect different indi-
viduals, populations, or ecosystems.
In the cause-consequence chain, the GWP
aggregates emissions at the level of “stress” (fig-
ure 4). The selection of this endpoint of analysis
is not universally accepted. The economic dam-
age index (EDI), a proposal by Hammitt and
colleagues (1996), assesses the whole impact
chain down to the level of “value lost” to com-
pare different greenhouse gases (figure 4). This
proposal evaluates the incremental increase in
temperature and then postulates a certain func-
tional relationship between the level and speed
of temperature increase and the resulting dam-
age, based on integrated assessment models. The
model discounts future effects to compare effects
across time. Hammitt and colleagues argue that
this model is more appropriate than the GWP
because it is closer to the subject of our concern,
the damages resulting from an increase in GHG
concentration. In addition, this model uses stan-
dard discounting instead of accounting for the
contribution of GHGs to global warming in 99
years, but not in 101 years.
Value judgments enter the development of a
global climate change indicator at two points, at
least. The first is the selection of a basis for the
comparison. This selection relates to the goals of
the analysis as well as to the standards we impose
on scientific evidence to be admissible to the
analysis. The EDI, as previously mentioned, is
closer to our subject of concern, the damage re-
sulting from climate change, and therefore better
reflects the goals of the analysis. Scientists have
less confidence, however, in the relationship be-
tween climate forcing and physical damage than
they have in the relationship between climate
forcing and greenhouse gas emissions. The choice
between those two indicators is therefore a trade-
off between scientific reliability and the ability of
the indicator to reflect our concerns (Hammitt
1999). The second point at which value judg-
ments enter the analysis is in the treatment of
impacts occurring at different times. Howarth and

18 Journal of Industrial Ecology


Figure 4 Conceptualization of the climate change
impact chain following the proposal for the cause-
consequence chain by Holdren (1980). The global
warming potential (GWP) is based on a modeling
of the chain up to the stress level, whereas the
economic damage index (EDI) takes the conse-
quences of the stress into account. The two
assessment methods differ in how they treat effects
distributed across time.
Norgaard (1992) have investigated the question
of the timing of climate change impacts using so-
cial welfare analysis, an economic technique de-
veloped to assess the desirability of changes in the
distribution of wealth in a society. They built an
overlapping generations model and constructed a
social welfare function (indicating the desirability
of varying distributions of welfare) for different
generations. In their model, the discount rate de-
pends on the allocation of property rights to the
different generations, that is, the level of welfare
achieved by these generations. This shows that
the choice of a discount rate (and, by implication,
the choice of a discounting mechanism) depends
on how much we value future generations.
The GWP presents only a special case of the
comparison of environmental stressors. No two
environmental stressors are equal in their
mechanism of action, local extent, time profile,
or precise endpoint. Any comparison of envi-
ronmental stressors that takes the form of an
equivalency potential necessarily requires a nor-
mative basis, consisting of value judgments
about what the critical properties are and what
the desirable (spatial and temporal) distribution
of impacts across society is.
To avoid ruling out well-established methods
such as the GWP and the ozone depletion poten-
tial (ODP), ISO delegates now distinguish be-
Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA
FO RUM y
tween value judgments and technical assump-
tions. “The choices regarding the GWPs and
ODPs are regarded as technical assumptions,
whereas the adding up of different types of disabil-
ity is regarded as a value choice” (Udo de Haes
1999). 5 The division of value judgments into
value judgments and technical assumptions is ar-
bitrary. The definition of an assumption depends
on the purpose of the analysis. It is hard to argue
that the selection of a basis of comparison for the
GWP is a purely technical assumption whereas
the selection of a basis of comparison for the hu-
man toxicity potential constitutes a value choice.
This artificial division should be abandoned,
because it is misleading. It does not provide use-
ful guidance for the development or application
of characterization methods. The choice of a dis-
count mechanism and rate, regarded as techni-
cal assumptions by ISO, are value judgments
embedded in economic analysis (Howarth and
Norgaard 1992; Schelling 1995). The whole
language of the standard should be reconsidered
to avoid the bias toward natural science and to
provide public access to information (Hertwich
and Pease 1999).
The values debate raises important epistemo-
logical issues. Some arguments in the debate
make assertions about the character of science,
which is an important subject in the philosophy
of science. The position of LCA relative to sci-
ence is also of concern. The debate about the
ISO standard is about standards for evidence and
for arguments in LCA. In the more detailed in-
vestigation of these issues in the next section,
we argue that a more differentiated definition of
objectivity is more reasonable than the one used
in the current debate.
A Basis for Reasoning in LCA
“Scientific objectivity requires simply the
possibility of intelligible debate over the
merits of rival paradigms.”
Israel Scheffler6
The values debate in LCA is significant be-
cause it draws into question what LCA is, what
criteria are employed to evaluate its results and
its methods, and how arguments are made.
Whereas LCA is seen primarily as a collection
19
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and aggregation of environmentally relevant
facts related to the production, use, and disposal
of a product, the presence of value choices
makes it impossible to develop LCA methods
based only on scientific criteria. The use of val-
ues in the characterization step has been re-
jected by many LCA method developers and the
ISO committee because it would undermine the
authority and credibility of LCA results. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, science offers
the only basis for making objective claims, and
science is conceived as being value free. If the
argument in the previous section of this article is
correct and value judgments enter any compari-
son of environmental stressors, can we still claim
that LCA results are objective or credible? Does
the presence of value judgments inescapably un-
dermine our ability to make comparative envi-
ronmental assertions?
In the next section, we will take a careful
look at the issue of scientific objectivity and ex-
amine our ability to subject value judgments to
a systematic, rational analysis. We will show
how a more comprehensive definition of ratio-
nality and a more careful distinction of the types
of claims made in LCA can provide a basis for
theory choice and method development. LCA
can be turned into a rational and largely objec-
tive enterprise as long as its methods and argu-
ments are consistent with its goal.
Scientific Objectivity
The proponents of the ISO life-cycle impact
assessment standard view natural science as being
free of value judgments (Owens et al. 1997;
Marsmann et al. 1999). This view is in conflict
with both the position of philosophers of science
and the observation of historians and sociologists
of science. The proposition that science is based
on or influenced by values is now almost univer-
sally accepted by philosophers of science. The
hotly contested question is whether, given this
presence of values, objective knowledge is still
possible. This is the realism versus antirealism de-
bate. With their so-called strong program of anti-
realism, social constructivists assert that science is
purely a socially constructed activity. According
to social constructivists, there is no way to distin-
guish among competing theories (Klee 1997).
20 Journal of Industrial Ecology
The idea that values play a role in science
goes back to the underdetermination thesis fa-
mously developed by the Scottish philosopher
David Hume in 1742 (1978). All forms of this
thesis insist that multiple, mutually incompat-
ible theories can enjoy the same relation to a
given body of evidence. One cannot derive a
genuinely universal statement from any finite
set of observations. Hume’s work heavily influ-
enced the prominent philosopher of science
Karl Popper, who insisted that a positive belief
in a theory could never be rational (Laudan
1998). Values that influence the choice among
competing theories include consistency with
other theories held to be true, simplicity, and ex-
planatory power (Lycan 1998; Sober 1998).
The influence of values on science receives
even more attention in more recent philosophi-
cal descriptions of science. According to Kuhn’s
(1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scien-
tists adhere to a paradigm that consists of the
theories, experimental techniques, and common
beliefs characteristic of their scientific disci-
pline. Scientific revolutions occur when an es-
tablished paradigm is insufficient to explain
available data and an alternative paradigm that
addresses the flaws of the existing paradigm
emerges. The adherence to a paradigm is value
based. Kuhn maintains that “there is no method
of inquiry that stands outside any and all para-
digms” (Klee 1997, 141–147).
The cardinal role of values in science is
nicely illustrated by the following example de-
scribed by philosopher Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(1991, 57):
There are methodological value judg-
ments in science and . . . they substan-
tially affect scientific conclusions. The
case of physicist Wolfgang Pauli’s postu-
lation of the neutrino illustrates this
point. Pauli emphasized the value of in-
ternal consistency with conservation
principles and therefore postulated the
existence of the neutrino before it was
observed. Other physicists of his time
emphasized a different value—external
consistency with principles demanding
empirical proof—and therefore rejected
the neutrino.

Clearly, the claim that any type of science is
value free cannot sustain scrutiny. It is, hence,
also misplaced in the current debate about val-
ues in LCA. This raises the question whether
there is a better definition of scientific objectiv-
ity, one that allows science to be objective. An-
other question, raised for the purpose of our
investigation, is how such a definition could be
useful in distinguishing good arguments about
LCA methods and results from bad ones. This
definition will have to better account for the
problematic, but important role of values.
Instead of lumping all values together, we
find it more important to distinguish among dif-
ferent types of values and their roles in science
and other human endeavors. In her discussion of
value judgments and scientific objectivity in risk
analysis, Shrader-Frechette (1991) distinguished
among three different types of values: constitu-
tive values, contextual values, and bias values.
Bias values are really a special case of preference
values, which are important in decision making
but have no role in scientific investigations, ex-
cept as an object of study.
Constitutive Values
The acceptance of a scientific theory or para-
digm as the basis for further scientific investiga-
tion is a constitutive or methodological value
judgment; the values that underlie theory choice
are simplicity, consistency with other theories,
and explanatory power. “Constitutive or method-
ological value judgments are an integral part of
science, since scientists make constitutive value
judgments whenever they follow one method-
ological rule rather than another. Even collecting
data requires use of constitutive value judgments
because one must make evaluative assumptions
about what data to collect and what to ignore,
how to interpret the data and how to avoid erro-
neous interpretations” (Shrader-Frechette 1991,
41). Perception and experimentation do not pro-
vide us with pure facts; knowledge, values, theo-
ries, and beliefs we hold are important in
determining what we perceive.
Contextual Values
“Assessors subscribe to particular contextual
values whenever they include personal, social,
cultural, or philosophical emphasis in their judg-
Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA
FO RUM y
ments” (Shrader-Frechette 1991, 40). Contex-
tual values often enter the choice of one assump-
tion, data set, or estimation method over its
alternatives. Assumptions are influenced by
what is commonly accepted in a discipline and
region; the selection of data depends on finan-
cial constraints as well as the availability of sec-
ondary or proxy data sets and familiarity with
them. The latter again depends on the cultural
and institutional context.7
Preference Values
Preference values are the values that reflect
what we care about. They could be preferences
for different types of consequences or preferences
for procedures or ways of acting. Preference val-
ues are what economists try to assess through
valuation methods such as contingent valuation
or hedonic pricing. Preference values reflect not
only the utility of various environmental goods,
but also moral values, such as the concern for
equity or for future generations, or esthetic val-
ues, such as the appreciation for certain land-
scapes, plants, or animals. These are the values
that LCA refers to in the valuation stage to trade
off different categories of environmental impact
such as global warming and acidification.
Constitutive and contextual value judgments
are epistemological in nature; that is, they relate
to our ideas of how the world works. Preference
values concern our ideas of what is good or bad
for ourselves or for society. Preference values
have no place in natural science, and if they do
enter scientific analysis they are called bias val-
ues to indicate that they are undesirable.
Scientific objectivity is clearly not defined by
the absence of value judgments, and scientific re-
sults do not represent infallible truths. In what
sense is science objective? It is objective in the
sense that scientists engage in a rational process of
testing and improving their theories. Theories are
tested in experiments or evaluated according to
the rules of logic. Science is characterized by a
critical debate, and its theories are updated in the
face of new evidence (Hertwich 1999). Social
constructivists dispute the privileged status of sci-
entific knowledge and the possibility of scientific
objectivity, but we take a middle path between the
social constructivists and the nineteenth-century
21
y FO RUM
positivists. Like Klee (1997) and Shrader-
Frechette (1991), we recognize that values and so-
cial conditions influence science, but we believe
that scientific progress nonetheless occurs. Even if
specific theoretical choices are not uniquely de-
fined by experiments, “not all theoretical alterna-
tives are equal,” as Klee asserts. Coherence with
other theories and further (observational) impli-
cations of alternative theories serve as legitimate
criteria for theory choice (Klee 1997, 177–178).
The Objectivity of LCA
Science does contain values, but not prefer-
ence values. LCA, however, requires both sci-
ence and preference values because it not only
describes, but also evaluates aspects of reality.
The decision of how to treat uncertainty in the
characterization step, for example, is based on
preference values. In the previous section of this
article we argued that science is objective be-
cause it has procedures and criteria that allow us
to evaluate the merit of competing theories. In
making arguments about LCA, we should distin-
guish among three different types of truth claims.
The objectivity of each of these three types of
truth claims needs to be investigated separately.
1. Factual claims are concerned with facts.
They are scientific claims and can be
evaluated according to the rules and stan-
dards established in science. Factual
claims can relate to either the natural
world or the social world. Examples of fac-
tual claims in LCA are claims regarding
the fate or persistence of chemicals or the
effect of greenhouse gases on the global
energy balance. Factual claims relating to
social science may be relevant for eliciting
a population’s preference values.
2. Normative claims are claims about what is
good or bad, about what should or should
not be done. They fall into the domain of
politics, law, religion, and moral philoso-
phy. Examples of normative claims in LCA
are claims regarding the rights of future
generations or nonhuman species. Norma-
tive claims can be based on moral reason-
ing. Values can be elicited using various
valuation methods (Hertwich 1999).
22 Journal of Industrial Ecology
3. Relational claims are claims about how
facts relate to values. These claims are the
domain of policy analysis and decision
analysis. They can often be evaluated ac-
cording to the rules of logic. At the mini-
mum, a reasoned discussion of these
claims—appealing to similar, accepted
cases—is possible. Because relational
claims often determine the structure of as-
sessments, they may be the most impor-
tant claims in impact assessment.
LCA inevitably uses each type of truth claim.
The following examples illustrate the usefulness
of distinguishing among the three different types
of truth claims.
Factual claims are made in LCA whenever
scientific results or models are used. The human
toxicity potential (HTP), for example, makes
factual claims about the fate and partitioning of
chemicals. It makes claims about the mecha-
nisms by which pollutants accumulate in expo-
sure pathways. These claims can be tested by
experiment. An interesting argument about a
factual claim has been the “flux-pulse” problem
for HTP. Guinée and Heijungs (1993) find it
normatively more appropriate to model a pulse
release representing the emissions during the
short time in which a product is manufactured.
Because dynamic modeling of pollution fate is
mathematically difficult, however, they prefer
the simpler steady-state model. They argued that
normalization by a reference chemical takes care
of the time dimension. This argument was con-
tested until Heijungs (1995) and Scheringer
(1999) showed that the steady-state model ap-
propriately accounts for the time-integrated ex-
posure resulting from an emissions pulse. The
flux-pulse problem was basically resolved with a
mathematical proof.
Normative claims concern preference values.
The assertion that we should take the number of
affected individuals into account when evaluating
the impacts of toxic chemicals, for example, is a
normative claim.8 Another example of a norma-
tive claim is the choice of a discounting mecha-
nism and a discount rate for comparing impacts
across time.9 The types of arguments we can make
about normative claims are different from the
types of arguments we can make about factual or

relational claims. We can argue that normative
claims are reasonable and that they are consistent
with other, well-established normative judgments.
We can test the consistency of a set of normative
claims.10 Normative claims, however, cannot be
tested in the same manner as a scientific theory.
Relational claims concern the relationship of
facts and values, especially the relevancy of facts
to our values and the consistency of the math-
ematical relationship between the two. LCA
makes a relational claim whenever it says that if
we are concerned about a specific endpoint such
as human health, we should care about one stres-
sor more than another. Such a claim is based on
normative judgments about what constitutes rel-
evant criteria for representing a specific end-
point, and it contains factual information about
the different stressors. A relational claim can be
expressed as an argument that one method is
better than another method based on various cri-
teria for method choice. We would argue that
the EDI is a better indicator for climate change
than the GWP because it measures an endpoint
closer to our concern. This claim is based on
constitutive value judgments about theory
choice (Sober 1998) regarding the consistency of
intertemporal trade-offs and the relevancy of the
endpoint.
Each of these types of truth claims can be
evaluated objectively. This allows us to make ar-
guments about the merit of different assessment
methods. Not all theoretical alternatives are
equivalent. The difference between LCA and
natural science, however, is that in LCA there
are multiple legitimate sets of preference values
and alternative, logically consistent ways of
making judgments about facts (Renn 1998).
The Validity of LCA Methods
The ISO standard uses the terms “scientific
validity” and “technical validity” to describe the
acceptability of LCA methods. These terms are
useful only if they are defined in a way so that
“valid” LCA methods are objectively better
than “invalid” methods for informing environ-
mental decisions. We would like to suggest that
scientific validity should refer to the validity of
factual claims and technical validity to the va-
lidity of relational claims in LCA. To ensure
Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA
FO RUM y
symmetry, it may be desirable to also introduce a
requirement of “normative validity.”
An LCA method is scientifically valid if it
uses scientific models and data in a way that is
not in conflict with scientific understanding. It
requires both that factual claims be identified as
such and that they be valid as scientific state-
ments. The claim that the emission of 1 kg of
methane (CH4) is as bad as the emission of 24.5
kg of carbon dioxide (CO2) is not a factual claim,
as it cannot be evaluated by the scientific
method. Rather, it is a relational claim that rests
on factual claims regarding the lifetime and IR
absorption of the gases and normative claims re-
garding the relevance of increased IR radiation
and the rights of future generations. The defini-
tion of “scientifically valid” suggested here to re-
solve the problems with the ISO 14042 standard
would, for example, allow the GWP to be de-
fined as scientifically valid because the models
and the data used for its determination are scien-
tifically valid. The EDI is also scientifically valid,
but it reflects different normative claims. The re-
quirement of scientific validity does not uniquely
define the proper impact assessment method.
Technical validity refers to the validity of re-
lational claims. A method lacks technical valid-
ity if it can be shown to be logically flawed or if it
does not appropriately account for the normative
elements it purports to include. Most of the issues
that arise in LCA method development are tech-
nical issues, not scientific issues. The questions of
what elements should be included in a method
and how they relate to each other are technical.
“Normative validity” could ensure that LCA
method development only takes into account
normative claims that reflect reasonable prefer-
ence values. There are simply too many alterna-
tive analysis methods that would need to be
developed if every imaginable normative claim
required attention. The approaches to norma-
tive arguments in LCA presented by Scheringer
(1999) and Heijungs (1998) are important start-
ing points to further develop this requirement.
In defining requirements for LCA methods,
it is important to take into account the charac-
ter of environmental problems and the limita-
tions of social decision making. These factors
define, and limit, the relational and normative
claims possible in LCA.
23
y FO RUM
The Conditions of
Environmental Decision Making
Life-cycle assessment is a decision support
tool that addresses environm ental problems.
The development of LCA needs to consider
both the character of environmental problems
and the principal and cognitive constraints to
human decision making. Together, these ele-
ments define the conditions of environmental
decision making that any assessment method in-
variably encounters.
1. Environmental effects are, in the terminol-
ogy of economics, external effects, and en-
vironmental goods, such as clean air and a
stable climate, are public goods, that is,
nonrival, nonexclusive goods (Latin 1982;
Tietenberg 1992). Environmental deci-
sions are, therefore, decisions that concern
society at large, not just individuals.
2. Social decision making is problematic be-
cause competing individual preferences
cannot, in general, be reconciled to pro-
duce universally agreed-upon social pref-
erences. In addressing the problem of
ranking different objectives, Arrow
(1951) has shown that it is impossible to
construct generally acceptable group
rankings without being “dictatorial”; that
is, one member of a group will always
dominate (rule over) other members of
the group. Similar problems affect the
more difficult task of constructing a social
welfare function (Tresch 1981, 25–26).
3. The overwhelming complexity of environ-
mental processes implies that (1) we have
only a limited understanding of the pro-
cesses that lead to deleterious consequences;
(2) a mapping and utilization of even that
limited understanding is infeasible for indi-
vidual assessments; (3) any assessment will
be data intensive and require the combina-
tion of knowledge from different fields.
4. Where scientific models are available to
describe causal links between stressors and
impacts, data used in the models are often
uncertain. Given this uncertainty, deter-
ministic statements about environmental
impacts are not possible. How impact as-
sessment addresses uncertainty depends
24 Journal of Industrial Ecology
on preferences for strategies to address un-
certainty (e.g., utility functions, or the
Maximin principle) and attitudes toward
risk (e.g., risk aversion).
5. The trade-off between different objectives
and the judgment under uncertainty are
affected by systematic flaws in human rea-
soning. These flaws have become known
as “bounded rationality” (Simon 1957)
and “framing effects” (Kahneman et al.
1982). Empirical investigations show that
they are pervasive and affect individual
and group decision making (Kleindorfer et
al. 1993). These factors need to be consid-
ered in developing environmental deci-
sion support.
Latin (1982, 234) reviews uncertainty and
data gaps as well as the cognitive limitations of
the human mind that prevent us from under-
standing environmental repercussions of con-
sumption choices in all their complexity and
concludes:
The ideal allocation of environmental
resources, the one that perfectly in-
formed and perfectly rational consumers
would select, is not only unattainable but
indeterminable.
A perfect assessment is both practically and
theoretically impossible. The consequences of
environmental stressors cannot be described un-
ambiguously in terms of their extent, location,
and timing. Even if such a description were pos-
sible, the large number of different impacts
would pose a challenge to the assessment of
trade-offs. An ideal valuation process is impos-
sible because of the nature of social decision
making and the limitations of human judgment.
These limitations have important implications
for LCA. The fact that the environment is a
public good justifies the development of LCA
based on public attitudes and concerns, as well
as the publication of both definitive and specu-
lative knowledge regarding environmental im-
pacts. The impossibility of identifying a single
socially preferred alternative suggests that we
need to tolerate and accommodate conflicting
goals and interests. Discussions of both Arrow’s
“impossibility” theorem (Sen 1995) and the

limitations of our cognitive abilities (Slovic et
al. 1985) point to the necessity of an open,
democratic process.
The specific characteristics of LCA are a re-
flection of the general conditions of environ-
mental decision making. Both indicate that
technical analysis cannot produce decision out-
comes: It can inform, but not replace the deci-
sion maker. No uniquely correct answers exist
and a mediation among competing normative
claims is necessary. As two reviewers of this ar-
ticle pointed out, these conclusions have already
been reached in similar debates about other en-
vironmental assessment tools, such as risk analy-
sis (Jasanoff 1993; PCCRARM 1997; Renn
1998) and the valuation of ecosystems (O’Hara
1996; Daily 1997).
A Rationale for LCA
The constraints outlined in the previous sec-
tion raise the question of why we bother to con-
duct LCAs at all. LCAs are conducted to satisfy
the aspiration of decision makers to consider the en-
vironment in their decision making. Most of the
decisions that LCA are meant to inform are de-
cisions that are made anyway, regardless of
whether an LCA has been conducted or not.
The information presented in an LCA may in-
fluence a decision’s outcome, but not the fact
that a decision needs to be made. The inevita-
bility of a decision and the supplementary nature
of LCA speak directly to some of the issues
raised in the previous section and have impor-
tant repercussions for the design of impact as-
sessment methods.
Decisions made without the benefits of infor-
mation provided by LCA are not informed about
potential environmental “side effects.” Unin-
formed decisions are more likely to be
nonoptimal to many or all of the individuals af-
fected. Informed decisions, even if they are im-
perfect as Arrow’s theorem suggests, are likely to
be better (in the view of most, if not all indi-
viduals) than uninformed decisions.
The problem here is that because of the com-
plexity of environmental (and economic) pro-
cesses, the lack of data, and the pervasive
uncertainty, an analysis may recommend an al-
ternative that further analysis may show to be
Hertwich, Hammitt, and Pease, A Theoretical Foundation for LCA
FO RUM y
nonoptimal. It is the decision, not the analysis,
that is inconsistent with our values or “the
facts,” and the analysis is just a step leading to
the decision. The question then is whether or
not analysis reduces the likelihood of the deci-
sion being inconsistent with our values or the
magnitude of this inconsistency. Even if the
analysis is not able to identify one single superior
alternative, or if, by accident, the analysis rec-
ommends a choice that is only nearly optimal,
not totally optimal, the analysis may still be jus-
tified. It is a question of degree of information
that can be offered and of whether the decision
outcome informed by analysis is better than a
decision outcome not informed by analysis, not
whether the decision outcome is perfect.
The realities of decision making allow us to
put LCA in perspective. We are looking neither
for universal agreement nor for perfect analysis
that reflects the minute details of environmental
processes, but for an improvement of the current
decision-making process that often does not in-
corporate environment considerations. This im-
provement makes LCA both worthwhile and a
manageable task.
Conclusions
As a decision support tool, life-cycle assess-
ment invariably combines preference values and
science. It is the very purpose of a decision sup-
port tool to allow the decision maker to choose in
accordance with her preferences. LCIA presents
a comparison and aggregation of different envi-
ronmental stressors that utilize scientific data and
models. The use of such scientific knowledge
does not imply that the comparison itself is a re-
sult of natural science. Even if, due to the pres-
ence of normative elements, LCA is not a strictly
scientific tool, LCA can still be objective.
Like science, LCA can be objective in the
sense that arguments for method choice fulfill
clear criteria and follow rules deemed as reason-
able by the community involved in the develop-
ment of this tool. It can be objective not in the
sense that all arguments or methods have the
same standing, but that we can distinguish be-
tween valid and invalid arguments.11
To investigate the merit of impact assessment
methods and results, it is necessary to distinguish
25
y FO RUM
among different types of truth claims. Norma-
tive claims should be expressed explicitly and
have some amount of credible support. Factual
claims relating to data and scientific models can
be evaluated according to the criteria used in
science. Relational claims about the proper
combination of factual information and values
in the analysis must follow the rules of logic.
Whereas the approach suggested here can
turn LCA method development and application
into objective exercises, its reliance on prefer-
ences and the conditions of environmental deci-
sion making preclude the existence of uniquely
correct methods and results. Competing claims
of the environmental superiority of alternative
products are therefore permissible. One reviewer
suggested that this creates a “tower of Babel”
problem for LCA, and that the public would lose
confidence when confronted with competing as-
sessments. We contend that distinguishing
among the three types of claims and evaluating
the validity of each allows us to better discrimi-
nate between good and bad LCA methods and
results. In this way, fewer results will be deemed
valid than if the focus is limited to the scientific
aspects, and divergences will be easier to explain.
We have shown that the distinction between
value-free and value-based elements of LCA is a
false dichotomy. Value choices are present in all
parts of an LCA. The presence of preference val-
ues does not disqualify any method; rather, it is a
necessary feature of any decision support tool. In
the place of this false dichotomy, we propose a
distinction among factual claims, relational
claims, and normative claims. Different criteria
must be used to evaluate the validity of each type
of claim. We have also introduced fundamental
conditions of environmental decision making:
the societal nature of environmental problems,
the impossibility of ideal societal decisions, the
complexity and uncertainty of environmental
processes, and the imperfections of individual
reasoning. These conditions are unavoidable and
need to be taken into account when developing
LCA methods. Because it is the overall goal of
LCA to improve environmental decision mak-
ing, we suggest that the ultimate criterion for
method choice is whether a given method is bet-
ter than its alternatives in improving the deci-
sion.
26 Journal of Industrial Ecology
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Cathy Koshland,
Tom McKone, Martin Scheringer, Sarah
Trainor, the editor, and four reviewers for help-
ful comments. Funding was provided by the En-
vironmental Defense Fund and the Norwegian
Research Council.
Notes
1. LCA can and has been applied to other things in-
cluding services, processes, and facilities. We re-
fer to its use with product choices in this article
for purposes of brevity.
2. We use the older SETAC term valuation over the
term weighting used by ISO, because we find it more
appropriate. Weighting does not capture multi-
criteria decision making methods (Guitouni and
Martel 1998) or (nonlinear) utility functions
(Raiffa 1968), which decision analysts might see as
the most appropriate tools for this step.
3. In this article, the term “rational” comes from
economics and decision analysis and means best
suited to meet the goals. The term “objectiv e”
comes from the philosophy of science and means
subject to reasoning . Martin Scheringer offered us
the following more specific definition: A state-
ment is objective if it is based on transparent and re-
producible methods and rules, so that anyone who
starts at the same point and uses the same methods
and rules will end up with the same statement. This
assumes that there is agreement on the appropriate
methods and rules. If there is not, these have to be
subjected to the same process. Because LCA is a
tool designed to meet the goal of protecting the
environment, what is objectively better in LCA
method development is necessarily rational.
4. The International Standards Organization (ISO)
has developed four standards on LCA: ISO 14040
defines LCA generally, ISO 14041 addresses in-
ventory analysis, ISO 14042 addresses impact as-
sessment, and ISO 14043 addresses normalization
weighting and the interpretation of LCA results.
5. Without this distinction, the standard as it is now
written would prohibit the use of any currently
available impact assessment method for compara-
tive assertions and thus make it impossible to
publish the results of ISO-compliant LCAs. The
use of LCA in setting product policy could there-
fore be challenged and forbidden by the WTO.
6. Cited in Shrader-Frechette (1991, 52).
7. Some scientists see such a practice as a potential

source of bias and accept it only for pragmatic
reasons. Others use contextual information in-
tentionally by utilizing Baysian methods, which
are designed to include “prior” information, in-
cluding guesses (Malakoff 1999).
8. This is by no means a universally accepted claim.
A number of U.S. environmental regulations are
based on the premise that most exposed individu-
als should be protected, regardless of how many
individuals are exposed.
9. Normative claims are, therefore, included even
in the characterization step of impact assessment.
10. A common approach to reasoning about norma-
tive issues is through definition s, axioms, and
theorems. Heijungs (1998) proposes to use this
approach to “derive” LCA methods and sketches
how this could be done.
11. For a more detailed elaboration of objectivity see
Shrader-Frechette ’s (1991) discussion of scien-
tific proceduralism and epistemological discus-
sions of the scientific method and theory choice
(Klee 1997; Lycan 1998; Sober 1998).
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