VOL.

264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 167

People vs. Malimit
G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996. *

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE

ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias “MANOLO,” accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Police Blotters; Where entries in the police blotter are
merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of a witness, the
presentation of the police blotter as evidence is not indispensable.—Next, appellant
derided the nonpresentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could
prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. We do
not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence
a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court
fatal to the prosecution’s case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative
evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as
evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if appellant believed that he was not
identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police
Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach Batin’s
credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the blame
on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Judicial Notice; The non-disclosure by a witness to the
police officers of the accused’s identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime
is not entirely against human
____________________________
* THIRD DIVISION.

168

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Malimit
experience—the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal
prosecutions against immediate neighbors is of judicial notice.—Even assuming
arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15,
1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone
does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to
the police officers of appellant’s identity immediately after the occurrence of the
crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in
this case, is of judicial notice.
Same; Same; Same; It is the established rule of evidence that the findings of the trial
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest
degree of respect by the appellate court; Exceptions.—At any rate, the consistent
teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court
which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness’ demeanor, conduct and
attitude at the trial. And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1)
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence,
we found none in this case.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-Incrimination; The right
against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt and does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement
but an object evidence.—We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination
guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right,
as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, “x x x is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x.” It
is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]’s own lips,
against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object
evidence.
169
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 169
People vs. Malimit
Same; Same; Same; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; “Miranda
Rights”; Infractions of the so-called “Miranda rights” render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation—the
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.—These are the socalled “Miranda rights” so
oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained
or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not
informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the
investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a
written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions.
Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of
Malaki’s wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of
establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to
establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the
robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the
wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
Malaki.
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; There can be a verdict of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime; Requisites for Conviction.—
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that
there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Malimit
Same; Same; Alibi; As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses, it becomes weaker by
reason of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any corroboration.—On
the other hand, appellant’s version of the story does not inspire belief. He maintains
that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that
they had just arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui
Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did not bother to call appellant’s wife
to the witness stand to corroborate appellant’s alibi. Neither did it present as witness
Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the said
place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi
is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to
present any corroboration.
Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; Proof that the accused is in possession of a
stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same.—
Appellant’s insistence that he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance while
gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime
for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are
at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear being implicated
in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance. No inference can
be drawn from appellant’s purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion
that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in
possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the
same.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Juan,
Southern Leyte, Br. 26.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
171
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 171
People vs. Malimit
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the
1

special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial
2

court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to

3

indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost. 4

In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court
committed the following errors, to wit:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR
OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR
ALLEGED ‘KNOWLEDGE’ OF THE CRIME MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS
AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET
AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO
ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.” 5

____________________________
1 Information dated 28 November 1991; Record, p. 10.
2 Punishable under Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code.
3 Regional Trial Court, Southern Leyte, Branch 26.
4 RTC decision dated 18 January 1993; Rollo, pp. 57-67.
5 Rollo, p. 44.
172
17 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
People vs. Malimit
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its
Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on record:
“On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was
attending to his store. Malaki’s houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was
busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN,
June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14).
“Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon
was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon
came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from
Malaki’s store (Ibid., p. 24).
“Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded
directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin
stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of
the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own
blood, was sprawled on the floor ‘struggling for his life’ (hovering between life and
death) (Ibid.).
“Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw
appellant Jose Malimit (or ‘Manolo’) rushing out through the front door of Malaki’s
store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the
illumination coming from a pressure lamp (‘petromax’) inside the store, Rondon
clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
“Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met
Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and
Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki’s brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and
informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy,
went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood
lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store’s drawer was opened
and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-
17).”6

____________________________
6 Rollo, pp. 79-81.
173
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 173
People vs. Malimit
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing
out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He
posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on
September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly
concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this
gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date
however, was merely the date when Rondon and Batin executed their
7

respective affidavits, narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of
8

April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of
Malaki’s store. As to appellant’s claim of delay, suffice it to state that
extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating
appellant’s protestation, to wit: (1)) after having discovered the
commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for
Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki’s brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant
was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene; (2) 9

Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki
on that fateful night; and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later
10

at the Silago Police Station. 11

Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the

police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right
away by Batin to the crime. We do 12

____________________________
7 Exhibit “2-B,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 5; Exhibit “3-B,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 6.
8 Exhibit “2,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 5; Exhibit “3,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 6.
9 TSN, Eutiquio Beloy, May 22, 1992, p. 10.
10 TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, p. 19.
11 Id., pp. 20-21.
12 Brief for the Appellant, p. 8; Rollo, p. 51.
174
17 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
People vs. Malimit
not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present
as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its
non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution’s case. Entries in the
police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted
testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not
indispensable. Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified
13

therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police
Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
Batin’s credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot
14

now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which appellant
himself should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant
only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from
commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony
less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of
appellant’s identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not
entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most
15

people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against

____________________________
13 See People v. Comia, 236 SCRA 185 (1994); See also People v. Watson, 278 Ala. 425,
178 So. 2d 819, 821 (1965).
14 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 11. Impeachment of the adverse party’s witness.—A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at some other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted
of an offense. (Italics ours)
15People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 (1985); See also People v. Danico, 208 SCRA 472
(1992), and People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
175
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 175
People vs. Malimit
immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice. At any rate,
16 17

the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the
highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established
18

rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of

witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh
said testimony in the light of the witness’ demeanor, conduct and attitude
at the trial. And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely:
19

(1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored

by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.
20

In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission

as evidence of Malaki’s wallet together with its contents, viz., (1)
21

Malaki’s residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch
22 23

of keys, violates his

24

____________________________
16 The house of Malaki is just 80 meters away from appellant’s house; while the house of
witness Rondon is 150 meters away from Malaki’s house.
17 People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, June 20, 1996; People v. Sabellano, 198 SCRA 196
(1991); People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
18 People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69 (1993); People
v. de la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 (1993); People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 (1993); People
v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991); People v. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 (1985).
19 See People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Ocampo, 226 SCRA 1 (1993);
People v. Juma, 220 SCRA 432 (1993); People v. Bañez, 214 SCRA 109 (1992) citing
People v. Abrogar, 73 SCRA 466 (1979).
20 See People v. Gumahin, 21 SCRA 729 (1967); People v. Secapuri, et al., 16 SCRA 199
(1966).
21 Exhibit “A.”
22 Exhibit “A-1.”
23 Exhibit “A-2.”
24 Exhibit “A-3.”
176
17 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
People vs. Malimit
right against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their
25

exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed

to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki’s wallet, he
was not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed
under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as
put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, “x x x is a prohibition
26

of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications

from him x x x.” It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the [accused]’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It 27

does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on
evidence, thus, said:
“If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control
of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form
exercised, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law
to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles—a clear reductio
ad absurdum.In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, *** but testimonial compulsion.” 28

Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of

evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III,
Section 12, viz:
____________________________
25 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
26 218 U.S. 245.
27 U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, 152.
28 4 Wigmore 2263.
177
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 177
People vs. Malimit
“(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x x x x x x.
“(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof,
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (Italics ours.)
x x x x x x x x x”
These are the so-called “Miranda rights” so oftenly disregarded by our
men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are
relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not29

affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and
to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the
custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these
rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless,
these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki’s
wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose
of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is
admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from
Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence
certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore,
even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible,
the same will not detract from appellant’s culpability considering the
existence of other evidence and circumstances
____________________________
29 Rule 128, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court.
178
17 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
People vs. Malimit
establishing appellant’s identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime
charged.
We, now come to appellant’s third assignment of error where he demurs
on the prosecution’s evidence, contending that they are insufficient to
sustain his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we
ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order that
30

circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must

comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there were
31

at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events

which by their “concordant combination and cumulative effect,” satisfy
the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, specifically: (1)
32

appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were

untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki’s
store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; (2) Malaki sustained
33

multiple stab wounds and he died of “cardiac arrest, secondary to

34

____________________________
30 People v. Adriano, 226 SCRA 131, 135 (1993), citing People v. Galendez, 210 SCRA
360 (1992); See People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16 (1993); People v. Briones, 219 SCRA
134 (1993); People v. Ocampo, 218 SCRA 609 (1993); People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368
(1991); People v. Ganohon, 196 SCRA 431 (1991); People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942).
31 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
32 People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16, 28 (1993).
33 TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, pp. 15, 18, 23; TSN, Florencio Rondon, May 22,
1992, pp. 20-22, 31.
34 Exhibit “C-1,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 3.
179
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 179
People vs. Malimit
severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds”; (3) witness 35

Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some

policemen, retrieve Malaki’s wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in
Barangay Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony
36

that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the seashore

where he hid Malaki’s wallet; and (5) appellant’s flight and his
37

subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the

incident. 38

On the other hand, appellant’s version of the story does not inspire belief.
He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with
his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a gambling spree
allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however,
the defense did not bother to call appellant’s wife to the witness stand to
corroborate appellant’s alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui
Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the
said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the
defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the
appellant by the prosecution witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the
39

unexplained failure of the defense to present any corroboration. 40

Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime was
committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he
could not have been physically present at
____________________________
35 Exhibit ‘B-1,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 1; See also Exhibit “C,” Bill of Exhibits, p. 3.
36 TSN, Elmer Ladica, June 9, 1992, pp. 4-5.
37 TSN, Jose Malimit, September 23, 1994, pp. 8-9.
38 TSN, Florencio Rondon, May 22, 1992, p. 22; TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, p.
22.
39 People v. John Jenn Porras, G.R. Nos. 114263-64, March 29, 1996; People v. Miranday,
242 SCRA 620 (1995), citing People v. Claudio, 216 SCRA 647 (1992); People v.
Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993).
40 People v. Malonzo, 212 SCRA 85 (1992); People v. Paciente, 210 SCRA 87 (1992); See
People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274 (1991).
180
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
People vs. Malimit
the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. In 41

this case, appellant himself admitted that his house was just about eighty
(80) meters away from the house of Malaki. It was, therefore, not
42

impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility
was ever adduced by him at the trial.
Appellant’s insistence that he merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance
while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being
implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a
stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was,
as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he
merely found Malaki’s wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from
appellant’s purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that
appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in
possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he
stole the same. 43

In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery,

appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
____________________________
41 People v. John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo, G.R. 114263-64, March 29, 1996; People
v. Manero, Jr., 218 SCRA 89 (1993), citing People v. Pugal, 215 SCRA 247 (1992).
42 TSN, Jose Malimit, July 2, 1992, p. 10.
43 People v. Alhambra, 233 SCRA 604, 613 (1994).
181
VOL. 264, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 181
Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals
Note.—The rule is settled that once the primary source (the “tree”) is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. (People vs.
Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79 [1996])
——o0o——
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