LOEONARDO A. PAAT Vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while
on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.

Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources

Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within
which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22,
1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained
petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was,
however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2 Subsequently, the case
was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter
for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for
replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order
dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the
respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9 with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to
reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September
27, 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the secretary of DENR and his representatives are

empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest product in favor of the government.

Held:

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private

respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently
does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A,
which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or
other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and
policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit
any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules
and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover
the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to
give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation of
the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to
present situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section
68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and
distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to
supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD
705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved

and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from

technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to

penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and
realities;"
 FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. Vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

Facts:

After the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter

dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated
April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources
[MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of
TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October
12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
[hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex
"5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the
contents of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE

REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE
RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent
a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions
to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be
heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of
the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of
the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire
on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR
through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986
denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a
contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and
that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among
ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis
was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners cancellation of timber license was a

violation of his right as forest product businessman

Held:

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response

to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest
lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate
waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the
irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even
more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of
nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been
triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people
seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet
the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to
ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further
denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of
the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v.
Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28,
1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General,
G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R.
No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-
33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage,
G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the
present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against
that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken
to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should
enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz,
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
 MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. Vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352

Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as
a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate
of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25
September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent

A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.

The material operative facts are as follows:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra

flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together
with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of
the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard
in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding
certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts
from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.

Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner

retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the
articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders.

On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents
covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion
on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must
accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure.

On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to

Secretary Factoran the following:

1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of

Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill
and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;

2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the

truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the
DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;

3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber
Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra
and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes
through;

4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the
lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents.

Issue:

Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that

petitioner should not be held for illegal logging

Held:

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an

affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this
Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber
is included in the term timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or

lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph
(q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or

combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is a
processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
distinguere debemus.

Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the

RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.