PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
After the physical division of the lot among the co-owners, the community
ownership is terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each other
was no longer available. There is no co-ownership when the different portions
owned by the different people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically
described.
Si v CA “three deeds of sale in one certificate” “sold share”
Facts
Property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada.
During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children by
the Deed of Sale. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA (son), conveyed property in favor of
(petitioners) ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si. Herein spouses Jose
Armada and Remedios Almanzor (private respondents), filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against herein
petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana.
Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by inserting in the
deed of absolute sale they inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are not
interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them.", and that petitioners
knew of the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the
other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged Escolastica, with the consent of her husband
executed three separate deeds of sale. Since the property was already three
distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers.
Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his
share to the spouses Si. After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners. CA
reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of redemption
under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code.
Ratio
It is our considered view now, that the trial court is correct when it found that the
land already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales
(sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo segregated and with the
corresponding technical description. In short, this is what we call extrajudicial
partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared
for taxation purposes. These are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold was
concretely determined and identifiable. The fact that the three portions are
embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable
or identifiable or distinguishable. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners
exists.
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother
was no longer available.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership
when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an
immovable may bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an
ejectment action without joining the other co-owners, the suit being deemed
instituted for the benefit of all.
Sering v Plazo “forcibly entry” “implead”
Facts
The proceeding at bar had its inception in a forcible entry suit filed by petitioner
Sering against respondent Spouses Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan. The case
resulted in a judgment against the Plazos In the latter court the Plazos learned that
the property subject of the suit was not owned solely by Sering but was owned in
common by him and others. This prompted the Plazos to move for the impleading
of the other co-owners as parties plaintiff, on the theory that they were
indispensable parties. The Court agreed and ordered Sering to amend his complaint
so as to include his co-owners as co-plaintiffs. Sering demurred claiming that under
the law anyone of the co-owners could bring suit for ejectment without joining the
others. Because Sering failed to comply with the Courts order for amendment of the
complaint, the Trial Court dismissed his complaint.
Ratio
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PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
The orders complained of are indeed tainted by serious error and should therefore
be reversed and set aside. Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry
and detainer should be brought in the name of all co-owners. Article 487 of the Civil
Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action
in ejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the
other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all. And the
term, "action in ejectment," includes a suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio). In forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter to
be determined is simply the question of prior physical possession.
Any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment for the benefit of all the
co-owners. Nonetheless, the action should be dismissed if the suit is for the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of
the property.
Adlawan v Adlawan “illegitimate child” “forcible entry”
Facts:
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot and
the house built thereonregistered in the name of the late Dominador.
Petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child. Claiming to
be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to
himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.7 Out of respect and generosity
to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to
occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should
his need for the property arise. Sometime in January he verbally requested
respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead
an action for quieting of title.
Respondents aver that hey have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house
standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the
ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother,
Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia
needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were
not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the
name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a
college education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale,
a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot
7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed,
Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership of the lot.
He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the
property until they died
The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the
judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana
are co-owners of Lot 7226.
Ratio:
RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner
would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so
because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his
legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on
May 28, 1987.24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became
co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make
petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana
passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with
whom she had no blood relations.
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article
487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the
suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of
the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole
owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their
rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or
such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action.
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Plasabas v CA “recovery of title” “implead”
Facts:
In 1974, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title. Respondents claim
that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common
ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.6
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the
land. What the Court wants to say here is that the instant case should have
been dismissed without prejudice a long time ago for lack of cause of action
as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte
have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without
joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further,
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the
principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not
be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for
recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.
Ratio:
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of
the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse,
the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners
as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus,
entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper
unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable
parties.
The property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners
have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s
behalf.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property, the sale will affect only his own share
and not the share of the other co-owners who didn't consent to the sale. Since
this is the case, a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the others is not null and
void.
Palmituan v CA “brothers” “sold to daughter” “taxes”
Facts
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left the two parcels
of land, From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now
deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual
Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, apparently shortly after his mother
passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner,
Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of
Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children.
Petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the
claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. Donato
executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091
was forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government
of Negros Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land
was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of
Negros Occidental. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the
property from the Provincial Government of Negros .
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual
Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties
plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription. It has been eleven years
after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title. Petitioner Juliana P.
Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive
ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor
by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption
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from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Ratio
It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did not predecease his
mother, thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on
the right of representation. The right of ownership, not only of Donato but
also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was
automatically and by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their
mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did
not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every inheritance, the
relative nearest in degree excludes the more distantones." From the time of
the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of
her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of
the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate
of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs,
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual
Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as
no partition was ever made.
Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death,
became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent
estate..
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his
daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents
and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to
him upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the
rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they
inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the
buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the whole property subject of the co-ownership.
Cruz v Leis “widow” “loan” “right of repurchase”
Facts
Adriano and Gertrudes were married, Gertrudes acquired from the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of
land. TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who
was also referred to therein as a "widow." On 2 December 1973, Adriano
died. It does not appear that he executed a will before his death.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the
spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz. The loan was secured by a mortgage
over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes, however, failed to
pay the loan on the due date.
Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The
first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de
retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the
property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the
same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan."
For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was
consolidated in the name of Alexander . On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro
died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received
demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the
property.
The RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence
presented by private respondents disclosed that the same was acquired
during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money
for the purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes
could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not
conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described in
the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No.
43100 as a widow.
Ratio
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PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to
his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.).
While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state
of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489).
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be
made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.
While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir
or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over
it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a
retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra,
art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the
right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only
dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was
registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro,
widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties
of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a
purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title
thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires
a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased
spouse.
The wife is wrong. She is one of those contemplated by law as being a third person.
The right of redemption lies against her.
*Dissenting opinion: the right of redemption doesn't lie against her.
Villanueva v Florendo “wife” “third person”
Facts
Petitioners and respondent Concepcion Villanueva are the children of
spouses Macario Villanueva (one of the respondents) and Basilia Garcia.
Said spouses owned a small parcel of land. Basilia Garcia died intestate,
leaving her husband, Macario Villanueva and children (herein petitioners) as
her sole and only legitimate heirs.
Surviving spouse, Macario, without the subject lot having been
partitioned, sold in favor of Erlinda Vallangca, the wife of respondent
Concepcion Villanueva, one-half or 82.5 square meters of the
aforementioned lot, particularly the western portion thereof.
The five children each owned a 1/10 share of that same lot while Macario
owned ½ thereof as his conjugal share or 82,5 square meters. Note that
north of the lot is the lot of Severino Feri, Valentina's husband. On 3/4 of the
lot stands a house of strong materials occupied by Valentina.
Petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot in question but
respondent vendee refused to allow such redemption contending that
she is the wife of one of the legal heirs and therefore redemption will not lie
against her because she is not the "third party" or "stranger"
contemplated in the law.
The trial court, on July 14, 1970, rendered a decision ordering among other
things, the reformation of the Deed of Sale and declaring the vendee the
absolute owner of the subject lot. TC considered the vendee, Erlinda
Vallangca, a co-heir
Ratio
Art. 1620 of the New Civil Code provides:
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PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner
shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption,
they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in
the thing owned in common.
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed
redemption because it considered the vendee, Erlinda Vallangca, a co-heir,
being married to Concepcion Villanueva, and the conveyance was held valid
since it was in favor of the conjugal partnership of the spouses in the
absence of any statement that it is paraphernal in character. Within the
meaning of Art. 1620, the term "third person" or "stranger" refers to all
persons who are not heirs in succession.
In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner. The vendee is
related by affinity to the deceased by reason of her marriage to one of the
heirs and being married to Concepcion does not entitle the vendee to inherit
or succeed in her own right.
The co-owners should therefore be allowed to exercise their right to
redeem the property sold to Erlinda Vallangca. To deny petitioners the right
of redemption recognized in Art. 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the
purpose of minimizing co-ownership. It is an inherent and peculiar feature of
co-ownership that although the co-owners may have unequal shares in the
common property quantitatively speaking, each co-owner has the same right
in a qualitative sense as any one of the other co-owners. In other words,
every co-owner is the owner of the whole and over the whole, he exercises
the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which
is truly abstract because until division is effected, such portion is not correctly
determined.   Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint for "recovery of possession
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I am of the opinion that no right of redemption exists in favor of Erlinda's
sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law because the sale was made to the
(conjugal partnership of Erlinda and Concepcion), a co-owner.
Erlinda is not a co-owner but the unblinkable fact is that she is married to a
co-owner and the ½ portion sold became her conjugal property and that
of her husband. They in turn are co-owners of that conjugal 1/2 portion.
1. The right to redeem is not lost in the absence of any written notice of the sale
by the vendors. The 30-day period has not
begin to run.
2. The redemption of a co-owner inures to the benefit of all co-owners.
Mariano v CA “mortgage” “right of redemption” “no written notice”
Facts
Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot. The lot in
question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao.
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived by his
heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants. The loan being unpaid, the lot in
dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and the same was awarded
to the mortgagee bank as the highest bidder.
Third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the
property. On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and
that of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma together with Carlos and
Severino executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of Redemption" in
favor of Amparo G.Ibarra.
On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property to
defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently established residence on
the lot subject of this controversy.
Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the
sale of said property by the third-party defendants. Leonardo Mariano
sold the same property to his children. On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs
and legal redemption. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs
and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their
respective shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the
same, and the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-
owners sold to the defendants.
Trial Court stated that the respondents had no right of ownership or
possession over the lot in question. The trial court further said that when the
subject property foreclosed and sold at public auction, the rights of the
heirs were reduced to a mere right of redemption. And when Amparo G.
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Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with
her own money she became the sole owner of the property. The Court of
Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of
the trial court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the
property in the question.
Ratio
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a
co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to
redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a
co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but
will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to
the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not
timely exercised by the private respondents, since Article 1088 prescribes
that the same must be done within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article
1620 is that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property
or properties of the inheritance, the right redemption that arises in favor of the
other co-heirs is that recognized in Article 1620. On the other hand, if the
sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without
specifying any particular object, the right recognized in Article 1088 exists. 8
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the
sale being given whatsoever to private respondents. Article 1088 of the
New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old
law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient.
We likewise do not find merit in petitioners' position that private respondents
could not have validly effected redemption due to their failure to consign in
court the full redemption price after tender thereof was rejected by the
petitioners. Consignation is not necessary, because the tender of
payment was not made to discharge an obligation, but to enforce or
exercise a right. Premises considered, respondents have not lost their
right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by
the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
Co-ownership expired when the heirs allowed the one-year redemption period to
expire without redeeming their parent’s property and permitted the issuance of the
new title and consolidation of ownership. There was no co-ownership anymore
when Annie “redeemed” the property. It was in all accounts, to be considered as a
sale.
Tan v CA “amicable settlement” “ROR expired”
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun, was the registered owner of a 178
square meter parcel of land and its improvements. In order to secure
payment of various obligations with respondent China Banking
Corporation or China Bank for short, Mr. and Mrs. Tan Tiong Tick
mortgaged the disputed property to the bank. China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage and purchased the property at public auction as the highest
bidder for the sum of P186,100.00.
On August 31, 1972, the widow and children of Tan Tiong Tick filed a
complaint against China Bank with the Court of First Instance of Manila
praying for the nullity of the real estate mortgage executed by the
spouses Tan and the foreclosure sale conducted by the Sheriff. They also
asked that the redemption period be suspended.
The one year period for redemption expired on July 6, 1973 without the
Tan heirs having exercised the right to redeem the property. About two
weeks earlier, however, the heirs of Tan and China Bank agreed to amicably
settle the action for nullity of mortgage before the Court of First Instance
of Manila. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss.
The heirs were given the right to repurchase the property for P180,000.00
provided it was done on or before August 31,1974. There are allegations that
some of the heirs tried to buy the property in the ensuing one year period but
for one reason or another, were unable to do so.
Finally, on August 30, 1974, or one day before the end of the period to
buy back, petitioner D. Annie Tan went to the office of Mr. Dee K. Chiong
of China Bank and tendered her China Bank Manager's Check for
P180,000.00 as payment. Upon the insistence of the bank official, the
deed of sale returning the property to the heirs was executed in favor, not
of D. Annie Tan who alone paid for the property but of all the six heirs of
Tan Tiong Tick who would, therefore, share and share alike.
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PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
This led to the filing of the action by D. Annie Tan against her brothers and
sisters and the China Banking Corporation to reconvey the disputed property
to her. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On
September 7, 1987, a
Issue
Whether or not the co-ownership among the heirs over a parcel of land
formerly belonging to their parents had been dissolved by the
Ratio
The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed
property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and
sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more than
one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated
its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name.
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof, obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of their
predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as owner, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter
seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and
their rights thereafter. The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of
repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.
Delima v CA “issuance of a new title” “prescription”
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-
Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the
government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents,
executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this
affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on
February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of
the other heirs.
Petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action
for reconveyance and/or partition. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners. Respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers
and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already
relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor,
considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance
of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon
Issue
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners'
action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by
law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the
disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Ratio
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period
of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse
to the others, but will be held to benefit all. If, as such owner, he
administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of
delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as
a depository, a lessee or a trustee. Thus, an action to compel partition
may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual
possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-
Jon de Leon
PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others
any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition
but of ownership.. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for
partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners
has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period
sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In
order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust
amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must
concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to
an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had
been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence
thereon should be clear and conclusive.
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a
deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of
the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one
wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their
shares, the statute of limitations started to run
Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance
of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the
statute of limitations is counted
The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the
trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession
by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by
prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his
exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs
and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when
petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1968 (14 years), such action was already barred by
prescription.
Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem the property entitles the vendee
a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto to his name. Even so, this
doesn’t mean that the redeeming co-owner has the right to the entire property. It
doesn't provide a mode of transferring co- ownership.
Adille v CA “redeemed” “only heir” “partial redemption”
Land in question originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private
property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille,
with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in
her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein
plaintiffs, — now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in
pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3
years, but she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her
death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-
judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his
mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his
name alone also. Plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting
on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of
plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant
counterclaimed for her to vacate that, —
Trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was and became
absolute owner, he was not a trustee. The respondent Court of appeals
reversed the trial Court.
Issue
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
Ratio
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to
his share alone. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make
him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing
state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right
to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
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PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be
made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.
While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-
heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership
over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name.
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to
the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title
over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership.
Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as
a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of
the private respondents.
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the
registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole
heir to the. This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that
prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by
another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In that event, the
party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-
ownership is ended . In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955
by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private
respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the
contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by
feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore
be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership.
Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a
portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to
eject her therefrom. It is true that registration under the Torrens system is
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as we
said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case.
The registration in the names of petitioners of the titles to the properties is not an
act of repudiation of the co-ownership.
Mariategui v CA “3 wives” “repudiation” “registration” “prescription”
Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who
died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children. With his second wife,
Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named. Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children.
Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No.
163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was
issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the
registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos.
163-A to 163-H.
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage filed with the
lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.
Jon de Leon
PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim.
Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children.
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring
all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to
equal shares
Issue
whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui
Ratio
An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred
by laches. Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership
when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private
respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16;
Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to
the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription
had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action
for partition
Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their
relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the
estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he
had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their
(respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had
been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will
get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed
a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not
operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. Prescription, as a
mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2)
such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title
does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the
act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates
as a universal notice of title.
Prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation
Private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after
learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
Compliance with the conditions is needed before prescription may run against a co-
owner. (Remember the 4 requisites).
Heirs of Maninding v CA “acquisitive prescription” “donation proper nuptias”
“rice and sugarland”
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly
discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children
only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the
properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.
With regard to the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having executed the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented by petitioners. He claimed that he
acquired ownership over both the sugarland and the riceland by
donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and Sotera
Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra Loresco.
Since the death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in open,
continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject
properties.
The trial court found that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of
Ramon Bauzon and his wife Sotera Zulueta which, upon their death,
Jon de Leon
PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
devolved by right of succession to their children Segunda Maningding, Maria
Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon in equal pro-indiviso
shares. The court a quo however awarded both parcels to Segunda
Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after
finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an
Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for
failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and ruled that the
same was negated by the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation of Juan
Maningding and Maria Maningding in favor of Roque Bauzon and nullified the
deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor of Luis Bauzon as regards the
riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect to the sugarland. It concluded
that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half
(1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the properties validly pertained
to Roque Bauzon by virtue of the donation propter nuptias.
Consequently, the transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect.
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the same deed of donation was
declared null and void by the appellate court for failure to comply with
Art. 633 of the old Civil Code, the law then applicable, which required
for the validity of the deed of donation to be in a public instrument.
Nevertheless, the same court maintained that the properties belonged to
Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Ratio
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership
over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in
general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is
either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In
extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.
The disputed lots are unregistered lands. While tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled
with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations
and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to
comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for
adverse possession. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. It must be clearly shown that he has
repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim
of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would
begin to run.
The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt.
Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the
acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription
arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.
As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the
property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never
given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they
demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their
shares.
A co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned.
Aguilar v CA “borthers” “rent” 2/3 & 1/3”
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the
youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is
the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot
in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining
years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that
Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen
was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970,
Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot
should be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS)
Jon de Leon
PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house together
with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the
brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title
registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. After Maximiano
Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that
the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds
thereof divided among them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be
divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the
house by respondent after their father died.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial
court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in
equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. The trial court also
upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Court of Appeals
set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed
judgment rendered by default.
Ratio
petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal
shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at
any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the
proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective
interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner
from the time their father died. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor
of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly
rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence
only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to
who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon
proper reimbursement of the co-owners
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house
and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use
the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and
the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
The sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos is limited to the
portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination of co-ownership over
the subject property with her children.
Coronel v Constantino “mother sold her share”
The subject property consists of two parcels. The property is originally
owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was inherited by Emilia
Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and
Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by
Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for
declaration of ownership, quieting of title. Plaintiffs allege that: on April
23, 1981, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property
belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale signed by
Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to
Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement in
Civil Case No. 8289-M; they are the owners of the subject property and
defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises in
Jon de Leon
PROPERTY WEEK 7 DIGESTS CO-OWNERSHIP
question; and pray that "defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the
right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of
the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described property".l^vvphi1.net

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties and ordered the
defendant to remove whatever improvements introduced by them.

On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision of the lower court and denied defendants’ motion for
reconsideration.

Ratop

Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin did not sign
the document and that the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the
subject property were not sold by them.

Since the shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs
Constantino and Buensuceso have no cause of action against them or
against any of their heirs. Further, the deed of sale is not a competent proof
that petitioner Benjamin had sold his own share of the subject property. It
cannot be disputed that Benjamin did not sign the document and therefore, it
is unenforceable against him.l^vvphi1.net

Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in

representation of her three children.

Article 493 of the Civil Code states:

"Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership."

Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of

Santos and Bernardo is limited to the portion which may be allotted to
her upon the termination of her co-ownership over the subject property
with her children.
Jon de Leon