Legal Ethics EH307

Cases 21-40 Digest

Garcy Kate D. Go LLB - 1

PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., Court of Industrial
Relations and Quentin Muning

Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo in the Court of Industrial Relations. The complainants were represented by
Cipriano Cid & Associates thru Atty. ANastacio Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non-layer.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of the complainants; a portion of
that order granted respondent Quentin Muning, a non-laywer attorney’s fees for
professional service. Thus a petition was filed seeking review of the order made by the
Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo.

Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?

Holding: Order under review is set aside.

Ratio: Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent

Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot therefore, recover
attorney’s fees.

Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party litigants should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications for the protection of the
courts, clients and the public.

The permission of a non-lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself
entitle the representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court provides: Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s Agreement as to Fees – An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees.

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B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs CA, Eulogio Reyes, Nicanor Salaysay and Anotonio
Marinas

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to review the resolution of
respondent court in CA-GR No. 53546R denying petitioner’s motion to reinstate its
appeal earlier dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief.

Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased filed an action for damages with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch against the Director of Public Works and
petitioner B.R. Sebastian Enterprise Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-
R.

On May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages
but absolving the other defendants. On appeal, counsel for petitioner Baizas, Alberto
and Associates failed to file the Brief within the prescribed period and subsequently
failed to answer the Court of Appeal’s resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

On September 28, 1974, Baizas’ Law Office filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
that the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner resulted in the dissolution of
Baizas, Alberto and Associates.

Issue: WON the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal?

Holding: Petition is dismissed.

Ratio: The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas’ is not a valid justification for its failure to file the brief. With Atty. Baizas’ death,
the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the
Rules or Court.

Moreover, the appearance of counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner.

The rule is well settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.

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Cases 21-40 Digest
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Adelino H. Ledesma v Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case
pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharged his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as
counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as
counsel de oficio for the defendents. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the COMELEC requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied
the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: WON the order of the respondent judge in denying the motion of the petitioner
is a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding: No, Ledesma’s withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the
duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the
bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer maybe required to act as counsel de oficio
to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services
are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer’s zeal.

Ratio: The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are judges,
or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the Office of the Solicitor
General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, Section 35 of the Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court). The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant
counsel’s counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of
attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant
(People vs Williams CA GR. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963).

To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a

lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio (People v. Daban). Moreover, the
right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional
right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of
law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to
enjoy them (People vs Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950).

The trial court in criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de
oficio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused
(Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930).
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Cases 21-40 Digest
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Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210

Facts: Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception
practiced in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the
introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn
in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza claimed that he took
no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood,
whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence
and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the
administration of justice.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood
committed in court.

Held: YES. Respondent was reprimanded.

Ratio: There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursuedby the
respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the lawyer’s oath is one impressed
with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to issue
reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if
the offense of the same character is repeated

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Cases 21-40 Digest
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EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA vs. ENGRACIO CASTILLO

Facts: APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
ProVince.

MTC: Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez, Quezon
Province. A copy of the court’s decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, was sent by
registered mail to her lawyer at San Pablo City. That mail was received in the city post
office on the following day. The city postmaster’s office supposedly sent to Barrameda’s
counsel three notices regarding the registered mail.

Barrameda’s lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal court
and was received there as unclaimed mail.

Eusebia Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse decision could not
be served upon her lawyer. She received personally a copy of the decision.

CFI: Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal. Castillo did not interpose in
the municipal court any objection to her appeal. The court gave it due course.

Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it was filed out of time. His theory was that the fifteen-day reglementary
period within which Barrameda could appeal should be counted from the expiration of
five days from the date of the first notice sent by the postmaster to Barrameda’s lawyer.

In this case, the supposed first notice was sent, when the mail in question was
received in the San Pablo City post office. The five days counted from that date expired
when the second notice was allegedly sent to Barrameda’s lawyer.

Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillo’s motion to dismiss her appeal. She contended
that Castillo failed to prove that her counsel actually received the supposed three
notices sent by the postmaster. She argued that because in the municipal court Castillo
did not object to her appeal, his motion could no longer be entertained in the Court of
First Instance.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. It assumed that the
fifteen-day period should be counted from the date of the third notice and the period
had already expired, according to the trial court’s computation.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal.

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Ruling: Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments.—Final orders or judgments shall be
served either personally or by registered mail, x x x.
“SEC. 8. Completeness of service.—Personal service is complete upon actual
delivery. x x x Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days
from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.”

In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the addressee does not claim his
mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then the service
takes effect at the expiration of such time.
If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed complete on the 6th
day, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives his mail two months
after it is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is complete on
the date of actual receipt, following the general rule.

Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail refers to

constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident that the fair and just
application of that exception depends upon conclusive proof that a first notice was sent
by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed should not be applied to such a situation.

Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, who relies on

constructive service or who contends that his adversary was served with a copy of a final
order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of registered
mail sent by the postmaster to prove that that first notice was sent and delivered to the
addressee. A certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact.
The mailman’s testimony may also be adduced to prove that fact..

The postmaster’s certification as to the sending of the first notice “should include
the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent
but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made.”

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to
Barrameda’s lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should have been received by
him. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented in court. The face of
the envelope contains the notation “Returned to sender. Reason: Unclaimed”. Above
the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the legend “City of San Pablo, Philippines

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are written the dates. Written also on the back of the envelope are the following: “R to
S, notified 3/3/66”.

Relying on those notations on “the envelope, the trial court literally and rigidly
applied the presumption as to constructive service. It did not require appellee Castillo to
present the postmaster’s certification that a first notice was sent to Barrameda’s lawyer
and that the notice was received by the latter.

Under those circumstances, the trial court’s order dismissing Barrameda’s appeal is
fraught with injustice.

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Cases 21-40 Digest
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PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor
children, LYDIA MALIJAN, JOSEFINA MALIJAN, TEODORA MALIJAN, and
SEBASTIAN MALIJAN vs. LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN

Facts: Pantaleon Malijan was walking with Leonardo Amante when he was hit by a
gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While on the ground, Malijan was again
run over by the tanker’s right wheel that got detached from its axle. Amante, with the
help of the barrio captain, brouugh Malijan to the hospital, but was declared dead on
arrival. The gasoline tanker was driven by Ernesto Labasan, employee of Lily Lim Tan.

So the plaintiffs filed a case for damages against Tan and the driver. The defendants
failed to answer so they were declared in default, and son the plaintiffs were allowed to
present evidence ex parte. After this, the trial court rendered a decision in favour of the
plaintiffs. Labasan the driver was ordered to pay for the hospitalization
expenses,medical treatment, vigil and burial of Malijan, as well as indemnity for death,
loss of earnings, moral damages, attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit. The trial court
held that if Labasan can’t pay, Tan should pay as she is subsidiarily liable as owner and
operator of the tanker.

And so defendants appealed and asked that the order of default be lifted, and asked
for a new trial. They said that the accident was due to force majeure, and that Tan
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. But the trial court
denied this appeal.

Mostly procedural matters were brought up, with defendants saying that they didn’t
file an answer because their lawyer only told them about the suit on the 11 th day after
receipt, but still the court didn’t excuse defendants from not answering especially since
they still had 4 days to answer. The defendants further put blame on their lawyer Atty.
Chavez who was allegedly abnormal at that time, as shown by his having committed
suicide a few months after the complaint was lodged. But the court held that Atty.
Chavez still exercised ordinary and reasonable care over the interests of his client when
he made a long distance call to Tan asking for the specifics of the case, then endorsed
the suit to Atty. De Castro.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the appellants in default.

Ruling: In the instant case, We agree with the trial court, that appellants have not shown
that they exercised such diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise, to have
the answer filed within the reglementary period. Appellant Lily Lim Tan admitted in her
affidavit that she received the summons and copy of the complaint on May 19, 1966,
and that having read the complaint she found out that she was being sued, together
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with her driver, for damages in connection with the accident of February 6, 1965 at Sto.
Tomas, Batangas. The damages asked in the complaint amounts to P36,600.00. The
summons required them to answer the complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof,
and warned them that should they fail to answer within said period the plaintiffs would
take judgment against-them for the relief demanded in the complaint. The damages
demanded was not a negligible sum, and appellant Lily Lim Tan, who is a business
woman, should have considered the matter a serious one. Ordinary prudence would
dictate that she should concern herself about the matter, that she should refer said
complaint with the least possible delay to her lawyer. But, for reasons she did not
explain, she referred the complaint to her lawyer only after the lapse of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, i.e., on May 30, 1966. She should have considered that four days
might not be sufficient time for her lawyer to prepare and file the answer.

The lower court’s denial of the motion to lift order of default and new trial is
affirmed.

Fernandez, concurring and dissenting

The negligence of Tan and Atty. Chavez should be excused. Chavez had a troubled
mind, that’s why he misinformed the parties on the date of summons. Atty de Castro
was not negligent since he relied on the information Atty. Chavez gave. So, Justice
Fernandez believes Tan should’ve been granted a new trial.

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Cases 21-40 Digest
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INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO, SR., CONSUELO

DOMINGO DE LOPEZ vs. PEDRO A. AQUINO, deceased, substituted by
SALVACION YUSAY AQUlNO ETC., and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment
approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate
by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from
the available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum
from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of Appeals, and
on January 20, 1967, the appellate court found for respondent as appellant, and
affirmed the lower court's judgment with modifications in favor of respondent.
Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9,
1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be
served with a copy of the Judgment," stating inter alia, that the former special
administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as such with the
permission of the intestate court, that the other co-special administrator, Atty. Luis
Domingo, Jr. was removed from his trust by the intestate court's order dated May 21,
1963, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has
since been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix
wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that
the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of
on Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of
time to move for re hearing or reconsideration;" and praying that as present judicial
administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her
counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's decision.

The appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration

No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later
when on September 23, 1967, after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion
for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the
present petition. Upon the representations — contrary to the records — that the
appellate court had granted "new or further relief" in favor of respondent by awarding
compound interest on the sum due respondent and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be
the estate's lawyer since May 21, 1963 with the removal of the former administrator,
Luis Domingo, Jr. as such.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Jose A. Unson ceased to be the estate's lawyer with the
removal of the former administrator Luis Domingo, Jr.
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Ruling: The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on
record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as
such counsel. As a matter of fact, even after the removal on May 21, 1963 of Luis
Domingo, Jr. as administrator the estate, Atty. Unson filed in the appellate court his
memorandum dated August 17, 1963, for the estate as appellant. While it may be true
that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel for the estate and for the former administrator
sometime on November 8, 1966, when the intestate court granted his motion
dated November 2, 1966, to withdraw as counsel by virtue of his appointment to and
assumption on February 8, 1966 of the public office of Assistant Administrator of the
Sugar Quota Administration, 2 this was true only insofar as the case in the intestate
court was concerned. He continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the
estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and
neither did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel or of party-
administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no
appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.

The party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C.
Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case.
The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity
as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding
Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel
in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its
counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.

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MARIA CRISTINA MANALOTO vs. SIXTO L. REYES

Facts: Sixto L. Reyes was legal counsel for the Manaloto family. He also undertook to
help said family to secure a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines. For his
services, the Manaloto family allegedly paid him not less than P1,000.00 exclusive of
traveling expenses. He, however, admits having received only a total of P590.00 and two
sacks of rice as his fees in the cases he handled in behalf of the Mnaloto family.

On October 13, 1961, Maria Cristina Manaloto instituted disbarment proceedings

against Sixto L. Reyes for abandonment of the cases and conversion of sums of money
entrusted to him by the petitioner and her sister, Rosario.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty for abandonment of cases and conversion
of sums of money entrusted to him.

"ABANDONMENT"
In the evening of July 17, 1961 respondent Sixto L. Reyes informed petitioner herein
that inasmuch as he was pre-occupied with the election campaign of congressional
candidate Rellosa in the province of Laguna, he would entrust to Atty. Jacinto de los
Reyes the hearing of the said cases. This proposal of respondent did not meet with
petitioner's approval. Forthwith, petitioner requested, by telegram and telephone, for
the postponement of the scheduled hearing.
Subsequently, petitioner verbally advised respondent that she intended to replace
him with another lawyer. This, she did by retaining the services of Atty. Vicente
Fernando as counsel in the aforesaid cases.

Ruling: This charge preferred by petitioner cannot prosper. First of all, respondent did
not retire from the cases. Petitioner dismissed respondent and substituted him with
Atty. Vicente Fernando. Secondly, the act of respondent in proposing to petitioner that
Atty. Jacinto de los Reyes conduct the hearing of the cases scheduled for July 18, 1961,
did not amount to abandonment by respondent of said cases. On the contrary, it tended
to show his interest in said cases, otherwise, he would not have proposed that another
lawyer attend to the hearing of the two cases in his absence. True, Atty. de los Reyes did
not actually proceed to Victoria and Tarlac but it was because petitioner herself took
steps to have the hearing postponed. Hence, there was actually no hearing to take care
of.

"CONVERSION"
In the morning of January 31, 1961 respondent asked and received from the
Manaloto family the sum of P500.00 allegedly to be used in filing the proper action in
court to stay the auction sale scheduled at ten o'clock in the same morning. Acting upon
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respondent's advice and assurance that the sale would be stopped, petitioner stayed at
home on that day and did not anymore bother to check with the sheriff's office.

Later, petitioner was informed that, the auction sale went on as scheduled and her
mother's property was sold to the highest bidder. Upon inquiry with the clerk of court
she further learned that respondent filed no motion with, and paid no money to, the
court in order to stop or postpone the auction sale. The sum of P500.00 was never
returned to her.

On another occasion, petitioner solicited respondent's help in applying for an

industrial loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines but the respondent did not
file the application for loan. He did not pay to the bank the amount of P30.00 which she
gave him for filing fee and the said amount was likewise never returned to her by
respondent.

The respondent denies having received both sum of P500.00 and P30.00

Held:
Although petitioner could not present any receipt signed by respondent therefor —
for there was none — we have found her oral evidence sufficiently convincing. And,
considering that respondent never returned to her the amounts involved, the
presumption is that he appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.

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Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals

61 SCRA 85

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the resolution
reinstating Alvendia’s appeal and to compel the Court of Appeals to remand the record
to the lower court for the execution of its final judgment. In 1963 a judgment based on a
compromise was rendered by the City Court of Manila in a case instituted by Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc against Jesus Alvendia. In 1968 the said corporation again sued
Alvendia in the City Court of Manila for the revival of the judgment.

The City Court of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of Gutierrez. Alvendia appealed
which after a trial de novo affirmed its decision with some modifications in it decision
dated June 5, 1973. In all those proceeding, Alvendia’s counsel of record was Escolastico
Viola. The copy of the decision was served on Viola and not on Baizas, Alberto and
Associates.

On February 26, 1974 the Court of Appeals notified viola that the docket fee of forty-
eight pesos and the legal research fee of forty five peso should be paid within fifteen
days from notice and that forty copies of the printed record on appeal should be filed
within sixty days, with warning that failure to do so would constitute an abandonment of
the appeal and cause of the dismissal thereof. Viola received that notice on February 28,
1974 however he failed to comply with the notice. Thus, the CA dismissed his appeal.

On June 26, 1974 or forty-nine days after the order of dismissal was served Atty. Viola,
Alvendia through Rodolfo Espiritu of the Baizas law office, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that order on the ground that Viola had ceased to be Alvendia
counsel since September, 1973 and that Atty. Baizas had taken his place and latter would
handle the appeal.

The motion was verified and was supported by their affidavits, the gist of which is that,
due to the death of Atty. Baizas. Alvendia failed to follow up his appeal and Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. opposed the motion for reconsideration. It insisted that viola was
Alvendia’s counsel of record for purposes of the appeal and that Baizas had never
entered his appearance as Alvendia’s counsel. It claimed that the resolution had already
become final and that the Court of Appeals had no more jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: WON the CA erred in granting the motion and reinstated Alvendia’s Appeal

Held: YES, Atty. Viola was negligent in not apprising Alvendia of the notice to pay the
docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of the printed record on appeal.
Alvendia is bound by his lawyer’s negligence. Viola was also negligent in not making a
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formal withdrawal as Alvendia’s counsel and in not appraising the Court of Appeals that
Baizas was supposedly appellant new counsel. In the absence of a formal withdrawal, he
continued to be Alvendia’s counsel of record.

Moreover, “where a party is represented by two attorneys, the rule is that the notice
maybe made either upon one of them, regardless of whether they belong to the same
law firm or are practicing one independently of the other. The death of one of the
lawyers was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to its
clients appeal supposing arguendo that his office was one actually collaborating with the
case. The new counsel who handled the case did not file a formal appearance in the
Court of Appeals.

It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of a strict
compliance with the periods for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and that
transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise those periods could
be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would ultimately become
inutile.

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Aro vs. Nanawa

27 SCRA 109

Facts: Petitioner Regino Aro, a practicing lawyer, engaged by respondents Luis Magtibay
and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their
deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay. During the period in which the petitioner services were
rendered, the plaintiff and the defendant of the case, handled by the petitioner, entered
into an amicable settlement. Plaintiffs and defendant made an extrajudicial partition of
the properties and the plaintiff waived their share in favor of the defendant Aurelio
Martinez, thru which fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was deprived of his contingent
fees agreed upon.

Issue: WON the dismissal of the lawyer, without justifiable cause, said lawyer is entitled
for payment in full of attorney’ fees (as expressly agreed upon in contract in herein case)

Held: The client cannot, by settling compromising, or dismissing his suit during its
pendency, deprive the lawyer of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless the
lawyer consents to such settlement, compromise or dismissal, for the lawyer is or hall be
entitled to have and recover from his clients a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
service rendered and the professional standing of the lawyer. Albeit, under Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Ethics, in fixing fees it should not be forgotten that the
profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not mere money getting trade.
It must be emphasized that the same provision, which is an incorporation of Republic
Act 636 into the Rules of Court, also provide that if the contract between client and
lawyer had been reduced into writing and the dismissal of the lawyer was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full compensation. In the
case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement in question and even inserting
therein a prayer to the court to dismiss the case filed by the petitioner, petitioner’s client
impliedly dismissed him. Such implied dismissal appears to us to have been made
without justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in the record, and so Section 26 Rule
138 applies here. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to recover full compensation.

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Francisco vs. Matias

10 SCRA 89

Facts: In May, 1952, Atty. Francisco’s services were engaged to secure the probate of the
will of Gabina Raquel. Upon the allowance of the will rested the Aurea Matias right to
the bulk of an estate, worth more than 1 million pesos. Had the will been disallowed,
Aurea Matias and the other legatees named in the will would have received nothing. The
whole estate would have passed to the oppositor- to the exclusion of Matias and the
other legatees named in the will. The probate of the will, confronted Aurea’s counsel
with question of fact and questions of law. Counsel had to prove that the said will was
valid, duly executed in accordance with the law. Attempting to minimize the importance
to the estate of legal services in securing approval of the will, Aurea Matias points out
that will or no will, the estate remains. The argument, however plausible, overlooks the
significance of the will. It is the desire, the command of the owner of the estate as to
how inheritance shall be distributed. In upholding the will and working its approval, the
lawyer was simply serving such departed owner of the estate and so in effect serving the
estate.

Issue: WON Atty. Francisco is entitled of lawyer’s fee.

Held: The professional standing of Atty. Francisco has been amply attested to by the late
Senator Claro M. Recto and the former Secretary of Justice Jose Bengzon. That Atty.
Francisco has been shown to have practiced since his admission to the bar, either alone
or in associate with other equally prominent lawyers to have figured in several
precedent laying controversies decided by the Court; to have annotated or written
commentaries on practically every branch of the law; to have published and edited for
23 years, the lawyers Journal; to have founded a law school; to have actively participated
in various political and civic organizations, and to have been elected as a Philippine
Senator where he got the most number of votes. Taking into account all the variables of
proceeding in the light of our several pronouncement on matter of contingent lawyer’s
fees we feel that the modify the appealed resolution and awarding instead of 25% to
12% the market value of the estate, should be given to Atty. Francisco as counsel Fees
for it would accomplish substantial justice.

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Quilban vs. Robinol

171 SCRA 768

Facts: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint before
this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75000 and
praying that the court exercise its power to discipline over members of the bar unworthy
to practice law.

In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by complainants to

appeal their case to the CA after they had lost in the lower court. The agreement as to
the attorneys’ fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the decision of
the lower Courts decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of
the litigation. There was confusion as to payment and they want the lawyers to be
disciplined for the said actions of the lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally
true that the Court cannot pass judgment on complainants pleas that the amount
deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an
ordinary action that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money
in his possession for himself but he is holding it until the fees are satisfied there being no
guarantee for its satisfaction because of the complainants refusal to pay him.

Issue: WON Atty. Robinol is unworthy to practice law.

Held: Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct
that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession. After the CA had
rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter’s funds,
suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land equivalent
to that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money
not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because under the
circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so. His clients were mere squatters who
could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas
per family with which after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage
of them.

The principle of quantum merit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price

agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case however, there was an
express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on
quantum merit therefore is inapplicable.

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Matute vs. Matute

Facts: This is an appeal by Carlos V. Matute and Matias V. Matute, co-administrators of

the Testate Estate of the late Amadeo Matute Olave, and by their attorney-at-law,
Paterno Canlas, to seek reversal of the probate court’s order of 22 April 1967 requiring
these appellants to surrender seventeen titles to divers properties of the estate to the
assistant clerk of court for safekeeping. The incident originated in a motion filed by
respondents praying that the appellant be ordered to surrender said properties. The
motion was resisted by the co-administrators pleading that the removal of Matias as
administrator and his replacement by Jose S. Matute were still under appeal; that the
titles of aforesaid had been delivered to both Matias and Carlos Matute; that the latter
“is at present and from time to time in possession of the said seventeen titles”, and “the
co-administrator Matias is no longer in possession of said titles”; that Attorney Paterno
Canlas had a pending clain for P261,000.00, on account of legal services rendered to the
estate for the preparation, due execution and probation of the 1962 testament of the
deceased. As aforesaid, the probate court granted the motion to surrender the
documents to the clerk of court for safekeeping.

Issue: WON the court erred in granting the motion to surrender the titles in question.

Held: Yes, according to Rule 138, Section 37, of the Rules of Court: “An attorney shall
have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof...”

The explicit terms of this section afford no alternative but to uphold the claim of
appellant Paterno Canlas with respect to the seventeen documents in his possession. His
right, as counsel for the deceased and his estate, “ to retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid “is incontestable and under the rule and section
aforesaid, the attorney cannot be compelled to surrender the muniments of title
mentioned without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied. The courts, in the
exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the court, are bound
to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum
and respectability of the profession.

In view of the foregoing, the orders of the probate court date 22 April 1967 and 29 May
1967, in so far as denying appellant Attorney Paterno Canlas’ right to retain the
seventeen documents in his hands, as counsel for the estate, and requiring him to
surrender the same without his claim for fees being first satisfied, are hereby reversed
and set aside. Costs against appellees.

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Ampil vs Agrava

Facts: Facts: Ampil was the counsel for Angela Perez in several cases. The principal cases
handled by Ampil were filed in the CFI by Angela’s husband and son, Antonio and
Benigno Perez, asking that Angela be placed under guardianship and that a suitable
person be appointed to administer her properties. Later on, the parties submitted to
court, which dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal was affirmed by
SC.

A case was later filed by Antonio and Benigno with the domestic court of Manila, seeking
the court’s approval of the compromise agreement. The domestic court dismissed the
proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the case which was to be
settled amicably by the compromise agreement had already been dismissed by CFI as
affirmed by SC.

Ampil asserts that Angela terminated his services as counsel without just cause and
without paying him for his profiessional services, for which he presented his bill and
asserted his retaining lien over the three titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course
of his professional employment.

Eventually, the compromise agreement mentioned above was approved by the Supreme
Court. Benigno and Antonio thus filed a case to obtain the titles held by Ampil. They
claimed that the attorney’s lien must be exercised over the properties belonging to
Angela, not over the properties belonging to them in the compromise agreement. They
also argued that the compromise agreement was entered into 8 years before Ampil was
discharged as Angela’s counsel, besides, Ampil took a position adverse to them by
seeking to have the compromise agreement annulled. They concluded that Ampil was
therefore bound by the compromise agreement.

Issue: WON Ampil has a right to keep his retaining lien over the said titles until his
services are paid for.

Held: YES. Three elements of attorney’s retaining lien were met: 1) lawyer-client
relationship; 2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents, and papers; and 3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees.

Ampil obtained possession of the titles when they still belonged to his client Angela. It
was only when Angela later on confirmed the compromise agreement that it became
valid. The transfer of the properties to Antonio and Benigno could not retroact to the
time the compromise was originally executed.

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The situation would be different where title to the property is the very subject in dispute
in the case and the court adjudges the client’s adversary to be rightfully entitled thereto.
In such as case the titles to the property could not be said to be properties of the client.
The attorney may enforce his lien only over the properties of his client and not against
those of his client’s adversary.

Petitioner is in no way interfering with the taking possession of the properties and
enjoyment of the fruits thereof. All that petitioner asserts and exercises is his passive
lien of retaining the muniments of title thereto. Such retention only impedes the
corresponding registration and transfer of titles to respondents.

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Tajan vs. Cusi

Facts: In this action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No.
59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of
the Philippine Bar. In a letter addressed to petitioner, he was required by respondent
Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the
practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing
factual averments which petitioner knew were false.

Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967

denying the material averments of respondent Judge’s letter and explaining the
circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition. Apparently not
satisfied with petitioner’s answer, respondent Judge filed an administrative case against
petitioner. At the hearing, petitioner questioned the propriety of the proceedings,
contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof. Petitioner
orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case
in view of the latter’s conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time. The
oral motion was denied.

Petitioner’s thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear
and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because
jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in
courts of first instance.

Issue: WON respondent Judge has jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as
the subject matter thereof.

Held: Yes. We find petitioner’s contentions without merit.

1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems
from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law
and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident
to the proper administration of justice. The law accords to the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members at
the bar. The provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:
Sec 28 – Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court or First
Instance, Sec 29, and Sec 30.
2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the
bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the
respondent is a defendant. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
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conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon
its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously
the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. This is for the
protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration
of justice,
3. Sec 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in disciplinary
proceedings is granted 10 days from service of a copy of the complaint within
which to file his answer. It is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should be
granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the
purpose of uniformity in procedure. We find, however, in the case at bar,
petitioner not only failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him
by the court within which to answer the complaint, but actually was not
substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint within
the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.
Wherefore, the present petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolve, with cost against petitioner.

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Gonzales vs Abaya

Facts: This is a complaint by Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria charging Judge Emannuel M.

Abaya with:

1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents.

The gravement of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as
Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51, RTC was a ghost employee from August
1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period, being then
employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with
her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily
time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered
service and incurred no absences or tardiness and was granted leave.
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed
money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different
litigants.
It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in
Criminal case entitled “People vs Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot” for murder, in
consideration of the sum of P2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes,
complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case.
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinates.
It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two employees
in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment.

Judge Abaya denied all these charges. He asserted that these charges were concocted in
retaliation against the administrative complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Austria for
dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order.
Atty. Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having
promulgated it, but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of
Judge Abaya, who asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his
load of presiding over two branches. The Court resolved to consolidate these related
cases.

Issue: WON respondent Judge is guilty of the charges of

1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed
money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different
litigants
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his suburdinates

WON Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct

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Held:

I. A.M No. R-705-RTJ:

a. We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be

supported by substantial evidence. Especially damaging to the
pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered
service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration
are the school records of the Holy Trinity College, showing the Cardenas
was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984.
Equally damaging to respondents’ assertions are the Daily Time Records
of Princess Tours showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide
on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering services as
stenographic reporter.
b. Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from
Mrs. Fuertes. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been
pressured by Atty. Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of
sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him
for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son’s
alleged killers. The Court finds no improper motive as to why Mrs.
Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute such a serious offense against a
judge unless it be the truth. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs.
Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which
cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications.
c. While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both
Servando and Jamora “testified in a natural and straightforward, albeit in
an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge
Abaya,” he concluded that “the evidence in this regard would be unable
to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. It would
simply be the word of one against a judge.”
In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and moral character which would have warranted his
dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. By these acts, Judge
Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and perquisites
attached to his office.

II. A.M No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909

Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency that having been granted full
authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority to sign
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the Judge’s name if the need arose. Atty. Austria’s theory of agency that she lawfully
acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. The judicial power vested in a
judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of his
highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency. That would not only be
contrary to law, but also subversive of public order and public policy.

We find Atty. Austria’s misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as
a member of the Bar, for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of
the act complained of.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas

and Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction against
Judge Abaya.

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Cuaresma vs Aguilar

Facts: The facts show that in an Information dated November 15, 1991, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, Gorgonio D. Olarte, charged Florencio Banite with
the murder of Daniel Acosta, a relative of herein complainants. The Information, which
carried no recommendation for bail, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2-648 in Branch
44 of the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro presided by the HonorableVenancio M.
Tarriela.

On February 4, 1992, Mrs.AgripinaAgbayariZubiri, Supervising Steno-Reporter IV

at the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, went to see the
respondent judge, the Hon. Restituto L. Aguilar, in his chambers. Respondent judge is
the Executive and Presiding Judge of Branch 45, RTC, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Mrs.Zubiri informed the respondent judge that she was sent by Prosecutor Olarte to
request for the release of accused Banite on a bail of P20,000.00. All pertinent papers,
including the Property Bail Bond, the Order approving the bond and directing the
release of the accused, etc., were already prepared for the signature of the respondent
judge. On the same day, respondent judge signed and issued the Order dated February
4, 1992 approving the property bond, and the Order directing the annotation of said
undertaking as lien with the Register of Deeds.

On the strength of the above Orders, accused Banite was released.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of authority in ordering
the release of herein accused?

Held: We find merit in the complaint.

The case against accused Banite was filed in Branch 44, presided by the Judge
Tarriela. Respondent judge who presides in Branch 45, had no power to act on the
request to release on bail accused Banite. The record does not show that at the time
respondent judge ordered Banite's release, Judge Tarriela was absent or unavailable and
could not have acted on the request. It was also irregular for respondent judge to
entertain the request considering that it did not appear that a formal motion had been
filed by the accused to that effect. Indeed, respondent judge did not even examine the
records of the case as he merely signed the Orders allegedly prepared by Prosecutor
Olarte. His indifference to duty prevented him from discovering that at the time he
ordered the release of accused Banite, the Information charging the latter with Murder
with no recommendation for bail had not been properly amended. Respondent judge's
action shows such lack of familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to
undermine the public confidence in the integrity of our courts.
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Paras vs Paras 343 SCRA 414

Facts: Atty. Justo De Jesus was charged by her wife Rosa Paras and initiated a case for
disbarment, falsification of public documents and fraud for counterfeiting using his
wife’s name and signature to obtain loans from certain banks. Respondent was also
charged with grossly immoral conduct and concubinage for siring a chilg with another
woman; obstruction of justice by using his skills to derail all the proceedings in the
criminal actions initiated by him; and unethical and unprofessional conduct by using his
legal skills to frighten, harass and intimidate.

Issue: Whether or not respondent can be disbarred on the grounds of falsification of

public documents, grossly immoral conduct and concubinage?

Held: Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law; power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and only in clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and as a member of the bar; it should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty such as temporary suspension could accomplish the end desired- it is a time-
honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. The case at bar, respondent has fallen below the moral when he forged
his wife’s signature in the bank loans documents, and sired a daughter with a woman
other than his wife. However, the power to misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the
bar should never be decreed where any lesser penalty such as temporary suspension
could accomplish the end desired. Therefore, respondent is suspended from the practice
of law for six months on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents
and other related loan instruments; and for one year on the changes of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.

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Fule vs. Cordero AC No. 284

Facts: Respondent, Solon F. Cordero, a member of the Philippine Bar and Auxiliary
Justice of the Peace of San Pablo City stands charged — by his first cousins, namely,
Attorneys Hector C. Fule and Conrado C. Fule (brothers), the latter being the Justice of
the Peace of Alaminos, Laguna — with violation of his attorney's oath, allegedly by
blackmailing the Fule brothers. The alleged blackmail consists in respondent's threat to
file criminal and administrative charges against Conrado C. Fule for alleged falsification
of public documents, namely, Daily Time Records, or Municipal Form No. 45 (A), if
Hector C. Fule would not desist from pursuing his application for the position of solicitor
in the Solicitor General's Office, Department of Justice, because respondent was himself
interested in said position. 1 Despite the threats made by respondent, however,
petitioner, Hector Fule, pursued his application for the position of solicitor in the
Solicitor General's Office, and was, in fact, appointed solicitor. 2 Whereupon, respondent
made good his threat and filed five (5) separate administrative charges with the
Department of Justice and a criminal complaint on five (5) counts with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Laguna, against Conrado C. Fule, i.e., Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents, allegedly for having falsified daily time records or Municipal Form No.
45 (A), a form prescribed by the General Auditing Office for certification of services
rendered by members of the judiciary, for the purpose of entitling them to the salaries
claimed for a particular period of time. 3 A series of charges and countercharges were
thereafter filed by respondent against petitioners and vice-versa, ranging from criminal
cases to administrative charges, coupled with an exchange of unsavory vilifications.

Issue: Whether or not Solon Cordero should be disbarred for allegedly blackmailing the
petitioners?

Held: Due to the close inter-relationship of the events that had made up the case at bar
and the aforementioned charges, the present administrative case filed by the Fule
brothers against respondent had to await the developments and the outcome of the
charges filed by him against Conrado C. Fule. In due time, the criminal complaint filed
against Conrado C. Fule by Solon F. Cordero was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
by the Investigating Fiscal, after preliminary investigation, in a resolution dated October
11, 1960, which is now under appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The administrative
charges resulted in admonition to Municipal Judge Conrado C. Fule.

The Solicitor General recommends that, in view of the death of respondent,

Solon F. Cordero, on January 9, 1977 (as reported by Cordero's counsel) the instant
petition should be dismissed as moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, let this administrative case be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

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Prudential Bank vs Grecia 192 SCRA 381

Facts: In a Decision, dated 12 November 1987, this Court, upon finding that respondent
Benjamin Grecia had "proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession,"
ordered his disbarment.

On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a "Motion for Permission to Reiterate

his Petition for Reinstatement" stating that he humbly begs permission to plead again for
its forgiveness and clemency; that he has suffered the harsh and supreme sanction of
disbarment for two long years now; that this is his first offense; that he solemnly
declares that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he
is fully repentant and learned the most bitter lesson of his life to such an extent that he
solemnly vows never to commit any offense again; that his sufferance of the extreme
sanction of disbarment has changed him for the better; that he had fully purged himself
in the proper and irreproachable manner and that he prays that he be forgiven and
pardoned by this Court. The Motion was denied with finality in the Resolution of 21
December 1989.

On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, wife of respondent wrote a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court stating that she has
long wanted to write and if it need be, on bended knees, to ask the Court sincerely to
forgive her husband and permit him to practice his profession; that it is not only he who
is suffering the anguish and shame caused by his disbarment but also his children and
herself; that it is now two and a half (2 1/2) years since her husband has been disbarred
and completely without any means to support his family; that their youngest daughter
may altogether have to stop studying; that during these years, her husband has deeply
repented and is now very humble and prayerful and has reformed for the better and that
she pleads that her husband be forgiven and reinstated as a lawyer. The letter was Noted
for the time being in the Resolution of 28 June 1990.

On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar, submitted to
the Bar Confidant for the Court's consideration, Resolution No. 90-057, adopted on 9
October 1990, praying that the Court extend its judicial clemency to respondent Grecia
and reinstate him as a member of the Philippine Bar, reasoning among others, that he
has been "sufficiently punished," has reformed and rehabilitated himself, and can again
be entrusted with the exercise of the noble profession of law.

In a letter, dated 21 November 1990, addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Court, respondent Grecia pleaded anew that once the Court restores him
to the practice of law, he "unreservedly bind(s)" himself "henceforth to act and behave
carefully as a worthy member of the Philippine Bar.
University of San Carlos – School of Law and Governance
Legal Ethics EH307
Cases 21-40 Digest
Garcy Kate D. Go LLB - 1

Issue: Whether or not a previously disbarred member of the bar who has proven himself
unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession may be allowed for readmission?

Held: "The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by
one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and
convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the
rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be
readmitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust. (In Re: Rusiana, Adm.
Case No. 270, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 240)

"The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows: Whether or not the
applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court.
The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by
the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law.
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is
a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement." (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443, cited in
In Re: Juan T. Publico, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 721).

Cognizant, therefore, "that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to

disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle,"
(In re Juan T. Publico, supra), we heed respondent's plea for reinstatement. His expiation
subsequent to his disbarment; his realization of his mistake and the gravity of his
offense; the testimonials from exemplary members of the Bar as to his fitness to resume
the practice of law; and his solemn pledge to the Court, that if his disbarment is lifted,
he will always closely and faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal
profession, call for this affirmative response.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby ordered READMITTED

to membership in the Bar.

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