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language of our sources. Prior to my trip to Boston, most of our modeling related work
involved clarifying Stark’s propositions in light of our work with primary sources. In
Boston, we worked with the document the students and I had been creating and further
refined it. The modelers began work on the model while I was there, which gave me a
much better idea of what a model involved. I returned from Boston able to give the
students an overview of where we were going. This included introducing them to
NetLogo, the platform on which on model was going to run; specifying the input data we
needed for each of their groups and the steps we needed to take to get it ready; the basic
idea of how the model itself would work; and how we would test and verify it.
Input Data:
what you need to provide
✤ Group Matrix (discussed on next slide)
✤ Excel Sheet (tracks changes over time)*
✤ Were they proselytizing? (#5)
✤ Were there falsifiable events? (#2)
✤ Data on actual group size over time**
✤ Practices (indicate key changes over time on excel sheet) - #3/#9, #6/#10, #8
✤ Mandatory practices
✤ Frequency expected/mandated
✤ Harshness of sanctions for not performing
✤ “Suggested Practices”
✤ Must be central to group ID
✤ Frequency expected
✤ Authority and leadership roles (changes over time on excel sheet)
✤ Authority structure of group and key figures (#4)
✤ Personal Matrix for key figures (discussed in “Creating Agents”)
Figure 3: Slide from PowerPoint summarizing what I had learned at the Boston meeting,
presented in class, 23 February 2017
At the Boston meeting, the modelers introduced the idea of individual, group, and
environmental belief matrices. The group matrix was to identify the core beliefs that
distinguished a given NRM from all the others and the environmental matrix was to
identify the prevalent beliefs in the environment, which we agreed had to be period
specific. Individual belief matrices, I learned, would be generated by the computer
program. As instructed by the modelers, the students and I came up with the minimal
set of beliefs that allowed us to differentiate our ten NRMs. Working together and using
Heaven’s Gate as an example, we came up with the following Belief Matrix headings.
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4. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they have
legitimate leaders with adequate authority to be effective.
(4a) Adequate authority requires clear doctrinal justifications for an effective and
legitimate leadership.
4.a.1. Adequate authority & justification for leadership
Low High
The group does not have Some roles are justified The group has teachings
teachings that justify their and others are not. that justify their form of
form of leadership. leadership.
Comment: Doctrines must
define the basis for leader-
ship. Who may lead, how is
leadership is obtained, &
what powers are granted to
leaders.
4a2. Adequate authority to assert it = What sanctions may leaders impose?
Leaders cannot or do not Leaders impose sanctions
impose sanctions for for violation of norms
violation of norms (=consequences for not
(=consequences for not adhering to practices)
adhering to practices)
(4b) Authority is regarded as more legitimate and gains in effectiveness to the degree
that members perceive themselves as participants in the system of authority.
Low perception of Middle, e.g. megachurch High perception of
participation in system of with lots of small participation in system of
authority, e.g., optional groups authority, e.g. Communal
passive participation groups high
5. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they can
Figure 5: Operationalization of Proposition 4 (excerpted from a class document titled
generate a highly motivated, volunteer, religious labor force, including many willing
“Stark’s Criteria, v. 5”)
to proselytize.
Actions of #5 are based on actions in #3. We expect that the number of converts
Once we had each of the propositions clarified, we were able to have a group
will vary depending on the nature of the connections that group members are
conversation in which we discussed and collectively agreed on where each group fell on
allowed to maintain with out-group members. OK
the continua and inserted them in a common spreadsheet (see Table 2). In this context,
High Low
Scientology provided a particularly interesting case as the answers differed depending
Large number of contacts with out-group Few contacts with out-group members
on the level of the members’ involvement. Thus, Scientology is specified in the table in
members with aim of getting them to join. with aim of getting them to join.
relation to three different levels of engagement: SCIPUB (public/auditors), SCI-OT
(Operating Thetan), and SCI-SEA (SeaOrg).
6. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they maintain a
level of fertility sufficient to at least offset member mortality.
General: Biological entry. Fertility is measured in terms of whether or not they have
kids. This is connected to #3 in terms of beliefs in celibacy or pre-existent entities
that need bodies, which relate to sexual practice. Quality of life of children is
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Stark Proposition #3 [LOW] NAZ 1st gen. NAZ 2nd-3rd gen [HIGH]
Strictness of Practices Practices are optional CSL BNL AS Practices are mandatory
Mandatory Rating Practices are legal SCIPUB SCIOT Practices may be illegal
Skepticism is allowed ON Skepticism is not allowed
CAW PT SCISEA JW
HG PT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Stark Proposition #4 [LOW] [HIGH]
4A1: Adequate authority No teachings that justify leadership 3HO CSL NAZ AS SCI DM JW Has teachings that justify leadership
& justification for leadership CAW ON PT
BNL HG
SCI LRH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4A2: Sanctions [LOW] [HIGH]
No Sanctions HG1 AS SCIPUB HG2 ON SCIOT Sanctions are severe
CSL NAZ BNL JW,
CAW PT
SCISEA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4B: Members perceive that [LOW] JW NAZ PT [HIGH]
they are particpants in the Only the leader has impact on 3HO ON HG Everyone has impact on decisions
system of authority decisions BNL CAW CSL and feels like they have a job
AS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Stark Proposition #6 [LOW] SCISEA, HG ON 3HO JW SCIOT PT [HIGH]
Level of fertility offsets Post-reproductive age CAW SCIPUB NAZ Reproductive age
members mortality Anti-fertility oriented beliefs BNL CSL Fertility oriented beliefs
Mortality promoting beliefs AS Health promoting beliefs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Starks Proposition #8 [LOW] AS CAW JW PT [HIGH]
Internal/External bonds and Associate with everyone, no sense BNL ON Association with only in group members
relational mobility of group. CSL SCIPUB NAZ SCIOT SCISEA No contact with family members
High mobility, free associations Sever ties with previous religion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Starks Proposition #8A [LOW] HG1 SCIPUB SCIOT AS JW Strong ties within group
In-Group Ties Weak ties with individuals inside group CAW HG2 PT
Table 2: Ten NRMs located on Low-to-High continua for Propositions 2-4, 6, & 8
CSL SCISEA
NAZ
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Key: AS = Aetherius, 3HO = Healthy, Happy, Holy Organization; NAZ = Church of the
Stark Proposition #9 [LOW]
1 2 3 4 5 6
SCIPUB
7 8
JW
9
[HIGH]
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Church of all Worlds; BNL = Brotherhood of New Life; CSL = United Centers of Spiritual Sanctions for violations of norms
HG
PT
HG
AS
CSL
Although we had the input data on the NRMs ready to test in the model by the
end of the course, ten weeks wasn’t enough time to both develop the model and test it.
The class reconvened after the quarter was over to see the model in action, but it took a
while longer before the specific groups were added to the model and it was not until
some months later that we finally created an environmental matrix that approximated
beliefs in the general society over time.
Our Model and its Limitations
In developing an agent-based model, the modelers had to fill in lacunae in Stark’s
theory. The most obvious problem was that Stark’s model referred to NRMs rather than
agents. The modelers had to assume that NRMs were groups with members (agents),
that groups had specific beliefs and practices, and that Stark’s theory predicted whether
agents would leave or join groups, thus causing them to gain or lose members. Creating
an agent-based model, in other words, required translating Stark’s theory from the
passive voice (NRMs gain and lose members) to the active voice (agents chose to leave
or join groups). Giving agents “agency” meant giving them the characteristics that
Stark’s model seemed to presuppose but didn’t actually state. The modelers specified
these characteristics in light of assumptions implicit in the theory. These characteristics
included the capacity to hold beliefs, connect with others, assume roles as leaders or
followers, leave and join groups, convert others and be converted, reproduce, and
socialize offspring.
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The idea that “religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they
maintain a medium level of tension with their surrounding environment – are strict, but
not too strict” -- is central to Stark’s theory. Again, this is specified passively in terms of
NRMs rather than actively in terms of agents. To create a dynamic, agent-based model,
the modelers had to create a metric to determine whether agents were inclined to leave
their current group and search for another. They specified this in terms of an agent-
based calculation of their “happiness” with their current situation. To program this, the
modelers specified Stark’s “tensions” as tension between agent and leader, tension
between the agent’s beliefs and those around them, and tension between the agent’s
actual and desired level of connection to others. Agents were programmed with several
personality traits, e.g. skepticism and credulity, that we thought particularly relevant.
In retrospect, it is obvious that Stark’s theory had two key limitations: it
presupposed the existence of NRMs and attempted to account for their growth or
decline in passive terms. Upal (2005a,b) identified these limitations and offered an
alternative socio-cognitive model to account for the emergence as well as the growth of
NRMs. When we decided on Stark’s theory, however, I was unaware of Upal’s (2005b)
computational model and, in any case, didn’t have the ability at that point to assess it. In
retrospect, I think his was more theoretically sound. Where we had to supply agent
characteristics and motives in order to model Stark’s theory, Upal began with an agent
based theory built (ironically) on Stark and Bainbridge’s (1987) entrepreneurship
theory of religion. Upal’s model presupposed that humans seek information to solve
problems, that founders of new movements are information entrepreneurs, and the
people join movements if and when they think the entrepreneur’s new ideas offer
solutions to their perceived problems.
With the creation of our model of Stark’s theory, it – like Upal’s model – is ready
to be tested against actual historical data. Given the ways that we had to flesh out
Stark’s theory in order to model it, the computer model version of Stark’s theory is now
somewhat closer to Upal’s model than Stark’s printed theory was. The belief matrices
we generated for each of the NRMs are analogous to the new information generated by
problem-solving agents in Upal’s model. Testing Upal’s model against actual NRMs
would likely be as complicated as testing the model of Stark’s theory, however. Just as
we had to operationalize Stark’s propositions in order to test the model of his theory, so
too we would need to operationalize NRMs founders’ problem-solving ability based on
historical data to test Upal’s model. This would require identifying problems in the
environment, the solutions proposed by founders, and assessing the relative strengths of
the solutions. Ultimately it might make sense to run the same groups through both
models and see how close each came to reproducing the actual history of the group.
It’s important to note that I could not have written this description of how the
modelers created the model of Stark’s theory when I returned from Boston or even at
the end of the NRM course. My ability to explain what they did rests in large part on a
later conversation with Justin Lane, which took place after I spent some time learning to
understand the code hidden behind the NetLogo user interface.
Concluding Thoughts: Modeling Theories versus Modeling Phenomena
Much as I learned from going through the collaborative process with the
modelers, I came away frustrated by my limited understanding of the actual modeling
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process. By the end of the quarter, I had a rough idea of what a model was, but no idea
how they wrote the code. Behind the NetLogo user interface, the actual model was a
“black box.” To learn more, two of the undergraduates (Emily Stolken and Garrison
Freeman) and I spent time during Spring Quarter learning the basics of NetLogo. Here
again we started with a theory we wanted to model – in this case a theory of how people
“cope,” that is, how they appraise situations and decide how to act. But in contrast to the
course, we didn’t try to model human coping, but looked into how other animals cope
and tried to imagine the simplest form of coping that we could. Because we had no
coding experience, we wanted to begin by creating the simplest possible version of the
process.
The challenge again was one of translation. As humanists, we had to figure out
how the language we were using – that of animals appraising situations and deciding
how to act – could be translated into a modeling language, such as NetLogo. As is the
case with any new language, learning the basics wasn’t the same as becoming fluent, but
the basics gave us an idea of what is possible. Thus, in NetLogo language we learned:
turtles are agents, turtles exist in worlds, situations are programed to occur, and turtles
are programmed to appraise them.
Although watching our first primitive program run was extremely satisfying, the
most significant thing I learned was that the approach we took– starting with the
simplest possible version of the process we wanted to model – is how generative social
science models are being created. Reading Epstein (1996, 2006, 2013) on generative
social science as we learned the basics of NetLogo (Wilensky & Rand, 2015), I learned
that generative modelers begin with a phenomenon they want to model and derive a
theory from their model, rather than modeling a full-blown theory they want to test.
Asking humanists to model a theory rather than modeling a phenomenon had
certain advantages: we began with something familiar (a theory and historical data), we
were forced to analyze the theory in great detail and figure out how to operationalize
historical data in the terms of the theory, and, if we had had more time, we could have
tested the theory in light of the simulation. In this collaborative approach, the
humanists do not actually construct the model; the modeling and simulation experts do
that. While this undoubtedly made the process less daunting, I couldn’t understand how
they translated the pencil and paper version of the theory into a computer model of the
theory until I tried to do a little modeling myself.
Moreover, inviting humanists to model a theory as if that were the only option
obscured an important alternative: modeling a phenomenon and deriving a theory from
a model that generated it. This approach requires humanists to learn something about
modeling – it requires us to look into the black box – but doing so introduced us to an
important development – the emergence of a generative social science with its
commitment to building phenomena from the ground up. In the end, neither approach
resulted in a finished product but devoting a quarter to each -- on a very part time basis
– did give me insights into the strengths and weaknesses of each and whetted my
appetite for more.
Thanks to my modeling team – LeRon Shults, Justin Lane and John Balch – and thanks to
the students who took up the modeling challenge: Lakshmi Alban (Aetherius), Shandeep
Ahdi (3HO), Julie Best (Church of the Nazarene), Chris Edge (People’s Temple), Jenn
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