Ang Bayong Bayani vs. COMELEC

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA
DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-
LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for The True
Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Office for
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
(OCW).
Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buñag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Office and Antonio R.
Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the
present petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that
the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded
the case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court
rejected the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the
party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. According to the Court,
such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the
party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the establishment of
the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power;
to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in
the larger affairs of the State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid
down some guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC

OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OF RULES OF
COURT. — Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. — These cases present an exception to the rule
t h at certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding
the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant
case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED OVER TO
PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. — Procedural requirements "may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available."
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE; MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 1(D), RULE 13 THEREOF.
— The assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being
a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO FORMULATE GUIDING
AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR
RULES. — These cases raise transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules." acCTIS
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST

ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. — Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system. Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941
leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system.
We quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably, therefore, political
parties — even the major ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to
parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system.
In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that,
if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes.
But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have
no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. — For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED. —
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number
of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in
scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941;
namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. — "Lack
of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERE

LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS
TERMS. — The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with
this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, . . ., to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.
12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED, QUALIFIED OR
SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. — While the enumeration
of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE FROM WHICH TO
ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF PROVISION
ITSELF. — The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is
that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose
is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in
which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain
the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY VIOLATES
OR IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE STRUCK
DOWN BY THIS COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. — When a lower court, or a
quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it.
15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS. — Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using
government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.
It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); POLITICAL
PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5
THEREOF. — First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5
of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record — that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily,
majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY REPRESENT
INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED. — Second, while
even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives."
In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they
are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests
of the marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. — In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes
the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS
SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. — Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered." The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest
running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST
NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. — Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect
or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2)
It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party
or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased
to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT. — Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of
the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs
of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the
House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. — Not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION
AND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL BENEFIT THE
NATION AS A WHOLE. — As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee
proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district . . . ."
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM;
SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND
SECTORAL REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. — Perhaps the present controversy
stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first
glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of proportional
representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first,
proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to
open up the electoral process for broader participation and representation.
Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that every underrepresented
sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based
representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be
represented.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1) POLITICAL
PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4)
COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. — The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1)
political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A
political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or
platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominate
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A
sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors,
such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution,
which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities
and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral
organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of
duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election
purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. — A party-list nominee

is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts
candidates, with the exception of the additional requirement that he be
nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for
any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they
purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation. A nominee
of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30
years of age on the day of the election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30
during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once
elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges
as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-
wide Development Fund (CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORAL
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE
STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE
AGENTS. — A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral
groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of
"candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list
representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by
the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his
term, his party can send another person to take his place for the remaining
period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees
submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list
representative who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat.
So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the
election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under
his new party or organization. EcTDCI
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT

MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE
ADOPTING IT. — The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always
remains — "effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this
tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according
to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as
less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing
the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial
legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the
lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this
Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as
and when better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; MOST
IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM
WHOM CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. —
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people
from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed."
The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
"registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratification of the
Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2)
provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.
2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES FAIL AS SAID
PROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF CONSTITUTION WHEN
MEANING IS CLEAR. — The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been
stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS OF
REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT
DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. — The two systems of representation are
not identical. Party-list representation is a type of proportional representation
designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient
strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
"marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system,
representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number
of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which,
even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the
party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats
in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district,
the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a
percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-
list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not
limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.
Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the
legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY
NUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO
GIVE THEM A SEAT NATIONWIDE. — The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it
is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may
not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently
numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on
Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod
differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both
proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the
'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as
termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are 'always third or
fourth place in each of the districts.'"
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IS
RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. — A problem was placed before
the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this
problem of under representation two solutions were proposed: sectoral
representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold
that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend
without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in
Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this
Article."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2 THEREOF,
CONSTRUED. — What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is that the purpose
of the party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end,
"a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2
does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win
seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law
is "to promote proportional representation through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the
representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose
of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-
take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily
limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly
include other sectors. DHITcS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-
list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According
to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the
last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of
the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result
the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed
in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus
Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001."
2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond
the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations)
of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-
partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping
only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and
more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the
Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
12 docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that
the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the
party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and,
on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address
the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list

elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21
and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as
it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed,
under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being
a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have
proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet
formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its
position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorari shall
lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves
the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage

of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion
of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party , organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a
regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng

UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their
votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that
is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate
in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter
— may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law , who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law , except the religious sector." (Italics
supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when
the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of
August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history,
by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy . — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent
the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who
are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under
the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the
party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as
a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list
of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor ,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-
list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In
fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral
Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens — specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties — to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position
to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark
reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome
than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more
directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst
are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine
hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a
direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for
genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the
past — the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it — those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long
been within it — those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill
the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit
of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to
the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words
used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent
or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first.
Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for
participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional
deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the
framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best,
only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or
statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA
7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary,
it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The
OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list
elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by
this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of
all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties — Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP,
NPC, LP and PMP — on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they
have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties
in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the
"advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass,
preferred poll watchers . . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in
the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply
with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by
laws, history, platform of government and track record — that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the
ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of
Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as
much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political
party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented
in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in order to
circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their
inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths,
will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition,
then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA.
When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is
not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent
their group.
REV. RIGOS.
Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni
Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects

shall not be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered." 59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for

violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws
include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to
"enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply
with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to
the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees . — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat,
under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely,
the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can
those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that
"the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle
that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is
one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great
masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the
destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change
is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and
the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections'
receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente
M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People
Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a
cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian
participation in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely
perpetuation of a single party in power — a convenient contrivance for
authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter —
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING
THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,
WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. —
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon
C. Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved
seats in the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was
made from a selected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves. The
sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next three terms;
thenceforth, they would have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their
representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the
legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the
terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). — First, the system should only apply
to the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives,
second, it would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and,
third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be represented in
voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations
or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and
Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through
the Party-List System." In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the sectors were
required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an open electoral
contest with other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system.
While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public
unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list
elections, however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups
and coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently obtained
accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political
parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP,
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground
that their participation does not level the playing field for less known and less
organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery.
Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized
sectors, as well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter field
sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualification of
the large major political parties and groups which do not represent any "genuine"
sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into
the electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on
the qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list
system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to
provide for the system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law
itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads —
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives, by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible."
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2),
of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed
by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total
seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the
difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the
view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the
unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be
like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the
party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting
19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession
the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their
electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the
more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the
monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the
statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the
number of seats that may be gained by a party or organization. 1 Votes garnered
in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three
seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that
disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at
the same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character
of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a
combination of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and
sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is
intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader
participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other,
presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This
impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article
6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific
sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to
the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much
reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in
no case not later than sixty (60) days before election." EcTIDA
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute,
defining a "sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only
"sectoral parties" and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral
organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941
intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand
it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the
will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce
the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral
parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral
party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as
those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which
includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and
women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group
of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register
with the COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for party-list
representatives, arranged according to the group's order of preference. In every
election for the House of Representatives, each voter casts two votes — one for
the district representative of his choice and another for the party or organization
of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and organizations are totaled
nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials where the rule of
plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) is adopted,
the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number of votes
received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis
of the number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the
party-list system, should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to
one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves.
Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and
authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that
control political power, parties add an important element of stability to a political
system and also help organize the government and electorate by recruiting
candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and
generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and providing
varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be seen as
a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend
the multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many
interests of a complex society, including a range of ideological differences,
conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit — "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to
the free choice of the people." 2 The multi-party system of proportional
representation broadens the composition of the House of Representatives to
accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined political
constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to
legislative districts candidates, 3 with the exception of the additional requirement
that he be nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a
candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. 4 A nominee must actually belong to the sector
which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation.
5 A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more
than 30 years of age on the day of the election. 6 Should he, however, attain the
age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. 7
Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and
privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the
Country-wide Development Fund (CDF). 8
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and
their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies,
becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the
organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party
can send another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the
replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the
COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who
switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also, if a person
changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not
be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or
organization. 10
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as
they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged
deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect
must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it." 11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the
elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according
to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as
less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. 12 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be
crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While,
the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this
Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as
and when better counsel prevails. aASEcH
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their

judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but
before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political
agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party
representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized
sectors. Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection with
the election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R.
No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — for the purpose of
seeking the annulment of the registration of the following parties classified as
"political parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),

Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
Liberal Party (LP),

Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),

The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),

Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),

National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to
participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration
not later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law
requires that any party, organization, or coalition which is already registered
with the COMELEC should declare its intention to participate in the party-list
system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the
applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties,
organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of
parties, organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001
elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and coalitions were accredited,
including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is
exclusively for the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine
society and that there is no way by which other sectors not so identified, much
less the major political parties, can participate in the party-list elections.
Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to the fact that seven of the
respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-
LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in the country today as
determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and
charges that the rest of private respondents are "pseudo party-list organizations"
which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the
problem of ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and
enhance direct people's action and participation in the decision-making
process to counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House
of Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list system of
respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this
purpose because these parties do not represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No.
7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning
the five major political parties from participating in the party-list system only
in the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in subsequent
elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and
they do not prohibit, the participation of "registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations" to participate in the party-list system,
whether or not said parties or organizations represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society. 2
It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the
House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners'
recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party,
organization, or coalition represents "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The
COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending
petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP,
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the
disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases
were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and
there was doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was
forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases
were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other "plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" within the meaning of Rule 65,
§§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified in resorting to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal
resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press
statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not
representing "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in
the election for the party-list system — a fact confirmed by it in its comment and
memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting that petitioners
should have exhausted administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second
issue above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system
is limited to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the
affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the
Constitution:
Art. VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List
System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote proportional
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives . — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people
from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed."
3 The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
"registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratification of the
Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2)
provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list
representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give those
who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district
elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis.
(In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and
underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected
from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast
to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners
49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in
order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all"
single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures
parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their
public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented
sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of
Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these
sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to
the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional
intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in
the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role
of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what
it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they
meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look
behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they
wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our
councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

against petitioners' reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the
Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to
proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
from the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives
shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the
House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a
population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section. 6
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in

the House of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative
Department: one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner
Villacorta, and another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner
Monsod. The two are not the same. As Commissioner Monsod said in explaining
his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for
the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors . . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would
mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will
choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And
then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and
other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified
here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission.
The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the
Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. . . . Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. .
. . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is
up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be
included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. .
. . This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to
say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly.
Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC
will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there
derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may
not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They
may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have
votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have
no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system. 7
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected

from the sectors and party list" in §5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL
OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 8
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it

later became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE:
Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the
Committee would like to get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS," is he referring to any sector which the law may
subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD:
. . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is

a system that opens up the list to any regional, national or sectoral
party . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is
not necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD:
No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of
sectoral parties or organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to
sectoral parties or organizations.
MS. AQUINO.
And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any
sector? In other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party
list if it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat
for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. 9
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM.
Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this

amendment because it is possible that the labor sector will not be
represented considering that those who will vote are all the voters
of the Philippines. In other words, the representative of labor will be
chosen by all the electors of the Philippines, and that is not correct.
My contention is that the sectoral representative must be selected
by his own constituents, and for that reason, I am objecting to this
amendment. 10
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to
participate in the party-list system, the major political parties could gobble up
the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO
. . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political parties.
Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.
11
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay
din iyong sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list
system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong
198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties. 12
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not
solve the problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He
said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at
the start of this century, our legislators were elected based on their
promise that they would represent the little people of our land. With the
exception of a few patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our
Commission today, members of the National Assemblies, the Congresses,
and the Batasans of the past did not devote themselves enough to the
alleviation of the dismal condition of our country's poor and lower classes.
xxx xxx xxx
These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators
who can best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized
than those coming from within their ranks. 13
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give
them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD.
My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM
OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this

amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party
list representatives will be reserved for the sectors. 14
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5 was
suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one week,
a compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to the
plenary session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall
be elected from the sectors and the party list," it was proposed that the following
be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL
AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW.
THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of

sectoral representation were not satisfied that it would be allowed only for two
terms and only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list
representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following
amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY
LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with nineteen (19)
voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against. 15
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two
(32) commissioners against none. 16 As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION,
FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary
number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a
seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say
that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals
as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the
framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by
Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the
districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do
not have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted
was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the
seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other
hand, the "third or fourth place(rs)" in district elections, for whom the party-list
system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but
nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the
House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors,
but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the
"marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the
same ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others,
to the Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that
certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list
system; that the big parties might gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-
list system will not solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
"underprivileged sectors." These objections, however, did not carry the day, as
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the
Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to
overrule the Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the
existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of
voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions
were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This
Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners
contend without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in
Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this
Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that
the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner
Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able
to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation
of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties,
this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being
formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a
stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the
mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties.
It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So
that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in
Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of
those parties. 18
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list
system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration . — The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this
provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They
are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is
unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is
couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by
law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941 . . . . Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole
. . ."
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A.
No. 7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote proportional
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is
to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed.
Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system
is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of
Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote
proportional representation through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is
not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation
is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a
chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors
mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for
the party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5
of the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals? After all, what is provided for is "a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" each of
which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of
the law:
SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as
a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list
system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be
dismissed.
Footnotes
1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.

Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion
Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
7. See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8. TSN (GR Nos. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
10. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

11. Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the
Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor
General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement,
Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.
12. Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14. These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong
Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local
Autonomy Movement.
15. Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the
Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon
Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD
and OCW.
16. See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17. See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon
Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18. Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections.
19. OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
21. "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed . The following pleadings are not
allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision
except in election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx"
22. Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec
a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of
the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and
266 et seq.
23. Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16,
1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304
SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA , GR No. 134437,
January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134169, February 2, 2000.
24. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See
als o ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No.
133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11,
1972.
25. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See
also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219
SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
27. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p.
18.
28. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
29. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30. Italics supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31. It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of
the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
32. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

36. Infra.
37. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248
SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
38. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.
39. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
40. Infra.
41. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.

42. Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
44. Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
45. Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
46. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18,
1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See
also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
47. See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
48. 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v.
Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
49. Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298
SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September
16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50. Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al ., GR No. 136781, October 6,
2000.
51. See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals , 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr.
v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June
28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7,
1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals , 270 SCRA 360, March
24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
52. TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
53. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No. 147589), p.
19.
54. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.

56. §2 (5), Article IX (C).
57. Christian S. Monsod.
58. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
59. See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
60. See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
61. The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill
No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
VITUG, J., dissenting:
1. Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.
2. Bernas, pp. 355-358.
3. The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to

party-list nominees —
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the
day of the election, at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
4. Section 8, R.A. 7941.
5. Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.
6. Section 9, R.A. 7941.
7. Ibid.
8. See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
9. Section 15, R.A. 7941.
10. Ibid.
11. Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.
12. People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast , 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
1. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.
2. Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.
3. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission,
102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
4. 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3
Atl. 220 (1886).
5. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
6. Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (italics added).
7. 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday, July
22, 1986 (italics added).
8. Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

9. Id. at 253 (italics added).
10. Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
11. Id. at 254.
12. Id. at 257.
13. Id. at 255.
14. Id. at 258.

15. Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
16. Id. at 589.
17. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
18. II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

Ang Bayong Bayani vs. COMELEC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ang Bayong Bayani vs. COMELEC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC

6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERE

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. — A party-list nominee

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

The Court's Ruling

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng

"xxx xxx xxx"

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

The following discussion is also pertinent:

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualiﬁes a party or group for

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),

Liberal Party (LP),

Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),

Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),

Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),

It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in

xxx xxx xxx

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected

Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modiﬁcation it

. . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is

The Committee would like to be clariﬁed on this.

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this

My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this

However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.

3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

10. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

41. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com