EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO , petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH;
MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE
TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO;
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG;
and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, respondents.

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for
The True Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Office
for Chamber of Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract
Workers (OCW).
 Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buñag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Office and
Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed
the present petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court
remanded the case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants. The Court rejected the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead
of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the
establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social justice
principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some
guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants.

SYLLABUS
 1. Â REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY
OF COMELEC OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE
BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER
RULE 65 OF RULES OF COURT. — Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec
Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. — These cases present an
exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest
and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20
percent of the House of Representatives.
3. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE
GLOSSED OVER TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. — Procedural
requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when
the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought
to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
4. Â POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION
1(D), RULE 13 THEREOF. — The assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1
(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
5. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO
FORMULATE GUIDING AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES,
PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR RULES. — These cases raise transcendental
constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
acCTIS

6. Â ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE

IN PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. — Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation
of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below: . . . Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones —
may participate in the party-list elections.
7. Â ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Commissioner Monsod stated that the
purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to
give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. He explained: "The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system."
8. Â ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. — For its part, Section 2 of
RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office."
9. Â ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION,
CONSTRUED. — "Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not
refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
10. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY,
EXPLAINED. — "Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of
a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
11. Â STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES;
WHERE LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO
ITS EXPRESS TERMS. — The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give
genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law,
we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . .,
to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language
of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
12. Â ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED,
QUALIFIED OR SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. — While
the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can
be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by
those in immediate association.
13. Â ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE
FROM WHICH TO ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS
LANGUAGE OF PROVISION ITSELF. — The fundamental principle in
constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which
to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision
itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other
words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is
unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
14. Â REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCY VIOLATES OR IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS
ACTION CAN BE STRUCK DOWN BY THIS COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF.
— When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be
struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to
apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
15. Â ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A
TRIER OF FACTS. — Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government
entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is
not a trier of facts. It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the
truth of such factual allegations.
16. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941);
POLITICAL PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION
5 THEREOF. — First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.
17. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT
THEY REPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED. — Second , while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc

18. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. — In view of the objections directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious
group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
19. Â ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS
AND SECTS SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. —
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and
sects shall not be registered." The prohibition was explained by a member of
the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
20. Â ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR
ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. —
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It
is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from
any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to
comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares
untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one
(1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
21. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN
ADJUNCT OF, OR A PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR
ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. — Fifth, the party or organization must not
be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated
by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of
the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective
of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
22. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. — Not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of
the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the
urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to
betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized
and underrepresented.
23. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO
FORMULATION AND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL
BENEFIT THE NATION AS A WHOLE. — As previously discussed, while lacking
a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the
bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . . ."
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM; SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
AND SECTORAL REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. — Perhaps the present
controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list
system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of
proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral
representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is
intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for
broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the
other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in
Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the
provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941,
in enumerating specific sectors to be represented.
2. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1)
POLITICAL PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS,
AND 4) COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. — The party-list system is limited to four
groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations,
and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an
organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those
enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which
includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and
women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral
organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes
or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an
aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for election purposes.
3. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. — A
party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable
to legislative districts candidates, with the exception of the additional
requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and provided, further,
that he is not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. A nominee must
actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise,
there can be no true representation. A nominee of the youth sector is further
required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of
the election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is
allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once elected, party-list
representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do district
representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide
Development Fund (CDF).
4. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES,
SECTORAL GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION
ACQUIRE STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO
MERE AGENTS. — A feature of the party-list system is that political parties,
sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the
status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if
a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed
from office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is
disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his
place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in
succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon
registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his
sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible
for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or
organization.EcTDCI

5. Â STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF
ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE ADOPTING IT. — The polestar in the
constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect must be given to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." The
law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved
in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms
and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less
intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be
crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.
While, the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies
not with this Court but with the people themselves through an amendment
of their work as and when better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. Â STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION; MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING
INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM WHOM CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS
LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. — "The most important single factor
in determining the intention of the people from whom the Constitution
emanated is the language in which it is expressed." The text of Art. VI,
§5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratification of
the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to
party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually,
Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it
is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide
exclusive representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term
petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors.
2. Â ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES
FAIL AS SAID PROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF
CONSTITUTION WHEN MEANING IS CLEAR. — The polestar of constitutional
interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary , as follows: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS
OF REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-
SEAT DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. — The two systems of
representation are not identical. Party-list representation is a type of
proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot
win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to
win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense,
these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under
the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in
proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-
all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the
votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the party-list system, a party or
candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On
the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for
a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a
percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the
party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such
as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of
Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to
these sectors seats in the legislature.
4. Â ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE
THE NECESSARY NUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE
SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO GIVE THEM A SEAT NATIONWIDE. — The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of
proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not
have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently
numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the
debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta
and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list
system, both proponents worked within the framework that the party-list
system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those
which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'"
5. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM IS RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. — A problem
was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-
take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of under representation two solutions
were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.
This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of the
Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article."
6. Â ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2
THEREOF, CONSTRUED. — What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is
that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be
guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that the
party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the
House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to
promote proportional representation through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the
House. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already
explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who
cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning.
These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5,
i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.
DHITcS

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give
more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious
veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several
Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political
parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the
status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were
scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of
these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated
a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties.
These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under
Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered
parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political
parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions
for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several
others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind

that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage
multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral
parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a

 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we

must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable
level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations
or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the
Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents]
be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended."
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some
of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also
set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May
3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001.
This Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court
directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court
ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents
named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before
noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May
17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the
Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as
scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to
submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible
period of five days. 15
Issues:
 During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to
address the following issues:

"1. Â Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under

the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Â Whether or not political parties may participate in the

party-list elections.

"3. Â Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to

'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

"4. Â Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded
to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941, as specified in this Decision. ASCTac

First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule
65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General
argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either
for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19,
20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9,
2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec
Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of
Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by
Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was
possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the
Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna
sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at
the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action;
to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it.
But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite
clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that
certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is
one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and
with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20
percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the
party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice .
. . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable
portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna
objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand,
the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is,
in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may
"be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. Â No votes cast in favor of a political party,

organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Â Political parties, or organizations or coalitions

registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
 voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm.

Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system
may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the
following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO.

 Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian

ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE.

 Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list

provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the
system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point,
the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the
participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the
pertinent provision below:

"xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
 "xxx xxx xxx"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may

participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party — or any organization or group for
that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) Â The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) Â The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per

centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished

member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this
first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our
national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It
is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may
be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Â Declaration of Policy . — The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
 formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting
proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system,
which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,

1. Â who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties; and

2. Â who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. Â who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation,"

"marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined
constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in
scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of
the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those
Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
 The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent
with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise
clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented
under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which
states:

"SEC. 5. Â Registration. — Any organized group of persons

may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90)
days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the
sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals ."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors

is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the
Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation
in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing
the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to
enable certain Filipino citizens — specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties — to
be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even
the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of
Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of
Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate;
hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common
sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists
and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically
speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout
engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number
and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in
our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the fisher
folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to come
out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to
win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up
the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives
through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has
been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it — those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
 "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open
the system to those who have long been within it — those privileged sectors
that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly
understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by
its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house"
is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can
enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein,
the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected
through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for
the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a
tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the
same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied

and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C.
Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent
of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is
that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails.
Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such
as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order
to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision
being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court
stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list
system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be
provided by law . Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should
therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous
should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from
its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list
system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no
need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings
of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the
meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2
and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law,
which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec
failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On
the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any
group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be
struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to
apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the
outright disqualification of the major political parties — Respondents Lakas-
NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP — on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including
PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues
that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec
Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers . . . ." We
 note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election,
but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the
154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the
law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using
government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of
facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of
such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first
be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the
Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the
Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from
the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.
Second , while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to
the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly
situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the
following quote shows:
 "JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

 I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the

political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN:

 Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52

Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of

Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the
Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may
not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional
proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. OPLE. . . .

 In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and

even international networks of members and supporters, in order
to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political
party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established
religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD.

 If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the

prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the
legal fiction." 54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA.

 When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS,"

he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who
may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.

REV. RIGOS.

 Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the

Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et
cetera." 55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations

and sects shall not be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a
member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition
is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see
any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
58
 Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:

"(1) Â It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;

(2) Â It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) Â It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) Â It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) Â It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;

(6) Â It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) Â It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) Â It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or

fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered." 59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or

group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list
system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become members
of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that
does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. The participation of the government or its
officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair
to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law;
its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

SEC. 9. Â Qualifications of Party-List Nominees . — No person

shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
 member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be

twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age
of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented
by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral
committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is
not going to represent a particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice
principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-
list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It
gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is
a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out
of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the
Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them.
It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating
hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list
provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on
 dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the
altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention
of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining
the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin
its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered
such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec
"to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election,
shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and
reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on
Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ .,
concur.
Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of
J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:

The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986
People Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian
society in a cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing
civilian participation in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-
too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in power — a convenient
contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the
1987 Charter —

THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY

PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS. AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF
OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE
FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE
 LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY
BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. —

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president
Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to
the reserved seats in the Lower House, representatives of the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth
sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of names submitted
by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these
reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to
participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait
for the legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be
circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). — First, the
system should only apply to the election of 20% of the total composition of
the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory
proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating
parties and organizations to be represented in voter's registration boards,
board of election inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing
for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the
basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the
"Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998 first party-
list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their
political mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and
organizations under a party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter
turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness of an electoral
innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however, were
different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied
for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the
COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political parties, namely
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO,
LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on
the ground that their participation does not level the playing field for less
known and less organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election
logistics and machinery. Arguing that the system is open to the
underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties but only
on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein
petitioner sought the disqualification of the large major political parties and
groups which do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the
Constitution into the electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions
to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group or coalition to
participate under the party-list system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a
subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the system's focal particulars,
which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads —

"The State shall promote proportional representation in the

election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,

subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions
— the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20
percentum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by
some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the
sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats
for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery
potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the
unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would
be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from
participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in
1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise — that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further
whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system
to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of
votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the
Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the
1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and
solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible,
abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is
evident in the statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes
the limit to the number of seats that may be gained by a party or
organization. 1 Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not
entitle the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law
that disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list
system and, at the same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district
representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual
character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of
being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditional parties
and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one
end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process
for broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the
other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in
Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the
provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941,
in enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party
list system is open only to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors,
the ponencia places much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:

"SEC. 5. Â Registration. Any organized group of persons may

register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the
sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.

"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2)

national newspapers of general circulation.

"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election."
EcTIDA

It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the

statute, defining a "sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify
only "sectoral parties" and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political
parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2),
nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society
and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to
be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2)
sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party
is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform,
principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of
the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941
like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the
same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required
to register with the COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for
party-list representatives, arranged according to the group's order of
preference. In every election for the House of Representatives, each voter
casts two votes — one for the district representative of his choice and
another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the
parties and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election
of all other officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the
highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the
party-list system depends on the number of votes received in proportion to
the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the number of
registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system,
should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties
themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both
democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and
institutions that control political power, parties add an important element of
stability to a political system and also help organize the government and
electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging
partisan attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter
participation and providing varying degrees of policy direction to
government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and recruiting
ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the multi-party as
allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a
complex society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting
political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit — "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people." 2 The multi-party system of
proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of
Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have
well-defined political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or
small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications
applicable to legislative districts candidates, 3 with the exception of the
additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and provided,
further, that he is not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid
for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. 4 A nominee
must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent,
otherwise, there can be no true representation. 5 A nominee of the youth
sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age
on the day of the election. 6 Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during
his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. 7 Once
elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and
privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to
the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF). 8
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral
groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of
"candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-
list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from
office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is
disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his
place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in
succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon
registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also, if a person changes his
sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible
for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or
organization. 10
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been
overlooked as they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and
prolonged deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains
— "effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it." 11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this
tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that
any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions
according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance
and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by
countervailing advantages. 12 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the
dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a
constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is
understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people
themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better
 counsel prevails. aASEcH

WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their

judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my

vote, but before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts
and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the
political agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and
non-profit organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a
political party representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other
marginalized sectors. Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections
in connection with the election for party-list representatives on May 14,
2001.
Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and,
in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — for the
purpose of seeking the annulment of the registration of the following parties
classified as "political parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by the
Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:

Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),

Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC),

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),

Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),

Liberal Party (LP),

Nacionalista Party (NP),

Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong

Organizations/Coalitions:

Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),

Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),

The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),

 Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),

Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace

(JEEP),

Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),

Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),

Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),

Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),

National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)

R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition
desiring to participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC
for registration not later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand,
§4 of the same law requires that any party, organization, or coalition which
is already registered with the COMELEC should declare its intention to
participate in the party-list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed
upon the applications for registration or manifestations of intention of
several parties, organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a
certified list of parties, organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in
the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and
coalitions were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is
exclusively for the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of the
Philippine society and that there is no way by which other sectors not so
identified, much less the major political parties, can participate in the party-
list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to the fact
that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC,
LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in
the country today as determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073,
dated May 3, 2001, and charges that the rest of private respondents are
"pseudo party-list organizations" which are actually satellites of the major
political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address
the problem of ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of
society and enhance direct people's action and participation in the decision-
making process to counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of
the House of Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list
system of respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to
defeat this purpose because these parties do not represent "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that
R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that,
by banning the five major political parties from participating in the party-list
system only in the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in
subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:

[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly

allow, and they do not prohibit, the participation of "registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" to participate
in the party-list system, whether or not said parties or organizations
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. 2

It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this

Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector,

as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in

the House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners'
recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party,
organization, or coalition represents "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The
COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has
pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP,
PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG
BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Â Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed
for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC;
and
(2) Â Whether the party-list system is exclusively for "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the
disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these
cases were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month
away, and there was doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for
disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on
May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no
other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"
within the meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
were justified in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
 From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await
formal resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in
press statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether
or not representing "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, could
participate in the election for the party-list system — a fact confirmed by it in
its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for
insisting that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies
before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the
second issue above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the
party-list system is limited to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors
is answered in the affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of
respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision
of the Constitution:

Art. VI, §5(1).  The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) Â The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per

centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law except the religious sector.

To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the

Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:

SEC. 2. Â Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
 for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.

SEC. 11. Â Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-

list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the

following procedure shall be observed:

(a) Â The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked

from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.

(b) Â The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at

least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the

people from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is
expressed." 3 The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a
party-list system of "registered, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive
terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow
sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for
petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list
system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for "marginalized
sectors," by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list
representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give
those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in
district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a
nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized
and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are
elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes
received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which,
even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come
in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the
"winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are
wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent
then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the
legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables
marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise,
the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the
legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as
answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized
and underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the
constitutional intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this
Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 4 as follows:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates

and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers' understanding thereof.

It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the

role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could
discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that
is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding
force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document,
prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should
eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks
clearly against petitioners' reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that
the Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference
to proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative
Department read:
 SEC. 5. Â The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected from the sectors and party list. The sectoral or
party list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the
entire membership of the House of Representatives.

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that
each city with a population of more than two hundred thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.

Within three years following the return of every census, the

Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section. 6

As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional

representation in the House of Representatives were submitted by the
Committee on Legislative Department: one for sectoral representation,
advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and another one for party-list system,
advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:

MR. MONSOD. . . .

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the

proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid
the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of
the sectors . . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly
would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they
will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats.
And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine
sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be
represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to
approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop
at these nine sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the
problem of who comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the
person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.

. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. . . . This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need
not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the
end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not
have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
 party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of
the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.

xxx xxx xxx

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who
really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a
chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these
groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative
district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but
surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,

we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count
their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So,
they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five
or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics,
the purpose and objectives of the party list system. 7

Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall

be elected from the sectors and party list" in §5 by replacing it with the
following

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL

OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 8

Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it

later became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:

MR. DAVIDE:

 Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment,

the Committee would like to get some clarifications.

When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS," is he referring to any sector which the law may
subsequently define?

MR. MONSOD:

 . . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this

amendment is a system that opens up the list to any regional,
national or sectoral party . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO.

 The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

 Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is
not necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?

MR. MONSOD:

 No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right

of sectoral parties or organizations to register, but it is not
exclusive to sectoral parties or organizations.

MS. AQUINO.

 And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any
sector? In other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party
list if it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat
for the sectors.

MR. MONSOD.

 Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. 9

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by

Commissioner Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and
Bernas. Lerum said:

MR. LERUM.

 Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to

this amendment because it is possible that the labor sector will
not be represented considering that those who will vote are all
the voters of the Philippines. In other words, the representative of
labor will be chosen by all the electors of the Philippines, and that
is not correct. My contention is that the sectoral representative
must be selected by his own constituents, and for that reason, I
am objecting to this amendment. 10

On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to

participate in the party-list system, the major political parties could gobble
up the sectoral parties. He said:

MR. TADEO

 . . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political

parties. Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala
ang sektor. 11

MR. TADEO.

 Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang

political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din iyong sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang
"reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties. 12
 Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it
would not solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
underprivileged sectors. He said:

For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-

government at the start of this century, our legislators were elected
based on their promise that they would represent the little people of
our land. With the exception of a few patriotic legislators, some of
whom are in our Commission today, members of the National
Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not
devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition of
our country's poor and lower classes.

xxx xxx xxx

These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and

legislators who can best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the
marginalized than those coming from within their ranks. 13

To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give
them effective representation:

MR. MONSOD.

 My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST

SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this

amendment?

MR. VILLACORTA.

 Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for
the party list representatives will be reserved for the sectors. 14

Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5
was suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After
one week, a compromise formula was reached by the two groups and
presented to the plenary session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In
lieu of the phrase "shall be elected from the sectors and the party list," it
was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL

AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW.
THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE
SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED
BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.

However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the

advocates of sectoral representation were not satisfied that it would be
allowed only for two terms and only with respect to one-half of the seats
allocated for party-list representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed
instead the following amendment of §5:

ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,

REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE
TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY
LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND
YOUTH SECTORS.

When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with

nineteen (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against. 15
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was approved by a
vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners against none. 16 As finally worded, the
amendment reads:

SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION,

FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY
BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the

party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type
of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not
have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently
numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the
debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta
and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list
system, both proponents worked within the framework that the party-list
system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those
which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and
they do not have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral
representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized
sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these
sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of
Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or
fourth place(rs)" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was
intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but
nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in
the House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged"
sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to
give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system
for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents
are the same ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum,
among others, to the Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI,
§5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the
House under the party-list system; that the big parties might gobble up the
sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem of
ineffective representation of the "underprivileged sectors." These objections,
however, did not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that
even those who spoke against the Monsod proposal did not vote against it.
To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the Constitutional
Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission
that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves
blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation
two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system
or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the
party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is
reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing
entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the
opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that
"A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the
view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As
Commissioner Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:

In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political

parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example,
we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they
should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so
that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through
the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will
be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such
parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them.
 So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have
in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of
those parties. 18

With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the

party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:

SEC. 6. Â Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration . — The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) Â It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;

(2) Â It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) Â It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) Â It is receiving support from any foreign government,

foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) Â It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or

regulations relating to elections;

(6) Â It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) Â It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) Â It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding

elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.

Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as

private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are
disqualified under this provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due
notice and hearing. They are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:

The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional

provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the
words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order
 to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list

system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall
be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941 . . . .
Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole . . ."

With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of

§2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:

SEC. 2. Â Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.

What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list
system is to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this
end, "a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims,
§2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that
the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to
win seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only
purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to
enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a
chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors
mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly
include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the
election for the party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are
enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all, what is
provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations" each of which is separately defined in §3
of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear
from §5 of the law:

SEC. 5. Â Registration. — Any organized group of persons

may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90)
days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the
sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.

There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list
system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be
dismissed.
Â
Footnotes

1. Â Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.

Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.

2. Â Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.

3. Â Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4. Â Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.

5. Â Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.

6. Â Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.

7. Â See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.

8. Â TSN (GR Nos. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.

9. Â Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.

10. Â Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.

11. Â Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists,
the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the
Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy
Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health
Foundation.

12. Â Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.

13. Â Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

14. Â These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the
Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine
Local Autonomy Movement.

15. Â Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the
Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon
Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-
NUCD and OCW.

16. Â See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.

17. Â See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4;
Aksyon Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp.
3-6.

18. Â Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and
local elections.

19. Â OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.

20. Â Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

21. Â "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are
not allowed:

xxx xxx xxx

 Â d) Â motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;

xxx xxx xxx"

22. Â Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the
Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2,
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp.
250 et seq. and 266 et seq.

23. Â Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan , 263 SCRA 222, October
16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA , 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v.
Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA , GR
No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec , G.R. No. 134169, February
2, 2000.

24. Â Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per

Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on
Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel , 44
SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.

25. Â Salonga v. Cruz Paño , 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez,
Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v.
Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.

26. Â ABS-CBN v. Comelec , GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban,
J.

27. Â Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 18.

28. Â Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.

29. Â OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

30.  Italics supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

31. Â It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early
days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.

32. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

33. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.

34. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

35. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.

36. Â Infra.

37. Â Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan , 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v.
CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.

38.  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.

39. Â OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.

40. Â Infra.

41. Â TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.

42. Â Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.

43. Â TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.

44.  Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free
and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."

45. Â Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible."

46. Â JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration , 31 SCRA 413,
February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990
ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez , 66 Phil 259, 264
(1938).

47. Â See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.

48. Â 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth
v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.

49. Â Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre , 314 SCRA
603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.

50. Â Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October
6, 2000.

51. Â See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals , 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999;
Inciong Jr. v. CA , 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC , 257 SCRA
680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA , 269 SCRA
283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals , 270
SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr ., 302 SCRA 217, January
27, 1999.

52. Â TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.

53. Â Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 19.

54. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.

55. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.

56.  §2 (5), Article IX (C).

57. Â Christian S. Monsod.

58. Â Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634

59.  See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.

60.  See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP
881.

61. Â The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of

Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

1. Â Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.

2. Â Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3. Â The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives

apply to party-list nominees —

 Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the

House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.

4. Â Section 8, R.A. 7941.

5. Â Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.

6. Â Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7. Â Ibid.

8. Â See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.

9. Â Section 15, R.A. 7941.

10. Â Ibid.

11. Â Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.

12. Â People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

1. Â Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.

2. Â Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.

3. Â Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration

Commission , 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).

4. Â 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph , 111 Pa.
365, 3 Atl. 220 (1886).

5. Â LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).

6. Â Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (italics added).

7. Â 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of

Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (italics added).

8. Â Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

9. Â Id. at 253 (italics added).

10. Â Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

11. Â Id. at 254.

12. Â Id. at 257.

13. Â Id. at 255.

14. Â Id. at 258.

15. Â Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

16. Â Id. at 589.

17. Â Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 13.

18. Â II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.