Introspection is the examination of one's own conscious thoughts and feelings.

[1] In psychology,
the process of introspection relies exclusively on observation of one's mental state, while in
a spiritual context it may refer to the examination of one's soul. Introspection is closely related
to human self-reflection and is contrasted with external observation.
Introspection generally provides a privileged access to our own mental states,[2] not mediated by
other sources of knowledge, so that individual experience of the mind is unique. Introspection
can determine any number of mental states including: sensory, bodily, cognitive, emotional and
so forth.[3]
Introspection has been a subject of philosophical discussion for thousands of years. The
philosopher Plato asked, "…why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts,
and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are?"[4][5] While
introspection is applicable to many facets of philosophical thought it is perhaps best known for its
role in epistemology, in this context introspection is often compared
with perception, reason, memory, and testimony as a source of knowledge.[6]

Contents
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 1In psychology
o 1.1Wundt
o 1.2Titchener
o 1.3Historical misconceptions
o 1.4Recent developments
 2In religion
o 2.1Christianity
o 2.2Gnosticism
o 2.3Jainism
o 2.4Hinduism
 3In fiction
 4See also
 5References
 6Further reading
 7External links

In psychology[edit]
Wundt[edit]
It has often been claimed that Wilhelm Wundt, the father of modern psychology, was the first to
adopt introspection to experimental psychology[1] though the methodological idea had been
presented long before, as by 18th century German philosopher-psychologists such as Alexander
Gottlieb Baumgarten or Johann Nicolaus Tetens.[7] Also, Wundt's views on introspection must be
approached with great care.[8] Wundt was influenced by notable physiologists, such as Gustav
Fechner, who used a kind of controlled introspection as a means to study
human sensory organs. Building upon the pre-existing use of introspection in physiology, Wundt
believed the method of introspection was the ability to observe an experience,not just the logical
reflection or speculations which some others interpreted his meaning to be.[9] Wundt imposed
exacting control over the use of introspection in his experimental laboratory at the University of
Leipzig[1] making it possible for other scientists to replicate his experiments elsewhere, a
development that proved essential to the development of psychology as a modern, peer-
reviewed scientific discipline. Such exact purism was typical of Wundt and he instructed all
introspection observations be performed under these same instructions "1) the Observer must, if
possible, be in a position to determine beforehand the entrance of the process to be observed. 2)
the introspectionist must, as far as possible, grasp the phenomenon in a state of strained
attention and follow its course. 3) Every observation must, in order to make certain, be capable of
being repeated several times under the same conditions and 4) the conditions under which the
phenomenon appears must be found out by the variation of the attendant circumstances and
when this was done the various coherent experiments must be varied according to a plan partly
by eliminating certain stimuli and partly by grading their strength and quality".[10]

Titchener[edit]
Edward Titchener was an early pioneer in experimental psychology and student of Wilhelm
Wundt.[1] After earning his doctorate under the tutelage of Wundt at the University of Leipzig, he
made his way to Cornell University where he established his own laboratory and
research.[1] When Titchener arrived at Cornell, psychology was still a fledgling discipline,
especially in the United States, and Titchener was a key figure in bringing Wundt's ideas to
America. However, Titchener misrepresented some of Wundt's ideas to the American
psychological establishment, especially in his account of introspection which, Titchener taught,
only served a purpose in the qualitative analysis of consciousness into its various parts,[1] while
Wundt saw it as a means to quantitatively measure the whole of conscious
experience.[1] Titchener was exclusively interested in the individual components that comprise
conscious experience, while Wundt, seeing little purpose in the analysis of individual
components, focused on synthesis of these components. Ultimately Titchener's ideas would form
the basis of the short-lived psychological theory of structuralism.[1]

Historical misconceptions[edit]
American historiography of introspection, according to some authors,[11][12] is dominated by three
misconceptions. In particular, historians of psychology tend to argue 1) that introspection once
was the dominant method of psychological inquiry, 2) that behaviorism, and in particular John B.
Watson, is responsible for discrediting introspection as a valid method, and 3) that
scientific psychology completely abandoned introspection as a result of those critiques.[11] Yet,
introspection has not been the dominant method. It is believed to be so because Edward
Titchener's student Edwin G. Boring, in his influential historical accounts of experimental
psychology privileged Titchener's views while giving little credit to original
sources.[11] Introspection has been critiqued by many other psychologists, including Wilhelm
Wundt, and Knight Dunlap who in his article "The Case Against Introspection", presents an
argument against self-observation that is not primarily rooted in behaviorist epistemology.
Introspection is still widely used in psychology, but under different names, such as self-report
surveys, interviews and fMRIs.[12] It is not the method but rather its name that has been dropped
from the dominant psychological vocabulary.

Recent developments[edit]
See also: Introspection illusion
Partly as a result of Titchener's misrepresentation, the use of introspection diminished after his
death and the subsequent decline of structuralism.[1] Later psychological movements, such
as functionalism and behaviorism, rejected introspection for its lack of scientific reliability among
other factors.[1] Functionalism originally arose in direct opposition to structuralism, opposing its
narrow focus on the elements of consciousness[1] and emphasising the purpose of
consciousness and other psychological behavior. Behaviorism's objection to introspection
focused much more on its unreliability and subjectivity which conflicted with behaviorism's focus
on measurable behavior.[1][13]
The more recently established cognitive psychology movement has to some extent accepted
introspection's usefulness in the study of psychological phenomena, though generally only in
experiments pertaining to internal thought conducted under experimental conditions. For
example, in the "think aloud protocol", investigators cue participants to speak their thoughts
aloud in order to study an active thought process without forcing an individual to comment on the
process itself.[14]
Already in the 18th century authors had criticized the use of introspection, both for knowing one's
own mind and as a method for psychology. David Hume pointed out that introspecting a mental
state tends to alter the very state itself; a German author, Christian Gottfried Schütz, noted that
introspection is often described as mere "inner sensation", but actually requires also attention,
that introspection does not get at unconscious mental states, and that it cannot be used naively -
one needs to know what to look for. Immanuel Kant added that, if they are understood too
narrowly, introspective experiments are impossible. Introspection delivers, at best, hints about
what goes on in the mind; it does not suffice to justify knowledge claims about the
mind.[15] Similarly, the idea continued to be discussed between John Stuart Mill and Auguste
Comte. Recent psychological research on cognition and attribution has asked people to report on
their mental processes, for instance to say why they made a particular choice or how they arrived
at a judgment. In some situations, these reports are clearly confabulated.[16] For example, people
justify choices they have not in fact made.[17] Such results undermine the idea that those verbal
reports are based on direct introspective access to mental content. Instead, judgements about
one's own mind seem to be inferences from overt behavior, similar to judgements made about
another person.[16]However, it is hard to assess whether these results only apply to unusual
experimental situations, or if they reveal something about everyday introspection.[18]The theory of
the adaptive unconscious suggests that a very large proportion of mental processes, even "high-
level" processes like goal-setting and decision-making, are inaccessible to
introspection.[19] Indeed, it is questionable how confident researchers can be in their own
introspections.
One of the central implications of dissociations between consciousness and meta-consciousness
is that individuals, presumably including researchers, can misrepresent their experiences to
themselves. Jack and Roepstorff assert, '...there is also a sense in which subjects simply cannot
be wrong about their own experiential states.' Presumably they arrived at this conclusion by
drawing on the seemingly self-evident quality of their own introspections, and assumed that it
must equally apply to others. However, when we consider research on the topic, this conclusion
seems less self-evident. If, for example, extensive introspection can cause people to make
decisions that they later regret, then one very reasonable possibility is that the introspection
caused them to 'lose touch with their feelings'. In short, empirical studies suggest that people can
fail to appraise adequately (i.e. are wrong about) their own experiential states.
Another question in regards to the veracious accountability of introspection is if researchers lack
the confidence in their own introspections and those of their participants, then how can it gain
legitimacy? Three strategies are accountable: identifying behaviors that establish credibility,
finding common ground that enables mutual understanding, and developing a trust that allows
one to know when to give the benefit of the doubt. That is to say, that words are only meaningful
if validated by one's actions; When people report strategies, feelings or beliefs, their behaviors
must correspond with these statements if they are to be believed.[20]