EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym

OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN
AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG
BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-
UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-
LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , respondents.

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP);
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA;
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS;
JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION ,
respondents.

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Ofices for The
True Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Ofice
for Chamber of Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 (OCW).
Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buñag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Ofice, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Ofice and
Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the present
petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 37851
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded the
case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without
any qualification, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only weaken
the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It
would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the
establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list system
was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the
opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. The
State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social
justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work
of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF

COMELEC OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT
BEFORE THIS COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OF
RULES OF COURT. — Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. — These cases present an exception to the
rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest
and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED
OVER TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. — Procedural requirements "may
be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice . .
. when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 1(D), RULE 13
THEREOF. — The assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited
pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO FORMULATE GUIDING
AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR
RULES. — These cases raise transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN
PARTY- LIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.
— Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system. Furthermore, Section 11 of RA
7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the
major ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the
party- list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they
would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. — For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941
also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, " Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED. —
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of people
in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. —
"Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERE
LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS
EXPRESS TERMS. — The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of
the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . ., to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must
be applied according to its express terms.
12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED,
QUALIFIED OR SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. — While the
enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It
is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and
the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE FROM WHICH
TO ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF
PROVISION ITSELF. — The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose
is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other
words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such
as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light
on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY
VIOLATES OR IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE
STRUCK DOWN BY THIS
COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. — When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial
agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law,
its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A
TRIER OF FACTS. — Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941);
POLITICAL PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5
THEREOF. — First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words,
it must show
— through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests,
it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY
REPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED. —
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-
LIST SYSTEM. — In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND
SECTS SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. — Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." The
prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise:
"[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not
see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here;
it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR
ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. —
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It
advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or
organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its oficers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to
exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF,
OR A PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT. — Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by
citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its oficials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to
enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations
to be elected to the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. — Not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat,
under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests
of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to
give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO
FORMULATION AND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL
BENEFIT THE NATION AS A WHOLE. — As previously discussed, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district "
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM; SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
AND SECTORAL REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. — Perhaps the present controversy
stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it
gives the impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-
traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one
end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader
participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that
every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-
based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1) POLITICAL
PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4)
COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. — The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political
parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a
group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. — A party-list
nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts
candidates, with the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one
list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective ofice or has lost
his bid for an elective ofice in the immediately preceding election. A nominee must
actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no
true representation. A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but
not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. Should he, however, attain the age
of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once elected,
party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges
as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the
Country-wide Development Fund (CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORAL
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE
STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE
AGENTS. — A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their
nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes
physically incapacitated, removed from ofice by the party or the organization he
represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to
take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in
the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-
list representative who switches party afiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if
a person changes his sectoral afiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be
eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT
MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE
ADOPTING IT. — The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains —
"effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the
application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been
considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
compensated by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament
of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails.
 MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; MOST
IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM
WHOM CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. —
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the
Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." The text of Art. VI, §5(1)
(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive terms
following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats
allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art.
VI,
§5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for
"marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES FAIL
AS SAID PROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF CONSTITUTION
WHEN MEANING IS CLEAR. — The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been
stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows: While it is
permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS OF
REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT
DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. — The two systems of representation are not
identical. Party- list representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give
those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections
a chance to win if they have suficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these
groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system,
representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes
received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a
candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the party-list system, a
party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the
other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate
are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it
assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public
support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as,
but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list
system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION
INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY
NUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO
GIVE THEM A
SEAT NATIONWIDE. — The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that
the party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation
intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a
district but are suficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads
the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and
Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both
proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized'
as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'"
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM IS RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. — A problem was
placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
under representation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list
system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list
system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend
without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly
the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2 THEREOF,
CONSTRUED. — What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is that the purpose of the
party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the
majority claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of
Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional
representation through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the
representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law,
it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to
enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of
winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in
§5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These
groups can possibly include other sectors.
 DECISIO N

PANGANIBAN, J :

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law
to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and
the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty
objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to
the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties
and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations
filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent
to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic]
 and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to
directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of

proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must

recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those
who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly
the suficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes
cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees
not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed
a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification
cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on
April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed
as
G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-
extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12
docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument
on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing
of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open
court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
 "1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list

elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule
65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law. 1 7 The Ofice of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have
filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A
18
dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in
a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved
the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec,
through the Ofice of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite
clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage
of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the decision
sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political
Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of
the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 2 8 On the other hand, the Ofice of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system
as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered

under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance
with law."
30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.

Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,

PDP- Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido ."
 Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, " Section 3
expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate
in the party-list system.

"xxx xxx xxx"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate in
the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and
Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law , who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
 allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the

Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give
"genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a
new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the
legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence,
RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and

Underrepresented to Become
Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude
to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign.
The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system,
Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the House
of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to
its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party- list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of oficers, coalition agreement
and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that
the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and
their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System
Desecrated by the OSG
Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Ofice of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that
any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in
the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Ofice of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens — specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties — to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich
and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of
these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly
defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that
their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-
list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs
of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those
in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-
list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the
seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent,
the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional
district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44
in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation
in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that
the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it — those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system
to those who have long been within it — those privileged sectors that have long dominated
the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In
the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected
through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of
the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such
as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light
on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched
in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation,
we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous
should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need
for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any
event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best,
only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA
7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied
plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to
have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented,
could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties — Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP — on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the
May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting oficial Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers . . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list
election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic
Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination
of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups,
have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the
Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
 Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-
list system.
Guidelines for
Screening Party-List
Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements
of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history,
platform of government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict
of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN:

Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52

Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
 within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD.

If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then
certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA.

When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not,

of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say,
the indigenous community sector to represent their group.

REV. RIGOS.

Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the
Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as
a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate.
That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized
for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its oficers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain
at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered." 59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for

violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include
Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
 Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or
its oficials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other
parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees . — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working
class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose
Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a
party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
 Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such
position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery
of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely,
this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers
of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of
the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections,
the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to
have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30
days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur. Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Vicente
M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.

Separate Opinions
VITUG , J., dissenting:

The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People
Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing
political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily
governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in
power — a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection
2, of the 1987 Charter —
 THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING
THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN,
YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,
EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. —

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C.
Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the
Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of
names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these
reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an
electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the
legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed
in Article 6, Section 5(2). — First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of the
total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory
proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating parties and
organizations to be represented in voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors,
parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution
No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and Regulations Governing the
Elections of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May
1998 first party-list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their
political mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and organizations
under a party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a
result of public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list
elections, however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and
coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the
COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION,
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL
PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP- LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that
their participation does not level the playing field for less known and less organized
sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the
system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties
but only on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein
petitioner sought the disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which
do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the
electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the
qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the system's
focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads
—
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lacked well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of
the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees
from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the dificulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full- pledged parties equipped
with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented.
The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and
less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the
lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately
gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from
participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for
sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system
be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further
whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates
from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution,
by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the
monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory
imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats that
may be gained by a party or organization. 1 Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total
votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that
disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at the
same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the
party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of
proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first,
proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the
electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on
the other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This
impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section
5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be
represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to the underrepresented and
marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list of oficers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.

"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no
case not later than sixty (60) days before election."

It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a
"sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not the
other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither
Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of
society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The
real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to
introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral
parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable
sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution,
which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women
and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the
same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is
an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register
with the COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for party-list representatives,
arranged according to the group's order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives, each voter casts two votes — one for the district representative of his
choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties
and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other oficials
where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) is
adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number of votes
received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the
number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system,
should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves.
Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties
add an important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the
government and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging
partisan attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and
providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be seen
as a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the
multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a
complex society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting political values
and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit — "A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people." 2 The multi-
party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of
Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined
political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to
legislative districts candidates, 3 with the exception of the additional requirement that he be
nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective
ofice or has lost his bid for an elective ofice in the immediately preceding election. 4 A
nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise,
there can be no true representation. 5 A nominee of the youth sector is further required to
be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. 6 Should he,
however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration
thereof. 7 Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and
privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-
wide Development Fund (CDF). 8
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their
nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes
physically incapacitated, removed from ofice by the party or the organization he
represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to
take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in
the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-
list representative who switches party afiliations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also,
if a person changes his sectoral afiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not
be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization.
10
 The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as they
precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the
members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect
must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."
11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the
application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been
considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
compensated by countervailing advantages. 12 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament
of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails.
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment.
I am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but
before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political
agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party representing
peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were accredited
by the Commission on Elections in connection with the election for party-list
representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R.
No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — for the purpose of seeking
the annulment of the registration of the following parties classified as "political parties"
and "organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),

Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC),

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),

Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-

LABAN), Liberal Party (LP),

Nacionalista Party (NP),

 Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong

Organizations/Coalitions :
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),

Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO

PHILIPPINES), The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS

LOYALIST), Philippine Local Autonomy Movement,

Inc. (PLAM),

Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace

(JEEP), Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),

Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc.

(SHAF), Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers

(OCW),

Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG

BAYANI), National Federation of Sugar

Planters (NFSP)

R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to
participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration not later
than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires that any
party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the COMELEC should
declare its intention to participate in the party-list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the
applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations,
and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of parties, organizations, or
coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties,
organizations, and coalitions were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively
for the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine society and that there
is no way by which other sectors not so identified, much less the major political parties,
can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention
to the fact that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD- UMDP, NPC,
LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in the
country today as determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3,
2001, and charges that the rest of private respondents are "pseudo party-list
organizations" which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big
businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the
problem of ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and
enhance direct people's action and participation in the decision-making process to
counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of
Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list system of respondent
political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose because these
parties do not represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this
reason, Bayan Muna
 prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by
banning the five major political parties from participating in the party-list system only in
the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they
do not prohibit, the participation of "registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations" to participate in the party-list system, whether or not said
parties or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society. 2

It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector,

as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the House of
Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners' recourse is not to this
Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition
represents "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a question of fact, and this
Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner
Bayan Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents
NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and
BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSIO
N I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the
disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases were
filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was
doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was forthcoming. In
fact, up to the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved.
Petitioners, therefore, had no other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law" within the meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and were justified in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal
resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press statements its
stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in the election for the party-list system —
a fact confirmed by it in its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no
basis for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies before
coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second issue
above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system is limited to
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the afirmative will it be
necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the
Constitution:
Art. VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of

the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law
except the religious sector.

To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List
System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible.

SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list

representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate
in
 the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." 3 The text of Art.
VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive
terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the
seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually,
Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for
"marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list representation
is a type of proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a
seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have
suficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
"marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are
elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to
the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the
votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order
to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat
district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage
of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables
marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in
the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these
sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the
problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in
adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
 The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary , 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.

It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of
history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what
it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant
when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond
what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said,
anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason
why we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5

Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

against petitioners' reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional
Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected from
the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall
in no case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a population
of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. 6

As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the
House of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department:
one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and another one for
party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
 I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for
the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and
who constitute the members of the sectors . . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in
the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they
will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we
have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9,
the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine
sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in
the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. . . .
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers A doctor may be a
farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so
he would be included in that sector.

. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. . . .
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao . One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen
can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate
the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does
not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party —
and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had
been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.

xxx xxx xxx

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who really have a
national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in
the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system. 7

Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected

from the sectors and party list" in §5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL
OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 8

Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it later
became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
 MR. DAVIDE:

Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the Committee

would like to get some clarifications.

When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS," is he referring to any sector which the law may subsequently
define?

MR. MONSOD:

. . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a

system that opens up the list to any regional, national or sectoral party . . .
.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO.

The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not
necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?

MR. MONSOD:

No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of

sectoral parties or organizations to register, but it is not exclusive
to sectoral parties or organizations.
MS. AQUINO.

And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any sector? In
other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the
capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.

MR. MONSOD.

Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. 9

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM.

Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this amendment

because it is possible that the labor sector will not be represented considering
that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other words,
the representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of the
Philippines, and that is not correct. My contention is that the sectoral
representative must be selected by his own constituents, and for that reason, I
am objecting to this amendment. 10

On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in
the party-list system, the major political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He
said:

MR. TADEO

. . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political

 parties.
Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.
11
 MR. TADEO.

Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto
ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties. 12

Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve the
problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at
the start of this century, our legislators were elected based on their promise that
they would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a few
patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today, members of
the National Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not
devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition of our
country's poor and lower classes.

xxx xxx xxx

These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who
can best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming
from within their ranks. 13

To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them
effective representation:
MR. MONSOD.

My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF

REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS.

My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?

MR. VILLACORTA.

Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party list
representatives will be reserved for the sectors. 14

Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5

was suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one week, a
compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary
session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall be elected
from the sectors and the party list," it was proposed that the following be inserted in §5
of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL
AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY SELECTION OR
ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN
POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.
 However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of
sectoral representation were not satisfied that it would be allowed only for two terms and
only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives.
Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE
TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY
LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND
YOUTH SECTORS.

When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with nineteen (19)
voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against. 15
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two (32)
commissioners against none. 16 As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION,
FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors referred to by
petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those
who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are suficiently
numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI,
§5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their
proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the
framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as
those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do not
have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent
reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and
only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth place(rs)" in district elections,
for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be suficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the
House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they
are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors"
one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are
identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same
ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod
proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors, like
labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that the big parties
might gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem of
ineffective representation of the "underprivileged sectors." These objections, however, did
not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of
the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the
Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing
"winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the
party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the
meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the
party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner Ople said in supporting the
Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-
Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And
if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they
will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that
with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations afiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the
leadership of those parties. 18

With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system,
§6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration . — The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
 (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political

party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its oficers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this
provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They are unfit
for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system,

is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941 Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole "

With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A.
No.
7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
 as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.

What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not
say that the party-list system is intended " to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that
the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win
seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the
aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-
all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the
sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.

Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the
party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e.,
labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all,
what is provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations" each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of the
law:
SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as
a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list of oficers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.

There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list system is
reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be
dismissed.

Footnotes

1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco,

Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra
and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.

2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p.

40. 3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.

5. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.

6. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.

7. See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.

8. TSN (GR Nos. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.

9. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.

10. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

11. Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec,
Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Ofice of the Solicitor General,
CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon
Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang
Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.

12. Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.

13. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

14. These were filed by the Ofice of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong
Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local
Autonomy Movement.

15. Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, the Ofice of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.

16. See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.

17. See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon
Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.

18. Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a manifestation to
participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

19. OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the duty of
the
 courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

21. "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:

xxx xxx xxx

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in

election offense cases;

xxx xxx xxx"

22. Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec a
similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the
Ofice of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.

23. Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan , 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996;
BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA
421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA , GR No. 134437, January
31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134169, February 2, 2000.

24. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See
also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No.
133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.

25. Salonga v. Cruz Paño , 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
See also Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales,
219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.

26. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.

27. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18.

28. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.

29. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

30. Italics supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

31. It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the post-
Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.

32. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

33. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.

34. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

35. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.

36. Infra.

37. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan , 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248
SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.

38. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.

39. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

40. Infra.

41. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.

42. Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.

43. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-

180.

44. Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and open
party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article."
45. Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

46. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18,
1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also
Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
47. See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.

48. 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph ,
111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.

49. Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298
SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September 16,
1999; Garcia
v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50. Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.

51. See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals , 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v.
CA , 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28,
1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997;
Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24,
1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr ., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.

52. TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.

53. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19.

54. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.

55. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.

56. §2 (5), Article IX (C).

57. Christian S. Monsod.

58. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634

59. See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.

60. See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.

61. The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No.
1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
VITUG, J., dissenting:

1. Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.

2. Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3. The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to party-list

nominees —

Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of
the election, at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the elections.

4. Section 8, R.A. 7941.

5. Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.

6. Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7. Ibid.

8. See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No.

3043. 9. Section 15, R.A. 7941.

10. Ibid.

11. Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.

12. People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE

485. MEND OZA, J., dissenting:

1. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.

2. Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.

3. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration

Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
4. 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl.
220
(1886).

5. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).

6. Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (italics added).

7. 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday,

July 22, 1986 (italics added).

8. Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

9. Id. at 253 (italics added).

10. Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

11. Id. at 254.

12. Id. at 257.
13. Id. at 255.

14. Id. at 258.

15. Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

16. Id. at 589.

17. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 13.

18. II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.