Social Justice Research, Vol. 12. No.

4, 1999

Minority Religions and Social Justice in Russian

Courts: An Analysis of Recent Cases
James T. Richardson1 and Marat Shterin2

This paper presents a number of important recent cases from Russia involving new
and minority faiths. The cases are examined to see how these unpopular groups
are dealt within the context of a rapidly changing Russia. Conclusions are drawn
about how the legal system in Russia operates concerning minority faiths, using
the sociological variables discussed in this issue's introduction.
KEY WORDS: Russia; sociology of law; legal cases; minority religions; freedom of religion.

INTRODUCTION

This paper summarizes several important legal cases involving minority and
new religious groups that have taken place in Russia in the past few years. Included
are several cases in which new and controversial religious groups have been taken
to court by detractors, usually groups of parents of members, but sometimes gov-
ernment officials as well. These legal actions are usually seeking the dissolution of
the group, and often damages are claimed. Also included are some cases involving
new religions or their supporters as plaintiffs, as the groups attempt to use the legal
system to defend themselves from attack. These cases are used to illustrate how
sociological variables and legal processes discussed in the issue's introduction
operate within Russia at this time.

KEY RUSSIAN CASES INVOLVING MINORITY RELIGIONS

In the several years since passage of the 1990 law allowing much more re-
ligious freedom in Russia, there have been a number of legal actions involving

1The Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada.

2 Doctoral Candidate
at the Department of Sociology, London School of Economics, London, England.

393
0885-7466/99/1200-0393$16.00/0 C 1999 Plenum Publishing Corporation
394 Richardson and Shterin

controversial newer religions. The 1990 law has since been changed, modify-
ing the legal landscape considerably in a way much less conducive to religious
freedom (Shterin and Richardson, 1998). It may even be that some of the cases de-
scribed played a role in the movement to modify the 1990 law (more on this later).
However, for now we summarize several cases, commenting on the application of
considerations discussed in the first part of the paper. The discussion of specific
cases is divided into two broad categories: cases brought against the groups by
others and cases brought by the groups themselves or by their supporters. First,
the cases brought against the groups are reviewed.

Cases Brought Against Minority Religions3

Included in this category is the case brought against Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) in
April 1995 that led to the official dissolution of that group in Russia. Also included
is a case brought against an organizational entity tied to the Unification Church
(UC) in St. Petersburg in July 1995, as well as another action brought against the
UC in Kuzminski District People's Court in Moscow. The continuing effort to have
the Jehovah's Witnesses (JWs) dissolved in Russia is described as well, including
the unsuccessful effort to stop the group from operating in the Sakhalinsk region.

Aum Shinrikyo

In 1994, the Moscow Public Prosecutor's Office began an investigation of

Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) at the request of some individuals who were concerned
about the growth of AUM in Russia and the group's alleged connections with
governmental agencies. No criminal charges were brought at that time, however,
as no evidence of any criminal activity was uncovered. Later that year, two citizens'
groups known as the Committee for the Protection of Family and Personality and
the Interregional Committee for Salvation from Totalitarian Sects brought an action
in Ostankino Intermuniciple Court in Moscow to seek the dissolution of AUM in
Russia. The plaintiffs in the action also were seeking 20 billion rubles to provide
rehabilitation for participants in AUM, which they accused of "psychoterrorist
aggression by a pseudo-religious group" and of "total zombie-izing and encoding"
of participants.
3
Much of the information for this paper comes from Galina Krylova, an attorney in several Russia
cases. Because of her success in dealing with legal attacks on minority religions in Russia, Krylova
has herself been personally attacked by representatives of the anti-cult forces in Russia and elsewhere.
Thomas Gandow, a leader of the anti-cult movement in Germany and a Lutheran pastor assigned for
special duties concerning sects and cults, and Alexander Dworkin, a Russian leader of anti-cult forces,
have launched a strong attack on the credibiltiy of Krylova, claiming among other things that she is
a member of Scientology. See Shterin and Richardson (1999) for a discussion of the involvement of
both these anti-cultists in the Yakunin v. Dworkin case in Russia.
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 395

This case was probably not going to result in any serious difficulty for AUM.
It had been delayed and interrupted several times because the Committee could
not furnish definitive evidence that participating in the group was harmful. Indeed,
there was considerable evidence to the contrary from participants who would
furnish medical records and other material to substantiate their assertions that par-
ticipating in the group was helpful to them, not harmful, as the plaintiff Committee
was claiming.
But for the tragic timing of the March 20, 1995, gas attack in the Tokyo
subway that killed several people and injured thousands, the case might have been
lost by the plaintiffs, with little attention being paid to it. That terrible event and
the attendant publicity about AUM activities in Japan gave new life to the effort by
the Committee, as concern by the public and by governmental officials led to the
case being taken very seriously. Within a month (April 18, 1995), the Ostankino
Court rendered a decision to liquidate AUM.
Thus, although there was no evidence of illegal activities in Russia on the
part of AUM participants, the group was dissolved, establishing a precedent that
private groups opposed to minority religions could bring successful actions in
Russian courts. A serious question could be raised about why the committees
had any standing to bring an action of this type. This question notwithstanding,
the case was allowed to proceed and was used as a way to exert control over
AUM. The AUM case therefore established the precedent that this was a pro-
cedure to use when seeking to exert social control over controversial religious
groups. The Court allowed this case to be used as a vehicle as it responded to the
concerns of the public and government officials who wanted AUM controlled or
dissolved.
Of special interest in this case is the extreme selectivity shown by the court
concerning evidence in the AUM case (Krylova, 1996). A large amount of evidence
was mustered by the defense to show that participation was not harmful and that it
may have been ameliorative. Reports of a number of psychiatric and psychological
studies were offered, but were ignored by the Court. This included a study of 30
participants by the Independent Psychiatric Association that showed only 1 of the
30 (all of whom were randomly chosen for study) had any sort of mental problem.
Testimony was also offered about a survey of 330 participants by the Institute of
Psychology of the Russian Academy. Most of the participants claimed that their
mental health had improved since joining AUM, with a significant percentage of
them claiming to have given up use of alcohol, smoking, and drug use because
of their involvement in AUM. Another study of 106 participants in St. Petersburg
showed similar results, taking strong issue with reports offered by the plaintiff
committees' psychiatrists.
All this and more evidence in opposition to the claims of the plaintiff were
ignored by the Court, which instead chose to adopt the anti-cult line of testimony
offered by several witnesses, including particularly Professor Yu I. Polischuck, a
396 Richardson and Shtcrin

prominent person in the move to control newer faiths in Russia. Polischuck has
become one of the main proponents of the view that activities of the new religious
groups are antisocial. He claimed to have found evidence of psychological and
physical harm caused by participation in such groups, a perspective he shares with
proponents of so-called brainwashing theories of the Western Anti-Cult Movement.
However, he cited only one such case concerned with Aum Shinrikyo, and even
that was a case in which the person had suffered a psychiatric disorder prior to
engaging in the group's activities.
Polischuck holds many official titles, including Director of the Clinical De-
partment of Moscow Institute of Psychiatry of the Russian Ministry of Public
Health, as well as being Scientific Secretary of the Board of the Russian Psychi-
atric Society. Polischuck's prominence makes him an ideal person to lend credence
to the anti-cult perspective in Russian courts. His testimony served as a basis on
which normative decisions could be legitimated.
As one of the main proofs of the use of damaging techniques by AUM, the
plaintiffs presented a helmet that, according to their "experts," had a special electric
device. It was allegedly used to affect the brain of those who participated in the
group's meditations. The helmet was examined by experts from the Institute of
Applied Physics of Moscow University, who dismissed such a possibility. Despite
this, the helmet was featured in the ruling of the court as a "material proof of the
group's dangerous activities.

Cases Against the Unification Church

In 1995 in St. Petersburg, the Interregional Committee for Salvation from

Totalitarian Sects brought an action against the Collegiate Association for Research
of the Principle (CARP) seeking the dissolution of the group. Also, the Committee
for the Protection of the Family and Personality filed a suit against CARP. These
actions, which asked together for a total of the equivalent of $ 13 million in damages,
were brought shortly after the registration application of the UC was rejected in
that region, and after a warning from the Justice Department of St. Petersburg
to CARP that its religious activities were illegal because they were not covered
under the CARP charter. In March 1996, the Committee for the Protection of
the Family and Personality withdrew its suit; however, the other action was left
intact. This action was joined by the City Prosecutor for the St. Petersburg region
who supported the claim and, later in 1996, filed his own criminal suit against
CARP. These developments gave much credibility to the original claims of the
committees, which were made up mostly of parents of participants (Richardson,
1996).
The plaintiff's original claim stated, among other things, that "manipulations
with the conscience of sectarians destroy the psychological basis of personality
and, therefore, family and social environment" (Krylova 1998:5). The organization
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 397

was also accused of activities that resulted in "neurosis and mental failure," as well
as somehow harming "the genetic fund of the nation."
The lead plaintiff, Mrs. N. K. Russkikh, whose daughter was a participant
in CARP, testified at length, offering a number of quite questionable theories and
ideas about the actions of CARP and the UC, and about the negative effects of
participation. She talked about "brainwashing" and many other alleged evils of the
group, and asked that all members of CARP be subjected to 16 months of forced
psychiatric treatment.
The Court appointed experts to examine some of the CARP participants but,
according to Krylova (1998), the experts found no negative effects from partic-
ipating. Efforts by the defense attorneys to submit other evidence critical of the
evidence presented by the plaintiff were rejected. After some delay, the case was
dismissed in 1998, but in the interim neither the UC nor CARP could engage in
any activities in the St. Petersburg region. Thus, the UC and its related organization
CARP were completely stymied in that area from 1995 to 1998 through the official
actions of governmental agencies and the court action involving the Committee.
The judge in the St. Petersburg case, in her judgment granting dismissal of
the case, admitted that the case was incorrectly accepted in the first place, as the
committee had no legal right to demand liquidation of a public organization offi-
cially registered by the proper authorities. However, behind the move to dismiss the
case was perhaps a desire by local authorities to avoid embarrassment because the
defense lawyers had presented evidence that the plaintiff committees had received
funding from St. Petersburg local authorities.
The dismissal of the case was appealed successfully but the case was even-
tually withdrawn by the plaintiff Committee because it could not muster enough
evidence of harm to sustain the action. The only remaining case involving the UC
in the St. Petersburg area was then the one brought by the City Prosecutor. In
May 1999, the Justice Department disavowed its earlier warning about the alleged
illegal activities of CARP, but reinstated this claim in October 1999, when it joined
in the criminal case of the City Prosecutor. This joint action was, however, finally
rejected by the Court in November 1999.
The St. Petersburg UC cases are quite interesting in terms of some of the
variables discussed in Richardson (2000b) as well as how they reveal the inner
workings of the justice system in that locale. The obvious cooperation between
city authorities (who helped fund the anti-cult committees bringing the actions),
the local legal officials (who stepped in when the local committees could not carry
the case properly), and the anti-cult committees was impressive. Normal rules
of standing to bring an action were ignored, as were understandings about who
should receive public funding. This sort of collusion between anti-cult groups and
authorities is not unprecedented, but it does illustrate the operation of variables
such as status and intimacy in such cases. However, the St. Petersburg cases against
the UC also demonstrate that the court was able to exercise some autonomy as it
dealt with the cases.
398 Richardson and Shterin

Another civil case involving the UC was filed in 1997 in Kuzminski District
People's Court of Moscow by the group of parents whose children were partici-
pating in the UC, including Mrs. Russkikh of the St. Petersburg case. The parents
were seeking damages of 2 billion rubles each for emotional distress caused by
the participation of their children, most of whom were of legal age. The claim was
that the participation caused the breakdown of the families and a deterioration of
the health of the participants. The plaintiffs also claimed that the participation was
antigovernmental, and that it was aimed at destroying moral and human dignity
and values.
These claims notwithstanding, the Court found that the UC had committed no
illegal acts, that it was properly registered since 1992 with the Ministry of Justice
of the Russian Federation, and that the participants had adopted the beliefs of the
UC freely and without any force being used. The judgment cited, among other
statutes, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the U.N.
General Assembly (adopted Dec. 10, 1948), which grants the right of freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change one's religion. The
Court also cited the evidence rendered in the St. Petersburg UC case that no harm
had been done to the individuals involved by virtue of their participation in UC.
The plaintiffs had sought new psychiatric examinations of the participants,
but the Court refused the request after hearing convincing testimony from one of
the participants, the daughter of the lead plaintiff, Mrs. Russkikh. There were also
strong efforts made to put the theology of the UC on trial in this case, but the Court
eventually disregarded such testimony, focusing instead on the legal arguments
concerning claims made by the plaintiffs. Those claims were found wanting, and
thus the case was won by the UC, in spite of its attracting some attention in the
media. The case was appealed by the Committee, but in March 1999, the appeal
was turned down by the Moscow City Court.

Legal Attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses

The JWs, who have been present in Russia for more than 100 years, have
been under attack in Russia for decades, suffering severe repression under the
communist regime. After a brief respite in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
effort to attack the JWs has gained new momentum. In 1996, criminal actions
against the JWs were brought in St. Petersburg and Moscow, mainly through the
efforts of anti-cult committees that wanted the JWs abolished. These actions were
not successful because the courts did not find them guilty of any crime. However,
the Prosecutor General's office insisted on continuing investigations of the JWs.
In 1997, the anti-cult Committee for the Protection of Family and Personality in
St. Petersburg filed a suit to liquidate the administrative center of the JWs there,
and asked for 100 million roubles in damages to the mental and physical health
of JW members to be awarded to the committee. In 1998, the court ruled that the
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 399

Committee had no legal standing to file such an action, a decision that might have
had some precedential value.
However, in 1998, an action was brought in Moscow by the anti-cult group
known as the Committee for the Protection of Youth. This is the same group
that lost the case against the UC in Moscow and that is closely related to the
organization that brought the case against the UC in St. Petersburg. The plaintiff
group sought 100 billion rubles to compensate for the damage to the mental and
physical health of its participants. The case was adjourned (postponed) after its
initial filing because of lack of evidence that any harms were being done by the
JWs, coupled with the fact that they were duly registered under the 1990 law.
Since the original adjournment there have been several attempts to revive the
case, but lack of evidence has deterred the efforts until recently. On December
28,1997, the District Prosecutor stated that the JWs activities in Russia fully con-
formed to the Constitution and the Federal law in Russia, which seemed to be a
final statement on the matter. However, on April 13,1998, the Moscow City Pros-
ecutor stated that although there was no ground for a criminal case, "the activities
of the religious organization Jehovah's Witnesses violate... the stipulations of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation,... Russian laws, although concrete facts
have not been found that the members of this organization have committed any
crime" (Decision N334, Criminal Case 217885, April 13, 1998, p. 8).
The matter was then referred to the Prosecutor for the Northern Administra-
tive District of Moscow with the understanding that an action would be brought
in Golivinsky Interregional People's Court to de-register the organization of the
Jehovah's Witnesses. This action was taken, and on August 6, 1998 the Regional
Administrative Center of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia was officially notified
of the effort to liquidate the JWs in Russia. Hearings were held on this case in
September and November 1998, as well as in February and March 1999, with
considerable media attention and public interest, because this represents the first
effort to deregister a religious group since the 1997 law was passed. The prosecutor
presented much evidence against the JWs, but it was refuted by attorneys for the
defense (Krylova, 1999).
The judge adjourned the case yet again, and appointed a panel of expert to
assess the teachings of the JWs, a decision that may delay the case indefinitely.
Thus it is not known what might happen in this important case, but the fact that it is
being pressed at all by authorities brings a sense of foreboding to those interested
in religious freedom in Russia.
The prosecutor in the Moscow case seems motivated by nationalistic rhetoric
and anti-cult sentiments in decisions to press forward with this potentially landmark
case. The defense arguments in the case have successfully refuted most of the
testimony from the prosecutor, thus making it very difficult for the court to rule
in favor of the prosecutor. However, apparently the court has also felt unable to
dismiss the case for political reasons, and thus has used the tactic of adjornment and
delay. In a sense, this might be considered a victory for religious freedom in Russia,
400 Richardson and Shlerin

but the manner in which the case has been handled also seems to demonstrate the
intrusion of politics into the court system in a dramatic way, with the justice system
being used in efforts to exert social control over this and other minority faiths.

Cases Brought by Minority Religions and Their Supporters

Included in this group is a libel action brought by the Hare Krishna against
one Khvila-Olinter in September 1997, a case that was eventually settled in favor
of the plaintiff. Also discussed as a part of this section is the widely publicized
case Yakunin v. Dvorkin, which pitted a major dissident, Father Gleb Yakunin,
against a functionary of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) who was heading
an anti-cult and sect organization affiliated with the ROC. An action filed by the
UC in an effort to fend off governmental intervention is noted briefly as well.

Hare Krishna Libel Action

The Hare Krishna, a group that has been much maligned in Russia by anti-
cult writers, brought an action against one of those writers, Kvilia-Olinter in
Khoroshevsky Municiple Court of Justice (in Moscow) in 1997. Kvilia-Olinter
had written a number of very damning statements about Krishna devotees in anti-
cult pamphlets and articles. On Oct. 9, 1997, after the author admitted publicly
that his claims about the Krishna were incorrect, the case was dismissed. In the
dismissal, the judge stated that differences in theology cannot be used as a basis
for legal action.
The admission by Kvilia-Olinter occurred because the Krishna had been able
to muster very strong evidence to counter the claims made, and it appeared that
the defendant would not be able to prevail at trial. Thus the admission was made to
avoid fighting what appearing to be a losing battle and drawing more attention to
the case.
This case, which did not attract much media attention, was also not attended
to by the ROC or governmental officials. It seemed not to be defined as a major
case by those in positions of power in Russia, and thus it was left alone to be
decided on its merits. Hence the admission and dismissal.

Unification Church Case in Oryol

A branch of CARP, associated with the UC, was established in 1996 and
properly registered there, receiving a certificate of registration on August 21,1996.
It began operations that included recruitment to the UC and the sharing of UC
beliefs with interested parties on the streets of the city. On March 4,1997, the head
of the Department of Justice in Oryol notified the group that it was in violation of
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 401

statutes because of its activities to educate and proselytize among the citizens of
the city.
The warning was taken seriously because the law on public associations
grants authorities the right to liquidate an organization on receipt of a second such
warning. CARP leaders asked for an explanation but received none. On April 2,
1997, however, another official from the department for Relations with Public and
Religious Organizations sent a warning to school officials urging them not to allow
students to attend a festival that was being sponsored by the UC-affiliated group.
The UC CARP group decided to seek legal action to defend themselves, and
they filed a motion seeking the invalidation of the warning. A court date was set
for April 28, 1997, but then moved to May 21, 1997. As part of its evidence for
the case, the CARP plaintiffs sought the advice and help of some experts in the
field of religion who rendered statements that the UC and CARP had not violated
the terms of their registration, and that there was no legal basis for the warning.
On May 20, 1997, the head of the Department of Justice informed the Court
that he had abolished the warning. Other actions were taken as well that indicated
the case would not be pressed. Thus, this case was a victory for the UC.

Yakunin v. Dvorkin: Battle of the Titans

A much publicized libel case, Yakunin v. Dvorkin, with considerable implica-

tions for religious freedom, took place in Russia in April and May 1997 (Shterin
and Richardson, 1999). It involved as plaintiff a high-profile Russian human rights
organization headed by noted Russian dissident Father Gleb Yakunin and as de-
fendant a functionary of the ROC who was also a leader of the anti-cult movement
(ACM) in Russia. The case attracted considerable attention within Russia and
elsewhere, and played a role in the campaign to modify the rather liberal national
law in Russia passed in 1990 concerning religious activities within Russia. (The
authors were both expert witnesses in this case; see Shterin and Richardson, 1999).
The case was brought by the Committee for the Protection of Freedom of
Conscience, led by Father Gleb Yakunin. Father Yakunin was a prominent political
dissident who first came to the attention of Russian politicians and ROC officials in
1965, when he and another ROC priest wrote lengthy open letters to the chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as well as to Patriarch Aleksii
I, head of the ROC (Shterin and Richardson, 1998).
For his actions, Yakunin and his fellow priest were removed from their
parishes and banned from exercising priestly functions. After years of other quite-
public dissident activities, Yakunin was arrested in 1979 and sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of internal exile. In 1987, he was released
from his sentence, one of the many signs that changes were occurring under Pere-
stroika. Yakunin became one of the leaders of the political movement "Democratic
Russia," and was elected member of the Duma, the Russian parliament.
402 Richardson and Shterin

Yakunin continued to be a staunch critic of both the Communist Party and

the ROC, and also made charges of ROC collaboration with the Soviet regime and
alleged corruption within the Church's highest hierarchy. This posture put him in
conflict with the Church's hierarchy, especially after his refusal to abide by the
Patriarch's order that forbade the clergy's participation in political institutions. He
was first defrocked and then excommunicated from the ROC and, in a controversial
move, passed under jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Yakunin's involvement as head of the Committee that brought the suit guaran-
teed it a high profile and considerable media attention. The suit named as defendant
Alexandre Dvorkin, the chief ideologist of the ACM in Russia. Alexandre Dvorkin
emigrated from Russia in 1984 and eventually came to the United States. He at-
tended the Vladimir Spiritual Academy and Fordham University in New York
City, where he received a doctorate in church history. He claims a specialty in
ROC history. Dvorkin then had a short stint working for Western broadcasting
institutions that aimed to reach out to the then Soviet Union. In 1991, after the
fall of communism, he went back to Russia and began to work with the ROC.
He set up the Irineus of Leon Information Center affiliated with the ROC and
closely connected to a number of Western anti-cult organizations, especially the
well-known (in anti-cult circles) Dialogue Center (Denmark) of which he is a vice
chairman.
In 1995, Dvorkin wrote a booklet "The ten questions to a recruiter. A manual
for those who do not want to be recruited." In his booklet, Dvorkin lists a number
of minority religions (the Mormons, Jehovah Witnesses, ISKCON, Unification
Church, Scientology, and others) that he describes as "totalitarian sects" that are
in essence "mafioso structures" (p. 9). He further claimed that the groups expose
their members to "constant violence; from beating to rape" (p. 5), and he stated
that they would not stop short of "lying, stealing, misleading people, using mind
control on their co-believers... and... even get rid physically of those who are in
their way" (p. 9).
The grounds for a libel action were that the organizations mentioned by
Dvorkin were officially recognized under the 1990 law by the Russian state (i.e.,
registered with the Ministry of Justice) and did not have any record of criminal ac-
tivity in Russia that would allow someone to question their reputation so blatantly.
Accordingly, in the Committee's view, Dvorkin's allegations could be regarded as
libelous. Thus, the plaintiffs presumed that the new religious movements (NRMs)
whose rights they undertook to defend must be evaluated on the basis of what they
had actually done within Russia, instead of on the basis of anti-cultist inspired
claims made about alleged actions elsewhere.
Before proceeding, one significant legal peculiarity of this court case that
may have affected its outcome should be considered. In strictly legal terms, the
Committee was not entitled to bring the case because it was not directly affected
by the booklet, and thus had no legal standing. In order to pursue the case against
Dvorkin initially, the Committee had to persuade at least one group or an individual
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 403

member to enter the case as plaintiff—an action that the organizations were loathe
to undertake, apparently for fear of arousing the ROC even more. After some
negotiation, two members of ISKCON and a number of Scientologists filed an
action against Dvorkin, only to withdraw immediately before or at the beginning
of the court case. This withdrawal left the Committee "holding the bag," but after
the Committee filed a motion to be substituted as plaintiff in the case, the Court
issued a ruling that allowed the case to proceed with the Committee so listed,
accepting the claim made by the Committee that its leaders were members of at
least one of the groups named in Dvorkin's writing. Thus what might be termed a
legal fiction served as the basis for granting the Committee legal standing required
to substitute for the original plaintiffs.
Defendant Dvorkin, after being challenged with the libel action, admitted
that their was little proof that the groups named had violated any Russian laws.
However, he claimed that each of the groups was part of an international "destruc-
tive cult" network, and that they should not be allowed to practice their faith in
Russia because of the dangers associated with these international connections. He
also claimed that the groups were totalitarian sects, a term with heavy negative
connotations in Russia. The defendant claimed as well that his booklet was an
exercise of his right to spread information and warn society against a potentially
dangerous phenomenon. Thus Dvorkin adopted a defense based on the basic val-
ues of freedom of speech and press, as well as the idea that the groups named had
histories of legal problems in the West.
The plaintiff Committee saw its task as limited to purely legal matters related
to Russian laws. Committee leaders believed that because there was no evidence
of wrongdoing in Russia by the groups named in the booklet, then there was no
justification for the defendant's allegations. Thus the Committee was attempting
to limit the legal action to claims about actions of the named groups in Russia, and
they assumed that the technical truth of the groups not having been convicted or
violating any Russian laws would be a sufficient to make the case that Dvorkin's
writings were libelous. Thus the plaintiff Committee carrying the legal action was
depending ultimately on the idea of religious freedom being paramount, given the
1990 law granting religious freedom, and that religious freedom would protect the
religions Dvorkin attacked so strongly in his publication.
The defendant had to be allowed to create during the court proceedings a
negative image of all NRMs and show that it was applicable to the ones mentioned
in the booklet. However, there were hidden resources available to the defendant,
including the influence of the ROC and the strong tendency for the media to do
what has been done in the West concerning new religions—that is, treat them
stereotypically and negatively.
The plaintiffs, however, perhaps naively thought they might rely on the recent
history in Russia of the apparent development of considerable religious freedom,
as evidenced by the 1990 law. Also, they were depending as well as on a strict in-
terpretation of the law of libel in Russia. However, as it turned out, the Committee
404 Richardson and Shterin

had limited resources with which to counter the strong negative opinions engen-
dered in the media and the support of the defendant that accrued from certain other
institutional structures in Russia, particularly the ROC.
The judges in the case had a crucial choice early in the case of deciding
between two options (trial courts in Russia have one professional judge and two
lay judges, but no jury). The organizations written about by Dvorkin in his booklet
could be regarded on their own merit as Russian organizations that were responsible
only for what they might have done in Russia; or the organizations could be
assumed to be a part of the international "destructive cult" networks described
by Dvorkin, which would make evidence from international scholars and others
potentially relevant as well as broaden the scope of the trial considerably.
The judge ruled at the outset of the case that international expert witnesses
could be invited from the both sides, thus, by implication, accepting the defendant's
supposition that the court was dealing with an international problem and that
the evidence from elsewhere was relevant and probative, and could therefore be
applicable to NRMs operating in Russia. Literature on NRMs in the West was
allowed, as was testimony, concerning NRMs in the West.
Thus the stage was set for this libel action to become a battleground between
political forces in Russia. The case was much more than a simply "garden variety"
libel case. It became instead a major political and public relations battle between
two forces in Russia: those who wanted change and openness to the West and
newer religions, and those who wanted to close Russia to more Western influence,
including especially perhaps, religious groups. It is also possible to describe what
happened with the case by saying that NRMs became a pawn in a much larger
game involving major cultural and political forces in Russia.
The final judgment in the case, rendered after a 5-week trial, was in favor
of the defendant. The case was appealed, but to no avail, and the judgment now
stands as a high water mark for the influence of the ROC and the political structure
on the legal system. Also, the plaintiffs are liable themselves for the cost of the
trial, which were considerable (see Shterin and Richardson, 1999, for much more
detail on this case).

CONCLUSIONS

The court cases discussed in this article seem indicative of the readjustments
that Russian society is undergoing in relation to religion and religious groups.
On the one hand, there are vestiges of the previous short-lived infatuation with
liberalism and religious freedom of which the 1990 law was an obvious result. Thus,
a few cases have been won by newer religious groups under the 1990 law, especially
if the cases had not gained attention from the ROC and political authorities. On
the other hand, by the time of the major Yakunin case, the equality of religions and
individual freedom of religion had ceased to be indisputable concepts. The bloom
was off the rose of religious freedom in Russia, and more traditional values were
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 405

being asserted, values that include a preeminent place for the ROC. The traditional
idea was being reestablished that the various religions were to play different roles
in society and receive differential treatment from state institutions, the media, and
the general public.
The activities of some of the new religious phenomena, especially aggressive
proselytizing by Western groups, although usually within legal limits, had caused
considerable anxieties on the part of the ROC and some other sections of society.
Such activities had been almost unheard of in Russia, where for centuries everyone
was assumed to be born into the ROC (if they are not Jewish, Muslim, or Buddhist,
of course). The social environment that in the early 1990s seemed favorable to
new religions, including even ones from the West, had changed radically in a few
years. The ROC, with its general rejection of any kind of proselytism in Russian
territory, and the ACM within Russia specifically targeting NRMs, became the
major constructors of a negative image of all new religions operating in Russia
(Shterin and Richardson, 2000).
The following points are worth highlighting as a way of summarizing the
general conclusions suggested by this review of cases and the sociology of law
variables and processes discussed in the introduction to this collection:

1. The use of the legal system seems to be increasing in matters dealing

with religion. This development has been encouraged by recent decisions
to allow parents groups to have standing to bring actions against reli-
gious groups. The confluence of private and state interests in some of the
cases is readily apparent, with prosecutors and other governmental offi-
cials getting deeply involved in some cases that were originally brought
by private anti-cult groups. Thus, it seems safe to say that the legal sys-
tem is becoming more pervasive, at least as it refers to social control
efforts focused on minority religions. However, it must be stated that the
record so far is mixed, with some victories by religious minorities, as well
as some losses, some of which were major ones (the Yakunin case par-
ticularly). So, there is some hope that social justice considerations will
prevail in Russia, and that the legal system will work not just as a device
of social control, but also as a process wherein religious freedoms are
defended.
2. Judicial systems vary greatly in terms of their independence from influ-
ence by other institutions within a given society. In the instances described
herein, it is seems clear that some cases evoke considerable attention from
other institutional structures in Russian society. When this happens, there
appears to be a relative lack of autonomy of the judicial system demon-
strated in how the cases are handled. Political and historical forces some-
times operate that may, at least temporarily, overpower the independence
of the court, leading to questionable decisions in the realm of due pro-
cess, admission and assessment of evidence, as well as problematic judg-
ments. Thus, it seems clear that judicial discretion and autonomy can be
406 Richardson and Shterin

compromised in at least some cases, even if there are some exceptions to

that general rule.
3. Rules and practices guaranteeing due process are not well developed or
consistently applied. Who can bring a case (the standing issue) and collect
damages seems quite flexible, allowing normative considerations to play
a sometimes large role, especially in cases that become high profile in the
media. Allowing, for instance, parents groups to initiate actions against
new religious movement groups is problematic, and would not be allowed
in most Western countries, yet this has happened frequently in Russia in
recent years.
4. Judicial systems may not clearly distinguish between scientific and non-
scientific evidence concerning religious groups, especially when there are
external pressures not to do so. Thus, in certain contexts, courts are prone
to treat the two types of evidence equally, or worse yet, to grant greater pro-
bative value to sensationalistic ACM-oriented testimony, most of which
has been imported from the Western ACM (Shterin and Richardson, 2000).
The proceedings of several of the court cases described leaves the impres-
sion that almost anything may be deemed acceptable as scientific evidence,
suggesting that at least some Russian courts are unsophisticated in dealing
with such matters as scientific evidence about religious groups, especially
unpopular ones. (This is not just a problem in Russia, of course. See
Richardson, 2000a, for a discussion of the misuse of discretion in other
countries, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
the United States in cases involving minority faiths. See also Ginsburg
and Richardson, 1998, and Anthony, this issue, for critiques of so-called
brainwashing-based testimony in cases involving new religious groups.)
5. Related to the issue of evidentiary criteria is the status of the proffered
expert witness. It is difficult to expect that judges could be sufficiently
academically equipped to handle the problem of validity and reliability
of complex social scientific evidence. They inevitably rely on the expert
opinion. But who is to be regarded as experts and in which fields? For
instance, sociologists of religion who testified in the Yakunin case never
claimed expertise in the Christian Lutheran theology, but a noted Lutheran
pastor and theologian from Denmark who testified for the defendant in-
dulged in wholesale criticism of sociological methods. His testimony was
offered from a theological and normative perspective, but the difference
between that view and the social scientific perspective appeared to be lost
on judges and others, including the media. In other cases, particularly the
Aum Shinrikyo case, there was a battle between members of the psychi-
atric community, with the more anti-cult oriented ones being used as a
basis for the judgment to disband the organization.
6. As the cases suggest, the judges may be totally unprepared to distin-
guish between personalistic allegations on the one hand and scientific
Minority Religions in Russian Courts 407

generalizations on the other hand. The tendency seems to be for the judges
to pay more attention to reliability of presented facts rather than to validity
of interpretations and generalization drawn from them. In this respect, aca-
demic expert witnesses may find themselves in disadvantageous situations
in which the complex pictures of NRMs they offer in their testimonies may
be interpreted in incorrect ways, with only negatively viewed facts being
selected out and focused on by the opposition.
7. Judges in high-profile cases important to other major institutional struc-
tures seem to experience enormous pressures and considerable limitations
as they deal with the issues of the case. There were, in the Yakunin case,
considerable pressures from some representatives of the ROC who inter-
preted the case to be directed against the Church. This has also occurred in
other cases involving minority faiths in Russia. At the end of the Yakunin
case, a high-ranking Orthodox official requested permission to offer a
"blessing from the Patriarch" in favor of the defendant (permission was
granted!), as but one example of many public indications of unofficial ROC
support for the defendant. More importantly, at the time of that particular
court case, a general frontal attack against Western "sects and cults" on
nationalistic grounds was fully underway within the whole range of po-
litical bodies (from the Duma, the lower house of the parliament, to the
government) preparing major restrictive amendments to the 1990 Russian
Law on Freedom of Conscience. The Aum Shinrikyo case also showed
the impact of high-level political authorities directing that an action be
taken in a given case. Such directives bring pressure to bear, and the legal
system has usually concurred in these high-profile cases.
8. The variables of status and intimacy described in Richardson (2000b)
seem to be working here, both in the losses suffered by minority reli-
gions, but also in the few victories won. For instance, the UC case and the
JW case in Moscow involved a well-known attorney representing them,
Galina Krylova, who understood the law very well. Her personal involve-
ment gave some credence to the defense. However, this same attorney was
involved in the Aum Shinrikyo case and the appeal of the Yakunin case,
which was lost. In those situations it seemed obvious that major political
forces had spoken, and that the AUM and the plaintiffs in Yakunin were
going to lose, even if it meant overpowering the status and intimacy vari-
able. There was considerable credible evidence that the AUM group had
broken no laws and harmed no one inside Russia, and that the defendant
in the Yakunin case had indeed libeled some minority faiths by publishing
untruths about their activities. However, the cases were lost anyway.
9. The cases described, and especially the major ones that received the most
media and other attention, show that Russia is struggling with religious
pluralism. Apparently, many in positions of authority want Russia to look
backward to a time of comparative cultural homogeneity. This position
408 Richardson and Shterin

does not recognize the new, more pluralistic reality in Russia, and it ig-
nores the tremendous influence that the West has on Russia, particularly
its youth. Thus, it would seem that political and religious authorities in
Russia will be engaged in the battle against the forces of pluralism for
some time to come. Only time will tell the outcome of this struggle, and
if social justice will prevail for participants in minority faiths in Russia.

REFERENCES

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H. (ed.). Law and Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 265-288.
Krylova, G. A. (1996). Psychiatry treats heterodoxy. Unpublished paper. Moscow.
Krylova, G. A. (1998). Freedom of conscience on the scales of justice. Unpublished paper. Moscow.
Krylova, G. A. (1999). The Jehovah's Witness case in Moscow. Presented at 13th International CESNUR
Conference, Bryn Athyn, PA. June 2-5.
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