The Tain of the Mirror

I .
The Tain
of the Mirror
Dewida and tbe Philosophy
of Reflection

*l-4#

RodoIphe Gaschi

Harvatd University Press

Cambridgq Massachusetts
and London, England
Gpy.;ght 8 1986 by rhe Raiht and helb af Hnwmrd C o l g
Nl ri&s mmd
kinred in rhe Unrtcd h a t - of America
Fifth printins 1997

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hmw brm c h m m for s t m & and dmbitity.

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Roaolpk.
The nin of the mirmr.
Bibliography: p.
Indudes index.
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I

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to David B. Allison, Man Bass, Barbara Job- John

P. b v y , Gayatri C. Spivak, and others who have translated Derrida’s
wotk into English. Thanks to their expert trandations, I was able to
complete my own work without dumring the text with numerous
refuencrs to Dcrrida’s French. Graceful acknowledgment is made to
the Johns Hopkins Univcrsity Press for permission to quote from
Jacques Derrida, Of Grmnntatology,mans. Gayaui C. Spivak, as well
as m the Northwcsrrrn University k e s r for pmnission to U M Jacques
Dcrrida, Speech mrd Phenomenon. trans. David B. Allison. Acknowl-
edgment is also made to the University af Chicago Prns for lines
quoted from the following works of Jacques Dmida: D*mninntim.
trans. Barbara Johnson, copyright 0 1981 by the University of Chi-
cago; Marghs ofPh’hilosophy,tram. Alan Bass, copyright 8 1982 by
‘ 7 h c University of Chicago; Posirions. trans. AIan Bass, copyright 0
1981 by The University of Chicago; and Writing old Diflmmm,
trans. Alan Bass, copyright 0 I978 by The University of Chicago. 1
am ptehl m Jacques Dmida’s English publishers for permission to
q u a frwm his work, as follows: T h e Hancsrcr Prcnr, Murpinr of
Philosophy, tram.Alan B a q Rouddlg and Kegan Paul, Writing und
Difference; and T h e Arhlone Press, Pusitions and Dissenriwrion. I
would also like to thank the Stare University of New Yo& h s s for
pemissiw to q u m from the two following works by Gcorg WilhcIm
Wedrich Hcgel: The Diff- betwmn Ficbte’s a d Scbelling’s Sys-
tm offpbihopby, trans. W.Czrf and H.5. Harris, translation copy-
tight 0 1977 by State Universiq of New York; and Fdth m d
Kriwledge, trans. W.W a n d H. S. Matis, translation copyright Q
1977 by State University of New York.
VE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Afirstdrafttfthefitsttwopamafrhis book warwrittenin 1981-

82, while 1 held an American Council of Learned Societies fellowship.
Without the assistance and support of the State University of New
York a t Buffalo, it would not have been easy ta complete this project.
Several sections of rhc book h a w bwn published independently. A
first version of Chapter 6 has appeared in Italian under the title “Eter-
ologia e decostrurione,” ‘tram. Stefan0 Rosso, in Rivista di Estetiur.
25, no. 17 (1984). A section of Chapter 9 entitled “Infrastructures
and Sysremaricity” has becn publishcd in Deconstruction and Phi-
losophy, ed.John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
Part of Chapter 1 I has been printed under the tide “Quasi-Mera-
phoricity and the Question of Being,” in Hermmsurics a d Decon-
shrrEtion. cd. Hugh J. Silverman and Dm lhdc (Albany: Statc University
of New York Press, 1985}.
Very special thanks are due ro TWO ppIe-ChcryI Lester and
Philip Barnard-for the mericulouscarcandconrinual gcncrosiry with
time and advice with which they prepared the manuscript for pub-
lication. Many ,improvements in style and substance are the resuit of
their discerning eye. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Bronislawa Karst
for the patience with which she awaited this b w k , and for so much
more.
 Contents

PART ONE
Toward the Limits of Reflection
I. DdiningRRdleaion 13
2. The Philosophy of Rdkcrion 23
3. The Sclf-DcmUcd~Of R ~ t l d ~ n 35
Isobted Reflection 35
Pbiloropbiurl R&ction 36
Spccvlatiw or Abrolufe R&ctiou 38
4. Identity, Totality, and Mys~icRapnuc 55
5. Pon-Hqdian Criticism of R d k x i t i q 60
6. Beyond Reflection: The Interlacing of HetcroIw 79

PART TWO
On Deconstruction
7. A h , DrrmrLtEon. DccommKtion 109
8. Dcconsmmctive Merhodology 121
The Pmpnedentics of Dcconrtmction 124
Aaoinst Nentrnlify 136
Inhartrvcrvrnl Acanmtmg 142
7hc hfarpnl IrrCrriptmn offbe Ground 154
Thr B l p a r r e Operarmn of Dcmrmvnia 163
 ...
Vttl CONTENTS

9. A System beyond Being 177

T h e Infrastrucrurat Cham 185
The Generol Theory of Doubling 225
The General S v s t m 239

PART THREE
Literature or PhiIosophy?
10. Literature in Parentheses 255
I I . The Inscription of Universality 271
Writing 271
Text 278
Metophor 293

Notes 321
Bibliography 336
Index 141
 The Tain of the Mirror

Thcb&mughnnvrrdndicllothamrr(wi&
ITS+ to tfit philomphid amapt--of the
concept) always n k a within philosophy, rhc
/ o m of an aposteriority or an empiricism. But
his is an &MI of the speculrr nature of phil-
cmphicnl rekction, philowphy king iscapa-
bleolimcribing (mmprchcnding)what isoutsidr
ir curhemkc r h m through rhc appropriating
rsrimilation of a ncptivc image of it, and dis-
semination is written on the back-the fain-
of that mirmr.
Jnquw Dd&, Dismhatim
 ARBREVIATIONS OF WORKS B Y JACQUES DERRIDA

T h e abhwisdnns that appcar in the text, followed br page citations, refer

to the following worts by Jacques Derrida:
AF The Archmrogy of rhe Frivolour. mns. J. P. Ixavy (Pittsburgh:
Duqucsne, 1980)
D Distmindion. iranr. B. Johnson (Chicago: Univmiy of Chicago
Press, 1981)
L? “Limited Brc.,” in Glyph 2. trans. S. Wcbcr (Balrimore: Johns
Hopkins University P r a s , 1977), pp. 162-254
M Margins of Philosophy, rrans. A. Bass (Chicago Univmiry of
Chicggo Press. 19az1
0 Edmmd Husserl’s Origin of Ceometty: An Snrductiori, rrans.
J, P. Lcavy (Stony Brook. N.Y.: Nicholas Hays. 1978)
OG Of G r u m m t o b ~trans
, G. C. Spivak (Baftimore: Johns Hopkins
Universiry Press, 1976)
P. Positions, trans. A. Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss,
1971)
S Spars: Nietrrchc’s Styles. trans. B. Harlow (Chicap: University
of Chicago Press, 1979)
SP Speech and Phenomena. rrans. D. B. Allison ‘(Evancron, 111.:
Northwestern University Press, 1973)
VP La Vgriri en peinrure (Paris: Flammarion. 1978)
W D Wriring and Differace, trans. A. Bass ‘(Chicago: University
of Chicago P,1978)
 Inrroduction

I
Any attempt to interprcrJacques Derrida”swritings in chc perspecrive
of philosophy as a discipline is bound to stir controversy. Indeed,
many philosophers and literary critics alike agree that Derrida’s work
is literary in essence. For the philosuphcrs in question, however, such
an assertion is one of uncompromising ,reproof, for It is bawd on
what they perceive as an incompatibility with philosophical sobriety,
a lack of philosophical problematics and argumentarion. For the lir-
erary critics, by mntrast, the epithet literary is a mark of distinction,
b a d on the fact hat Derrida has writren extemively on literary
works and has also thmatized a number of concepts crucial to the
literary-critical enterprise. Above all, the qualificadon l i m q refers
to what is viewcd a5 Derrida’s playful style and fine sensibility to the
very matter of literature: that is, language. Yet to judge Derrida’s
writing as literary-to exclude them from the sphere of ‘krious,”
that is, philosophical discussion, or to recuperate them for literary
criticism-is a feeble attempt to mastcr his work, one that cannot do
justice to the complexity of the Derridean enterprise. To miect such
a characterization of Derrida’s work does not, howcvcr, imply that
it must therefore be philosophical. If philosophy is understood as
mnstitutcd by a horizon of probiematizariw exclusively determined
by the traditional desiderata of a canon of issucs, and if, in particular,
such problcmatization is identified with one special technique of ar-
gumentation, then Dcrrida’r writings arc certainly not philosophical.
If philosophy is understood in this manner, the purpose of this book
camat be simply to reapprupnatc Derrida for philosophy.
Yet my exposition of Derrida’s writings is manifestly philosophical,
for at least two reasons. First, what Dertida has tu say is mediated
 L INTRODUCTION

by rhecanon of the traditional problems and methods of philosaophical

problem solving, as well as by the history of these problems and
methods, even if his work cannot be fully situated within the,confines
of that canon and history. My interpretation is philosophical insofar
as it focus= on Derrida’s relation to the philosophical tradition, and
emphasizes the manner in which his wrirings address not only par-
ticular philosophical problems and ihtir tradirional formulations, bur,
more important, the philosophical itself. Second, my study is philo-
sophical because it aics to prove that rhe specific displacements of
rradidonal philosophical issues by deconstruction amount not to an
abandonment of philosophical rhaughr as such, bur rather to an at-
rempt at positively recasting philosophy’s necessity and possibility in
view of its incvirable inconsisrencies. Indeed, Derrida’s inquiry into
the limits of philosophy is an investigation into the conditions of
possibility and impossibility of a type of discourse and questioning
that he r e c ~ g n i z eas
~ absolurely indispensable. The philosophical
meaning of such an intcllcctual entcrprisc is certainly nor easy tograsp.
Its difftculty stems not simply from phi~osoaphy’nnomrioun transgrcs-
sion of commonplace representation, but from an attempr, made in
full respect of all the classical requirements of philosophical argu-
mentation and development, to question the laws of posribjliiy of
that transgression itself, without, however, aiming to do away with
it. Therefore, reading Derrida requires not only the rraditional sur-
mounting or bracketing of rhe natural amrude, ordinary consdous-
n m , or habitual modes of thoughr that all approaches K) a philosophical
work rcquirc. bur above all an additional retreat or absmnion, whereby
the philosophical gcsture and mode of perception themselves become
thematic. In short, my exposition of Derrida’s work is philosophical
to the exrenr rhac we understand his debate with the condirian of
philosophical generality to be “philosophicat’* in intent.
Apart from the fact that I ’believe that Dcrrida’s thought can be
adcquately understood only if approached philosophicaIy-that is,
shown to bc engaged in a constant debate with the major philosophical
themes from a primarily philosophical perspecrive-it must also be
adrnittcd chat some of my emphasis on thc philosophical dimensions
of Derrida’s work is clearly a function of his receprion in this country,
particularly, by the proponents of what has comc to be known as
dcconsrruclive criticism. Undoubtedly dcconstruccive criticism has
grcdtly profited from Dertida’s thought, both thematically and merh-
odologically. But to quarry from Derrida’s writings i a not auromat-
ically to become deconstmctive in the eminent sense. Indeed, many

I
 IMRODUCTION 3

dmstnrctionist ctiticp have c h m simply m ignore the profooundly

philosophical thrust of Derridean thought, and have consequently
misconstrued what deconstruction consists of and what it seeks to
achieve. From the pmpectivr of what 1establish here as to the naturc
of de~onsmctim,hardly any dcconsmctionist aitic could lay daim
tothat titlt Yet my sometimcr harsh judgment of that sort of criticism
is not meant to be a wholesale njcction. Undoubtdy demnstruc-
donist criticism has brought frah air and imagination into the oth-
erwise stuffy a m o s p h m of the critical cstablishmcnt. It has led to
exciting and highly valuable readings of literary tern. But d m n s h u c -
tionkt criticism also has a spDdficity of in own; it obeys laws and
foIIaws intentions that arc nor at all those that underlie Derrida‘s
philosophical enterprise. Indeed no one was more aware of &is dis-
crepancy benvecn venturn than Paul h Man, as I have tried to
demonstrate elmvhtm’ Moreover, deconmuctionist aiticim is the
offspring of a heritage rhar has licrlc in common with that of k r i d a ’ s
thought. Deconstructionist criticism must be understood as originat-
ing in New Criticism; it is a continuation of his American-bred lit-
erary scholarship. tt is against this criticism’s appropriation of a
philosophical~yp q e d notion OF deconstruction, but also against many
philosophers’ misreadings of Derrida as literary humbug, that some
of my emphasis is directed,
Yet since this book is concerncd neither with the history of d m -
mructionist criticism and its miscomprchmsion of deconstruction in
a smct sense, nor with cstablishing the distinctive spedficity p r o p
to this type of P;ti&m, I havc avoidcd all dctailcd debate with de-
cmsrmdwe criticism. In order to undertake such a debate at teast
w o things would be required, neither of which this book could hope
to achicvc: B determination of the autonomy of this rypc of critiasm,
and a d c h t i o n of a criticism that would yield to deconstruction as
dcvelopcd herein. Rather this book confines itself M an analysis af
the philophid background and implications of deconstruction, and
to a discussion of some of the prernisa of a criticism b a d on it. In
short, anyone will undoubtedly be deceived who me to es-
tablish what a “true’” deconsrmaianist criticism wauld be, bcyand
what Barbara Johnson has diagnosed. in an ekgant phrase, as the
double infidtliry of dcconsrrucrionisr critiasm, which, through irs
incursion into the exotic-the seducdvc foreipncss of Derrida’s
thaught-comm to remember what it was thar had appealed IO it in
: is, Ncw Criticism.2 Bur all rhcsc
what i t was being unfaithful t ~ that
t a t s are dependent preascly on a prior elucidation of that which
4 INTRQUUGIION

deconstructionist criticism is onfaairhful to in Derrida’s writing, and

rhat i s all I want to cstablish here.
Some may argue that my attempt to present Decrida’s thought in
a perspective of disciplinary philosophy. although perhaps ,feasiblein
the caw of his earlier work, which is obviously philosophicd and
conteprual in a technical sense, could be succcssful wirh the later
work only if this portion of Derrida’s writings wcreviewed somewhat
selectively. As a matter of fact, this book is based o n atmost the
enrirery of Derrida’s writings up to La Viriti m peinrure (1979)-
wirh rhe exception of Gbs-as well as on a host of essays. Purring
aside the delicate question of whar is to be counted as more philo-
sophical or more tirerarily playful, not to mention earlier or later, I
havc adrnitrcdly given greater prominence to the marc philosophically
discursive texts. It has not been my intention to mver the totaliry of
Derrida’s oeuvre up to this point, o r to speak for what he may publish
in the future. This hook cerrsinly does nor claim to be ,exhausrive.
The question, then, is whether the analysis of the supposedly earlier
and more philosophical texts has any bearing an Derrida’s later writ-
ings. But has not Dcrrida insisted time and again on the continuity
of his intellectual mterpriw? For instance, in “The Time of a Thesis:
Punctuations” (19821, he rcmarks thar “all of the probIema worked
on in the Introduction to The Origin ofGeomehy have continued to
organize the work I have subsequcntly atrempted in connection with
philosophical, literary and even nondiscursive corpora, mosr notably
that of pictorial work,“’ Indeed 1 believe 6rmly thar all rhc motifs of
the earlier iexrs continue to inform and direct Dertida’s more “play-
ful” texts. The diffcrcnce between the more “philosophical” and the
more “literary” approach consirts, primarily, in making philosophical
arguments in P nondiscursivc manncr, on rhe level of the rignifier,
syntax, and textual organization. A5 is well known from the Platonic
dialogues, such a proccdutc is itself thoroughly philosophical. and
thus shows these texu to beconcerned with problems similar to those
discuscd in a technically conceptual manner in the cxplicirly philo-
sophical works.
To affirm such continuity, however, is not to deny difference and
evolution. An cxtcnrive cvolurion is widmr as one passcs from thc
carlicr to rhe later work, insofar a5 Derrida comes ro speak on subiects
hc had nor taken up beforc. But rnorc imporram is the intcnsivc
wolurion rooted in Derrida’s dcconsrrucrion of the constintrive rhe-
torical and literary dcvices nf philosophical argummtation. Indeed,
if the making of arguments in a literary or poetic manner is itself
 INTRODUCTION P
~~ ~~

eminently philosophical, Derrida’s mimicry of these devices m e t h e

lcss outdoes philosophy’s manery ofthe aignifier. His earlier work is
very much concerned with the inevitable problcms of concept for-
ination and argumentation; the l a m work adds to rhis the dimension
of the problems that follow from philosophy’s involvement in the
materiality, spatiajity, and mporality of its texts. In his so-called
literary texts, Dcrrida pursues the same problems on yet another level,
a level that adds both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect to his
Iater mrrk. Yet this complication itself becomes intelligible only if we
first eluadate the &rust ofDerrida’s philosophical debatcs. Neglecring
to d o 50 leads to the unfortunatt designation of the latcr prorcan
texts as literary, regardless of whether “literary” is understood as
merely l i m r y . Although in some d e g m 1 indicate an approach to
thcse texts, for the most part 1 have limited myself ro expounding the
more argumcnrativc side of Drrrida’s wrirings. This explication is
necessary if one wish- to come to grips with what amounts to a
deconsuuction af the phiImophinl rules for staging an argument in
texts.
To q o s c rhc esmtial wits and the philosophical thrust of Der-
ridean thought, I have chosen a triple approach. Fint, 1 ,situate and
i n m p m Derrida’s phiIosophy with respect to one particular philo-
sophical problem and its history: namely, the criticism of the notion
of reflexiviry. Second, while choosing that formof presentation, de-
velopcd since Aristatle, that proceeds by logical dependency, I also
link rogcrhcr a mulrirudt of motifs in Dcrrida’s oeuvre in ordcr to
demonstrate the consistent nature of this philosophical enterprise, and
to attempt to sysmnatizc some of its results. Third, I further devtlop
these concerns, especially insofar .as they impinge on the problem of
universality, by analyzing a scries of Drnidean concepts thar have
been abwrbed into deconstructionist criticism, and I clarity their phil-
osophical status in Derrida’s work. This thrmfold intention broadly
corresponds ro the three para of this book.
Unlike orhen who have aitemprrd to situate Dcrrida’s thought in
the history at the grand disputcs concerning the question of being
(Girard Granel], o r in the apocryphal histary of t h t grammatological
(Jean Grksch).not to mention m a i n histories bordering on the phan-
tasmic which some philosophers and critics have devised, I discuss
Dcrrida’s philosophy in terms of the criticism to which the phiIa
sophical concept of reffedon and reflexivity has been subjected. The
reasons for this choice arc dearly drcumstantiial. Indeed the dominant
rnimnception of Derrida is b a d on the confusion by many literary
6 INTRODUCTION

critics of dcconstmction with rcflcxivity. Refltcrjm and reflexivity,

however, are precisely what will not fir in Derrida’s work-not be-
cause he would wish ta refute or reject them in favor of a drcam of
immcdiacy. but because hi5 work questions reflection’s unthought,
and thus the Iimiis of its possibility. This book’s ride, Tbe Toin of
the Mirror, alludes 10 that “beyond” of the orchestrated mirror play
of reflection t h a t Derrida’h philosophy sccks to conccpmalizc. Tak.
3 ward altered from the French it&, according to the OED. refers
to the tinfoil, the silver lining, the lusterless back of the mirror. Det-
rida‘s philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of reflection, is
engaged in the systematic exploration of that dull surface without
which no reflection and no specular and spcculativc activity would
be possible, but which a t the same time has no place and no part in
reflcction’s scintillating play-
Yer my hislory of the critique of reflection, outhned in Part I, is
nor a straightforward history. It does nor describe the full range of
answers suggcstcd with respcm to this question. Nor d m it refer m
Anglo-Saxon and American authors who have broached this problem,
from Shadworth Hodgson to Sydney Shoemaker. By contrast, Hegel’s
speculative criticism of rhe philosophy of reflection is bven what mme
may consider inordinate importance. But Part I is intended not as a
total history of that problem, but merely as an oriented history that
serves as a theoretical prelude to the systematicexposition of Derrida’s
thought, which I undertake in Part I[. in spite of my contention rhar
Derrida’s philosophy must ‘be relatcd to rhe modern bistory of the
concept of reflection and to the criticism it has drawn, 1 seek primarily
to bring into view Derrida’s debate with the traditional paradigms of
philosophy in general. The speculative form in which Hegel cast the
unvarying philosophical topoi, and even their I-lusserlian or Heideg-
gerisn phenomenological farm, are, undoubtedty, because of their
~trategicimportancc for Derrida’s wrEtings as D whole, privileged
means of acces to this thinker’s discourse. But neither Hegel nor
Husserl is truly at stake, nor is any other regional or historically
limited form of philosophy. Ar stake rather is what in these aurhors
touches on the enterprise of philosophy as such. indecd to interpret
Dtrrida i s to confronr the whole tradition of Western thought, not
so much as a cumulative series ofphilosophical figures, however. but
as a rradition roored in and yielding to a set of unsurpassable rherr
rctica1 and cthical themes and dcrnands. These arc, as I have tricd to
show, the reat terms of rcfcrence and the adequate horizon of thought
of Derrida’s philosophical enterprise, and they alone explain the rad-
 lNTRODUCTlON 7

icaIity and contemporary attractivenes of his writing, however mi5

construed they may have bcen.
In short, whcther discussing Hegel, Husserl, or Heid-, Demda
is primarily engaged in a dcbatc with the main philosophical question
regarding &c ultimate foundarion of whrr is. Conrnry to those phi-
losophers who naively negate and thus remain closcly and uncon-
trollably bound up with this issue, Derrida confrontsthe philosophical
qumt for the ultimate foundation a5 a necessity. Yet his faithfulness
to intrinsic philosophical demands is paired with an inquiry into the
inn- limits of t h e e demands themselves, as well as of their u n q u e -
tionable necessity.
My goal is to demonstrate that h i d a ’ s philosophical writings
display a subtle economy that recognizes the essential requirements
ofphilosophical thought while quesrioning the limirs of rhc possibiliry
of thcre requirements. Deconstruction, as 1 show in Pam 11, is engaged
in the construction of the “quasi-synthetic concepts” which account
for the economy of the conditions of possibility and impossibility of
the basic philosophemcs. Itrfrartrlrctures, a word used by Derrida on
sevcrat -ions in refacnoe m thesc quaskynthm’c constructs, mmcd
to represent the mast economical way to conceptualizeall of Derrida’s
proposed quasi-synthetic concepts in a general manner. “Undecida-
bla” would have been an alternative, ycr ‘‘infrastmmre’’ bas the
suppiemenrary advantage of allowing for a problematization of Der-
rida’s debate with structuralism and with the Platonism thar it ha$
inherited from conseruativc strata in Husscrlian phenomenology. The
notion of infrastructures has not yet been picked up by any of those
who have written on Dcrrida. From the perspective of my analysis of
deconstruction, however-its necessity, how it is carried out, and of
what irs conclusions consist-the occurrence of the word infrostrrrc-
flrre in Derrida’s writings is mare than a coincidence.
In Pan 111 I inquire into the problems of philosophical gcnerality
and universality from a daanstruaive point of view by way of a
discussion of Dcrrida’s use of the terms writing, textuality, and met-
aphor. In each case I try to reconstruct the precise context in which
rhm conceprs b w m c operational in Dcrrida’s work, and thus to
determine what philosophical task they are meant to paform. Here
roo I s u p t some of the criteria that a possible dewnsrructionisr
literary criticism would have to observe.
As an investigation into the irreducibly plural eonditiom of pos-
sibility of all major philosophical, theoretical, and ethical dcsidcrata,
dcconstmction is eminently plural. Derrida’s philosaphy, as I shal1
8 INTRDDUCTI OH

show, is plural. ycr not pluralistic in the li'beral senst-that is, as

HegeI knew, secretly monological. This plural nature, or openness,
of Derrida's philosophy makes it thoroughly impossible m conceivc
of his work in terms of orthodoxy, nor simply because, since he is P
living author, his work is not yet completed, but primarily because
it resists any possibleclosure, and thus doctrinal r&$dity, for essential
reasons. Still, such openncss and pluralism do not give license to a
free inrerpreration of Derrida's thoughr. or for its adaptarion to any
particular need or interest. Nor are all the inrerpretations of Derrida's
thought that seek legitimacy in such openness equally valid. In this
b w k I hope that I have found a middleground h e e n the srmctural
pluraliry of Derrida's philosophy-a plurality rhar makes it impossible
ro elcvarc any 6nal essence of his work into irs iruc meaning-and
thc srricr criteria to which any inrerpretation of his work must yield,
if it is to be about that work and not merely a private fantasy. These
criteria, at ccnrer stage in this book, are, as I shall show. philosophica[
and not literary in nature.
Some might want ro call my efforts a rctranslation of Derrida's
writings back inro the technical language of philosophy and its ac-
cepted set of questions. Indeed, in order to show at what precise point
rhe questions and demands of philosophy are transgressed in Derrida's
thought, I have had to emphasize their tcthnical aspects. Yct such a
proccdurc cart hardly hc called a literal rctranslation, since "philos-
ophy" is spellcd out in capital letters throughout Derrida's work, his
seemingly more playful texts includcd. I f this is a retranslation at all,
it is one that focus= on what Dupin describes, refcrring in The Pur-
b i n d Letter to a certain gamc, as rhat which escapes "obscrvation
by dint of being excessively obvious."' Yet this excasively obvious
aspcct of Derrida's work, which SO many readers have overlooked,
is precisely what givcs special significance to Derrida's so-called aban-
donment of philosophy and its rechnical language.
Bur in addirionro rhe danger of being ma obvious in dernonsrraring
the philosophical thrust at Dcrrida's work, a more serious risk is
involved in attempting a retranslation. Apart from rhe always looming
danger of opacity and crudity owing to insufficient philosophical ren-
ritivity on thc part nf thc inarpretcr, the major danger i s thar this
opention may be understood as an end in irseIf. Obviously this is the
risk I encounrcr with the professional philosopher. Indeed, in referring
Derrida's philosophy back to the ctassical and technical vocabulary
in order ro determine prccisely the level, Incus, and dfcct of a dc-
mnsrructivc inrervcntion in the traditional fieldof philosophical prob-
 INTRODWCTIDN. . 9

lematics, one may well confound the assignment of that locus with
the debatc itsclf. In spite of all the precautions I have taken-regard-
ing, f o r instance,my reference to such Derridean concepts as ariginary
synthesis and transcendentality to indicate the lml on which his
debate with philosophy m r s - m y determination of the level and
the scope of the debatc may be mistaken by some for that which is
at stake in the debate inelf. In this sense, rather than clarifying ex-
tremely intricate problems, my “mansIation” may even create a
series of new abstacls to undemanding Derrida’s thought. Yet this
is the risk any interpretation must take, a risk that, as Dcrrida’s
philosophy maintains, is always possible and thus a nccasary pos-
sibility that has to be accounted for. And it is a risk that I happily
assume, if I have been succcssfuI in providing some insights into a
number of ditficult matters not prcviously a d d w e d , and Especially
if this book helps set forth more rigorous uiteria for any future
discussion of Derrida’s thought.
 PART ONE

Toward the Limits

of Reflection
 1

Defining Reflection

I
ReOcction is undoubtedly ar old as the discourseof phiIosophy itself.
A statement such as this, howmer, borderson the trivial, if one de6nes
reflection in its most common senst, as meditation or carcful consid-
eration of some subject by turning or fixing one's thoughts on it.
Without such action, no philosophical discourse could gcr off the
ground. 1 am concerned here instead with the philosophical concept
of reflection, which from the outset has turned away from the im-
mediacy and contingency of the reflective gatwe by which philoso-
phiaing bcgim in order to reflect on the beginningof philosophy itself.
The mnccpt of philosophical reflection is, as we shall see, a name for
philosophy's eternal aspiradon toward wlf-foundation. Yet only with
modern philosophy-philosophid thought since D e s c a m r a i d re-
flection expliatly acquire this status of a principle par excellence.
Why, then, did reflection become an outstanding, perhaps a n un-
surpassed, principle of philDsophica1 &inking, and in what way are
we M undersrand It? First of all, from the momcnt it became the chief
methodological conctpt for Cartesian thought, it has signified the
turning away from any straightforward consideration of objects and
from thc immediacy of such an experience toward a considcrarion of
the very experience in which objew are given. Second, with such a
bending back upon the modalitits of obiect perception, reflection
show itself to mean primarity =If-reflection, self-relation, self-mir-
roring, By lifting the ego out of its immediate entanglement in the
world and by thematizing the subject ot thought irrelf, DRczrtcs
establishes t h e apodictic certainty of self as a result of the clarity and
disrinctncss with which it perceiver itself. Through self-reflection, the
self-the ego, the subject-is put on its own feer, set free from all
 Id TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION
~~ ~~ ~

unmcdiated relation to being. In giving priority to the human being’s

determinarion as a thinking being, self-reflection marks the human
being’s risc m the rank of a subject. tr makcs the human being a
subjectivity that has its center in itself, a self-consciousness certain of
itself. This is the Crst epoch-making achievement of the concept of
refleaion, and it chancrerim modern rneraphysia as a rnaaphysia
of subjectivity.
By severing the self from the immediacy of the obiccr world, re-
flcction helps give the subiea freedom as a thinking being. From
Descants to Huvjerl, not to mention German Idealism, reflection as
the self-thinking of though5 as sclf-conKiousncss, has had an mi-
nently emancipatory function. lt constitutes the autonomy of the cog-
do, of the subiecr, of thought. Liberum est quod cuusa sui &. Only
rhe subjea rhar knows itself, and rhus finds the center of all cemrudc
in itself, is free. But self-reflection in modern philosophy not only
grounds the autonomy of the individual as a rational being; it also
appears to be the very motor of history as progress toward a frec
sodety. Self-reflection has informed all philosophy af spirit since Des-
cams; indctd, ir also constirums the modem mnccpr a l hisrory and
is the alpha and omega of political philosophy.
Yet Descartcs’s attempt to doubt anything, and Husrcrl’s eidetic
bracketing of all thetical positioning of the world, a m of freedom by
which thc rhinking subject reflects irself inro irself, do nor abandon
the world ofobiects. Although rhe principle of self-reflemion risks the
danger of solipsism, it is the very condition by which the world can
turn into a world of objects. Self-reflection, then (and this is another
of its maior modem characteristics). makcs masrery of the world
dependent on the status of the world as a world of obicas for a free
and self-conscious subject who bears thc promise of a free world.
As I have mentioned, sin= the bcginning of modem metaphysics
reflection has represented the sole means by which an ego can en-
gender itself as a subject. Because such a subject is seen as providing
the foundation, thesolid and unshakable ground of all possible knowl-
cdgc, the thcory of reflexivity also inaugurates the particular kind of
philosophical investigation thar with Kanr came to be known as rran-
sccndental philosophy, “rranscendtntal” referring to that son of
philosophical reOection that brings to conxiousncss the inner con-
dirions that consuture the objects in kenera1 thar present themselves
10 our experience. Indeed for Kant, tranwendcntal philosophy not
only hematites the forms and categories that make objective knowl-
edge possible but aIso makcs the transcendental subject “not merely
 DEFlNlNG REFLECTION 15

a logical condition of possible xlf-consdoumss, but that which rea1

consciousnsr knows to bc the subject of all possible reat conscious-
ness.”’ From Dcscartes to Kant, self-consciousness as the ground of
deduction of the systems of knowledge represents a still u n a n a l y d
presupposition; the analysis of its structure bemmcs a m a a l preoc-
cupation of modem philosophy only wirh Fiche. Nonetheless, in the
sort of invstigation latent since Descartes and beginning with Kant-
namely, tranffendntta philowphy-sclf-reflexiviig remains an a priori
structural precondition of what we undcrstand by knowledge ioelf.
As chis implies, the impfications ofself-decrios go beyond subjec-.
tivity, f r d o m , and rtanscendenralicy.
To the extent that transcendental philosophy laysdaim to reflecting
the a priori conditions of all knowledge, it must also reflect on the
ground proper of philosophy, and thus become rhe mtdium of the
self-retlection of philosophy. In the thinking of thinking-what Ar-
istotle called noesis norseos-rdlexivity serves at once as a medium,
the method, and the foundation by which philosophy gmunds itself
within itself. Through such a rdlecrion upon irself, in the philosaphy
of philosophy, the philosophical discourse xckr to achieve complete
clarity concerning its m csscnap and complete freedom from any
assumprions, thereby conlrrming its claim to bc the “first” philosophy,
the philosophy of philosophy, the philosophy capable of furnishing
the foundation of all other sdcnccs. In othcr words. %If-reflection
grounds the autonomy of philosophy as the knowledge that i s most
free. Here, one can best grasp that self-Amion is not only method
or medium but foundation as well. All modern philosophy has an
essential relation to itself such that all rdexive analyses are analyses
of the essential nature of things themselves, as Huswrl claimed with
respect to phenomenological reflection; furthermore, all reflmion by
philosophy upon itself represents an essential act of freedomin which,
as Fichte maintains, philwphy becomes its own content and returns
into itself.1 In short,self-reflection is not merely L key concept denoting
a method specific to modern philosophy, nor is it simply one of phi-
losophy’s major concerns. T h e scope of reflexivity is not cxhaustcd
by in role in constituting subjsdviry, freedom, tranmdmtality, and
philwophy us philosophy. At the very heart of modern metaphysics
as a metaphysics of subjcctivity, reflexivity is the very medium of its
unfolding; it is the method and substance, thcvery origin of philosophy
itself as a discourse of radicaI autonomy. Yet, despite i n capital im-
portance, the task of determining rigorously what reflection is is not
an easy one.
16 TOWARD T H E LIMITS O F REFLECTION

Since reffection is a5 old as philosophy iself, and gained systematic

significance as early as Descanes, it is surprising that it has not been
fully conceptualized. One can, of course, try to explain this incon-
gruiry by pointing a t rhe in fact very diffcrent meanings of reflection
throughout the history of philosophy, but one would still confront
rhc necmsicy of eoncepmatizing rhcsc dilfcmces. Any ammpt to
circumscribe 3 definite meaning of these different uses of the term by
zracing it back to its etymological roots in the Latin verb re-/here
is certain to be of little help. Still, such a procedure is not without
merit as a beginning, since it will suggest some of the mom formal
characteristics of the movements that compose reflection, as well as
some of rhc fundarncnral imagery associated with this concept. Re-
flecterp means “to bend” or “to turn back” or backward, as well as
“to bring back.” Yet this turning back is significant for understanding
reflection only if one recalls that in both Creek and Latin philosophy
thc term has optic connotations, in that it refers to the action by
ITIirrOringsUrfacKnfthrowing back Fight, and in particular a mirror’s
exhibition or reproduction nf obiccts in the form ,of images. In this
sense, reflection signifies the process that takes place between a figure
or object and its image on a polished surface. As a consequence of
this optic metaphoriciry, reflection. when designating the mode and
operation hy which the mind has knowledge at itself and its opcra-
rims, becomes analogous to the process whereby physical ljghr is
thrown back on 3 reflecring surface. From thc beginning, self-con-
sciousness as constirured by self-reflccrion has been conceptualized in
terms of this optic operation and. m5re generally, a5 we shall sec later,
in terms analogous to perception, with the effect that sdf-conscious-
ness has come to suggest 8 beam of light thrown back upon itself
aFter impact with a reflecting surface. In this vein the Stok, and later
the Neoplaronists, camc to undersand the m u s as a =If-reflecting
and self-illuminating light, which sees itself by mirroring obiccts.’ A5
500n as consciousness is said to reflect the world and itself by turning
upon itsclf, and rhus to bc conscious of itself in this act of coiling
upon itself, this rnctaphysics of light. or photology, is transposed to
it. Unlike thc common notion of reflection, reflcction as a philosoph-
ical concept requires that the action of reproduction also be thrown
back upon itself.
Recognizing the convcrgcnce ofthe word reflection’s etymological
meaning with the rnccsphoriciry of light. one could venture a prclim-
inary dchirion: rcttection is the structure and thc pronss ofan op-
eration that, inaddition to designating theaction o f a mirror reproducing
 DEFINING REFLECTION 17

an object, implies that mirror's mirroring itself, by which process the

mirror is made ro see itself. Such a minimal definition, apart from the
formidabb ptoblans it p c s , can hardly Explain all the different
theories o r philosophies of reflection throughout the history of phi-
losophy, aithough they may all share the optic memphor predominant
in the conapt of reflection. T h i s is partjculedy true of modern phi-
losophy from DeKartes to Kant, and ro some extent Hegel.
Whar arc the major events in this history of the philmaphy of
reflection?Although it is true h a t the Augustinian notion of rediws
in se ipswnr-a return upon and into oneself constituting rhc medium
of philosophy-prefigures rhe modern concept of reflection, rhe phi-
Iosophy of reflection is generally considercd to have begun with Des-
cartes's prbna pbilosopbia. There are good 1eax1~5for this assumption,
For in k c a r m the scholastic idea of the reditus undergoes an epoch-
making mnsformation. whereby reflection. instead of being merely
the medium of mctaphysjq becomes its very foundation. With Carte-
sian thought, the self-certainry of the thinking subject-a certainty
apodicticafty found in the cogito me rogi*rre-becomes the unshak-
able ground of philosophy itself. No longer does rhe essence of rhe
human being reside primarily in grounds ontologically and thcolog-
ically independent of him; DeMarres discovers ir in the iogically and
ontologically prior phenomenon of the rogito me cogitare, in which
the thinking self appears to itself as me cogitare. With the ego a$
,cogitrmsbecoming its own copital~nl,a major paradigm of reflection,
and of the ensuing philosophy, is set forth. In fact, one could scho
maticatly ascertain the different and ohen concravcrsial forms al the
philosophies of reflection in posr-Catresian philosophy up to Kant as
d i k n t modes of determining the me roghre.
The status of the founding reflexive act in Dcwrtm retains, as
Hubert Schnldelbach has convincingly demonstrated, a strange am-
bijyity, such that it is impossible to make out clearly whether this
act is scnsible or inteliigibk.' from here on, the history of the devel-
opment of the philosophy of reflection becomes almost predictable.
Take, for instance, the case of Locke, for whom reflection is also the
fundamental method of philorophizing. inasmuch ms it is the sole
means of dimvering logical categories. But for Lucke, this source of
cognition, by which the mind becomes aware ~f its own doiny, is
basically a sensible, empirical operation of internal perception or inner
experience. Reflection here is empirical d e c t i o n , an rm#mtio recta
direcud upon thoughr a5 an internal realiry, belonging by right to
psychology and nor to philosophy. For Leibniz too, reflection is an
rg TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

aKCnnOn directed upon self, but it is a process that rakes place in

turning from everything sensible toward an intellectual anualization
of innate ideas. Unlike Lockt’s empirical reflection, Ixibniz’s refleaion
must be termed logical. A first synthesis of these opposite positions
on the status of the me cogitmecan be found in Rousseau, for whom
self-consciousness is grounded in a state of emotional self-affecrion
which stands as the precondition of all propositional activity-that
is, of thc passing of judgments. Needlessto say, these characterizations
are not straightforwardly historical but arc schematic at best; yct I
do not mean them to be more. All 1 am concerned with a t this point
is evoking this dominant motif of reflection as a founding principle
of modern philosophy.
Now. a5 regards this history of the concept of reflection, what is
Kant’s pasirion? As the famous addendum to Trrrnscmdmtd Anu-
lyric-the chapter entitled “On the EquivocaI Naturt of Amphib-
oly”-demonstr~tes, Kant is critical of both logical and cmpiricat
reflection. His criticism is rnadc in the name of what could be con-
sidered a return to Desurtes. yet which is, at the same time, a total
innovation within the Cartesian paradigm of reflection. His criricism
is a function of trartscmdental rcflection. Kant writes: “ R d e d o n
(refkcio)does not concern itself with obiects themselvce with a view
to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in
which we lirst set ourselves to discover the subjective condirions under
which (alone1 we arc able to arrive at conccpts.”3As truwcendetrirrl
reflection,reflection examines and distinguishes the faculties of cog-
nition with which conceptions of objects originatc, and which detet-
mine whether a givcn conception belongs to pure understanding or
S C ~ S U O U Sintuition. Transcendental reflection Is dcfined as the inquiry
into the ground ofpossibility of sensible intuition in general and of
the objective comparison of rcpracntations, and it is thus very $if-
ferent from empirical and Logical refleaion, neither of which aixounrs
for the faculty of cognition to which the conceptions belong. UnlIkc
inner or outer reflection, transandental reflection anciapatcs the deeply
conccaled hunscendentdl unity. to usc Kant’s words. of these two
types of reflection.‘ Trans~endcntalrcflmion grounds both empirical
and logical reflection in the unity of a more fundamental reflection,
which is the result ,of Kant’s twisting the founding certainty of cogito
me cogitore into the subjective dimension for the mndilions of pos-
sibility of dl knowledge. But what is most decisive for the turn re-
fleaive philosophy taka in post-Kantian thought k that tra-dcnd
reflection is also the thinking of the unityof the operation of reflection
 DEFINING REFLECTION 19

itself. With the pure synthetic unity of the I tbkk that must at least
virtually accompany all of the experiencing subject’s repreenmion$,
and w h i B Kant was led to assume as a m l t of his transmdenral
deduction of the carcgoris, he achieved a first, howcvct hypothetical
unification of the different moments that constitute rhr minimal dcf-
inition ofreflection as xlf-dcctian.
Although since Degeartes self-consciousness has been the ground
of foundation and deduction for aU systems of knowledge, not until
Fichte did anyone begin M explore systematicallyrhe strumre af self-
reflexivity that constitutes df-aonsciousncss. Since such an investi-
gation into the srruccum of reflection, understood by Fichfe as the
bring driven inward of the endlessly outreaching activity of self, br-
came possible only afrcr Kant had recognized rhc synthetic narufc of
teflectioti, Hegel could view Fichte’s demonstration of a self-positing
“I,” the indispensablepresupposition of any objective “1” or of any
objective positing (Non-I), as a direct continuationof what he termed
"speculative gemIS” in Kant’s philmphy. W h i l e Fichte radicalid
Kantkidca of the transccndenral unity ofappermprion in terms of a
subjective idealism, Schelling, in his philosophy of nature, developed
an o b j d v e variation on the sanlc problem. With Hcgel’s attempt m
supersede thae oppositions h e e n subjective and objeaivc soh-
tions to the problem of self-consciousness and seIf-rcfIeCtioo,the phi-
losophy of reflexivity reached a climax.
What this a l l TO shon ourline of the history of mtlcction suggesf~
is that we need to distinguish between differmr ryp- of reflection.
First are those we have already mcounnred: logical, empirical, and
transcendental refleuion. Empirical reflation, as bending i n upon
what takes p l a a within us, is the sourm of all psychological howl-
edge. *car reflection is a turning backward of thou&, away from
its relation to objccrs (including imclf as an empirical reality] to the
mamination of the relations among objects,and the relations among
the concepts of these objects. Since Kant recognized that neither cm-
pirical nor logicat reflection accounts for the r e m m that would prove
their cppistemolagical validiry, or for rhe origin of the concepts they
examine and compare. a new form of mtlection-nanmdmral re-
Rmion--takes over the rask d determining and securing the con-
ditions of possibility of valid cognition. In this sense, transendental
reflection is an inquiry into the a pti~aprinciples of the cognition of
obi- in p e a l . Of course, rhii is not rhc only meaning of man-
scendcntal reflection, which aqrrirbd a new and original meaningwith
Husxd’s phenomenology in particular. Reflection for Husserl has a
20 TOWARD THE LtMIT5 OF REFLECTION
~

“univmd methodologiml function”; ir is “ ‘mnsciousnw.’ own rncthod

for thc knowlcdge of consciousness gcncrally”-that is, a method
immanent to’rhe sphcre of being which it analyzes, and by which rhe
phenomena of this sphere: can be grasped and analyzcd in the light
of their own evidence.’ Insofar as the fundamental merhodological
irnporrance of reflection for phenomenology is based on iB invari-
gation of the rcflcxivc acts of consciousness-that is, of all the modes
of immanent apprehension of the essence and of all modes of im-
manent experience as well-it is a transcendental reflcctian. Yet, whereas
Kant’s tnnscendenral reflection is essentially concerned with the va-
lidity of reflections or thoughts, Hosserl’n assumption of a r e d con-
ncction between reflection and what is reflected makes Husserlian
transcendental reflection an analysis a1 the production and consti-
tution of thoughts by a thinking subject. ,Such refleciion can be con-
sidcrcd nocmaric reflection, turning on the acts constituting the
intentional objects of thought in general.
The last typc of rcflcction,which will preoccupy us morctxtcnsively
than the previous four, is what Hegel called absolute and speculative
reflection. Hegel’s norion of absolute reflection represents the most
complete typc of reflection-the concept at reflection itself-refleaing
the totality of its formal movements. In addition, it is important to
note that it i s a first ctitiquc of the paradigm of reflection.‘ Before
promeding, Icr us first circle back for a rnomcnt to the minimal dcf-
inition of reflection as the process and structure of the mirroring of
an ohject by a polished surface und, at the same time, a mirroring of
the mirror as well. Reflection thus seems to yield to a double move-
mcnt, and to contain two distinct moments, bur it i s far from clear
how these two moments relate, how reflection as a unitary phenom-
enon can at once be refleaion of Other and refleaion of the mirroring
subject. Yet a philosophical analysis 01 reflection is bound to live up
to the universal requirement lor unity. Kant’s concept of rransccn-
dental reflection is a first attempt to realize this demand, whereas
Hegel’s concept of absolute reflection fulfills this requirement. In what
ways must one determine thc two distincr moments of reflection in
order to make them the living pans of a harmonious whole? As we
have seen, rcflection as sclf-reflection coincides in rnodcrn metaphysici
with the powerful motif OF subiectivity. Therefore, it is in subjectivity
thar we must look for the source of unification of the reflexive pro-
cess’s separate elements, although this implies that rhe mirror’s self-
reflection cannot be a part of that whole comparable to the moment
of objective reflection. The mirroring mbiect’s self-mirroring is rhe
goat of the whole process. Consequently the quesrion is, how can the
 DEFINING REFLECTION 21

Ictlecrion of objects lead or be related to self-refledon? Obviously a

third mommt is required to unite all the dments of d c c t i o n into
one whole, Thomas Aquinas had remarked in De Y n i m that re-
fleaion i s directed both at the reproduced image or concept of an
object and at the act of reflecting itscif. Indeed, such a reflection
provider the missing link; the rhird, in rruth, Em momenraf reflection
is found in the remgnition that the object reflected by the mirroring
subjar is IIOT just any object but rahR this subject’s symmetric Other-
in orher words, a rcprcsenurion of ics alienared self. With such an
alienating positing of irseIf as object, its reflection truly bemmes an
act of bringing back, a rccapruring recognition. In the rcflection of
h e mirrorazbjcct as an annulment of the mirroring subject’s former
alienation, the reflection of Other becomes a reflmion of sdf, The
mirror’s self-reflection is the embracing whole that allows it m release
itxlf into Other, which ,explains why it faas an object in the first
place and why it returns dcxively to itself.
In Hans Hcinz HoIz’s analysis of thc strumre and logical meaning
ofthis dialectical unity of self-reflection, in his essay “Die SeIbstin-
tcrprctation des Seinq” the mirror metaphor is shown m be consti-
nrrive of being, if rhe lamr is understood in terms of subjectivityy.
Moreovu, as metaphor, it is itself a moment in the pmccss of the
self-interpretation of the concept of being. In the metaphor of the
mirmr the concept of being can properly appear to itself. Holz con-
cludes: “The doubling of what is mirrored in the mirrored, the lamr
being the same as what is mirrored and yet an other, hence ‘represents
the d i a k i c a l relation according to which the species encompasses
itxlf and irs opposite: k i n g is the specis of itself and of nonbcing,
the One is species of itself and rhe rnanifold.”Y T h e paradigm of
d c c t i o n thus requires, in addition to the two moments outlincd in
the minimal definition, a third element, which triggers the unifying
dialectic beween the mirror and i s o b j e q as well as between the
mirror and itsclL T k i s dialectic, by means of which the mirrored objecr
is seen to be that into which the mirror opens out as an image of the
mirror itself, both the same as and diffcrcnr frwm it. allows for the
integration of the two previously distinguished mammts of rcflcaion
into the unity created by the self-revcladan of the mirroring subject.
The alienation of the mirror in its Other and the reflection of the
object arc linked together in such a way a5 to form a totality in which
they are reflected into one another, leaving absolutely no remainder
outside. T h i s conceptual totality salvages even the reflective mirroring
process as its alienating meraphoric detour to i d f .
Although we now havc a more mrnplctc minimal definition of
22 TOWARD THE LlMlTS OF REFLECTION

reflection, of Ea basic ingrdiena and their dialectic, it remains an

abstract concept of rcflection, and onc that must be rendered more
concrete. Such an abstracr ,definitioncannot serve to identify all the
philosophies of reflection; it only encompasses other, more narrow
definitions, to the extent that it representsa more complete exposition
of reflection’s formal movements. In historical terms, this definition
can be found only in the philosophy of German Idealism afrtr b n t .
Hegel’s critique of rhc philosophy of reflection was carried out in the
name of this speculative definition of reflection. I hope to prove that
mosr of the later ,criticismof mflcction was carried out in the name
of this definition as weU. The irony, then, of this more encompassing
definition of reflection is that it brings the problem of reflection to a
certain end.
 2

T h e Philosophy
of Reflection

y1

In the following three chapters I hope to clarify the mncepr of re-

flecrian by analyling Hegel’s nation of absolute rdtccdon. This analg-
sis should provide UP with the totality of the formal movements of
d e c t i o n . It is important to note at the s t a r t that Hegel developed
rht notion of absolute rdlcaion, or speculation, as the mutt of his
mnfmnmadon with what he calls the philosophy of reflection. His
mncept of abolua refleaion repments the first attempt to address
a number of problems which were left unsolved by the pR-Hcgetian
philwphcro of ccflection. Hegels debate with hex phiIosophcrs of
reflection-with Kant, Jambi, and Fichre-is located in the rwo long
essays wrimn in Jena between 1801 and 1802, The Diffbmce be-
twem Fiche’s and Scheliilrg’s System of Philosophy and Faith and
Knowledge, as well a5 later, in a different form, in The Science of
Logic. It is therefore only fitting that we should give these two essays,
and in particular The Diffmme, special consideration. A very suc-
cinct oudinc of the historical background and at least some of the
major theoretical stakes in that debate ir, indispensable beforc I clab-
orate what HegeI understands by “philosophy of reflccdon,” what
his critique consisted of, and what concept of reflection he d c v e l ~ c d
to ovemme its. dificulties.
When Hegel arrived in Jena in 1801, the p m of diffrrmtiation
within German Idealism w a s already well under way. Two years
before, Kant had publish4 a declaration against his follower Fiche,
repudiating all affiliation between his own thinking and Science of
Knowledge, which pretended to be nothing other than a rigorous
explanation of the spirit of Kantian philosophy.
Although Schelling still conceived of h t work as no more than a
3.4 TOWARD T H E LIMITS OF REFLECTION

supplement to Fichte’s philosophy, Schelling’s System af Tronscen-

dental Idedirm. which appeared in 1800. made his thcomical dif-
hrenm with Fichtequite clear. On hisarrival atjena, Hegel immediately
became invalvcd in the dcbatc. Hc publishcd The Di/fermre, and
then, in Krirische Joumul dw Philosophie, which he and Schelling
founded as a forum for promulgating objcctivc idcalism, the essay
Faith and Knowhfge. Both texts represent a global and systematic
sertting of accounts bcrwccn what was at that moment the position
of subiective idealism, a5 opposed to that of objecrive ideatism, a
dcbatc in which Hcgd seems M have sidcd almost uncritically with
Schelling, Although in his essay “Uber die wissenschaftliche Bthand-
lung des Narurrecha” hc had already declarcd the superiority of thc
spirit to nature (by spirit 1 mean the intelligible reality of the moral
world of frccdom, and nor the immatcrial substance called spirit in
prc-Kantian theo-rationalistic systems), the break with Schelling be-
came cffective and final only with the appcarancc, in 1807, of Phe-
trowrenofogy of Spirit, which Schelling rightly understood to be a
catcgoncal critique of his own thought.
In order to undcrsrand what Hegel means by philosophy of reflec-
tion, and in order to appraise the critical achievement of his notion
of ahsolute reflection, thc stakes in this pmcess of differentiation muit
be summarized briefly. In The Difemnce. in explaining what distin-
guishes Kant, Fichtc, and Schclling, Hegel makcs use of a ScheIlingian
formula which, in spite of its schematic character, describes the sit-
uation quite well. Hegel accuses Fichtr of subjenivc idealism in Sci-
ence of Knowledge, while valorizing Schelling’s philosophy of naturc
and systcm of identity as objective idealism. Although Hegel seems
entirely partisan, one cannot temain inscnsitive to his implicit dec-
laration, in Tlre Di{fermce, that philosophy has to proceed beyond
the difhrrnce benvcen subjective and objective idealism toward a
subjective-objcctivc, or absolute, idealism. T h i s rriparticc idealism is
rooted in the three philosophers’ differing appraisals of their own
critical developments of Kant’s philosophy of rcfteceion. As Hegel
defines it in The Dif/erence, the philosophy of reflection is the kind
of thought that, by sharply distinguishing berwccn thinking and being,
detcrmines objects through a suhicaive assessment of experience. By
contrast, in the philosophy of identity, and men more so in Hegel’s
absolute idealism, hcing and thinking are one, only moments in rhc
objective process of self-devetoping rhought.
Now, when Kanr denicd all similarities betwcm Fichre’s philosophy
and hisown. he was both right and wrong. Indeed, Science of#huru/-
 W E PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTTON 2s

edge develops out of Kant but is, a t the same time, an entirely new
mode of philosophizing. In historical terms, the new kind of philos-
ophy that starts with Fichtt and lcads through Schelling to Hcgel,
who brings it to fuffillment, takes its impulse from what in K a n t
reaches beyond a wcre critique of knowledge and beyond his reflexive
distinction betwpen rhe dinking being and that which is being thought.
Fichre’s, Schelling‘s, and Wegel’s philosophies dcvelop the speculative
and dialectical elements in G a t . promising that the gap opened up
bctwcen thinking and bang, scnsIl~iliiyand understanding, thmry
and praxis, and so on which Kant’s philosophy appears unable to
ovcrcome might be bridged. This impossibility of coming to grips
with dualism characterim Kant’s philosophy as a philosaphy of TC-
kction; mnstquently. any attempt to ground thinking in the spec-
ulative germs of Kant’o cnterpriK must bc viewed as a critiquc of
reflexivity.
1 hope to prove that this use of the term &dim to designate the
duality of o p p i t i o n is nor at all incompatible with the methodolog-
ical concept of reflection as previously outlined, which was shown to
constitute modem metaphysics. By formulating the probiem of re-
flection in terms of dualism, Hcgel brought to the bre a logical in-
m5htencyin the rnethodologicalwnoept of reflection, an inconsisrency,
however, thar auld be overcome only at che price of a radicalization
of rcflccrion that is itself a dcparturc from the philosophy olreflection
from Dcscam to Kant. In order to make this argument, I shall have
to explain what must be catled reflexive in Kant’s thought and what
are in Kant the so-called speculative germs of the diakctical bridging
of dualism. Bhforc moving on, though, let us first consider some of
Hegcl’s objections to K a n t According 10 Hegel. Kant’s phitosophy is
a “metaphysic of refleaion.”’ Before analyzing in some detail Hegcl’s
dcccrminanons of retlecrion, let us for the moment define it as char-
acterizing the act by which the ego, ahcr having stripped away its
natural immediacy and returned into itself, becomes conscious of its
subjectivity in relation to counnrpositcd objccriviry, and disringuishcs
itself from ir, For Hegd, such a characterization implies in general
that Kant’s thinking remains caught in a mavemcnt of mdlcss du-
plication which it is unable to overcome. Furthermore, because the
activity of doubling is rhc result at an act of separating, the philosophy
of reflection i s shown to be in cssmce a philosophy of understanding
( Y a d ) , since “the activity of dissolution is the power and work
of thc wmdmrarrding,” as Hegel remarks in Pbrnomcnol~gu.~
But what are the major separations brought about by understand-
26 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

ing? Fiat and fonmost, understanding separates itself, a5 thinking,

from its own object, that is, from being. A philosophy of reflection
is similarly marked by an unbridgeable gulf between reflection and
that which it mflects. T h i s opposition i s caeval with that of subject
and object, since reflection, which Hegd assmiares in Faith and
Knorvledge with Spinoza’s conapt of imagination (Einbildungs-
kra/t)-that is, with a mode of thought related to existing singular
rhings yet lackingconceptuality-is subjective, an activity by a know-
ing subject. Yet as subjectivity, as a movement of the ego, reflection
i s a h %If-knowledge and, in the last instance, knowledge of the
transcendental presuppositions of knowledge and of what is given.
As a transcendental inquiry, however, reflection is as antithetical as
when it is seen as an activity by a subject upon the world. In both
cases it depara from and fosters irreducible oppositions. Because
reflection is unable to overcome the separarion it presupposes, Hegel
stigmatizes rhe knawIcdge of understanding as mere formal knowl-
edge.’ This knowledge splits into two irreconcilable forms: reflection
leads either to empirical knowledge, void of concepts, or to an un-
demanding of the a priori conditions of knowlcdgc, independent of
what empirically exists. Reflection gives birth to an endless and un-
determined multiplicity of facts a d o r to a coherent systcm of a priori
conditions; both forms of knowledge are i n an antithetical relation,
Reflection, as belonging to understanding, opens differences and pcr-
peruates them as fixed and unalterable oppositions, because under-
standing, or the intellect, is for Kant “the absolute immovable,
insuperable finitude of human Reason.”4 To put it in rhe language of
thr greater Logic. Kant i s unable to bridge the gap b e e n rcflcaion-
into-self and reflection-into-other, and since reflection is at the heart
of the ideas of subjectivity, fkedorn, and transcendcntality, according
to Hegel, it confers its own power of dissolution upon them, unable
to overcome the merc abstraction of these concepts. Wegcl, therefore,
can speak of a failure of reflcction owing essentially to its fundamental
prcsupposition of an irreconcilable ,differma between the objcct to
be explained and the explanation. Because of this @If, reflection
becomes enmeshed in unsolvable contradictions; wherever it uics to
unite itself to i t s object (be it the given or the ego itself) in order to
account lor it, it necessarily fails todo so. Although refleaion i s critical
of everything, it i s unable to quation its own premises. It cannot do
so because, as Eugkne Flcischman remarks: “Reflexion cannot rec-
ognize that i t s objects exist in its imagination alone without at the
same rime giving itsell up. And, on the other hand, i t cannot give
 THE PHILOSOPHY O F REFLECTION z7

itself up, sinm-and always according to its imagination-cognition

(orexplication) would not be possible without the subject-object dis-
tinction.”’
It must be emphasized hem, however, that this failure is not simply
a wcakncss of Kantian thought but i s itsclf the result of the dissolving
power of understanding, whose (relative) merit Hegel was the fiatto
acknowledge. Whar, then, are the prccisc limits of rcflmion? For
Hegcl the limits of reflection are rooted in its neglecting to recognize
that, logically speaking, doublinb separation, and dissolution arc
meaningful only with r q e c t to a totality. The metaphysic of d e c -
rim, without its knowledge, pmupposa an original unity within
which the fragmenting and antithetical power of understanding can
become effective. Kant, who was well aware of this exigency, could
nonetheless conceive of such a totality only as a hypotheticalnemsiry,
or as an abstract and absolute beyond ~mseitr),that is, as an object
only of human faith and strife. In thus removing the original unity
from the realm of what can pmpedy be known, Kant was again a
viaim of his philosophy of reflection. In 5hart, one a n wnclude with
Jean Hrppolite t h a t Kantian thought, in its abortcd attempt to mflect
the very presuppositions of its dualistic philosophy, “represents the
deeming ofreflectiun in ulI its dimensions. This rcffmion pcnevatcs
indeed into what maka it possible-and that i s its speculative side-
bur it refuscs to give up its rdcnive rigor, and that is what Hegel
credits it for; yet it provcs unable to avcrcome reflection by refleaion
and, thus, remains chained to reflective opposition.”‘ This judgment
is canfinned by Fleischmann when hc claims that “Kant’s thought is
fuli of unsuccessful mediations, since they arc witncss only to the
a m k c of separation that is at their basis.”’
Still, although Kant’s mediations are purely hypothetical, or have
the character of an absolute and unfathomable beyond and are in
essence reflexive, they are, to follow HegeI, the speculative germs
within Kant’s thinking that carry the promise of overcoming the
metaphysic of reflection. What are these spcculative germs in Kantian
philosophy? There are many, among which one must mention schc-
matism, which scwes to mediate sensibility and understanding; faith,
which mediatrs the world of the phenomena and the m d u s intel-
ligibilis; and others. Lct US concern ourselves h e x with only two:the
rranscendenral unity of apperception in Crifique of Pure Reason and
thc assumption of an inrekcms mchetyprrc in Critique ofJudgmmt.
When, coward the begnning of his First Critique, Kant contends
that thoughts withour mmnt arc empty, and intuitions without con-
28 TOWARD THE L I M l f S OF REFLECTION

cepts blind, he implicitly suggests that a common tie must reunite the
very different faculties of scnsibility and understanding. The same
Stnse of unity i s at work in his inquiry into synthetic a priori judg-
ments-rhat is ro say, into the reasons that permit rhe base term, or
rhc suh/cct in its paniculariry in a synthetic judgmenr, to be chanc-
terixed by uriiuer5~71predicates of thoupht. In order to be possible,
synthetic judgments-the judgments by meanr of which naturc bc-
comes knowable to a subject-must presuppose a hidden ground, rhc
originary synthcric unity of the transcendental ego, a unity that, a5
the highsr reason and ground, cxplains the validity of scientific prop-
ositions. This unity, of mum, must not be mistakcn for the subjecrivc
unity of individual consciousness, which in itself has no necmiry
whatsoever. Hegel comments an this absolute identity in Fnith and
Knowledge: “This is how Kant truly solved his problem, ‘Howare
synthetic judgments a priori possible?‘Thcy are possible through the
original, absolute identity of the hererogeneous. T h I s identity, as the
unconditioned, sunders itself, and appears 3s stparatad into the form
of a judgment, as subjen and predicate, or particular and universal.”m
But Kant explicitly broaches the idca of such an original identity
only when discussing understanding (Vmiund] with respect to the
transcendcntal deduction of the categories. Indced, what bccomes
obvious at this point in Kent’s argumentation is that in order for there
to be a coherence in thc expcricncc of the manifold, this expcriencc
must be one’s own and must draw on a prior logicd representation
of unity rnadc possible precisely by the ego’s self-cornprchcnsion. Thc
ultimate stmcture of synthesizing understanding, rhe mosr originary
a priori of cognition, is the origissry unity of rhe cogiro. or what
Kant calls in this mnrext the originary unity of transcendental apper-
ception. In developing this idea of pure self-consciousncss as neither
an inner nor an outer an-in short, as nor belonging ro sensibiliry-
Kent wchcs back to rhe common source of both intuition and un-
dcrsranding. As Hcgcl remarks, “This original synthetic unity must
bc conceived, not 8s produced out of opposites, but as a truly nec-
essary, absolute, original identity of oppmires” (p. 70). And in the
gWaFer Logic: “This original synthesis of apperception i s one of the
most profound principles tor speculative developmcnr; it contains
the beginning af a rrue apprehension of the nature of the Notion
and is cornplctcly opposed to that empty identity or abstract univer-
sality which is not within itself a synthesis.”’ Kant’s insight into the
spontaneous 3 priori synthcsiring faacdty of pure self-consciousness,
according to Hegcl, implicitty overcomes rhe dualism inevitably con-
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLEGTION 29

n d wirh reflection. By o p i n g up the dimension of rranscmdentat

imagination, Kant sm forth the very prinaple of speculation.
Apart from the fact that Critique ofJildgmmt i s itself conceived
as a bridge linking dx two heterogenmus worlds of the Fiat and
Second Critiques, the speculative germs oi rhe Third Critique are co
be found in the hyporhcsis of an immemorial identity of pleasure and
cognition, and especialIy in the notion of a rrflectivc faculty of judg-
ment, a facu1cy that gives itsclf the transcendental prinaplc of the
unityof the manifold. Hue, I will consider only thc famous paragraph
76 of thc Third Critique. Here Kant, after having rcmgnized that
ordinary human knowledge is reduced to subsuming the parricular
within the universal, and that this kind of knowlcdg, whereby the
particular is condemn4 to remain contingent, is inadequate to nature
as a whole, dedarcs himself compelled to posit hypothetically the
possibility of a higher fonn of cognition for which this opposition of
the universal and the particular would no longer exist, a sorr of
intellectus archcrypus anterior to the antinomies of understanding.
Hcgcl notes in Faith und Knowledge: “It is an ‘archetypal (urbildlich)
intellect’ for which ‘the pmsibiliy ofthe parts, ete., as to their char-
acter and intrgration is dependent on the whole.’ Kant also recognizes
char we are necessarily driven to this Idea. The Idur of this archetypal
inwitiw intellect is a t bottom nothing elw but the Idea of the
transcendental imagination” (pp. 88-89). The intelkectm wcherypus.
in cunrrasr ta the derivative rndc of human intuition, is original. Ir
is an intellect that itself givm existence to its objects. It is, in other
words, a nondiscursivc intellect, linking things as heterogeneous as
the intellect and the intuition, which for Kant is the privilege of the
primordial being alone. This intellect is characterized by intuitive
intellectia or indkcnd inmiurn [ k t e k k ~ e l lAnschmcrrtg).
c a mode
of intuition beyond the antinomies of understanding and reflexive
thinking.
The idea of a transcrndmtal imagination, of a pure a p p m p r i o n
which impEdtb scrves to bridge intuition and undemanding, as in
Critique of Fwe Reason, as we11 as the kypothcricnl assumption of
an ilrtsllcaus mrhebypus ‘beyond the antinomi- of teflmion in Cri-
riquc ofJudgmmt. k a m e programmatic for the whole of German
philosophy in the wake of Kant’s thought. Under the name of intcl-
lectual intuition (not to be mistaken for th$ hornologously termed
concept in Kant), the idea of an original and synthetic knowledge, of
a sensiblc understanding--in short, of Reasan-led m thc develop-
ment of the systems of Fichte, then SEhdling, and finaily Hegcl. “The
30 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

still purer Idea of intellect that is at the same time posteriori, the
Idea of a n intuitive intellect as the ahsoiutc middle” (p. SO), to quote
Hegel, becomes after Kant the identical subject-object, the foundation
of all thrce idealisms. &cause inretlemal intuition-the principle of
speculation-can be grounded in three logically different ways (in the
sell-positing self of Fichte’s Science of Knowkedge, in the objective
dialectics of nature according to Schdling, and in the dialectia of an
absolute subject-object identity A la Hcgtl), it gives birth to the three
systems of German idealism, the last of which is the most complete,
the most cncompassing.
Since intellectual inmition is a key term in all of German Idealism,
and since it i s the gcrm of rhc speculativc critique of reflection, WE
must further clarify this issue. Intelltmal intuitionoverlaps with the
original and synthetic unity of sensibility and understanding, which
Kant w a s compelled to posit in order to be able to proceed to the
categorics of understanding or to thc determination of the cpistc-
mological baundarics of the faculty of judging. Intellectual intuition
is the uniry of self-consciousness, pure apperception-that Is to say,
the self-reflection OF the self as the possibility of a priori cognizance:
it is the mode of cognition specific to cogito me cogitme. As a matter
of fact, pure apperception is Ihe Kanrian figure for rhc Carresian ego
cogito. This becomes even more clear with Fichtc, whcre intellectual
intuition designates the inner stateof the self and its waysot knowing
itself which p r c d e rhc separation into an objective elf and a nonsclf.
In Fairh andKnodedge, H g c l rcfcrs to Fichtc’s concept of inteilecrual
intuition in the following words:
The difficult rcquircmcnt of intellectual intuition has amued gcncral Eom-
plaint, and we have sometima heard tell of people who went mad in their
efforts to produce he purc acr of will and the inrcllcctual intuition. Both the
wmplaint and the madnss were no doubt occasioned by thc name of the
thing, nor by rhc thing itself, which Fichrc describes as mmmon and easy
enough, the only difficulty being perhaps to mnvintc o n m l f that it really is
just this simple everyday rhing. T h c intuition of anything ar all as alicn ro
pure conKinusmss or Ego, is empirical intuition; though the Ego too is, as
Fichte puts it, equally given in common consciousness. A h c t i n g from
everything alien in consciousness on the other band. and thinking oncrclf, i
inttIltcrua1 intuition. Abstracring from the determinate Content in any rn
of knowlcdgc and knowing only pure knowing. knowing only what is formal
in knowing, this i s pure absolute Lnowlcdge. (pp. 157-158)
Intektud intuitionin khelhg’s objective idealism bceomes the “organ
of 111. transcendental thinking,” which means, in his Sysrm o(Tmn-
 W E PHltDSOPHY OF REPLECCION 3x

scmdentul Ideulim, the wg;m of adequate comprehension and dis-

closure of objective reality, and of the demonstration of the Oneness
of nature and human knowlodge+ In wntraat to Kant’s hypothmcnl
assumption of an intellectual intuition, and to Fichtc’s Iimirarion of
it co thc m l m of subjectivity, intcl!ectual intuition for Schelling bc-
come an objective rtaliy.t@ Although i n c c l l m a l intuition is also the
starting point of Hegel’s philosophy, it don not esc9pc his criticism,
for Hcgcl, Kant’s, Fichte’s, and Schelling’o treatmcnm of infcllectual
intuition fall short of solving rhe problems engendered by the mem-
physics of rekction.
To $urnmarire Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s theory of mediation in
an elcnmcntary way, Hegel’s argument dcmonsmtcs that Kant’s at-
tempts to mediate apparendy irmncilable opposites falls prey to his
philosophy of rctlcaion. For Kant, HcgeI argues, the speculative Idea
which OCCUFS in uncorrupted and pure form in the deduction of the
~rrgaricrof undcrstanding“bemrncs a t o n a (t pure [that is, absrract]
identity, P unity of the intellea,” or “it m r s as a merely possible
thought which cannot acquire any reality in thinking because reflcc-
tion is to be dominant without quaMacion” (p. 148). Furthermore,
in his aitique of the unity of apperception as daboratcd by Kant,
Hegel ridcs with Kant when t h e latar characterizes this original syn-
thesis a% the unity of the I thmk, or sclfsanxiausnw, but he objects
to Rant’s duction of this unity to the purciy formal I &ink that
must acfompany all rcprrsentation. Hegcl wrircs in Faith mtd Know!-
edge:
T h e w h D k transmdenmt deduction b w h of the fom of intuition and of
the u t c g ~ r ym gmcral annot be u n d d without distinguishing what
Kant d t r thc hculiy of the original synthcfic unity of appemption k o m
the E p which does the rtpmmdng and is the rubim-the @ which, as
Kam says, merely accompanier all r c ~ r a r i o n s [Sccrmd]
. we must not
take the Iamlty of [productive) imagination as the middle tcrm that gets
i n s e d bawem an exisring abgolua subject and an absoluteexisting world
T h e produmivc imagination mug rather be recognized as what is primary
and original, as that out of which sulbiccrivc Ego and objective world first
a& chcmsdva into thc rtectrssrity bipartite a p p r a n a and product, and
as rhe sole In-ioclf. (pp. 72-73]

Hegel’s objections to Kant’s handling of rhe “ m e a prior?’ i s that

the law’s reduction of chis a priori m the pure formal unity of the
I think not only robs the true a priorj of its character as an original,
synthetic uniry, but a h ~IXCS the formal Ego in an opposition with
an always unfathomable beyond. With this objection in particular,
3z TQWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

Hegels radical critique of reflection becomes manifestr although it

m r a c w the original synthesis-a synrhcsis of which subjcct and world
are the necessarily bipartite appearances and products-the mera-
physia of reflection proves unabte to lift thc self-refkcring subjcct
ont of its opposition to the world of objects. To limit the idea of a
pure apperception tn an escntially accompanying phenomenon of a
subject reflming upon itself and upon a world of phenomena is not
only to fall hack into a Lnckean critique af knowlcdgc, but also to
reinstate and even solidify the ,derivative moments of an opposition
which the true a priori was incant to ovcrcome.
In The Dif/ermce between Fichtc’s and Schelling’s System of Pki-
/osophy. Hcgcl formulates thc same objections. He argues thar, al-
though intuition and understanding are grounded in the course of the
transcendental deduction in the original synthesis of apperception,
one opposition rcmains intact: the opposition of ,intellectual intuition
to othcr forms of intuition. Since the opposition that rcmains is that
between self-consciousness and empirical or objecrive consciousn~ss,
the unsolved problem arises from turning the original unity of ap-
perception into mere formal self-reflection. Although this sort of crit-
icism &o Effects Kant, it is aimed here especially at Fichre. Hcgel
agrees rhat the idea of the ahsolure act of the free self-activity of a
sclf-positing self-consciousness is indeed the condition of possibility
of philosophical knowledge as such. But, since it is opposed to e m -
pirical consciousness. and thus rcrnains abstract and formal, only a
conccpt, it is n o t yct that knowkdgc itself. Such an opposition, like
all oppositions, presupposes that its moments share a common higher
sphere. If intellectual intuirinn as a formal activity remains apposed
to other intuitions, such as those of empirical consciousness,then they
must both partake in the communal sphcrc of thought as such. Thought
as such-the totality of both cmpirical intuition and pure self-con-
sciousncss, a totality in which 411 separation and apposition is sub-
lad-is philosophical knowledge itself. Unlikc the unhappy syntheses
of the metaphysics of reflection, philosophy (Denken iiberbnupr) be-
comes a reflection on reflection’s unsolved appositions, and thus,
within the pcrspective of Hcgclian thought, thc end of rekction in
absolute reflection or spcculatiori.
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s and Fichte’s intcrprctation of the intel-
lcctual intuition demonstrates that they had not understood this Eon-
cept as a frue totality. In identifying it as the self-knowing of self-
consciousness, they absrractcd intellectual intuition from its inrrinsic
relation to consciousness of Otherness, and as a. result created the
 THE PHtLOSOPHY OF REFLECTION 33

problem of reconnecting it ‘to its Other again. Interpreted in this

manner, intellectual intuition, ratha than k i n g a totality, isonly part
of P mtaliry. The reasom for their failure m conceive intellectual:
intuition as the true a pion. as Hcgd makes quire clear in Faith and
Know[.dge. lie in empirical-that is, nonphilosophical-cxperience:
“Why does not this idea of the totality itself, the measure against
which pure knowing shows iaclf to be incomplete, step forth as the
Absolute! Why is the Absolute [in Fichte] surncthing that is recognized
as being only a part and as deficient? No reason can be found €or i t
exapt that this pan has empirical certainty and m t h ; of course
everyone knows that he knows. Empirical truth of this sort is given
preference over the absolute truth of the totahy!” [p. 159).Genuine
intcltmaI intuition would call for the subtation of empirical expe-
riena [ofthe gjvenness of objects or sates of mind) and of analyzing
thought, as well as of what makes such experience possible. True
intclEcctual inmition r q u i m rhar the reflcxivc oppositions of an ex-
perience, enmeshed in empiricist immediacy, be rrfleaed back into
h e common ground fmm whjcb these oppositions grow. Only through
such a rwounding of the reflective oppositions BS bifurcations of an
original synthetic unity, which encompams both thc opposition of
that unity and that which it reunites, can one prevent intellectual
intuition from falling hack again “into inert simplicity” and from
depicting “actuality i t d f in a non-actual manner,” as happens in
Schelling.”
It is evident at this point that Hegel’s crinque of the metaphysk
of reflection take place under the aegis of the canccpcs of totality,
ground, and unity. Heptl’s principal objectian to reflection is its in-
ability to reflect itsclf-to reground its opposed moments-in t k
rotality presupposed by the antithetical terms. l h a c objections rcvcal
that Hcgel’s uitiquc of the philosophy of reflection questions the very
titles of t h b philosophy. &cawphilosophy in gmcral is most inti-
mately determined by the quest for unity, he chastises the mcraphysics
of reflection for io inability to achieve that end.
According to Hegel, the only possibic mediation-a mediation that
leaves nothing unrncdiated-rnusr be bawd on the idea of totality.
Unlike Kant, whose major preoccupation is to esrablish a variety of
autonomous unifying principlcs, Hegel radically rcinterprcts the spec-
ulative germs of Kant’s philosophy in such a way as to show rhar all
thex principles, by cntering into opposition with one another, con-
stitute the unity formed by their dialectical re1ations. Since any sep-
aration is, for Hcgel, always the result of a prnious unity apprrhensiblc
34 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

through the opposing moments, this unity is the m e ground of these

momenrs. The passage from reflection to the thinking a1 rotaliry is
the passage from reflection to absolute reflection or speculation.
Reflection in Kanr, insofar as it engenders and solidifies opposites,
is the unity of the opposing terms, but in an immediare manner only.
Yer since reflection docs not rcflem it, this unity remainspurely formal.
Canscquendy, one can contend that Kant's transcendental reflection.
although a solely subiective reflection, anticipata and calls For the
elaboration of an absolute reflection. Absolute refledon, to quote
Hyppolite.
m n m d s reflection. Reflecrion coincides with mere human rctlectjon on
experience and on its mnstimtion. Absolute reflection mrnprchcnds contmr
imtf as reflmioo. It is k i n g that knows itself through man, and not man
who reflects on being. This specularive reflection-or absolute teflcction-
replaces the old dogmatic meraphysics. Anrhropology is overcome, yrr the
a x n c e i s not turned into a secand world that would explain and ground
the first. T h e immediate itsclf rcflccts itsclf, and this idenrity of mtldion and
rhc immediate corrcspnodr ro philosophical knowlcdy as such."
The relatian of philosophicat knowledgc. or absolute reflection, to
reflection properly speakingir a relation Of partid criticism and pamal
justification. Within absolute reflection, reflection properly speaking
and rransrendenral reflection coincide with what as mere reflection
they could not but presuppose: the inhitcly reflected totality. Wegel's
criticism of reflection puts reflection into the Absolute, thereby sub-
lating thc dualism which it seemed unable to overcome by itself.
Reflection is no longer lost in the bipartite moments of its appcarance
or in rhe pure and transcendental a priari which the dualism of re-
flection necessarily presuppses.1'
 3

The Self-Destruction
ofReflection

Inardcrto undernand what Hegel,in TheDiffmcebetweenFichre’s

mrd Scbellmgs System of Philosophy, calls the self-dstrucfion of
reflcction, it is nccessary to study the passage from reflection proper
to absolute or speculative reflection. Such an invatigarion requires
us to distinguish cIearIy among the several types of reflection m which
Hegel refers. Indeed in Hcgel, the notion of rcflmion is nor a unified
concept. T h e word appears in a variety of contexts that determine its
meaning and is used in a t least three different ways. Absolute reflcc-
don, as characreristic of rhc speculative profess as a whole, must be
distinguished from rmified rcfltction, a$ outlined in the “Logic of
Essence” section of the greater Logic, which is itself a speculative
reinterpretation of the reflexive process of understanding.’ Therefore,
we can distinguish benvten reflection as (1) the dissolving fom of
undersrandin& (2)the totalizing power of the specularive proms, and
(3) one moment within that process. Each of these diffetent notions
of reflection is itself divided into a number of aspects. In outlining
the logiw-dialectical process of the passage of reflection from undcr-
standing to Reason, I shall skip the critical and dialcctiml reappro-
priation of reflection in the greater Logtc and limit my discussion to
the major features of this problem by following the distinctions HegeI
made in The Diferenre bctwccn isolated and philosophical reflection.

ISOLATED REFLECTION
Isolated r d l d a n , also called simple, pure, or common tetleaion, is
the mode of thought characteristic of the positioning {Secwr] partic-
ular to understanding. Representing the force uf limitation (die Krufr
36 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

des Beschrunkens), undmranding only posirs opposim (Entgegen-

geserzte). Isolated reflection thus perpetuates the dissolving activity
of understanding by fixing those t h i n g that understanding posits as
being in opposition tn each orher. In short, isolated reflection is a
mode of thought that has no relation to the Absolute, chat is, to the
unity or totality ofwhat the h c d opposites prcsuppore as their com-
mon medium or element. Lacking such a relation, isolated reflection
rcmains incapable d raising itself above itself, or above whar it is
opposed to. Since it has no rclation to the Absolute, it remains isolated.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION
Philosophical reflection, according to The Ditfercnce, is “the instru-
mmf of philosophizitrg.”‘ Since t h r task of philosophy is the con-
struction of the Absolure, or totality, for consciousness. philosophical
rcflcction is called upon to mediate b m e c n isolated reflection and
the divided totality char it produces. Yet in order t o be able to tender
pure reflection fluid and thus overcome in obdurate oppositions,
philosophical reflection must entertain some form of relation to the
Absolute. How,then. dws this relation to the A b d u t c become man-
ifest in philosophical refiemion, and what are the ways in which Et
surmounts thc dualism of isolatcd reflection?
Whereas simplc rcflcction, or rcflcction without relation to the
Absolute. perpetuates the opposites posited by understanding. philo-
sophical reflection conceives the totality or the Absolute; it does so,
however, in a merely formal manner. Because philosophical reflection
belongs to thc realm of understanding, it can grasp the truc and real
synrhesis of opposites only if it invens (Yerkehren) that synthesis inro
something apposcd to that which it is the nynthcsis of, According to
Hegel, philosophical reflection inverts Reason as the unifying faculty
inro something merely reasonable (Verstiindiges). Philosophical rc-
necrion originates in opposires, and the formal insight inro the ne-
cessiry of a unity of opposite tcrms. It posits this unity in opposition
to the initial dualistic structures, as their “beyond.” When philo-
sophical reflection expounds the true nature of this identity. it sets it
forth { D d r s t d h g ) as the binding powcr of irreducible opposites.
Consequently, it can conceiveof the original synthesis as a union only
in the form of an antinomy of absolutely dualistic tcrms. Because it
is indebted rn understanding, philosophical reflection continues the
scparating activity of rhis mode of thought: it can behold only thc
~ ~ lof absolute synthesis, or, a5 Hegel expresses it,
~ d y t i form
 T H E SELF-DE52RUCflON OF REFLECTION 37

“the purely formal appearance of the Absolute.” Indeed, for philo-

sophical reflection, the Absolute is a t most an antinomy, a synthesis
of opposites, a “nullification [Vernichtmg] of rhc opposim in con-
tradiction” (p. 1091.The knowledge that flows horn philosophiml
reflecrion is “pure knowledge,” a knowledge without t r u e intellertual
intuition.
Yet the purely formal or antinomic synthesis to which phi[osophical
reflection raises itself is not just any unity. It i s a unity thoroughly
determined in itself. Iris morality whose anrinornic narute is grounded
in what Hegel calls reflective dererminatians (RefTexhnsbesrimmwtt-
gm). o r in what Kant calls the mtegories of rcndmkmding. These
reflective determinations, which arise through abstraction from ab-
solute identity, help philosophical reflection set forth iG antinornic
synthesis of opposites. But why do these reflective determinations lead
only to a purely formal and antinomic union?
A t least two reasons must be mentioned here. Since the reflective
determinations are abstracred by understanding from the absolure
identity, they are thought to be irreconcilable. Hegcl writes: “Infinity
and finitude, indeterminateness and determinateness. etc. are reflective
products of the same sarr. There is no transition from the infinite to
the finite, from the indeterminate to the determinate, The transition
as synthesis becomes antinomy; for reflection, which separares ab-
solutely, cannot allow a synthesis of the finite and the infinite+of the
deterrninatc and the indctcrminatc to be brought about, and it is
reflection that legislates here” (pp. 158-159). By analyring the specific
sort of contradiction that exists b e c n thcsc reflexive determina-
tions, one can better grasp not only the exclusively formal quality of
the unity to which philosophical reflection is capable of raising itself,
but also the second reason for which this unity must remain contra-
dictory.
All that is posited by understanding-that is, being and everything
limited-is dererminate, since philosophical reflection “aims a t tho-
roughgoingdetermination” (p. 95)- But determination pmoccds through
negation, that is, by positing an opposite to what is given. Being and
everything limited, because they are determinate, must consequently
have an indeterminate before and after, according to Hegel, for the
determinate must be bounded by an indeterminate. Yet in the per-
spective OF understanding, that indeterminate is norhing; it is a mere
bqond. Thus the detcrminate n s t s o n nothing. Hegel condudcs, “Thus
its [understanding’s] positings and determining5 never accomplish the
task; in the very positing and dererrnining that have occurred there
38 TOWARD T H E LlMlTS OF REFLECTION

lies a nonpositing and something indeterrninare, and hcna the task

of positing and determining recurs perpetually” (p. 95).Becausephilo-
sophicat reflection is “bound to fall into the making of endless de-
rerminarions” (p. 146), a compulsion Hegel compares to he activity
of policing, the mraliry to which ir is able to raise itself is not solely
the formal unity of antinomies, the simple abstracc concept of a unity
that, since it remains opposed to what it reunites, “kills the living
elemenr of rrue identity in it” (p. 149). It is also an abyssal concept
of unity, that is to say, no concept at all. Indeed. by extending the
process of determination t6 infinity, by reducing ir M an endless pro-
cess, philosophical reflection nullifies not ‘only its own principle but
also the idea of a unity itself.
With this faiture to conceptualize the Absolure, philosophical re-
flection reaches the point where it begins ro dissolve and pass over
into its Other. “The highest maturity, the highest stage, which any-
thing can attain is that in which its ,downfall begins,” Hegel wrim.3
Having reached its inner limits with the impossibility of thinking the
identity of the determinate, philosophical reflection faces the necessity
of passing over into another mode of thought or reflection that will
accomplish what it wt out to do. Such a possibility arises, according
to Hegel, as soon as philosophical reflection recognizes that the things
it oppnses in a dualistic fashion are only ideal factors, or opposites
of Thought alone. Wirh this recognition that the opposites of under-
standing are thoroughly relative terms, as long a5 they are nor undcr-
stood with respect to rhe true absolute identity, that ofthought itself,
and with thcdetcrmination of the oppositcs philosophical reflection
within the limits of the Absolute-that is, as real opposites-philo-
sophical reflccrion bccomes Reason and makes the leap into absolute
o r speculative reflection.

SPECULATIVE OR ABSOLUTE REFLECTlON

In order to understand the nature of abdute reflection, and how it
compares to thc other forms of rcflmion, we must first understand
the manner in which the transition of philosophical reflccrion to spec-
ulation OCCUI‘S, What makes that passage possible i s that under-
standing is alrcady a fore-form of Reason. Without knowing it,
understanding copies Reason, says Hegel. Indeed, i t cannot keep Rca-
son away: “it sccks ro protcct itself against the feeling of its inner
emptiness, and from the Seccet fear that plagues anything limited, by
whitewashing its particularities with a semblancc of Reason” (pp.
 THE SELF-DESTRUCTION OF REFLECTION 19

92-93). It is seduced by Reason“into producinganobjacrivc totality”

(p. 95). Although it is not conscious of doing so, understanding as
the fore of separation alrcady prcsupposa an identity into which its
dissolving power CUB. As philasophid dcction, u n b d i n g takes
on the task of thinking the originary unity of thc dcterminatc in a
formal manner, as we have seen. But understanding not only copies
Reason unknowingly insofar a5 it scts forth a merely formal identity;
it also lets itself be seduced by Reason into nullifying its own principle
in the endless task of reflectively determining the formal totality in
question. When philosophical reflection remgnizcs that its anrinomic
synthesis of opposit- is only the cxpliat formula, the putcly formal
expression (fomrellen Ausdmck), of trurh, it makes a place for &a-
son. At that point Reason, as Hcgel mrnarks, “has (already] brought
the formal essence of reflection undcr its control” (p. 108). hdeed,
what caum the downfall of philosophical reflection, the indetermi-
nate that it must ncmsarily oppose to dmrminatc being i n order to
determine it fully, the infinite that it cannot avoid juxtaposing to the
finite-an opposition that throws philosophical reflecrion into the
endless process of determination-”is [already] something rational
[belongingtothe order ofReason] as posited by the intellect,” k u s e
“taken by itself.. it merely e x p ~ the s negating of the finite” (p.
90). Although the infinite task of determination thar ruins philo-
sophical rcflcction is a charactcristic of the Iowcr srandpoinr from
which the absolute synthesis is considered, it is a charaaeriscic of
Reason as well. This infinite task shows understanding to be manip-
ulated by Reason, because it is Reason rhat “makes thcinrcllmbound-
less, and in this infinite wealth the intellect and its objective world
meet their downtall” (p, 95).
Let us recal1 that the opposites of philosophical reflection arc only
opposites of thought. Their merely ideal nature is a function of the
indetcrminate, conceptualized by philosophical refleaion under the
form of the Ego, which is turned into the correlate of the totality of
the determinations of king. Yet, because “the Ego is [thus] placed
in absolute opposition to the object, it is nothingreal, but is something
thought, a pure product of reflection, a mere form of cognition,“
Hcgel argues (p. 158). Because it is indebted to understanding, philo-
sophical reflection is unable to think an organic relation between the
opposim it sets forth. As ideal opposites, whose objeaive pole. more-
over, is determined by a host of addimand ideal opposites, they remain
in absolute contradiction to one another. Thus, the torality of phil-
osophical rcflmion is cornpod only of “the Ego, i.e., indctermi-
40 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

natencss. or sclf-determination. and . . , the objm, determinateness,”

beyond whose play of reciprocity it cannot reach (p. 139). In a clear
mfcmcc to Fichtc’s transcendental philosophy, Hegcl shows the purely
formal and antithetical synthesis of understanding to be rooted in a
hypostasis of the Ego, or in 3 subject-object relation that is primarily
subjective. According to Hegel, S c h e h g opposes an objective subject-
object relation, an ohjcaive idcntity, to Fichtc’s subjcaivc one in order
to overcome the subjective and rncrcly ideal determination of the
opposites, and ro overcome with the same stroke understanding and
philosophical reflection. With such an obieaivc interprccarion of ab-
solute idcntity, thc totality of moments a t play in philosophical re-
flection begins to come into v i m . The hitherto ideal opposites, whosc
signification now derives from the totality of which they are parts,
appear as real opposites in Schelling’s philosophy of nature as the
theory d nature’s self-construction. As soon as philosophical reflcc-
tion turns to the conceptualization of the absolutc idcntity of subim
and object. it bnmrncs, in Hcgel’s terms, ~pcculativc.~ But it truly
becomes speculation only when it conccives of the absolute identity
as thc subjective and objective suhjccr-objccr, because only this de-
termination of absdure synthesis, t a k e the totaliry of its logically
possible determinations into acmount. Needless to say, this concept
of the Absolute coincides with Hcgel’s philosophic;ll enterprise.
Bcforc analyzing absolute or spcculativc rcflccrion in itself, and its
distinction from mere philosophical reflection, we must Crst consider
what happens to reflection in the transition to absolute reflection.
What takes place is the self-destruction of reflection, “Being the [aculty
of being and limitation,” rcflecrion, says Hegel, "nullifies irself and
all being and everything limited.. . [as soon as]. it connects [itself
and] them with the Absolute” [p. 94). The self-destruction of reflection
rcsulting from the reflcction upon reflection takcsplace a t the mornent
31 which rhc limited is rclared to rhc Absolute. “Ukc everything else,
reflection has standing only in the Ab5alute; but as reflection it stands
in opposition to it” (p. 96). The negative power of understanding, by
destroying itsclf in the process of self-reflection, is consequently thc
manifestation of the positive powcr of Reason.
Let us analyze this process of self-destruction in more derail. By
conceiving of the totality of all determinations 3% an antinomic unity
in which the opposir- are desrraycd preciwly to the CJrtcnt that they
arc in a relation of antinomy. refleaion reveals itself as Reason by
pointing toward an nbsolute synthesis. Indeed, in the antinomic dc-
struction of opposites, a destruction that leads to the establishment
 T H E SELF-DESTRUCTION OF REFLECTION 4f
of a formal mtaliry, philosophicaI rcflcction “has not maintained but
nullified the opposition and the standing of the wo terms or of either
of them, and it has not maintained but nullified [the claim1 that it is
itself the Absolute and the eternal; ir has thrown irself into the abyss
of its perf&on” (p. 140). Since reflection, like everything else, has
standing only in the Absolute, but stands as reflection in an adverse
relation to it, then reflection, in order to be at once opposed to and
m1ed by Reasan, “must give irself the law of self-desttuciion.” This
law, which is “its supreme law, [is1 given to it by Reason and [is]
moving it to become Reason” (p. 96).&cause tellenion is Reason
onIy to the cxtent that it is connected to the Absolute, the tcflection
on this connection d m away with all of reflection’s work. T h e truth
of reflection is thus “the truth of its nullification” (pp. 97-98). By
destroying itsclf in making itself its ownobiem, reflection throws itself,
to use Hegel’s words, into the abyss of its own petfedon. But what
does this colorful expression mean! T h e abyss is the negative image
by which Reasonappears to and in reflection. Reflection rnusc become
this abyss, in which alone it has a standing. Only by dattoying itself
can reflection achieve this goal. By working at its own destruction.
“Reason thus drowns inell and its knowledge and its reflection of
the abaohce identiry, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere
reflection and of the calcularing intellect, in this night which is the
noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another”
(p. 103). The abyss i s the abyss of Reason; in it, all opposites are
reunited. It i s ~ t h celement in which reflection, common sense, and
speculation fist meet in indifference.
The abyss of Reason is destructive of dll forms of relcction. insofar
as the latter s w e s the opposing force of understanding. Thus, Reason
is rhe abyss into which reflection throws itself 3s a self, that is, as
standing in opposirion to Reason. Bur ir is also the abyss of Reasan,
as long as philosophical reflection and understanding are still its op-
posites. In short, the abyss of Reason, inm which reflcrdon throws
itself in a gesture of self-destruction, is the medium of the sublation
of all self and everything o p p o d to the self,that is, of d l opposition.
And since this sublation rakes place when reflection destroys itself by
making itself its own reflective object, the process of the becoming of
Reason coincides with the overcoming of the last possible opposition,
that ofthe self to itself. With this total identiry of subject and objm,
an identity in which neither a subjective nor an objective synthesis of
the subice-object relation prevails, aII separation is overcome, and
the realm of the Absolute is reached. The self-destruction of reflection
12 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REPLECTlON

rcprcxnts a regrounding of rcflmion in the Absolute, This reground-

ing takes place in reflection’s self-annihilation-that is. by its destruc-
tion of itself as standing in opposition to all objects, and ro itself a5
well, The self of reflection, the hypartssis af the Ego or subjm, is the
main obstacle in the way of becoming speculation or absolute reflec-
tion. What, then, is specuiation?
Speculation is a word that has fallcn into dccp disrcputc since
Manin Luther’s criticism of system-oricnted scholasric theology. Since
then the pejorative sense of specuIariw has rcferted primarily to those
propositions of Christian theology that evasively transcend the given,
or reality, and, more broadly, tp the construction of idle thoughts
about idle subjm, of so-called a priori conmumions or, of what is
believed to mean the same, contrary-to-fact hypotheses. But spccu-
Iation, or S p e C U ! d O , which together with contmplutio makes up the
Latin translation of the Creek conxpcpr of thheoriil, has little to do with
that deforming rcprmtation meaning that which is mcre fancy of
thought, in thought alone. The term beats a connotation of reckless-
ness only for thought that is caught in a “naturalistic” prejudice
against rhoughr irself. Undoubredly scholasric philosophy and Ger-
man Idealism have indulged in speculative aberration. Yet, since spec-
ulation as rheorio m a n s cssentially the pursuit of knowicdp for
knowledge’s snke. it is from that perspective that speculation must
bc understood and evaluated. Thus, for Thomas Aquinas, speculation
coincides with the necessity of philosophical thought as such, to the
extent that philosophical reflection transcends the facrual given and
moves toward its ultimate determining grounds.J Such speculation,
since it was tied to thc scholastic and theological form of philosophical
thoughr. was of coursc rmtriaed to the interpretation of ail finite
substances as deriving from the one divine subsrancc. Bur s i n e Des-
cartes’s recasring of the concept of rruth, the meaning ,ofspeculation
in Carmian and post-Cancsian philosophical thought has not only
signified the necessary transcendenm of what i s given in a sensuous
manner, but has begun to signify as welt the necessary dcmonsrration
of the givenness of being, of the cognitive objectivity of the world
and its absolute ground.* It is in this amplified sense that Kant’s
positive use of rhe concept of speculation should bc understood. The
same applies to the German Idcalist philosophers, Hegel inctuded.
The term speculntion is rwted in rhe Latin specio, “IO look,” “to
behold.” The specularive discourse is, as Ricocur remarks, the theo-
retical discourse par exccllencc-that i5, “the discourse that cstab-
lishes the primary notions, rhe principles, that articulate primordially
 THE SELF-DESPRtlMJON OF REFLECTION 43

the space of the concept”-and, since concepts cannot effectively bc

deduced p e t i d l y from perceptions or images, “the speculative is
the condition of the possibility of rhc concepntal.”7 Because, with
respect to ordinary and scientific languages, speculation o h n the
reflective distance that allows a conceptual space to constitute irself,
and bezausc it is thus 6rsc in the order of foundation, it appears as
the very condition of the possibility of philosophical knowledge and
thought. This must not be forgotten when, hcreinafcer, we review a
srrics of critical positions on speollations and absolute reflection,
positions which in -rice represent radical attacks on what rhc tra-
dition has meant by philosophical thought. Ytr not all critiques of
the tdKnce ofphilosophid thought are of equal pertinence. The one
I s h a l be most concerned with-Derrida’s criticism of speculation
and absolute reflection-is a position that recognizes the well-found-
cdncss, the cxigcncies, evcn the absolute nacssity of the speculative
element of philosophical thought.
But what is ir rhar m a k e speculation such a privilegcd discourse?
Nothing Icss, indeed, than its mirroring herion. Cicero, apparently
erronmusly, derived speculatio from specuhris, “in the manner of a
mirror” (speculum). Scholastic philosophy referred m specsrlimr as
well, in order to emphasize spmrlation’s capability of indirect wg-
nition of the Divine. But with post-Camian philosophy, the mir-
roring aspea of speculation takes on a new and additional meaning.
S i n a Kant, but especially in C m a n Idealism, speculocive designam
that kind of pure, or purely thcorctical, knowledge-a knowledge
free from all subjective and practical ingredients-that is also the
knowledge of itself. Speculativc knowledge is rhar son of knowledge
that constitutes itself in self-refleaioa. Since German Idealism, spec-
uhtive bas meant the p’cmss of constant exchange between a mirror
and irs m i m r image. One calls a relation speculative when an object
first m a i n s fixed in a purely phenomenal state, but is then also
recognized as being for a subject-an in-itself, or indeed a for-itself.
.Cansqucndy, Hans-Gwrg Cadamer can write that “a thought is
speculative if the relationship that it expresses is not conceived as the
unambiguous assigning of a determination to a subjcct, a p r o m to
a Mvcn thing, but must be thought d as a mirroring, in which the
reflection is the pure appearance of what is reflected, just as the one
is the one of rhe other, and the other is the other of the ont.”e
Bur GadamcrS d-on of speculative &ought is nor precise enough
TO account for what really distinguishes absolutc rcflmion or spec-
d a ~ o nfrom philosophical reflection. When Hegd writes in Scimce
44 T O W A R D THE LIMITS OF REFLECTTON

of Logic that “spccu~uriucthinking consists solely in the fact rhat

thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but docs not
allow irsclf ro be dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where ia
dctcrminations arc rcsolved by contradiction only into other dctcr-
minations or into nothing,*’ it becomes obvious thar speculative thought
is concerned with reconsrituting the unity of what is diverse.P In con-
trast to philosophiul reflection, whose essence resides in opposing,
and in this manner relating, one thing to another-and which there
fore cannot conceptualize the unity of what i s in opposirion-spec-
ulative thought poliscsste, as Hegel puts it, the boldnerc to tbinb
contradiction, which according to traditions[ logic is unthinkable and
should thus be nonexistent.’” It has thc boldness ‘toconceive of op-
posites in their unity. Now,because the thought of such unity requires
a bcho[ding of what is opposite as such-that is, the being in op-
posirion of the oppositm as well as the mutual reflection by which
these opposites becomc unified in the idea of the 5pirit-speculative
thought is grounded in ihi5 reflective mirroring of what is positively
in opposition. It coincides with the reciprocal mirroring and unifi-
cation of the conflicting poles. The mirroring that constitutes spec-
ulativc thought amculates the divem, and the contradinions that
exist between its elemenrs, in such a way as to exhibit the totality of
which this diversity is a pan. Speculmim, then, is the movcmtnt that
consiiturcs the mmr complerc uniry, the ulrirnars foundation of d l
poniblc diveniry, opposition, and contradiction. The standpoint of
speculation. unlike that of reflection, is a structured and absolutely
encompassing totality, comprising borhdifFmnce and unity. Itsstand-
point is that of absolute identity, and irs mode of cognition that of
pure reasonablc (vmiinftige] knowing of the Absolute. Its standpoint
is thus the standpoint of Reason, and Reason itself is the Absolute
under the form of knowing.
In The Differmre. Hcgel contends that “for speculation everything
determinate has reality and truth only in the cognition of its connec-
don with the Absolurc” (p. 99). T o speculation . .rhe finirudes arc
I

radii of the infinire focus which irradiates them at the same time thar
it is formed by them. In the radii the focus is positcd and in thc focus
the radii” (p. 1 I 1). Speculative thought is the systematic accomplish-
ment uf the unity presupposcd by reflection. It lifts, says Hegcl, “the
identity of which sound scnsc i s not conscious into consciousness’*
(p. loo),.But ,in the highest and mosr complete synthmis. speculatioa
must a l u , abolish the opposition hcnvccn thc conscious and the non-
conscious, thought and nonrhought, rogiianr and cogitatrrm. Specu-
 THE SELF-DESTRUCTION f l F KEFLECTIDN 4s

lation wwequentpl also demands the nullification of mere consciousness

through the self-destruction of reflection. The higher unity 01 spirit
is achieved only a t thc prim of a ruspcnsion of all opposition. Only
at this point does philosophical thinking achieve its telas, because the
momenr a t which all opposition is abolished mincidm with the total
self-penetration and self-deterrninarion of thought. Ar rhis point of
completion, speculative thought can conceive of the object of its think-
ing as nothing Icss than thc xlfdetermined movement of its own self-
comprehension as thought. Indeed, speculation achieves its totalizing
efforts when it recognizes its own achievement as the achievement of
the self-determination of the Concept.
To sum up: Speculation, or absolute refleaion, is a critique of
reflection and, particularly, of philosophical reflection insofar a s its
mirroring function permits rhe overcoming of the major antinomy of
reflection, that between the cmpirical. formal. or transcendental self-
reflection of the subject of cognition (the thinking being) and the
reflcctcd objcct of this epistemological endeavor (what is thought).
The determination of the abject of cognition in term5 of a sclf-alicn-
arion of he subiect, as the image of the subject thrown back by the
reflecting mirror (or, in Hcgclian terms, as an itself thar is in fact a
for-anself), is a movemenr of thought thar permits ar once the over-
coming of the purely formal and constitutive function of self-con-
sciousness in the process of knowledge, and the beyond of the object
that for such a consciousness must always remain indecipherable. By
establishing this speculative rorality, philosophical thinking expounds
and devclops, explicitly and exhaustively, the logical presuppositions
of dividing philosophical reflection itseIf.
Bcforc we move on to funher discussion of the philosophical
achievements of this critique of reflexivity, ir may be useful ra assert
rhat speculation is not a diffuse and occult enterpriw. Speculation is
rooted, as hermeneutic philosophers such as Gadamer and Ricbeur
remind us, in language itself, or to be more precise, in the philosophical
concept of language. At thevery moment thar language is understood
a5 more than a pragmaric roo1 for rcprcscnting what is (although this
view does nor a p e the philosophical concept of language), it vouchcs
for the possibility of articulating a relation ro the whotc of being, and
of expressing it in language. Bccause language realizes meaning in
speech or writing. because it makes communication and mderstand-
ing possible, it must, in philasophica1 terms, be thought of as a to-
talizing medium. Undoubtedly HegeI, who brought the Greek
philosophy of the fogos to its full completion, at first conceived of
46 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

speculative mediation as an operation of thought alone. But since

speculation is effective or real only where it finds ia exposirion in rhc
speculative proposition, it cannot be altogether xvcred from the mc-
dium of language. Indced, it presupposes rhe possibility of linguistic
utterance and exposition.
Let us look more closely at whit Hegel understands by the "spec-
ulative propo~ihon," which destroys thc ordinary notion of the prop-
osition. Although Hcgel discusses the speculative proposition in rhe
preface 10 Phenomenology and in the last pages of Scimce of Logic,
as well as in a number of passages from his Enqdopedia, I shall
consider only the discussion in the preface, since it i s here that he is
most explicit on this subject. Speaking of the specularive proposition,
Hegel writes, "The general nature of the judgment or proposition,
which involves the distinction of Subjecr and Predicate, is destroyed
by the speculativc proposition, and the proposition of identity which
the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against that subiect-
prcdicatc relationship."" The sprmlativc proposition is thus said to
alter radically the relation between subjectand predicate in predicarive
sentences or empirical propositions. The common strumre of iudg-
mcnts or propositions consists. from an Aristotelian and Cartesian
perspective, of the predication of a subiect within the horizon of a
dererminarion of truth as certitude. But why should it be important
to overturn the srruaure of predication, and what happens to that
srrucrurc in specularive proposirions?
Ratiocinative rhought, argues Hegel. is adequatcly cxpresred within
the usual structures of thc common proposition, because it conceivcs
of the content of its thought in the same way as it conceives of the
subject of the proposition-that is, as an underlying substance, a
bypokeimmon. whose arrribures are by definition clearly distinyish-
able. Yet thc content of speculative thought is such that it destroys
rhestructure of thcordinaryproposition. As we have seen, differences
in rhc content of speculation such as subjcct and object or subject
and attributes are determined within the totality of which rhey are
the bipartite manifesrarion. The conrcnt of the spcculative proposition
i s the identity of the sclf-determinjng Concepr and thought itself.
Thcreforc, the common proposition, with its possibility of absoiutely
isolating and separating subjccr and predicate,secrnsan inappropriate
form of expression for specularive co:irenr.'2
Bur what, then, are rhc ways in which speculativc content dntroys
the traditional form of judgment? First, despite the fact that thc spec-
utative critique of the form of predicative propositions is a cririque
 T H E SELF-DESTRUCTION O F REFLECTION 47

of Kanr, Hegel‘s speculative minrerprctarion of rhe s m m m of judg-

ment is pmiblc only as a result of Kant’s insights into the ternary
s t r u m r e of the proposition. “The g m of speculation lies in this
triplicity alone,’’ Hegd writes in Fuitb und Knowledge.’*Indeed, at
rhc beginning of paagraph 19 of the second deduction of ‘Tran-
scendental Logic” in Cririquc ofPwe Rearon, Kant admits that ht is
not satisfied with the logician’s definition of judgment as a reprcscn-
tarion of a relarion bawecn two canccpts. Wc recognizes that for a
judgment to be possiblq a third element or medium must bc added
to the two relating concepts. For Kant, this medium is self-monscious-
ness, and it ties the relation b m c n the two conapts to thc originary
synthetic unity of apperception. This third term, according to Kant,
explains the synthetic characrzr of propositions, or judpmenr. Even
if HegeI 6nds faulr with this h t i a n cxplanatiun of iudgitm-which,
sincc rhe medium of self-consaousness i s not for b u t a concept,
remains formally a binary synthesis of subim and predicate-Kant’s
hypothais of a ternary strumre of the propairion serves as the
stardng point for Hcpl’s dcvclopmcnr or the spccularivc propasirion,
Hegel develops the simple proposition of judgment into the syllopism,
His speculative inarprcration of judgment, “his so to speak quater-
nary inrepmation of triplicity”-quaternary because Hegel’s re-
placing wlf-consEiousncsswith a third concept does not da away with
sclf-oonsciousna but reinstates it as a fourth position from which it
grounds and animates rhc triplicity itself-is only a more consistent
devclopmmt of Kant’s own discovery.“
Yet ir is imporcant to rcalizc, as Werner Marx has argued, that
despite the incongruity between the specularive contenr and the or-
dinary smctllfcob the proposition, the form of the d i n a r y pmp-
ositioa is not ovcrtly destroyed. At fiat,speculative thought is simply
p r o j m d inm the traditional form of the propo~ition.~~ mar, then,
does such an inner destruction of the uaditional form of the ptopo-
sition amount to?Hcgcl‘s own example of such an inmr dcstruaion
of the common figure of the propasition by a speculative mntent is
the staremenr “God is being.” In contrasrta thc conventional relation
between subject and predicate in propositions, being, in the propo-
sition “God is being,” has acquired an cssenrial substanrisliry, which
destroys its character as a prcdicarc, and in which the subject, God,
becoma dissolved Aaording M &is example, a specdative sentencc
is one in which the predicate of the propsirion is made a subjm.
‘The spaulativc m t m t of the proposidon “God is being” reds “Being
is Gad.” Spccuiativethought does not pmcctdby affirming or denying
48 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLFCTION

prcdicatcs ahnut a subjca that would rcmain a stable and solid base
throughout the pmcms of detcrrninarion, Hcgel remarks:
Here thinkink instead of making p r a m s i n the transition from Subject to
Predicate,in reality ferlsitsclt chcckcd by thc loss of thchbjtct, and, missing
it, is rhrown hack on to the thought of the Subject. Or, since the Predicate
itsclt has bmn cxprswd as a Subiect, as rhe beingot essence which exhausts
the nature of the Suhiecr, thinking finds rhe Subieo immediarely in the Pred-
icate; and now. having returned into i t r l f in rhe P d i c a t e . instead of being
is a position whcrc i t has frecdorn for argumort, it is still absorbed in thc
content, or at !cast is faced with the demand that It should be.1b

In other words, the inner revolution of the proposirion, m3de pos-

sible by a spccularivc contcnt, is not limircd to a simpkc rcversal of
subject and predicate. Thc counterthrust of which Heget spcaks makcs
the speculative proposition a proposition of idcnrily. Hence, what is
changd by the speculativc contcnr in thc usual suhjcct-prcdicatc rc-
lation of propositions is not only the respecrive positions of subject
and prcdicare but thc very status ofrhc copula in the iudgrncnt.n l c
is has radically changed meaning: it no Eongcr stcurs the attribution
of predicatts to a subject, of univenals to the particular; instead, it
expresses an identity that is itself both passive and transitive.” The
copula of the proposition thus k a m e s the real subjcct of the spec-
ulative proposition. Ir expresses the Absolute iaelf-the Absolutc that
is thc rorality of the Conccpr.
In what ways, then, is the specularive propasirion different from
the empirical proposition?Although a speculativc proposition resem-
bles the empirical proposition in ,appearance, it is destructive of the
binary and rcflcctivc form of the relation of subject 3nd predicate. In
3 speculative proposition, the predicate is no longer a class, a sensible
gcncraliry, but a category, a universal dcterrninarion. I r is the vcry
subsrance, the essence of rhe subject. The subject of the ordinary
proposition becomcs lost in rhc subsranrial cssencc of rhc prcdicntc
in the specularive proposition. With this idcntity of subject and prcd-
icatc, a n idenrity that makes thc bounds uf reflection disappear, mc-
diation becomes thc tmc subject of thc proposition. Such rncdiation
as a toralising proccss of dcwrrnination srands for absolute reflection.
Within the speculativc proposition, Hegel argues, the dificultics of
reflection insofar as they pertain to the strumre of judgment are
overcome.
On the level of judgment, thc spcculativc pmposirion represents
rhc solution ofthc Kantian reflective diffcrcncc between thc empirical
proposition as a formal relation of rwo concepts and self-conscious-
 THE SELF-DESTRWIXION OF REFLECTION 49

ness as he judiciary medium of the synthetic function of judgment.

In the speculative judpnent, this solution is the result of the synthe-
sizing function of the copula, of the dialectical self-reflection of mc-
diation in which subject and predicate become identical.”
T h e solely inward destruction of the empirical proposition, how-
ever, is still insufficient. Hcgel writes:

The sublation of rhe form of the proposition must not happcn only in an
inmcdiute manner, through the mere content of rhc propsition. On the
contrary, this opposite rnovemcnt must find explicit expression: it must nor
just be the inward inhibition mentioned above. This m r n of the Notion
into itself musr be set forth [hrgestellrl. This rnovcmcnt which constitutes
what formerly rhc pmof was ruppoxdto accomplish, is the dialmica1move-
mental the proposition itsceIf. T h i s alone i s the specularive inncr (wirhlicbcJ,
and only rhe expression of this movement is a spcculativc exposition [Dar-
stellung].‘?

Since thepredicate in a speculative proposition mustexhibitie nature

as subject, and since this can occur only dialectically, through me-
diation, one proposition alone is incapable of explicitly expressing
the speculative. This i s why the true speculative, “the speculative C
uct [Urirkliche],” requires what Hegel calls “speculative exposition.”
In speculative exposition not only is the speculative content devoted
ro rhc immcdiare or inward destruction of the common form of the
proposition; the specdative expresses itself in an efiective manner as
well. A5 Werner Marx has shown, absolute reflection achieves its
essence only in such a speculative exposition of the specularive con-
rent.
Within the pramration of the whole as truth, a singuEnr proposition is
xrrncthing “fixed” and “positively dead,’%and hcncc something “wrong”
The simple proposition can ar bcst denote a “fixed result.’’ In thc.porttayaE
of the life of rrurh, and completing irself as a whole, the proposition in its
particularity i s sublaid. The single proposition becomes a link in e chain of
proposirions. The propositions are linked together as p m u p p i n g and as
positing; herein lies the sole possibility of showing how the totality of dc-
terminations is fused inro a true association. n c spcculative presentation
must take command of an cntire system of pmpoeitions.2’

The passage from the sfcumre of the single speculative proposition

M the tcxrure and torality of sentences marks the transition from
spcculation m dialectics. While the young Hegel used speculation and
dialectics synonymously, in his h e r work he dimtinguishcr between
these concepts. Dialectics. in the preface to Phenommology. signifies
the mode of exposition of the speculative conrenr. With dialectics,
TO TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

rpculation turns from a putely inward tevoludon into an active dem-

onstration of its content.
Yet since the dialectical exposition of the specularive in m sysrcm
of proposirians empties t h m propositions of everything that is not
the Notion or Concept, or everything that the Notion docs not com-
prehend, the passage to dialectics does not correspond to a simple
exteriorization of speculation in the medium of language. Language
is used in the dialectical exposition of speculative thoughr only to the
extent that the proper meaning of the words is entircly superseded
by the categories, which themselves form a “logical” totality, and in
which thcy appear only as moments of the self-determining Notion
or Concept. Although thedialectical mediationof thespeculativetakes
place only in thought, its altered state, language, represents an essen-
tial moment in the complmon of the totality o f t h s Conccpr. Language
thus becorn- the privileged medium by which the Concept can acquire
the total transparency, the absolute intelligibility that characterizes ir
as the totality of the reflected moments of the proccss of its own
becoming.1
Despitc the difference between thc hermeneutic and the Hegelian
concept of language, it is important to tress the menrial link of
Ianguage to borh speculation and absolute rcflection. In Hegelian and
hermeneutic philosophy, language plays a fundammral role in estab-
lishing the specularivetotality, or opening, as it is called d a y , within
which philosophical reflection, be it empirical orrranscendental, must
be siruated, that is, shown to har once p s i b l e and limited in its unpe.
This exposition of the specularive totality as the resolution of re-
flective oppositions can be taken one step farther. A useful marring
point is Ricocur’s account of what makes the speculative discourse
possible and of what it is to achieve. Ricacur writes in The Rule of
Metaphor:
Sprcularive discourse is possible, because language passacs the rej7eche
capacity to place itself at a distance and to mnridcr itwlf. as such and in its
mrirety, a relarcd ro the mraliry of what is. Language designates itself and
its othcr. T h i s rcflcctivc character extends what linguistics calls mcta-Iio-
guistic functioning, but articulates it in another discourse, speculative dis-
MUM. It is then no longer a function that can be oppsed to othcr hnaians,
i n particular to the reiermtial h m i o t v far it i s the knowledge t h a t accom-
panics the referential function itself. the knowledge of its being-related to
being.”
Froma Wcgehan pcrspcctive, Ricocur’s definition of speculation could
easily be considered Kantian. One reason for this is that Rimeur
 THE SELF-DESTRUtTION OF REFLECTION 51

undentandr the speculative discourse itself a5 a discourse a h t Inn-

guage’s discernible and multiple functions, as a discoursc that the-
matites and extendsthe meta-linguistic function that accompaniesrhe
function of refermce. According to Riaxur, each of these functions
can be dearly and absolutely distinguished from each other, Ahbough
Ricoeur strrsscs that language’s reflective character, when articulated
in speculative discourse as language’s consciousness of in openness
to what is, can no longer be opposed to the linguistic functions, and
that it is incommensurable with such hncdom, he seems to reduce
the reflective character of language to a formal synthcsis similar to
the Kantian “I think,” which must aocornpany not so much all one’s
represenrations as all one’s linguistic acts. If R i m u r escapes such
criridsm, it is because he also views language as a totality comparable
m the Hcgelian Absolute, which cncompasxs through sublation the
two distinct linguistic functions of the ineta-linguistic and the refcr-
tntial. But if this is so, Ricocur would have to expound spccutativcly
the ways in which the two functions within language ate superseded
by the totality of language itself. In any evmt, Ricoeuc’s discussion
allows us to determine more clearly what Hegel achieves with absolute
reflection.
In order m be all-enmmpassing, rhe speculative discourse cannot
k about the functions of Ianguagc. If the spcculative discourse is
restricted to the smculation of these functions, it remains, in Hegelian
terms, opposed to language. Therefore, Hcgclian speculative knowl-
edge demonstrates the identiry of self-cognition and the cognition of
the world of objects. The identity of these two pasitions occurs a t the
moment when exterior reflection, or the reflection of objccrs, recog-
nizes that it must presuppose itself as xtf-reflection. and that the
immediate object of its reftecdon is merely the reflection at chat which
grounds cxtcrior reflcbion. Through this gesture of thought. spem-
lative or absolute reflection succeeds in reuniting both the dogmatic
or naively empirical mode of thinking characteristic of mpiriasm-
which consists of identifying absolutely a content ptior to its formal
reflection-and the critical attitude, presented by Kant’s transcen-
dental philosophy, in which thou&t knows itself to be in the position
of a content for itself. Jean Hyppolice makcs rhis quire dear when he
writes t h a t speculative knowledge

implies the synthesis of rhc dogmark aII5Nde and the critical rnitudc as
p m m n d in Kant’s mwccndcntal philosophy. The imtc~tiow&y of con-
x i o u m w which is turned toward prmisting k i n g and which rclgam
cz TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTlON

reflection to its subjectivity, and transcendental rcflcnian, which reflects thc

sclfof knowing by rclcgating hcing to the thing-in-itsetf, must bc confounded
in speculutiw &nowing,which is df-knowledgein thcmntcnt, ofthecontent
as =If. and for which the twisting nf the soul, which in hoking at being
looks at ixwlf and vice-versa, i s itself expressed in a new logic.”
In empirical consciousness, intuition posits subiect and obiea by
opposing them absolutely to one another. Far this reason intuition
is, as Hegel states in The Diffmmcc, “empirical. given. non-mn-
Kious” (p. 110). Transccndental intuition, by contrast, ‘*entersmn-
sciousnss through free abstraction from the whole manifold of empirial
consciousn~m,and in this respect it is something subjective” (p. 173).
I t is, above all, nothing bur “pure knowledge, which would be know-
ing without intuition, [as] is the nullification of the opposites in can-
tradiction” (p. 109).Speculativerdcaion is not the mechanical synthesis
of thc two previous positions on intuition. reflcction and cognition.
Only by refleciing those two positions into idenriry can rhc synthesis
of absolute reflection bc brought ahout. This is done by dcmonsrrating
that ,empiricalconsciousness presuppose itselfin transcendental con-
sciousness,and that the subjcciive aspcct of transcendental mnscious-
ness has its rruth in the objectivity of the thing-in-itself. As a resulr
of such a mediation, of rhe rwo opposed and conrradirtory positions
of empiricism and transccndentalism, spccularivc or absolute reflcc-
tiort bccorncs, as Hyppolite notes, “thc a priori sponruneiry that both
.
presuppose, and which one discovers in them , , Thi5 a priori syn-
thesis is that of the self-positing Absolute that entighrens itself by its
own light.”” Heget’s speculative reflection thusgathers into one what
Kant h3d conceptualized under the ride of the rranscendmral and
formal unity of apperception m d thc empirical consciousncss made
possible by rhe latter. Specularive reflection is the analysis sub specie
aeterni. so to speak-that is, here, in the perspective of the entirety
of logical detwminationc-of thc still rrflcctive opposition of empir-
icism and tranwxndentalisrn. Hegel wrira in The Difference: “In
order ro grasp transcendental intuition in its purity, philosophical
reflection must further ahstram from chis subjective aspect 50 t h a t
transccndcntal intuition, as the foundation of philosophy, may be
neither subjective nor objective for it, neither self-consciousness a$
oppnwd to matter, nor matter as o p v c d to self-consciousness. hut
pure transcendental intuition, absolute identity, that is neither sub-
jcctive nor objective’’ (pp. 173-1741. Thc task of speculative philos-
ophy is, consequendy, “to suspend the apparent opposition of
transcendental and crnpirical consciousncss” (p. lZO).This suspension
 THE SELF-DESTRUCTION QF REFtfCTION 53

is achieved in thc mly a priori q m h & of absolute reflection, which

is a truly a priori spontaneity ‘bccausc it conrains in itself both the a
priori as a ,purely formal identity and the vcry possibility of an a
posteriority, which in it arc n o longer ahsolutely opposed. This true
a priori sponraneity of atwoiutc reflection also represents the ovet-
corning of the absolute reflective opposition af subject and object.
Empirical subjectivity as a subjectivity riveted to objem, as well is
mnsccndmtal subjectivity. is overmrnt in this m e a priori, which
coincids with the self-determination ofthe Concept or Notion in the
exposition of the process of i~ logical unfolding.
T h c suspension of the empirical and the transandcntal is achieved
in speculative reflection by means of the dialectical exposition of the
idrnriry af undemanding, or retlcrtian, and intuition. “Speculation,”
writes Hegel, “produces the consciousness of this identity, and because
ideality and riality are one in it, it is intuition” (p. 111). Speculation,
then, is the true hlfillmenr of transcendental imagination or of what,
since Fichte, and in distinction from Rant’s homologous use of the
term, has btcome known ar intellectual intuition, Speculation is ab-
solute intuition, In The Difference Hegel writes:
In empirical intuition, subject and object are oppositzs; the philosopher ap
pnhmds the activity of intuiting, he intuits intuiting and thus conceives it
as an idcntity. This intuiting of intuiting is, on the om hand, philasophim1
reflection and a5 suchapposcd both to ordinary nflectionand to theempirical
mnsciousntsd in gcntral which docs not raise itself above itself and it$ op-
positions. On rhc orher hand, this mnscmdental intuition is at the %me
time the objcct of philosophical dection; it is rhc Abrotutc, rhe original
idmriry. (p. 120)

When transcendental intuition as the intuition of intuition becomes

rhe object of philosophical reflection, philosophical reflection is raised
to the status of a ttanscmdtntal intuition, h a u x “philosophical
reflmion makes i d f [in this manner] into the abject and Is one with
it: thisis what makes it spcculation” (p. 173). Inothcrwords,absolute
reflectionor specularion is “the activity of the one universal Reason
directed upon itself,” grasping “its grounding within itself” (p. 88).
Or, as Hcgel also notes, it is ”the pure thinking chat thinks itself, the
idcnciry of subim and abject” (p. 81).
To sum up: spcularion or absolute refleaion resulting from the
self-dtsrmcrion of rctlcction-the annulment of such reflexive ~p
positions as the tdiltologicd knowledge of formal thinking and the
hererologicd knowledge OF empirical thought, of the a p i o n of the
54 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

transcendental and the a posteriori of the empirical, of subjectivity

and objectivity, of freedom and necessity, of theory and praxis, as
well as of the last logicaily possible oppositions, the opposition of the
self ro itself and to what it is not-is the self-intuition of Reason in
“absolute indifference,” as the young Hegel called it, using a Schel-
lingian term. The self-destruction of rcffcction in a b d u t e reflection
coincides with the self-begemng of Reason in infinite inruition. Ab-
solurc reflecrion is the full expasirion of all the logically possible
momenrs of rhe logos,a process rhar is cornplered a5 soon as the logos
is folded back into irself.
 4

Identity, Totality,
and Mystic Rapture

x
Unlike reflection, which, as a function of understanding, perpetuates
division and absolutely W oppoeiiion, absolute reflection, or spec-
ulation, dcliberatcly pursues a todizing goal. Neverrhclms, specu-
lation is not in a rcladon of apposition to reflection. Speculation
simply articulates and develops what reflection, as rhc activity of
dividing, must i d f pmuppope-the prior wholeness of the divided.
nis idea of totality whereby absolute reflection measures itself up to
rht idea proper of philosophy-that is, ics daim to complercnm-
has constituted philosophy since its inception in Grccce. The best way
m expound h e Hegcliian concept of totality is to demonstrate that
rht passage from philosophica1rcflcctian t~ speculation is also a pas-
sage from one way of mediating opposites to another. Yet this is also
IO acknowledge that the difference between rcflemionand speculation
is based on the different wholes they promote. Indeed, philasophicaI
rdlection. to the extent that it is philosophical, is also based on this
totality. But in contrast to absolute reflection,philosophical reflection
only prcsuppoxs such a totality, or knows of it only in an instinccivc
way, whereas speculation throws this regulating idea of philosophy
into relief and elaborates on it.
Let us fitst negativeiy determine the true synthcsis at which spec-
ulation aims. An absolute synthcsis, says Wegel, “must bc more than
a mcrc fitting together,. .for the Absolute is no [ m m ] juxtapori-
don.’” Because it is not supposed to be a whole composed of discrete
paw, the mode in which irs pans m i a s to one anorhcr cannor be
one of reciprocal detenninarion (WechsdbssrhmuHg, Wecbselw+
tung). Such an interplay of mutual conditioning would in no way
reduce thc opposition of the oppasim. Nor is &is a whole in which
56 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

parts are connected in conformity with the law OF causality, for such
a synthesis would be a “synthesis hy way of domination.” in which
one of the poles would be placed “in subservience to the higher,”
thus making lordship and bondage absolute, and infinitely extended
(p. 138; see also p. 146). R true synthetic tnraliry is nor characterrzed
by an Enfinitc or cndlcss process of either mutual dctcrmination or
subservient domination of the parts. A totaliry of that sort would
onlyprotongthercignof rcflcction. But more important, a truc totality
cannot be constructed from mere produrn of reflection. Hegel w r i t s
in The Differenm, “Our of products of mere rcflccrion identity cannot
construcr itself as totality; for they arise through abstraction from the
absolute identity which can only relate itself to them immcdiately
through nullificarion. nor through consrmcrion” (p.158). A5 long as
the “prducts of merc rcflccrion” are not relaced to the absolute
identity, as long as they remain pure determinations ~t understanding,
they appear incapable of engendering a true totality. What, then, is
a true synthetic rotaliry? While philosophical reflection and its exclu-
sively formal concept of unity are characterized by discontinuity, ab-
solute reflection is based on a demonsrration of the conrinuiry of ics
constituting elcmcnn, A t r u e totalky is a medium of continuity in
which hitherto oppmcd terms, by being related to &he Absolute and
hy being dcstroyed in their isolated one-sidedness, are lost in each
orher. Bur such a roraliry is also differentiated in irself, *‘so rhar uniry
and manifold do not supervene each to the other in it; rather they
detach themselves ,from one another within it, and are held together
forcefully, 35 Plata says, by the rniddle.”l
Discussing, in Tbe Di/‘fereme, the idca of cornplctc totality in t e r n s
of the two sciences of the Absolute-that is, the rranscendental science
(of Kant and Fichte) and the science of Nature (of Schelling) which
have to be reunited within it-Hegel remarks: “Inasmuch as both
scicnccs arc scicnccs of thc Absolute and thrir opposition is real, they
are the poles of the indifference [point] and cohere with one another
at this point itself; they arc themselves the lines which link the pole
with the center. The center is itself doubled, however, identity hcing
qne, and totaiiry the othcr, and in this perspective the two sciences
appear as the progressive evolution, or sdf-construction, of identity
into totaliry” (p. 170). Identity and totality are not the samc. The
identity of opposing poles does not suffice to make a totality. Identity
is only one aspccr ,oftorality. In order for a toraliry to be complete,
“the claims of separarion must he admitted [within the totality itsclfl
just as much as those of identity” (p. 156). For Hegel, absolute totality
 I D E N T m , TOTALITY, AND MYSTIC RAPTURE T?

is the result of a self-mnstruction in which identity turns into totality

by maintaining the identical pole’ nonidcntiry. Indeed, as Hegel re-
marks in Science of Logic, “tnrth is complete only in the rrrity of
idmtiry with differern, and hcnoe consists only in this unity.” H e
continurn

When awning that &is identity is imperfect, tttc perfaxion one has vagucly
in mind is this totality, measured against which the identiry is imperfccr, but
since, on the other hand, idcntiry is rigidly held to be absolutely sparate
from diffetcmc and in this separation is taken to hc something asenrial,
valid, true, then the only t b i v to be s m in these conflicting assertions is
the failure to bring togcther there thoughts, namely, that identity as absrraa
identity is essential, and that as, such it is equally imperfect: the lack of
awarcncss of the ncgauvc mornenr which. in these assertions, identiry itself
i s rcprcsrntcd to be.’

In order to achieve the continuity that mnstitutco true totality,

totality must, as the substratum, embrace both identity and non-
idcntity. This is why HqcI makes ux, in The Diffrrctrce, of the
following formula, which brings together the conflicting thoughts on
unity: “the Ahsalute itrelf is the identity of identity and nan-identity;
being opposed and being onc are both together in it” (p. 156). With
this inclusion of nonidcntiry, of the negative moment presupposed by
identity, the totality encompasses the last logically possible moment
without which thc passage from identity to totality would not bc
complete. Totality, then, i s the unityof itself and of the disunion that
such a unity must presuppose. By including that moment of negativity,
no other negative determination m a i n s possible, and the totality is
thuscomplete. Since everything that is in counterposition tosomething
else is also opposed to itself in this developed whole, and thus de-
strayed in its singularity, everything singular, to the extent that it has
standing in the AbsoIute, is nothing but a point at which “relations”
cross. Everything is at once pole, line, and center. To quote again:
“Since a duality is now p i t e d , each one of the opposim is opposed
to imlf and rhc pamrion g w on ad infiniturn. Hence, every part of
the subject and cvery part of ahc obiem is itself in the Absolute, an
idmtiry of subiea and object; cvery cognition is a mrth just as every
speck of dust is an organization” (p. 1571. A totality in which the
poles “arc themselves the lines w h i h Iink the pole with rhe center”
amounts to a rncdium of mediation, a middle of intersecting lines. In
its full exposition, this medium is the very completion of Reason, the
ultimate ground of everything singular.‘
FB TOWARD THE LIMITS OF RBFLlCTlON

Now,let us elaborate, ar least briefly, on a major difference bctwwn

the concept of toraliry as employed by Hegel and [rhe later) Schelling.
Although Ncgcl sterns, in The Differme, to endorse futly Schelling’s
idea of torality as an obiective subiecc-object identity, it follows from
everything we have sccn that. to conform with Hegel’s radical critique
of the philosophy of reflection, a true synthesis has to, be a synthesis
of a subiective and objective subject-object, to usc his language of
that period. Despite rhe fact thar Hegel refers m mraliry in Schellingian
terms as L “point of indifference,” he also evokcs rhe “true point of
indifference”-that is, a totality that, unlike ScheIIing’s, does not
imply thc complete annulment or extinction of all opposition (p. 172).
For Schelling, the cririque of the rigidity of the reflective determina-
tions and thc categories of understanding led to thcir complete dis-
solution in the rategoria of Reason. understood as immediate and
unmediated intellectual intuition. In Hegel, by contrast, the mediation
of the opposites replaces Schelling’s originary synthetic unity. There-
fore, Hegel’s concept of totality contains the nonidentiry as well as
and apart tram the identity of the QppOSitC5. He writes in The Dif-
ference: “In the absolute identity subject and objcn arc suspended,
hut because they are within the absolute identity they both have
standing too. This standing is what makes a knowledge possible; for
in knowledge their separation is posited up to a point” (p. 126).
A totality such as Schelling’s, which exdudes all negativity and has
no roam for that which is limitcd, is, according to Hegel’s later lan-
guage, an abstract totality. In Phenomenology ofSpiril hc refers to
it as the night in which all cows are black. Such a philosophy is satistied
“by simply penetrating. to the principle of nullifying all fixed oppo-
sition and connecting the limited to the Absolute“ (p. 1.12). T h e “col-
orless light” of such a n intuition confined to the abstract side of
cognition culrninares in “the mystic raprure” 50 familiar to the
Romantics. Indeed, Hegel’s critique of the abstract totality aims not
only at Schelling’s philosophy bur, in The Difftrence, at Jacobi, and
at Schlegel and Novalia as well. By heavily relying on Fichte’s notion
ofa self-positing self, the early Romantics developed a conccption of
the Absolute in terms of what Walter Benjamin calls the “medium of
reflection.” Although Schlegel and Novalis were not cnrirely without
pretensions concerning the systematic cxpsirion of their philosophy,
they contented themselves with what Hegel calls, in The Differmce,
the “negative side, where meryrhing finite is drowned in the infinite”
(p. 156). What Hegel objects to in such an understanding of the
Absolutc i5 its lack of intcrnal coherence, and thus the Romantics’
failure 10 achieve an objective totality of knowledge.
 IDENTITY. TOTALITY, AND MYSTIC RAPTURE 59

Although such an absrncr notion of totaliiy could, of course, be

made concrete, Hcgcl claims that, for the Romantics, it is merely “a
matter of subjective mntingmcy whether this kind of philosophizing
is bound up with the need for a system or not” (p. 156). In other
words, Romantic philosophy, although no longer “abstract reason-
ing,’’ and already a form of overcoming the reflcciivc determinations
of understanding, falls back again into the rigid Kantian opposirions
by leaving the opposition ofthc Absolute and the manifooid intact, or
the object of a (mcreIy) contingenk subicaive act of mediation. A
philosophy, however, that aims at a radical critique of the metaphysics
of decriort cannot be satisfied with he mystic rapture rhar the all-
devouring Absalurt of the Romanrics invircs; it must expound the
intrinsic links between the Absolute and its content, and it must iry
to posit this manifold as internally connected m the Absolute. Yet
such internal connection coincides with producing a totality of h o w -
ing, that is, a sysmn of science. A “philosophizing that dots not
construct itself into a system is a constant flight h m limitations” (p.
113); true philosophy, according to Hegel, renders the Absolute con-
crete in the form of the system. Such an exposition of the content of
the Absolum, however, cannot remain dependent on a subjective and
contingent act, as is the case in Rommticism, sin= it cornsponds m
an objmivc need of the Absolute itself. The sysrcm must be under-
stood as the “pure self-exposition” of he absolute totality. Hegel
stam, “In rhis self-production of Reason rhc Absolute shapes itself
into an objecriw totality, which is a whole in itself held fast and
complete, having no p u n d outside i d f , but founded by itself in ics
beginning, middle and end” (p. 113).
The self-production of the Absolute requires, moreover, that “the
philosophy of the system and the systcm irsclf da . . . minade” {p.
114), that “the product.. .correspond to the producing” (p. 131).
and that “the result of the system. . .return to its beginning” (p.
132). Having failed to mediate t h e oppositions, Fichte, Shellin&
and the Romantitics ham not scapcd the metaphysics of reflection.
Only a b d u t e reflection or speculation a n be consistent and suc-
c d u l in surmounting the aporias and antinomia of rcflcction man-
ifest in philosophy from Dtscam M Kant.
 5

Post-Hegelian Criticism
of Reflexivity

I
Reflcction, according to Hcgel’s critique, is an almost entirely negative
concept. As thc mdde of thinking particular to undemanding, it is a
force of separation incapablc hy itself of thinking the unity prcsup-
posed by this activity, Fnr t h e critic of Kantian philosophy-that is.
Hegct-everything dependent on rhe notion of rcflection-subiectiv-
ity, freedom. transcendentality, and so on-is also affected by the
inability of rcflcction to mcct the most fundamental of all philosoph-
ical demands, thar of unity. In dktinction from other reprewntaiives
of German Idealism and early Rommcirism, who also conceived of
rhcmsclves as lollowcn and critics of thc Kantian philmophy of re-
flection, only Hcgcl succeeded in ovcrcoming the Kantian dichoto-
mies. Hegcl indeed [iquefics cvcn the ultimate reflective distinctions
left sranding by both Fichtc and Schclling.
A s we have seen, Hegcl i s critical of rhc rnctaphysics nf reflection
because it tcavm the dcmand for totality unanswered. Heget’s spcc-
ulative dialectics mighr he calted a first critique of the philosophy of
reflection, but not because he opted for an irnmdiare response to the
qucstinn of unity and totality, rhercby relegating rcflccrion with all
its problems to the trash heap of thought. Unlike some of the Ro-
manrics Hcgcl docs not discard this idea, so fundamental to m d c r -
nity, but, by historidzingthe logicat categories constituting teflexivity,
hc shows reflection to bc tied u p in a process in which its own aporias
are overcome by reflection itself. His critique culminates in a dem-
onstration of rcfieccion’sdcvclopmcnt towards its own sublation. Rooted
in the unthought of the metaphysics of reflection-that is, the idea
of totality-Hegcl’s critique is made in the name of a reflection that
has overcome i t s shortmmingsr absolute reflection, or spccularion,
 POST-HECBLIAN CRITICISM OF REFLEXIVIW 61

which Hegel oppose to the ,narrow p h i h o p h i d concept of reflec

tion. CriticaI of rhe metaphysics of reflection and yet containing it
insofar as it brings the unhought of the philosophy of reflection to
bear on that very concept, absolute rciI&on rcprcscnrs the fulfillment
of reflection, its completion, its coming into its own.
It is important to note that the concept of reflexivity found in
contemporary philosophical debates or in the discourse of literary
criticism rarely refers to the pre-Kantian or Kantiafi definition of
reflection. Rather, the concept of reflection in wntemporary debates,
which surfaces in an affirmative or critical manner, is basically in-
debted to the speculative critique of the rneraphysia of reflection.
Indeed, what is generally meant by the arms rtflectim and self-re-
fiction is either absolute reflection or its Romantic sense-what Bm-
jamin called “tbe medium of reflection."' This implies that thc critique
of what is called, in contemporary Gcrman philosophy, the “theory
(or philosophy) of reflection” is either tributary to or CriticaI of the
speculative project or of the idea of Romantic absolute refleetion. In
any case, whatever d i m i o n this sort of criticism takes, for historical
and systematic reasons, it raises i t d f , unlike the positivist critique of
reflection, to the heights of speculation, which is a 5 we have seen
distinguished by its awareness of the problems posed by reflexivity.
Yet what is true of the German critiquc of the philosophy of reflcc-
tion-namely, is consciousntss of the philosophical exigencies of
speculation, whether or not Hegel’s own solution to thc problems oi
reflexivity are seen to have lost their persuasive power-is men more
m e of the debate with reflexivity that stretches from Heidegger to
Derrida. This debare takes off against the backdrop of Hegel’s spec-
ulative thought.
Wore 1 embark on a teview of both t y p of criticism. it seem5
k i n g to refine the minimal definition of reflection, outlined at the
beginning of Part 1. It now appears that this definition, which unites
the mast important farmaf movements of reflection, mrrcsponds to
the speculative notion of reflection. To recapitulate: The prc-Kantian
theory of reflection is charactcrized by the assumption that the cog-
nitive subject bccomcF a self-rclatingsubjca by making itself an obiea
for imlf. The identity that springs forth from such an activity is a
result of mrning char kind of attenrion originally directed upon objects
back upon the knowing subject itself. T h i s act of throwing thc subject
of represenration back onto itself i s rhc act of idlemion, By detaching
rcflcction from human reflection, Kant , c h a t s transccndental rcflec-
tion to the rank of a constituting principleof all the forms of thinking
62 TOWARD l W E tIM115 QF REFLECTION

and experience. Reflexivity thus becomes an essential characteristic

of thought itself. Yet Kant's transcendcntal ego is dominated by rhc
dualism characreristic of reflective ntetaphysia from Descartes an-
the dualism of an active subject and a passive obiea. Only when
reflection is raised to the rank of the Concept or Notion, and thus
radically separated from the realm of human self-retation and its
arrenrion m objects-in other words, when thought as such becomes
rhc subjccr of thinking-is the dualism of reflection wercome.
How does Hegel bring about the reflecrion of the absolute subject,
or spirit? The possibility of a sublation of the dualism of reflection
becomes a reality only at the moment a t which the thesis of an object
and the antithesisof a subject can be viewed as partaking in a totality.
As we have seen, Hegel's criticism of the meraphysiw of rdlection is
guided by the notion of totality. If reflection is an operation produced
between a figure and irs image in the mirror, between a subject and
an objecr, then rhc poles or extremes of the process of reflection are
no longer the essential part of that process but its mean,or the whole
of all of the relations of thc prm ss between thcm. The medium in
which reflection takes place, this middlc which splits into opposed
poles and from which they borrow their meaning, becomes the real
subject of refleaion. This subjecr, rhe spirit or Concepr, is what, as
pure activity, produm both the opposed moments of subjcctivc rc-
flecrion-the subjert and the ,objcct--and itself as the totality of the
mcdium of reflection. To ihc exrenr that this medium gathers into
one synthesis the whole of thc mornems thar characterize reflection
and itself as the mean af these moments, it is thetrueSubject, absolute
reflection. Its achievement is to unite in one whole that which is
opposed.
This unity as a developed whole is the radical answer to the quaestio
iuris, which, with the inception of the idea of reflection in Descartes,
was reflection's guiding idea, but which had not yet revcaled all of
ib conscqucncs. tn the same way, Hegel's critique of reflection, and
his intensification af ir to absolute reflection by elevating the major
themes of reflection to the levcl of the Concept or Notion. represents
a radical completion of subjectivity, freedom, autonomy, self-certitude
and certitude, transcendcntality, nnd PO on. The speculative deter-
mination of the meaning of these concepa takes place in the devel-
opment ofa philosophy of absolua subjectivity and absolute reflection
that breaks away from the theories and philosophies of cognition and
knowledge, and from the dualisms with which they are kct:em-
pirical and transcendental experience, apriorism and apostcriorism,
 POST-HECELldN CRIltCISM O F REFLEXIVITY 6a

subject and objccr. In w m o m i n g thest conceptual dyads, which arise

from the kind of positing that characterizes understanding, Hegel’s
critique of the philosophy of reflection and hi5 development of a
philosophy of absolute reflection try to achieve thc goal of philosophy
irself, the goal of a totality of knowledgc, itself free of contradictions,
thar accounts for all contradictions and oppositions.
h t us consider this totality and its essential mnstitumts onc last
rime. It is a unity of self-relation and Otherness.of immanent refleaion
and reflection-into-Orher. A “metatheory” of rcflmion of sons, the
theory of absolute reflection ratores the immediacy of being that is
lost a t the moment when immanent reflection severs the subjm from
the world. This immediacy is reestablished as the movement of the
reflection of the antagonistic modes of rctlection-that is, reflection-
into-Orher and reflection-into-self. Absolute reflection--“chc move-
ment of reflecting itself into itself,” as Hcgcl rcmarks in P b m a e -
nologyl-becomes the totality embracing both types of refleaion,
which thus remain entirely immanent and interior to one another, to
the extent that it also reflects itself in the form of the refleaion-into-
self it now comprises. With this self-inclusion of absolute reflection,
which Pscapa any further reflection, not only is reflection overcome,
for ir is comprised, bur also absolute reflection becomes the ultimate
totality of all possible reiations, the relation to self induded. Because
what is rdlccted within it has lost its power of separation and hation,
it has become, so to speak, a self-relating relation without related
poles. It is identical to Rtason, or logos;it is Reason in its cornpietion.
To circIe back, then, to the minimal definition of reflection, Iet us
add that such a definition must contain, in addition to the three
moments already distinguished, the thought of refleaion‘s own re-
flection in the form of that mode of mirroring that is opposed to
objects or images. To achieve the totality of all the rnovcmena of
reflection, it is not sufficient to poinrro the diaIectics of self and Other
which take place between mirror and object. This dialectic is possible
only on condition that the mirror of self and Other is itself only a
form of absolute rekction. Refleaion’s reflection requires that re
flcction be contained within reflection, that mirroring itself include
the mirror’s mirroring. This can be achieved only by demonstrating
that the mirror’s mirroring of itself and Other is a still insufficient
reflection and that in its fixation, which opcns a pmccss of endless
sell-mirroring, the mirror’s mirroring is dependent o n a positing by
absolute reflection, which at the same rime makes this mirroring prc-
cess a n alienated, and thus tecuperable, momenr of absolute reflection.
6.4 TOWARD T H E LIMITS OF REFLECTION

Only at this point is the toraEity of reflection's constiturive features

defined. Reflection is complered-rhar is. inclusive of all irs consti-
tutive moments-when it includcs itself in that form of reflection
which is reflection of self in opposition to reflection of Other.
In the afrermath of Hegel's speculative overhading of the meta-
physics of reflection, all rigorous debate wirh reflection has been a
debate wirh this conccpt of reflection,in which setf-reflection is also
the rtflccrion of that S D o~f self-refleaion that stitl faces objects. But
since Hcgel's critique of the philosophy of reflection addresses the
demand that characterizes philosophy as philosophy, the demand for
unity or rotality, a debate with his speculative concept of reflection
is a debate not only ahaur rhe fundamental themes of modern phi-
losophy-subjectivity, freedom, autonomy. transcmdentaliry-but
also about the rhemcs consrimring thc vcry projcct ofphilosophy since
its inccprion in Greece. Indeed, wben Hegel subjected rhe mosr im-
porrant methodological conccpt of modern philosaphy, as well as the
rhemcs cocvd with rhe birthof rhisconcept, to his spcculativccririque,
he rncasurcd thc achievements of reflection against the demand for a
totalizing understanding of thought and being, a demand as old as
philosophy irserf. Any rigorous cririquc of rcflcxiviry must face this
chatlengc to values, without which therc would be no such thing as
a discoursc of philosophy. ethics, or politics.
B u t are these not the difficulties faced by any cridque of refledon
and rencxivity? Such a critique must recognize that reflection is a n
unsurpassed principle of philosophy for which naive resistance is cer-
tainly no march. This is cven more true of absalute reflection, The
rradirional arguments against absolute reflection or speculation do
nor seriously affect such reflection, even where one would be inclined
to acknowledge that some of its historical consequences have been
abcrranr. Total dialccticd mediation as it characterizes absolute rc-
flecrion, is, in principle. of unequaled superiority. As a result of this
logical preeminence, a11 polcmics againsr it would seem to bc without
ground. Ahsolute reflection. as articulated 'in the greater Logic, for
instance, mricipares all the logically possibk adverse stands and in-
tegrarcs rhcm as moments within ics spcculativr totality. Cadamer
expresses this very well in Truth and Method: "The Archimedean
poinr from where HcgePs philosophy could be toppled can ncver bc
found rhrnugh reflection. This is precisely the formal quality of re-
flective philosophy, rhat thcrc cannot be a posirion that is nor drawn
into the reflective movement of consciousness coming to itself,"' This
superiority of absolure reffection is one of principle. I t cannot bc
 POST-HECELSAN CRITICISM OF REFLEXIVITY 65
~_____

challenged by the aberrational mnxqumas to which it has led. and

which are to a great exrent responsible for bringing speculation into
discredit. Nor can absolure reflection’s superiority be challenged by
a demonstration of its imperfections or alleged indefcnsibilirics, as,
for example, in Hegel’s Pbmommo!ogy. Science of Logic, or hey-
ciopedb. Such defiaencim become manifest if one atternpa to pen-
etran the microstmctum of the argumentation that develops absolute
reflection. Subjected to close mutiny, the passage from one logical
moment m another a h appears imprecise. Buq as Dieter Hcnrich
has most convincingly demonstrated, “the deficimcics in the dcvel-
opmrnr . .. arc not harmful to the firmntss or soundness of The ar-
chitecture of rhe origina1 draft [ofHegel’s Science of Logic] nor as
far as the fundamentally important outlines of its aceortion are con-
cerned.”‘ What Hcnrich has been abL to show in a most persuasive
manner, in what he calls “mmctions” or “remnstructions” of He
gclian argumcnrarion, is rhar Hcgel in fact had all the means ncccrsary
to make his arguments logically faultlss, and that one can supply
m t a i n weak microstructures with more powerful reasonings chat
remain entirely within rhc spirit of Hegdian thoughr.l These defi-
ciencies, consequently, have no impact on the acrual concept of ab-
solute decdon. If ir is true, as Heluich contends, that the degree of
perfection that Hegel actually achieved in his major work divergcs
quite a bit from the ideal, but that it can nevertheless bc measured
up to Hegel‘sown origencits, then the work‘s imperfmion can be
accounted far+as Hcnrich shows, by the discrepancy beween Hegel’s
vimosity in developing logical relations and his merhodological re-
flmions on this development.
Where, then, docs this leave us with regard to the problem of
absolute reflection? If absolute reflection cannot bc radically put into
question by reflection itself, because all possible points of criticism
arc already moments of reflection, and if acrual deficiencies of the
system of a h l u r e refleion pak i n t o insignificance when compared
to its potential elaboration, does this mean that reflection cannot be
c r i t i d y evaluated, and that Hegel’s speculative critique and inter-
pretation of reflection are the only one5 possible?Does the succes of
the principlc of absolute reflection closc off all further questioning?
Lct us step back for a moment into history. As early as Plato,
reflection, in the sense of self-refleaion. has been subject to criticism.
lo the dialogue Chmnrides, a part of Plato’s critique of the Sophists,
Socrates makes the at h t surprising move of declaring rhar sopkm-
s y n t cannot cxisr becauz it is a conrradimry notion.6 Sophrosync,
66 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

an idcal stmnd to nonc in irnportancc for the Crceks, was held to be

L science or knowledge distinct from all other knowledge since, corn-
p a d m other sciences, which are sciences only of something else.
sophrosyne was a science both of other sciences and of itself. Soph-
rosyne-wisdom, temperance-corresponds esse~~tially to self-knowl-
edge. But Socrares’ argumentation shows rhar a relation to self is
altogmher inadmissible, and hardly credible, because it i s impossible
for a property of something to relate m itself. One example is the impos-
sibility of a seeing that would be the seeing of itself. Socrates asks
Cririas: “Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like the
ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of orher sorts of vision, and
of thc defect of them, which in seeing sees no color, but only itsell
and other SOKS of vision. Do you think that there is such a kind of
vision? Certainly nor.”’ For the same reason, Socrates believcs a
knowledge of knowledge-rhat is, a knowledge chat would nor relate
to anything in particular-to be irnpossiblc. He wcn goes so far as
m question the u s e d this knowledge of knowledge if it were ro exist,
a use he dcclares null because such knowlcdge would be empty knowl-
edge, relating to nothing. Indeed, if knowledge is always relational,
knowlcdge of knowledge would have to be knowledge of knowtedge
of, a. srrumre which, cpisremologically speakink is void.
Socrates’ demonstration is surprising at first because it sccrns to
contradict other passages i n Plato in which a dynumb is shown to
relate not only to what its powcr is the power of but also to itself.
These passages, however, concede self-relationality only to the soul,
which, as the primurn mowns of the cosmos, is dctennined by rhc
property of self-movemmr, and has litrlc in common with what is
undcrstood by soul in modem philosophy.o Consequcntly, although
Plato recognizes a self-relationality of the soul, or of divine being, hc
denies such a possibility to the knowledge of knowledge. Indeed,
insread of anticipating the Cartesian self-relationality of reflexivity,
sophrosyne, in the conrext of Cbamrides, is at best a knowledge of
good and cvil. Socrarcs’ argumenrs, therefore, do nor impinge on rhc
possibility of conceiving of absolute reflection, in particular since, on
othcr occasions, hc recognizes self-rclationaliry as that which consti-
tutes rhe soul.‘ As a matter of faa, Soctateec‘questioning of sophro-
m e . by presupposing thc possibility of thc self-relationaliry of thc
soul, is a kind of criticism that would not hc possible without the
higher form of a dynamis by which the soul relates to itself. I t is in
this znsc rhar we understand Sacram’ critique of the knowledge of
knowledge to be implicitly speculative. Socrates’ interrogation of the
 POST-HEGLLIAN CRITICISM O F REFLEXIVITY 67

reflexivity of sopbrosyne, by implying that reflection is truly possible

only in the form of the self-movement of the soul, leads us d i r d y
back ro Hcgel's spectllaiivc correcrion of the contradictions oc re-
flection in absolute reflection. In contrast to skeptical or empiricat
critiasm af reflexivity, which concludes from rhc aporeric nature of
$elf-rcflection its thorough impossibility, the sort of criticism Plaro
directs against selCreRection-which informs many later objections
to the philosophy of reflection, Hegel's objections included-is, in
essence, speculative. It points cowards the aparias of =If-reflection in
the name of a higher form of sclf-reflection.
It is imporrant to recognize that where the criticism of reflection
is not simply skeptical, it is overtly or latently specdative. But what
if all genuine skepticism must also presuppos what it puts into qua-
tion? To outline an answer M this question, we must first establish
the nature of the authentic criticism that skepticism levels against
reflection. Sextus Empiricus formulates these objections in the follow-
ing passage:
For if the mind spprchcnds itdf, cithtr it as a whole will apprehend itself,
or it will do so not as a whok bur emptoying for the purpose a part of inclf.
Now it will not be able as a wholc to apprehend italf. For if as a wholc ir
apprehends imlf, it will be as a whole apprchcnsion and apprchen'ding, and,
the apprehending subim being the whole, rhe apprehended object will no
longer be anything: but it is a thing most irrational that the apprehending
subinr should mist while the object of the apprehension d o a not exist. Nor,
in facr, can thc mind cmploy for this purpose a part of itself. For how does
the part itself apprehend itsell? If as a whole, rhe object thought will be
nothing; white if with a pan, how will rhac pan in mrn d i m itself? And
so on 10 infinity.l0
The aporia i s obvious: either reason knows itself as Other, and this
means that it does nor know itself, or it becomes caught in a never-
ending process of self-approximation.
Yet these contradictions arc not final obstacles to elaboraring the
self-reflection of the Absolute, because they can be seen to be moments
ih self-knowltdge as a process. The Other, which the sclf can only
know itself as, thus becomes the result of a self-alienation of h e self
before it recognizes thI5 Other as itself again. The skeptical contra-
dictions in this pcrsptcrive arc seen sub s p e c k acremi, thar is, with
regard to the unity they pmuppose. Certainly one cannot refute this
skeptical doubt concerning the possibility of self-knowledge or wlf-
reflection in the same way that one refutes skepriasmt calling into
question the cpistemologicd signification of reflection in general. In-
6R TOTDARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

deed in refuting scll-knowledge, it does not presuppose what it is

doubtful about in the same way that it must presuppose the signifi-
cation of reflection when putting, in a reflective manner, reflection
into question, B u t it r m a i n s to bc seen whethcr the skeptical evidence
concerning thc impossibiliry of self-knowledge must not, in the last
resort, also bc groundcd in the cvidcncc of a self-knowing subject.
Hegel's specdative criticism, as we have seen, displacs the quation
of the aporias by admining that rhcy can certainly nor be solved on
the level of psychological and epistemological self-reflection, but only
on the higher Icvel of absolute knowing. Such a totality of the Notion
or Concept is something that the skeptical argument, a t least from a
spmlative pcrspcctive, must prcsupposc, since it setvcs as the unity
in rhe tight of which its aporetic demonstrations make sense in the
first place. Thc samc is truc of a varicry of other obiectinns to the
possibility of self-reflecthn. W e shall consider several of thse objec-
tions in a discussion of the critique of the philosophy of reflection as
it has been developed in contemporary German philosophy.
This critique branches o u t into two different sets of arguments.
T h e firsr ser is heavily indebted ro Russell and Whitehead's dernon-
stration of the formal antinomies that characterize the idea of self-
reference or reflexiveness, as well as to Wittgenstein's theory of types.
Among this set of objections is Dietcr Hcnrich's demonstration of the
incvitably circular consrrurtion of wlf-rcfledon. This type of argu-
ment was f i r s raised by Fichte's disciple Friedrich Hetbart, whose
polemic against his master demonstrated not the impossibility of self-
consciousness but rhe inadequacy of rhe model of self-represenration
to describe it. Henrich follows this line of thought inasmuch as his
whole argumentation conccrning self-reflnrion is a function of his
desire to show that self-reflection is an inappropriate tool for ex-
plaining self-consciousness. Yer, is rhar not prccisely what a theory
nf rcflcction hopcs to achieve?
With basically two arguments, Henrich dcmonstrates thccircularity
of all the forms of the theory of reflection up to Kant, including
rranscendcntal rcflmion. He borrows his first argument from Fichre,
whom he considers to be the first ro have felt the inadequacy of the
theory of reflection to cope with the problem of self-consciousness.
This argument may be summarized as follows: The theary of self-
reflection contends that a Subject-Self comes to know itself when it
rums its reffecrion upon itself. Yet, since one can speak of a Subject-
Self anly where there is already self-consciousness, the theory of
rcffcction presupposm what it hopes to explain. Indeed. the act of
 POSFHEGELTAW CRITICISM QF R@FLWfVITY 69

reflecting must bc rhe act of a d f in possession of imIt Henrich

writes in “Fichtc’s Original Insight”: “Thus anyone who scts reflection
into motion must himself already bc both the !mower and the known.
The subjeet of reflection on its own thereby satisfies the wholc equa-
tion ‘I=I.’ Yet, reflection alone was supposcd to bring about this
cquarion.”l‘ From this the corollary folfown that r d m r o n of thc self
will never produce self-consciousties if that self i s somerhing other
than a reIf-aonsciousncss. “If the Subject-SeIf is not the Self, then
neither canthe Self, of which we come to have knowledge,thar is the
Object-Self, cver be identical with it.”’*In short, a theory of reflection
that pretends to explain the origin of self-consciousness must presup-
pose what i t IS suppossd to explain. If self-reflaion is to lead to self-
mnsciousnesr, the reflected self must necessarily aIready be conscious
of itself. At k s t , a theory of reflection can account for an explicit
self-arperience of a self, but it is unable to expIain the self-knowldge
of a knawingsubjectivicy. Compared 10this primordial phenomcnon,
refledon is only a secondary phenomenon.13
Henrich’ssccond objection takcs off from the theory that retlemion
assumes that the *If-knowledge of a subject originates in an act of
self-menion. Yet in order for such self-knowltdgc m be possible,
the subject must know in advance that the objm rcfleded is ia own
self, identical with itself. tt is just rhat identity-that is, the knowledge
thar the object turned upon in reflection is oneself-that the theory
of reflection is supposed to amount for. Henrich writ- “But how
can sclf-consciowness know that it has grasped itself, if an Objcct-
Self had come about only via the Selfs act of reflection? Obviously
it can know this only if it already knew irsclf beforc. For only on the
basis of previous knowledgc is it possible for self-consciousness to
say: ‘What 1 am grasping is 1 myself-’ But, if it already knows itself,
then it aIready knows &at ‘I =I.’“1‘ This second objection reaches
the samc conclusion as the first: the theory of reflection already ptc-
supposes the dution of the problem it sets out to explain. The theory
of reflection is based on a prtitio primripii.
Now, what is important here is that Hrnrich’s critical arguments
concerning the circularity of reflection, as well as hi5 confining re-
flection’sepistemological significance to a secondary phenomenon, d o
nor at all discredit self-consciousness itself. Sclf-reflection only sccms
an inadequate tool with which to think self-consciousness proper.
As a matter of fact, the attempt to exhibit teflcction’s antinomical
properties is grounded in the azwmption of a primordial identity of
sclf-conshusness. It is in the very name of self-consciousness that
70 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

Henrich’s whole argument takes place, especially since he shows that

the theories of reflection presuppose, in their very failure, such an
originay df-identity. It is this intimacy with oneself-that is, this
intimate knowledge of oneself, aa Hmrich calls it-that makes thc
secondary, reffexive mode of self-relation possible, for this secondary
mode is irself derivative, and cannor serve as irs own origin.12 In
“Fichte’s Original Insight,” he writes: “This primordial selfhood first
allows a Self to work itself free from its connection with the world
and to grasp itself explicitly as what it must have been previously,
namely, knowledge t h a t what it is, is knowing subicctivity. Tbc pas-
sibiliry of reflection must be understcad OR the basis of this primordial
essence of the Self.”l*
Despite its prereflexive connotations, which bring it near to H u r
serl’s and Heideggcr’s attempts to circumvent radically the regressus
ud ittfmitum caused by rhe idea of self-relation, which I discuss later
in this chapter, such a notion of the original identity of selfhood,
based on an intimacy with oneself and presupposed by self-rcflection,
is perhaps, with its insistence on genuine identity and totality, rhe
major theorem of speculative philosophy. Henrich seeks to concep-
tualize this originary idenriry in thc inevirably paradoxical terms of
“an (implicitly) self-less consciousness of self,’* precisely ‘to avoid the
circularity of reflexive theories.” Primordial selfhood is to be thought
of a5 a nonreflexive identity.’* Thus, although Henrich’s critique of
the theories d reflection cannot be called speculative in the sense oi
an ancmpr to solve the aporias of reflection by absolutizing reflexivity,
it is nonetheless an attempt m solve these aporias by deducing re-
flection from an original totality of which it would be a secondary
rnodc. Hcnrich does not explain the nature oithenonrcflcxivc rclarion
which constitutes the fundamental fact of such 31 original identity.
Thus, as long as this nonreflective totality is not expounded explicitly,
its connatation ol identity and rotality b r i n e it near to what Hegel
calls a spccularEvc germ. Although a nonrcflcctivetotality, this original
identity is, with respect to reflection, in a relation of constitution and
derivation similar to that between absotutc reflection and the sphere
of essential reflection. In short, Henrich’s critique of reflection-a
critique that seeks nor to rid itself of consciousn~ssor the subject,
but rarhrr to think such phcnomcna by avoiding the classical aporias
of thought-abandons reflectionon the ground of arguments that arc
basically skeptical. Yct he docs so to the benefit of a different and,
because it avoids the antinomies of thought, higher mode of relation
to self. Although this higher mode of identity to self, of a selfless
 POST-AEGELIAN CRITICISM OF REFLEXIVITY 71

consdourness of self, would not coincide with what the Idealists ailed
“intellectual intuition,” the critique is indubitably spccuiative in na-
ture.
The same observations can be made in rhe case of Ulrich Pothast’s
ammpr m come m grips wirh the aprias of self-relation mncep-
tualizcd reflexively. By ma king use of the tools developed by andytical
philosophy, Pothast shows, even more clearly than Hcnrich. that the
aporias rhar result from the attempt to think consciousness with the
help of concepts of reflexivity are analogous to the antinomies of
logic. Not only does a relation of reflexive turning upon oneself lead
m an infinite rqges, but it is also xmantically void. What is important
for us is whar fotlows from such a basically skeptical and even em-
piricist approach ro the problem of refleaion. Toward the end of his
study. Pothast remarks that his critique does not, far principal reasons,
exclude all turning backward of attention. Self-reflection is possibIc
in the mx of an arrentional experience; bur this is not to be conceived
as self-perception.that is, in terms of cognitive self-relation, As Pothast
has demonstrated with g e a r accuracy, the major aporias that haunt
the reflexive model of consciousness arc due to a projecrion of anal-
ogies of perception onto psychic relations, Because consciousness is
thus interpreted in terms of spacialiry, making wlf-relation a function
,of a prior dichotomy of subject and object (the subject as ,obim), it
is logically impossible to avoid the regressus ud libitum. Yet, says
Pothast, such an interpretation is illegitiman, because within con-
xiousnms there are no perceptions properly speaking. ldsclf-reflection
as attentional experience, inshort consciousness, is thus to be thought
without conrradicrion, consciousness cannot be a [reflexive) sclf-rc-
lation. As Pothast puts it%a bit ambiguously, it can only be thou&
of as “an entirely ‘objective’ process, in the sense that it is not ac-
companied by a howingself-relation at any moment.” Consciousness
becomes, in short, a predicate, or a pmpricty that refuuscs all further
analysis.?’
At this point one may object that there is no reason to view a
critical approach such as Poihast’s as implicitly specularive. Yet P-
thasr links the concept of consciousness, as a predicate developed in
rhe proccss of whar he understands as a dcsrrunion of rhe traditional
philosophicai theories of subjectivity, M one area of that tradition
which has h m e questionable in almost meiy regard, and which he
wants to defend against any further attempts at desmEtion.This issue
i5 nothing lcss than thc synthetic unity of apperception. Alrhough
Pothast does not want m understand this originary uniry, as did Kant,
72 TOWARD T H E LlMITS O F REFLECTTON

as the highest point in the sense of a deduction, and although h e

claims that it nced not always already be inhabited bya represenration
ofits own self nor be compdscd synthetically of discrete and singular
things, he holds that “probably, it alone explains how a being can
develop a srrmure asdiffcrcntiared and as ,farrcrnoved from its initial
nature as a happening. as the structure of our ‘knowing.’ ”m The idea
of a synthaic unity of apperception is not Simply, in Pothast’s ar-
gument, a piece of the rndition ro be saved; the entirety of Porhasr’s
reasoning takes place in i t s name. Yet, like inrellecnral intuition, the
idea of an originary unity of consciousness is a specularive germ, and
thus Pothast’s skeptical arguments against rcflection, like Henrich‘s,
ippcar to bc functions of a speculative understanding of philosophy.
This rcmains thc case e w n if spcculation is no longer undccstood as
rhe rcflection of reflection. lndecd, Henrich‘s and Pothast’sdiscussions
of thc aporias of reflection suggest a non-Wegelian mode of specu-
lation, in which thc demand for unity and dcduction is to be achieved
o n nonmflccrive grounds.
Thc second type of criticism of reflexivity proceeds from the as-
sumption that reflexivity i s not to be relinquishcd but must be saved
by reflection itself. Even though Hegcl’s reflection of refleaion is not
itself sufficient to overcome all the problems inherent in reflection, it
is nonetheless an explicitly speculative approach to the aporirs of
rcflection. To begin, let u s t u r n m another aporia, this time conccrning
rhc self-cngendermenr, by and through itself, of the absolute subject.
This aporia has been pointed our hy Walter Schulr in his srudy entitled
DQSProblem der Absolurm Reflexion. I t affccts thc very possibiliiy
of absotute reflection's achieving a grounding function, which is the
purpose for which it was developed in the first place. Paradoxically,
hecausc chis grounding funnion of absolute rcflmion (of self-con-
sciousness, of the self-positing Self, Reason, Spirit) is of prevailing
importance to thoughr, irs very possibility is ncvcr cxarnincd as such
within the tradition. According to Schulz, the aporia is that absolute
reflection, although it is supposed to function as the principle of a
transparent construction of what is, cannot be conceived in itself,
since, according to its nature, it must not be derived from anything
clsc. But if absolute reflcction cannot be fixed, cannot possibly bc
conceived, hecause it is in itself a cnntinuous df-transgression that
endlessly presupposes its own self-psiring, Then it cannot serve as a
grounding principle. Ungraspablc bccausc it cscapes all fixation, it
cannot serve a5 thc ground of all that is. Schulr writes: “Absolute
renemion is indeed superior to mundane beings, but this superiority
 POST-HEGELtAN CRITICISM OF REFLEXlVlTY 73

exists only if one accepts the Absolute to be what it is, that is, the
principle that repeatedly and mndnuausly pansgrmcs itsctf, and whose
essence thought cannot, in truth, hope to think in a satisfactory rnan-
ner.””
In addition, Schufzpoints out that such an Absolute. as rhc ground
ofall being, also undercuts the possibility of deducing being from it,
since such a deduction would equal a limitation of the Absolute, and
would indeed cancel out the privileged status of absolute reflection
as a principle:

Onc rvho p a i r 3 a’limitation, with respect to the world, in h e Absolute as

the true beginning i 5 not only incapable, as Kant has already demonstrated
in theanrihcsirof h e thirdantinomy, of rendering this acprowrrd Limirarion
intelligible but, above all, he contradim the purc thought of the principle
which-lxuuw ab~olutdyunconditionaknnot wen be subjected to the
form of stlf-limtation. I n d d , self-limirarion hidcs the fact of the present
world, and it is this fact which calls for self-limitation a5 the rcsrriaion of
the Absolute. But what this means is that the insights that the absolute
principle cannot be made into what is conditioned by that prinaple, and
that bcing cannot LCI derived tram it, belong rogcther.u

T h i s awarcncss of the apolwjc nature of the concept of absolute

reflection as a grounding principle leads Schulz to criticize teflection’s
claim t o absoluteness without, however, opting for the p d a r opposite
5f reflection, for the immcdjatt, or so-called reality. Schulz wants to
contain the idealist gesture that brings about the absolute self-positing
of rcflmion as the principle of at1 things, while a t the same time
keeping the antithetical anthmpologifal option in che& since the
latter is as metaphysical as that which it attCInptS to dislocate. khulz
writes, “Neither ahsolun reflection nor an unreflected being, but re-
flection as the xlrs confrontation with what is, makes the essence of
man.“”
Yet, in describing absolute refleaion in the absolute fashion mm-
tioned earlier, as a principle of all beings yet 50 absolute that it i s
entirely beyond comprehension, Schulz merely summarizes a position
of speculative thought that was heId by Schelling, whose Romantic
and abstract tendencies Hegcl had radically criticized in the preface
to Phenomenology. Heeel was concerned with Schelling’s attempt to
overcome the unhappy choice between absolute reflection and an-
thropological immediacy. Hegel’s own norion of absolute reflection,
which, as we have seen, avoids the aporias Schulz has pointed out by
understanding and developing the Notion or Concept as the concrerc
?A TOWARD THE LlMITS OF REFLECTION
~~~~~~ ~

mtality of all the iogically possible relations h e e n rhe abstract and

the particular, is precisely that kind of dialogue betwtcn the self and
what is, between the ego and being, that Schulz promota. The “crit-
ical reducrion” of Idcaiism that he proposes is nothing short of what
Hegel has in mind in Science of Logic, where he develops his concept
of absolute reflection. Like Schulz. Hegel was unwilling ro consider
the unity preceding the disxnsion in quation as a state of unity that
“really” and “actually” precedes the given state as its mctaphysically
original beginning. Hegel thought chat the romliry of the possible
relations b e e n polar oppositions are immanent in them. If rhere
is any differenoe benvecn Hegel’s critical account and speculative
appraisal of the aporias of reflection, and that of Schulz, it is that for
Schulz, the dialogue snms to be an opm debate, with no internal
boundarim.This istosay that although Schulz’scritiqueoftheaporia~
of absolute reflection is in essential agreement with the mediating
spccularivc solution of these contradictions, it is also critical of the
subjectivity constituting the modern metaphysical solution of that
essentially spcculative and philosophical problem. In other words,
while Schulz’s critical account of the aporias of reflection avoids the
pitfalls of a philosophy of immediacy, o r philosophical anthropology,
it is nonerhelcss very much a speculative account, in 3 Hegelian sense,
yet negatively so.
Any attempt to challenge absolute reflection through svmc notion
of Immediacy is bound to fail. For instance. the reproachful argument
that immediate perception dissipates when reflected upon. an argu-
ment that ascribes, in Hegel’s words, “cvcrything bad to reflection
generally, regarding it and all: its works as the polar opposite and
hereditary foe of the absolute method of philosophizing” disregards
the fact that such a reflection, which starts with something ahen to
it, i s what Wegel callcd external reflection, and thus one moment in
the dialectics of reflection, which develops into absolute reflection
where that dualism is superseded.” Ir bccomcs obvious that the in-
sistence a n the immediate, since it is not itself an immediate kind of
relaring. always already refures itself. Indeed, insisting an the im-
mediate is irself a reflecrive act. Thus, even this S D of~ naive criticism
of reflection is latently speculative, because it admits as its unrhought
premise what it hies to put into question: reflection itself. Let me:
emphasize. then, t h a t it appears impossible to bypass the Wegelian
speculative solution to rhc difficultks of absolatc rcflccrion. If one is
to address the principal deficiencies of the theories of subjectivity, of
consciousness and self-wnsciousnes-that is, of reflection-recourse
to Hegel’s speculative and dialectical solution is unavoidable,not only
 POST-HECELIAN CRITlClSM OF REFLEXIVITY 75

for all post-Hcgelian theories of reflction, as Konrad Cramer strongly

sugipts, but for &e pre-Hegelian attempts to cope with this problem
as wd1.l.’ As Crama no-, “The systematic place in which, and in
which alone, the possibility opens up of avoiding the fundamental
deficiencies of the theory of reflection as it concerns sclf-cansciousncss
as well as the .embarrassed and meaningless response by the thesis of
immediacy, i s a science of pure meaning that proceeds according to
the dialectical rncthod.”u
As we have seen,this is implicitly the case with che sort of criticism
that makes rcferencc to skeptical argumma conmrning h e aporetic
nature of reflection. It is all the more thc case for those attempts that
aim at saving reflection by trying tn assign it a proper function, such
as constimcing what SchuE caUs the dialogue benvcen the self and
the world. It is also necessarily the case with all a m p s to overcame
the dilficulties in thinking reflection by reflection as a method inelf,
Yet i t would be t m n m u s to bclievc that the inevitable pathway
through Hcgcl mcansrhat one has no choice but to accept the Hegelian
solution. It is to affirm, for the moment only, and foremost, that all
criticism of reftection, all attempts to come m grips with what has
traditionally bccn viewed as reflection’s aporctic s t n ~ c t u i e ,must take
its standards from the Hegelian project, and second, must, whatever
its answer to these problems may be, mcasnre up to the speculative
solution givm by Hegel. T h i s means that na critique of reflection, or,
for that mamr, of absolute nflection, can legitimately try simply to
destroy reflection, or to declare it, as did the logical positiiyists, null
and void. Turning to WcgeI prompts us to give sharpened attention
to problems unthought of in refleaion and in the speculative solution
as wcll. This WIT of problemaric is an inmaphilosophical demand and
calls for a radical deepening of the reflection of reflecdan. Yet, as we
shall 9ct in the next chapter, an entirely different approach to the
problem of reflacdon is possible. It i s an approach that takes the
Hcgelian solution most Mriously and i s highly conscious of rhc Phil-
osophical txigcnacs translated into the speculativeovercoming of the
deficiencies of reflection. T h i s particular approach sccb to account
forreflection a d absolute reflection from “presuppositions” of both
that traditional philosophical thought has not found it nemsary to
thematire.
Exorcising reflexivity from the discourse of philomphy through
positivistic or analytic arguments could only be a short-lived and
~ h 0 ~ 4 g h tway
t d of dealing with the problem of reflecrion. Russcll
and Whirchcad’s phobia of what Russ.lI termed the paradars of
rcflexivity--rhat is, of rhc sunanric and logim-marhemarim1contlicrs
76 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

that result from propositions that speak of themsdves, from predicates

that apply ro rhernselves, or from classes rhat contain rhemelves-
led to thc banning of thc very concept of reflexivity from much of
the philosophy to which they gave rise. But the “pseudoproblems”
they had hoped to eliminate by striafy prohibiting the use of linguistic
reflcxtvity soon crept back, disguised by a new terminology, into the
discoursc of analytic philosophy. Thus. Austin’s so-called rwolutIon
of analytic philosophy amounts to nothing more nor less than the
surreptitious rcintroducrion of the pmblcm of rcflection in order to
solve the problems left in the wake of logical positivism. His revolution
consisted of hinging the entire representational function of language,
with which Russell and Whitehead were exclusively concerned, on a
constituting self-rcflexivity of the linguistic act. To speak of the “per-
forrnarivc function” of speech a c ~ sis ro apply a new word to a very
old problcm.
Eeforc turning to a discussion of the type of criticism of reflexivity
that I c h a r a m r i d as dealing with ccrtain unthought “presupposi-
dons” of rehaion, Ict me menrion bricfly two attempts to cope with
thc problcm of reflection and absdute mflection. which, in spire of
bcing inspired by the analytic perspective in philosophy, do not al-
together sacrifice the philosophically fundamenral aspects of rhat
problem.
The first concerns Emst Tugmdhar’s critical appraisal of thc apo-
rias of reflection as poinred out by Henrich and Porhasr. Tugendhot
argues that t h c x sporias, and the impossibility of solving them, are
a result of the absurd starring point that informs traditional rheories
of reflection. Following Henrich’s and Pothast’s analyscs, Tugcndhat
argues rhar rhe following three models animate these theories: (1) the
ontological model of a substancc and its modifications, amodeIdeeply
rooted in the subjccr-predicate structure of (ordinary) language; (2)
rhc subjcct-object relation, which characrcrizcs consciousness as a
representational strucrure, with rhe result rhar self-refleaion is under-
stood as a relation in which the subjecc rums upon itself as upon an
object, and ( 3 ) the assumption that all immediate knowledgc is ronrcd
in perception, and that self-rdlcction must therefore be understood
as inner self-perceprion.”The interplay of thcse three models required
by the idea of self-consciousness, self-reflection, and absolure reflec-
tion as an identity of the knower and what is known, of the subject
and itself as objecr is, says,Tugendhar, a priori impossible. In addition,
M spcak of immediate identification as a cognitive achicvemcnt is
sheer nonsense. Indcrd, if the three models can, under no circum-
stances, produce self-cansciousness. and if. moreover, idcntity cannot
 POST-HEGELIAN CRlTlClSM OF REFLEXIVITY 77

be taken as knowledge, it is because for Tugendhat and the analytic

tradition he represents, knowledge and truth can only be proposi-
tional, and arc thus incommensurable with any form of self-identi-
fication. He concludes that “a structure of the form ‘I know myselF
is in itself impossible and ‘contradicts the very meaning of ‘know-
ing.’ ‘‘28 Yet it does not follow from all this that self-consciousness
itself would be an impossibility. On the contrary, Tugendhat accuse
Henrich of disposing of xlf-consciousness, despite the fact that Hen-
rich’s rfgms from self-consciousness to mnsriousness is a srep toward
the deduction of self-consciousness as a secondary phenomenon from
what he calls “selfless consciousness of self.” Instead of rclinquishing
self-consciousncss, Tugendhat intends to give an analytic account of
what he calls “epistemicself-consciousness,” in particular in irsimrne-
diate form. This form of self-consciousness, the only one that Tug-
endhat concedes, is e n t i d y linguistic. it is grounded in the immediate
knowledge one has of having certain states. It is a knowledge not of
oneself o r of one’s states in themselves bur only a knowledge rhar one
has those states. Tugendhat contends that this kind of ~ l f - ~ ~ t i -
sciousncrs can be thought without aparias, since itr concept can be
elaborated without the three models that inform traditional theories
of self-rcflccrion.
It is not my intention M discuss in dctail Tugendhat’s theory of
epistcmic or theoretical self-consciousness, or to ponder its speculative
echoes. What I want to stress here is that the theoretical ascetism that
springs from confining oncsetf to linguistic and propositional truth is
self-defeating. By eliminating altogether the ontologicat dimension of
self-identity in self-consciousness (and, for that matter, in abmlutc
reflection), one deprives oneself of the possibility of thinking the very
foundations of propositional knowledge and truth, as well as of the
very idea of epistemic self-conwiousness. The very possibility of prop-
ositional ,truth requires that kind of immediate identification Tu-
gendhat rejccts as contradictory to all cognitive achievement proper.
Without the presupposition of ontological or formal-ontoiogical iden-
tity of being and thought, of subject and object, of the knower and
what is known, there is no ground for any propositional attribution
whatsoever. To rejea the concept of sell-reftenion or absolute re-
flection on the basis that it leads to contradictions is precisely to reject
that kind of necessary gmund. Since one cannot abandon such a
ground without hesitation, one must embark on a &tical inquiry into
the nature of that ground, an inquiry capable of accounting for the
aporeric structure of the ultimate principle, without necessarily yirtd-
ing to the Hcgclian solution of these aporias.
78 TOWARD W E PtMlTS OF REFLETTION

This is what Herbert SchnSdelbach seems to have achieved in his

superb study Reflexion m d Diskurs, Fragen einer Logik der Philo-
Sophie. While contending that the problems affecting traditional the-
oris of reflection are rooted in their “mentalistic” terminology, and
thus subiect to the danger of psychologism and solipsism, SchnHdel-
bach embarks on a new explication of the concept of reflection by
manslaring the phenomenon of reflection into linguistic terminology
while at the same time conserving the full scope and depth of the
traditional problem of reflection. Schnidelbach’s attempt 10 refor-
mulare ihe tradirional problem of reflection linguistically does not
consist ofconfounding it with metacornmunication. If reflection were
to be translated into metacommunication, one would miss the spec-
ificiry of reflection while at the same timc projecting o n it a number
of unsolvable problems that beset the theory of meralanguages. SchnI-
delbach writes: “Merely rnetalinguistic spcech is. .. per dehitionem
nonreflexive. The attempt to grasp its constituting rules in z meta-
theoretical fashion leads to the well-known endless hierarchy of
metalanguages, in which reflexivity has no place.”29 In order ro rrans-
latc the traditional problem of reflection into linguistics, Schniidclbach
chooses a modified version of Habermas’s pragmatic theary of dis-
course, in which the reflective structure of discursive modes of the-
matizing does not entail an endless progression of superimposedlevels
of speech. What Habcrmas, and evcn mom so Schnadclbach, under-
stand by discourse is precisely a language game which is simultane-
OUS[y a process of communicarion and metacommunication, On the
historical premise that reflection has been the major methodological
concept of philowphy since Descartes-thc very means by which
philusophy must seek to ground irself a5 philosophy-rhis character-
izarion of philosophical reflecrion 3s discourse leads Schnadclbach to
call for the development ofa philosophy of philosophy which “secks
to clzrify the conditions of the logon didomi in philosophy and to
xcure them from a normative point of view.”’0 With this theory of
discourse, Schnadelbach reestablishes rcflcction as the medium at self-
foundation of philosophy. He succeeds while warding off r h t pitfalls
of mentalism that affecr rhe traditional concept of reflection. in fully
reinstating this notion to its spcculativc hcights and to its role as a
principle free o l the aporias its critia have pointed out. Schnidel-
bach‘s reformulation of the pmhlcm of reflection is a most persuasive
demonstration that within traditional philosophy, and within its rules
and standards for an ultimate overcoming of contradictions. such a
solution can bc satisfactorily reached.
 6

Beyond Reflection:
the Interlacings of Heternlogy

w
Up to this point I have dim& a mode of dealing with thc aporias
of reflection that still seems to prevail, in which a mrn to Hegel's
speculative thought is 5etn as the only way to come to grips with the
shortcomingsof subjectivity. Let us now cum to a d i f k n t approach
to the problems of sclfionsEiousncss and, mbtk m t u n d i s , absolute
reflection, It is an approach that recognizes rhe previous one as philo-
sophically well founded, and recognize as well the logical superiority
of speculative thought over all attempts to criticize it in a rcflexive
mode from a position crroncously considered to be outside it. But
ths approach also grants the possibility rhat rhc aporias of reflection,
at Icast as far as the horizon of ocpectation ofphilosophy IS mnocmed,
are susceptible of k i n g su-fully overcome in absolute rcflcction,
or in a modified speculative thtoo of discourse. Whether or not these
would be definite solutions i s not really the question. Such an ap
proach conacda that, within the limits of the standards of philc-
sophical problem solving, a mmmon ground capable of superseding
apormcal propositions can be found. T h i s docs not, of course, imply
rhat succcss is taken for grand or left unquesrioncd. On rhc contrary,
I shall question the very succcsshulnas of succcsrfu~philosophical
mlucionn to the aparias af &&on. If Arjstotle, discussing form as
primary being, could state that m ask why something is itself (ti uuto
estin auto) is to inquire into nothing or not to inquire in the first
place, then one can just as easily contend that to qustion the success
of rhc spccuIntive so1utiws to rctkxivity is not to question at all.'
From a mdirianal philosophical pcrspeccive, an approach of this sort
makes no sense. Indacd, as we shall see, the approach 1 shaIl be
concerned with cscags the norms and c x ~ r i o n classically
s a m
80 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

ciatcd with thc discourse of philosophy. It i s an approach that is

attcntarive to a set of what one could call “presuppositions,”’ ”pre-
positions,” or k t t e r yci “structures,” which inform, without philos-
ophy’s knowledge, its meatrnenr ol the problem of the aporetic namre
of reflection and in possibly successful sublation by absolutc rcflcc-
tinn.
First we must wake yet another Qpe of criticism directed against
thc philosophy of reflection, as well as against Hegel’s speculative
solution, a criticism from which the approach to be presented derivcs
same of in major impulses. When, in the aftermarh of Kanr’s tran-
scendental solution to the problcms of rationalism and empiricism,
the tradition begun by the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity ex-
pcrienced a cenain dampcning, in an effort to avoid the aporias that
such a philosophy carries with it, Hegel’s radically immanent philos-
ophy emerged as the major chnllenge to the philosophy of reflcction.
Yet, although Hegel anempted to overcome the reflexive aporias of
the Cartesian and Kantian paradigm of thought through a return to
the Creek concepa of being and substance, this return took the form
of a total subjectivieation of these concepa. For this reawn, Hegel’s
philosophy must he viewed above all as the complcrion of Cartesian
thought. Therefore, although Hegel’s immanent and, in his sense,
nnnrcflexive philosophy can be seen as originating rhe type of criticism
on which I shall clabontc. it also dicitcd this criticism as a reaction
to itaclf.
I do not rncan this to be a straightforward historical presentation
of thc antcccdents of the approach now to bc discussed, namely, that
ofJacquesDerdda. Those landmarks can be found in thc philosophies
of Nicnschc, Dilthcy, the latcr Husscrl, and the carly Heidegger-in
short, in a type of philosophy that cannot comfortably be placed
within the usual philosophical classifications. These a r t philosophics
that unwind out of the philosophy of subjectivity. T h e critique of
reflexivity and speculation enacted by these philosophies (which at
their best house a philosophically irreducible and radical “empiri-
cism” unlikc the philosophical doctrinc of crnpiricism grounded in
experience, and which can be easily aceammodated by traditional
philosophy as its nonphilosophical Other) is mingled with much more
traditional rhcmes. And yet new and unwonted mmifs also make
thernsclves heard in thesc philosophies. Take, for instance, Nichsche’s
critique of rcflcction and self-consciousness, which places a necessary
gap between knowledge, on the one hand, and, o n the orher, self-
cognition. Hc writcs at the bcginning of On rhe Genealogy ofMora/s:
 THE lNTERLACINGS OF HETEROLOGY 81
- . .

“We arc unknown to outstlvs, we men of knowldgc-and wirh

good reason. We have never sought ourselves-how could it happm
t h a t we should ever fi~dourselvcs? , , . So wearc nmssarilystrangcrs
to ourselves. we do not comprehend ourselves, m hove $0 rnirun-
d m t a n d ourselves, for us the law ‘Each i s ,furthest from himsclf‘
applies to all eternity-we are not ‘men of Knowledge’ wirh respect
to oucseIvcs,”~T h e same morif can be said ro underlie his “autu-
biography,” in which Ni&c declares thar to become what one is,
one must avoid knowing oneself: “Where msce te Ipsm would be
the recipe for ruin, forgemng oncself, misundmtatrditrg oneself, mak-
ing oneself smaller, narrower, mediocre, become reason itself.”’
Self-reflection is seen in both cases as a flower of decadena and
mundanity, as a phenomenon deriving from a primary state free of
self-awareness, with r w p m ro which self-consciousness is a falling
away; but it is also seen as the necessary gap between oneself and
one’s knowledge, which breaks radically with the philosophically con-
-red mode of accounring lor the knowledge that one claims ro
posscss by grounding it in the self-canscious and publicly accountable
subject. Here, self-reflection loses all foundational capacity with re-
spcct to knowledge. It i s not my purposc to evaluate the extent to
which such a turn in interpretation remains indebted to the tradition
under attack. 1 mean rarher to emphasize thar the noncognirive and
nonreflexive state, of which self-knowledge is an alienated product,
cannot simply be conceprualizcd in terms of the irrarional, cmotional,
and inruirivc. What Nierzsche and Dilthey thematize as life is some-
thing h a t escapes, sr lcasr up to a certain poinr, rhe classical oppo-
sition of the rational and the irrational. Is if nor after all because he
called the vital link brween understanding and lived experience ir-
rational chat Dilrhey’sconcept of life has been greatly misundersrood?
In many ways mercIy a substitute for what Hegel called objective
spirit, life, in Dilthey, is essentially thc nonrefiexivc source of reflection
and self-reflection. As thc source of alI reflexivity, it forever escapes
reflection. Tlis also explains why life, for Dilrhey, Iacks rhe asp~crof
toality, which is so decisive for all self-rcflcaivtmriries! “The realm
of Life, mated a$ a temporal and causal construction objectified in
time, is history. It is a whole which can never be mrnpletcd.”‘
Whether DiLhey can really conceptualize the essential incompIeteners
of the wholc of life i s not the point here. What concerns us is only
Dilrhey‘s, as well as Niensche’s, s u g g d o n thar life and lived expe-
rience-in other words, something of an order other rhan that of
self-consciousness (individual or cultural)-serve as rhc groundof sclf-
82 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

consciousness. Self-consciousness can ncver hope to encompass that

ground, because it is not simply a more true, more fundamental, mom
essential sclf-consciousness, such as intellectuai intuition, but also
because it is incommensurable with all reflexive appropriation. What
Dilthey calls life is undoubtedly anorher name lor spirir. counrerpostd
to the isalating and abstract operations of reflective life; but at the
same time, it is also heterogeneous to that which depcnds an it for
its possibility, without, however, serving merely as what I have hirh-
erto caltcd a ground. T h e thought of such a consfifutivc heterogeneity
af self-reflection and self-consciousness inaugurates the type of crir-
icism to which I refer here.
By drawing on such issues as Brcntano’s claim that predication is
not the essence of judgmenr; Husserl’s critique of the abstract nature
of the Cartesian cogilo, his opening of the stream of experience to
inactualities, and his general return from logic to the prepredicative;
Schelcr’s phcnomenological analyscs; and Jaspers’s invesrigarions into
the psychology of world views, Heidegger in Being and Time pow-
erfully continues this type of criticism of the philosophy of reflection.
Let us consider briefly his analyses of the modes of understanding
proper to Dasein, modes that structurally precede all thematic. prop-
ositional, and reflexive cognition. Hcidegger’s concern in Being md
Time i5 to demonstrate that man is never simply a subircr relating ro
objects, that the essencc of man does not lie primarily in the subject-
object relation. Analyzing the existential 5tmcturcs of Dmeiv, Hei-
degger comes to assume, on the contrary, that man‘s reiation to the
world is constituted, first and foremost, by a disclosure not of ohiccts
but of whar is ready-ro-hand within-rhe-world (innerzucMch Zuban-
denesJ, not to a reflecting subject hut to a bcing ,characterized as
being-in-the-world. This disclosure, which takes place through states-
of-mind (Stimmrmgen), is a n unconcealing in a primordial sense. It
is presupposed by all immamnt reflection, which, as a “kind of ap-
prehending which first turns round and then b a c k ’ can only come
upon “experiences” “becauw the ‘there” has already been disclosed
in a state-of-mind.”” The states-of-mind that characterize man pri-
mordially, by first disclosing the world as a whole, effcct the required
opening within which subjectdbject rdations. and hence reflexive
operations, can take place. Heidcgger characterizes the b o w i n g pe-
culiar to states-of-mind as follows: “This ‘knowing’does nal first
arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of
the ‘here,’ which is essentially understanding” (p. 184). Hence, ir is
a knowing by the Dasein that is not grounded in a subject’s relating
 THE lNTERPACINGS O F HETEROLOGY 81

to itself i n the mode of a subjcct-objm relation. It is not a knowing

chat would arise primarily from a lone subject’s d - d d o n . To a t e
again: “In existing, entities sight ‘thcmdvs’ [sichcet ‘sidl’] only in-
sofar as they have become transparent to thcmxlves with equal pri-
mordidty in those items which arc constitutive for their existence:
their king-alongside the world and their king-with-Others" (p, 187).
Self-reflection, one’s relating to oneself in rhc mode in which a
subjcct rclatcs to an abject, presupposes thc prereflcxive transparency
Of man’s viewing “himelf‘ in contemporancity with thc world. The
Darrin’s =it, in identity. cannot be u n d c r s d as that of a seIf-
knowing, self-conscious being. In The Basic Problem of Phmotnc-
nology, his ktures a t Marburg folIowing the publication of Being
mrd T i m , Heidegger made this quire dcar: “W-unhnding should
not be equated formally with a reflected ego-ntperiencc”6 Indeed,
“ t h mocintcd unveiling ofrhc self‘ accompanyingthe Darein’s re-
lation is not a givcn “as might be thought in adherence to Kant-in
such a wag that an ‘1 think’ accompanies all rcprcscnrations and goes
dong with the acts directed at extant beings, which &us would be a
rcfltctivc act direacd at rhe first act” {p. 158). dn what sense, then,
is the %If given to itself? Heidgscr anrwcrs: “The self i s there for
the h e i n itself without rcflcction and without inner perception,
wore all refidon. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only
a mode of self-upprehmriott, but nor h e mode of primary sclf-dis-
dosure” (p. 1S9). The Dusein docs nor find itself within itself; on the
contrary, it finds iwtf in the things by which it is surrounded in the
world of what is ready-tehand. T h i s a h explains why Ddseirr’s self-
understanding tahs on many diffctmt f o r m 5 in conformiry with tht
things by way of which it encounters itself, and by way of which it
i s disclosed to itself in in own self. These multiple means of self-
understandingcannotbc equated with what,sincc Dscrrtes, hasbecn
conceived of as “the ontological constitution of the person, the ego,
zhc subject” (p. 174, in short, as self-consciousness. Self-conscious-
n c a and its constituting self-refldon relate to t h s c more primary
fom of prereflcxivc selfdisclosure as to their lost foundation. To
condude his development of this subject, Heidqger writes: ”Wecan-
not d d n c the Dascin’s ontological constitution with rhc aid of self-
ccmsciausnas, but, on the contrary, we have to clarify the diverse
possibilitits of self-understandingby way of an adquately darified
structure of existence” (p. 174).
Heideggm entirely excludes the possibility of making an appro-
priate theoretical responx to the question of existential self-under-
84 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

standing by rcflecting a n it in terms of a reflexive relation to setf.

Only by rcgrcssingtoward theprerdlevivestructutureoolunderstanding
characteristic of the Dasein as being-in-theworld can one account
for primordial self-sighting, Self-consciousness as a self-reflarive state
can then also be derived through abstraction from the initial disclosure
of the world and the self in state-of-mind.
Even in a brief outline of this other type of criticism of reflexivity.
it becomes obvious t h a t rhc philosophies of Nictzsche, Dilrhey, and
Heidcggcr before the Kehre are attsmpts to account for the problem
of subjectivity. In this sense, they carry o n the philwophy of subjcc-
tivity rypical of modern phiIasophy sincc Descartes. Yet the manner
in which thmc philosophies account for subjectiviry is no longer sub-
jective. They are phIlmophIcs. in a rnannmsubstantia1ly different from
that of Heget, of the “object,” rhc world, life, the lifc-world, and,
finally, Bcing. If Hcgel’a turn toward the philosophy of being resulted
in an ahsolurcsubjccrivizationof being, hcre, on rhc contrary, wc find
that the oricntarion toward the object, the wortd, or Being serves to
desecratc rhe concepr of thc suhjccr. Mom prccIscIy, rhcsc arc phi-
losophies of finitude, understood as the radical conaction of the
universal and abstract metaphysical concept of subjectivity. None-
rheless, evcn hire conccprs of the subject such as Descin, of self-
reflexivity such as Dasein’s self-disclosure, of the transcendental such
as the existential structures of Dasciti, of freedom such as the concept
of Sein-konnen. and so on, do not radically break with thc paradigm
of subjectivity. It is true that the traditional problems of reflexivity
and self-reflcxivity-that is, their constitutional role with regard ro
the subject and objm-arc overcome by grounding rhese modes of
knowing in primary and prcreflcrivc mode5 of discl~surc,a solution
independent of the question of whethcr the aporias of reflection have
been solved. It is for this reamn that Hcidegger’s circumscription of
self-consciousness and self-reflection has justly been considered a re-
linquishing of the Cartcsian opcningot thc problem of reflection and
of the quesrions to which it is linked. But i s Hcidegger’s concretion
of rhc subiect in terms of Dusein really as radical a break with rhe
Cartaian paradigm as i s believcd? That Heidegger borrows all the
conceptual tools with which he criticizes reflection. or rather puts it
in its proper place, from wirhin the tradition iaelf is not insignificant,
especially in light of the fact that Descartes himself conceived of the
cogito not merely as the pure act of a reflexive recoiling upon one’s
thought. but also as acollection of complexes of various and changing
spontaneiries of mnsciousness. It is thus not astonishing that Hei-
 T H E INTERLACING5 O F HETEROLOGY 8t
~ ~~~~ ~

dcggcr's exploration of the srmcrurcs of consciousness in daily life

could produce only a mom original and primordial ,mncept of,re-
fleaion, namely, h e DaKin's prereflexive self-understanding. Last but
not least, it is Heideggrr's insight into the unsatisfamry nature of
this handling of the problem of subjecdvity ,and wlf-consciousness
that triggers the Kehe-that is, Heidegger's turning away from the
analytia of Dusein toward the question of Being. With this he begins
an cntircly new way of questioning the phenomenon of rdccrian.
Heideggerk theory of self-cansciousncss is not concerned with the
aporias of reflection. Self-consciousnessis a mode of self-apprehension
in terms of a reflexive subjbct-objcct relation. If it is problematic for
Hcidegger, it i s not because such a relation could not be rhougbr
without our h m i n g enmeshed in unsolvable problems. The manner
in which the tradition has conceptualized sclf-consciousncs is px-
suasive, and Hddcgger docs not question what was, for philosophers
from Dcxartes to Husserl, B goad enough solution in terms of what
the philosophical discourse expects of itself. What he objects to are
nor iogicrl deficiencies in a narrow sax, but rathcr that thesc phi-
Iosophics erect only one mode of self-apprehension, and one that is
moreover historically l i m i d , a s the vcry cssmce of man. In Being
and Time this particular mode of relating to onesetf is grounded in
the original mode of D d s sdfdidixlosure. But by ddihaly turning
to rhe quesrion of Bein& Hcideggcr grounds the Dasem's df-undcr-
standing marc fundamentally, by making it a function of the history
of Being, and the vcry nature of the thing now themarizcd under the
tide of k i n g even more radically displace the traditional problems
cancerning the aporias or antinomies of reflexivity. Heidegger's later
philosophy reaches our under the name of Being toward stmctures
of thought rhat are not easily rtcupcrable in terms of m a n t i = and
that arc, indeed, more originary than the classical obiecrs of thought.
Instead of synthesizing the manifold, the contradictory, the aporetic
into one speculative whole or totality, t h s e structures (such as Zug,
Fuge, C&&, Unier-Schied, and so on) serve as pa&-breaking,
btcaching traces, according M which the manifold, the contradictory.
is laid out (and held topether). They offer the primal matrix For the
i m d u a b k difference between mbjm and o b j m constituting the d r
rivativc mode of that sort of self-apprchcnsion that is self-reflection.
These smmm are the inmmrncnsurable, hcrcrogcntous "beyond"
of the aporetic or anrinomic, without m m p n d i n g to the truly syn-
thetic and speculative. From the perspective of Being, therefore, self-
reflection. and absolute reflection as well, do nor fail simply because
86 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

they cannot be praperly thought. The structures of Being offer thcm-

selves to the confining abstraction that leads to the historical event
of the surge of self-consciousness. These structures account for the
possibility 06 self-reflecrion, Itsaporias, and their speculativesolution,
but thcy also show it to be a reductive figure of the modes in which
relation to self takes place. From the perspcctiveof Being,the synthetic
unity of apperception is itself foregrounded in the ~truu~llltes of king.
instead of representing a reflexive or speculative solurion to rhe prob-
lems of self-rcflecrion. As the opening for any originary self-percep-
tion, these structures remain strangely external to it.
By freeing the structural articulations of Being, Hcideggcr paved
the way tor Derridn’s even more effective accounting, beyond tradi-
tional aporccics and speculation, for the problem of reflexivity. Con-
cerned with demonstrating both the possibility and essential Iimits-
that is, ultimate impossibility. of self-reflection-Derrida's approach
aims neither to dismantle nor to annul reflection in a skeptical, em-
piricist, or positivist manner; nor does it aim to solve reflection’s
notorious problems in a speculative fashion. Like Heidegger, Dcrrida
is nor concerned with dialectically solving intraphiIosophica1 problems
according to the canonized forms of philosophical procedures.
Since Piam, and specially since Ariscotle’s Metaphysics, the philo-
saphical method has consisted in starting off from difficulties and
conflicting arguments that seem to offer no way out-in other words
from uporios-and exploring various routes, assuming the features
of a dialectical procen, until a way out lercporia) is found. The passage
through thc hopelessnas of aporetic situations or propositions in
search of philosophy’s own way constitutes the philosophical method.
To relinquish all efforts to master these situations or propasitions-
serdng aside the problem of the aporctic-is also to relinquish method.
But to put method aside does not necessarily imply that one rambles
arbitrarily. Although Derrida is not interested in (dialectically) finding
the way o u t of hopeless situations, withour of course declaring these
situations unsolvable, like Heidegget, he focuses on an entirely new
set of issues on rhe margin of thc philosophIca1 path that leads from
aporias to their harmonious uniry. The manner in which he tackles
the problem of reflexivity thus takes the form of an investigation into
the “pre-suppositions,” “pre-positions.” or “structures” to which the
exposition of this problem. as well as irs evenmd speculativesolution,
must nccesarily yield. It is not easy to define the nature and the status
of what 1 have called, for better or worse, “presuppositions.” The
term pre-supposition is nor to he understood to mean mere assump-
 THE INTERLACJNGS O F HETEROLOGY 87

dons rhar chc philosophical discourse would have allowed m pass

without demonstratingtheir truth. Nor is pre-supposition to be taken
to mcan Iogical pmupposition,a n-ary truth that is either implicit
or explicit in thc philosophical discourse. As far as its ontological
status is concerned, it cannot have the status ot an effective acrualiry,
either real or ideal, b o n d rhe omniparence of reflection, since both
t y p s of actuality, and actuality itself, are themselves reflexive con-
cepts.
Since, as 1 have s u p & , all new accounts of reflexivity must
measure up to Hegel’s speculative and absolute reflection, and s i n a
this is evcn more thc a s e for the approach that I am outlining (and
which is concerned with the entirety of the argumentivc structures
that lead from the aporias to the dialemid fluidization). let us take
as a starting point the methodolopica1 directions that D i m r Henrich
h B shown to characterize the position of idealist philosophy. Henrich
writes:
(1) The first a s k af philosophy, from whore solution one obtains the
solution of all its other tasks, is the m m comprrhrnsion of the difference
that still breaches the idea of self-relation.
(2) One cannot expect to be able to think a self-refation that would bc
the m u l t of a simple diffcrcncc, or wen of an exclusion of all diffcrmce.
There is nothing such as an immediate and yet closed self-relation. Real cclf-
tclation incltldes, on the conrrary, the development of rhc difference that it
conrriminroa form whichissocomplex thatitEannglongCTbedirringuirhed
from thc totality of what is.’

The position of idcalist philosophy is to capitalize OR the diffcrcncc

within self-relation a t the bcn& of a whole for which difference,
rather than irremediably dividing it, becomes,in its speculative layout,
that very whole itself. As Heidtsger has pointed out, the insurmount-
able reverse of speculation is a rhcology of the Absolute.’ What dis-
tinguishcs Heidegger’s and Derrida‘s positions from that of idealist
philosophy is primarily their inquiry into what may be called the
difference beoveen identity and difference, beween the totality of
what is and the difference that inhabits self-relation. What sounds ar
first like a parody of speculative thought is nor, however, its negativc
counterpart. It is not an inquiry in dre service of a greater ,diffcrencc.
What distinguishes the positions is that Heidegger’s investigation is
into difference itself, into the true essence of differencc, not into dif-
ference that would simply be the same as the whole of Being (let 0 5
not forget that the later Heidegger relinquishes the namc of Being)
88 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

and that would unite what is set forth within it, whereas Dcrrida’s
inquiries are concerned with a differcnce that is no longer phenom-
enulogizable. that has n o “itselF’ to itself bur that. in its irreducible
plurality, ceaselessly differs from itself. In k r r i d a , thisdifference links
idenrity b a d on self-relation to differcnce. each time in a different
manner, and in such a manner that what is held rognher does nor
form a whole. Within thc ncrwork of relations of this difference,
wholes can bc sct out, but because thcy are inscribed within that
difference, they remain forever incomplete. In othrr wards, the dif-
ference Dtrrida is concerned with i s a condition of possibility con-
stituting unity and totality and, at the same ttmc,thcirtssential limits.
Both Hcidrgger’s and Dcrrida’s a p p r o a c h could therefore be viewed
as inquiries, in a new sense, into rhc principles of the ulrirnare [om-
darion of 311 possible knowledge. Yet, of the pre-suppositions or strut-
turcs that both philomphcrs build upon-structures conccrning the
passage from differcnce to identity, from the aporiasol: self-reflection
to absolute reflection, and so forth-Dcrrida’s appcar more rernotc
from the logos of philosophy, which, as a discourse that is an argu-
mcntativc cntcrprisc within rhc horizon of rorality, must noncthcless,
although unwittingly, combine with these pre-suppositions or struc-
rurcs.
As thc conrcmporary neo-Kantian German philosopher Werner
Fhch has pointcd OUT, alt inquiry inro the truly ultimale pcinciplcs of
thc foundation of knowlcdge is of ncmsity a “pure heterology.”
nerrida’s philosophy can be viewed as a hctcrology as well. especially
s i n e the structures t r e a d in his wirings are, as we haw said, strangely
extraneous to the discourse of knowledge. But what are we to un-
derstand here ‘by hetemlogy? Is Dcrrida’s philosophy a hetcrology
bccausc it would ravcal thc fundamental grounds of knowing, or
rathcr becausc the s t m c t ~ r it c ~develops are in a relation of a certain
alrcriry to the discourse of philosophy? To give a satisfactory answer
to there qustions it is ncccssary first ro establish firmly what hcter-
alogy means in tcrms of traditional philosophy irself. Toward that
end, Ict us consider thc unjustly ignorcd work of Wcrncr Flach entitlcd
Negution urrd Andersheit: Ein Beitrog zur Problem& der Lcirtim-
plikntion.’ Flach’s devclopment of hercralogy is onc of rhc most rad-
ical attempts possible within the rradirional boundarics of philosophy’s
rhinking of Otherness. This dcrour through Flach’s study, which will
reveal a vaticty of striking resemblances to certain topoi of Derrida’s
thought. will have the additional advantagc of providing the n ~ c s s a r y
fail against which the radicalityaf Derrida’s hercrology can be clearly
5et off.
 THE INTERLACINGS OF HETEROLQGY 89

I t i s important to note from the outset that Flach‘s pure heterology,

as an invesrigation into the final implications of logic, conceives of
itself as a critique af HcgEl’s notion of absolute refleetion. Durn hct-
erology, as Flach understands it, is aimed a t demonstrating that He-
gel’s interpretation of synthesis as reflection, or as refiedon of rcflecrion,
falls short of establishing the ultimate ground for derermining thought
(besrimmmdes Dmken). Flach’s enrerprise elaborates a n the struc-
tural moments of the absolute relation (ubsofutes Verbihir).which,
as the principle of thought, cannot be grasped by methodical retlecrion
sinct;as a principle, ir is supposed to account precisely for the nature
of reflection. Flach’s enterprise is geared toward a more radical un-
derstanding of reflection, toward grounding it in an absolute principle
whose self-rrlationaliry is no longer of the realm of reflexivity. Flach
i s compelled to follow such a direction because he tccognizes that
Hegel’s detcrmination of the ground of reflection-f the originary
synthetic unity--is not amrmpanied by a determination of that ground
as ground. Instead of determining that ground as radically herero-
geneous 10 what, as ground, it is supposed to make possible, Hegel’s
concept of thc reflection of rcflection undcrsrands ground in the senst
of homogeneity, that is, in the sense of what the ground is to account
for.
Yet if a ground is M ‘be an absolure ground, ir must be.hmrogc-
nmus. “Pure heterogeneity,” Flach notes, “contains nothing less than
the thought of the principle, of what can, and can alonc be understood
by ’prinaple’ Through his pure heterology, Flach purporrs ro achieve
the goal of establishing rhe &mate and radical ground of determining
thought, H e writes: “The caesura lies in thought itself: with the think-
ing of the meaning of meaning (total reflection), a heterogeneous
sphere of conditions must be a t issue that preceds thinking as the
thinking of meaning {dcrerminak reflection) and rhc thinking as the
thinking of being (external reflection), aswell a5 the thinking as being
(positing refledon). I t is the sphere of ‘pure heterogeneity’ which
constitutes itself in itself as the logical beginning” (p. 64).Like both
Heidegger’s and Demda’s critiques of reflexivity, Flach‘s hereroge-
neous and principal condiiioning relation of thought, which grounds
refkction more radically, dbes not issue from a debate over the apor-
etic nature of refleaion but is based on a rigorous understanding of
what a ground is supposed to achieve. Since Flach’s enterprise docs
not start as either a skeptical, irrationalist, or rationalist critique of
reflection (it takes speculation in a Hegdian sense very seriously in-
deed) but as a n accusation against Hegel for having failed ro give a
radical salurion KIrhe problem of oridnary synthesis, ir is a sort of
90 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTION

debate with reflection that does not try to get rid of the larrer. In
claiming that the different forms of reflection cannot bc logically
accounted for by a reflection of refltcrion, but only by a pure herer-
ology, Flach aims only ar a more originary understanding of the
srructural characrerisrics of the absolute retation rhar makes reflection
possiblc in the first place.
Let us sec how Flach determines the pure heterogeneity of the
absolurc reladon, and haw he conccivcs of its inrercourse with de-
termining thought and reflection. By pinpointing the various motifs
shared by Flach's and Dcrrida's philosophies, we shaIl see beyond
doubt that Derrida's philosophy must also be understood as a het-
erology. But this comparison will also demonsrrate the essential dif-
ferences benveen the rwo rypes of heterolcigi-. From the pure hemology
of Flach. wc shaH have to distinguish Derrida's philosophy as an
unconditionally pure and impure heteralogy.
In demonstrating what he terms the "reflexive conatitutivitfa of
the htterological principle, Flach, in order to determine the absolute
synthetic unity al this originary correlation, questions the originarity
of negativiry and contradiction constiruting the relation benvern m e
ments within reflection. Flach recalls thar negation is a structural
concept of reflection. an index of determining thought charaacrisric
of the sphere 'of judgment. The same is true of contradiction, which,
because it is connected to predication, belongs to the sphere of iudg-
ment a5 well. Hence, dialectics must also be situated in the sphere of
determining thought, in the sphere of knowing. It follows from this
that it a hererology is to establish the identity of the absolute ground
as the purc logical beginning, it cannot achieve this goal by detcr-
mining the absolute ground in terms of negation, contradiction, or
dialectic, for these concepts are inadequare lor formulating the purc
structure of hecerogeneiry. Since the Hegelian cancept of negation
links morncnta in a relation of sclf and Other. thc inevitably contra-
dictory nature of such a relation necessarily anticipates its dialectical
sublation in a third term, by which synthais the homogeneity of thc
sphere of reflection is esrahlished. Thus, the terms required to con-
ceptualize rhc ultimare srructure of thoughr musr be very different
from rhose of negation, ,contradiction, and dialectics, yet must be
capable of accounting for those principles, which govern the homo-
geneous domain of rcflmion and judgment.
If the absolute synthesis i s to account for the play of the moments
in which reflcction and dialectics are grounded, and which they mc-
diateinta a n undivided whole.it must bcdividcd in itself. The absoIurc
 THE It+TERLACIHCS OF HETEROLOGY QI
~

synthesis, according to Flach, can fulfill this task only if it is divided

to such a degm that all mediation is radially excludd from the
realm of pure logic. Hence, the momena that enter the originary
synthesis must be irrevocably disjunctive-their nature must he one
of “full disjointedness” (p. 43)-if they arc to furnish a justifying
explanarion for the duplication constituting unifying reflection. A-
though this originary division of the pure Iogical beginning is ins-
arable from the dividedncos at the base of rdection that it makes
passiMc, it is also very dihrenc and thus cannot be thought in terms
of reflection: “One thing is the inseparability of this ‘duplication’
from rctluivity, another the deccrmination of this ‘duplication’ by
refltxivity. The inseparability of ‘pure heterogeneity’ from rcflexiviry
is a ncccssary determination of its structure, and rhis precisely insofar
as ‘pure heterogeneity’ m a k e reflexivity possible in an originary man-
ner” (p. 44).
In order to subtract this originary division and duplication horn
the principles that reign in the homogeneous realm of rdlecdan, yet
without hampering ia originary consrimtivity with respect to rcflec-
tion, Flach, with recourse to Ricken’s development of the notion of
hetecothesis, as well as to a controversy that rook place in the menties
beovecn Rickcrt and Kroner, determines the structure of rhar division
to bt hmmlogical. What this means is simply that the coupled mo-
ments of the absolute relation stand in a relation of mutual exclusion,
in which the opposite rnornenq without negating one another, com-
plete each other to form a totaiicy. FolIowing Rickert’s determination
of the heternthetical prinaple, Aach SKS the absolute relation as
comprising the one and the Otber, in which the Other is not the
negation of the one but an exclusive Other of the same. In this min-
imum of the pure logical relation, both the one and the Other are
equiprimordial. Neither has any ascendancy over the other; it is a
relation of rhc onc to thc Other, and vice v m a , in which negativity
plays as yet no pan. Since there is no negativity in the one’s relation
co its mrnplcrnrntary Other, they do not stand in a telation of con-
tradiction. As a result, h e originrry synrhais of the absolute relation
appears to be irrecrtcvably divided.
Having banned conaadinion from hctmlogy, Rach also ernpries
it nf rhc unifymg and homogenizing W i b i l i t y of reflection and di-
alectics. Yet ir is prcdsely because ir does not mntain contradiction
&at the sbsalute relation can become a gmuine principle of thought
and reflexivity. Flach remarks: “Othmtss is not a ‘plus’ but a ‘less’
than negation; indeed, it belongs to the minimum of what can the-
91 T O W A R D THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

oretically be thought. This is what makes its originarity, and grounds

its charactcr as a moment" (pp. 36-37). As Rickert had insisted,
Otherness logically precedes the possibility of negation. No negation
would be possible wirhour a prior Othcrnew; and since nor all Orh-
emess lends itsclf to negation, negation is doubly derivative. Instead
of being a fundamental principle of thought, it is, in spite of its
importance, a particular principle of thoughr. Notwithstanding the
formidable role played hy negation as a methodical tool of reflection,
this role dws not suffice to endow negativity with any priority re-
gardEng Otherness. Ncgation and cnntradiction belong to the sphcre
of reflection-that is, to thac of cognition-whereas the hetcrothetical
principlr of Otherness is a function of pure positing. As a pure, min-
imal principle of rhoughr, ir belongs ro rhe hererologiul medium of
thc originary relarion. That spherc, unlike the sphere of cognition,
dctermination. and reflection, is one of purc positing thought.
Ar this point we should be in a position to assess the implications
of Flach's conccpr of hercrology. It must be noted that his concept of
pure hctcrogcncity as bcaring upon thc originary sm~rtllmof thought-
upon thought's hererothetical positings-has a very distinctivc and ,
singular mcaning. It is certainly not to be mistaken for that sort of
heterogeneity grounded in hornogmeiry that stems from the structural
leveling of pure hercrology ro rhc Othcrncss rcquird in detcrmina-
rim.'"
But in truth. how hctcrological is FFach's hctcrology? Flach Icavcs
no doubt 8s to his heterdogy's also being a heautology, a science o r
a logic that thinks itselfjbeuuton) and not exclusively Otherness. In
a manner similar to Hegel, whose philosaphy of spirit is an arrcmpr
to subsume under the One the thinking of the sclf and the thinking
of the Other, Flach's hcrctology becomes a heautology notonlyinsohr
as the originary and absolutc relation to itself i s concemcd, but also
insofar as the heterogeneity that characterizes that primary relation
is linkcd in an embracc with the principles governing the realm of
cognition, determination, and reflecrion. The hctcmlogy of the orig-
inary logical spherc does nor merely ground the homogeneous sphere
of judgment, Betwren these 'IWO distinctivelogical domains also reigns
a communion of being, what Flach calls a constitutive koinotriu. by
which or in which very diftcrcnt principltx come togcthcr to form the
unified nature of thought: '"as eine Denken." Flach's heternlogy is
a unified and unifying scicncc of the Other. I t hinges on the mcntial
Oneness of rhought, whereas this originary Oneness is itself a funcrion
of its cmbracing nonconrradictory and contradictory Otherness. To
 THE INTERLACINCS O F HETEROLOCY 91

cite again from Negation und Andmlrcir: “In the communion, in the
hoinonia. in the symploke alone of the hctcrothctical and the principle
of contradiction as well as of the other principles of thought, the om
thought bemmcs constituted.” And, ’7hc one thought i s constituted
by all the principles of thought” (p. 54).
As a result of thenatureoftheoriginary~lationasonemOthcm~s
in general, the herurology in question can only be a heterologicat
whole itself. It is in itself, as a whole, opposed to itself, irretrievably
divided, and since its parts are complementary only tu the extent that
they arc mutually cxdusjvc, its uniry is not dialmicai. Oncncss of
thought, for Flach, is not equal to identity or indifference; on the
contrary, it is one in its very division. T h e unity that holds thought
together in iu primary principle, as well as in thought 3s a whole, is
that of “a hncrional clnsurc of the principls” as well as of “the whole
ofthought” (p. 601.This unity of the heterological is the rrsult of an
encampaising bond of union that weaves the very different moments
and principles together iota onc totality that prwerves difference-
the difference of the Other-as complementarity in the whole, Thc
unity of that whole stems from an amculation (GefGge). D relationship
and connection of the parts. N o wonder, then, that Flach stresses the
themes of mmbinanon, aommunion, or interlacing-in technical terms,
boinonia and symplobe-and that he conceives a I his hetcrology as
an essential freeing of the idea of symploke to include Otherness, in
this cast tinking into ,One the hcremlogical and the homogeneous
realm of judgment, the domain of the absolutely diHermt ground and
the domain of what is grounded, as wcl[ a5 the idea of unity itself.
Flach asks: “tn what manner does the heteroIogy come to grips with
the problem of rymploke? In the only sufficient one, namely by con-
ceiving of uniry, difference, totalig and foundation (in their unifia-
hility) as the uniform and unified speculative chararmof the absalutc
relation.” (p. 45).
Flach‘s ambition is clearly to bring TO a fulfillment what Hcgcl
began: the Iinkagc of the entirety of all principles. But in distinction
from Hegel, who set out to ground reflection in the hornagenmus
(nonlground of thc reflection of reflection, Flach, by tying into one
whole the ground us ground to what this ground in its very Otherness
makes possible. opens the meaning of v p l o h e to the heterogeneous,
to ihc heterogeneity of the ground as the radical Other, and ro the
heterogeneity of the nonconrradictory Other. But apart from this
narrowing down of Othcrness--of the heterotogical-to these t w o
forms of Otherness, the opening of rhe question of symploke to 0th-
94 TOWILRD THE LIMIT5 OF REFLECTION

erness remains itself a function of the idea of the totality of all rela-
rions. Symplokc becomes subject in this manner to a trim of a l l a m p r e
hensive inclusion as far as the principles of thought are concerned.
Although it may be a Oncncss no longer owingto dialectical mediation
of opposites, Oneness nonethekss is the horizon of Flach‘s hetemlogy,
and of the corollary problem of Sympfoke.
I do nor mean to engage in a detailed comparison of Rach‘s dc
termination of nondialeaical Otherness with Derrida’s hctcrological
venture, although such a comparison would help clarify many details.
I mean only to outline the similaritics and differences between their
concepts of hcterology. It remains unclear whether Flach really does
justicero Htgcl when, in intcrpretingthe Hegelian canceptof negation
as belonging to the sphere of judgment alone, he is compelled to
restrict the realm of dialcairn to dctcrmining thought alone, to !he
sphere of knowledge based on judgmcnr, neglecting in this manner
the all-important ohjcctive dialectics, or dialectics of the real. But in
spire of Hegel‘s most powerfulelaboration of theenriretyolthe logical
scnscs of Othcmcss. Flach’s concept of an Otherness logically antcrior
to negation, and thus his hcnrology as well, is in principle capable
of accounting for Hcgelian dialectics and spcculative thought t~ the
exrent that it does nor fall under rhe jurisdiction of what Hegel calls
the abstract or wen harmless Other. Ftach’s Other docs not yield,
from a speculative viewpoint, to such a logical determination of simple
Otherness, bccause tbc relation of the one to its complementary Other
in the absolure relation is not conceived, however negatively, in terms
of a logic of derennination. It is nor a rclarion of mediation, and thus
the Other is nor the Other ofthtone in spite of their complementarity.
What m a k a the absolute relation different from all simple Hegclian
Otherness is t h a t its relation between thc equiprimordial one and
Other is 3 w h i m Qf pure difference, or originary duplication, which
cannot be turned into a moment of the process of deierminarion
whether or not it is limited 10 the sphere of judgment, because it is
itself a logicdprcsupposition of the logicof speculative determination.
Yielding nonetheless to the imperatives of Hegelim thought, in par-
ticular inasmuch as Hcgclian thought exemplifies the requirements of
philosophy as such, his inquiry into whar I have calIcd pre-supposi-
tions or structures of reflection and the reflection of reflection rep-
resents a standard against which Dcrrida’s hetcrology can be measured
and thus determined in what one can no longcr call its radical, because
unheard OF, specificity.
In a manner similar to Hach, Derrjda acknowledge an irduciblc
 THE INTERLACINGS OF HETEROLOGY 95

doubling of thc IogIca! origin, a camra at the heart of the grounding

principles and of the principal conditioning relation of thought. Like
Ha&, he conceives of this caesura in terms of alterig rather than in
terms of ncganvity and contradiction. Both philosophers question the
hndamentality o€negativity and contradiction as structural concepts
of absolute rcflcxiviry, cornpard to relation to Otherncss in F e r a l .
Bath also share the insight into the solidarity between the t m s of
negativity, contradiction, sublation, dialectics, and homogeneity, a
solidarity in the service of the evacuation of the hetcrological from
the speculative unity of the totality of all oppositions. In addition,
both Flach and Denida open up the concept of symploke to include
rhc hererogcnmus.
But thii is as far as the similarities go. As we haw seen, in Rach
h e heternlogical is basically limited to the Otherness of the prinaplcs
and to the Orhcr which, in the One, mmplemcncs the one. Flach’s
heterogeneity is an ~ S S m t i dheterogeneity, whereas, ,asI shall try to
prove, Dcrrida’s heterogeneity i s not confined to the csxntial. Con-
sequently, his heterology is not a hcautology either. Although one
may at fim justly compare the presuppositions e x h i b i d by Dcrrida’s
philosophy-in other words what he calls “infta-suumres” or “un-
deeidables” such as “arche-uacc,” ”difkrance,” and “suppkmmtar-
ity,’’ to name only a few-to founding principles, their own nature,
as well as thc relatian they ,rntertain with what rhcy constitute, can
no longer bethematized in 2trms of csscnm. Unlike FIach’s, Derrida’s
rrcanncnt of the problem of Eymplokr is not governed by toraliry and
Oneness, values the German philosopher rightly holds to constitute
thought as such, following in this a philosophical r h m c a5 old as
philosophy itself. Bur is it nor precisely thought ar such that i s the
issue in the second rypc of criticism of reflexivity to which I have
alluded? And arc not the “pre-suppositions” of r c k i v i t y in particular
prcsuppositiom of thought’s Oneness, of the generality of Oneness,
and not only of the one of speculative thought? But if this is the case,
then Flach‘s recasting of the traditional definition ofsyntploke remains
a revolution within the conccptuat limits of the tradition itwlf.
Lct us consider for a moment the classical treatment of the problem
of symploke. The dialogue on the Sratesrnan is onc of the most im-
portant Platonic dialogues dealing explicitly with this problem.’’ The
objective of this dialogue is to determine the activify of the true states-
man as “a kingly weaving p m e ” ( h i l i k e n cymp/okFn) (306a).
Yet,,compared to the craftsmanship of the weaver, which serves in
thii instance as rhe leading paradigm to define such kingly activity,
96 TOWARD T H E LIMITS O F REFLECTtON

the statcsman’s task is a much more formidable challenge. Whcrcas

the weaver combinm &reads into cloth, thus exempli$ing the many
in the Onc and the One in the many, the sort of plaiting togcrhcr that
nwaiathe kingly weaver ismuch morecomplex, for unlikethe weaver,
the statesman cannot limit himsclf to combining what already Icnds
itsclf through its inherent substance (mi0 urrfois syndeta) to combi-
nation. W a r the weaver weaves rogcthcr is compacted in its own
substance (emtois syndoumetton) (27%-28Da). The kingIy weaver,
in contrast, is supposed to plait together opposites that arc at war
with one another. But what m e these opposites that, because they are
rnurually exclusive, find themselves in inevitable conflicr?
The examples to which Plato refcrs arc different kinds of virtues
that ,clash with one another, such as moderation and couragc. The
task of the Staresman consists of tying together that inimical values,
caught up in a family quarrel, with what Plnto calls a “supernatural
link” or bond ltht-io suna*gmosonrene). which “unitcs the elements
of goodness which are diverse in nature and would else be opposing
in tcndency“ (310a). In doing so. rhc statesman makes sure that the
gentlc VirtUCS are never separated from the brave ones, and that rhey
combine in such a manner as to form one organic whale. Compared
to thc cloth WOYCR by the craftsman, the kingly weavcr’s web i s
smooth and ctosc woven; it i s “thc finest and b a t of all fabria”
hecause “in its firm contexture“ it wcavcs together hitherto OPPVSCC~
strands into a Nnified character (31 Ib-c).
To understand fully Dlato’s handling of the problem olsynrploke-
and hy exrcnsion its intcrpreration throughout the madition-it i s
irnperativc to realize that the unity, or rhc one.eame, into which the
opposites or extremes are plaited together (ti$ a m O ~ O sumgo-
~ Q
gein) is a function of theextrernes’ negative derermination with resptn
M one another (267b-c). Each at the extremes is a negation of the
orhcr. T h i s is the condition under which they can bc dialccrically
linked togerher by the divine bond rhit the statesman draws between
them. Obviously, to rcstrict rbe operation of the symploke to the
weaving together into m e totality of what mwt, with respca to its
oppositc. be dctermincd as negative lcaves a variety of other possible
relations unreckoned. Or rather, they become violendyexcluded from
the scope of the rymploke. No artiat who works by combining ma-
terials would ddibctately choose to make any of his products out of
n combination of good materials and bad, asscrts the stranger in the
dialogue. On the cantrary, he rejects rhe bad marerial as fat as pas-
siblc. Similarly, a statesman would never “choose deliberately to con-
 THE INTERLACINGS OF HETZROLOGY 97

strum rhc life of any communiry out of a combination of good char-

acters with bad chafactcn” (308d). Sympl6ke can achieve ia goal
only if it expels from the mvisioncd totality those opposites that
cannot be determined in terms of negativity, that is, in terms of di-
alectical Othemm. The m e statesman, in order to achieve rhc fineit
and best of all fabrin in which oppowd strands art d e d in one or-
e c whole, is bound to climinate &OKirrcduEible orhers rhat do not
bend to negativity. Thus, for instance,those children who ”cannat be
taught to be courageous and moderate and to acquire the other vir-
tuous tmdencies, but arc impJlcd to godlrssrless and to vaunting pride
and injustice by h e drive of an evil nature. These the king expels from
thccommunity. He punthemto death or banisherthcm orclxhcchas-
t i s a them by the Severest public disgrace” (308e). The totality woven
by the rymploke-a totafty of concurring and cvmplemenrary oppo-
sires-is thus a tunaion of the expulsion of absolute hettrogcneity.
In distincdon to this Platonic interpretation of synrploke, Flach
seem at first to broaden ,thespectrum of what lends itsdf to farming
a part in a whole. Thc hmrogcneous that he includes in the minimal
unit of rhe absolute relation is of the order of an Orher that i s not in
a negativeopposition to the one (or same],but that is a complementary
Other.” Yet, since the heterogeneity that he includes within the to-
tality of the Oneness of thought is that of the principles, it i s a h a -
etogcneity that, in spite of a11 the difference between ground as ground
and what it makes possible, is in puri materia with what follows from
these principles. lndeed, the equality of matter i s the condition on
which a complementary Other, as well as a principle, can contribute
to brming a whole, although this whole will not be the result of a
dialectical process of sublation of opposites. But above all, what keeps
Hach’s interpretation of symploke within thc limits of its Platonic
determinatian is the teleology (and theology) of Oneness. unity, and
organic totality. As we have secn,.thesevalua are intrinsically part
of the traditional understanding of the concept As a result, Flach’s
pure hctemlogy, despite i t s stress on a heterogeneity beyond mediation
and reflection-a heterogeneity constituting thinking, reflection, and
dmcrminatian-remains an attempt at establishing the (however non-
dialectical) idcntiry of the Absolute. It culminates in a heautology of
al[ the principles of thought.
But In what ways i s Derrida’s work concerned with the problem
of ryntploke? Any attentive reader will notice that the problem ,of
rymploke is a major fil condwcreur in Dcrrida’s writings. In La Viritd
en peinture he claims that “c’est vees la pensee du fi1 et de Pentre-
98 TOWARD THE LIMITS O F REFLECTION

Incemmt que .~.je voudrais VQUS conduire*’ (VP,p. 24). From his
first work to his most recent publications, the topoi of VMechhmg,
Gefltcbt, interlacing [in the writings of Husserl, Heidegger, Freud,
and others), the bond (lo bande in Gh),grafting (grefie). and so
forth have been the focus of his arrenrion.’L
The discussion of the a r t of weaving of the statesman shows chat
umplohe is dialecrical in essence. The opposite mornenrs rhat ir plaia
mgether are not moments in a relation of capricious or contingent
exterionty, consequently lacking any meaning. From Plato to Kegel
such relations were considered arbitrary and lawless. Dialectical in-
terlacing takes place berwccn terms that, because they are at war with
m e another, are also posited in the Absolute. Real opposites are
absolutely identical. Only between real opposition docs the dialectica1
art of sympbks weave what Plam, at one point in Timaerrs. calls “the
fairesr bond,” and which, by the way, Hegel also refers to in The
Differenceat thcprecise moment a t which he describes thc dialcaical
identity of opp0sites.l’ Plato writes:

The fairest bond i s rhat which makes the most complete fusion of imEf and
the things which it mmbina. and proportion is best adapted to effect such
a union. For whrncver in any t h m numbers, whether tube or square, there
i s a mean, which is 10 rhe lnsr ierm whnr rhe Crar term is to it, a d again,
whcn t h e mcan is to the first tcm a5 the last nrm i s to the man-thcn rhc
mean becoming first and last, and the first and last becoming mean%they
will all of them at necessity mme to be tht same, and having bccornr thc
same with one another will be all one. (31c-32a)

The fairest bond is nor only the fundamental bond of tssmcc that
penetrates and unites a plurality ofpredicates. It is not only the bond
created by the interlacing par excellence that is being. As Plato in-
dicates, the fairest bond is that of mntinucd geometrid proportion-
in short, the union according to analogy. Such a bond alone cffectuara
the uue boimtiu with the Other, ,as a communion in which the one
cncroachcs upon the Orhcr, unifying i t d f and the Other in Onc
whole. In this unity, caused by the fairest bond. the Other (and Oth-
erness) find their rightfuul place as they become justified in their role
of an Other to the one, to the same, which assume the function of
fcgitimizing itself and the Other dependent on it.
Derrida recognizm this essentially dialectical nature of sympioke
when he writes in Dissemination “that dialectics i s also an art of
weaving, a science of the symploke” (0, p. 122).That the interlacing
of d i a l e d - is eminenrly, and preferably, analogical, and thus one of
 W E I ” E R U C 1 N G S OF PETEROLOGY 99

being, is a? least irnpkitly assumed in such essays as “White My-

thology” in Margins or Philosophy. and in The Archm/ogy of the
Frimhs But this recognition that diakaics is an art of intcrlacing
,also implies that dialectics, and with it analogy, are somehow only
forms of symploke among others, and, as Fladr has contendad, thar
there is a nondialecdcal harm of linkage. Indeed, this is what M d a
sets out to prove in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” but with clcady different
resutk from Flach‘s opening of q m p b k e to a more fundammtal,
more originaiy form of plaiting tugether.
As Derrida demonsrrates, in analyzing Plam’s distinction in Tbcac-
tetus b a n drc science of grammar and diakcda, the science of
interlacing rcpresmd by dialectics-u Kicnce guided by the value
of truth-instcad of k i n g able to distinguish itself clearly fmm gram-
mar, mush in fact and always, compound with relation, nonpresence,
and thus with the n o n m t h of the othcr science of qmplokc, a science
traditionally seen as inferior to dialectics, the science of grammar.
lndccd, as one can gather from the Sophist, “the very mndition of
dipcoum-tme or false-is the diacritical prindple of sprploke” (D,
p . 166).
mth this insight into the structural dependence of dialectics as one
art of weaving on rhc ,science of grammar as another, not only dots
rhe $istinction bmvrm the two sciences begin to waver, but the ne-
cesity of a generdimtion of symplobe also begins to be felt. Since
both sciences, dialectical and grammatical interlacing, are linked to
,each other-Interlaced-a rncditarion on rhc gtncraliy of synploke
becomes inevitabie. This meditation can no longer choose berwccn
one of the two sciences of interlacing. Focusing on what tics them
together and what unties them into their unstable difference, the mcd-
iration must arriculatc h e m as a double scietr~e,a science simulta-
neously playing on ttua stages during tum sessions. As we shall see,
the genttakation of symplokc by this double science is nothing other
&an the production. through inmrlaang, of gmerdity.
The new art of weaving suggcstcd by Dcrrida’s hctcrology is thor-
oughIy different hom that of Flach. It is no longrr governed by truth
valacs, and it tscapcs regulation by the ideas of toraliry and unity.
DerridaG deconstruction of symplokc-his gncralization of inter-
Iacing, and his thinking of radical alreriry-are subversive of rhought
itself, of what has been called by that name in the tradition, namely
the thinking not only of sorncthing specific but of one d m m i n c d
thing, of a thing in its Oneness. Arirtotle w t h c standards of thought
when he stated that one doR not think at all if one does not think
100 TOWARD THE LIMITS OF REFLECTlON

one rhing-the thing in its essential unity.Rs from this perspective,

Derrida’s hererology is nor only different from rhe pure hererology
af Fiach; it is, strictly speaking, no longer a philosophical enterprise
(nor is it, for that matter, a literary undertaking), since the force of
knotting the manifold is no longer that of thought. In an Aristotclian
view, this heterology does not think anything at all.
Facusing in a nondialccrical manncr on rhe ways in which m r h
compounds with nontruth, on how principles and nonpresence are
welded rogcrher. Dcrrida’s hererology is not ro be seen as a search
for more fundamental principles of thought and cognition. unless the
nature of both were to be radically redefined. Thhc sort of synthesa
produced by Derrida’s heterology-consider the *‘arche-syntheses” of
rhe arche-trace, differance, supplementarity, and so on-are not cu-
mulative opcrrtions of roraliwdon. The Ocher tied into, the arche-
syntheses would not find its justification by bcing embraced by the
One. These “synthem,” on the contrary. “account“ for structurally
nonroralizable arrangemenrs of heterogeneous elemcnrs, wirh rhe rc-
sult that the system of predicates that they form is also essentially
incomplete. Thus, these “syntheses” do not belong to the register of
the grounds: theirs is en alterity beyond that which characterizcs the
relation of principles to what they rule. I t is, one could venture to
say, an alrerity that separates the principle from what it is supposed
to accaunt for, and from itself, by dcmonsrrating how ir is brcached
by that which ir makes possible. It is thus an alrerity that represents
’both a condirion of possibility and one of impossibility, of principles
and what they justifyy.that is, their Other. It follows from rhis rhat
the interlacing produced by this unheard-of hcterology doesnot stand
in a relarion of constitutive koinoniu to whar it “accounts lor.” It is,
thcreforc, also incorrect to spcak of in interlacing simply as one of
founding, grounding, accounting, and so on.
Bur the question to be raised at this point is whether this unheard-
of heterology can still be calted by that name, especially if one takes
into account that the pure hcteroloSy we have cxarnined deals exclu-
sively wirh rhe Orherncss of the absolute relation constituting knowl-
edge and rhe sclf-knowledge of knowledge. Heterology is indeed a
highly charged term, and by itself docs not adquately designate what
I want it to say in this context. Hererology means “science OF’or
“discourse on” the Othcr. But first, is a science or theory of “archc-
synthrses” possible, sinceall such scienceor theory presupposes them?
Second, considering the significance of the concept of the Other in
 THE INTERLAClNGS QF HETEROLOCY I01

the philosophical tradition, can one conceptualize the infrastruccural

syntheses in terms of Otherness? And third, since heremlogy is not
only the science of the Otherness of the l o g i d principles of thought,
but a h the $cia= of a mote radial satmi than the one with which
the discourse of knowledge is believed to be concerned (one thinks
hem in particular of that irrationalist movement of thought which
leads from the Romantio to Rudolf Otto’s derermination of what he
,called“the Absolute Other” in tcms of the sacred or numinous) might
it not be advisable to avoid the word heterology altogether? Still, since
Western philosophy is in essence the amernpt 10domesticate Other-
nss, since what we understand by thought is nothing but such a
pmiect, betemlogy, for both intrinsic and strategic reasons, s m s an
adequate name for the investigation of the “pre-suppositions” of
Western philosophy, of what is understood by Bought and by what
is called noesis noeseos, the thinking of thought. If one avoids the
dangcr and the almost inevitable temptation of construing hetcrology
as the truth of philosophy-that is, as another, more true mode of
philosophy-and if one remains aware of the fact that the alterity
with which heterology is concerned is not a positive Other given in
any way, whose enigma could be solved o n e and for all (as w e shall
see, this is not h a u s e rhe Other in question would be ineffable, but
for reamns of srructurc, which make it always other than itself), such
a httcrology would not only help to understand thought; it would
also, and especially, open thought-which could then no longer be
called by that name-to a confrontation with Otherness that would
no longer bc its o m . Indeed, such a possibility hinges on the insrip-
tion within thought of its structural limitations-limitations that do
nor result from the deficiencies of ‘the cognizing subiea as a finite
being Thought, or a t h e r “thought,” would in this manner become
able, perhaps for the first time, to think something other than itself,
something other than itself in its Other, or itself in itself.
To circle back to the problem from which we set out-the problcm
of reflexivity-it must be said that, unlike Flach’s pure heterology,
Derrida’s hctcrology does not function as a reflexive sonstirutivity.
In Of Grammatology we read:
There ate things like nflcctingpools, snd images, an infinite reference from
one to the othct, but no longer a roum, a spring. Thm is no longer a simple
oripin. For what is reflected is split in ihdfand not ~ n l as
y an addition to
itself of is image. T h e RRstion, theimage. rhtdoublt. sp[im what it doubles.
T h e origin of the speculation becomcs a difference. What can look at itwlf
roz TOWARD THE LtMlTS OF REFLECTION

is nor onc; and the law of the addition IYF thcorigin to ia repmentation, of
the thing to in image, is rhar one plus DMC makes ar lcasr thrcc. (OC, p.
361

Derrida’s unconditional hcrcrology questions the vcry possibility of

a source of reflection, of a constituting homogeneous principle, or of
a heterogenmus principle B la Flach. The alteriv that splits reflection
from itself and thus makes it ablc to fold belf into itsclf-to rcflecr
itseif-is also what makes it, for srrumral reasons, incapable af
closing upon itself. Thc very possibility of reflexivity is also rhc sub-
version of its own source. Derrida’s critique of reflexivity must thcre-
fore at first take the paradonical turn of a generalization of rdection,
of infinitely reflecting mirrors. But, since such a reflection is caught.
up in a n endless p r e s s of rcfetence to Other, preventing all ultimate
recoiling into self, the generalization ot reflexivity becomes at the
same time the cnd of refleaion and spccularion. Ir opens itself up to
the thought ofan alterity, a difference that remains unaccounted for
by the polar opposition of wurce and reflection, principle and what
is derived from it, the one and the Other.
Before I engage in a detailed exposition of such an unconditional
hererology, and of the “method” of deconsmction associated with
it, it is appropriate to insist oncc more on the fact that Derrida’s
uncood;tionaI heterology, like Flach’s pure hctcrology, is conccrncd
with Othcrncss not cxclusivcly elicited in terms of negation. For this
rea5m the sphere of heterologymust, for both,beclearlydistinguished
from that of eflexivc determination. As w e have secn, Hegel dcrer-
mines difference-that is, meaningful differen-xclusivcly as con-
tradiction. Difference, or thc relation to Otherness, bcmrnes, themfore,
relation to the negative. The difference that such negarively charac-
terized Otherness makes to thought is that it allows for reflexive
determination in a developing dialectical system. Difference, under-
stood as contradiction, makes negativity one face of positivity within
the process and rhc system of the self-exposition of absolute knowl-
edge, or of the absolute idea. As the underside and accomplice of
positivity, negativity and contradiction are sublared, internalized in
the syllogistic process of speculative dialectia. The dialecticization of
negativity, by which ncgativiry remains within the enclosure of mcia-
physics, of onro-rheology and onto-teleology, purs negativity to work.
As Dcrrida dcmonsrrares in Writing m d Difference, “ncgativity is a
resource. In naming the wirhout-rtscrvc of absolute experience ‘ab-
stract negativity,’ Hegel, through precipi&aiion,blinded himself to that
which he bad laid base under tlrc rubric of negativity. And did Y)
through pdpimtion toward the scriousnm of meaning and the se-
curity of knowledge” (WD, p. ,259).
k i d a cxpmsa reservations as m the use of ‘?the metaphysical
or romantic pathos of negativity.” fearing “that the category of he-
gation’ reinaoduas thc Hcgdian logic of the A # f i e h g ’ * (P,pp. 86,
95). Instead of dmrmining negativity as only a k, a moment, or
a condition of meaning-as work-Dcrrida’s philosophy, like Ba-
tailIe’5, pushes the negative to its l o g i d cod, to that point where the
negative seems an afnrimap of something that misn all salvage by
t h e system of meaning. In his essay on Ehtaille, Dertida formulatea
t h e task in the following way:

It is convulsively to war apart the ncgativc side, that which makes ir the
ramring0th d a c e of the positive;and it is to d u b i t d i n the ncgPrivs
in an inltant, that which mn no Ioonga bc called wptim. And can no longer
be alld negative precisely beuuu it has RO reycmd underside, because it
‘canno longer cdhboratr with the continuous linking-up of meaning, con-
ccp4 time and truth in discourse; bccause it literally can no longer lobor and
ler i d f be inm-mgad as &c %work of dtc negative.” (WD,pp. 259-
260)

The Orhtmcss with which uncanditional hmralagg is concerned

is not even a negative. Untih Flach’s Other, which is only Otherness
in gmcrrrl, the -ce of Orhemess, a l0gic;alIy more fuunhcnral
Otherness compared to negativity, Dcrrida’s Other-let US call it the
getera1Other-is an altcrity that has nothing of an csscncc or truth.
I n d of being m e essential aIterity, it i s irreaicvably plural and
cannot be assimilated, digested, rcprcsented, or thought us such, and
hence put to work by the system of metaphysics. Rather than being
a more profound ground of rht systems of whir can bc known and
thought, of what is meaninghl, it i s precixIy the alterity of the struc-
tural conditioms of that which is determined a$ knowledge and ia
grounds wirhin the tradition.
M d a ’ s Othernca is, msequcntly, ncirher a lack, a substantial
mid, an a b x n a wscrptible of determination, nor rhe sdll meaningful
ltytfx side of the positivity of the Hcgclian Conccpr or Nodon. The
Otherness of unconditional heternlogy is mare and less than negativ-
ity. It i s Irrs because it has no meaning, no signification; it is a “neg-
ativity without negativity,” to quote Dsrida IVP,p, 143. It is more
than negativity becaux it is the “medium” (the nonmcdiating me-
,&urn) in which philosophy comes to carve out its (dialectical, and
TQ4 TOWARD T H E LIMITS Of REFLECTION

hence sublatable) contradictions. The Otherness of unconditional het-

cmlogy is rhc vndrcidable rcscrve of negativity. Speaking of the pbar-
mahon as onc othcr name for this Otherness, Derrida remarks:
Conrradicrions end pairs of opposircs arc lifrcd from rhe bottom of this
diacritical, diffcring. dcfemng, reserve. Alrcady inhabited by diffcranec, this
reserve, even though ir “precedes” the opposition betwccn different cffms,
even rhough it preexists differcnm as cffecrr, does nor h i v e the punctual
simplicity of a cuincidmtio opposirorum. It is from this fund thsr dialectia
draws irs philosophcmcs. The pbamalon, without being anything in icsclf,
always exceeds them in consriiuring rhcir botromlm fund. (D, p. 127)

Such a n Otherness, which is refercntial to oihcr. more alim modes

of difference, conflictualiry, contradiction-mod= of difkrmce that
cannot be made meaningful by bringing them to a s ~ inpnegativity-
is not merely of the order of what Flach calls the heterogeneity of the
principles. I t is an Qrhernrss thar divides rhc principle against itsself,
that is more originary than it, that even divides a double principle
likc thatofFlach. theminimum oftheabsolutcrelation. For theradical
alterity that Derrida rhematizes, and that we call radical only for
reasons of convcniencc, there is no place cither as an essential moment
of theprinciples, or as that which these principles shape or constitute,
o r in thc totality of what Flach calls rhc one rhinking. The Otherness
of unconditional hcterology doer nor have the purity of principles. It
is concerned with the principks‘ irrcduciblc impurity. with thc non-
ncgarive diffcrcncc thardivides them in themselves against thernselvts.
For rhis reason it is an impure heterdopy. Bur it is also an impure
hctcrology hccausc thc “mcdiurn” of Otherness-more and less than
naativity--is also a mixed milieu, precisely because the ncgative no
longer dorninatcs i t . Opcn co hercrologiml modes of dating, this
rnilicu does not homogeneously knot or interlace. I t is distinguished
by “synthcses” that, by soldering and grafting predicates, concepts,
instances, or Icveh of various orders onto one another, must neccs-
w i l y appear contradictory, even irrcducibty aporeric. But rhcsc cat-
cgories, born from philosophy and it5 logic of contradiction,, do not
apply here, hccauke the syntheses in question are nothing less than
the conditions of possibility and impossibility of such logic.
Thc impure and uncondirional hetcrology focuses on an alterig
rhar docs not lend irsolf ro phcnommologizarion, that escapes pre-
wnrarion of itself in propria persona. This “radical” alterity thus
marks a “space” of exteriority a1 the border of philosophy, whether
or not philosophy is explicitly phcnorncnological. It is situated on the
 THE INTERLACINGS OF HETEROLOGY so5

margin of what can be meaningfully totalized. Yet, although i t docs

not bend to the Eancepr of presence, neither does ir for that matter
lend itself to theconceptual grip of absence. since, lackingall meaning,
it is also void of the meaning conferred by an absence of meaning.
But as we ha11 see, this border is not simply external m philosophy.
It dms not encompass philosophy like a circle but traverses it within.
Although this “radical” alteriry docs not present itself rls suck, the
history of philosophy in i t s entirety is. indccd, the unintcrmpted at-
tempt to domesticate it in the form Qf its delegates. In presenting it
in negative images-as rhc opposita of valorized metaphysical con-
cepts-specular reflection seeks to account for, and do away wirh,
the sort of altcrity that aubvem ia hope of reflexive or speculative
seif-foundation. This altcrity forever undermines, but aIso maker pos-
sible, the dream of autonomy achieved through a reflexive coiling
upon self, sinre it mmcs a structural precondition of such a desired
state, a precondition that represents the lrmit of such a possibility.
 PART TWO

On Deconstruction
 7

Abbau, Destruktion,
Deconstruction

st
Before engaging in a detailed analysis of Derrida’s philosophy and
determining in what manner his “mnhod”of deconstruction is critical
of reflexivity, let us first examine the conceptual filiation of this motion
of deconstrcrion. which for many has come to designate the content
and style of hrrida’s thought. Such an inquiry into the provenance
of what e m s to be a methodological concept of sorts should provide
the historical and sysrematic background for the subsequent arternpt
to demarcate “deconstmudon” radically from i~ antecedents. Thz main
concepts ta which deconstruction can and mu5t be rcaaced are those
of Abbau (dismantling) in the later work of Husserl and Destnrbtion
(destrucrion) in the early philosophy of Heidegger.‘
Although Huserl’s notion of A b h u appears lor the first timc in
Experience and jttdperrr (1938),and thus later than Heidcggcr’s
notion of Destfubtion in Being and Time (1927), it should be dis-
c u d first, for, in spite of some menrial differences, it is in large
part anather name for phtnomcnological reduction. Sin, Heidegger’s
method of destruction in Beingond Time must be viewed against the
backdrop of the epochal process of discovery, it is certainly legitimate
to discuss the method of Abbm first, in particular since thosc features
that distinguish it horn orthcdox phenomenological reduction make
it part of he history of the critique of reflexiviry.
It is important to understand the context in which Husscrl speaks
of Abbau in Experience and Judgment if ant is to ase55 the meaning
of this notion. Engaged in a genetic exploration of the conditions of
rhc validity of judgment, Husserl conrends that neither logic nor psy-
chology i s capable of revealing the true foundations of predicative
evidence. This would require a “necessary retrogression ra the m a r
LIO OH DECONSTRUCTION

original self-cvidencc ofcxpericnce,’a to a stratum of experience that

is never thematized by either logic or psycholo$y.z To achieve this
goal, Husserl proposts a double retrogression: one that leads from
the pregiven and ‘‘objective” world to the original lifeworld, and
another thar rcachcs through thc life-world toward the transcendental
subjectivity consritutiveofboth life-wor1dand“objeaive” world. The
objective world “is them as that on which contemporary science has
already done its work of exact determination.” In fact, it is thc “the-
oretical world,” a world inseparable from the natural sciences, whose
tradition determines its mode of givennes and informs the way ,one
cxpcriences ir. A retrogrcssion ro the original life-world, to the pre-
theoretical world and prepredicarivc experience by which it is char-
acterized, thus requires a radical dismantling of the theoretical world,
an undoing of the idealizations out of which it is waven. T h i s dis-
mantling, which Husserl refers to as A b h , i s supposed to produce
a “breakthrough to the concealed foundatian” of these idealizations
or “sense-scdimentations” in the most original experience. This toun-
dation represents the sourcc, according to Husserl, of “the origination
of this garb of ideas thrown over the world.”
In paragraph 11 of Erpcrimce and Judgment, Husrerl explains
that the original life-world, as well as transcendental subjectivity, d o
not “lie open to the view of reflection.” In other words, the operarion
of rctrogrcssiort through dismanrling is not a rcflccrive operation. It
cannot he performed by psychological reflection, which is an aspect
QF what Husserl also calls “theoretical convicrions.” and which must
be dismantled if one wants to gain access to that more “effective
subjectivity” that “is not the subjeaiviry of psychological reflection”
but that, on thecuntrary, grounds it. Consequently, reflecdon appears
to he not only an inappropriate mode of access to the life-world and
thc constituting subjectivity, but 3150 one of those idealizations that
conceal rhc origjnaty foundation of all sense-sedimentations. Yet per-
haps Husserl rejects psychological redcction only because Irs scope
docs not go beyond that of which it is itse[f 3 part. It may well be
that, in a manner thoroughly consistent with the whale of his phe-
nomenological enterprise, Hussed rejects psychological reflection in
the name of a more radical reflection, that is, transcendental reflection.
In that case. of course. it would be a mistake to conclude that the
method of Abbau is nonreflcxive. The retrogression that it achieves
would have to be understood simpIy in terms of a more fundamcntal
mode of reflection.
And yet. as David Carr has a w e d in Phenomenology a d the
Problem of History,a strange ambiguity sets the opcration of dis-
mantling apart from all other forms of phcnornenological reduction,
On the one hand, Abbuu seems to stand for a nonreflenive way of
reaching the roots of the pregiven world, its idealization, and the
sense-constituting structures of transcendental subjectivity. O n the
other hand, as a nonreflective approach to the origins of the idealizing
superstructures of the prcgiven world, it is not an wmediated ap.
proach. The very idea of dismantling is clearly “a far cry from the
phenomenological insistenceon grasping in original intuition the thing
itself,” remarks Carr.’ Obviously the paradox Carr refers to results
from.the traditional equation of nonreflexivity with immediacy. But
sin= Husserl’s proccdurc in Experimce und ludgment consist5 of
dismantling the idealizations that cover up the original life-world, a
world with which our historical world has lost all contact, the op-
eration of Abbuu in its paradoxically mediated nonreflwtive gesture
is particularly suited 10 achieve what is at stake: to rcach back to
origins that must remain esxntially conmaled if they am to function
as the original historical premises of history. T h e method of disman-
tling is nonreflective because it allows for a retrogression to something
t h a t cannot in principle be given as such. Becaux rhc conditions of ,
prediaxive evidence with which it attempts to make contact cannot
be beheld in an intuiting act, Abbm is a mcdiand approach. Abbuu,
then, is precisely the kind of retrogression required for a reactivation
of origins, such as hisrorica1 origins, which must remain essmritially
dissimulated, in order to achieve the sort of grounding one expms
from them. Therefore, it is no contradiction if the method of re-
trogression through dismantling is at once mediated and nonreflec-
rive.‘
It is, canseqamtly, appropriate to assume that, in Erperimce and
Judgmmr, Husscrl repudiate both psychological and transcendental
reflection. Unlike all previous forms of reduction, or what Husserl in
!&us calls mcntal dcstnraions (gedanklichr Desfruktioti),which op-
erate in concert with a nonpsychological mode of reflection, the op-
eration of Abbm is not infomed by a fully reacdvatable end point
of rbe retrograding process.’ Abbuu i s ccrtainly a method of tran-
scendental investigation, but in a sense thoroughly different from that
ofKant, as well a5 from that of the early Husserl. In this sense it can
bc said to anticipate deconstruction. It is a nonreflective turning back.
The nonreflexivity that characterizes Huserl‘a notion of Abbuu is
undoubtedly a major fcamre of what in 1927 Heideggcr called Dc-
shktion. Heidegger may have borrowed this concept from Husserl,
I12 O N DECDNSTRUCTION

who referred to the forms of reduction. bracketing, or e p o c h as

“mental destructions.” But it is only with Being and Time that de-
struction acquired the status of a philosophical concept. It i s inrer-
eting too that, in his F 927 lectures, Heideggcr speaks of dcstrucrion
as a ‘‘critical dismantling” (4ririrCher dbbarr), thus anticipating the
cnnccpt that Huserl was nor to make his own until 1938.b
The concept of desrrucrion, a s coined by Heidegger, issues from a
debate with Hussrrl’s early philosophy, and especially with the rncthod
of phenomenological reduction. Whereas phenomenological reduc-
tion, as Husserl had first dcvcloped it in Ideas (1913), represents the
method of bracketing the natural attitude toward the world in order
to focus on the transcendcntat subjectivity that constitutes it, Hci-
degger comesto see it as “lendingphenomenologicalvision back from
the apprchcnsion of a being, whatever may bc the character of that
apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being,” as he
explains in his 1927 lectures entitlcd The Bnsic Problems of Pheno-
menology.’ This retrogression, no longer toward the sense-constitut-
ing scructurm of a trassccndcntal ego OKthe prepredicatory experience
of cvidcncc in the original life-world, becomes for Heidegger a rncan~
of regaining the original metaphysical expericncc of Being. As a can-
sequence of the more fundamental understanding of this phenome-
nological gaze, destruction serves to lcvel off not only the force of
tradition to the extent that it is dominated by the sciences, but aIso
the entire philosophical tradition since antiquity. Indeed. once Hei-
degger estabtishes in 8eing and Time that the trancendcntal horizon
for thc explication of Being is time, the whole history of ontology-
that is, of the previous doctrines of Bcing-appears to hare deter-
mined Being in the perspective of one singular mode of time. the mode
of thc prcsent. In the projected second part of Being and T h e he
intended to outline the “basic features of a phenomenological de-
struction of the history of onmlogy, with the problematic of Tcm-
porality a s . . .[the] clue,” in order to reestablish the elementary
conditions under which the question of Bcingcouid be taken up again
in a productive manner.’ Hcidegger writes: “We understand this task
as one in which by taking tbe question of Being as our clue, wc arc
to destroy [Desmtkrion]the traditional conrent of ancient ontology
until we artivc at those primordial expericnca in which we achieved
our Iirst ways of determining the nature of king-tho ways which
hare guided us ever ~ t n c e . ” ~
As orthodox phenomenological reduction goes hand E n hand with
a (transcendental) rellecrion concerning its goals, thccnd terms of the
operation of retrogression, simiIarly thii “guidance of vision back
h m beings to being requirc[s] at h e same time chat we shnuld bring
o u ~ c l v c sf o m r d to beinp itdf.”’O Heideggd calls this movement
of projection of what is prcgiven loward its Being and its s t ~ c ~ u c c s
not reflection but ‘cpbmomenologiEIIlconstruction.”” According to
Heideggct, rhc phmornmological method is distinguished by three
telated momma: reduction or retrogression h m what is to &in&
c o n s h d o n of Bdng, and destructionor the dismantlingof tradition.
D a m d o n i s the necessary correlate of both reduction and construe-
tian: “It i s far rhis reason that there necessarily belongs rwthe con-
q t u a l irmcrprccation ofbdng and its sirucnms, char is, ro the rcduaive
construction of being, a desrructialr-a critical p- in which the
traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are
de-constructed (kritircher A b h ) down to the sources from which
they were drawn. Only by means of chis dmrucrion can ontology
fully assure itsclf in a phenomenological way of the genuine character
of its concep.”’~
This unavoidable lnoaming up of a h a r d e d tradition, and the
dissolurion of the concealment it has brought about, arc not, as Hci-
dtggcr o h insists, violent am, Noneheless, it is inttrcaing to note
h a t in the antext of the public debate between Cassirer and Hei-
degger in April 1929 a t Davos, Swiacdand, Hcideggcr employed the
much more forceful Guman word Zerst6rrmg. as o p p d to its Lat-
inization in Being m d The, to designate the radical dismantling of
d i e foundations of Oecidcnml metaphysics ( t h e Spins L o p , Rea-
son).t’ A t any rate, the destruction of the history of ontology that hc
calls for in Sting and Time, or the overcoming (VmimfungJ or
dcrnchmr (Loslhmg) from the madition, as he would later call It,
“must not be t a d , because the tradition remains rich i n truth.”’d
Heidcgger remarks, “To bury the past in nullity i s not the purposc
of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains
unexpressed and indirect.”” This positive intent of destruction con-
skts of a ~ysrmaticremoval or dismantlingat rhc canccalmcncs per-
decblurgen) of the meaning of Bdng by the history of ontology, a
meaning with regard to which traditionai ontology docs not simply
become relativized but in which it is rooted and from which it acquires
its own cpochal meaning. Such a destruction, says Hcidcppcr, must
“stake out rhe posirive pmibiitier of that tradition, and this always
means keeping it within its limits.” The loosening of the hardened
madidon. i s well as the dissolution of the concealmenrs it necessarily
produces, i s positive, as long as. it i s carried out along the guidelines
114 O N DECONSTRUCTION

of the question of Being. At the same time, this question-the on-

tologically fundamental investigation into the meaning of Ekirtg-
gains its true realization only in the performed destruction. In short,
dcrtruction ir the necessary reverse of the reductive construction of
the question of Being in philosophy. T h e leveling off that it accom-
plishes equals a positive appropriation of the tradition, such that the
philosophical inquiry into Being is, in a specific and important way,
historical knowledge. Destroying what conccals the original cxpcri-
ence, releasing the first and subsequently guiding determinations of
Being paves the way for a transsubjective beginning vf a meaning of
Being, through which ontology from antiquity to the present Cnds its
possibility, insofar ,as t h a t ontology represents the oblivion of that
first gaze into the destiny of Being.
I have already stressed the necessary correlation between destruc-
tion and reductive construction. Although this correlation scems to
parallel Husscrl’s correlation betwcen reduction and transcendental
reflection, it may well be of a different nature. First, reduction in
Heidegger seems to refcr to nothing more than a qualification of a
construcrion that takes place within the space created by the leveling
off of the traditional intcrprmations of Being. Reductive construction
would thus appear tw correspond to Husserlian transcendental re-
flection, as it sets limits and a goal to the movement of destruction.
But what distinguish= reductive constmcrion from reflection is that
instead of providing a level that no longer needs to be dissolved, such
as the Hunerlian essences and forms, it constructs a radically original
ground. By avoiding the terminology of reflection with respect to
reductive construction a s ir rclates to dcsrmaion, Heidegger cmpha-
sizes a fundamental shik from a subjective transcendental peKpedVe
toward thc question of Being as the transcendental question par ex-
cellence. giving truflso?ndentda historically new meaning. What takes
place in rhc passage Imm phenomenological reduction to Heidegger’s
concept of destruction of the history o f ontology is a decisive turning
away from the questionof reflexivity.Thisshift from egological think-
ing, transcendental or not, can he grasped in Heidegger’s turn toward
the question of Being. as well as in the vcry conmption of the mo-
dalirie of his phenomenological method.
Instead of further engaging ia a demonstration of the nonreflexivity
of the operation of destruction, I want to camment briefly an three
orher methodological notions in the later work of Heidegger that
clearly support the nonreflcxive conception of destruction: Schritt
nniitk. Andenken, and Bssinnvng. The movement that characterizes
 ABEAU, DESTRUKTION, DE60N5TRWCTlON If F

rhese thm notions involves a certain obscurity, which nccffssrily

bafflesboth the philosopher of dkction and the empiriast. The qua-
tion &at rhcse thrtc “methodological” devices answer is, How can
the ontological tradition be dismantled without recoucse to a concept
such as reflection, which, ss pact of that tradition, would provide a
present ground for the operation of retro-ion? The movement
that distinguishs the three notions of Scbritt orriicb, Andenken, and
Besinnung must ensure that the detachment from tradition makes
contact with the hidden and -tially withdrawing gronnd of that
tradition, with a ground that is thus not simply forgotten but whose
oblivion is forgotten as well. The gesture of such a reaching out cannot
but appear suspicious to reflective and empirical thought, as it seems
co rely on a pctitio principii.
Let us m E l that what is being turned m in the operation of dis-
mantling is not of the order of the subject, however transcendental
it may be, nor of the order of rnyrhing constituted by such a subject.
It is not something that would come into view through reflecting on
oneself- On the contrary, as Heidegger puts it, “it i s what we aurselvei
are not and least of all could ever Yct at the same time it is
not only within our confines; it is as near to us as the unthought of
our forgetting of it. The movement characreriaricohhis reaching back
to the withdrawn ground membla that of the Crack epagoge, as
analyzed by Heidtgger in his essay on pbysis. Epgoge, often mis-
leadingly translated as “induetion,” does not mean the scanning of a
scrim of facts in order M induce what they have in common, an
abstract universal. Instead, “Epagoge means ‘leading rowards’ that
which comes into view insofar as we have previouoly looked away,
over and beyond Individual beings. At what? At king. For example,

-
only if we already have acenws in view can we identify individual
mcs. Epugoge is seeing and making visible what already stands in
vim-for exampIe, treents5. Epugoge i s ‘constituting’ in the double
of, first bringing s o m d i n g into v i m and then likewise estab-
lishing what has been seen.””
Now, the universal that the epugoge brings into view, to which it
fmds, is never given in the mode of the present. For instance, being
in motion is the fundamental mode of being of pbysir as it comes into
view in epagage. As such, the retrogression toward it does nor assume
a d e h i t e end point of the turning back, since pbysis is not ta be
undersrood as motion per se but as being in motion. The epagoge
dots not lead to a ddinabk essence and therefore d a s not imply a
priiiio principii. Yet the very movement of the petere prkcipium. as
116 O N DECONSTRUCTION

“the reaching out to the supporting ground,” is, according to Hei-

degger, ”the only move that philosophy makes. It is the ‘offensive’
that breaks open [dcrerijffnande Vorsross] the terrirory within whose
borders science can first scttle down.”*‘ T h e retrogression does not
hinge on the prior assumption of a present term of its movement but
is itself thc reaching out for a ground. its positing, which it constructs
as it retrogrades. Scbritt ruriitk, Adenken and Besinnung are the
different modes in which that which shows itself in and by itself
becomes the object of thc rctrogmsive reaching our for the grounding
ground. All three 3re modes of disclosure of this ground; they occur
as one makes the step back through recollective thought, or Besinnung
(a mm which I prefer ro lcave untranslared), toward what we our-
selves are not.
h t mc try to dcrcribc these three movmcnts more succinctly,
according to their differences and to the manner in which they com-
plement each othcr. First, the step back from rradirional ontulogy-
that is, horn metaphysics as a whole-toward its hidden essence does
not sipify a rcturn to the past. It is not an attempt to revive the past
artificially. The misinterpretation particularly to be avoided i s that of
a historical r m r n to the earliest Occidental philosophers, for, as
Heidegger narcs in Identity end Difference,“the ‘whither’ m which
thestep back directs us, develops andshows itsclfonly in thccxmtion
of the step.”” What, then, is the step back? It is a modc of dealing
with the history of philosophy conceived by Heideggm in opposition
m Hegel’s process of the sublation of the truth-moments of that tra-
dition. It undoubtedly represents a return to a beginning; but it is a
beginning that never occurred as such, and thar is rhe realm, “which
until now has been skipped over,” of the essence of metaphysics,
which comes into vicw only by means of retrogression.*o What is
constructed En the: step back from metaphysics is “that lowhy (rhc
oblivion of Being), from o m of which rncraphysics obrained and re-
rains iu ongin.’’zl By unwinding our of representin& reflecting, and
explicatory thinking, rhc step back lets [hat locality and what char-
acre- it-the onticbdntologiml difference, or the quation of Being-
appear fa- to fa= with thought. Through this stepping back, that
which is worthy ,ofbeing questioned is set free into a confrontation
with thought, and thought can cntcc into a qucstioning that experi-
ences or lets itself he addressed by what it confronts face to face,
instead of making it the obiect in the habitual opining that charac-
terizes philosophy. This is how the step back turns thinking into
“recollective” &inking, a thinking which, as Heidegger puts it, ‘“may
well remain wholly without an objccr.’.””
 XBBAU, DESTRUKTtON. DECOWSTRWCTION ~ . 1x7
. . .

The qualitative difference of thought in the step back from a11

subsequent prescntation ( V o r s t e h g ) of mllacrion’s facing its op-
posite is that this face-[&face confrontation ro which ir.leads back,
and by which it lets itself be addressed, is something to which it itscIf
belongs as recollection. Hcidegger formulates this relation as follows:
“Such thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of king and nothing
else. Belonging m Being, because thrown by Being into the prcser-
rationof itstruth and claimed forsuch preservation,itthinks Being”’>
Recollective thought, which frees that toward which one steps back
into an opposite for thought, belongs to what it constructs in the very
moveinent of retrogression.What is being reached out for in both the
step back and in racollcction does not exist independently of these
movments. It io achieved in the p r o m of being posited, nlthoough
this proax. is itself a function of that which is constructed in this
manner.
Now, if rtcolleaive thought brings what is c o n s u u d into a po-
sition facc to face with thought, what, then, is Besinnrcrrg? It must
not be uanslatcd as ‘‘reflection,’’ a w n a p t that p m u p p o s a the sub-
jocr-obje division, since we haw here neither a subject nor an object
but rather rc~ollectivethought and its opposite. Besinnung cor-
r q o n d s to the movement by which thought become involved in
what it belongs tc-that is, in is opposite, which it meets facc to
face-“instead of objectifying ir through subiect presentation.” “Be-
sinnung’, ” writes Heidegger, “is caIm, self-posscsscd surrender to
that which is worthy of qucstiming.”~4Bcsinnung, like the step back
and the idea of ~ l l K t i v thought,
c thus articulates a different mb-
ment in the opcrarion of rctrogression: “Through BeEinnung [since
‘reflection’ is misleading, I have substituted the original German word]
so u n d m t d we actually arrive at the placc whcre, without having
experienced it and without having seen penetratingly into it, we have
long been 50iOUming. In Berinnung we gain access to a p l a a from
out of which there first opens the space traversed at any given time
by all our doing and leaving undone.”” Besinnurrg, consequently, is
the tern by which Heideggcr ah the nonrdcxive capturing of what
is turned back to through a destruction of the history of ontology,
not only insofar as its repmentations of Being art concerned, but
also as concerns its major methodological concept of reflection.
Hue, one is able to grasp how the movement of retrogression
h o n d the tradition of ontology i s at the same time the conmuction
and the letting be of the hidden ground of rhar metaphysical tradition.
As we have seen, it is nor a refl&ve return to something rhat, as the
origin of that tradition, would be of the same order-an csscncc, a
I18 O N DECONSTRUCTION

past-prmcnt or a prcgivm, for instance. Rctcogmsion is the very

movement of differentiating (brinein) between what shows itself in
and by itself and what does not-what is in all its forms. As such a
differentiation, a retrogression manages the radical space of the ul-
timate ground of what is. That ground is a ‘‘hnction,” so to speak,
of the regressive differentiation and dismantlingof the tradition, More
precisely, it is itself of the order of that dismantling rmgression, of
an appearing through retreat; moreover, the operarion of dismantling
is itself grounded therein. This ground grounds when it i s set free in
the very am ofrcrurning ro ir. Such a ground, since it can never be
given, Cannot bccornc thc cnd point of a reflection. As one reaches
out for it reflectively, it withdraws.
To the extmt that Hcideggcr’s concept of destruction appcars to
‘be a nonreflexiveconcept, it can besaid to prefigure, a5 docs Huscerl’s
concept of Abbau, Derrida’s concept of deconstruction. Beforc dis-
cussing the similarities, and especially [he differences, between de-
construction on theone handand Abbm and destruction on the other,
however, let us first consider what Derrida himself ha5 said about the
word deconstruEcion. In the debates following the presentation of
“L‘Oreille de I’aurre” in 1979 in Montreal, Derrida rccalled that when
he employed the word deconstmction in his early writing, hc did so
only rarely, and with the understanding that it was only one word
among others, a secondary word. translating Hcidegger’s terms for
destruction and dismantling.>cIt is a word, he hassaid elsewhere. that
he has never likcd, and whose fortune has disagreeably surprised
him.” Only after others valorized thc word in rhc context of struc-
mralism-which, Derrida claims, did not primarily determine his usage
of thc word-did Dcrrida try to define deconstnrctioion in his own

In this short inquiry into the origin of the concept of deconstruction

I have already hinted a t tbe lwel of abstraction required 10undersrand
the concept and the problems it i s meant to confront. Bur by outlining
chis history 1 do nor mean 10blur the fundamental differences bctwccn
deconsrmcrion, desmmion, and dismantling. All three are nonreflec-
tive merhodological dzviccs; all thrce are in essence positive move-
ments, never negative in the usuat sense, and certainly not “purely
negative”; and all three attempt to construct, in a mom or Ecss sys-
tematic fashion, grounds of greatcr generality for what is to be ac-
wunted lor. Yct, although Derrida’s notion of deaonstn~aioncontinua
to address the quesrions raised by the philosophies of Husserl and
Hcidegger, his critique of the basic tendcncies of their work also
 AIBBAU, DESTRUKTION, DECONSTRUCTION TI9

muches on theii notions of dismantling and dmruction. Likc Hei-

dcggtr, Dcrrids criticizes Husserl’s phmomcnological reduction, but
he a h qu&m Heidegpp’s inmpmation of that method as a method
of inquiring into the meaningof Being. If, as Derrida writes in Writing
m d Difwtnm, referring to the Cmrerian Mediraiiorrs, that “in crit-
icizing classical metaphysicp. phenomenology acwmplishcs h e most
profound project of metaphysics” (WD,p. 166), then the same can
be said of Heidcgger‘s dcstnrction of the Occidental tradition of on-
tology and of his focus on &in#.
Derrida’s objcaions to Hcidcggcr’s destruction of traditional on-
tology (aswell as to Heideggef’s “solution” of the problem of reflex-
ivity by caking it back to the more radical idea of a prercflcxive
understanding) are perhaps most forcefuuy expressed in “Ousia and
Gramme.” Hcre Dcrrida argues that Hcidcggcr’s break with mcta-
physics remains, for systemadc masons, i t h f u I to metaphysics. He
writes, “At a certain point , . . the destruction of ineraphysic, remains
within metaphysia, only making expliat its prinaples” (M,p. 481.
In fact, what D d d a him tu dcmonstratc in this essay Is that Hci-
d w r ’ s destruction in Being und Time of the metaphysical mneept
of time bomrws unm‘ricdy from the discourse of metaphysics itself,
h e very conceptual rt5ources that he 1154 to criticize and dclimit
metaphysia’ naive concept of time. This is possible btcausc “cvery
text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the M -
called ‘vulgar’ m n q t of time md the rcsou~ccsthat will be borrowcd
from the system of metaphysics in order to criticize that concept” (M,
p. 60). Thus any concept af time that one would wish to oppose IO
a naive one remains metaphysical, because the very idea of a more
fundamental, more universal, mom r a d d concept of time belongs
to the very possibilitia of metaphysical conccptualiry. “In attempting
to ptoduce this other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it
is constructed out of other metaphysical or onto-theoIogical predi-
cates.” As a conscquenae, “the cxrraordinary trembling to which das-
sical ontology is subjected i n . . . [the dcsmrction of that tradition]
still m a i n s within the grammar and lexicon of mcraphysid (M. p.
63).
The phenomenological reduction of which Heideggcr’sdesrrucrion
aimed ta be a more radical interpretation led Hcideggcr, as it had Id
Husseri, to an ever more fundamental notion of the essence of what
is under consideration. The very conapt of a s e n a that acmmpanics
the operation of destmcrion is only a more radicaal, more original
concept of essence than the naive onto-thedogid concept of it. Phe-
I ZQ ON DECONSTRUCTION

nomenology in general, whether in its Husscrlian form or its more

radical Heidcggerian form. is by definition a mcthodkal passage to
essentiality. Reduction, dismantling, and destruction arc in agreement
with such a systematic transition toward e 5 m c ~ . .
Here thc diffcrenccs betwcm deconstruction, destruction, and dis-
mantling start to cume to light. Surely dcconstruction sham with
Abbnu and Desrnrbtion the goal of attaining rhe “ultimate founda-
tion” of conccpts (OG, p. 60). Yet these foundations, as we shall see,
are no longer essences, however radical. For the same reason, these
ultimate reasons are no longcr primordial. and thc operation of de-
construction t h a t rmches out for them is no iongerphenomenologic.l
in any strict sense. The Husscrlian notion of Abbau already sccmed
to preclude reflection, since the laner represcnts a methodological
concept that belongs precidy to that tradition beyond which the
opcrarion of dismantling tries to reach in its search for an original
life-world (and for the tcansccndental egological 5tructum that con-
stitute both rhar original world and ics rransformarion into the world
OF the natural sciences). and thus for a world and for stmctures of
which there is no experience within that tradition. The Heidegeerian
notion of destruction is manifestly nonreflective, because it r m -
gresses to something that is not prcscnr in any way wharsaevtr, hut
t h a t constructs itself in the vcry process of stepping back. Deconstmc-
tion is, in an even more radical manner, nonreflexive. The resources
necessary to conceive of the ultimate foundations that deconstruction
seeks arc not a positive part of mrraphysical conceptuality but are
given in meraphysics in a ncgarive manner. Thc “rationality,” so to
speak, of the “ultimate foundations” to be discovered by dmnstruc-
tion ‘*no longer issum from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the
destruction, not the demolition but the de-xdirncntation. the dc-
construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of
the logos“ (OC,p. 10). In other words. thc ultimate foundations for
which deconstruction reaches out are no longer simply part of the
grammar and lexicon of metaphysics. They are in a certain way, as
wc shall set, exterior to metaphysics. For this reason, neither reflex-
ivity nor any morc radical concept of it is capable of didosing such
foundations, hecausc retlection can reflecr only whar is imrnanenr ro
the logos. But for the same reason, it may well be that deconstruction
cannot be rermd nonrcflexive, in rhe sense rhar I havc applied this
wrm to Abbm and destruction. In what follows, we shall address
these questions specifically,
 . .
8

Deconstructive Methodology

at

If dmnsrmction reach= out far “ultimate foundations,” it may b

said to represent a methodital principle of philosophical houndation
and grounding. Such a statement, however, must bc rendered more
precise and scchxl against a numbcr of misundcrstandinkr. All the
concepts implied in chis staarcmcnt will have to bc put in quotation
marks.
Methods arc p c r a U y understood as mads (fmm hodos: ”way,’’
“road”} to knowltdg~.In the sciences, as well as in the philosophies
that scimtific thinking patronizes, method is an instrument for rep-
resentinga given field, and it i s applied to that field from the outside.
That is, it is on the side of the subject and i s an ucamal refkction of
the object. It i s an insrrumcnral approach iu knowledge from an
entirely subjective pasition. Ytr such a relation of scientific represen-
tation as a form extcrior to a given content is in principle extraneous
to any thinking philosophy. This, however, is not to say that me-
thodical thought should be replaced “by the non-method of presen-
timent and inspiration, or by the arbitrariness of prophetic uttcranct,
bath of which dapisc not only scitnrific pomposity, bur scientific
p m d u r e of all kinds,” as Hegel puts it.’ For gcnuinc philosaphicat
thought, methods arc always determined methods, which have their
Boura in the rcgion to which they apply and which arc dcpcndmr
onthenaturcands~fidtyotthatrcgion.Forthisreasantheultimate
mahod-that is, the m&od that qrcgeno the philosophical itin-
,crary to truth-uat bc one that describes the intrinsic and sponta-
neous movement OF truth itseIf. The philOQophica1method, as the
mad toward truth i n a domain that i s itself determined in tcrms of
trueh, impliesphilosophy’s self-implication, and the necessity co m l m
I?.+ ON DECONSTRUCTION

itsclf into self-wnsciousncss, Since Plam such a method has been

called dirllektike, the science of dividing (diairesis) and reunification
(synngoge). Such a method is nothing other than the patient pursuit
of the conceptual activity of m t h as it develops its own coherence.
It is thus not a formal procedure or rule separate from the content
of truth. Method, then, is no longm simply the way to truth; it i 5
truth itself. This is what Hegel means when, in the lasr chapter of rhc
greater Logic, cntitlcd “The Absolute Idea,” he finally thematizes the
concept of method: “From this course the method has emerged as
theself-knowing Notion rhat bas itself, as the absolute, both subjective
and objective, far its strbject matter, consequently as the pure corrt-
spondence of the Notion and ia reality, PS a cancretc existence that
is the Notion itself.”J What is called “method” in Hcgcl is thus the
totalizing dynamic dcscriprion of the inrellemal acdviry that, as “rhc
soul of being,” attains its most complex and complete fulfillment in
the Notion or Concept wherein that acrivity achieves full sclf-deter-
mination. In other words, method for Hegtl is idential to the stmc-
turc of thought, insofar as thought is also the sysrematic and genetic
exposirian of the successive moments that constirure it as a whole. In
Hegel it coincides with the self-experience of thought.
To the extent rhat Derrida’s work is a genuinely philosophical
inquiry that takes the standard rules ofphilosophy very seriously, its
“method” is certainly not characterizedby any exteriority ra its object.
But is this t a say that, in the last resort, it would tend to coincide
with the movement of the self-exposition of truth as Cancept? Un-
douhtedly not. since dmmstruaion also manifestly includa the de-
construction af dialectics, in b t h a Platonic and a Hegelian sense.
As a method, deconstruction is very much determined by the region
and the regions of philosophy to which it applies. Yet Derrida has
argued rhar deconstruction is exorbiranr ro the totality of philosoph-
ical knowledge, in particular as that knowledge culminates in the
Wcgclian Conccpr. 11 procccds from a cenain point of exteriority to
the whole of the region of all rqions of philosophy so as to reinscribe
or reground that totality in or with regard to what is exorbitant to
it. Obviously, such a procedure ‘nor only makes it impossible to give
the usual methodological or logical intraorbitary assurances for an
operation such as deconsuucdon, but it also raiss the question wh&
deconstruction can be thought of in terms of method.
Taking off from a ccrrain poinr outside the roraliry of the age ot
logocentrism,-that is, the totality consriturive of philosophy, and in
particular speculative philosophy, which claims to have achieved that
 DBCONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 123

totdity-deaonstruaion m s to flirt with the ECienti6c iSea of d o d

that is characterid precisely by its exteriority to its o b i m . But as
w e shall see, rhis point of cxreriority to the totality is not that of the
subject. Deconstruction is never the effect of a subjective act of desire
o r will or wishing. What provokes a damnstmaion i s rather of an
“objective” nature. It is a “must,” so to speak. “The incision [Pen-
m e ; ah ‘opening,’ ‘beginning,’‘broaching’] of deconsaucdon, which
is not a voluntary decision or an absolute beginning, docs not take
place just anywhere, or in an absolute elsewhere. An incision, pre-
ciscly. it can be made only according to lines of form and ioms of
rupnrrc that are localizable in the discourse to be dewnstructed” (P,
p. 82).
Decunstmction, as a methodical prinaple, cannor ’be mistaken for
anything resembling scientificproccdural mlm,in spiteof itrdeparturc
from a certain point outside philosophy, nor does it yield to philos-
ophy’s classical definition of method, according to which the methcd
must not be irreducibly alien to the leld tbrough which it leads.
Although dcconstrucrion is an eminently philosophical operation, an
operation of extreme sensibility toward the immanence or inherence
of the ways of thought to that which is thought-the subjea matter
(the identity of method and concept, as Hegel would say]-it is nor
sbictrr s m u methdical, since it does take plam from a ccrtain point
ounide such an identity. Therefore, deconstruction is also the decon-
struction of the concept of mcrhod (both scientific and philosophical)
and has to be determined accordingly.
As in Heidegger, the scientificand philosophical conccpa of method
a r t reductive concepts for Derrida. According to Heidegger, the con-
cept ofmethod, by inaugurating the tcchnologization of thought, has
radically disfigured the essence of the road (hodos) as the proper mode
of philostrphical thought. In his debarc with method, however, Dcrrida
does not attempt to oppose a more fundamental notion of method
to scientific or philosophical method. If mcthod for Derrida is a re-
ductive concept, it is so in a different sense than for Heidegger. For
Dcrrida, method is by nature reductive, whether it is fundarnenral or
only derived.’ Yet it would be a great mistake to condude drat becausc
dcconsrruaion is critical of the discourse of metaphysics and irs mn-
ccpt of method (scientific or philosophical), it would, in total disre-
spca of all levels, indulge in uncontrollable free play. Although a
deconstruction of method, deconstruction is not a nonmethcd, an
invitation m wild and private lucubrations. The rigor of dcconsmc-
tion is cxempli6ed. tor example, by the discrete steps it takes to
121 ON DECONSTRUCTION

deconstruct method. Like those of dissemination, the steps of dcmn-

strunion, says Derrida, “allow for (no) method [pas de m&hodel: no
path leads around in a ~ircletoward a first step, nor proceeds from
..
the simple to the compler, nor ]=dads from a k n n i n g to an end . We
here note a pninflack of method [poki de mkrhode]: this [however]
d o a not rule out a certain marching order” (D,p. 271).
Ir is therefore important to emphasizc rhc systematism of decon-
struction. It represents a procedure all of whose movements intertwine
to form a coherent theoretical configuration. Thus deconsmctive
“m~hodology”as a whole cannot be characterized by any imprm-
sfonistic or empiricist appropriation of one or two ofirs “moments.“
A rnerccvocation of some of thcsc memcnts, or of some of the themes
with which deconstruction is concerned, will never lead ro any true
insight into what deconstruction purports to achieve.
Derrida wakes varied use of the term deconstnrdan. In the early
writings especially, demmtnution sometimes merely translam Abhu
or Desmr&rion;at ,other times it metonymically namm its own dif-
ferent movements or steps as well; and finally by appositional qual-
ifications it now and again appears m differenriate h e m a mukiplidty
of operations. Yet for the most part, the term has a very dchnite
meaning. Even if the operation of deconstruction also affects the
conccpt of method, nothing prevents our formalizing to some extenr
the different theoretical movements that make up one rigorous notion
of deconstruction. Before we can discuss the methodical aspect of
deconstruction, however, we must clarify its theoretical presupposi-
tions, determining the specific point a t which it becomes compelling
and operational, the different steps that lead wp to that point, and
finaily the aims of deconstruction. Only against such a background
can the formal cb~racrerisiirsof deconstruction be lully undersraad.

THE PROPAEDEUTKS OF DECONSTRUCTION

tct us recall Gadamcr’s contention that absolute reflection as it is
amculated by Hegel anticipates all logically possible reflective stands
o n the specdative totality of philosophy by turning them into par-
ticular moments of that tonlIty. More generally speaking, Hegel’s
discourse is thought to have takm account of all possible Otherness
to that totality, including the concept of Otherness and exteriarity,
d a rcmainder or a beyond to the system, by making them eirnplc
elements in the process of the wlf-elaboration of truth. With this, of
course, philosophy reachm its completion and its end. Derrida tec-
 ’ . DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY I +S

ognizes this completion o f ‘philosophy in speculative thought as well

when he wrim that “in completing itself, [philosaphy] could both
include within itself and anticipate all the figures of its beyond, aB
the formsand resources of its exterior; and could do so in order to
keep thew forms and resources close to itself by simply taking hold
of their enunciation” (WDp- 252).‘ The compelling problem at that
momenr is how to b m k the silence without falling back behind the
Iogical achievements of Hegel’s position when in the end here is
nothing left to be said.s Like all other philosophies, srarting with the
Hegelian Ich, which in the wake of Hegel‘s completion of the meta-
physical projecr of philosophy became aware of the dilemma p o d
by Hegd’s thought, Derrida .acknowledges that Hegel’s superior so-
lution of the traditional problems of philosophy is a terriblechallenge
to philosophical thought. Obviously that challengc cannot be met
cirher &mu& a ddibaare decision to overcome Hegel’s completion
of mctaphysia or by simple indifference. That brid segment of the
history of the tradition of contesting metaphysics in the aftcrmarh of
Hegel, -which, as 1 have shown in Part I of this srudy, began with
Nitrzsche, dearly show what is at stake. Instead of ignoring the task,
such a tradition, on the contrary, testifies to the increasing urgency
of meeting that challenge, as welt as to an equally increasing vigilance
concerning all the methodological m l s and themes that purport to
unhinge the dmurse of a h l u t e bowing. After Heideggcr’s desrmc-
tion, Dcrrida’s deconstruction is the latest and most complex devel-
opment of that tradition.
How, then, arc we ta characterize, in as succinct a manner as
possible, Derrida’s approach to theproblm?Hcgd’sphilwbphy must
be deaibed as an attempt to overcome the aporias of traditional
philosophid positions, which ariv fmm a naive adoption of a set
of inherited conaptual oppositions, by consaucdvely destroyingthem
in a purely conceptual genesis. Dcrrida’s concern is with a naivety
unthought by philosophy in general, a blindness constitutive of pbil-
osophical thought, Hegel’s speculative system included. This naivety
is an essmtid one and is a function of the logical (dialectical or not)
consismcy sought and achieved by the philosophical discourse. Ir is
not a naivety rbat would hamper the solution of traditional philo-
sophical problems; on the contrary, it is a blindness without which
them may be no hope of ever solving them. This naivety is thar of
the phiIosophical discourse, of its practice of arguing toward and
exposing its concepts. Derrida, who is particularly conccrncd with
the discursive strategies constitutive of the spcculativt solution {in all
It4 ON DECONSTRUCTION

its forms)of the aporias to which the traditional brmation of concepts

leads, has described theappmach of singling out thisdiscursive naivety
as follows:

A, task is then prescribed: m study the philosophicat text in its formal s m c -

NIT, in is rherorical organization, in rhespcificity and diversity of its textual
rypes, in jts models of exposirion and praduaion-band what previously
wccc calkd gcnrcs-and also in the space of irs wises en sche. in a syntax
which would be not only the anicularion of its significds, its rdcrcnc~to
Being o r m truth. but also the handling of in proceedings, and of everything
invesrcd in them. ( M , p. 293)

The naiveties brought to light by such a study-a study that is not

yet the deconstruction of the philosophicnl text but only its negative
and prior momcnt-arc not, propcrly spcaking, logical deficiencies.
Thhas, after pointing out in “The Double Scssion” that, for organi-
zational reasons concerning the text of Phikbor, Plato’s conrcntion
of a priority of thc imitated over imitation is problematic in the rext
itself, Derrida warns us”not to be too quick ro call [it] contradicrory’”
(D,p. 190). Conrradicrions are in principle susceptible m a (dialcc-
tical) solution. What Derrida is pointing out here is an inconsistency
on the level of philosophical argumentation t h a t cannot be mended,
but that nevertheless makes It possible to obtain the desired author-
irarive results. The very s u m of Plaro’s dialogue hinges on such .
inconsistenaes.
Thew naiveties are conrradinions owing neither m an inconsistency
in logicat argumentation nor to the rhetorical farce of the discourse I

of philosophy. To call these naiveties logical deficiencies or to make

them dependent on the inevitable rhetorical use of language in phi-
losophy is tn dcscribc only very approxImatcly the sorts of problems
exhibited in what may be called the propacdcutia of deconstrucrion.
It is even misleading, because the logical and the rhetorical arc, pre-
cisely, corresponding intraphilosophical norms of the coherence and
cohesion of the philosophical discourse, whose unthought is being
focused upon here. In irs apparent contradiction to the logical exi-
gencies of philosophical discourse, the rhetorical. figural, and im-
proper use of language combine with rhe logical use of language to
achicve the desired conceptual transparency.
In ordcr to understand the full impact of the shift from one sort
of criticism of naivety to another-from the philosophical criticism
of thc unscientific and unphilosophical consciousness and its “natura!
attitude’‘ (from Parmenides to H u w t l ) to the critique of the naiveties
 DPCONSfRUCflVE METHODOLOGY I 27
~~ ~~

implid by the discursive pragmatics of the firsr type of aiucism

(spxdative or not)-it is necessary to recall that at least sin= Plato,
all major philosophial concepts have rcprsrnrcd desiderata, values
not of what is but of what wgbt to be. As Derrida has shown, sin=
its inception philosophy has been mnuived of as an antidote to the
Ocher of phjlosophy, eirher in rhe form of ‘hem a m of illusion, the
charlatans and rhaumaturgs (in the Republic for instance), or in
the form of the unrep-table and unnameable, which in Kant’s
Third Critique is thematired undet the name of the disgusting, against
which it is said that wc strive with all our might (set D. pp. 137-
138).i Moreover, all ofphilosophy’s concepts and values arc d n m s
of plenitude. It would be simplistic to reton that such would he rme
only of.idcalist philosophy, since even the most empirical description
in philosophy of what is is normative, even were it only for the
,inevitablyaxiological dimension of the concepts used in description.
As desiderata, all philosophical concepts arc in a way utopian and
ampic; they rcprtsmc whar Dcnida calls erhi~tclmlogicalor ethico-
ontologicalvalues (LZ,pp, 217,236), Hence the hisrory of philosophy
in the expmsion of the n d to think thcx mnceprs, again and again,
in a satisfactory snd desirable manner-satisfactorg, that is,according
to the prinaple of nonconadiction. All thesc desiderata of philos-
ophy are thus c o n c e p ~of unity, rouliy, idenriry, cohesion,plenitude,
states of noncontradiction, in which thc negative has bem absorbad
by the posirive, states that lack, and by all rights precedt, all dissen-
sion, difkrcna, and separation, statcs of peace and reconciliation.
Yet Derrida’s contention is not simply that it wouid be impossible to
think nancontradiaion in a noncontradictoiy way. By focusing on
rhe formal, organizational, and t m a l production of noncontradic-
tion in the philosophical dimursc, he shows that, o n the contrary,
what makes nonwntradiction possible and successful within the Iimics
of philosophy’s cxpecradons is precisely the evasion of insighr char
results from the failure to question the discrepancies and inconsist-
encits of phiImphy’s mise m sche- This is the naivety that is the-
m a t i d in Derrida’s writings.
This inquiry into the p r o w of philosophial conceptualization,
as well as into €he pracda of discursive exposition and the s t r u ~ ~ t l l ~ s
of philosophical argumentation, brings UI light a whole new field of
“contradictions” and “aporias,” which, instead of simply belying the
philosophid enterprise, arc rarhcr mnstitucive of its successful com-
pletion. If one could venture to say that Hcidegger reveals a theme
unthought by metaphysics-the question of the ontim-ontologid
I 18 O N DECONSTRUCTION

diffcrencc-one could certainly say that Derrida discloses the UH-

thought synia* (a word that 1 shall have to render more precise) of
philosophical conceptuatization and srgumcntotion. Since the "con-
tradictions" and"aporias" that spring from this unthought dimension
of philosophical practice have never been thcmatized by philosophy
itself and are thus in a certain way exterior to the traditional and
coded problcms of philosophy, they cannot bc construed as conrra-
dictions or aporias proper. Therefore, rigorously speaking, it is mis-
lcadingta dcfine dtconsmction as an opcration that, 35 Ricocur puts
ir. "always consists in destroying rnersphysical discnurse by rcduction
to aporias," without further clarification.' Derrida'r own occasional
use of the words aporia and rotltradiction (see, for instance, M, p.
SO) does not render such an cffort toward clarification dispensable,
sincc undemanding dcmnsrruction depends on it. As we shall see,
Derrida does not limit the notions of aporia and contradiction to
fallacies of philomphical description and predication. Neither are
these concepts borrowed from the conceptual arsenal of the skeptical
tradition in philosophy, a rradition rhar throws doubt upon philo-
sophical knowledge only from the petspecrive of a higher mode of
truth. Aporio and contrddiction must be undcrsmod in Dcrrida as
referring to the general dissimilarity benveen the various ingredients,
elernem, or constitucnts of the discourse of philosophy as such. In-
deed, Dcrrida'r parallel inquiry into the formation of philosophical
c o n c c p and thc argumentative, discursivc, and textual stmztureps of
philosophy leads to the recognition of a n esrenrial nonhomogeneiry
brnvecn the concepts 3nd phitosophica1 texts or works thcrnsclves.
All major philosophical concepts. hc contends, are ethico-teleological
values of unbmached plenitude and presence. But, as respectable 3s
.
they may be, they "live on a delusion and nonrcspccr f o r . . [their]
own condition of origin" (OG, p. 139). They exist preEisdy on a
disregard far their own bipalar opposite, M which they deny a vatuc
similar to their own. Philosophical concepts wauld be entirely ho-
mogeneous if they posscsscd a nucleus ot rncaning that thcy owcd
exclusively to themselves-if they were, in other words, conceptual
atoms. Yet since concepts are produced within a discursive network
of diffcrenccs. thcy not only are what they are by virtue of other
concepts, but thcy also, in a hndamenrat way, inscribe that Otherness
within themselves.
Let us outline several ways in which the rel~llogialvalue of the
homogeneity of concepts is disproved by the very proem of thc for-
mation of concepts. First, since a conrcpt i s not a simple point but a
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 129

mmrt of prcdicam clustered around one central prrdicate, the

determining predicate is itself mnditioned by the backdrop of the
others. Second, each concept is part of a concephra1 binary opposition
in which each rtnn is believed to be simply exterior to the other. Yet
rht interval that separate cach from its opposite and from what it is
nor also makes cach concept what it is. A concept is thus constimhd
by an interval, by im difference from anorher concept But this interval
brings the concept inn, irs own by simultaneously dividing it. The
propcity of a concept depends entirely on irs difference from the
excluded concept. No conccpt, includingthe concept of ethics (‘1There
is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and conse
quendy, without absence, dissimulation, detour, differance, writing,”
OC, pp. 139-1401, can be thought rigorously without including the
tram of its difference from i s Other within itself. YR that is as much
a5 to say that h e concept-of ethics, for example, but all other con-
cepts as well-inciudcs within itself the trace of that to which it 5trives
(teleologically) to oppose itself in simple and pure exteriority. As a
result of this law canstituiive of concepts, all concepts are in a sense
paradoxical. Take, far instance, thc conccpr of the center:
It has always been rhought &at the center, which is by definition unique,
mnstihrd that vcry thing within a SRUCIU~ which while governing the
strumurn. cKapcJ smcturality. This is why dassifal thouht concerning
stnicmrn could say that h e cmm is, paradoxically,within thc strumre and
outside it. The center ir a t the centct ofthe totality, and yet. since the center
does not belong to the toraliry (is not part of the totaliry), the totaticy bus
its m t t r E/s&. ?he m t c r is not thc center. T h c concept of centered
structurc-al&ough it rcgrcrcnts m h m u itself, the wndition of the *is-
r philosophy or Ifience-is mntndimtily coherent. And as always,
~ m r as
w h m c t in aontradinion rxprt*us thr fom of a desire. (WD, p. 279)

Third, concepts arc always (by right and in ha) insaibtd within
systems or conceptual chains in which they wnsrantly relate to a
plurality of other concepts and conceptual oppositions from which
they rcaive their meaning by v i m e of the differential play of SMSC
consti~tion,andwhichthrrsaffeEtthemintheirverycore.Andfourrh,
one single conccpr may be subject ro different functions within a text
or a corpus of texts. It may function as a citation of itself as well as
of anaher meaning that this same concept may have in a different
place or stratum oron another occasion. This citational play, far from
being innocent, also affects the ideal closure of the concepts. True,
the different meanings 10 which any one monccpt may be subiccred
130 ON DECONSTRUCTION

within the same c o n m t are not a problem for philosophy. If philos-

ophy does not simply ignorc the question, it solves it hermeneutically,
as an index of a more profound and hidden meaning, or it solves h e
qucstion of d a t i n g rhc two kinds of meaning of one concept by
clcvating onc of t h a e meanings into the more true, complete meaning,
of which rhe other is but a derivation. As an examplc, ler us refer to
Kmt’s distinction berween pulchrido wuga and p u l c h r i d o ad-
b e r m s . Although these two determinations of beauty are of a prd-
iaung nayure, rhe question of beauty in general-that is, of h e common
root that would precomprchend the two concepts and make them
communicate-is denied consideration. The essence of beauty is
understood in terms of o m of the determinations only. For Kant there
is no single common sourcc of rhc two forms of bcaury: “We do not
pre-understand the csscnce of bcauty in the commonality of the two
types, but rather from the perspective of the free beauty that gives
rise to a purc aesthctic judgement. It is thc pure that gives us the
meaning of beauty in general, the pure telos of bcauty (as a non-
telosi. Iris the most beautiful that allows us to think essenaal beauty
and nor the less beautiful, which remains a groping approximation
en vuc de I’muwce” ( VP. p. 114).
In short, then, philosophical concepts arc not homogeneous. Their
nonhomogeneiry is manifold, caused by rhe very process of concept
formation and concept use. Yet the variety of dissimilarities that turn
mnceprs into paradoxical structures must not concern us furrher,sincc
a t this point I am intcrmtcd only in accenruaring thc generality of
their contradictory and aporetic nature. We must note, however, that
thesc diffcrcnt incohcrcnces constituting concepts, which arc either
absolutely fundamental insofar as concepts are formed within a dif-
ferential play, or seemingly contingent if they 5tcm from a varicd, if
not contradictov, usage within a single context, arc overshadowed
by philosophy’s desire for cohcrcnce. What Derrida calls the “regu-
lated incoherence within mnceptualiiy” (OC. pp. 237-238) cannot,
themfore, be thematized in philosophy. But the morivc of homc-
gencity-a rcleological morivc par cxcellence (P, p. 86)-not only
blurs the incoherence within concepts but also organizes the philo-
sophical conception of texrs. Let us first consider how philosophy
regulates differences in homogeneity telatlve to philosophical descrip-
tion and the construction of an argument. Derrida’s investigation of
philosophical works ,(and ofliterary texts as well) brings into view a
variety of d i p c q a n c i a betwecn the various strata that rnakc up a
work’s argurncntation and description, and that make it thoroughly
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY Ijl

illusionary simply m maintain the metaphysical desire for the purc

coherence of their volume,
Let us dwdl h r a moment on rht specitic nature of what, ii h e
light of Alhusxr’s concept of uncvm dcvclopmrnt, I have &oxn to
dl discursive inequaIities or dissimilarities, which are due to these
conflicting strata within the coherence of textsor works.’ Their nature
i s manifold too. One example of such a disparity bctwccn IevtIs of
argumentation is Derrida’s demonstration of a contradiction within
Saussure’s scient& project. This contradiction stems from the fact
that Sausurc, in daermining thc object of structural linguistics ac-
cording m the prinaple of diffcrendality as a system d marks &m-
parable to writing, bclies his strong condemnationin C o w 5 of writing
as harmfd to speech. Both a logo- and a phonoacntric valoritation
,ofspmh cohabit in this discourg as well as another scientific stratum
that is a radical questioning of the former orientation. Another ex-
ample is the tension between gesture and statement in Rousseau’r
,discussian of the origin of language. In OfGr~-tdogy, Dcrrida
disunguishcs between Rousscau’s explicit dcctararions as to how he
wishes to think the origin of language and his matteraf-fact &snip-
tion of it. Rousscau’s ddared intentian is to think the origin as a
,simpleoneunbroached by any difference. “But in spite of that d d a r t d
intention, Rousszau’s discourse lets itself be constrained by a com-
plexity which always ha5 the form of the supplement of or horn the
origin” (OG,p. 243). Yet instead of cancludhg, based on what bC
lows from his own description of the origin, that from the o u w
difference has corrupted the origin, Rousseau prefers to believe that
the supplmenz “ m t (should) have” bttn encloscd in, in the sense
of bcing confused with, the origin. “There must (should) buue been
plcnitudt and not Is&, p m c e without diffcma” [OC,p. 2151.
As a result of this crhico-rhmrerical decision, which valorim origi-
narity as a desideratum, everything that had emerged in the dcscrip-
don of the origin as already broaching it-that is, as being more
originary than the origin-is turned into sewn*, inm s o m d i n g
that “Q& itself from the oarside 0s evil und lack to happy and
innocent plenimde.” The dangaous supplement, then, “would come
from an ousidc which would be simply the outside” (OG, p, 215).
Conscqucndy, the tension b mgesture and statemen& desaiption
and declaration, far from resulting in mutual annihilarion conmburcs
to the cohenncc of rhe r i m by means of rht grid of the “ought to
he,’’ or the conditional mood. “Should [dcwuitl: it is the mode and
msc of a rclcoological and eschatological anticipation that supetin-
132 O N DECONSTRUCTION

tends Rousseau’s entire discourse,” writes Derrida (OC,p. 2951.

Through this mood the contradiction is made to be no mom than
apparent, and Rousseau can think the two ,incompatiblepossibilities,
the origin and the supplement, simulraneously. As the conditional
mood reveals, it is irself the uniry ofa desire. Derrida writes. “As in
the dream, as Freud analyzes it, incompatibles are simultaneously
admitted as soon as it is a matter of satisfying a dmire, in spite of the
principle of identity, or of thc excluded third parry-the logical time
of consciousness” (OG,p. 245)+These discursive contradictions are
united by d&rc into a conuadictory coherence regulated by what Freud
calls the sophistry of the borrowed kettle.’ Derrida sums up t h i s kind
of reasoning which according to Freud is suppascd to illustrate dream
logic, in the following passage: ‘‘In his attempt to arrange everything
in his favor. the defendant piles up contradictory argurnenis: (1) T h e
kmle I am returning ID you Is brand new; (2)The holes were aiready
in it when you lent it to me: (3) You never lent me a kettle, anyway”
(D, p. 111; see also S, p. 67).
The various argumcnts concerning the- origin and the cupplemcnt,
speech and writing, are organized by Saussure and Rousseau in 3
similar rnanncr: (1)The supplemcnt and writing are torally exterior
and inferior to the origin and to speech, which are thus not affected
by them and remain inncc; (2) they are harmful because they are
separate from the origin and thereby corrupt living speech, which
otherwise wouId be intact; and ( 3 ) if one needs to fall back on the
supplement or on writing, it is not becausc of their intrinsic valuc but
because the origin, was already deficient, and because living speech
was alrcady finite before it became supplemented by writing. Hence.
supplement and writing do not harm origin or speech at all. On the
contrary, they mend thc ddlcicndcs of origin and speech (D.p. 111).
&cause of this logic within discursive contradiction, or contradic-
tory arguments held together by the desire for unity, it is insufficient
simply to say “that Rousseau thinks the supplement without thinking
it, that he does not match his saying and his meaning, his descriptions
and his declarations” (OC, p- 245). Rather, the contradiction is reg-
ulated, which gives thew texts thcir very coherence and totality. In-
stead of permitting these contradictions to cancel each other out,
Rousseau, Iike Saussure “ammulata wntradicrory arguments to bring
about a satisfactory decision: the exclusion of writing,” differcncc,
or the supplement (OG, p. 45). But this organization of incompatibles
into a unity dominated by ethico-teleological values, which mainrains
and contains the adverse arguments and srrata in the very act of
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 733

decision by which philosophy institutes itdf, is possible only through

the evasion of a number of qustions and implicatiam that follow
horn the fact that “Rousscau, caught, like the logic of identity, witbirr
the graphic of supplementariry, says what he dcm nor wish to say,
describes what he docs nor wish to &ncludc” (QG. p. 246).
A last example of such contradidom concerning the gap beween
dccIaration and, this time, faaual practice concerns the often Kr-
ccived contradiction in the Platonic condemnation of writing in writ-
ing. Mow could Plato, Romeau, and others subordinarc wtiting to
‘.pee& while writing thernselva? Derrida asks:

W h r law governs this “mnmdiction:’ this opposjtion to itsclf of what is

said against wridng, of a dicrum rhar pmnouncu iaclf against itself a5 m n
as it finds its way into writing, as scan IS it wrires down its self-idmtiry and
~ r r i c saway what is prop” to it ugafnrt this ground of writing? This “con-
mdiction,” which is nothing other &an the rclation.m-wlf of diction as i t
oppopeo itsclf to saiprion, as ir chases itself (away) in hunting down what
is proply its trup-this mnrradiction is not contingent, (0, p, 156)
The sort of discursive inequalities that I have pointed out concern
contradictory strata of description within the argumentation of a
single work, dismpanaes between explicit statements and the &id-
cram of thought, between declaration and hctual p n a i a . But the
analysis preceding deconsrrucrian-the prapaedeutics ot decommc-
tion-is not limited to bringing into prominence conceptual aporias
on the one hand and, on the other, discursive inequalities of all sons.
There is a third type of discursive heterogeneity which in fact defies
categorization properly speaking. In each instance it comprises a mul-
tipIicity of very different and radially incommensurable layers, agcn-
ds,or sedimena that invariably make up discursive wholes.Through
thematizing this kind of conrradicrion or aporia in the philosophical
text, it becomes evident that the philosophical concept of conaadic-
tion or aporia is incapable of covering and comprehending t h e rypes
of inconsistencies, nor only in isolation but especially when taken
rogcrher. Ended, thest disuepancim srem from differences in the im-
portance. scope, and stams of parts or eierncnts of philosophical dis-
mums, as well AS h the imdudbly dispmpordonatc and dissimilar
nature of various constituents of these parts or elements. let us, then,
look a t some paradigmatic types of this sort of discursive inequality.
which, contrary to appearances, have not becn problematized in the
perspective outlined above.
The analysis of philosophical diswursa reveals that they a m ram-
I34 ON DECONSTRUCTION
~ _ _ _

w e d not only of pure concepts and philasophcmes but also of met-

aphors and mythemes. As discursive elements, the last two are of an
entirely different status from that of concepts, yet they necessarily
combine with c o n u p , whose purity as to rnyrhical and figural res-
idues should be beyond all question. Certainly the relation between
myth and logos is a philosophical problem of long standing; the same
must be said of the relation berween concept and figure. Bur what
Derrida is concerned with-in “Plaro’s Pharmacy,” for instance-is
mot so much the way in which philosophy tries to master its relation
to myth or to figures a$ the manner in which this intimate combi-
nation, within a whole of such dissimilar elements as conccpts and
nonconccpts, philosophcmes and rnyrhemcs, instead of simply resist-
ing absorption into the homogeneity of the concept contributes to the
creation of an effect of such purity, In ,other words, Derrida’s concern
is with the irreducibility and inevitability of the combination of op-
posite genres in the philosophical discourse.
Such an analysis may also accentuate a leximlogical inconsistency
arising from the diffcrent and repeated use of one particular mo-called
key word or key signification in a texc The emphasis of such an
analysis is an the singularity and inextricability of the juxtaposition
of thcw significations in onc ensemble. The different citations of one
and the same word within one text or context can be opposed to one
anarhcr, bur rhcy can also be simply dissimilar and irrduciblc to
one anather. in which caw they resist all hermeneutical solution.
“There cannot be any such thing as key words,” writcs Derrida (D,
p. 256). T h e e multiple different usages of thc same term in one work
or textual unity mnst thus be analyzed as the background against
which the hermeneutical search for an u1timatc signified rates place.
The analysis may dm focus on a chain of words similar to one
another, which may have the same etymological mot but are none-
theless nor supposed to communicate within the text. Phurmakein-
phom$on-pharmokeus in Plato’s Phoedms, which Derrida analyzes
in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” is an instance of such a chain.
This sort of analysis may also throw inta relict unsubtatcd and
unmediated statements or propositions about one particular h e m e
within a text or a corpus of texts, for instance the theme of the
“woman” in Nietz-schc, analyzed by Derrida in Spurs. It may a150
point out the cohabitation in onc text or corpus of OHO or mare
irreducible types atone general thing (such as pulchrihido ndhuerm
and pukbritudo vogn in rhe Third Critiquc. analyzcd by Dcrrida in
“Parergon”); of a variety of information in a text and a context;!Q or
 DBCONSTRVCTIVE MEMODOtOGY 132

simply of fit repeated and dissimilar functions within om text or

cantcxt of mere signifiers, such as the I m s i and r in MaIIarmt (sn
D,p. ,282).
Other such discursive inequalities can be found bermen pam of
a rexr, for ucample a preface and the main body of a met, as d i m m e d
by Dcrrida in “Outwork, Prrfacing”; between the title and thc main
pan of the text, as thematid in “Tim pddser”; or between two
stgmcns of a text dividcd by an intermediary space which is marked
either by a blank, as in Blanchot’sL’Arra de mod. analyzed in “Living
On: €?ordmLines,’’ or marked by an inmpolated text a5 in Nicawhc’s
Homo, treated in “COtobiographie de Nicasche.”” For p m t
purposq it is not n-ry to accumulate further cvidcna of such
discurbivc disazpancics arising from a grafting of thoroughly hmr-
ogcneous elements upon one another. Lct us rccalI for the morncnt
that rhcy are multiple, different in status, and different in essence.
The analysis p ’ t s u p p d by all deconstruction. properly speaking,
canoists ofsuch an assessment of the various heterogeneous levels of
philosophical discouse, as well a~ of the hctcrogcncous clemcnts or
agcncis that combine on these levels. It is not a question of reduang
t h e e variegated discursive and conceptual disparitis to one model
of divergency, cspccially not m that of contradiction as the major
criterion of the necessary f a l x h d of statements. Nor is the question
one of how to reduce these disparities, incon&tenci~,and dissimi-
larities through any of the traditional procedures. What is at stake is
the assessment of the generality and irreducibility of these various
incqdiues. Under this condition only can the second step of decon-
struction take place. h w n s m d o n is thus the ammpt to acmunt
for the hcterogmcity constitutive of the philosophical discaursc, not
by trying to overcome irs inner diMerenccs but by maintaining them.
To sum up: decansmction srarfs with a systematic elucidation of
contradictions, paradoxes, inconsistencies, and aporias constitutive
of coanccptuality, argumentation, and the disamivencss of philoso-
phy. Yet these discrepanacs arc not logical contradictions, the only
discrepanda for which the philosophical discourse can aauunt h d e d
by the logic of identity, they arc consequently not contradictions
prOpRly speaking. Nor are t h c ~ n-ry inmnsisrcncies rhc result
of inquality between form and conrent. Their urdusion from the
canon of philosophical themes is precisely what makes it possible to
distinguish beorrcen form and mntcnt, a distinction that takcs place
solely against the horizon of the possibility of their homogeneous
reunification.
136 O N DECONSTRUCTION

As its Grst step, deconstruction thus presupposm a cuncrtrely de-

veloped demonstration of the fact that concepts and discursive to-
talities are already cracked and fissured by necessary contradictions
and hmrogeneitics that thr discourse of philosophy fails to take into
account, &her bceause they are not, rigorously speaking, logical mn-
tradiaions, or because a reguIatcd (conceptual) economy must avoid
them in order to safeguard the ethico-theoretical decisions that orient
i t s discourse. These fissures become apparent whcn wc follow to its
logical end that which in the pmcess of concepruaIizarion or argu-
mentation i s only in a cenain manner said. Demnsrmaion thus begins
by taking up broached bur discontinued implications-discontinued
because they would have contradicted thc intentions of philosophy.
In the case of Rousseau's text, Derrida formulates this p d u r e as
follow%
Rousscau's text must constantly bcmnridered asa m m p h a n d many-tevclcd
smcmrc; in it, certain, pmpositions may be acid as inrcrprctations of other
pmpositionr thar we are, up to a certain p i n t and with rcrtain precautions,
f r e to read oihcnvisc. Rousscau says A, then for reasons thar we must
dcrerminc. he interprets ,A into B. A, which was alrndy an intcrprctation.
i s reinterpreted into B. kfrcr raking cognizame of it,we may, without leaving
Rousuau's r a t . isolate A from it$ interpretation into B, and diswver par-
sibilitics and rcrourccs there that indeed belong to Rousseau's text, but were
not produced or exploited by him. which. for q u a l l y legible modvn, he
preferred to cut short by a gesturc neither witting nor unwirting. ( O G , p,
307)
T h e dcmonsrration of these uncxploited possibilities and t c m u r c q
which contradict the ethim-theoretical decisions characteristic of con-
ceptualization and philosophical argumentation and haunt the con-
ceprs and the texts ,of philosophy, corresponds to the rhematization
of a naivety unthought by discursive philosophical practice. Such
naivety complies with and is a function ofthe ethical orientation of
theorizing and is in no way a naivety or deficicncy owing to the finitude
of the philosophizing subiect, Rousseau or Saussure, for instance. On
the contrary, such naivety is the very possibility of theory.

AGAINST NEUTRALln
Although philosophy's blind spot may 'be locared in the discrepancies
mnstitutivc of the philosophical discourse, it docs not ncccssarily
follow that the philosophical protect itself would be unsettled by
attempts to show that these contradictions or aponas cancel each
 DECONZTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 137

other out. Exactly the opposim is true. Such a purported dcrnystifi-

cation of phiiosophy amounts to nothing more (nor less) than the
Romantic attempt to re&, philosophy’s dream of homogmeity by
a shortcut. Deconstruction begins with demonstrating such inequal-
itics within concepts or texu, but it aims as little as the texts thcmxlvcs
at an annulment of that which is in opposition. That deconsuucdon
h s nothing in common with such an operarion of annulmmr is spclIed
aut in capital letttrs in Derrida’s work. The primary reason for this
i s that the contradictions, oppositions, and dyadic stcuctllrcs of con-
cepts, texts, and r h a r rnultipk argumentational levels are nwm sym-
mnetrieal. Derrida insists timc and again that “in classical philosophical
opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a uis
2 vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs
rhe other (axidogically, tog+cally, crc.), or has “rhc upper hand” (P,
p. 41). Indeed, “there is no dualism without primacy,” as even Fried-
rich Schlegcl well knew.‘iTbus, no simplemllapsingof opposite rerrns
is possible. But this dissymmetry is not only one of conrcprs opposed
binarily within the discourse of philosophy; i t is also true of the
aporias, paradoxes, and contradictions that constitute the concepts
themselves, or that exist betureen suppressed possibilities, RSOUM,
or implications and t h a t which is valorized or explicitly developed
within discursive toaliucs. In the lamer case they cannot be collapsed,
because they belong to entirely different levcIs of thought and argu-
mentatidn. To mistake deconstruction for an operation aiming at an
annulment of thcsc conccptual ot textual discrepancies is ta confound
Ievels of thought and texts, to overlook the axiological and logical
subordination of its concepts, and to demonstraw an insensibility to
what texts, and panicularly philosophical tern, are meant to achieve.
Even if dcmnsauction’s intention, in the last analysis. is to expose
the impossibility of clear-cut genres, and thus the ultimate failure of
a distinct genre such as philosophy, its point of departure remains an
extreme awarenessof the projectparticularto the genre of philosophy,
as o p p d to literature in particular.
“Deconstruction,” writes Dcrrida, “cannot limit itself or proceed
immediately to a neutralization” (M,p. 329). Such an annulment or
neutralization of mnccptual or textual inconsistencies. by overlooking
the canflictuaI smcturc of oppositions, would in p r u d e “leave the
previous Ccld untouched, leaving one no hold on the prnious op-
position, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the 6eld
effectively" (P, p. 41). Such neutralization would not only renounce
all active intervention in thc texts to be dtconstrumd, bur would
138 O N DECONSTRUCTION

w e n scryc the pu’poscs and interests of traditional interpretation. In

a long fmmote to “The Double Session” he writes, ‘Just as the motif
of neutrality, in its ncgative form paves the way for thc most classical
and suspect attempts at reappropriation, it would be imprudent just
to canccl out the pairs of metaphysical oppositions,,simply to m r k
off from them any text (assuming this to be possible).” (D, p. 207).
In the case of Mallarmi, for example, a deconstruction, in the sense
of a ncutralizaton or annulment, of oppositional dyads would fieme
only ro confirm the hitherto idealist interpretation of that author.
Indeed,by annulling and equalizingall oppositional forces inrhe mode
of pro and contra, such an operation would not only stabilize these
torccs in an economy of decidable polarities, bur would also be a
“free shot which aims nonetheIess 10 collect its interests” (S, p. 63).
Therefore, Dcrrida insists on a dissymmeiric sharegy in demnstruc-
tion in order to control and “countcrbalance the neutralizingmoments
of any deconstruction” (D.p, 207). Dewnstrction is nor neutral;
neutrality ”has a negative essence (nr-uter), is rhe negative side of
transgression” (WD.p. 274). A s such, it is produced within discursive
knowledge. in which ultimately all the contradimions and all the
oppositions of classical logic are avercome in thc work of neutrali-
zation. Neurrafizarion, then, i s a negative image of deconstruction
within discursive knowledge. What Detrida says in Writing und Dif-
ference of Bataille’s sovereign operation is valid for deconstrucrion
too: “The sovereign operation is not content with neurralizing the
classical operations in discourse; in the major form of experience it
transgresses the law or prohibitions that form a system with discourse,
rmd e m with the w o r k ofneutrulizatiott” (WD, p. 274).‘J
Since the identifying Q f deconstruction with the neutralization or
mutual annulment of contradicting concepts or textual strata is still
one of the dominant misconccptions about deconsmution, it may bc
useful ro pursue its implications. This misconceprion has informed
most deconstrucrive litcrary criticism. whether of literary, philosoph-
ical. or critical texts, and it has come ta be known as the theory of
self-retlecrion or self-d-deconsuuction of texts. This self-reflection is
understood to take place by a mutual annulment, neutralization, o r
cancellation of all bipolar oppositions within these texts. Such a prin-
ciple of annulment also informs critical enterprises that oppose con-
flicting and mutually exclusive positions wirhin critical theory or
philosophy in order m demonstrarc their identity. by showing that
one posiEion partakes in the other it opposes {and vice versa). in this
manner pointing our the inadcquacy ot either as a universa1 statement.
 DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 3'19
. .
Whcrhcr this mutual neutralimrion is seen as a final coming to rest
of the antagonistic positions or as an endless conilict betwen the two
positions. the principle is the same. But what theoretical pmuppo-
sitions do these different critical enterprises share, whether rhey deal
with texts of literature, philosophy, or criticism? Firsr, the suspicion
that anrappnistic positions or opposite canceps are identical ariscs
from a negIcct of the historical and pragmatic aspects of thc contexts
in which they are expressed. Only through such a simplification or
reduction of this context-that is to say, anly when historical and
theoretical dispiamments within a tradition arc no longer seen as
corresponding to real theoretical problems, form, ideologies, and so
on-is such a dramatization of adthetical positions of criticism pos-
sible. By neglecting the pragmatic and historical context of the utter-
ance of what is dramatized in such a manner as to cancel it out, the
criticism in qucstion reveals its origins in Romantic (as well as, in a
certain interpretation, Idealist) philosophy. It is a suprahistorical crit-
icism that pretends to speak from a position free of ideology-that
is, from an abdute point of view.
This last point needs to be developed a bit further. First, let us
remember rhat this kind of criticism originated in early German Ro-
mantiasm. The reciprocal dissolution of opposing concepts or con-
tradictorysmta within a text, which this criticism promotes, must
be traced back to the Romantics' attempt at a transcendend poetry
that was to represent an amalgam nor only of all different genres but
also of all the hithem separate disciplines. Such a p~errywas to be
created through a fluidization Qr liquefaction (Ve-$iissig.ng) of all
oppositions and particularities by means of objecriveirony. The m l t
was to be a medium afrefiriudy, in which all individual, and thus
opposite, stands would achieve total reciprocity." Second-and this
point too can only be presented schematically-it is necessary to &all
Hegel's criticism of Romanticism, bath in general and in pardcular
of thc ideas of reciprocity. annulmenr, and neutrality. T h e medium
of neurraliradon or dissolution (mewmum uniuersale) was thought
to result from the reciprocal determination of all the t m 5 that par-
take in it. In their attempt to define this medium, the RomanriG singled
out Fichte's synthetic concept of interdetermination (Wecbselbestim-
munp) and rum4 it into the one constitutive movement of annulment.
But innrderermination in Fichte's Science of Kttowledge is not the
only form, however major, of determination. In osdcr to break the
idealist arcularity of such an interaction, he exablished the necessity
of a further determination of interdetermination through selfdeter-
140 O N DECONSTRUCTION
~

mination.’lThissprmlative concepr of determinarion is the very back-

bone of Hegel’s critique of Romantic philosophy.
Especially in his Logic, Hegel develops this Fichtean critique of a
self-contained reciprocity, a reciprocity that avoids its own detenni-
narion. This further determination of reciprocity and inrcrdetctmi-
nation takes placc in “The Doctrine of Essence” in the second b m k
of the first part of Tbe Science of Logic. ’Ihe problem of reciprocal
determination, which consriruces rhc Romanric medium of reflection
as much a5 the contemporary idea of a self-destructing text, is dealt
with in “The Logic of Reflection.” While discussing the penultimate
reflexive determination-in other words, contradiction-Hegel con-
cludes that the reflective dissolution of contradiction, the “ceaselm
vanishing of the opposites into themselves,” in which each of rhc
polar oppositions “is simply the transition or rather the self-trans-
position of itself into its opposite.” serves roproduce a unity {Einheit)
created precisely by the self-destruction of the opposed tcm5. “Thq
destroy thcnrselws [sie rithro! sich urgnmde] in that they determine
themselves as self-identical, yet in this detcrmination arc rather the
negative, an identity-with-seIf that is a relation-to-other.”‘r This unity
in which the contradimions mutually dissolve is therefore a unity of
nullity (Nd!).As a matter of fact, representing (vorsreUmdes) con-
sciousncss, unlike speculative consciousness, “stops shorr at the one-
sided resohion of it inro norhirrg, and fails to recognize rhc posirivc
side of contradiction where it becomes absolute activity and absolurc
ground” (p. 442). How are we then to think the positive side of
contradiction, and in what way can a xlf-dissolution of opposites
lead to a positive unity?Hegel wrim: “But contradiction contains
not mercly the negative, but also the positive; or, rhc sclfcxcluding
tetleaion is at the same rime positing reflection; tht result of contra-
diction is not mcmly a nullity. Thc positivc and negative constitute
the posiredtresz of the self-subsisrence. Their own negation of them-
selves sublam the positedncss of the self-subsistence. It is h i s which
in truth perishes in contradiction” (p. 433).
Indeed. from thc perspective of speculative consciousness-thar is,
from a detcrmination of interderemination in selt-deterrninarion-
the mutually derestricting play of opposites docs not simply result in
a zero outcomc. Instead of destroying thcmsclves in a unity of nullity,
the contradictory terms that “fall to the ground” (zugrmdegebm) in
self-liqucfaction articulate a wnity of rcflcction in which the opposed
terms ate rooted and of which they are the bipolar representation.
As Hegel puts it, the dissolvcd contradiction, the canceled-out op-
 llECONSTRUCTIVE. METHODO LOGY 141

pasition, is “ground, -ct as unity of the positive and mgative”

(p.435). But this can be recognized only if conscjousnlss docs not
stop shorn a t the concept o i interdetermination but determines it fur-
ther:

T h e sclf-contadicroty, self-subsirtento p p s i h n was therefore already imlf

ground; all thar was added 10 it was thc derermination of unity-wirh-sdf,
which results from the fact that each of the.seU-subsismt oppositc~oublatcs
itself a d makcs imlf into i t s opposite, &us falling to the pound [zugrundc
gehr]; but in this prows it at the same time only unircs with itoclt; hcreforc,
it is only in falling to tht pound [irr scimm Untmgmgt-], that is, in its
positcdnar or negation, &at hc oppositc is really the essence that is retlected
into and identical w i h itself. (p. 435)

In short, Hegel’s speculative critique rcvealr that both the shortcom-

ings and,ambitions of the Romantic dissolution of contradimion, a
dissolution that prestppows diffirena and rcsula only in the negative
arnQof :be mtrd (a unity of nullity), were within the realm of truth.
Unless one temgnizes with Heidegger that nihilism is the very e s x n r e
of metaphysics and that consequently all the concepts of wencc,
ground, and unity as rhought within onto-theology are nihiIistic-
concepts to which both Romanticism and mntemponry literary crit-
iasm and those ideological positions that a c m s them of being ni-
hilistic are indebted-Hegel‘s critique of the medium of reflexivity
shows thar what the Romanda aimed at was not 50 nihilistic after
all. As this disassion ofreciprocal determination or the self-canceling
of bipolar oppositions has demonstrated, the Romantic idea of the
medium of reflexivity, as well as that of the text as B medium of
neutralization and annulment of concepts and strata, fails to achieve
what it sceh: a unitary ground or essence in which all xlf-subsistent
opposites dissolve in order to ground themscIves. Were they to achiwc
this goal, Romantic self-reflmion and deconrtructive criticism would
represent a fulCllment of the telos of metaphysics. But Hegel’s spec-
ulative critique ot the movement of contradiction, which applies both
m Romanticism and tocnnremporary deconsuuctivc literary criticism,
shows that this movement produces only the simple or abstract idea
of such a ground. As Hegel shows, such a unity cannot be achieved
in a logically satisfactory manner within a lagic of eSEenaor reflection
but only in the logic of the Concept or Notion, since only here can
the determination of interdetermination by self-determination be com-
pleted.
k me repeat, then, that deconsmction has nothing in common
142 ON DECONSTRUCTION

with this sort of philosophical or criticat practice, although it is often

confused with it. Deconstruction docs not engage in the annulment
or neutralization of opposites. It is not a practice in search of an
essence, ground, or unity beyond all singular and opposite rerms or
beyond thc htstorical and pragmatic aspects of the concepts 01 po-
sitions whose dramatization is staged in Romantic philosophy and in
related literary criticism. We have seen that this cannot be the case.
The propacdeutia of deconstruction reveal that ir is not mnccrncd
with what has hitherto been called contradictions or aporias, which
lcnd themselves to a mutual self-dcstruction or to dissolution in an
all-embracing ground or essence.

INFRASTRUCTURAL ACCOUNTING
If decomtruction, conrequeotly. cannot be mistaken for such a meta-
physical operation, regardless of the way in which ncutratizatian at
annulment of differences is u n d e n t d - a s a conciliatory putting to
rest or as rhc opening of an infinite war bfrrvten them-how then is
demnsrrunion different? What does it do with the contradictions,
aporias,and inconsistencies that it so eagerly pinisto in the formation
of concepts or the argumentative and discursive structures of texts of
all som? A firsr schematic answer is that de*lnstructian attempts to
”account’* for these “contradictions” by “grounding” them in “in-
frastructures” discovered by analyzing the specific organization of
these “contradictions.” In addition to Derrida’s philosophical style
and the multifarious infrastmcrures to which his analysts lead, the
very concept of infrastructure, as the formd rule that each time reg-
ulatcs diffcrcntly the play of the contradictions in quation, is an
intflnsic part of his original contribution to philosophy. It is a con-
trihurion that displaces the logic of philosophy and inscriber ir within
a general heterology.
Let us address specifically the three general concepts that 1 have
put in quotarion marks in this,definirion of deconstruction: “account-
ing for,” “grounding” (as it differs from thc metaphysical operation
of grounding), and “structure.”
Since Plato, at1 reasonable speech has been held M be that which
not only assern bur also always accounts for what is asserted, by
stating the grounds or reasons for it. Yet such a substantiation, by
reasons or grounds, of what is asscrred, and hence the claims to
knowledge of reasonable speech. d m nor proceed cxclusivcly by
empirical and logim-mathmatical justification. Ir must also take place,
 DECQNZTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 141

as Kant wrim at the beginning OF Critique of Piwe Ru*m, in a “free

and public lamination."^^ As hgon d i d m i , or a rendcring of ac-
counts, all accounting-that is, all stating ,of the pounds of what is
asserted-comprises a practical and publicaspectin which thcthinker
justifies himself before others. Just as in ancient Greece the individual
laid his entire life bare in the public square of the agora to ranivc
the civic stamp of approval of the whole community, without which
his life as a citizen would have been incomplete, so too the appeal to
public approval is a n m r y and intrinsic clement of philosophical
accounting, without which philosophy could not ,claim universality.
In this process the individual’s self-consciousnesscoalcsccs, and the
legitimacy of the grounds of explanation receives its ,official stamp of
recognition from the public. The concept of accounring’for, rhm,
which ultimately hinges on the lagon didomi, involves much more
than merely stating grounds in the process of substantiating what is
asserted. The individual also rkssponds to the demand of accounting
for himself before the community in arder to receive recognition of
his status as a self-conscious pubIic being. Only in unison can all thcx
moments of accounting establish the artitudc of truth. They show
the pr- of accounting to be a unitary proms, in which the sub-
stantiation of truth claims hinges on rhe public constitution of the
individual as a self-conscious, reasonable being, capable ofdrmon-
strating philosophy’s claim to self-legitimfzation,’~
Derrida’s anernpt to “ground” the contradictions in concept for-
marion as well as in the argumentative and rcrmal man of philo-
sophical ensembles in “infTastructurc5” has many consequences for
the rraditional concept of accounting and its structure of wholenes-
more consequences than can be analyzed here. Although it is irnpor-
tam to rcalim rhar Dcrrida d m not simply craw the metaphysical
concept of accounting and of a Iasr instance, if only because to do sn
“wouid run the risk of defusing the nemsary critique it perrnia in
certain determinate contexts” (0, p. 2081, it will soon bccome clear
that the infraastrumral grounds that account for the differences in
question and correspond to problems that do not belong to the cia*
sical canon of philosophy are no longer simply grounds in the phil-
osophical sense. Consequently, establishing such nongrounds can no
longer be viewed as an act of philosophical accounring.
I have maintained that deconstruction consists of establishing “in-
frastructures’’ to accaunt for differences as far as they pertain to
canceptF and texts. Clarifying what 9tructure and infiastrucrure mean
in this wntcxt may give us a better grasp of rhc episttmologgicaI
=44 ON DECONSTRUCTION

achievement of deconstruction. Throughout his writings Denida has

acknowledged the pertincnce of the structuralist enterprise. But he
has also regularly pointed out its ethico-metaphysical provenance,
especially in phenomenology. in whose shadow modern structuralism
has grown and flourished. He has insisted on the affinity between
5tructurat and eidetic reduction and on the problem t h a t follows from
both: the systematic privileging of one of the rwo series that char-
acterize rhe system of metaphysics-rhc xrics concerned with form,
quantity, internal organization, closure, static analysis, aod so on as
opposcd to that concerned with content, quality, history, opcnness,
genetic analysis. Therefore, Derrida concludes, “it would not be dif-
ficult rr, show that a certain structuralism has always been philoso-
phy’s most spontaneous gesture” (WD, p~ 159). Yct he also claims
to have dcvcloped “the most legitimarc principled migcncies of ‘struc-
turalism’ ’* (P, p. 28), as far as a norion such as “differance” is COR-
ccrned, that is, as onc example of “infrastmaura.” Cansequcntly, it
is all the more urgent to clarify the concepr of srructure as used by
Uerrida.
Whether one retraces the traditional meaning of stmctwe back to
the origin of its present usage in the calculus of variations of the 1870s
and in topabgy at the turn of the century,or to its synonyms in Creek
thought, it always refers to a constructed system functioning perfectly
within itself. Yet in this sensethe term structure borrows heavily from
several other traditional concepts. Thus, an analysis pretending to
exhaust the meaning of rhe modern concept of structure would have
to begin by explaining why it wcrned necessary at o n e point m replacc
more traditional concepts with this new term. “To know why one
says ‘structure,’ is to know why one no longer wishes to say eidos,
*essence,’‘form,’ Gestalt, ‘ensemble,’ ‘composition,’ ‘complex,” ‘con-
struction,’ ‘correlation,’ ’totality,’ ‘Idea,” ‘organism,’ ‘sate,’ ‘system.’
ctc. One must understand not only why each of these words showed
i r d f to be insufficient but also why the notion nf structure continues
to borrow Some implicit signification from them and to be inhabited
by them” (WD, p. ,301).What the norion of structure shares with all
thcsc concepts i s closure, according to which the passage from one
structure to another can be rhoughr only in tcms of chance, hamrd,
or catastrophe. I t is important 10 note that this closure is due not
only to the bracketing of facts t h a t a structuralist perrpecrivcrequim,
bur also to the fact that the traditional concept of structure is always
thought to hc cenrered. T h e concept of structure has always been
thought with regard to a point of presence or fixed origin which turns
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY f4 5

is botders into the arcumfmncz of a totality, This aspen of a doscd

mmlity, withdrawn from all possibIe &change from ourside, which thus
makesesthcsrrucrurean ideal model rather than a de fact0 consmction,
is also emphasized by the metaphorical origin of structure in the
concept of spatialiry.
In W r i h g mzd Dflmrcnre, Derrida m i n d s us that
..
gnicnr SCIISU, the muon ofsuumre r c f e ~only
~ co space, gmmeuic or mor-
phological space, the order of forms and sitcs. Srmuurc is hnt the structure
of an organic or artificial work, thc inumal unity of an.asremblagc, a con-
shrctiorr; a work i5 gmcrncd by a unifying pnndple, the nrchiiecirre that
..
is bdit and made visible in a location. Only metaphorically was this
topogruphical literality displaced in the direction of iro Aristoulean and top-
i d signification (the t h m r y of mrnrnonplaccs in languagc and thc manip
ulauan of rnorifs or arguments) {WD,pp. 15-16)
In short, the conocpt of s r m c t u ~is a highly charged and ambiguous
one. Consequently, “cvcrythirtg depends upon how one sets ir to
work,” as D d d a says in Pmitians (P,p. 24). The kind of work to
which Derrida refers is lccated,,firstof all, in^ the spatiality waked
by thc.mctaphor of stmcnue. The task is to interrogate the meta-
phoridty of the term structure in order to prevent irs geometrical and
rnorphobgical connotations from taking dre upper hand. Subse-
quently, a ccrtain nonspatialky or original spatiality of thc concept
of structure comes into focus- Derrida writes in Writing nnd Difler-
mce:
As long sthe mctaphorial scnsc of the notion of ~ c t u r isc not acknowl-
edged as such. that is to ‘say interrogated and cvm dcsroycd as concerns its
figurative quality so that tbt nonsparialiry or original spatiality designad
by it may be mivcd, one runs the risk, through a Kind of sliding as unnotiad
as it is efficacious, of confusing meaning with its gmmeiric, morphological,
or, in the bnt d cases, cinematic model. One risks being interested in the
figure itrclf m the detriment of the play going on within it mctaphori-
cally. (WD,
p. 16)
By bracketing in rhii manner all the figurative connorations of the
original model of structure-&at is, by thematizing and excluding
from the term its geometrical representation of a unified a n d centered
space-the “structuralicy of structure" may come into v i m . As a
matter of fact, the predominantly figurative spatiality associated with
the term smcrure neutralizes and obliterates the thought or m c -
turality of structure and what it is to achieve. The morphological and
gcamerric rneraphoricity of the notion of swcture not only fails to
146 O N DECONSTRUCTION

exhaust the meaning of the term bur also depends on the structurality
of s t r u m r e for its very meaning.
T h e thought of the strumrality of stfuchlre. a thought that bc-
m e s possible as soon as the ,oridnary metaphorical meaning of
shchrre is recopitad and put between quoration marks, is the thought
of the law according to which the notion of strncture has always been
svbjccted to a center. It is also a n attempt to decenter structure, to
think its openness, or 10 think what remains open in an otherwise
closed structurc. Thc stmcturality of structure sccms, thus. to be an-
other name for the tsscncc of sttrutture, which comes into view as
s w n as the spatiality that informs the mctaphor of structure is set
aside. Why essence is not the proper name for the atructurality of
s t r u m r c wit1 become obvious as we go on. For rhc moment it should
be clear that whm Derrids operates “positively” with the conccpt of
structure, he aims ar thc structurality of structure. To spcak of the
rrrucmrality of structure is to speak on a level entirely other than the
lcvcl on which the conccpt of ”the (necmarily closed} minor smuc-
ture” exists. This structuralicy ofsrructurc is the “fundamtnral 5truc-
ture” (WD. pp. 155,261; it allows a dostd-off totality to open itself,
ifonly in the mere anticipation of iis subscquent reclmure. But this
“fundarncntal” or “cssential” stmcmre is in truth “the structurality
of an opening,” a transcendental of sorts that allows the minor Struc-
tures to comc to the fore (WD. p. 155). It is an opening that is
nrucrural, QT the smcturrlity of an opening. Yet each of thesc con-
cepts excludes the other. It is thus as little a structure as it is an
opening; it is as little static as it is genetic. as little structural a5 it is
historical. It can be understood neither from a genetic nor from il
structuralist and taxonomic point of view, nor from a combination
of both points of view.
What, then, is this more “fundamcntar” stnrcture? What is in
srructurality? I t is thc opening or possibility of what opens up closed
structures, and what closes structures off against any exterior intcr-
fcrence. It is the principle that guides the decentering and centering
ofstructures. “This opening is certainly that which fibcrates timc and
genesis (even coincides with them), but it is also that which risks
enclosing p’ogression toward the future-becoming-by giving it form.
That which risks stifling force under form” (WD, p. 26). The tran-
scendentality of this structurality of an opening is therefore both the
condition of possibility of a systematic structuralism and “‘theprin-
cipled, essential, and structural impossibility of dosing a structural
 DECONETRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY IA 7
~~~~

phanomenology” or any systematic strumralism of whatever kind

(WD,p. 162).To sum up: shsrrfrrw in Derrida has the meaning of
a nonregional and tranMendrntd opening that represents the con-
dition of possibility of the minor structures and the accidents t h a t
they suffer. Shctrrre, as used by Derrida, is an infrastructure.
In Positions, Dcrrida notes rhat the concept .ofinkastructurc, as
he uses it several times in Of Crummarolagy, camsponds to a ”trans-
..
farmed concept of ‘inframmure,’ , an ‘inkasmmcture’ of which
the gmerul rert would no longer be an effect or a reflection,” char
is to say, to a non-Mandst notion of infrastructure (P,p. 90). Sinm
Derrida has never explicitly outlined this particular transformarion,
wc may immcdiarcly pracecd to a characterization of the major fea-
m m of the notion of infrastructure.1~
With regard to concepts in bipolar opposition-that is, m mcra-
physical conceprs, to the aporias that become visible in the formation
of concepts, and to the codicting strata of argumentative and dis-
cursive totalities-the infrastructure is the “open matrix” in which
tficsc oppositions and contradictions arc engendered." Dcrrida defines
infiastructure when he writes, “Herespurnre means the irreduable
complldcy within which one can only shape or shift the play of
prcscncc or absence: that within which metaphysics can be produced
but which rnaaphysia cannot think” (OG.p. 167). The infrastruc-
tures. which as we shall see are irremediably plural, represent the
relation-connection, rdo, rapport-that organizes and thus ac-
count5 for the differenccs, contradictions, aporias. or inconsisrenciei
b m m n mncepts, levels, argumentative and texmal arrangements,
and so o n that drtracrerize rho discourse of meraphysics.
Now, 1 have daimed that by means of such infrastrumrcs decon-
struction accounts for the differenm that &we the discourse of
philosophy, and any othcr discourse dependent on it. Pumng aside
for the moment the questions concerning the technicalities of such a
way of accounring, we must first of all come to an understanding of
the philosophical tide of such an operation.indeed, what makes the
infrastructures in general capable of explaining and judiaally ground-
ing the aporias and contradictions of philosophical discourse? Let us
consider three reasons indicative of the exceptional rank of t h e
infrasmmrm: (1)theirprmnmbgical and prclogical status, (2)their
synthetic character, and (3) their economical and strategic nature. All
these qualities are, of mursc, Iinkcd, so that in expounding one, we
may have m presuppose another.
r48 ON DECONSTRUCTION

Preaniolagical and Prelogical Status of Infrdswuctures

Bemuse of the strategic predicamenr of the infrastmcnws-rhat is.
becausc of thcir conrexmal and historical dctermtnarion-it is, rig-
orousty speaking, improper m refer to infrasrrunures ar such, as I
havc done until now. The infrastructure, as thc specific complex or-
ganization responsible for the philosophical opposition of structure
and gcnesis, is only one possible infnsrructure, in the sense in which
I use the rerm here. For reasons of exposirion, however, I shall have
to continue to speak of infrastrucrures in general in order M name
everything that can account for the differences that I will be iddress-
ing. Now,in establishing thc prcontological status of infrasrructures
in general, one encounten the Same problem, owing to the fact t h a t
thc qua[ification preontdgicol refers, rigoroudy speaking, to the
character of one particular infrastructure with regard to the opposi-
tion in philowphy of being and nothingness. presence and absence.
In spiteof these strategic limits, the determination prtonrologicafwill
rtonerheless help u s characterize infrastructum in general. But Ict me
caution against any misunderstanding of preontoiogical either in terns
of temporal interiority or in terms of Heidegger’s fundamental on-
tology.
what, then, does prmtrtologicd mean in terns of infrastructurcs?
As a judiciary ground, an infrastrumrc must not be of the nature of
the opposites for which it accounts: otherwisc it would bclong to the
order of what it comes to explain. With regard to the traditional and
canonical oppositions of presence and absence, of being and noth-
ingness, infrastructures must nor bedescribed in terms of these bipolar
opposirions, or of other oppositions derivative of them. Only by put-
ting the authority of prcscncc and its simple symmetrical counterpart,
a b m c c or lack, into question can an infrastructure achievc what it
is supposed to achieve. The infrastructure, conscqucntly, must he
thought of as preceding, in a nontemporal way, the alternarivc of
being and norhingness, of presence and abscnce, and of the nntice
ontological difference as well, as Derrida shows in “Diffecance.” If
an infrastructurc is to assumc thc explicatory status of a ground, it
must be a radical altcrity in excess of that which it accounts for. For
thc same reasons, thc infrastructure must bc prelogical. T h e laws that
it formulates for the discourse of phitorophy must belaws that account
for the difference between the philosophimi logos and all its Others,
and for rhar vcry reason it cannot have the simplicity of a IogicaI
principle. Of course this is not to say that the infrasrmcture would
 . DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 149

be irrational, since the irrational as one of the many Other0 of phi-

l ~ o p h yi s alwr only “the abomve offspring of the unthought ra-
tional,” as Hcidcgger purs it.?’ The infrismctufal analysis concerns
both the deciding instance of the logos and that which is derivativc
of it. As Dcrrida has made amply clear in “Limited Inc.,” the infm-
structural Iaws are those that govern the possibility of every logical
proposition. Therefore, “no wnsrituttd logic nor any rde of a IogimI
order can.. . provide a decision or impost its n o m upon these pre-
logical possibilities of logic. Such possibilities are not ‘logically’ pri-
mary or secondary with regard to logic itself. They are (topologically?)
alien to it, but not as its principle, condition of possibility, or ‘radical’
foundation“ (LI, p. 2351. It’fallawsfrom rhic that:
1. An infrastructure i s not an existent. It is not. Nor, however, is
it simply absent. “It is not a being-present, however excellent, unique,
principal, or transcendent one makes it,” writes Derrida in “Differ-
ance” (SP,p. 153). Although nor a k i n g (an]# it ia not a nonbting
( M Lan). Being present in neither a sensible nor an intelligiblemanner,
and thus belonging to no region whatsoever, thc infrastructure belongs
to a space ‘‘logically’’ anterior and alien to that of the regulated
contradictions ofrnetaphysia. TOquote again: ”Wetnust laoursclvcs
be referred to an order that no longer refers to sensibility. But we are
not referred to intelligibility either, to an ideality not formimusly
associated with the objectivity of rhewein or undemanding. We must
be referred to an order, thcn. that resists philosophy’s founding o p
position benvcen the sensible and the intelligible” (SP,p. 133). By
t h i s deontologization OF thc infrastructures, all realism with regard
to them is avoided. As it wil1 become dear, the concept of infra-
structure exages all nominalist philosophy as well.
2. Its preantoIogica1 nature aside, the infrastructure acquires its
interpretive efficiency with regard to the specific problems it clarifies
through being in excecs of the opposition af Sense and non-wnse,
meaning and the absence dmeaning. Having no meaning in itsclf (in
contrast to the fundamental Heideggenan question concerning the
ontico-ontological difference as a question about the “meaning” of
Being), it is in a position of anterioriry to the epoch of meaning and
the loss of meaning.
3. An infrastructure, moreover, is not an essence, sin= Er is not
dependent on any category of rhar which is present or absent. Nor i s
it a supraessentiality beyond the finite categorics of essence and cx-
istence. Ir doe5 nor call any higher, inconceivable, or ineffable mode
of being it5 own. It has no stable character, no autonomy, no ideal
150 QN DECONSTRUCTION

identity, and is thus not a substance, or hypokeimmon. Its “essence”

is m havc no essence. And yer an infrastructure is endowed with a
certain universaliry. T h e relations of irreducible complexity to which
it rcfers arc not merely fortuitous; but this is not to say that an
infrastructure is for thar reason an idealization. By accounting for thc
metaphysical opposition of the ideal and the nonideal. infrasmcturs
are, as Derrida insisrs, in a position ro render “the project of ideali-
zation possible without lending. .. [thmselves] to any pure, simple,
and jdealizable conceptualization” (LI, p. 210).
If infrastructures are not essences, then they cannot be the object
of wen the mosr refined form of the intuiting of essences that is the
Husserlian WCSeWSChQU. They are not a correlate of phmomcnolog-
ically reduced perception, and they do not yield to the “principle of
all principles,” that is, to the archetypal form of widen= of the
immediate presence of the rhing itself in propriu persona. Therc is no
bt such to thc infrastructures. They are not tlomu of perception. In
other words, they escape phenornenologization to the extcnt that they
rcfuse ro appear in person or present themdves to a phenorncnolog-
ical gaze. The infrastructures dissolve the comprehension of the thing
itself. Instcad ofoffcringthemselvcs, theywithdraw. They cffaccthem-
selves, constantly disappearing as they go alang. “They cannot, in
classical affirmation, be affirmed without being negated“ {D,p, 157).
What thus makes its entrance into philosophy is thc very possibility
of a disappearing of truth, as Demda has illustrated it, under what
he names “women” in .Spurs IS, pp. 48-51). Hcnce, what Derrida
assew of “differance” is true of all other infrastmctures as well.
“There is no essence of the differance; not only can it not allow itself
to be taken u p into the us such of its name or in appearing, but it
threatens the authority of the us such in general, thc thing’s presence
in is essence” (SP,p. 158).
InfrastruFturcs appear or manifest themselves only 4s the differerrcr
of, say, structure and genesis, but never in person, never us such. One
could venture the following dcfinirion: infrastructures arc the “CS-
sences” of the structural-genetic difference. But since such an expla-
narion makes illegitimare use of the concept of esscncc, as wcll as of
the practice of Wesensscbau in general, Husserlian or not, it is clear
that the qualification e5scnce cannot be bestowed on infrastructurcs.
Infrasrrucrures do not offer themselves as such to any theorein. be it
that of traditional metaphysicr, of Husserlian phenomenology, or of
fundamental onrology. Yet it is precisely this alrerity, which prevents
them from ever prcsenting themselves in pmon, that qualifies the
 DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY

inframctorrs as an aplicandum of the difkrmcc Bawrrn the thing

in general and its essence, and of the differenm crucial to phenom-
enology, the difftrentrs of appearance and appearing, of perception
and what is perceived (indepmdmdy of the existence of the per-
ctivcd). of the nomco-nocmatic difference, and so onr

’ Syffthaic Chmrrntr of Ir&astmctrrres

The inftastructutal proass of aaounting is distinguis~cdfrom the
specularive mode of resolving mncradirrions insofar as it maintains
contradiction and resists its sublation into a ‘higher unity. It is also
distinguished from the Romantic fashion of eliminating contradiction
in terms of a reciprocal self-dwruction and annulment of oppositions
widin the s p h of, on the one hand, concordant fictions and, on rht
other, fictions of eternal strife between pairs of oppitcs. No differ-
encc-craoing complementarity or ontologization or idealization of the
war between opposites-bath Romantic alternatives ta sptculative
sublation-is sought in infrasmctural grounding. Hence, daconstruc-
dve interprcration of the contradictions, aporias, inconsistman, and
so on that are revealed in a scrutiny of the formation of concepts and
the discursive structures of philosophy will speak within contradiction
without contradiction. Indeed, in escablishing the infraatrumrcs a$
instances that account simultaneously for both p o l s of a bipolar
opposition, conceptual o r discursive, without eliminating that differ-
ence, one rhinks of them wirhour concradi&on-thar is, without
considering such contradictions to be pemnarr-as present und ab-
senr, sensible m d intelligible, empirical and transcmdental, and so
on,procirely because the infrastructures are neither present nor absent,
sensible nor inteliigible, empirical nor transandental. Infrastructures,
as we shall see, arc instances of an intcrmcdiary discourse, cnnwned
with a middle in which the diffcrends arc s u s p d c d and preserved,
bur which is not simply a dialectical middle. what explains this strange
logic is that the infrasuucrures must be originai syntheses if rhey arc
to live up to their judiciary ask. Yet, compared tn thc original syntheses
ar work in the discourse of mcraphysics, and in particular in G u m a n
Idealism as a whole, t h e syntheses can only be “unities by simula-
crum” (P,p 5s). Thcy cannot be secn as third terms that eventually
initiate solutions in the form ofspeculative diaIecticr. Rather, these
original qnthcxs, says Dcrrida, are analogous to what in traditional
philosophy, Csptdally in Kant, h z been relegated to transcendental
imagination, whose art dms not simply belong to the realm of the
152 ON DECONSTRUCTION

sensible and the intelligible, the passive and the active (xe D,p. 126).
f h c y do not simply carry implications of positing, activity, or agency
ofany son; nor are they merely passive, constituted syntheses. They
arc. on the contrary, more "originary" syntheses than any classical
origin. They represent n mode of synthesis that is older, or mare
111 .
simple," than the mode of uniting that is charactcriatic of philo-
sophical synthesizing. Synthesis, with respect to the inhasrmmres,
involves a complicity and caimplication that maintain together an
underermined number of possibilities, which need not necessarily be
in a relation of antithetical contrast with one another, as is the case
in the classical concept of Synthesis. Theachicvment of t h m original
synthtscs is that they tie together a variety of "contradictory" or
heterogeneous concepts, instances, strata, significations, and so on,
and that they make these communicate in a minimal organizational
unit, thus accounting for their contiguity in a given context while also
maintaining their irreducible diffcrence. For thm msons. the infra-
structural syntheses can be compared to 5cene5, stagings, and synopses
(rather than to tableaux) tothe extent thartheydo notcliminatedifIcr-
ence, spatialiry, or arrangemeor to the benefit of homogeneous unity.
T h e infastmaure is what knots ragcthcr all the threads of cor-
respondence among certain hetcrogmcous points of presence within
a discourse o r text. It must be understood as the medium ofdiffet-
eniiotion in ,general of thc heterogeneous possibilirics, contradictory
strata, lexicological disparities, and so on. This medium of all possible
differentiation-the common clement of all the oppositions, contra-
dictions, and discrepancies-is not a medium rhac would precede, as
an undiffcrentiated plenitudc, thc differenccs inro which it fragmcrits
itself. The adverse terms are not liquefied or mixed within it. As the
medium of differentiation in general, it precedes u n d i f f m r i a d unity
and the subsequent bipolar division. It is a unity of combat, "rhc
mmbar zonc hcovmn philosaphy and ir5 other" {D, p. 138). l r is rhc
locus of what Heidegger calls the some, as disrincr from the identical.
Thus, what makes the origjnaty syntheses of the infrastructures only
simulacra of syntheses is not merely their nature as arrangements of
possibilities, as opposed to what Hegel calls speculative germs, hut
their task of accounting for contradiction as such, without turning it
into the force of thc negative in the scrvioe of totality, whaher spec-
ularive or not. An infrasrmcturc, nores Derrida,

holds in rescrfe, in its undccidcd shadow and wigil, rhc opposins and the
differmds that the p m m s of discrimirration will come to carve our. Con-
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 153

tradictions and pairsofappasircrarelifted from thcbotrorn ofthisdiacritical.

djkring, deferring r e w e . Already inhabired by differme &is rrscry4
even though it ‘precedes’’ Ihc o p p i t i o n h c t w m diffetent tllms, even
though it prccxistsdiffcrcnar aseffms. docsnor hnvcrhcpunmal simplicity
of a coincidmrid oppositorurn. It is from this fund that d i a l d c r draws in
pftilosophernes. (D,p. 127)
But the rtservc of the infrastruaum as the medium of all possible
differentiation is also distinct from the Romantic medium of reflex-
ivity, in which everything communicates with everything within the
hul presence of the soul of the world.
We must r e a l l a t this poEnt that the contradictions among concepts
or argumentative patterns that ibhe infrastructures explain are cmtra-
dictions to which philosophical totalizations arc oblivious, and that
survive in spite of the miry of the concepts, in spite of successful
discursive totalization. The original synthesis of infrasrmctures must
thus explain the possibility of unity, speculative totaliry, and synthesis
against the backdrop of these nonsublimatcd, nonsublated, nonrec-
ollccted conrradicrions-that is, as syntheses thar do not erase con-
tradiction and aporia. Such a synthesis is originary prccisely because
it is not dosed, and because it maintains contradictory possihiliries
together. Such a “synthesis” must explain synthesis.

Economicul mid Strategic Ndiure of Snfmstrucmres

The last explanation I shall consider for the judiciary privilege of the
infrasrmctllres concerns the specific nature of the arrangement of the
conrradimry possibilities in original synthcxs. These originary ar-
rangements or compositions of conflicting possibilities are economi-
cal, in wcry sense of the word. They are economical synrheses according
M rhe sense of oibommos as “arrangement.” T h e y are economical
inmfar as they represent clusters of possibilitics indicating “that the
kind of bringing-together proposed here has the structure of an in-
terlacing, a weaving, or a web, which would allow the &&rent threads
and different lines of sense or force to separate again, as well as being
ready to bind others together” (SF‘, p. 132). Inhasctuctures fulfill the
economic prinaple of successful expIanation by accounting for a max-
imum of phenomena with a minimum of concepts and lagical traits.
Their synthew are economical too. in that they are characterized by
a artain calculus whereby the possibilities to be accounted for are
summed up by being p u t aside, in the same way that one puts money
aside as a reserve. The infrastructures reveal this goleral Economy as
154 ON DECONSTRUCTlON

organizing thhe relations between heterogeneous possibilities, such that

they constitute, in a sense still to be elaborated, the last instance.
In addition. what makc5 the fnfrastrucrurcs economical-a$ the
consideration of all the faaow of possibility present within a certain
thcoretical configuration-is also what limits both the nonethical,
nonidealizing explanatory scope of decanstnraian and the interven-
tion of its strategic dimension to only one particular dimrsive space
and time. Yet what may appear to be a limitation is actually what
makes deconstruction, contrary to the ahiscork and purely aesthetic
practice of annulment and ncutralization of opposites, an active his-
torical form of intervention in historically specified contexts.
Considering decanstructive interpretation as the production of in-
frastructurm capableof groundingcanrradictions and inconsistencies,
dmnsrmaion, far from being nihilisric, destructive, or negative, is,
on the contrary,affirmative. InSpurs, Dmida insists that deconsauc-
tive interpretation is affirmative interpretation (XE S, p. 37).Indecd,
evcrythingthar Heidcgser stated in his antinihilisricstand on dcstruc-
rion in "The Letter on Humanism" can be repeated with regard to
deconsrmcrion. The affirmative character of deconstructive interpre-
tation, however. is not to he confused with positivity. Demnstrucrivc
interpretation is affirmative in a Nimschean sense {see SP, pp. 1S9-
160).In the context of the present attempt to define it as the pro-
duction or reconstrunion of infrastructures, this means that decon-
suuaive interpretation affirms the play of thc positive and and the
negative, and thus it wards off the ethical temptation to liquidate
negativity and difference.

THE MARGINAL INSCRIPTION OF THE GROUND

At this point we must ask ourselves whether, rigorously speaking,
inhanrucrures can be called grounds, and we must quation as well
whether that which deconstruction achieves can in fact be compre-
hended and comprisd by the traditional opcration of grounding. No
doubt, if deconstruction is dcscribed as an attempt tu account by
means of infrastructures for the contradictions and differences that
the traditional discourse of philosophy accepts without question. then
this ,enterprise documents precisely the earnstness and rigor char-
acteristic of the philosophical operarion d foundation. But in order
to asses the true namrc of dcconstrucrion, the similarity between
dcconrtruciion and the philosophical operation of grounding must
not be overemphasized, sine this similarity is no more than a rcsem-
btance. Deconstruction repeats or mime5 grounding in order to ac-
 DECONSTRUCnVE METHODOLOGY 755

a u n t for the difference between a ground and that which is grounded,

with what can no longer be m l l d a ground.
Since it is in the very nature of a ground to be in eccm of what
it accounts for, the infrastructure--the difference h e e n the ground
and what is gmoundcd-cannot be understood simply as a ground.
Nor for these same reasons are the inEraascructures deep, as opposed
to surfacc, mctum; there is nothing proFornd about &MI. They
are not, strictly speaking, deeper grounds, which would be in oppo-
sition to what they make possible. In Spurs we read: “In its turn, the
opposition between metaphysic and non-metaphysic encounters its
limim here, the very limit of that apposition and of apposition’s
form.. . But, ifrhe form of opposition and the opposidonal s t r u m r e
are themsc~vcsmetaphysical, then the relation of metaphysics to its
other can n o longer be one of opposition” (S, pp. 117-119). The
inhastructure, or what I shall call the space of inscription, is not in
a relation of opposition to that which it makes possible. The relation
ofaltcrity b t r w c ~ r infra5tructures
r and t h a t which they account for is
not the relation of opposition between the ground and rhe grounded.=
The hicratchical relation between infrastructures and what they make
pssible (insofar as they also make it impossibIe) i s not that of a
hierarchy bascd o n opposition and contradiction. Hierarchy is no&
however, absenr; it is differently structured. For all rhcse reasons, an
infranmumrc is nut what is called a ground in traditional philosoph-
ical language. It is, on the contrary, a nonfundamental structure, or
an ab-1 srmcture, to the extent that it is without a bottom. Yet it
is not itself the bottom of anything either: “ln such a structure, which
is a non-fundamentalone, at once s u p d c i a l and bottomless, still and
always ‘flat,’ the property [propre] is Iiterally sunk. Even as it is carried
away of itself by its desire, it founders there in the waters of this its
own desire, uncncounterable-of iwlL It passes into the other” (S,
p. 117).
Infrastructures, consaquently, must bc understood in a necessarily
equivocal manmr-that is neither as the mult of florid language nor
08 fallacious reasoning-as simultaneously grounds and ungrounds,
as conditions of possibility and irnposibility. The n-icy of such
hfiridorspurions reasoning, of what Placo would have called logirtno
t h i notho, s t e m from the CffOK to think into “one” the metaphysical
opposition of the ground and that which it grounds, without, how-
met, turning it into an identity.” The neccsity of the apparently
incongruous staternem to which such rePsoning leads can be hlIy
accounted for only by considering what in Derrida corresponds m a
gcncral theory of duplication.
156 ON DECQNSTRUCTION

As we have seen, the infrastructure is not a subject or a cause. a

thing in general, or an essence to which everything that is could be
rewaced, as to a n origin present M itself. But mote important, neither
docs the infrasttmaure dmignate the processof division and separation
constitutive of differends and difference, because such a process still
presupposes a prior, unbroached origin. Thus, although dcconstruc-
tion, with its emphasis on the infraasttucrure, resembles what is called
in traditional philosophical language a search for a constituting, prb-
duang, and originary causality, the reconstruction of infrastmctures
dbes nor fall simply under philosophical jurisdiction. By tyingtogerher
in an infrastructure things as different as a ground and that which is
grounded, deconsrnrction does not proceed according to a strategy
of finality. infrastructures are only “general and formal predicative
structures” that repremr the “common root” for all predicates char-
acterizing opposing terms. This explains why infrastructura cannot
be concepts, but rather have the status of “philosophical quaicon-
cepts“ (VP,p. 64). Moreover, it shows that the infrastructurc is no
more than the open but comprehensive fund-the system of predi-
cative differences-in which the opposition between ground and that
which is grounded is carved out. The infrastructure is therefore also
rhe system of differenccs from which a11 constituting finality draws
its resources. For chis very reason, the infrasrruccural accounting does
not correspond to an operation of grounding; on the contrary, this
“operation which is not a n opration” (SP,p. 137) questions the very
values of origin, archue, and ielor. In what tams, then, are we to
understand the achievements of deconstruction? If the infrastructures
do not constitute, engender, or prcduce these differences or contra-
dictions, how, then, do they relate to them? If the infrastructures arc
not to be understood as causalities, active or passive, if they ace neither
of the order of subjectivity or essentiality nor, rigorously speaking,
conditions of possibiliry, how, hen, are we to rhink their intercourse
wirh t h a i of which they are infrastmcrures?
In his early work, such as Of Grammutology, Derrida a t times
speaks of the relation becwcen the infrasttucturcs and that which t h q
arc infrastructures of in terms of constitution and production, thus
meeting all the rcquircrnenfs of traditional philosophizing. For in-
stance, he invim us % speculate upon the power of exteriority as
constitutive of interiority: of specch, of signified meaning, of rhe pres-
ent as such” (OG, p. 313). Hence, there cannot be any doubt as to
the Icvel on which infrasmcrur= have ro be situated or as M t h c
goals toward which deconstruction i s aimed. Dertida’s hints, in Of
Crammarohgy, at “a new transcendental aesthetic” (OG. p. 290)
 DECONSTRUCTlVB METHODOLOGY 157

strongly support rhe dew that dcconstruaion aims at a theory of

originary constitution; but at the same time, Of Grummatology as a
whole mnsisrs of a dcconscruEtive critique of the philosophical mn-
cept of.ori@, and thus of the idea of a linear genesis. Let us also
recall that in the earlier Speech and Phmumenu, Derrida had written
that “the very concept of constitution itself must be deconstmmd”
(SP,p. 85). In OfCrumm&ology the notion of“inscription” (of both
ihe origin .and w h a t is derived from it) displaces the concepts of
production, engcndcrmtnt, gcncsis, constitution, and M on, which
are tributary to and characteristic of metaphysics and transcendental
phenomenology. Aftcr Of Grmmfology, Derrids enclam all t h e
terms in quotation marks.
Inrcliption is one of the tcms that both continue and break with
the transcendental question of production or constitution, of genesis
and hismry. inrcnpiian is another name for canstiturion, or more
precisely, “for the mnsdtudon of nrbjecrs and, so to speak, of con-
srirurion itself’ (OG. p. 281). In what ways, hen, dots the notion of
inscription both continue and displace the transcendental qustion of
constitution? First, what docs the word inscription designate? In-
scription, or rather, insmption in gmeral, is the name for a possibility
that all spccch must presuppose-that marks all speech-Mort it
can be linked m incision, engraving. drawing, the letter--in show to
writing in the common scnsc of the term. Without inscription in
genwul, without an bstitwted truce, without archewriting or proto-
writing affecting speech as the posiibility of its notation. whether or
not that possibility is ever actualized, no actual notation would be
possible. Without the possibility that an origin can he Iost, forgot-
rea, or dienared into what springs for& from it, an origin could
not bc an ongin. The possibility of i n d p t i o n is thus a neccsliary pos-
sibility, one that must always be possible. Dcrrida writes: “A new
mnsccndmtal acsthctic must Ia itulf bc guided not only by math-
ematical idealities but by the possibility of inscription in general, not
befalling an aiready constituted spacc as a contingent accident but
producing the spatiality of space. Indeed we say of inscription in
gmeml. in order to make it quite clear that it is not simply the no-
tation of a prepared s& representing i t d f , but inscription within
o+ and inscription as habittation always already situated” (OC,
p. 290).
Inscription, consequently, desigaam the passibiftits that neces-
sarily affect all origin insofar as it can factually be the origin of
something, or insofar as it can engender or constitute samething,
actively or passively. Inscription in g m m l is the mode in which
I58 ON DECONSTRUCTION

infrasrmcnrres qua nccmary possibilities relate to that of which they

are infrastructures. Thus inscription is what “con5titutcs” origins as
possible constituting origins. Yet such an investigation into the **con-
ditions of possibi1ities”of origins, into thespacc of inscriprion beyond
such oppositions as sensible and inrelligiblq as Derrida remarks, “ought
no longer to call itself a transcendental aarbetic. neither in the Kant-
ian, nor in the Husserlian,sense ofthwe words” (OG, p. 290). Indced,
deconstruction is an inquiry neither into the a priori forms of sense
perception andobject constimrion charaaeristicof a subject in general
nor into the meaning of thc prcpredicativc and preobjectivc spatio-
tcmporahy that Husserl envisioned in the conclusion of F o m l dad
Tramcmdmtul Logic as wcll as in the Curtesiun Meditations. ln-
scriplion is only one name for the way in which infrasrmcrurcs ground
or constitute. It describes only one cluster of determinations according
to which this particular mode of founding i5 to be thought. This one
cluster of dererminations must, however, suffice here to characterize
the differences between the philosophical operation of consritution
and rhar of deconstruction.
Inscription, says Derrida at the end of Positions, “is not a simple
position: it is rather that by means of which every position I s ofitself
conformded” (P,p. 96).Position here translates the Hegelian concept
of Setruwg, the determination of one with regard to an Other, or to
something in contrast with it. Pusition is thus a form of constitution
by means of which something becomes what it is through its relacion
to something other. Inscriprim, however, does not signify such 3
relation; on thc contrary, it is the determination of posirional con-
stirution, of the relation of the same and the Orher, for it demonstrates
that this relarion refers to something that cannot in any case be pos-
ited-the alterity of the Other-since this alterity is itself the ground
of pssibility of a positing self. Inscription in this sense refers to an
irreducible reference to Other, anterior TOan already consritutd sub-
jccr rhar pmupposes this rcfcrtnce as well as that which such a subject
constiturcs through posirioning. This implies that rhe relaton of phi-
losophy to its Others cannor bc one of opposition.
How, then, are wc to characrerize the achicvemmts of inscription?
Thc alterity in gmerd to which inscription refers is the possibiIity of
sameness. For that very wason it is also the possibility of becoming
different, other; and indeed, such a possibiliry must affea all self-
prcsenr and selfsame origin if it is to be rhe origin of something.
Indeed, an origin is an origin only if it can pmsibly be the origin of
something, whether or nor that possibility is actualized. An origin has
 DECO NSTWJCTWE M ETHODOLQGY . rs9

no rnaning whatsoever without such a possible space that it engcn-

d m and orients. It follows from this that an origin is necessariIy an
inscribed origin. In order to be a selfsame origin. it must irreducibly
d a t e to an 0th- in general, and in order to be the origin of somc-
thin& it must harbor the pnsibility of becoming other. In Writing
and Diffmmce, Dcrrida cancludq “Thc inscription is the written
origin t r a a d and henceforth iffsnibed in a system, in a figure which
it no longcr govern” (WD, p. 115). Inscription. &nscqucntly, docs
nor imply the annulment o r dstrucrion of rhe origin. On the contrary,
the origin o r constituting principle i s put into relation with the in-
frasuuctural rnibilitics of an origin, with alterity in general, which
must be prcsuppod if the origin is to be the origin of something.
lnsaiprion is a gcsnvc of comprehension which comprises rhc origin,
or any constititring principle, within a configuration of marks o r in-
Ir;lsrmctura.alpossibilities, a function of which the origin then appcan
to be. In a cerrain way one could speak of inscription as an gochc
of the origin; but it would be the opposite of a phenomenological
epoche, since it would rcprcscnt a bracketing of the function of origin
and of Qe meaning that origin confers on what derivcs from it. In
conuast M the phenomenological epoche, which is carried our in the
name of and in view of origin and meaning, inscription is the reduction
of the phenomenological reduction. The infrastructures teIated to the
origin, the principle, or the a priori through inscription are in excess
of phenamenaliry in general-that is, in excess of what represents the
absolute possibility of the meaning of what is, of what exists; they
arc more and lcss than an origin. Thc infranructunl. possibilities
represent an irreducible plurality in contrast with the uniqueness OF
the origin rhat they make possible but also impassible, since the origin
can never dominate their system. The origin and its constitutive op-
ention arc themselves “situated within P syntax without origin” (OG.
p. 2431. Since an origin, or any function of origin, is inscribed within
such a system of inftasmcrum, a system that is not a rows merm
or a mpm ourmios, the relation of this system to what it constirutcs
can no longer be described as a linear genesis. Indeed. how could a
,pig or Tstmof posribilitics engender o w line, flow, or beam? How,
moreover. could a qstern of inscription “engender” in the first place?
What Dcrrid? claims ofdissemination is m e of inscription in general:
it only a f i m . but docs not produce or constitute, the play or system
of possibilines rhar any function of origin must prtsupposc (and rhar
therefore limit its gossibility as wcll),
Thus inscription, insread of cnpmdering, conmmalizcs rhat which
160 O N DECONSTRUCTION

claims uniqucncss and oncness. Deconstruction reinscribs the origin

into the context or tern of its infrastructurd possibilities. To speak
the language of philosophy, one could say that this context of in-
frastructures-the space of inscription of the function of origin-is
an &OfUte passivity, if it did not also anticipate the metaphysical
difference between active and passive. But because of the irreducible
plurality of these infrastructures, they could also be said to rcprmenr
an rbsoluie mtiv;rY, if thcy did not subvert such an idea as well. Yet
to mention these possible detenninationr in order to discard them
immediately is not without purpose, for they give a hint of how
inscription is to be undersmod. Indeed, it is now clear that inscription
as the relation entertained by a function of origin to the mnrexr QF
it5 structur;ll passibiliiics rcveals rcpressed presuppositions and non-
thcmatized conditions of poseibi[ities. Moreover, since a function of
origin is piuively inscribed within a system of structural possibilities,
it follows that the system of structural possibilities does nor conrrol
or command the origin,which i s precisely ro bc cxpccrcd of grounds,
foundations, origins, or conditions of possibility, in the stria sense.
The system of infrastructural possibilities inscribes both the arigin
and its function of command, and even rhough this system of pos-
sihtlity docs not control or command the origin, the origin presup-
pows it as its (limiting) possibility, An o r i ~ i npresupposes this play
a5 a text presupposes its Context, a book i s m a r g k , a painting its
frame, or any unity its border. The relation ta the Other of philnsophy
is one of a ccrrain cxtcriority; yet thc specificity of that relation. i t 3
transccndcntaliry so to speak, is no longer of the order of production,
cngenderment, command. Throughout his works, under the name of
the margin, the frame, the borderline, and so forth. Derrida has them-
atized this relation. Oi “diffcnnce,” which is one such srructural
possibiliiy nf origin-an infrastructure in short-Derrida contends:
“11 commands norhing, rules aver nothing, and nowhere does it ex-
crcise any authoriry. It is not marked by a capiral Icner. Not only is
there no realm of differance, bur diffcrance is even the subversion of
every realm” (SP.p. 153).
Inscription is not a relation instituting the dependence of thearigin
or of any principle on another. more fundamental principle of rc-
sponsibility, which would serve exhausrively as the primary cause of
causes. Derrida‘s asswment of Bataible’s notion of sovereignry is also
true of inscription: it does not command in general. Rathcr, inscrip-
tion puts thc origin, or the causes liable ro be called upon. in relation
(en ruppoa] to the bundles of infrartructurcs that they prcsuppose,
 IlECONSfRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 1.61

yet to which they are not subordinate. Inscription pun the origin in
relation to that which is nor controlled by its judiciary function, yet
without which it could n o t pretend to responsibility in the first plrcc.
By inscribing a function 01origin, infrastructures d o not simply rep
rcscnt transcendcntaiia that, as a priori conditions, would rule over
origins. Indrasmmrcs arc not deeper, supracssmrial origins. If they
are said to ground origins, it must be added that they ungmund than
a t the same time. lnlrastructurcs are conditions as much of the im-
possibility as of the possibiliry of origins and grounds. ~nfrasmcrum
are structures, dusters of marks, without which grounds and ban-
scendcntal a prioris could not exist and could not exercise the Eon-
stitutional function cxpected OF thcm. Yet if, i m a d of constituting
or produang origins, inkasuucturcs were seen to inscribe them, then
the d m n s r m a i v e explication of rhe fissurts and cracks that char-
a& the philosophical discourse would no longer simply be &ought
of as an enterprise af accounting. Lct us, rhcrefore, circle back to the
problem of accounting.
inscription has been called B putting into rrlarion, or rather err
rupport. In the m a y on Bataillc, the rerm rapmfl s e r y ~to Iink two
forms of writing, minor and major; two economies, d e r c d and
gncral; as well as rhe known and the unknown, knowledge and the
non-smir, meaning and nonmeaning, mastery and sovereignty. None
of the terms of these rclations, howwer, dominates the other; none
is the principle or ground of this inscription, or mke m ruppppart. Yet
what ,doesr d p p o r ~mean? In English it mcans a relation marked by
harmony, accord, or affinity. 1n French it has addidoral meanings,
some of which we must take into consideration. First of all, it significs
a report, information, or account, as well as the revenue, profit, or
rcturn on a rucccssfd aperation. I t signifies such an operation insofar
as it is productive. Finally, ir refers to the sari0 or proportion char-
acterizing a relation. Consequently. rupport is characterid by sc-
manric ambiguity a s to its activity or passivity.
Inscription, or m*e 01 rapport, the operation of demnsrmction
par excellence, is thus a form of amounting. By bringing the origin
or a priori principles in relation to what exceeds them, the mise en
rapport state5 its reasons. It accounts for them by relating the tra-
ditional principles of accounting to the infrastructures, which dis-
count, or subtract, from t k principles what they have necessarily
lefr out of account. Through inscription, the traditional modes of
philosophical accounting-that is, the modes by which philosophical
discourse is repaid for its investments (refrouver ses ronrptes)-arc
K62 ON DECONSTRUCTION

shown to haw betn accounted for by that which excccds them. The
economy of the infrasrmctutes rakes into account that which cxceeds
accounting, that which, as a result, is never repaid in accounting
(nrunque d retrower son compte. see SF, p. 151). For rhe infrasrruc-
mres to which the origin is accauntablc or owing, no account or
reason can be given; they cannot be accounted for, and they represent
a capital that cannot be cashed in or turned into an account, since
they cannot be counted in the first place. They are, as I have men-
tioned, irrcrnediahly plural bur, a5 we shall see. abyssal and undecid-
able as well.
It follows from this that inscription, or mise en rapport, is not a
mode of accounting that, like the principlcs it inscribes, would account
for itself. Indeed, in contrast to origins or principles of Irgirimacy,
the infrastrumres do not command rhernselva, indeed, they do not
mmmand in general. “At stake in the opcration, thrrefort,” writes
Derrida, “is nor a self-consdousness, an abitity to be near oneself, to
maintain and to warch oneself. We are not in thc element of phe-
nomenology” (WD, p. 264). Precisely by refusing to command itself
nr ,anything eke. this opcrarion can function as that alreriry rhar
absolutely escapes the logic of philosophical accounring while ar the
same time “accounting” for it. As soon as the infrastruclures, or the
dcconstrucrivc operation of inscription, or wise en rapport, triies to
subject something to itseIf, itself included, it turns into what it pur-
ports to account tor. “In order not to govern, that is to say, in otder
not to he subjugated, it must subordinate nothing (direct object). thar
Is to say, be subordinated to nothing or no one (servile mediation of
the indirect obicct)” ( W D , p. 265),
To inscribe, or mertre en rapport, i s thus to speak without any
philosophical sccurity. The action secms to raemble Plato’s logismo
tini notho. That i s why Derrida can say h a t rMs is a tapport in the
form of nonrappon (WD, p. 268). It is also 3 rupport thar does nor
tolerate any rapport. because what the philosophical mode of ac-
counting is k i n g related co is beyond accounting. There cannot be
‘the slightest symmetry bctwmn inscription and what is inscribed,
between an origin and the syntax of the infrastructures against which
i t comes into relief. It is impossible ro account for somerhing that
inscribes the operation of accounting in a cluster of structural pos-
sibilities that cxclude their own self-domination and sclf-reflccrion.
Yet it is precisely this impossibility af accounring rhar allows inscrip-
tion, o r mist en rappot?, to explain what it inscribes-the origins,
the principle of legitimacy and rcspansibility, the de jarre conditions,
 DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY 16?

and so on. The explicatory power of inscription spring0 from the

radical Othmcss of the inframvctural marks to the philosophial
m o m y of accounts.
Insaiprion, as I have said, is beyond accounting, because what the
origins refer ro-thc spsterns of infrascmcrural possibilities-arc not
supnorigins, nor do they account for themselves. Inscription is be-
yond teasan, beaux the philosopher who puts origins into relation
with what rhey pmuppme as dusters of unthought pmdbilitia speaks
tKyand the Murity that philosophy can. and must, confer through
he sclf-rdIaction of i e ~discourse, Thus to deconstruct, or inscribe,
or put inm rdation the mnwmdental conditions of passibilitia with
their structural possibilities is to displace radically rhc log.. didomi
that is the ground of reasonable sptcch. This io not, however, to annul
or discard reasonable speech; nor does it entail any flirtation with
irrationalism. On the contrary, it is an attempr, paradoxically speak-
ing, co “accauht” far cfie ratia, far thc difference between rationality
and irrationality, in a gesture that both fulfills and transgresses the
most insistent and intimate goal of philosophy.

THE BIPARTITE OPERATlON OF DECONSTRUCTION

I have d t a r a c t e r i d decomciion as an attempt to account by way
of inbmmres for a variety of wmtial differenas and contradic-
tions within the philosophical disraurse. Ler us now consider the way
in which an infrasmmrc-or as Derrida also calk it a signifying
structure (strrtcme signif;mrk) (OG. p. 158)-is produced. DErrida
provides a primarily ncgativc elucidation af such an exorbitant pm-
duction in the chapter entitled “The Questions of Method” in Of
Grmnmrrrology. .in which he emphasizes char a transgression of the
contradictions, disaepanacs, and differencesin question toward their
unifyinginhastructure,or signifying structure, does not aim at some-
thing outside the discourse or tern in which they are encountered.
Deconstruction must be intrinsic; it must remain within the iexrs or
discoursts under cxamination. Sin= the interpretive efiicicncy of the
infrastructum or signifyiig smctutes depends on their insistence
witbin a given text or discoursr, one need not stress Derrida’s ultimate
justification-the absence of any transandental referent or signified-
for the tequiremmt that deconstruction take the dassial d i s c o m
or the tcxt as its point of departure. It may, however, be useful ro
emphasize &at the determination of deconstruction as an operation
immanent or inherent in the discourses or texts does not ncccssady
I 64 O W DECONSTRUCTION

imply their thematic or formal closure. Dmnsttuction is a production

that avoids bath traditionally opposite but complicimusly linked
methods of reading. “The security with which the commentary con-
siders the self-identity aftbe text, the confidence with which it cmwes
out its contour. goes kond in bmd with the tranquil m ~ r a n c crbot
leaps over tbe ter; towdrd its presumed content, in the diredon of
tbe pure signified” ‘(OC,p. 159). T h e deconstructive production of
signifying structurn, which accounts for the problems it set5 out to
tackle, is thus an opcration that remains intrinsic to the classical
discourses and texts without, however, positing rhe formal identity
or closure of the rexq as does all formalist criticism, New Criticism
included.
Perhaps at this point it would be useful to address the argument,
raiscd by some uninformed readers of Derrida, that deconstruction
is a se1f-defeating method since it can transgress metaphysics or log-
ocentrism ,only by continuing to speak the language of that tradition.
Derrida has fomulatcd thc problcm to which thcsc critics refer in thc
following way:

But all thme destructive dismurm and all their analogues are mapped in a
kind of circle. This circle is u n i q u r 11 describes the form of the relation
bctwcen the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of
metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the conccprr of mrmphyrics
in order to shake metaphysics. We hi ve no language-no syntax and no
lexicon-which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single
desituaivc proposition which has not alrcady had ro slip into tht form, the
logic. and the implicit postulations of precisely what i t scckr rn con-
t a r . (WD. pp, 280-2811

But what does this insight into the inevitable involvement of demn-
strumion in metaphysics mean? For the moment let us note anly that
Derrida calls it a circle ofaorts. not merely a circle, and t h a t he links
thc very meaning of dccanstruction to this kind of circularity. Thus
the circularity of logocentrism and dmnsuuction may well be akin
to Heidegger’s hcrmeneutic circle, which, far from k i n g a circrrlw
vitiosus, m be avoided at all costs. is a circle into which one has to
come in the right way if one wmts to think dr QII.
It i s true that Derrida himself may have encouraged his critics to
conclude that deconstruction is self-contadictory, for examplc by
speaking of the “aporias that appear to engage anyone who takes on
the task Qf defining the constraints which Limit philosophical dk-
coursc: for it is from the latter that the noncritical notions which arc
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 165

applied to its delimitation must be borrowed’“ (M,p. 180). Bur the

critics ought M have been aware that rhse aporias a r t aporias only
as long as rhe concepts borrowed fmm the dismursc of rnetaphrsics
go uncriricizcd.
“Deconstruction,” says Derrida, “does not.wnsist in passing h r n
one conapt to another, but in overturning and displacinga conceptual
order, as well as the noncancepmal order with which the conceptual
order is articularcd” (M,p. 329). This rcveaal and displament
require that one be solidly installed within traditional conceptuaiicy,
SI) that one xrs our with an awareness of at least rhrcc principlrs: (1)

that mnceprs in metaphysics are viewad as self-sufficient units; (2)

yet thcy appear only in oppositions, which are never simply juaa-
pcsirions of terms but hierarchies and ordm of subordination; and
(31 that furrhtrmore, all concepts srand in relations of solidarity. As
a resulr of chis Iasdcredennnination, concepts in philosophical discourse
cannor kinnocrntly separated. Instead of being d i m e elements or
atams, the concepts and gcsnrra of thought are taken in a syntax
and systcm. Because of this systFmaticand hisroricai solidarity, “every
particular bormwing brings along with it the whole oc rneraphysia”
(WD,p. 281). The awarcIKss of rhcsc rhree aspemof conccpts implies
that a concept can never be a self-sufficient unity, as mctaphysica
claims. “Every conapt is ncassariiy and essentially inscribed in a
chain or a system, wirhin which ir refm to another and to other
concepa, by the systematic play of diffcrcncs,” with the tcsult that
a concept “is never present in iself, in an adequate presenw &at
would rcfcr only to itxlf” (SP,p. 140). Two consequenm follow
horn this. First, there are no metaphysical conceps in rhemselvex As
Dcmda writcs in Pasitionc: “1 have n e w bclievcd that there were
metuphysicul concepts in and of thrmsclves. No concept i s by iisclf,
and consequently in andof itself, metaphysical, outside all the Mtrual
work in which it is inscribed” (P,p. 57; scc a k a M, p. 329),And
second, deconstruction cannor sirnpiy rcprcscnf a shift from one con-
cepr to anather, since the infnstructurtswith which it aims to account
for the specific apotias and differences bctwccn the concepts must
also account for the inability of concepa to be purely metaphysical
concepts, that is, to bc concepts ar all. The infrasmcture produced
by deconstruction is, then, no longer a concept.
Now,k u p e these infrastructures, which are the outcome of de-
construction, have somnimcs been dcsignarcd by a word or concept
that belongs ro the tradition 10be deconstructed, the critics have
charged rhat d m n s m c t i o n is inefticienr and futile in ia attempt to
166 O N DECONSTRUCTION

reach beyond metaphysics. This is not the place to review rhe different
forms this argument has taken and to retrace it to an inability to
understand the stakes of deconstruction. All I shall try to clarify is
the spccific manner in which an old concept can come to designate
something entirely different from its previous significd, as we11 as the
theoretical and practical impact of such a designation. Derrida calls
the provisional and strategic reawns for which an old name is retained
to designate infrastructures the “logic of paleonymics.” First, it must
be noted that, although deconstruchon does not aim at something
outside t h t discaurse of metaphysics, such as a last signified, still, the
old name that i s retained serves to designate something that is of a
Certain exterioriry to the discourse of metaphysics, to the extent that
it is of the order of an unthought structural possibility of that dis-
course. Although there is simply n o name for what the infrastructures
designate, this is not to say that such an unnamable would not be
represenrcd in one way or another in the discourse of metaphysics.
Since the infrastructum are implicitly presupposed by that discourse,
the rcprcsentatives of these srruchlral mmplexiries can be identified
more or less easily. Derrida at one point calls these representatives
“phantoms” or “ghosts.” Phantoms are the shapes of that from which
logic proceeds. As merely the shapes of he infrastmaures. these rep-
resentarives betray their subjection to the logic that they ungraund
(D. pp. 103-104). The ghosk representing the excluded Other from
the system arc always construcred within rhc system in a rauralogical
and symmerric form as “the negative key (le propre tnkgdgotifi to the
sysrcm.” in shotr, a5 its Other.” The names of these ghosts, of the
schemes under which the inframucrures abandon themselves to
the discourse of logic, are the only names according to which that
which exceeds mmaphysical conceptuality can be named within the
hisroricat closure or limits of scicnce and philmophy. The reasons for
which the X designated by the infrastructurm is given a particular
name arc entirely strategic, t h a t is to say historical. Although thc old
name t h a t is mobilized to name the infrastrumral X initially desig-
nates somcthing entirely different from it, it neverthelm is entitled
to do so if the name communicates in an essential way with thar X .
Writing is an old name for such an infmstrumral cluster of passi-
biiitics. Detrida justifies the usc of the name writing, in the sense of
arche-writing, as fallows:
An arche-writing whose nccessity and new concept 1 wish to indicate and
outline hem, and which 1 continue ta call writing only because it tssmtially
comrnunicatcs with thc vulgar mnfept vf writing. T h c t a m could not have
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY 167

i m p 4 i d f hPstaricatlp except by the dissimulation of the arche-writing,

by the desire far a speech dispIacing its other and itr double and working to
reduce im difference. If I persist in callingthat differencewriting, iris bccausc,
within the work 01 historical repression. writing was, by its situation, destined
rn signify the most formidable differem. (OG,p. 56)
Writkg i s thus a phantom name for the s t r u m 1 X, despite the
fact that it isvcry different from what has a h y s been called writing.
What make it susceptible to.bcingnamed X is that, within the dis-
courseof mctaphysics, it marks the repression of that X and therefore
essentially communicates with it. The reasons for retaining an old
name to name the entirely new reality of the i n f r a m c t u m is, w n -
SequentIy, historical, yet it is also a function Q( the singularity of a
topic. The justification for ia use "cormponds ro a condition of fotccs
and transIates an historical calculation" (OG, p. 70).
Deconstruction, therefore, borrows its notions, names, or "con-
ceprs" from philomphy in order to name what is unnamable w i h
im closure. Yet such an operation of borrowing is instantly followed
by an effort to mark this operation as plagiarism. Demarcated in this
manner, the borrowed concepts not only designarc something entirely
different from what they referred to before but also suffer a mutation
of meaning. And since deconstrucrion'sconccpts have been taken from
the given discourse of philosophy, it will permit an intervendon within
this discourse. In Posiriotts, Derrida formalizes the logic of paleonyrn-
ics as follows:
What, then, is the '*smtegic''necessity that q u i r e s the d o n a 1 main-
tcnancc of an old flume in ordcf to launch a new conctpt? With all the
rcservarions imposcd by this classical distinction betwm the name and the
conapt, one might bcgin to dcccribc this operation. Taking into account
the fact that a name docs not name thc punctual simpliary of a mnupt, but
rather a sysmn of predicates defining a conapt, a conceptual 5trumre m-
t m d a n a given predicate, we pmcccd: (1) to the extraction of a reduced
predicative trrjt that is held in rrserve, limited in a givcn conceptual s m m r c
(limited for motivations and relations of force to be a n a l y d ) , n m c d X ; (2)
to the delimitation, the grafting and regulated extension of the extracted
predicate, the name X being maintained as a kind of h e r of intrrvmtion,
in order to maintain a grasp on rhe previous organization, which is to be
transformed effectively. Tbercforr, extraction, graft, e x m i o n . (P. p. 71)
What follows from this description OF the formal modes i n which
an old name is transformed so as to designate precisely what it re-
prcsscs-modss 1 shall later discuss in thmrlvcs-is that the use of
traditional language by deconstructive interpretation is much more
168 ON DECONSTRUCTION

complex than its critics ‘believe. Indeed, the necessity of borrowing

one’s resources from the logic to be d e c o n s r m d is not only no
inconveniencc or calamity, as some have betieved, but is rather the
very condition of finding a hothold in the discourse ro be decon-
strucrcd. It is the very condition under which deeonstruction can be
successful and effmively intervene in the discourse of metaphysics.
“We cannot give up this metaphysid mrnpliciry without also giving
up the critique we are direcring against this compliciryy.” writes Der-
rida (WD, p. 281). The necessity under which deconstruction borrows
its notions from the discourse of philmophy secures the very possi-
bility of a subversive foothold-arways strategic and thus historical-
within rhe historical closure of that discourse. Generally speaking,
Derrida’s attcmpt at dcveloping a hcterology-that is, a nonhomo-
geneous discoursc-can be effective only if this discourse constantly
compounds with the forces that tend to annul it. It must doso because
deconstruction is an opention that situates itself in a hisrorical man-
ner with rcgard to the different forces that, at each pamcuiar moment,
produce the closure of its concepruality. It rnusr do so precisely be-
cause it is a hetcmlogy, which a5 such must include, or inscribe within
itself, that which it tries to displace or unhinge, and that which also
tries powerfully toannd it. This heternlogical dimension of Detrida’s
work is undoubtedly one of the main obstacles to its assimilation by
either the philosopher or thc literary critic, whosc discourses are te-
leologically hound to achicvc homogeneity. Yet the contradictions
that arise in a discourse critical of the premises of metaphysics from
the necessity of inscribing within itself these very same premises are
not all of equal pertinence. in Wrirhg mrd Diflerence, Derrida re-
marks:

But if no onc can escape this necessity [of aceammodating wirhin his own
discoursethe premise he is dcnouncingl. and if no m e is thcrefore responsible
for giving in to it, however little hc may do so, this does not mean that all
the ways of giving in to are of equal pcmncncc. The quality and fecundity
of a discaursc 3cc pcrhaps mcasurrd by thc critical rigor with which this
rdaiion to thc history of mctaphysim and to inherited concepts i 5
thought (WD. p. 282)

A hereralogical enterprise that compounds with the forces that try

to annu1 it while simultaneously unhinging them by inscribing or
generalizing them differs h on a contradictory discourse-that
r is,
from one that, owing to theoretical weakness or to deliberation, ac-
commodates contradictions in an otherwise homological discourse-
 DECONZTKUCTIVE METHODOLOGY I 69

in that it q l i c i t l y assumes a critical responsibility by unflaggingly

problematizingits own status asa discourse borrowingfrom a heritage
the very resources required for the deconstruction of that heritng
itself.
One of the ways in which dcconstructivc interpretation assumc6
its responsibility as a discourse is to question unremittingly the soli-
darity and systematic relation among conccpn in metaphysics:

Within the dmum by an obIique and always pcrilousmnvcmcnt, wnstandy

&king falling back tvithin what i s being drmnstructcd.- it is necessary to
surround rhc critical concepts with a ferrhrl and thorough dixourrc-to
mark the conditions, the medium, and h e limits of their effmivcncrs and
to-designate rigorously rhcir intimate .rclaiionrhip to the machinc whov
deconstruction thty permit; and, in the Same proms, dnipare thc c m i c c
&mu& which the ye# unnameable glimmer byand the closure can bc
glimpwd. (OG,p. 14)

What, then, is the meaning of such a transgression OF the discourse

of metaphysia? It should be obvious that demnstruction cannot be
an anrmpt to reach a simple outside or beyond of philcwphy and
metaphysics. Deconstruction is neither neutralized by the annulIing
form of the conceprs it borrows from the tradition it deconsrmcts,
nor deluded by the illusionary possibility of simply stepping outside
of philosophy. In any case, deconstruction is profoundly suspicious
of the cavalier assurance of those who think Chey have successfully
crossed the line. Deconstruction as an attempt to stcp outside thc
always historical closure of philosophy not only produces this “out-
side,” to speak the language of traditional philosophy, in a finite
fashion; but since it is also, and in particular, the deconstruction of
the genuinely metaphysical opposition ofinside and auaide, the op-
eration by which ir must produce rhis “outside“ of the discourse of
philosophy can no longer be u n d e r s t d as a parsagc from an interior
to an cxtcrior. Nor c a n such an outside be iaelf an outside w ith
regard to an inside. Now, since a transgression must, in order to
afhm iaelf as trmgressim, conme and c o n h in one way or
another that which it exceeds, insofar as it is only with rspecr to rhc
limit ir crosses, it can only consist of a sort of displacemcnr of the
limits and cl05ure of the discourse. To m c d the dismursc of phi-
losophy cannot possibly mean to step owtsidz the closure, because the
outside belongs to the catcgorics of the inside. The excess or transgres-
sion of philosaphy is, therefore, decided at the margins of the dosure
only, in an always strategical-that is, historically finite-fashion.
r7o O N DECONSTRUCTION

For this, reason it is i n c o m a to speak of a transgression or excess at

all. In Positians. Derrida remarks:
There i5 not a t r a n s F i o n , if onc understands by that a pure and simple
landing into a kyond of metaphysics, at a point which also would be, let
UP nor forget, firm of alt a point of language or wriring. Now, even in
aggresJions or nansgrcssions, wc arc consorting with a code to which meta-
physics is tid irreducibly, such that every transgrcssivt g c ~ n reendoss
r ~
us-precisely by giving u5 a hold on the closure of metaphysics-within this
closure. BUG by means of &he work donr on one side and the other of the
limir the field imidc is modified, and a transgression is produad that con-
wquently k nowhere prcscnt as a fdil dcmmpli. O n e is never installed within
transgression, one never lives clscwherc. Transgression irnplics rhrt rhc limir
is always ar work. Now,the “thought-rhat-means.nothin&”the thought that
.e*ceed9mcaningandmtaningar-hearing-oncsclf-spaltby interropcingthcrn-
rhis thou&, announced in gramrnarology. is given precisely a5 h e rhought
for which thcrc is sure opposition bctwcen outside and inside. At the
conclusion06 a certain work, cvcn the conccpts of excess or of transgression
un become suspect. (P,p. 12)
With rhis clarification of the way in which we are to understand
how dtconstrucrion transgresses the discour= of phiIosophy, wc can
return to analyzing the modes in which the “outside” oi meraphys-
ics-that i s to say, the infrastrucnrrfi-are produced. As 1 have cm-
phasized. a deconstruction i s not a function of a subjective desire or
act ofwill, nor is it an absolute act capable of providing the rotatity
of its methodological justifications. Defonstructive interpretation, in
its search for what cxorbiranrly exceeds the totality of h e conceptual
oppositions constitutive of metaphysics, p d s in a radically ern-
piricist manner-that is, in a manner incapable of justifying itself
entirely-but not because of empiricism’s recognized philosophical
inability to do so. “We must begin wherever we ore,” says Derrida.
Nonethelm. the admitred lack of an ahsolure beginning does nor
mean that the beginning is arbitrary or subjective. Derrida continues,
“Wherever we me: in a text where we already believe o u m t v e s to
be.” In other words, broaching a deconstruction depends on a his-
torical hermeneutics that justifies its beginninE as “subjea t o a certain
historical ncccssity” (OG,p. 162). Derrida summarizes these argu-
menrs in Positions, when he writes:

The incision of deconsrruaion, which is not a voEuntary decision or an

absolute beginning, does not take plam just anywhere, or in an absolute
clscwhcre. An incision, precisely, it can be made nnly acmrding to l i n e of
form and forces of rupture that a r c localizable in the discourse to bc dccon-
 DECONSTRVCTIVE METHODOLOGY 17l

mad.The Idpicar and ndnrical dcnnainadon of thc l O 5 t n a e g ay sim

and opcmtorr-bogtnnings, hold9. Irvcrs, --in a bvm situation dcpcnds
upon an historial andysis. This analysis is m& in the p ~ e r a movcmtnt
l
of the field, and is never exhausted by tht c~nrCiousulculation of a “sub-
ject.’’ (P,p. 82)
h e r a l l y spakin& one could say chat dmwmction stam within
rfie texts to be decmsmctedby fonising on traits within wnccptual
stlllCtuteS, ot on concepb within conceptual dyads that, for reasons
to be hismridydcrermined, have been c o n h e d to a secondary mle,
or put, w to speak, on =me. Writin& for instance, is such a concept
within the bipolar opposition spaechhuriting, whereas the conagt of
supplemenrarity relies o n philosophy’s refusal to give equal consid-
eration to the totality of its traits or predicates. The general strategy
of dtconstmccion, ac least as it pertains to the discrepancies and
differences a f h i n g concepts and philowphica1 argumcntation, is
characterid first’by a p h w of revmnl of rhese binary oppositions.
This is a sm~cn~rally necemrg-gaturc,sin= a mere neutralization of
thc dual opposidons, which arc dc t a m and de jure hierarchical
structurez, would Ieavc the field intact and con6rrn what is to be
d a o n s t r u d . Nor can the reversal simply limir itself t o reestablishing
an invme hierarchic11 ordet. The operation of reversing the given
hicrarchics docs not consist “in a renewal of the hierarchy or the
substance of values, but rather in Itransformation of the very value
‘of hierarchy itsclf” IS. p. 81). In darifylng this issue, Dcrrida ap-
provingly quotes Heideggcr’s discussion of NiemEhe’s pmblemaucs
of a d(Unrdrrhung)of Platonism. Heidcgger w r i m in Nicrtdw,
“A new Iuerarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering-structure
must be changed.”= This transfornation ot the hierarchical scheme
is not aimed at bringing about an inverse order or a total neutralization
of the oppositc terms in an anarchical state free of all hierarchy, but
a t a recasting d the traditional concept and structure of hierarchy:
“What must occur then is not merely a suppression of all hicrarchy,
for an-archy onIy consolidates jut as purely the established order of
a metaphysical hierarchy; nor is it a simple change or reversal in the
terms of any given hierarchy. Rather, the Umdrehmg must be a
tnnsformation of the hierarchical structure itself‘ (S, p. 81). The
phase of rtvcrsal of the hierarchy of prcdicatts or concepts is only
the first step; the second stcp consists of what is called a reinscription,
displacement, or reconstruction. This second phase is necessary be-
cause the first operates wkly within the concepruality of h e system
to be dcconstrucnd. Without such a second movement. the reversal
172 ON DECONSTRWCTlON

would be “nothing more than a clamomus declaration of the anti-

rhesis” (S, p. 95).
War, then, is the function of reinscription, or displacement? In
this second phase the hitherto rcprcsscd traits of concepts. or traits
held in reserve, are resrored to their generality, to their power of
generalization, and to their generative force. With rhis liberation of
the traits held in mcrve by the concepts within philosophy, n t w
“concepa”erupt into the territory of philosophy. T h c x concepts refer
to something t h a t could never be comprehended, that could never
have been an “object” within the discourse of philosophy. These
repressed train, leading through their generalization to the formation
of new “concepts,” can be grafted onto the traditional concepts or
names privileged in the first phase of reversal. But since the newly
privileged terms of revemd conceptual hierarchies arc onlyrhe ghass
nr spurious images of a beyond within the discourse of philosophy,
deconstruction cannot stop with them. It is only by grafringonro their
names rherneaning of which they are the repression rharrhe operarion
of deconsmctian becomes complete. This step produces conccprs
previorrsly unheard of in the tradition and in the discourse of meta-
physia, T h e w “philwophical quasi-concepts” arc what I have up to
now termed infrastructures.
Deconstruction, consequently, in Derrida’s words, proceeds by a
“double gcsture,” a phase of rcversal and a phase of reinscription or
displacemenr.26 To speak of phases here could, however, be mislead-
ing, since the word suggests a chronological sequence. I t is not to be
understood as such; rather, the double gesture that characterizes dc-
construction is to be conceived of a5 a systematically unified operation
thar simulraneously marks the difference bemeen irs TWO geihres.
Dcrrida writes, “We must p r m d using a double gesture, according
to a unity that is both systematic and in and of i t d f divided, a double
writing, that ‘is, a writing t h a t is in and of itself multiple’’ (P,p. 41).
It is in this sense that Derrida speaks of deconstruction as a double
science or a double staging. Within the unity of such a practice,
deconstrucrion traces the irreducible difference berween its rwu ges-
rurcs.
In Positions the relation ofthcst two gcsrum is furthcr determined
in terms of a chiasmatic doubling or crossing: “The form of the
chiasm, of the X, intercsts me a great deal, nor as the symbol of the
unknown, but k a u s e there is in it, as I underline in ‘La disrkni-
notion,’ a kind of fork (thc scrics cms5rwd5, quadrrfrrrcum. grid,
rrellis, key, erc.) thar is moreover, unequal, one of rhe points exrcnding
 DECONSTRUCTIVE METHODOLOGY =73
its nngF further than rhc other: h i s is the figure of the‘doubltgesture,
thc intersection’’ (P,p. 70). Determined as chiasmatic, the double
gesture appears to maintain the distinction between its two move-
ments h u s e of thdr diss)mm&cal aornmunimtion. b d of being
simply a mimure that confounds the w o gestures, the two phases of
deconswuction panidpate in one another in a crosswi3c manner, thus
emphasizing heir sameness ,despite their difference. But sameness,
l y o p i n g for the dif-
since it d w s not mean identity, is p ~ t c i s ~ the
ference between the wogestures. Yet what interests us here in par-
ticular is the fan that this’chiarrnatic structure of deconstruction is
not symmetric. It is ‘k kind of fork. . . moreover, unequal, one of
the points artending i t s range further than thc other.” The formal
dissymmerry of deconstruction makes it radically dissimilar from re-
flection. This need for dissymmetry, however, is not only formal.
Indeed, the two gestures of deconstruction arc incommensurate. n e y
are hetemgenmus gesture, grafted upon one another in the “one”
but irreducibIy split o p t i o n of deconstruction. Whereas the first
gesture plays estircly within the dosure of metaphysics, the scmnd
altFmptS a breakthrough toward a Cerrain outside of philw0phy:These
two gestures arc of different bearing and scopc. Compared to chc
conceptual hierarchies, r e v e d o r nor, the infrasmcturts produccd
during the m n d phase of d c c o n m a i o n arc unheard-of mncepo
within the limits of philosophy. The relation of the conceptual dyads
to t h infrastructures
~ is one of presuppositions, “in dissymmmical
fashion,as h e general space of their possibility” (M, p. 327). A5 the
operation that leads to the pmduction of that spa= of possibility, the
second movement of deconstruction is entirely heterogcncour to
the f k t moucmmt, which remains within the boundaries or closure
of what is to be demnsmcrcd.
The chiasmatic relation of the two heterogmcous gestures of de-
consmumion is characterized by a structural asymmetry that defies all
reflection; it is the matrix of both thc possibility and impossibility,
the ground and unground, of reflection. As I havc mentioned, this
dissymmetry is-rial in preventing any neutralizationof the bipolar
oppositions of the aporias or other contradictions resulting from dis-
cursive inequalities and disparities. The dissymmetry, as well as the
hetcragcncityof the two movements of this double-pointed operation
of deconstruction, ensures thc rcinhption-that is, the “reground-
ing”-of the conccprs of metaphysics in what reprants the generality
of its Other. This space of inscription of the symmetrically organized
binary concepts is the space of the infrasrmctura, which occupies a
174 ON DECON5fRUCTION

lateral and asymmetric rclation with respect to the r c a h of rhe con-

a p e . Although entircly differcnt, t k two orders communicatc in
various ways. As rhe notion of tho old names of the infrastmcrures
has demonstrated, infrastruchlres mainrain a fwthold in the mncep-
rual order, and must continue to do so if they are to intervene in it
effccrivcly. And yet, as the open matrix of the cancepmal differcncm,
the infrastrucrures function as their grounds of possibility. Yet since
theseinfrastructure are a sort of repressed reerve, they also by virmc
of their encompassing power delimit the conccpcr of metaphysim,
making them, rigorously speaking, impossible. They represent thc
rwrplur of the conceptual dyads or of the totality of 3 discourse as
well as what prevents them or that rotaliry from achieving closure.
They are, in other words, 3 hcb. As such, they are without the stability
and plenirudc “of a form or a n equation, in the stationary corre-
spondence of a symmetry or a homology” (P, p. 46). The space oc-
cupied by the infrastructures, the spacc of inscription, is thus in no
sense an opening into an inexhaustible realm of meaning, of man-
scendental farms, or of a transccndcntal semantic excess.
As a way of summing up,let us review the problems that distinguish
deconstruction. and that make it a significant undcrtakinp. Dcmn-
srrunion starts with an interrogation of a variety of contradictions
and aporias in rhc discaursc of philosophy. These are not contradic-
tions and aporias proper, however, since the discourse of philosophy
awommodam them without difficulty. In addition to these contra-
dictions and aporiaz, which pertain to the formation of concepts and
to the development of philosophical argurnenb, deconsrrucrion ad-
dresses many ocher discursive and conceptual inequalities that have
never before been questioned by philosophy. All these aporias, dif-
fercnccs of Ievcls, inequalities of dcvclopmenrs, and disparities char-
acteristic of the discourse of philosophy, yet which do not seem m
disturb the logic of philosophy, also contribute to the stablishrnent
of that logic. All the gestures of philosophy-reflection and tran-
scendentalization, all the themes of philosophy, bur primarily those
of subjectivity, mnsccndmtality, freedom, origin, truth, presence, and
the proper-are imposstblc without the differences and discrepancies
chat permeate philosophical texts. Yet tbese same disparitia also limit
thc ~ o p ofc thcsc gcsturcs and of the purity and coherence of the
philosophical concepts or themes.
Deconstruction is an attempt to account for thcse various and
essentially h e t e r o p w u s aporias and discursive inequalitis with what
I have called infrastcumres. These minimal ~ t r u ~ t u r are e s both the
 DECONSTRUCTWE METHODOLOGY = 75
grwnds of possibitiri- of the canonical philosophical gestures and
themes and their ungrounds, that is. that which makes them impos-
sible. These suuctum limit what they make possible by rendering its
rigor and purity impossihk. The infrastructures arc the internal limit
from which classical philosophical concepts and themes take their
force arid ncassity. Demnstruction does not merely d-y meta-
physical conEept9; it shows how rhese concepts and tl~mcsdraw their
possibility from that which ultimatdy makcs them impossibIc. The
infrastructures achieve this double task.
Since philosophy has p w n out of these ,inframucntres of the
formation of concepts, 08 the devehpment of philosophical argu-
ments, of the tcxtuaiity of the d i ~ o u r s cof philosophy, it a n n o t
dominate these infrastructures with either its gcstum or i s themes.
The inhastructures arc in a dissymmctrical and hetcrogmcous rclacian
to what they make possible. No reflection can reach our for them,
rcturn to them as to surnahing that, like a solid and prcsent ground,
would make reflection possible. In contrast to the founding concepts
of metaphysics, the inhstructurcs are incapable of accounting far
themselves. They are not reflected into themselves; chcy d o not relate
to chmselvcs in an identity-producing manner. Lacking the ability to
justify themselves or answer for themselves, they are akin to writing
as it has been dmrmincd by Occidental philosophy sincc Plaro. This
Is one of the reasons why Demda can say rhat they all entertain a
m a i n essential relation to writing.
In addition the infrasmctura are heterogeneous, and although
they form ‘&aim, the space they occupy is not uniform or homcge-
neous. As an invatigation of thw irreducibly hetcrogcneous infra-
smctum, deconstruction is in -ce a heterology, Extending the
requirement of philosophy that a ground mmt be different from what
it grounds, duansbuction exhibits such an absolute other ground as
“constitutive” of the canonical philosophical problems. As a solution
QF sorts to traditional philosophical problems, such as, for instance,
the problem of how something absolute can possibly have a gener-
ating, engendering, or comdtuting function, deconstruction both con-
serves h e immanence of philosophical argumentation and canept
formation while sirnultaneoudy opening it up to that which scruc-
turally disorganizes it. As in Hegel’s speculative thinking, where “di-
alectic has bwn separated from proof,” and whcre, thus, “the notion
of philosophical dcmonsmation has hecn lost,” dcconsmction, by
reinscribing philadophicai argumentation, radically displaces it.J7 As
a critique of philosophical argumentation and of reflection as the
176 ON DECONSTRUCTION

major methodological concept of modern philosophy, dcconstnrction

is consequently also a critique of the Cartesian dream of a self-
foundation and self-justificationof philosophy. Deconstruction traces
the inner limits of the project of a philosophy of philosophy, Yet
witbout in the least trying to do away with philosophy, its style of
argumentation, with the rigor of classical log& and without ever
dreaming the empiricist-that is, the symmetrical-dream of a final
impossibility of accounting and founding, dcconsttucticin pursucs the
formulation of problems that, although 'apparently more easily ac-
commodated by the discourse of literature and critical stylistics, arc
nonetheless not of that order. Deconstruction opens philosophy to its
Others. Literature is only one of these necessarily plural Others. It i s
an Othcr which is not simply beyond, nor simply to the side. It is,
uritbin philosophy, the margin of infrartructural possibilities. This
quest into the infrastructures is a philosophical quest, drhough it
p r o c d s in a new way.
 9

A System beyond Being

1
Aswe have seen, infrasimctum are the “grounds” by means of which
deconsnuction attempts to account for rhe ‘saontradictionr”and dis-
similarities in, from a philosophical standpoint, succcsshl concept
formation, argumentadon. and the production of discursive totalities
The “nature” of the infrastructures can be further clarified by ex-
ploring thc “system,” or rather the chains in which they are linkd
together, which, opened up in a dcconsuuctive vista, form an i r w
duciblt “space”-in Platonic term, epekcinn tcs owi--beyad bcing,
Tradjdonally it is assumed rhar when Plato refers in the Republic to
the idea mu agnthou, to that idea (of all other ideas) that is to the
objects of cognition and to knowledge irsclf what the sun i s to all
visible objects, he thinks of the Good as the source of all possible
knowledge. This SOUKC is iaelf “not essence bur still pansccpds cs-
sence in dignity and surpassing power.”’ It i s something more cxalred
than being (orrria); i t is the idea of all ideas, which thus becomes the
ultimate source of being. Yet it is doubrful whether one can call it a
form or idea in the first place. Furthermore, becauseof its fundamental
indeterminacy, the uguthon, as Hcideggcr has pointed out, cannot be
hastily determined in cthicc-metaphysical tcnns eithcr.l DPrrida fo1-
lows Hcidcggtr’s lead as mll as his warning when, for instance in
‘‘Plmro’s Pharmacy.” he demonstrates rhar rht “roum” of all being
beyond being is generalized, or rathergmernl, writing, whose essential
nonrmth and nonptescnu is the fundamentallyundecidable condi tion
of p i b i l i t y and impossibility ofpresence in its identity and of iden-
tity in its prcsencc (D, pp. 167-1681. The “source” of bcmg and
beine;ness is, for Derrida, the system or chain beyond being of the
various indrasmtcturcs or undcddablrs. Con-ly, the idea of a
178 O N DECONSTRUCTION

general sysrem is inseparabie from this space, which is btyond the

traditional oppositions of c o n q t s and of the argumentative and
discursive discrepancies to which dmnsrmmion has made us sensi-
tive. Yet thc claim thar Derrida’s philosophical clforts arc not without
systematical intentions needs immediate clarification, owing to the
general assumption that his philowphy is antisystematical.
In order to come to grips with Derrida’s thought, one must G e m
rhe temptation-made possible by ces~urccswithin the codified in-
terpretive possibilities of philosophy itself-simply to determine it as
antisystematic. From its inception in Greek thought, philosophy has
contained the two absolutely symmetrical alternatives of a systematic
and a nonsystematic approach ta truth. As proved in particular by
the later renewal of antisysternaric thoughr in Hamann, the Roman-
r i a , Niemchc, and others, the aesthetic of the fragment presupposes
the earty determination of philosophy as epistme, and hence the
systematic exposition and construction of systems. This antisysrcm-
atic, fragmentary practice is in no sense radicaliy subversive of the
idea of science or of systcmaticiry as characteristic of the philosophical
enterprise; it is, rather, a genuine possibility wiibin philosophy itself,
and it carries out the systematic requirements of philosophy in its
own way. W e have already seen thar Derrida’s effom to reach a
beyond of the classical opposition of logic and a[ogic do not lead him
to abandon all rigor in argumentation. Neither does his critique of
the idea of rigorous science as the timeless telos of all genuine phi-
losophy entail a mere renunciation of scientificity and systematic in-
tentions. Given the complicity between pretentions to systematiciry
and the antisysremaric practices in philosophy, we must presume thar
Dcrrida’s exploration Qf the infrastnrmrcs both continua the 5ys-
tematic tclos of philosophy and attempts something entirely differenr,
of which fragmentation gives a t best a very oblique image.
Let u s first briefly examine the ways in which Derrida assumes
certain systematic intentions without, however, yielding to tho ,iotra-
philosophical determination of the fragmenr. Take, for instance, the
beginning af Positions, where Derrida refers to “a certain system [of
his work! somewhere open to an undecidable resource that sets the
system into motion” and determines it to be an interrogation of the
order of reasons t h a t traditionally informs systmaric enterprises. Yer
at the same time, he admits his relunance “for obvious reasons, to
call lthe text of that system] fragmentary” (P,pp. 3-4; see also S,
pp. l24,134).Among the numerous instances of theconcepr of system
in the rexts of Dcrrida, with ur without quotation marks, I shall
mention onnly the following passages from the c s a y “Differance,”
 A SYSTEM BEYOND 8EING 179

where he speaks of the space of the infraspuctures as “a spstcm which

is no longer that of presence but that of differana” or ,as “a system
of ciphers that is not dominated by truth value, which in this manner
becomes an included, inscribed, circumscribed function” (SP,pp, L47,
149; translation slightly modified). Derrida’s intention must thus be
viewed a5 aiming at a more encompassing system which inscribes the
value of systematicity while criticizing thar very value, but without
asserring the opposing [and contemporaneous)value of the fragment.
Derrida’s philosophy is often seen as indiscriminately critical of the
epistemic and systematic exigencies of philosophy, for deconstruction
is an operation that also qu-tions the possibility of totalization. As
we have Seen in Hegel, legislation by mtalizanon is the speculative
answer to the aporis of reflection; only by means of a faultlm ex-
position of the sysrem of totality of all determinations of thought
coufd Hcgel hopc both to ovcrcume the antinomies of reflection,
which had become obvious with Kant, and to carry out and fulfill
radically what had until then bcen only reflection‘s promise. As an
intemption of the rot& of reflection, deconstruction also repre-
rcnrs a critique of the concept and possibility of system, without
revetting to a Romantic gesture d fragmentation, which is itself de-
pendent on the possibility of apprehending totality and system in a
pointlike, punmal, and immediate intuition.
DcconstruEtion has h n explicitly constmcd by Derrida as an at-
tempt to shake toraliry, to make it tremble in its entirety. Derrida’s
undertaking is to be v i m 4 as ”broaching the deconstruction of the
greatest totulity-the concept of the episteme and logocentric meta-
physia” (OG,p. 461, insofar as that totality is constituted by the
value of the system. Yet this critique of the h i t s of tonhation does
not procecd by means of a dassical refutation, which judges mtali-
zacion impossible on account of man’s finitude: “One then refers t o
the empiricai endeavor of tirhcr a subjca or a finite diswursc in a
vain and breathless quest of an infinite richness it can never master,
There i s too much, mom than onc can say” (WD,p. 289). This
classical rejection of rotalitadon underlies the Ramantic theology of
the fragment. Derrida outhes a different objection to the possibility
of totalization:
Nontoulizrtion can atso be dercrmintd in a&r way: no Iongrr fmm rhc
standpoint of a concept of finitude as relgatiom m the empirical. but from
the standpoint of h e conccpt of p h y . If totafiution no longer has any
mcening, it is nor baa- the i n b i a n a r of a field cannot bt covered bi a
finite glance or a finite discount, bur b m u x thc nature of h e field-that
is, languageand a finite languagr-cxcludcs totalilation.T h i s field is in cffcct
f 80 ON DECONSTRUCTION

chat ofphy, thar is to say, B field of infinite substitutions only bcwuae it io

finite, that is t m say. baausc instcad of bcing an inexhaustible field. as in the
classicaf hyparhcsis, instcad of bcing roa largc, rhcre is something missing
frum it: a center which arrests and grounds the playotsubairutions, (WD,
p. 289)
But this deconsrructive interpretation of totality and system, a t the
bcncfit and in the pcrspcaive of the nontotalizable field of the in-
frastructures, d w s nor preclude a11 sysrrmaticity. The deconsrructive
undoing of the greatest tomlity, the totality of onto-theology, faith-
fully repeats this totality in its totality while simultaneously making
it trcmblc, making i t insecure in its most assured evidences. The mim-
icry of totality and of the pretension to systcmaticity is an inseparable
clement of deconstruction, one of the very conditions of finding its
foorhold within the logic being deconsrmcred. Moreover, the space
opened up by the deconstruction, that of the infrastructures, despite
what fundamentally inhibits its eventual totalization is not without
structure or systematicity. As we shall sec, the infrastructures form
chains; they can and musc bc syscentariztd, up M a certain point. But
bccause it is situated beyond the common opposition of structure and
gcncsis. thc space of infrastrucrurcs. as thc space of structurality in
general, is also the space of the general *tern, Since it lies beyond
the opposition of system and fragment, whole and part, infinity and
the finire, it also consrirutes rhe systemaricity of systems.
As 1 have suggested, rhc infrastructures do not form a homogcntaus
body, Their space has no simple structure, is not unifarm or formed
from one substance. and is not composed throughout in the same
manner; it is a hetcrolugical space of ,an irreducible multipliciry of
infrastmctural instances. Here, perhaps, one can bcst begin to un-
derstand deconstruction's critique of the classical concept of origin
as a point of presence and simpliciry to which reflection tries to rettlrn
as to a n ultimate ground from which everything else can bc deduced,
The pluralization of the origin i s a f i r s step toward a demnstruction
of the value of origin. This deconstruction begins with the recognition
that the 50urce or origin is characterized by a certain heterogeneity:
"at first, there are sources, the source is other and plural" ( M , p.
277). Only by abstraction from rhar plurality, from ant source's re-
fctral to another, can a single origin be rigorously delimited. Decon-
struction does not, however, satisfy itsclf with the mere intuition of
originary plurality; it does not content itself with opposing thc man-
ifold to the one, but begins to determine the taw of the complicity of
origins. When Derrida writes, in Of Gromrnatology, that t h i s mm-
 A S Y S t P M BEYOND BETNG 181

plicity of originsmay be caIled arche-writing, he is m a n i b t l y referring

to t h e infrasmtctural chain, to the general system i n which single
Qrigins arc carved out.
M d a i s not alone in rhis effort to formulate an organizcd mul-
tiplicity of origins (which i s not, of murse, the same thing as an
abxncc of origins). He is continuing a tradition that s t a m wid Hus-
scrl and Heidcgger, and he curies ir up to a decisive ruraing point.
b t h Husxrl and Heid- introduced the idea of GIeichrsp+g-
lichkeir, a simultaneity of equally original instances or smcrum, in
the context OF II p l e m i c against German Idealism’s pretcnrions to
having deduced the oneness of origin.’ Let us restrict ourselves to one
example of this “equiprirnorddity” in Hcidegger alone. In Being umd
Time, Heidcggcr intraduces this concept in order M dtscribc, in a
fundamental and ontological pcffpective, the multiple and constitu-
tivc existential characteristics (Seinschmuktrre)of an underivable and
thus imduably original phenomenon such as h-seirt, “Being-in.” H e
writes: ‘*The fact t h a t something primordial is underivable does
not rule out thc possibility that a multiplicity of rharacteristia of
king may bc constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then ex-
istentiaIly they are equiprimordid (g/eichrsp&g!icb). The phenom-
enon of the cquiprimordhlity of constitutive items has often been
disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained
tendency to derive everything and anything from one simple ‘primal
ground.’ ’I4
The irrcducihly multifarious charaEnriscics of k i n g that simulta-
ncously CMlStitlloe an underivable phcnomcnon like Jking-in, or k i n g -
in-the-World, make t h e phenomena structural phenomena. tndeed,
what is oomprisbd by cquiprirnordiality can be understoodonly under
the btk of structure; mukpliciry, underivarivcnss, and srmcnrra1icy
arc t h e prime characteristics of cquiprimordiality. In his lectures of
1 9 2 5 4 6 entitled L0p.c: The Quesrion of Truth, Heidcgger further
refines the concept of equiprimordiality:
In a g c n d mode we say that the 5o-allcd structures that shows plurality
pcidcgger m Besorgm and Wirsaqe as quipdmordial possibilities
of D&] are equiprimordid In this way, we have alrcsdy warded off rhe
possibility of deriving onc fmm thc ather, at mnrrmcdng one an mp of the
..
other, but as yet we have not aaid anything about the unity of rhis plurality ,
Above all, nothing has brm dnidcd regarding thc question whether there is
only one kind of unity of this pluraliy or w h e k unity ir nm agrin the ride
for a m a i n palaibiliiicr rhar belong M Dmeh i d f . In a negarivc hshion, all
one can say rrgardingthe question about the unity of thcsc plural m ~ c t u r c s
182 ON DBCON5TRWffTOH

is that this unity is not il sum total in the ynsc &as as a unity. it would
follow its parts as their rcsulg so to speak. On the contrary, the unity of this,
plurality is a totality that, as a beginning, p d c s plurality and, first and
foremost, k, so IO speak. pam from itself.’

The plurally structured origins are thus characterized nor only by the
fact that they cannot be derived but also by the fact that the elements
that enter their composition cannot be dcrivcd from one another.
Equiprimordial structural phenomena are therefore hmrogeneous.
Yet for Heidegger these simuianeously coeval and originary srruc-
cures are still contained within a unity. For Heidcgger, in other words,
the irreducibly heterogeneous strunural possibiiitics form a totality
that, in an originary fashion, precedes its Severance into amultiplicity.
It seems that the unity and totality of the multiplicity are not put into
quation as such, m e n by the possible plurality of rhe unities to which
the multiplicities may give rise.
In spite of their plurality. coeval o r i ~ n s arc,
, consequently, am-
tained in oneness. But this can also be wen in Flach’s hcterological
foundation of the fundamental principles of logic, which I discussed
toward the end of Part 1. In his investigation of the ultimate principle
of thought, Flach comes ro the candusion that these principles cannot
be unities of idcntiry, of general simpliciry, in which the elemcnrs
would be at once themselves and their opposites. T h e ultimate prin-
ciple, according to Flach. can only be thought hctcrologically. rhat is,
a5 a unity of one und the Other. The absolure minimum ofthe purely
logical obiect is the unity of the equiprimordial moments of the one
and rhc Other. Moreover, because the one and the Other arc simul-
tanmusly original in the last principles of thought, the onc is not
disringuiqhcd hy prioricy over rhe Orhcr. Quoring Rickerr, Flach writm
‘The One and the Other are logically equiprimordial, ‘they do not
only logically belong to onc another, they are also logically totally
cquivalcnr’ . . With this it is shown, in a well-founded manner, that
I

what we can think as the last instance represents at least a duplicity.”‘

But although these principtes arc dctermined as pairs in a process of
limiting exclusion between complementary alumativts such as the
one and the Other, and although one must recognize a multiplicity
of such principles, and hence the plurality of thought, they must also
be related a 5 moments to a totality-the totality of the originary
sphere-in which they receive thcir final determination. Plurality, as
Flach remarks,isa positively intinite thought. As a result, thc plurality
of thc in thernsetves hererothetical. ultimate principles of thought is
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING IS?

synthetic “The absolute is therefore this absolutely synthetic unity,”

writes Flach, in conclusion.’ Yet if the equiprimordialicy of the one
and the Other lends itself to such a synthesis, it is because Flach‘s
haemlogical principic implics a homogeneity of that which enters
into conjunction. 1t prcsupposcs not only the equivalence of rhc one
and the Other but also their similarity in nature. What is equipd-
mordial thus a150 appears to be.of the same ontological order.
Now, in distinction from Flach’s contention that principles are
endowed with a constituting function oniy if they are linked together
in the totality of rhc originary oneness of thought, and also in dis-
tinction horn similar statements by Husserl and Hcidcggcr, Derrida’a
hecerological doctrine of inframctural. grounds radically quesdons
the philosophical gesture by which the structural multiplicity of the
cocval and underivable origioary phenomena is tamed into one whole,
Indeed, if Flach’s ultimate principles contain rhe one und the Other,
unity and muttiplicity, what allows him (orHwserl or Heidcgger) to
raise any of these principles to a position of dominance over all the
other principles? One principle, none of whose components has any
priorityovcrthe otherP,israiscdnonEel~sto a principleofprinciplcs;
one heterothctical opposition of h e sysrem of the equiprimordial
structural and minimal principlcs of thought is turned into the pos-
sibility of the system of all principles, in which it also partakes. By
this paradox, the initially heternlogical rnultiplicky of fundamental
p r i n a p k is turned into a synthetic uNry.
Precisely k u s e of this paradox, constitutivc of thc very nation
of equiprimordial principles, which raises one of the dually structured,
hetcrologjcal principles (onelmultiplicity) to rhe srams of a matrix for
all principles and thus confers unity upon their plurality, one must
distinguish Derrida’s investigation into the hetcrological i n h a m c -
tural grounds, which prcmeds from an awareness of this paradox,
from the positions discwed up to this point. Undoubtedly thc in-
frastructura resemble dx Heideggcrian s u u d possibiiities, or Fl&s
heternlogical prinapls, multiple and underivablc, that is to say, ul-
timate stmctum. Yet precisely becauw they cannot be dominated,
either by what they make possible or by themselves, their sysrem
cannot be absolutcly dosed OHinto a unity. As w e shall see, each of
the inframuctures can claim to represent all rhe others and thus to
function as thc matrix of possibility for them all. This possibility,
h o m e r , which also underminw all domination of the system by one
single infrastructure, consequently prevents its evenma1 closure. AI-
though the plural infrastructures’ lack of final unity indicates that
r.84 ON DECONSTRUCT I0N

they arc not principles properly speakin& this is not a privation, for
it allows the infrastructures, as we have seen, to accounr for the
“antinomies” of philosophical discourse. One such antinomy i s the
paradox consrimrive of a doctrine of Last prinapla.
The m m p t of equiprimordiality is thus not sufficient to comprc-
hend the irreducible multipIidty of the universality of the infrastruc-
tures. The system of the infrastructures is not a unity or totaliry; ir
is an open system, allhough nor in the sensc of an ,endless infinity,
chat is, what Hegel called bad or spurious infinity.’ Nor is it a finite
sysrcm, since the infrastructures are nor simply principles, simple el-
ments, or atuoms. Derrida notes in Positions: “By definirion the list [of
the infrastrucruresl ha5 no tavonomical closure, and even less does it
constimtc a lexicon. First, because these are nor atom, but rather
focal points of economic condensation, sites of pasage necessary for
a very largc number of marks, slightly more effervescent crucibles”
‘(P,p. 40). The system is best conceived of as one of chains. T ~ E
infrastructures can he linked together in diffcrmt ways, and their
chains too can enter into multiple mmbinations. Each infrastructure
partakes in a chain or in several chains, but which it nmcr dominatm
tn such a chain-arche-trace/arche-wntingldifferance/supplementar-
ity, for examplc, or mmge/marqve/rnarche, or rcscrve/remark/retrdiz/
restnncelretard-each term can be replaced by or substituted for the
othct. Yet thcse substitutions are not synonymous substitutions. Al-
though the rems of rhe chains are mulogous to each other, they are
not synonyms for one identical nrm. The substitutions within chains,
which, Derrida contends, become necessary according to context. are
not simply metonymic operations “that would leave intact the con-
ceptual identitics, the signified idealities, that the chain would be
happy just to translate, to put inro circulation” (P.p. 141. It is more
appropriate to understand this proccss of substitution as one of sup-
plementation.
Because the infrastructures are not atoms, because they have no
identity in themselves. the irreducibly mulriplcchains cannot be garh-
cred once and for all upon themselves in some ideal puriry. Let u5
not forget rhar the infrasrructures are the conditions of possibility
(and impossibility) of rhc conceptual differences as well as of discur-
sive inequalities; thus, they are what makes rhe project ~f systema-
tization possible, withour, however, k i n g sysremarizable themsectves.
Yet this is not to say that a certain systematization cannot apply to
them; it simply means that their system cannot be closed upon itself
by means of some dominating center. Strictly speaking they form no
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING *s5

system; rhcrcfolc, their *“-’ cannot be fctmlizcd. The infra-

structures, Demda remarks, “can ncvcr be s t a b d i d in the plmicuh
ofa form or an equation, in the etationary correspondence of a sym-
mcay or a homology” (P-p. 46). T h e s y s m of the infrastructures
cannot be formalized, ideslizcd, or s y s t e m a h d because it is precisely
its play that makes t h m projects possible. what the infrutructual
chains, the chains af a number of “sites of passage necessary for a
vcry large number of marks,” demonstrate i s the g m r d system.
Let us now inquire into some infrasmraral examples in order to
demonstrare rhar sysrematic intentions are n o t foreign M rhc field of
infrasrrumm. I shall a150 b c u n z e the field of infrastrucmm as
a s p a a of repetitionand self-doubling, in what 1 shall cali a gmeml
r h e q of doybling; and I shall show that deconstruction is a medi-
tation on the general system. or on what makes systemancity as such
both neeesFary and impossible.

T H E INFRASTRUCTURAL CHAIN
7hc concatenation to w h i h the infrastructures lend themselves is nor
the result of an aIlcged plenitude or abundance Qf transformations.
In what follows, my d b s s i o n of infrastructure US archc-mce. lls
differancc, as supplementarity, and so on entails no predication or
limimrion of rhc infrasmccurc ifselfi I have already insisted on the
purely expository grounds for my gcneralizarion of the term inpa-
mrrctwc. Indeed, rhc infraasaucturc is not a leading mnccpt or genus
which could be distinguished fram its subordinate species. T h e 0s of
these individualizations is meant to bring to the fore different Fades
of the breadth, clarity, and certitude of rhc infrascrcturc, appearing
each time as diMrmt unitirs reflected into thcmselvcs. Infrastructure
is to be thought of in the plural; the conjunction CIS seeryes to restore
this irreducible singularity and plurality. Atthough as traditionally
serves as an operator ofphenomenologization, of the revealing of an
esscncc, it m e 9 a very d i f f m n t purpose here., where it is meant
to indicate spcci6c inhastructural syntheses or “functions” that ate
imdudbly dn@ar. As a result, an investigation of the gmwul system
amounts to a sort of classification of a variety of such synthcss. To
say that they arc irreducibly singular, and not the expressions of a
prior infrastructural cssence, docs not impinge on their universality.
Compared to t k univcnaliry to which philosophical concepts must
pretend, infrasmmctural legitirnanon hinges, paradoxically, on rhc uni-
r86 ON WECOhlSTRUtTION

versality, or rather the generality, of something 1 shall initially reEer

to as a radical ernpiricity.
If, then, thc infrastructural synthcses okcn appear complemcntary
or overlapping. one must keep En mind that they arc nor a s p a s or
facm of a unity that offers itself as such in their disguise; there is no
such prior unity. Moreover, the infrastructural syntheses ace nor phe-
nomena in the first place but represent an articulation “older” than
the difference between bcing and appearance, appearance and ap-
pearing. The inhasrrucrural r a i n are not the traits ofsomething, nor
can they be ried together retrospively, tzppr&-coup. T h e cancaten-
ations between various infrastructurm-bctwcen, for cxarnplc, archc-
trace, diffetance, suupplementarity, iterability, and re-marking4o not
obey the linearity of logical time, or for that matter of dialectical time.
T h e signifying chains of thc infrastructures are voluminous; they have
the appearancc of scenes, stagings, synopses, and their organization
changes according to whar they are supposed to account for.
For essmiid reasons, I cannot hope ro achieve any definitive pre-
m t a t i o n of the “system” of the infrastructures. My goal here is more
limited. All I want to show is that the infrastrucrures tend themselves
to a certain systcmaticity, to a ccrrain s f r a t i t i d systematization. This
can be acbievcd by S-CKiItg side by side a limited number of these
undecidables and exploringsorne of the ways in which they implicate
one another.

The hfrusrructurc as Arcbe-Trace

In Of Grummorolqy, Dtrtida indicates a number of givens in the
contcmponry discourse of philosophy that motivated his choice of
the word truce 10 designate a specific inkasmumural amcuhdon. The
word ,trucemakes reference to Nietzsche’s ,andFreud‘s, k i n a s ’ s and
Heidcggdr preoccupation with a critique of the value of presence as
constitutive of classical ontology. It must be noted that trace is a
metaphysical concept on the same ground as the concept of pmscna
as self-praence, from which it is derived. Yet for Derrida, the word
designates something of which the metaphysica1 concepts of trace and
presence are rhe erasure. From Derrida’s analysis of Heidegger’s can-
ccpr of die [riibe Spur, ir follows that rrace is the necessarily mcta-
physical concept that names an originary uacing and effacement, of
which the traditional conceptual dyad of trace and presence within
the metaphysical text is the tram of effacement (M, p. 66). What,
then, don the word truce signify?
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING I87

As I have indicated, it n a m a somahing of which presence and

wce, or more gmeraIly self and Other, are the crasun Within the
discourse of philosophy. Whereas philosophy traditionally considers
the Other t~ be SKondary to the self, the Other of the self, thus
annulling the Other in its own right, Demda’s inquiry into their
difference leads to the recognition of a certain irreducibility of the
Other with respcct to the self. Indccd, dtspitc the s r l f s traditional
subjection oi the Other to itself, its own identity is a function of Its
dcmarcarion from the Ocher, which thus becomes endowed with an
mscntial autonomy. The archetrace is the consrituting possibiIiry of
this differential interplay h e e n scIf and Other, in short, of what
is traditionally understood as difference.
Most generally speaking, the originary tram designam the minimal
rburtuie required for the exisancc of any difference (oropposition)
of urns (and what they stand for). that is, f o r any relation to alterity.
Withi metaphysics, the difference b e e n two t e r n is invariably
pcrccived from the pcrspcctivc ofone of the terms, the term of plcn-
itude, from which the second term ,of the opposition is held to derive;
the first term is not taken to bc affmcd by h c fact that it appears in
opposition to another, less valorized term. In contrast, the arche-trace
stems from ZH insight into the mnstiruting function of diffcrcna, the
bol$irrg-against-anotber,of perspective variations (AbrchaMtngen),
to use a Husscrlian term. The problcmatic of the archc-trace articu-
l a m the recognition that the privileged term in a difference of op-
posmon would not a p p r as such without Ihc difference or opposih
that gives it form. Consequently, the archetrace is a reflection on the
form that a term or entity of plcnitude must take, insofar a5 it can
appear only in oppitians or dyadic muctures; it is a meditation
upon the indissocisblc uppeahg of what mmcs m the fore with
another, lcsscr term or entity. The archetrace explains why a concept
,ofpltnirude or presencecan be thought only within dyadic canccptual
svuctum.
Lct us attemptto imaginea mncepcthat has never bcen held against
another in a di~hotomousrdation. Entirely undemmincd, it would
bc altogether unintelligible; moreover, it would not yet be a concept.
Now, supposc it appcarcd once and only oncc, as if by accident, in
a differential relation to another term or entity; then, the very pos-
sibility of that accident would have to be accounted for by dcrnon-
mating what made it possible for it to suffer such an accident. Such
a demonstration would reveal that that concept or entity indudcs, in
one way or another, what it is opposed to, and also include most
r88 O N DECONSTRUCTION

fundamentaIly, the mark of the negativity characteristic of difference.

Yet conccptualized entities appcar always simultaneously with other
concepts in hierarchically determined (conflictual) oppositions. To say
that a concept appears simultaneously with its polar opposite, which
is usually in the lower position, designating the simulacrum of the
value referred ro by the first, is to admir char that concepr can be
what it is suppmed to be onIy fn distinguishing itself from another
term that it adds to itself. T h e identity of the leading term, therefore,
requires that the possibility of its own duplication and of its reference
to another bc inscribcd wirhin itself. Otherwise it could nor enter into
opposition with another term, in comparison with which it is what
it is. Arche-truce is the name for rhe universality of this diffmence,
for the necessary possibdiry of inscription in general, which ItIMSt
affect a concept and value of plenitude insofar as it appears as such
only within 3 difference or opposition. Since a mnceptual entity is,
by right, sclf-identical only insofar as it calls upon its lower self in a
dyadic structure, this difermce is not accidental but is the possibility
af both its identity and its difference from an Other. Any difference
or opposition between rerms, concepts, thing%and so on presupposes
rhis difference, which intimately affects everything that enters into a
relation of difference o r opposition-that is to say, everything-be-
cause it is the condition as such of thc possibility of entering into a
relation.
Since, within the sphere of metaphysics, a trace is dcrivarivc of.
and opposed to, an instant or instance of ful1 presence, the tram rhar
names the d i f f m c e , and char must inhabit that agency of full prcs-
ence in order to distinguish it from its rrace, must be called arche-
trace. It is a trace of which the rraa is only a trace, and it has breached
the moment of hll p r a n c e , which can thus appear in all its plenitude,
in opposition to the lack of plenitude conceptualized by the mnvcn-
tional trace. What the arche-trace thus allows to appear in a difference
af values, concepts, or entides is its own effacement ifi the form of
the valorized value and in the form of the absence of that value, a n
absence which is the only possible rcpresentation of the archetrace
within the realm of appearances. The trace is indeed consdrurtd by
the possibiliry of such an effacement. ‘The trace is the erasure of
sdhood, of ant’s own presence, and i s constituted by the threar or
anguish ofits irrernediabtc disappearance. of the disappearance of its
disappearance. An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full prcsencc,
an immobile and uncorrumible substance. a ,son of Cod. a sien ” of
parousia and nor a seed, that is a mortal g e m . This erasure i s dcath
itself‘’ (WD, p. 230).
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 189

The possibility of erasure wnstiturivc of the me shows itself in

be tram’s effacement of what could maintain the tram in prscnce.
The tracing of the tram is identical with that effacement, and &us
with the self-erasure of the trace. Through the effacement of what
a u l d maintain it in prcscna, rhe ma- consticures itself as relation
~6another tract. Hmcq “SinGC’the trace can onIy imprint itxlf by
referringto the other, to another uaa . . by letting itself be upsraged
I

and fOrgoKCn, i s force of produdion stands in necessary relation to

the energy of ia erasure’’ (D, p. 3311. Tracing and effacing are not
simply in u relation of cxreriority; what constitutes the trace in depth
is precisely the relationto Otherness by which the trace’s self-identity
and df-prescncc are marked, and thus effaced, by the detour through
rhc Other. Also, bust of this soiidarity between tracing and cffac-
ing, the archetram can never be prtstnrcd as such ouside the dif-
ferences that it maltes possible and as which it itself disappears. “It
is itself a trace that can nevcr bc prcsmtcd, that is, can never appear
,and manifest itself as such in its phenomenon, It is a trace that lies
beyond what profoundly ties fundamental antology to phenomc-
aology. AIways deferring, the trace is never ptescntcd as s u h . In
prrxnting itself it becomes effaced” (SP,p. 154; translation slightly
modified). Indeed, if the truce is relation to anorher trace in self-
effacement only, then ir has nothing thar could be called its own or
that could, as its proper es6cnce. be made to appear as such. Fot
essential reasons, nothing of the infrastructure arche-traa as such can
become present.
Itfollowsrhatitisimpassiblerr,arkwhatrhearchc-tfacc~, because
this would imply that it couId appear, come into ~ i min, its essence.
To s k what the arche-traw is is to pmuppox a differcnce, between
appearance and essence for instance, which the arche-trace is intended
to explain. Although this i n f r a s m m r e cannot, for these reasons, be
6xcd within the definirc and fuIly decidable contours of an eidos, a
deseriptian of its main fcamres is nor thereby precluded.
No one would challenge the nuclear physicist’s assumption of the
theoretical “txistence” of such particles a5 quarks or gluons, an as-
sumption required by quantum chromodynamics to explain artain
properties of matter on the subatomic level. Such a hypothesis could
never be mhrantiared rhrough rhe perception of such a single, un-
combined particle, aithough its “existence” can bc i n d i d y inferred
from cxpcriencc, since it leaves dcrccrablc signatures. Yet since rhtse
signamrts do not rand fat rhe eximnce of the partide as such, as
&c sclf-prescnt entity, but only justify its assumption as that of a
necessary possibility or mathematical function, the ontological status
I90 O N DECONSTRWCTION

of these particles is most peculiar. In an anahgous way, an infra-

structure such as the archvcrace must be assumed if one is to explain
the difference asxlciatcd with concepts and entities We begin to 5ee,
writes Derrida, that ‘‘difference cannot be thought without the mce”
(OG, p. 57). The arche-tracc, or difference in itself, is not B difference
with respect to an already constituted presence. On the conrrary, as
“an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity,” it
ie before all determination of a particular ditkrence “the PWE move-
ment which produces difference” (OG.p. 62). Since it produces dif-
ferends as an effect, the arche-trace is thus mow originary than the
diffcrends it consritutcs. As the origin of differencc, however, the
archemace also undermints the value of origin, for reasons discussed
in previous chapters. “The trace is not only the disappearance of
origin-within the discourse that we sustain and according ro the
path that we follow it rncans that the origin did not even disappear,
that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the
trace, which thus hecomes the origin of the origin” (OG, p. 61).
Similarly, and for the same reasons, the arche-trace is no longer a
principle properly speaking. If the mace cannot be submimd to the
onto-phenomenological quesrion of essence, it is because in irs case
one can ‘*no longer trust even tbc opposition of tam and principle,
which, in a11 its metaphysical, ontological, and transcendental forms,
has always functioncd wirhin rhc system of what is” (OG. p. 75).
Although no difference a n be thought without presupposing the arche-
trace, its conaituring funcrion can no longer be cast within the frame-
work of such concepts as origin or principle. It cannot be fully anti
appropriately accounted for with the traditional judiciary questions.
How, then, is the archc-trace, as an irreduciblyoriginary synthesis,
capable of cansumring differences? The arche-mace has already been
described a5 the minimal scructurc of all difference, and hcncc of all
alrerity between rerms or entities. Given the solidarity between tracing
and cffacing. thc infrastructure arche-trace can now be made more
precise by detcrmfning it in t a m s of what Derrida calls a “strucnIre
de renvoi generalisit? (M. p. 24). T h e notion of rhucture de renvoi
translates the German Ve‘cl.lueismgssttuRturand has been rendered by
it5 English translators as “referential smcrure,” *‘structureof refer-
ral,” or “structure of reference.” The archetract is a minimal struc-
ture of generalized refercnce, whcreby r e f m c e must be understood,
in the broadest scnseofreferring, as alluding or pointingto Eomcthing
other. The arche-rnce is a minimal structure of refcrral to the extent
that it constitutes difiercncc betwccn tcrms or cntities. Indeed, what
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEJNG 191

it dcsaibwis that all reference ro 5elFakcs place by way of a detour

through an Other and thus prcsuppoxs an originary df-cffaccrnent.
The arche-trace unites the double movement of referrncc (to self or
Other) and of self-diversion. Derrida conceprualizcs this structure of
teCfamI, a structure closely related to what Husserl calls “fomard
and backward rcferenm”(Hin-md Rlicktvrisirngen], in Speech and
Pbmornma, as p a n o f a discussion of Hwerl’s Cm investigation in
h g h l Imstigaiiom. Aidad by the disaqancy betwom various strata
of description within the work of Wusserl, Derrida proceeds, against
Husscrl’s cxp’css wish, m a dwnsmrctive generalization of indita-
rion, which this philosopher had attempted to dist.inmish from a p e s -
sion as one sip-hnction from another. For Husserl, indication is a
made of assadation of ideas characterized by empirical modvadon;
consequently, it is void of any truth value. In indication, a thing dOCg
not count scparaoly but onIy insofar as ir helps to present and point
M anothwthing. Husscrl writes, “The single item itself, in thme
various forward and backward references, is no mere experienced
cuntcnr, but an apparent objm (or part, property, etc., of the same)
&at appears only in so far ss experience (Erfahrung) endows m t e n t s
with a new phenomenological cburacter,.so that they no longer count
separately, but hdp to present an objea different from themselvcs.”’
According to Husscrl, exprtssion and its meaning function arc
entirely different from indication. In solitary mental life, where .it
a c h i m s total purity, expression is free of all indication and intima-
tion. Derrida’s argument in Speech and Pbrnonrena demonstrates that
this essential Hurserfian distinction (essential because the privileging
of expression over indicadon inauguram the specific domain of phe-
nomenological mearch-intentional consciousness and cxpcricncc)
cannot ultimately be upheld, since indication, in the form of self-
intimation, must inhabit expression even in its pure form of mental
soliloquy. Obvioudy enou&, the ensuing genetalirion of indication
implicr the nrccssity for a cornplm rethinking of indication, which,
in the essential Husserlian distinction, had ban entirely determined
from the pcrspxivc of expmion-that is, as a deficient and deriv-
arive made of exprcrsion. The arche-uaa &us n a m a a ndical gcn-
cralization of the indicative function.
As an originary nonpresence and dterity at rhe root of what Husserl
mccptualized under the name expression-the ideal self-presmce of
meaning without the mediation of signs-the arche-trace is thought
as the mndition of the ideality of meaning and of self-prcscnce in
gencral, insofar as both must he infinitely repcatable in order to bc
 ON I)BCOISTRUCTION

what they arc supposed to be. This necessary possibility of n-petition

in irs most general form-without which the ideality of meaning or
seIf+prescnce, that is, of the domain proper of phenomennlugical in-
vestigation.could not come about-is the “trace in thc most universal
smw.” The irreducible and unavoidable nonpresence and alterity within
self-pmmce and meaning strikes. says Derrida, “at the very m t of
the argument for the uselessness of signs [of indication, intimation,
and so on! in the self-relation.” Indeed, for a n idcal entity to repeat
irself, it must be able to intimate itsdl in contrasr to an Other from
which it is different. T h e trace that makes possible such reference to
self by way of an Other is “more ‘primordial’ than what i s phenorn-
enologically primordial,’’ or pristine to cxpression-that is, meaning.
self-presence, evidence, and M on. T h e originary trace is thus the:
constituting impurity or alterity, the constituting nonpresence, that
allows the phenorneno’togically primordial to come into its own by
providing the phenomenologicaIly primordial with the mark of a min-
imal difference within which it can repeat itself infinitely as the same
by referring to an Other and to (an Other of) i t d f within itself. In
short, the archc-trace must be understood a5 the foldaf an irreducible
“bending-back.” as a minimal ,(setf--)differencewithin (selh)identity,
which secures xlfhwd and self-presence through the detour of oneself
[as Other) to oneself.
The arche-trace is both thc minimal difterencr requited by self-
repetition, and thus by ideality, and the minimal relarion 10an Other
(the reladon of indication). wirhour which a self could not bc self, As
the very condition of being a self, the archctrace is the inscription
within the stigme of self of “the other point toward which it cantin-
ually drifts” (D, p. 241). Yet clearly enough, in this most universal
sense, the tncc is also that which forever prevents a self from being
self, since the reladon IO Other is “older” than selfhood. The structurc
of generalized reference that is the archc-tracc is also the limit of the
self-Identical referent. In irs capacity as such a general structure of
referral, thc archc-trace constimtcs the minimal synthesis of self-pres-
ence and self-idcntity through self-deportation. The arche-race is this
minimal unity of being at oncc oneself and an Other; it i s the minimal
and general structure of the constitution of an identity through re-
lation to alterity; it is, consequently, a strucfllfe of the retention of
thc mark of rhe Orher by the self, by which the sclf is what it is only
insofar as the interval that constitutes it simultaneously divides it.
This double movement is not that of a n already constituted identity
or personality, but is the minimal logical 5tmcture of relation to
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 193

a l k t y that such a constitution must presuppose. The difference that

such a consdrution entails is the trace ofthe archc-aacc. the trace as
which the arche-trace appcars; but the minimal rcfcrendal structure
that is the arche-trace dDcs not appear us such in what it mnstitures
as the trace of its effacement. As we have men, it rather disuppeam
in what it makes possible, since effacement, from the start, constitute
the trace as a trace. Effacement belong to the structure of the trace,
since the minimal synthesis of the rcbrtntial strumre makes self-
diverring and being marked by rhc Other a condition of self-identity,
For rhe same reason, the irreducible dupIicity of the synthesis of this
structure of rcfetral is the origin of repetition and thus idealization,
&cause “this trace is the-opening of the Srsr cxterioriry in general,
the enigmatic relation of the living to its other and of an inside to an
outside: spacing,” it is also the origin of spacc (OG, p. 70). Moreover,
bccausc the doubling characteristic of the structure of referentiality
is a proms of tcmporalization as well, it functions equalIy as the
origin of what is called time. These different implications of the in-
frastructure, or general S~UCNCC of referral, will be anal+ in more
detail. As archctcace, the general structure of reference-that is to
say, the minimal unity of self and Other before all relations between
constituted personalities, entities, or idenritics-explains the n m -
sary insaiption of all of phiIosophy’s axial concepts (and of what
they designate) within differential structures or sysrcms. Also calling
the a d e - m c e arche-writing, Denida notes: “To think the unique
within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gcstureof the arche-
writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of
sclf-pmcncc, in truth the loss of what has never taken place of a
self-presence which has never been given but only dreamed of and
always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itseld except
in its own disappearance” (OG, p. 112).
In its capacity as archc-trace, the gcncral struucfllrc of reference,
whereby constitution of self a n rake place only through relation to
Other, aaoun!s for the fact and the necessity that all concepts a p p r
in opposition to other concepe and are, in fact and of ncccssiry,
fomd by h e difkrcnct in which they appear. “Such would bc the
originary trace. Without a retention in the minimal unit of temporal
cxpcrimcc. without a cram reraining the other as other in the same,
no difference would do its work and no meaning would appear. It is
nor the quesrion of a canstitured difference h m , but rather, before
all determination of the content, of the pure movement which pro-
ducca diftercncc” (OG.p. 62). As the minimal unit of differential
I9d O N DECONSTRWCTIOH

determination, as the unity of the double movement of xlf-effacemmr

and relation M Other-that is, as arche-trace-the general smcttlre
of referennality is, then, rhe fabric fmm which systems can be cut. It
is i t d f rhe general system-thar is, the condition of possibility and,
in accordana with the logic of the infrastructures, of impossibility
of the systematic exposition 5fconcepts,

The Infiasfruciure 0s Differamce

For rhe same reasonsthat the archetract could not bt fixed into place
once and for all, differanm is a heterogeneity whosc movement cannot
be bounded within a definitive setting. Nonetheless, this impossibiiity
docs not preclude us from outlining the nuclcar traits of differancc.
The arche-synthesis of the arche-trace is the minimal structure of a
relation to atteriry, which, as pure difference, produces differends as
an effect “The (pure) trace is differmce,”wrjtes Derrida (OG.p. 62).
In Speech m d Phenontenu, for ,the first time Detrida i s compdlcd
to think of differance as both a pure and an impure difference, without
decidable poles and without independent o r irreversible polar terms.
After showing how Husserl achieves sense and presence through a
transcendental reduction of everything indicative, of all mediation
and relation to Other in the sphere of solitary mental Me, Derrida
argua that this same transccndental reduction aIso yields difkrance,
once Husserl admits that auto-affection is the condition of self-pres-
cnce. Indeed. without such auto-affection, no p r w n t could reflect
irsdf into itself; yet to g a n t that without df-affection no present
muld truly be self-present is to admit a minimal and pure diffcrena
(and hence, relation to Other) into presence as the vety hinge upon
which it turns into itself. Aum-affection, concludes Derrida, is there-
fore ‘‘not something that ‘happensto a transcendental subject, it pro-
duces ir. Auto-aftacrion is nor a modality of cx@cnoc that characrerim
a being that would already be itsdf (autos). Ir produces sameness as
sclf-relation within selfdiffemcc; it produces sammtas as thc non-
identical" (SP,p. 82). But the interval of this pure diffmna, which
divides self-presence so that it may fold itself into itself. also harbors
everything that Husscrl hoped to cxctude from xlf-p-ce as a threat
to its purity. To say, then, as Hwerl does, that self-affection makes
selCprcsence possible is also to say that self-prcsence can never be
pure, that the very difference that allows self-presence m cum into
itself also makes it former differ from itstlf. Differance, then, like the
pure self-presence reached in transcendental reduction, is cleariy a
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 195

transcendental concept, but it is iust as clearly h e reason why “no

pure transcendental reduction is possible,” and hence why no pure
transcendental comepts arc possible either (SP,p. 82). The pure dif-
hence of dt-affection, w h i l e it m a k s wlf-prrscnce p i b I e , ~ a tthe
same time“fissures aud retards presence, rubmining it simultancnusly
to primordial division and dday” (SP, p . 88). It acconnts a t oncc for
ideality and noni&aliry, and for rheir difference. How, &en, docs
diffmancc h m c the possibility of the difference b m c n the ideal
and the nonideal?
In Positim, Bcrrida has given the most exhaustive aaaunr.of the
fonna! h u m s of d i h n c e - Differance is not simply deferring, bc-
cause an a a of delay daes not n-rily entail a rnwemmt of dif-
h m .In addition m ddcrrin~ differancc neq5sarily i m p k difference.
As an infm~~cturc. it “is to be conceived prior to the separation
h e e n deferring as dday and differing as the acdvc work of differ-
ence’’ (SP,p . 88); thus, it is mom primordial than deferring and
,differencetaken separately. Like a11 other infrastructures, diffcrana,
in h a v i q m account for a varietp of thmdfal phenomena, is an
emomica1, conceptual, formal s t r u m r e to the m n t t h a t it draws
togctbcr a configuration of signifying movcmcncs from a variety of
heterogeneous resources; it is not a homogeneous unity of hctero-
p e a u s fcaturrs, however, and is wen “inconocivable as a mere ho-
mogeneous mmpliutian of a diagram or line of time” (SP,p. 88).
As an intnsrmciurc, diffcrancc is a nonunitary synthesis of herem-
gcnmus featurn.
As wc know, tfrc word wwmce is bmed by mbrtantivizing the
parduple of the verb d i f f h r , ?to defer,” ”to postpone,” “to ad-
j a m ” In creating his unusual noun, in which ‘heII substituted for
the t remains purely graphic, since r h e diffcrmcc between the nvo
row& cannot be heard (it is a difference that dcpcnds on the mute
intervention of a written trace, and thus of a trace t h a t tics diffcnnce
inwith the functioningof t h e arche-trace), Derrida opcns h e semantic
fieldof chis noun to a variety of meanings, not all of which stem from
theoriginal verb dijyircr. Liktsa m n y otherinfrasmctum, t h e -unw
ending of diff‘erance already Icavcs undcddabic whether this word i s
to be understood a6 active or passive, thus enabling it to occupy a
place beyond what phmomenology would distinguish as active and
passive constitution or synthesis. More strikingly, difemce knots
togetherthedifferent rnunings of tbcworddiffcmccwith theentidy
different significations of the verb to defcr (diff&er),h on whoK
r
parriciplcthe noundiflermce was derived; yet there is no etymological
196 ON DECONSTRUCTION

justification for doing so.Only by means of quasicatachrestic violence

can the nmlogism differurrce be made to refer to the semantic field
of the word difference. The sort of linguistic abuse at stake here is
required by the necessity of good economic “formalization,” which
the infrastructure differance is intended to achiwe. I h e lack of har-
mony bcnveen such different things as dcfcrment and difference, in-
stead of being a misfortune for the intended coherence, is preasely
what the term differawe Kwes to account for. Furthcrmorc, diffcr-
ance tics together in one archesynthesis much more than rhe move-
rnenr of dclerral and difference; it is composed of at lcast rhrec
additional, entirely heterogeneous concepts of difference. However
heterogeneous the different concepts that enter the structural config-
uration named by the plural noun diflerunce may be.they act in unison
to form a systematic and irreducible ensemble of possibilities rhar
economically accounts for a variety of distinct concepts of difference
simultaneourly at work in the discourse of philosophy. Differance ties
together five concepts, which owe their incommensurability to their
scope, spherc of origin. and level of argumentation, in one synthesis
that accounn for them all. Let us, rhen, discuss thmedifferent concepts
of diflcrcncc to which dif/erance rcfcrs, in order to dcterminc what
this strange linguistic formation is intended to achieve:
Fits?. diffmmce rclcrs to the (active mid passive) movcmmt that consists in
deferring by meam of delay, ddcgation. reprieve. rehml. detour, post-
ponement, rculrving. In this sense, differonce i s not prccedcd by lhcoriginary
and indivisible unity of a present pussibility that I muld rmervc, likc an
expenditure that 1 would put off calculatedly or for revons nf economy.
W h a t defers prescnct, on the contrary. is the very basis on which presence
i s announced or desirrd in what rcprcscnrs it, its sip, its trace. (P,p. 8 )
In this first determination of differance, Derrida make USE of onc
of the meanings of the Latin verb diffme insofar as it refers to time,
namely. rhc action of postponing until lam, of raking inra account, the
taking-account of timc and form in an rrpcratim that implics an cmnomic
reckoning, a detour, a rcspitr, a dclay, P rcserve, a reprcworarion-all the
mncepts that I will rum up here in a ward . . . tmporulizing [tmporiwtiotr].
‘To differ” in rhis sense is to temparaliu, to rcsarr, consciously or uneor-
sciously. to the temporal and tcntporaliung mediation of a detour that sus-
pends the acmmplishmcnt or fwlfillmcnt of a “dnirc” or “will.“ or carria
Jcsire nr will out in a way that annuls or tempers their cffcct. (SP,p. 136)

With differawe as deferment, “timc opens itself as the dclay of the

origin in relarion to itself’ (M,
p. 2901.
Let us now see in more detail ~ D Wrhis temporahzing aspecr of
 h SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 197

d i k n a is the condition of possibility of rernporalization (ienrpw-

disution), temporality, and time-their “primordial COO5tiNtiOn,” as
it would be c a U d withii the conccpwal system and according m the
classical requircmcnts of meraphysia and transcendental phenome-
nology.
The operation of deferring implicated by the 0 of diffcrancc dacs
not refer m the delaying of any already constituted or anticipated
moment of presence. “To defer [dif?rm]...Cannot m a n to retard
aprcscntpossibili~,topostponeanaa,toputoffaperccption already
now possible. That possibility is possible only through a diflwmcc
which must bc conaivcd of in orhcr terms than those of a calculus
or mechanics of decision.” If the am of deferring relared only to such
a moment, it would rcprexot nothing but “rhc lapse which a mn-
Kiousness, a ‘&If-prcsenceof the p e n t , accords itself’ (WD, p. 203)
snd would derive from the prcscncc; ycr the retardation in quetian
is originary and thus not a relation between two moments of presence.
Instead, what Derrida is attempting here is to think the pmcnt based
on time as differma. Differaim as rime, as the minimal acriviry of
postponing, is to be understood as COnStiNtiVe of presrnoc, as wcll
a$ of past and turnre, to the extent that they are only modifications
OF the now. Differance a5 time,or rather as t e m p o n l i n g (tempor-
isntim) is not,hen, a more simple and authentic time mompared to
the vulgar time progammatic of the philosophy oftime from Aristotlc
to Hcgcl. Indeed, as Derrida argues in “Ousia and Gramme,” the
very question concerning the meaning of time aupprcsscD time by
linking it to appearing, truth, presence, to essenceingeneral. To think
difkrance as tsrnporalizing, however, does not complicate time by
looking for its origin in the imcrdmc cxpedenm of consciousness;
such an attempt, which belongs to the pmjccrof a transcendental
phenomenology, cannot avoid thinking the time of the inner-time
canscioumcss accarding m the modci of mundane time. In distinnion
from the vulgar concept of time [which, according to Heid-, has
informed the philosophy of time since Aristotlc), from Husscrl’s con-
cept of an inner consciousness of time, and fmm H e i d e w ’ s notion
od authentic temporality, diffcrana as rime points at an “absolute
past,” a past that is na longer a modification of a present, no longer
a present-past, but a past to which, according to the logic of the arche-
mace, a present moment must rekr in ordcr to be what it is:

Diffcrana is what makes the movement of signification pc&ble only if each

rlcmmr char h said to be “present,” appearing on the smgc of pr-, is
related m something omcr than i t d but rctains the mark of a past element
198 ON DECONSTRUCTION
-
and already Im itself be hollowed our by the mark of its relatian to i future
elemenr. m h
is
i tram relam no less ro whar is called the future lhrn to what
is called the part, and it constitutes whar is called tbe p r m t by this vcry
rclation ‘to what it is not, to what it ahlurely is mot; that is, not cvm to a
past or k t u r c considered as L mdified present. ISP, pp, 142-143)
As a result of this radical alterity, without which presence could
never come into existence, pmence is always belated with regatd to
itself and comcs ex post, as an c f f m , to the absolute past to which
it must relate in order to bc constituted. Differance as temporalizing
names the irrcducible temporal movements rhat thus affm the idea
of presence itself. While time has always been thought from the present
now, this is a time anterior to time, P past o/ time, a past that has
never been prcsent. So if differance is conceived of as the primordial
consriturion of temporality and rime as commonly understood, then
differance allows time to come to the fore only a5 limited by what
makes it possible. This is why Derrida can contend t h a t “the inter-
mission or interim of rhc hymen does not establish time: neither time
a$ theexisrcnce of rheconcept (Hegel), nor lost timenor time regained,
and still less the moment or eternity. No prcscnt in truth presents
itself there, not even in thc form of its self-concealment” (D, p. 230).
But since the reference to an absolute atterity required by the consri-
mtion o f a present now is the insinuation of a space inm the sup
posedly self-sufficient present, its spacing, this reference M alteriry. is
also the becoming-time of space, 10 the extent that what is referred
to is a n absolute past. Indeed, differance as temporalizing is insepa-
rable from, though not identical to, diffcrancc as spacing, since the
‘becdming-time of spa- is the condition proper of spacing.
“Second, the rnovemcnt of differunce.as that which produces dif-
ferent t h i n g , that which Cfferentistes. is the common r w t of all the
oppasirional concepts that mark our language, such as, to take only
a few examples, sensibldintelligible, intuitiodsignificatian, nature/
culrure, erc” (P,p. 9). In this second determination of differance,
Dcrrida refers to the second meaning of the Latin verb differre. the
etymological root of the French dif{erer, which translates the Greek
diuphorein (to carry diffcrent ways, spread abroad, scatter, disperse,
separate, differ, be different). Diffcrance is here understood as the
producrive and primordial constituting causaliry, as one would say
in tradirional philosophy, of diffcrmds and differcncs. But since this
production of differences takes place through the opening of an in-
between, of a polemos based either on dissimilarity or allergy between
poles, terms, or mnccpts whercby hierarchical relations are installed,
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 199

ditfcfancc is here determined primarily as spucing (espamtmt]. “In

‘differents,’ whethm referring to the alterity of dissimilarity or the
dhrity of allerg or of polemics, iris necessary rhar interval, distance,
spacing ocau among .rhe different dcmcnts and occur actively, dy-
namically, and with a certain perseverance in repetition” (SP,pp.
136-137).
Let us try to undustand how differancc as spacing renders possibic
spatiality and space in the common m e . Spacing is neither time not
space. Rccail that the mlation to an Other constitutive of a self, whose
minimal unit is the archetram, presupposesan intenraI which at once
a f h and rnakcs possible the relation of self to Other and divides
the self within i d . In the same way, differana as the production
of a polemical space of differen- bath presupposes and pddufcs
the intervals between conapts, notions, terms, and so on. In that
m e , archc-mace and differan- tach in a difkrent manner, are
spacing. From the perspective ofthe acchc-trace, spacing “is the opcn-
ing of the first exteriority in general, rhe enigmatic relationship of the
living to it5 other and of an inridt to an outside” [OG, p. 70). Spaang
is the spae in g ~ ~ mor~“that l , minimum ofascntial spacing” that
any entity (real or canccptual) must contain o r bc inhabited by in
order to fall into a space ‘exterior’to it” (WD,p. 219).Since spa-
tializarion-king befallen by space-is a possibility m which any
entity is subject, this possibility musvbe inscribed wirhii that entity.
As this n-ary possibility--that is, a possibility that must always
be pwpible--spacing ensure the spatialization of enritie. Caw-
qucnrly. the falling into space of an enwry is never accidcnral-it never
happens by surprise-because its interiority i 5 already inhabited by
its outside as the possibility of an outside befalling it. Spacing, then,
also names the difference that insinuam itself within the self-Riation
of a self-identical cntity and that prevents this cnrity from cycr relating
only M itself, Spacing in rfiis sense is cxteriority in gercrd, without
which “the outside, ‘spatial’ and ‘objective’ cxteriority which wc be-
lieve we know as the most familiar thing in the world, as h i l i a r i t y
itsclf, would not appear” (OG, pp. 70-71).
From the pempoaive of difhrance, sprang is the fom of rupture
by which concepts are r p a r a t d from one anodxr, the staging of
conccpcp in an “arche-scene” at rhc origin of and, thcreforq the
condition of posibility of conccpmal signikation. “This spaanb”
notes Rcrrida, “is the sirnuleamusly active and passive.. . produc-
tion of the irltcrvals without whih the ‘fuil’ terms would not signify,
would not function” (P,p. 27). The intervalsopened by spacing allow
zoo O N DECONSTRUCTION

the different conceptual elements to enter into relation without, how.

ever, permitting them to coincide. Still, “spacing is not the simple
negariviry of a lack’ (M,p. 317); it is the emergence of concepts as
already marked by their relation to other concepts in the primal Scene
of signification.
Space in general, then, as the condition of possibility of the cxit of
any entity outside of itself and of signikation. insofar as the consti-
tution of concepts as hierarchical: or differential terms grounds thcir
itenbiliry, is the dimension neither of o surface nor of a depth. It is,
as Derrida points out in Dissemimtiort, literally nothing. H c wrires
in Positions, “Sprrcingdesignaresnothing,nothing chat is, no presence
at a distancc; it is the index of an irreducibltexterior, and at thesame
tirnea movement, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity”
(P, p, 81). Spacing is the synthesis without reconciliation of this pas-
sive and active aspeck “it is not only the interval, the space constituted
between two thing (which is the usual sense of spacing), but also
spacing, the operation, or in any event, the movement o f sating aside
[d I’icart]” (P,p. 106).Spacing, which blends in part, and tach time
differently, with archerram, differance. and other undecidables, is in
every instance the discrete synthcsis of (1) the movement by which
the self-idcntiry of an entity is interrupted and (2) the passive con-
stitution by inscription as habitation. The very nature of spacing does
not permit its own syntheric structure to be anc of remnciling the
two aspects it rcunitcs. For this same rcason, spacing cannot serve as
one expIicative principle for dl differences and for all specific spaces;
to elevate spacing into a theological function of total accounting is a
mtradicrion in rerms. “Spacing certainly operates in all fields, but
preciscry as different fields. And its oprration is different each time,
articulated otherwise” (P,p. 82). This is also true of all the other
infrastrumrcs, whosc purification and idcatization is impossible be-
cause the specific surt of synthesis that they achieve is context bound.
Another result of this kind of synthesis is thar the function represented
by each infrasrrucrurc also spplics to itsclf, so that it remains essen-
tially dislocated from itself. (This aspect of the infrastructures whose
name is that of another infrastructure or undecidable, the re-mark,
is analyzed later in this chapter.)
I have consrrued spacing to mean the originary constitution of
exteriorit).and space as it is known in a sensible or intelligiblemanner.
Yet this is not to say that the “transcendental” question conccrning
space elaborated here falls within a transcendental acsrhctics-whcrher
Kantian, Husserlian, or of an entirely new kind. As should be obvious
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 201

at this poine; this cannot possibly be the case. Spacing is not a form
Qf (pure) intuition that structuma a mbjcct’s cxpcriena of the world.
Nor does spacing follow from Husscrl’s radicalization of the Kantian
question. which concerns the prehistoric and prccultual level of spa-
cia-temporal experience a5 a unitary and unjvcrsal ground for all
subjectivity and culture. The notion of spacing as the condition of
possibility of sensible and inteIligible, or ideal, spacc undercuts the
very possibility of a self-present subject of intuition or of universal
and absolute expcrieuce; spacing aurharim such d i e m by limiting
them. 5 i n e it questions the veq possibility of the distinction k e e n
sensibility and pure sensibility, the “transcendental“ qumion of spac-
ing has to be situated beyond what Huwrl calls the logos of the
anthhctic world. Nor docs spacing wincide with the logical concept
of space developed by Hegel. In his Emcyc!opopedk, where h e d i s c u s e
the udstentiaf ground of contingency a$ that which prevents nature
from being rtducible to logical coherence-the “impotence of na-
lure”-Hegel develops an ontological substratum wherein all the p b
nomena that lack affinity and arc totally indifferent to one another
can be gathered topfther. This substratum, this ideal d u r n of lux-
taposition, is space, in which the unthinkable absolute incoherence
characteristic of the phenomena of nature is transkmod into a m c -
mrod totality.“‘ The birth of rhc logical mnccpt of space serves to
makc the existence of incoherencelogically possible. Although spacing
has this one ftature in common with logical space, in that it rep-a
3 medium of cohabitation of what is logically incoherent and indif-
ferent, spacing, unlike logical space, is not governed by the relos of
logicality within the boundaries of which space i s onc moment, Spac-
ing,hm, is not theobjaafa philoscrphyof nature, whether Wegelian
or of an entirely new kind
But could spacing bc tributary to a hcrmencutic philosophy? Is it
the hermencutical concept of that openncs~that primarily provides
the space in which space as we usudly understand it can unfold? This
htnncncutical concept of space, “the pnspatial region which fim
gives any possible ‘where,’ ” conaisa of the foreunderstanding of
separatcncss and manifoldncss in genml.” According to Heideggcr,
this foreunderstanding, thcmatized or not, is imperative to any un-
,derstanding of spatiatity and space; without it, spatiahy or space
would never bc g k n to us. The hermtncudal concept of space thus
nams the meaning or truth of spaa. Yct spacing is not of the
,order of unthematized preundcrsmnding, nor is it a truer meaning of
h e common meaning of spatiality. As that according to which any
20 2 ON DECONSTRUCTION

entity is what it is only by being divided by the Other to which it

refers in order M constime irstlf, spacing is also the pmignifying
opening of concealed and unconcealed meaning. Spacing as a presig-
nifying openness is the very possibility of “laying out,” of bringing
to understanding, or of the translating that distinguishes any her-
menewin.
As the movement by which any possible mtity is scparatcd within
itself, spacing $50 affects the now constitutive of the metaphysical
concept of time. It dividcs the present moment af the now within
irself. Insinuating an intervd in each presenr moment because de-
pendent on a movement of retention and protention (since that mo-
ment is present only with rcgard to a past and a future), the spaang
diastema is also the becomingspace oi time, the possibility proper of
ternporalization, as well as the becoming-time of space.
Tbkd, diffcrmcr is a h the production, if it can still be put his way, af
these differences, of rhe diacririciry that the linguistics gcncarcd by stussure,
and dl the structural sciences mdeled upon it, have recalled i s h e condirion
for any sipiCcaiion and any structure. T h e ,differcnms--and, for example,
thc raxonomical sciencc which thcy may occasion-arc thc cffas of d+-
ance; thcy arc neither inscribed in the heavens, nor in the brain, which does
not mean that they ate produced by the activity at some spcaking sub-
ject. (F,p. 9)

By tying the “scientific” conccpt of differcncc-diffemce as diacri-

ticity-into the predicative cluster of differana, Derrida makes dif-
fcrancc also serve as rhe principle of m i o n c and linguistic inoclhglbilicy.
The differtncta at the basis .of intelligibility arc not to be confoundcd
with those constimtiveof concepts;the differends under consideration
here arc thc differential or diacritical characterisria of signs and sign
sysnms. These differenriaF fearures. situated in a horizontal srructure
of dissimilarities (in contrast to the hierarchical nctwork of tbc con-
cepts), are the elementary components of possible signification. Der-
rida notcs, “Om has to admit, bcforc any dissociation of language
and speech, code and message, etc. (and everything that goes along
with such a dissociation), a systematic production of diffmmces, the
production of a system of differences-a di{fmmce-within whose
effects m e eventually, by abstraction and according to determined
motivations, will be able ro demarcare a linguistics of language and
a linguistics of speech” (P,p. 28). In ia capacity as a manix for there
diffcrcnccs of inrclligibiliry, diffcnncc i s thus the condition of signi-
fication, serving, in a way. as Its primordial constitution. Clearly, as
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 203

the principle of diacritical diffmtiality, differance also overlaps with

its meaning as m n q m a l spacing, inasmuch as mnceprs are n e -
sarily and c~scntiallyinscribed within systems and s ~ ~ c t l l ’ c cwherein
5
they refer negatively to other concepts.
“Difmunce-fourth ... would name provisionally this unfolding
of difference, in parricular, but nor only, or Erst of all, of the ontico-
ontoiogical difference” (F,p. 10). Here, differanct is made into the
preopening, an opening by right anterior to the ondcwnmlogical
difference. In this sense the concept of differancc “is what not only
p d e s mctaphysia but aIsa extends beyond the thought of being”
(OG, p. 1431, which, for Derrida, i s nothing other than metaphysics.
After all, the difference between king and what is, between Eking
and beings, the ontological and rhc onuc, which grounds in rhc tran-
scendence of the being-there (Dusxin), coincides with Being in an
authentic way, as Being no longer conceived within the perspcctivc
of what is present. Dif-fmmce,then, is Being as rhe opening in which
Seing ~m itsclf forth as absent in what is present. According to Hci-
degger, difference as Being is determined in terms of the differences
betwccn presenting and prsence (Anwesen and unwe$emf), presence
and absence, and Being and what is. Yet this implies that the onrim-
ontological difference, or difference in short, i s described in terms of
intrinsically metaphysical determinations; differace is thought within
the horizon of the question of the meaning of Being. “Perhaps dif-
ference is older than king itself‘ (M, p. 67),since Bting has never
been thought othctwise than as prcscna, as concealing itself in what
is. Thus, a difference anterior m the onticoontological difference or
to the truth or meaning of king, a difference which would be the
trace of the trace that is the ontico-ontological difference. insinuates
itself of necessity. “Thew may be a differenre sdl more unthought
than the differencc between king and beings” (M,p. 67). This mote
originary difference is not yet determined as the difference berween
Being and what is but precedes it as the possibility of difference as
such. Considering rhc metaphysical concept of the name and what it
is supposed to achieve, it is impossible to name this more originary
difference. The name differunce, by emphasizing the active movement
of difference that is comprehended by this infrastructural construction
but that does not exhaust it, economically accounts for the dissimi-
larity of the diverse functionsthat such an originary difference would
have to carry OUI.
“BeyondBeing and beings, thisdi~~ce,eeasdesslydifferingfrom
and deferring (itself), would tram (itself) ,(by inelf)-rhis diffeerancc
1.34 ON DECONSTRUCTION

would be the first or I a a trace if one still could speak, here, of origin
and end” (M, p. 67)’.Compared to the ontico-ontological differencc,
whwc difficult and urgent darificadon Heidegger took upon himself
in his epoch-makingwork, differance is a difference or trace preceding
all possible dissociation and within which the ontko-ontological dif-
fennce eventually cafves itsetf our. In distinction M diffetance, the
ontico-ontological difference is not as absolutely originary as Hci-
degger believed, since its form as difference depends on the possibility
ofthat form. Since this passibility is diifemncc, differance must also
bc construed as the condition of pssibility of Being.
These, lhm, are the different kinds of differences drawn synthezi-
caIly together in the term differmcei difference as ternporalizing, dif-
fcrencc as spacing, difference as the result of opening a polemical rift
between conceptual poles, difference as diacrikal differentiality, dif-
ference as ontico-ontological difference, and so on. The list of these
incommensurable and heterogeneous kinds of differmcm is, for struc-
tural reasons, open; their synthcsis as differance is not complete, for
such a synthesis necessarily defers its own closure. Ditfcrance as a
synthesis is precisely “an altering diffcrcnce” (M, p. 290), in the sense
of a tempor3lizing and spacing of itself, which thus cannot be a
synthesis in the classical sense.
Because differance is a synthesis of incommensurable modes of
diffcrence, rhcir unity cannot rcprcxnt the sublation of the conflic-
tualtty that dietingoishe each differmcc in itself or in relation to the
other kinds of diflcrenccs. By insisting on the irreducible ,difference
among differences, Derrida refuses 10 reduce them to logical differ-
ence-that is, to contradiction-which would make it possible ro
resolve them in one unity. “Since i t can no longer be subsumed by
the generality of logical contradiction, diffnunce (the proccss of dif-
ferentiation) permirs a differentiated accounting for heterogeneous
rncdesofconflictuality,or, ifyou will,forcontradictions”(P,p. 101).
Hence, because ir knots predicates of logical (Arkroteltan and He-
gelian) differenccdf contradiction-into its synthesis, differan- is,
filth, an archesynthesis that n o Iongcr privileges contradiction as the
one outstanding and dominating mode of difference, destined to sub-
jugate all other kinds of difference. Differance, in this sense, is more
originary rhan difference modeled afrer the law of thought according
to which the opposite of a True proposition is necessarily false, or
afrer the dialtcrical law according to which the ncgativity of tcuc
contradiction wakes it the spcculativc Other, and hence one moment
in the becoming of truth.
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING w5

As a spthtsis of differenm of incommensurable identity, differ-

a n ~ promoas
e the plurality of diffcrmae, of a mnflicrualify that dcxs not
culminate in dntradiction but remains a conmadicrion without mn-
tiadidon, that is, without eventual dissolution within the irnmanencc
of the Canocpt capable of interiorizing its own exteriorization or
nfgauviry. Wirh rhis, d i k a n c e appears ro be a concept at odds with
the Hegelian notion of difference as well as with the process of Aufie-
bung made possible by the interpretation of diffcrcnce exclusiveIy in
m s of negativity.
1 have attempted m dininguish dilfemnce (whwe n marin, among other
thingP, its pmductivc and mnflictual characteristics) fmm Hqelian diffcr-
ence, and have done so precisely at the point at which Hcgel, in the greater
Logic, determines diffefercnct as contradiction only in order m resolve it, m
inteciorize it, ti lift it up (according to the syIlo&tic pmms of spcmlstiv~
dialcctio) ‘intothe sdl-prescncc of an onm-theological or onto-teleologid
synthesis. Dilfr*rmce(ar a painr of alrnosr absolun proximity to Hcget -.. I
must sign the point ar which one breaks with the system of the Auficbung
and with spetll~tivedialcctia. (P,p. 44)
AIthough differana entertains deep relations of affinity with the
Hegelian discourst insofar as it is a “qmthcris”’ of differences, dif-
Icranm must also he ddincd as “precisely the limit, the interruption,
che’dtsttucdon of the Hegelian relhe wherever it operates” (P.pp.
40-41) As the essay “Difkrancc” notes, it is for this reason, among
others, h a t the aaivc movement of the production of differenas i s
not simply called difiermriation. Apart from the fact that such a
denomination would eliminate the temporalking aspect of diffcrancc,
it would also suggest the existence prior to in division of an originary
hamogmmus and organic d i t y . T h e d o g i s m d#emm was m i n d
in order m undercut rhe possibility of such a unity as rhe origin and
tclos of differences. It is thc nonunitaty synthais of all thew very
different types of difference and. as such, the matrix from which they
draw thci r cxisrcnce .
The Infrusrrumrre as Supp!mentm’ty
supplemcnr, says W d a in Of G ~ m t m t r r t ~ l ~ise‘*another
y, name for
differana” (OG, p. 150). “Supplementarily is in reality diffcrmrce,
the opcration of differing which at one and the same time both fissures
and retards presence, submitting it simultanmusly to primordial di-
vision and delay,” because thc supplementing difference “vicariously
stands in far pmence due to its primordial self-deficiency” (SP,p.
206 ON DECONSTRUCTION

88). But unlikc diffcrance. supplcmentariry 5 t r c s ~mom ~ cxplicitly

the function of substitutive supplementation in general, which is rooted
in thc “primordial nonself-prescncc” of “full” terms (SP,p. 87). It
places greater emphasis on the structural necessity of the addition of
a difference to a “full” entity such as an origin by showing it to be
a consequcnce ofthe fact that ”fult“ rerms compensate lor their lack
of anorhcr origin. In this sense. supplcmentarity could also be said to
be a variation of the arche-trace, but again, instead af referring to
Other, supplcmentarity aatibures the structural need of adding an
Other to the vicarious nature ofpresence itself,
I do not intend to develop the “logic of supplcmentarity” by fol-
lowing Derrida’s rich and detailed analysis of Rousseau’s work in Of
Crarnmtology. Nor will I cnrich the exposition of that logic rhrough
recourse to analogical structures such as the phannakon and the par-
ergon.12 In order to understand this particular infrastructure, however,
we must beawarc that it represents an attempt to account for a certain
contradictory logic characteristic of the philosophical discourse on
origin-in the caw of Rousscau, on nature as origin. The idea of
supplementarity ammpts to reunite in one structure a number of
contradictory statements and propositions on origin. in such a manner
that this contradiction is not oblireratcd but, on the contrary, explic-
irly accounted for. As Dcrrida has argued in Of Grurnrnutology, these
srarements make rhe following assertions: (1) origins, nature, ani-
mality. primitivism, childhood, and so on arc pure; (2) compared to
these pure and fully present origins, everything else (speech, society,
r c a ~ o n i)s an crterior addition which leaves their purity unbreached;
(3) the necessity of these additions is not rationally explicable; (4)
t h e e additions themselves function a5 secondary origins; ( 5 ) these
secondary origins are dangerous to the primal origins to the extent
that thcy pervcrt and undermine them; and so on. The logic of sup-
plernenrarity developed from Rousseau’s own use of that term to
dcscribc thc rclarianship ktwecn origins and thc additions to origins
accounts for the coherent incoherence of these statements within
Rousseau’s discourse. In his use of the term supplement. Rousscau
displaccs and dcformr “rhc miry of ihc signifitr and the signified, as
it is aniculared among nouns (supplement, substitute [srrpplhm.
suppliutir]), verbs (to supply, ro be subsritured [suppldm, se substi-
sue*], etc.) and adjcctivcr (supplementary. supplctory [supplimentaire,
supplirifl) and m a k e the signifieds play on the register of PIUS
and
minus. But t h c x displaccmcnts and deformations are regulated by the
contradictory unity-idf supplemmtary-of a desire” (OG, p. 245).
 I SYSTEM BEYOND BEING w7

Dnrida’s ancmpt to construct supplemrntarity as an i n h c t u l e

in order to amount for that ,rrgulatcd unity draws upon aU the re-
sourocs of tbar word. But first, Ict us see how Rousscau limits the
play of supplmcntariry. Rousscau, writes Dcrrida,
wishcs on the OM baud to u(finn. by it a positin value, mrgrhing
of which aniculation is the principle or everything w i h which it wnstruns
a sysmn [passion, language, society, man, ctc.1. But he intends m affirm
sirnulamusly all that is cancelled by articulation (acmx, life, passion yet
agmin, and so on). The supploncnt k i n g Be articulated structure of there
two pussibilitim. Rousszau can only decompose them and dissociate them
inta rwo rimpte u h , logically conrridimry yet allowing an intact purity
to bob the negative and h e pmitivc. (OG, pp. 24s-246) ,

Having thus dissaciad the two possibilities into two mnflicring

units, Rousscm p‘wccds to define the supplement (in this case, every-
thing of which articulation isthc principle] as a mereexterior addition,
as’the nothing of a simple uneriority. In this way the addition is
annulled (it is insignificant), W M c the origin r c m a k umouched. ‘Wbm
is added is nothing because it is added to u fiil presmce to which it
is exterior”(0G. p 167). Falling back on thevalue of a simple ourside,
Rousseau can simultaneously a h , in tom1 isolation, both the origin
and the supplement. Yet, not only must he assert the danger that
follows from the supplement;he must also describe the supposedly
pure plcninrdc of the origins in terms of seduction and threat-in
t e r m of the negarivc, death, absence. Nnw, the logic of supplemen-
tarity is the ammpt ro ric all t h e diffmnt propositions together
into a ~trtlcturethat explains bmh their possibility and the Ihh of
their scope. Thii structure is construed as a field of relations that
inscribes withh itself the function and value of the philosophical
,conceptof origin; it shows how the myth ofan unbreached origin is
dependent on the eHacement of the logic of that supplementarity.
“The concept of origin or narurc is nothing but the myth of addition,
of supplementarity annulied by being purely additive. I t is the myth
ofrhc effaccmenrof the trace, that is to say of an originay differancc
that is neither absence nor pmnce, neirba negative nor positive.
Originary differance is supplemenrarity as s h c b r e ” (OG, p. 167).
Let us try to draw the basic features of this infrastructure which,
by making the value of origin possible, a h imposes its limitations
on it. T h e logic of supplementarity is r o o d in a recourse to two
conflicting meanings intermined within the term, but it also makes
UBC of the entire consdlation of concepts dependent o n its system.
20 a ON DECONSTRUCTION

W h a t are these two heterogeneous meanings harbored by the term

slcpplemerrt, “whose cohabitation is as strangc as it is nccrssary”?
(OC. p. 144). According to the first meaning, B suppfmmt is some-
thing that “adds itself, . .. a surplus, a plenitude enriching another
plenitude, the f u l h t measure oi presence. It cumulates and accu-
mulates presence. It is thus that art, rechne, image, representation,
convention. ctc., come as supplements to nature and are rich with
this entire cumulating function. This kind of supplementarity deter-
mints in a certain way all the conceptual oppositions within which
Rousseau inscribs the norion of Nature to the extent that it should
bc self-suflicient” (OG,pp. 144-145). In this sense, the operation of
supplementation i s not a break in presence and plenitude hut rathct
a continuous and homogenous reparation and modification of both.
According to irs second meaning, howevcr,
the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervcncs or insin-
uatcs itxtf in-rhopbce-of; i f i r fills, it is as if one 611s a void. It it npnscnu
and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence. Compensatory
[supplirmt] and vicarious, the ~upplcmentis an adjunct, a subaltern instance ’
which tubes-(tbe)-plu [timt-lieu].As substirUte, it is not simply added to
the positivity of a presence, it produccs no relief, its place is assigned in the
structure by the mark of an emptiness. Somewhere, something can be fillcd
up ofitsdh can accomplish inclf. only by allowing itself to bc fillcd through
sign and proxy. (OG, p. 145)

Now, instead of playing aEternately on these two meanings of sup-

plernmr and juxtaposing thcm in a contradictmy fashion, as does
Rousseau-a possibility contingent on the fallacious determination
of the relation of the supplement m t h a t for which it compensates [a
full plenitude or an absence) as one of exwriority-Derrida draws
the two meaning of suppkmnt together in a structural manner. It
is not, howcver, because of semantic ambiguity that “supplementar-
ity” qualifics as an infrastructure. The new and thoroughly unnatural
synthesis ,of the two conflicting meanings of supplemcnr qualifies as
an infrasrructurc only if the “proxy” aspect of “supplement” i s gen-
eralized. According to the logic of identity and the principle of on-
tology, the supplement “adds itsefffrom the outside as evil und luck
to happy and innocent plenitude“ (OG, p. 215). Yet if one combines
1
the two meanings of supplcmmt. then the supplernenc, which seem-
ingly adds itself like a plenitude to another plcnitude, alsb fills an
absence of ptcnitude, makes up for a deficiency of plenitude. The
vicariousrms of the supplemcnr or the surrogate, howevcr, is not a
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING m9

function of somerhing that smehow preexists ir; the ddiaency in

q u a i o n is much more d i d , 5incc the supplement repFaces or t a k a
the place of an abmt.origin. Supplemmmrity, then, as the action of
addition to and vicarious substitution of an absmt origin, is the min-
imal structure required to explain the contradictories that reulr from
assuming the simple ntcriority of the supplement and, sirnultane-
ously, Its dangerow threat rn self-presenr origins. As h i s minimal
organizational unit, it is not only absolutely fint, but also accounts
far the possibilities from which it ,draw its major pdcatcs.
Whar fallows from the law of supplemrnrariy is that origins (plm-
ihldcs, p m w ) are always already additions or surrogates corn-
pcn$ating for a more origisary absence of plenitude. An origin,
consequently, is an effect brought about ex past by an originary
substitution of an origin that had fallen short of itself from the start.
Only under this condition can one explain why an origin a n haw
supplements and also why it must call upon them and repel them at
once. Only as a supplement for another origin aIready impaired can
an origin itsclf require a substitute. If, according to Rousscau, the
danger of the supplement stems from ics smcruraI ability to replace
and takc tkplace of what it ir addcd to, then this danger is a clear
function of the lamer’s belatedness. S i m thar unity which coma to
substitute vicariously and compensate for a lack of a full uniy must
be at once sufficiently the same and sufficiently diftermr to replace
that absence, the origin bclatcdly reconstituted as plenitude and p m -
ence in the absena of another origin is also affected in i s interiority
by the lack for which it compensates. “As always, the supplement is
inwmplm, unequal to the task, it lacks something in order for rhc
lack to bc filled, it paniapatcs in the evil chat it should repair” (OG.
p, 226). Al&ough the supplement is a plus, to the extent that it
substitutes for a lack on thc part of the origin, it is also less than an
origin, since it is itself in need of compensation. In shorr, then, &his
“logic of supplmenrarity, which would have it that the outside be
inside, that the Other and the lack come to add themselves as a plus
that replam a minus, that what adds itsdf to something taka the
place of a default in the thiig, that the default, as the outside of the
inside. should be already withii the inside, etc” (OG.p. 2151, de-
scribes, within a lo& of belatedness, an infrastructure that accounrs
for the emergence of origin as an &reffec~ It accounts for the pos-
sibility & a t such a reconstituted and reconstructed origin can i d f
be supplemenred by addidons, for h e possibility char such additions
can mdangr so-called origins, and fnr h e possibiliry that the opcr-
210 ON DECONSTRUCTION

ation of supplementation and the function of vicarious substitution

are unlimited. The infrastructure of supplementariry, by knotting to-
gether into one structure the minus and the plus, the lack of origin
and the supplementation of that origin, does not choose bcnveen
either one of them but shows that both functions are depcndmt on
one another in one srructure of replacemcnrs, within which “all p m -
ences will be supplemenm substituted for an absent origin, and all
differences, within the system of presence, will be thc irreducible effect
of what remains epebeina tes ,ousius” (D. p. 167).
Compared to the play of absence and presence on which it rests,
but which it also makes possible insofar as it ties both together in the
p d u a i o n of origins as supplemcnrs and of h e supplmrnts of origins,
the infrastructure is absolutely first. It is a last instance; yet as an
instance epekeinn tes DUSIUS it is, like all other infrastructures, nothing,
or ulmost nothing. It is not something that is either absent orprcsent,
although it could be said to be absent on the condition that absence
is not understood as a rnodificarion of presence, as an absent-presence.
“The supplement occupics the middle point benvcen total absence
and total presence,” writes Derrida (OG.p- 157). It isa nondialectical
middle, a structurc of jointcd predication, which cannot itself be com-
prchended b y the predicatcs which it distributes: origin and supple-
ment, origin and what is derived from it, inner and outer, presence
and absence. Therefore, this economic intermediary that is supple
rnentarity is inconceivable to reason and to its own logic of identity.
Although rhe logic of rhe ,supplemenr “should allow us to say the
contrary at thc same time withouc contradinion” {OC.p. 179), its
logic is not simply irrational. Instead of being simpry an opacity within
the system ofrationaliry, which woutd thus be comprehensible by it,
it is nanrational, “as the origin of reason must” be (OG, p. zS9).
Reason is structurally incapable of comprehending its origin in the
possibiliry ofsupplementsrity: “The possibitity of reason ..
I the sup-
plemcntny possibility, is inconceivable to reuson” (OG. p. 259). Not
that thir inability of reason to understand its origin in what it is not-
in the nonrational play of the structure of supplementarity-shows
a lack of power; rather, this inability is constitutive ,of the very pos-
sibility of the logic of identity, and of what appears of netmiry to
reason. as its irrational Orhcr according lo that very logic. Still. reason
cannor turn the strumre of supplementariiy inro simple irrationality,
into the opposite of reason, which would conform with the logic of
idcntity and thus be less irritating and waylaying rhan a structure that
refuses determination in terms of what it makes possible. Reason is
 I SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 21 I

blind to the supplement as one is blind to the source of seeing. Thus,

supplemenrarity has no sense and is given to no intuition. “It is the
suange esscna of the supplement not to have csscntislity: it may
always nor have taken place. Moreover, lirmlly, it has ncwr rakm
place i t is never prcsmt, hem and now. If it werc, it would not be
what ir is, a supplement, taking and keeping the plact of the other”
p. 314).
(06,
Let us sum up. The atrumre of supplemcntarity makes h e mn-
stimtion of an origin dcpendcnt on an originary subatirurion of an
absnt Other (origin]. It both explains the possibility of origin (pres-
mu, plcnitudc. and so on) and mrrim it to a function of sccondar-
inas. Supplementarityenassume t h t role of an origin mom originary
&an any origin, k u s e supplements m supposedly full origins (sup-
plements which the discourse of philosophy is bound to recopnk,
and which it cxpcrienai as threatening to the origin to which de lure
ir should remain indifferent) are pluscs that cornpeware for a minus
in the otigin. The supplemaration is &us also a cornpensadon (sup-
p l h c e ) . Since an origincan invite supplements,it is already inhabited
by their negativity and is not simply an origin but a substitutive
supplement for a lack. In its positivity, an origin compensates for the
lack of mother origin, but is inhabited a& i w a by this lack, becaw
of which it can supplement itself and can w e as a supplement. IlwtC
consequences follow: (1) a generatization of the structure of supplc-
mentarity, which thus appcsrs more originary than the substituta or
supplements and what thew substiturn repIaoc, compensate €or, or
supplcmcnr, that is, the origin; ( 2 )the possibility of a sugplemcnr to
the suppIcmenq that is io say, of the i t h i e and indefinite play of
rrpctitiwt and substitution (“As soon as the supplementary outside
is opolad,its m ~ t implies l l ~ that the supplement iself can be ‘typi,‘
replaced by its double, and that a supplement to the supplement, a
surrogate for the surrogate, kpossiblc and nausary,” D,p. 109);
and (3) the impossibility of going “back fmm the slrpplmmt to rhr
smrtl: one must rccagnire that there is a nrpplemtnt at the source’’
(OG,p. 3043.
By denoting wbat saucturally exaffds any toraliry ar whole, sup-
plmcnurity is the essential nothirrg from which this whole and its
doublcs can surge into nppurancc; but, as “the excess of a signifier
which, in in own inside, makts up (for) space and repcan the facr of
o p i n g ” (D, p. 2351, supplementaricy a h firnits this whole in its
plcnitude by restricting ir m semndarinem or belatcdncss,
Supplmtnrarity as an infrastructure is also the possibility of a
ItL O N DECONSTRUCTION

doubling repetition; this aspect of the infrastructure, however, is

thematized as the minimal structure of itcrubitity, a subject to which
we now turn.

The lnfrasmcture rzs 1terrrbiliiy

The issue of iterability has to do with “original repetition’”-that is,
a mpetirion prinr to common repnition, rhc lartcr k i n g alwayi the
repetition of an already constirured entity, moment, instance, or the
like. One must think of a repetition that “already divides thc point
ofdeparmreofthefirst time” (WD,p.Z13),andthatwouldbecapabIe
of accounrtng far thc fact-the possihiliry and the necessity-that
any singular and unique momcnt must be repeatable in order to exist.
This “original mpetirion” is not of the same order as repetition in
thc ordinary sense, which presupposes the uniqueness, singularity,
and integrity of a “Erst time.” I t is not, like empirical repetition, a
repetition t h a t muld possibly tuke place. The term refers, rather, to
the “repetition of repetition.” or reperition in generul. rcpeatabiliry.
In order not to mistake this possibility for the always accidentaIly
occurring Tepetiiion of common sense, Dcrrida calls it not iteration
bur iterabiliry; but this name d m more h a n just designate the pos-
sibility of iteration. Like most oT the othcr infrastructures. the dcs-
ignation iierubility draws upon a cluster of concepw, and rhus ir
simultaneously accounts for a variety of philosophical problems. It-
erubility reunites two opposite, or rather incommensurable, meanings:
the possibility of iterarion or repetition, and also the porsibility of
alteration. lter comes from ituru--“other” in Sanskrit-as Derrida
has pointed out on several occasions. Whether this etymology is cor-
rect is beside the p i o r , ,since it is only a pretext for condensing a
variety of concepts in one linguistic m a r k in order to exhibit a set of
necessary relations between them. Since the validity of etymology is
of an exclusivcly empirical nature, it cannot positively or negatively
affect the infrastructural relations, which are conceived as necessary
relations between possibiliries.
kfore: investigating the nuclear traits of the mark itefdbiliry, Ict us
recall that herobility is anorher name for supplemenmrity, to the
cxrenr rhar the lartet is already rhc space of duplication and thus of
repetition. herability is also another name for diflerdnce, with which
it shares the structural deferring of the possibility of a present instant
or entity. lterubility also partially overlaps the idea of arche-trace,
becausc it names the relation to Othcr as constitutive of the relation
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING z=3
to self. But despite these overlaps, iterability is an original infra-
structure insofar as it links its various filiations, each of which ac-
tualizes a slightly different aspm from those stressed by the other
infrasmcturcs, in a new and original syncheis, which serves to muster
a unique set of phiIosophical phenomena. We can distinguish five
different functions of iterabilip:
lrcrubiiity a the origin of iterdion or repetition. As we saw with
supplcmentariry, a repctition becomcs possible only if a unit that i s
both sufficiently similar and suficiently different to occupy the place
of another c a m s to fill in the lack created by its absence. At chat
moment, thc supplementing unit both repats rhc abscnr unit and
bemrnes an aiterity that takes its place. Repetition thw h i n p on the
strudural possibility of an absence of the repeated. If the unit to bc
repcatad were totally present and present to itself, if it were not
breachedby a certain lack of pIenimde, no repetition could ever occur.
This abscnce, however, is not to bc understood as a continuous and
ontological modification of pmence. It is not the absent presence of
a full plenitude, of a o n a or at one time self-prtscntpcescna; it is
an absence owing not to an empirically effective and hence accidental
occurrence of abscnce but, on the contrary, to the pmsibiliiy of being
absent. This possibility, as Dcrrida has argued in “Signature Event
Context,’’ and even more powerfuUy in “Limited Inc,”is what breaches
and dividts the plenirude o r self-pmnce of even the mosr unique
and singular event. T h i s m c t u r a l pssibility make its factual rcp-
etirion possiblc, even if it occurs only once. The mere possibility of
the absence of a unit c o m p n d s to “the rime and place of the other
time [lirutre fois] already at work, altering from the s t a r t the start
itself, the first time, the at once” (&I, p, 200). Therefore, what is in
quwion here is not iteration or repetition bur only chdr possibility,
or iterability, which tun occur as a possibility to any unit and is,
consequently, a neassary possibiliry that must be inscribed within
the w c e of that unit itself. A priori. then, the possibility of iteration
divides the identity of all units; iterabiliy is the impurity of an absence
that, from the start, prohibits the full and rigorous artainment of the
plenitudeof a unit, and that in principle subvertsits =If-identity. Such
an absence makes it possible for that unit to be repeated, iterated,
which is of course nor to say that it must be repeated. But the pos-
sibility of itcrarion inhabits the unit from the start in such a manner
that if its repetition does occur, it will not be accidental and will not
affect ir only ab extra.
Iterabbility i s also the condition of possibiliry of re-production, re-
=r4 ON RECONSTRUCTION

presentation, citation, and so on, and can bt read as the generalization

of rtprescntation. reproduction, citation. “Everything begins witb re-
producrion,” writes Derrida in Writing md Difiermce (WD, p. 2111.
“Everything, ‘begins,’ then, with citation,” he writes in Dirreminlrtion
(D,p. 316). And in O f Grummotology he concludes his essay on
Rousscau b y stating “that the very m n a of presence, if i t must
always be repeated within anorher presence, opms originarily, within
presence itself, thc structure of representation” (OG, p. 311). Every-
thing, hence, begins with repmentation; the possibility of reproduc-
tion, rcprcxntation, and citation must be inscribed in any entity, sign,
or a c t of speech in order for an entity, sign, ar speech act to be possible
in its singularIry in thc Cra place. If Dcrrida calls the inscriptian of
these possibilities the death from which l i f e with i t 5 limitations and
finitude spring forth, then this i s not merely a metaphorical manner
ofspeaking. This i s a meaning of dcarh prior to the proper meaning
of what wc commonly understand by death and, mutoris m u t a d i s ,
to a figural, metaphorical meaningof death. Death is understood here
as the condition af iterability without which no unit could bc cx-
changed, transmitted, represented, referred to, reproduced. remem-
bered, and so on.
itcrabdiiy 0 s the origin of idedinztion and identificution. Since
“iterability suppsm a minimal remainder (as well a5 a minimum of
idealizadon) in order that the identity of the sdfwme be repeatable
and identifiable irr. through, and even in view of its altmtion” (Ll.
p, 190). it can bc construed as the origin of idealization and idtnti-
fication. The possibility of repetition depends on the recognition of
sclf-identicalmarks; yet repetitionconstitutes thcse very marks in their
identity. A repeatable ideniiy is an ideal idmticy, however, inde-
pendent from thc mnmt and thc factual and multiple ments of its
occurrence. most ideally conceived in thc form of the ideality of the
eidos: “the truth of the eidos as that which i s identical to itself, always
the same as itself and therefore simple, incomposite ( a s w h e t o n ) ,
.
undecomposable, invariable.. Thc eidos i s rhar which can always
be repeated as the some. The ideality and invisibihy of rbc eidos are
is power-t&e-qeated” [D, p. 123). Without iterability. thcre would
be no tmth; yer rhc minimal. idcntity prcsuppod by iterability and
the minimal identity chat ir makes possible ir necessarily a divided
identity. Only an identity that already inscribes in itself the possibility
of nonidentify wodd lend itself to iteration.
The idcaliry broached by iteration is a breached ideality, a lirnired
ideality, since iterabiliry “ruins (even ideally) the very idendcy it ren-
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BElNC 2=5

ders possible” (LI,p. 217). Although ircrabiliry as such is the becow-

itfg of intelligibility and ideality, the very possibility of repetition as
the root of truth also prohibits truth from ever bcmrning itself. Ir-
erability, without which the ideality o n which truth is based could
not be achieved, i s at oncc the dcarh of mrh, irs finimdc.
It docs not heIp to try to distinguish betwcen good and bad rep-
etition, as Platonism has done since i t s incipience, to differentiate
between a good repetition that g i v a and presents the d o s , the ideal
and unchannging self-identity of truth, and a bad rcpctition thatrepeats
repetition, merely repeating itself instead of the living.truth. One
Cannot choose between the living repetition of life ,and trnttr and the
dead repaition of death and nontrurh bcouse, as the infrastructure
iterability demanmates, these two repetitions relate to one another,
implicate one another, and cannot even be thought except together:
“These two typcr of rcpctirion relate to each orher according 10 [he
graphiu of supplernentarity. Which means thar one ,can no more
‘separate’ them from each other, think of either one apart from the
other, ‘label’ them, than ane can in rhe pharmacy distinguish the
medicine from the poison, the good from the evil, the true from
the fake; rhe inside from the outside, the vital from the morral, the
first from rhe second, etc” (0,p. 169). The infrastructure itcrability
ties these OHO repetitions together in such a way that their separation
m s a violent decision, which results iri the coincidence: of the be-
ginning of philosophy with rhr forgetting of the mndirion d origin
of it5 valucs.
Itnabihy a.the origin ofaltcration. As a result of the diffcrenm
inscribed in each ideal unir as the possibility of its iteration, that unit
is always already something other than it purports to be. As I have
mentioned, the time and the place of an orhm time must from the
outset affect the first time if the latter is to be suwcptible to repetition
a5 a first and unique momcnt, whether or not such a repetition actually
happcns. Now, the possibility of a displacement by iteration implies
that “iteration alters, something new takes place” [LI. p 175). T h e
inhastrumre iterability-an Orher which is mrjrcly hercragenmus
to what it grounds, idcntity and di&rcnce-affccrs the grounded by
altering it; it alters it by repeating it,
Iterubility us duplication. Since iterability mnstitutcs the minimal
identity of the repeated as something divided by the possibility of
repetition, itcrabiliry is rhe possibility of xlf-duplication, of redou-
bling, of metaphoricity-that is, of an elementary translation or trans-
ference by which the thing is always already transported “within its
216 O N DECONSTRUCTION

double (that is to say already within an ideality)’’ (OG. p. 292).

lrenbiliry is a dupIication or reduplication which redoubls the first
rime, or rhe ideal idenriry, rhraugh its repicion as an identical and
a t the samc time different momenr o r endry. It is a reduplication in
which the repeated is already separated from itself, double in itxlf.
Since I investigate this originary duplication and doubling in greater
detail in the following chapter, I have limired myself here to these
fcw remarks about this particular nuclear trait of iterability.
Iterability us the possibility of the effacement of the truce. As I
emphasized in my treannenr of rhe arche-race, the possibility of an
originary effacement is an essential trair of the trace. It now appears
that ,suchan cffacemenr, awing tu the f a a that repeatability, be it
linguistic or not, as a necessary possibility of each instance, is also a
decisive mark of iterability. This is one manner in which iterability
marginally overlaps the arche-trace.
Let me add a few remarks cnncerning ircrabiliry in general. Like
all other infrastructures, iterability is a univcrsal and necessary struc-
ture, a “transcendmtal” law on which rhc c f f m listed depend. Al-
though iterability is such a law, this “does not amounr ra saying that
this law has the simplicity of a logical or transcendental principle.
One cannot even speak of it being fundamental or radical in the
traditional philosophical sense” (LI, p 234). lterability is not a pure
principle. Its simplicity is thoroughly cr~sscdour;itcrability “can only
bcwhat it is in thc impuriryof its selhidentity (reperition altering and
alteration identifying)” (LI, p. 203). This impurity stems from the
fact that an infrastructure ties heterogeneous threads together into
“one” law. If it is a principIc at all, it is, in Derrida‘s words, 3 ‘‘two-
fold mt.”Yet “twefold mots cannor play the role of philosophical
radicality” (LI,p. 234). “As soon as there is a double borrom. rhere
is no bottom or ground ar all in process of formation,” writes Derrida
(D, p. 308). Because of this nonsimplicity, iteribiliry is neither a
transcendental condition of possibility, in rhe strict sense, nor a n
csmce or suhsrancc clearly distinguishable from phenomena, attri-
butes, or accident$. Since it is what makcs idealization (the production
of the differenr forms uf the eidos) poreible and. by v i m e of is
twofold radicaliry, also impossible, iterability does nor lend *‘ ‘itself
‘toany purc, simple, and idcalizable conceptualizarion. No process or
project of idealization is possible without iterability, and yet itcrability
‘itself‘ cannot bc idealized. For i t cornpans an internal and impure
limit that prcvena it from being idcntified, synthaizcd, or reappro-
priatcd. just as it excludes thc rcappropriation of that whose ireration
 k SYSTEM BEYOND BEING +f 7

it nonetheless btoaches and breaches” ILL p. 210). Therefore the

infrastructures, and itcrability in pamcular, arc at once the condition
and the limit of theorizing; they make philosophical mastery possible,
but they themselves escape mastery.

The Infiasmrmre as Re-Mark

TI-e re-mark mts a m s all the other undecidabks that wc haw cx-
amined up to this point. It i s a form of the general law of supple-
mcnrarity which dislocate all presence, plenitude, or propriety. As
the remark demonstrates, supplementation always m n s i w of adding
a mark to another mark. “According to the structurc of supplcmm-
tarity, what is added is thus always a blank or a fold: the fact of
addition gives way to a kind of multiple division or subtraction that
enriches itself with zeros as it races breathlessly toward the infinite.
’More’ and ‘Icss’ are only scparatcd/unitcd by the inhimima1 in-
consistency, thc next-to-nothing of the hymen” (D.p. 262).
T h e re-mark is also a form of the minimal StNCture of referral that
I have analyzed as arche-trace. As I shall attempt to demonstrate in
discussing the remark, ”every d t m i n a t e fold unfolds the figure of
another,” thusdisruptingall prescncc in the mark (D, p. 270). Derrida
can, therefore, speak of the remark as a form of articulation of the
“differential-supplementary smcture, which constantly adds or with-
draws a fold from h e series,” wirh thc effm that no possible heme
of the fold is able “ro consrimte the system of its meaning or present
the unity of its multiplicity” (D, p. 270). But the re-mark is also a
form of thegmeral law ofiterability. A mark has the form of repetition
and duplication because the remark by which any mark is marked
in advance i s part of the mark i t d . “That which is rcmarkablc in
the mark, passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the
repeating,” is the break that intervcncs in the mark. “Condition or
effect-take your pick-of iterability” /LI, p. 190).
Considering the multitude of its intersections,the re-mark, whether
or not it re-covers all of them by merging wirh them, is nemsarily a
very complcx structurc. Bcforc trying to give a detailed account of
the different movements that enter into its composition, I want ’to
offer a brief definition and a succinct circumscription of the maior
probkms the remark address-. The mark (or mrgin, or murch-
in the sensc of “boundary”-all of which belong to the same scrim
of words) as re-mark i s that parrimlar infrastnmural fcaturc that
prohibits any diacridcally constituted series of rims,conqts, traces,
218 ON DECONStRUCTCrON

or marks from ever closing upon itself. This impossibihy of totali-

zation or of self-closureis not due to an infiniteabundanceof meaning,
which a finite consciousncss would be unable to master; on the con-
trary, it hinges on the existence of a certain nerve, fold, or angle on
which, as we shall see, this Impossibility is structurally based.
The re-mark is an infrasrruaure that accounts both for the nee-
essaty illusion of mralization and for its simultancous displacements.
The re-mark interrupts the mdizations of which it is itself the con-
dition of possibility, Yet thc economic scopc of this infrastructure is
not limited to the sole problem of totalization (and reflection). The
rc-mark is also that which opens up the possibility of referentiality
within rhe play of applicarion of one mark ro anorher. Since, in such
a play, the referent is wt asidc (a I‘icurt) in infinite rcfercnce. the
ternarkrenders rhe function of truth possible by limitingit. In general,
the re-mark is the structure that accounts for the possibility of all
transccndenral or theological illusions, because the supplementary
$tams of the re-mark (as a mark added to another mark) can always
be isolated from the mark it doublcs and can thus be rendered in-
dcpcndent of that mark. Derrida notes in Dissemimtion that the
structural place of the theological map is prescribed by the remark:
“The mark-supplement [le s~rpplirnmtde marque] produced by the
rcxt’sworkings, in fallingoutsidcofthetextlikcan independent object
with no origin other than itself, B trace that turns back into a presence
(or a sign), i s instparable from desire (the dcsirc for reappropriation
or reprcscotation). Or rather, it gives birth 10 i t and nourishes it in
the vcry act of separating from it”(D. p. 258).
Let us, then, distinguish the basic traits of the re-mark. It combines
at lcast four diffcrent E C ~ S C Sof the term mark and two distinct move-
ments. As in our prcvious analyscs, 1 shall discuss this inhastrucrurc
in absrractjon from the rich context in which it is produced within
Dcrrida’s work. Consequently, I shall nor take advantage of rhc ex-
amples of rhc remark, such as the fan, the blank, o r the fold in the
work of Mallamre, on which Dcrrida reliesin formulating thisgeneral
law. I shall also privilcgcrhc general Implicationsof this infrastructure
over the possibility of irs parricular consequences for literary criricism,
which represcnrs part of the conrext of “The Double %$ion,” is
whtch Dcrrida develops this notion of remarking. Part III of this book
focuses on these specific problems.
The term m r k refers, first, to the empirical objm commonly known
by that name: a sign, an indication, a trait, or token. Second, it refers,
through a tropic (analogical, metaphorical, metonymic) twist, to rhe
 . SYSTeM B E Y O N D BEING
4 219

totality of o b j m that function ar marks, to the semantic unities’and

the chains or series that they form. And third, the doubling of these
series, in a suppIcmcnrsry trop~logicatmovement, allows the mark
to serve as the “cancept” of all empirical marks. In all three cases the
mark is understood to refer IO a referent as a function of truth. In
the h t and sccond instan-, the mark is a distinguishing mit or
quality of something or someone; in the third it is the “concep~”5r
rather the totalizing s m e (-1, of the series of possible tokens-
in other wards, that which confers the meaning of relating to a rcfercnt
upon the different forms ofmarks.In this last case,at least, the mark
functions as a double of the mark, as the mark of the mark, as the
mark or mi6 of marks thought. A5 such a double of h e mark, it
adds itself to each individual mark, as well as to the seriesof its
analogical, metaphorical, or metonymical substitutes.
T h e fourth sense of the term is mom complicattd. According to
the law of the arche-trace, a mark is embedded in a differential system
of m a r k in which it acquim the minimal identity necessary to refer
to something other than itself. This identity hinges on its relation to
anothcr mark, on ia daour through another mark in thc very act of
self-referenw..A mark mum be re-marked by what it is not [anocher
mark) in order to bc rcpeamblc as the identical sign of a signified.
Therefore, the tropolDgiEa1 movement by which the mark (or seme)
&rs to the polyscmic series of marks, totatizing or embracing them
as their conccpr, BS the m n q r chat refers to hem in.rheir totality,
must contain mi additional tropological movemmt by which the scme
mark refers to what d c m a r a t e the marks, to the blanks between the
marks that relare the different marks to each other. Indeed, in addition
to designating the totaliry of all marks within a series, and to re-
marking in this manner the singular mark, or the scrics as a whole
by the srmic mark or concept of the mark-a marking by which the
singular m a r k become dre visible (ar invisible) incarnations of the
“content’’ of the xmic mark-the nature “proper” of the mark also
demands that it refer to that which opens up the possibility of marks
in general. Through the additional mopolngial movement, rhe scme
murk i s thus made M refer ta its asemic space of irmriptian, that is,
to the mark or march (both mean boundary) of thc mark. Dcrrida
calls this s p a a the mark‘s spaced-out semiopening jl’cntr’arrvermre
espaw.e).
Because a mark a q u i m the ideal idmriry necessary to its iteration
as the mark of something other than itself only to rhe extent that it
is constituted by what it is not, the totalizing semic mark must also
fZO ON DECONSTRUCTION

inscribe or insert within itself the differential siructure of the mark,

that which makes the mark possible. The mark must thus be marked,
or re-marked. by its own mark (march, margin). Since in its irreducible
duplication it must include a reference to what it is not, inserring
something heterogeneous to itself in itself-namely, what demarcates
it as a mark-the mark a150 names the space of inscription of c h i
marks, what holds them together and separares them, what makes
them resemble and differ from one anorher. Irreducibly double, the
mark remarked by the hercrogeneous order of what makes it pos-
sible--the re-mark-is thus the concept of the roralig of the scmic
valences of the mark plus the spaced-out semiopening of the whole
of these valences. The re-mark is thus more than the totality of the
marks and more than tbe totalizing concept of the mark; in addition
it is what make that totality possible. A t this point the remark seems
to coincide with the speculative concept of Alrfiebung a s a way in
which reflexivity reflecrs itself into itself, even including its own pos-
sibiliry. Indeed. Derrida has acknowledged that Aufbebmng, and thus
the operation proper of speculatinn, is mast similar to the graphics
of the remark ID.p. 248). The mait by which the mark becomes
doubled, however, is an undecidable trait, one that constitutes a limit
to the [conceptualizing or represenring) reflecrion of the limits or
margins of the mark, and with which Aufiebiing cannnt come to
grips.
Let me cmphasim t h a t this remarking of thc mark docs not come
from the outside, nor does it accidentally affect the mark, or series
ot marks. Since no mark, whether an individualmarkor the"eoncept"
of the mark, can lunction without referring to rhat which makes it
possihlc, the mark is in advancc re-markcd. The re-mark only makes
the mark a mark. As wc shall see, however, the n-iry of such re-
marking, without which the mark could not hope to refer to anything
at all, also affects the destiny of referentiality. We may anticipate rhe
following: if the remark were a self-reflcxivedoubling, it would make
all tefcrring to another Other than the self impossible. Ir must con-
scqucntly Entail the failure of self-reflection 50 that the mark can
assume a function of reference. Yet by virtue of the irreducibly double
n a m e of the mark, a doublinb constitutive of its ideality. the mark's
referencc to another Other than itself, to a nonrnark, is also constantly
deferred. Moreover, ,since the orher ro which the mark refers in order
to bc itself can only be another mark and not the punctuality of a
present instance or moment, ir must aIways be a referring without
referent. Bur thc mcraphysical illusion of a self-present referent is
 d SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 121

inscribed within the s t r u m & of the mark as re-mark; itr place i s

prescribed in advanct. By dissociating the marks‘ r c f h n g from what
demarcates them, from their space of inscription, by reducing the re-
mark constinruvc ,of rhc mark to a mere scmic function, the mark
begins to €unction as a signifier for a signified. From the fact that
each mark, as well as the conapt of a11 the semantic marks, must
take on the fold of the asemic space that unfolds benvstn the terms
of the scrim or system, w e may draw a double mnscqucnse. The re-
mark is indeed double.
As we have sccn up to this point, each individual mark and each
series of marks is remarked (doubled, rctlccted, mirrored) by irs con-
cept, as well as by its asemic space of mibility. Prccidy because
the mark as a mark must, irretrievabty. refcr to that non-senw space
that demarcates ir from other marks, no fuIfilling equarion beween
marks (or, for that matter, bn- their concept) and their meaning
can ever be achieved.
By referring ro “the place where nothing takes place but thc place”
ID, p. 2-57), to the mark’s spaced-out semiopcning, to “the re-marked
site of the mark” (F,p. 46), Derrida shows that, fifth, thc totalizing
rcmic concept of all the semcs or marks of a serics, a valence that i s
not just one among others is added to that series. Such a valence docs
not enrich that series; what is added, necessarily, “through a rcdu-
plication that is always rcprescnted” (D.p- 2.521, is the meaningful
and signifying delegate or representative of h e semantic void between
the marks of thc series. Only by making it signify can the haerogc-
neous space of inscription, in an extra turn, be referred to by the
mark (D, p. 222). Clearly, one trope too many is thus added to the
series, and, in the form of a proxy (of a metapbor or metonymy), it
represents what does not really belong to the serics of 5cmt5, the
nonmcaning against which the full marks stand out. If that tmpc is
subtracted from the scrim m be mtalized by the conccpt (of rhc mark],
however, this totalization leaves at least one mark unaccounted for.
Thus remarked by h e space of insaiption that demarcates all marks,
ID concept or theme of the mark could hope to coincide with what
it aims to embrace. T h e remark is a n Essential limit to all coinciding
reflection o r mirroring, a doubling of rhc mark rhar makes all self-
reflcctivc adquation impossiblc. For structural rcaaonh there is al-
ways more than totality; the extra valence added by the delegate of
the asemic spacc of diacritical diffmndarion of the rotalig of semes
always-infinitely-remains to be accounted for.
Not only the marks of a series must bend to the foid of heir asemic
222 ON DECONSTRWCTION

spacc of inscription; not onIy the full tcrms of a series are affected
by the remark. To the extent that that a m i c space is represented
by a proxy within, and in addition to, thc series, it becomes rneta-
phorially or metonyminUy tnashrmed into a mark, that is, into
precisely what it is supposed to make possible. Hena, sixth, the
heterogenencous space between the marks becomes re-marked as well,
bur this homogcnizing remark effaces that which makes signification
possible at the very rnament that it bcgins to signify. Under the re-
mark, the demarcating spacc that itself remarks the signifying marks
rccoils, withdraws, mtreats, disappearing-infinitely-in its own for-
ward movement. T h e remarking of the mark (or of rhe totality of
the marks in a serier) is, therefore, not only to bc understood as the
represented inscription of the spaced-out scrniopming in the mark
but also as the withdrawal of what makes the marks possible from
the marks themselves."
By remarking itself, the mark effam itself, producing in this man-
ner the illusion of the refcrent. I t effaces itself, disappears in the
appearing of what it is not-a proxy of itself. In affecting itself by
the remark, designating is own space of engenderment, the mark
inscribes itself within itself, reflects itself within itseff under the form
of what it is not. T h e mark is heterogeneous to the mark. In marking
what de-marcates it, the margin of the mark is turned into a mark
that is hetcrogcncous to the hcterogcncous spacc of i t s inscription.
Infinitcly re-marking that space by another semic mark, the mark
rcnders its margin invisible. Likewisc, it can be said that a11 the marks
of a series are in the position of sernic substitntcs for h e spaced-out
scmiopening that makes them possible.
1\5 a result of this constant retraction. thc me-mark docs not lend
itself to phenomenologization; the remark does not present itself as
such to any intuition of it as a phenomenon.

lo themoilingofthchlankupon t h e ~ l a n k , t h c ~ l a n k m l o ~ ~ ~ l f , ~ c o m ~ -
for itself, of itself, affecting itself ad infinirum-irs own c~lorltps,ever more
invisible. ground. Not t h a t it is out of reach, like the phenomenological
horizon of pcrcepnon, but that, in rhc act of inscribing itself on itsclf indef-
initely. mark upon mark. i t mulriplics and complicates is text, a tcxr within
a tcxc, a margin in a mark, the one indcfinitcfy rcpcaml within the other:
an abyss. (D, p. 265)

Because of the remark's nature as a n angte or fold to which each

mark must bcnd tf it is m function as a mark, the very inscription of
in condition of possibility into the mark itself can nwer be the in-
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING =s3

scriptionof this “‘almost nothing” as ,such.The mark’s transcendental

opcning withdraws in its represenration, making manifest the limits
of speculative Aufhebmg, which is incapable of accounting for the
re-mark us such, not only because rhis inlrasmcnrrc cannot be phe-
nomenologized and aperimcod, but also because at least one rep-
mcntation of it-that is, at least onc Egurc in which it disappears-
is left unaccounted tor. This last figure i s ultimately the figure of
Aufiebbung itsell.
By effaang itself, the infrastructural an& of the re-mark provides
Mom far the porsibiliry of rrurh as udeqrurrio or bmaiasis, as I have
already mentioned. Moreover, the infrastructure of the remark is
also rhc matrix for thc conception of mrh as aletheid, of truth as
revealing and concealing, since the angle of the re-mark-the unde-
cidable play between the re- of the doubling rcpctirion of the mark,
and of the re- OF the rcpcatcd and thus altercd doublc. and the re- of
the retraction of the mark-also accounts for the movemrnt of corning
to the fore and withdrawing in that which presents itself in this man-
ner. Consequently, the infrasrmmre of the remark, inscribing wirfiin
itself the possibility of the difference bctween appearing and what
appears, as well as the possibility of udepatio and homoiosis, ac-
caunts, in an economical stnrnure, for the major theories of truth as
they have bcen formulated in Western metaphysics.
In light of the foregoing rcvicw of the fivc systems of predicates,
which Derrida calls infrasrructures or graphemutic irr getieral {M,p.
322), some concluding remarks may be appropriare. A certain sys-
tematicity exism among rhtse five infrasuuctures. Althou& the for-
malizing capaciiy of each infrasmcture differs from the others, the
variety in scope or range of the organizing power of the undecidablcs
does not prevent our recognizing the ways in which they overlap. Lct
us first review the five infrasmctures hemselves: (1)The niche-trace
is a stmcturc of referral linking all relation to self to the xlFs cf-
facement in its relation to an Other which is not the speculative other
of the self. (2) Differance corresponds to a nonunitary yet originary
synthesis of the movemenrsof differing, deferring, differentiation, and
so on rhat rclegares rhc possibility of plenitude and self-prescnoc ro
rharof anaftereffecr. (3)Supplemmturitydesignatesthe law according
ro which the possibility of the unbreached plenitude of an ntiry is
dependent on the absence of an Other which it coma to replace, and
which, consequently, marks its proxy in deprh. (4) Itwubiliiy. by
linking together in one srmthlre the possibilities of rcpaition and
alteration, is the explication of idealization constitutive of both iden-
124 ON DECONSTRUCTION

tity and its limits, to the extent that the dupIication presupposed and
made possible by repetition is also thc mnstant alteration of identity.
( 5 ) The re-mmk, which knots ragether in one cluster of ,predicates
themovcmcnrr of doubling, repctition,and retraction (oreffacement),
makm the possibility of reference hinge on the mark's or the trace's
withdrawal in the doubling movement of the reflectinn of its heter-
ogcneovs space of inscription.
Each infrastructure draws together in a differest manner a difkrenr
Stt of concepts: hrncc thc varying scope and reach nf what can be
derived from each. Since they represent the systematic exploration of
what Derrida calls the space of inscription, they exhibit the density
of a fanned-out volume, within which systematic overlapping, re-
coverings, and intetscctions b e c n the different structures can easily
he distinguished. This does not mean, however, that they can bc
derived from one another within the totality of what is traditionally
called a system. For many reasons, rhe polywmie, or rather dissem-
inating, structure of the necessarily open ensemble of the infrastruc-
tures cannot be governed '"by the unity of a f m s or of a harizon ot
meaning which promises ir a totalization or a systematic adjoin-
rncnt-"" One such reason is the strategic, contextual, and historicaE
nature of the economical Enfrastructurcs. Another mason is that the
infrastructures are not stTiciu sensu transcendentals of condirions or
possibilities; since the unity of rhese originary synthcses is not unitary,
their explicatory power is not thealogically ahsolutc. Among the rea-
sons I have not yet considered, one in particular needs to be mentioned
here. It stems from thc fact chat each infrastructure as a relation to
Other-as a structure of selfdeferring, self-effacement, duplication,
repetition, and alkration--can be substituted for another, and can
ulrimately cornc to represent the whole chain of infrastructures, or
what Derrida calls text in an jnfrastructural sense (see Chapter 11).
AIthough each singular infrastructure is one among others, each onc
also dtscrihe the chain itsclf, the bcing-chain of an infrastructurat
chain, t h a t is, the strumre of substitution in which they are caught
and which they articulate. Owing to this possibility of each infra-
structure to inscribe within itself the 'being-chain of rhe chain, each
inhasrrucrure becomes thc nuckus of a system; but since each in-
fraaruaure can and must assume this rote, no system is ultimately
possiblc on the lcvcl of the infrastructures. What can be grasped.
however, in the play of substitution of the inftastructumis thegrnerol
system. Before discussing this decisive aspcct of Derrida's thought, I
want to concentrate on what in this philosophy corresponds to a
genera1 theory of doubling.
 A SYSTEM UEYOND BEING 225

THE GENERAL THEORY OF DOUBLING

It may not seem appropriate to privilege theprobtern of duplicity and
duplication in attempting to formulatc the gcnerui symnt. Yet if one
considers chat iterabiliry, for instance, as a necessary possibility con-
stitutive of idcaliries, “produces” as much as it “presupposes” alterity;
and that the necessary possibilities of supplementarity, differance, and
archotrace broach the identity of a full instant, entity, or moment by
establishing an Other, a double opposite to them, then duplicity must
appear to be a major feature of all infrastructum. The whole logic
of the re- that I have tried, explicitly and implicitly, to prove decisive
in understanding the infrastructures seems to prmuppdse an initial
duplication. The h t i n particle re-, which corresponds to the English
“again” and “against,” properly denotes a turning back (upon oneself
or iwlf) or an appasirion. Its figurative meaning denotes dther a
restoration of a thing to its original condidon, a transition i n t o an
opposite smte, or the repetition of an action. Insofar as same of the
infrastructures make explicit UK of the logic of re- by tying all or
several of these meanings together, as i s the case of the re-marko r
the re-trait (but also re-presentation, re-producrion, mstmce, and so
on), and others, such a5 the infrasuuctures ofiterability and supple-
mentarity, presuppose it, il gencral thcory of duplication seems nec-
essarily to underlie all theinfrastructum. Yet duplication is not more
original than, 5ay, iteration, although one could show duplication to
be a presupposition as e a d y as an effect of that infrastructure; rather,
as I have suggested, they arcequiprimordial.This becomsparticuiarly
obvious’in those infrastructures, such as inrability, in which dupB-
cation and repetition are clearly tied together. Thus, although I am
about to concentrate on doubling, I could just as easily focus on
itcrabiBty, diffcrance, or remarking.
A gmerat theory of doubling should help acmunr for dupliciry in
gencral. in canformirywith what infrasasrmchlraa t e s u p p a d to achieve,
such a theory will not explain duplicity by way of an undivided whole
that would precede it. A5 all the infrastructures demonstrate, such a
whale is only an aftereffect, a necessary illusion produced by the play
of the undccidables. To explain duplicity and doubling preslrppo~s
an originary doubling, which would not be preceded by any unity,
and which thus annuls rhe traditional restridon of doubling to a
macrer of accidentaliry and semndarinss. Traditionally, the double
comes after the simpIe, andsubscqmdy mdtiplies it. in order, then,
to account for the possibility of an opposition such as that between
a simple and its double, a general theory af doubting must conceive
226 ON DBCONSfRWCTlON

of “ a doublc that doubles no simple, a doublethat nothing anticipates,

nothing at least that is not Emelf already double” (D, p. 206). Such a
theory must conceive of an a priori, and from the start irreducible,
double, of “a double rootedness,” of a dupIicadon that mnstitutcs
the simple, and only within which it can emerge as a simplicity. Indeed,
if the simpIe could not be doubled, the simple would not be what ir
is. As a consequence of its identity, thc simple must inscribe the
possibility of being divided within itself; in order to be simple, the
simple must already be doublc. A general theory of doubling will have
to focus on this dupticiry, which logically precedes the philosophical
opposition of the simple and the derivative double.
How is this originary duplication or doubling to be understood?
In Of Grammatology. Derrida notes on several occasions that thc
reflection, the image, the double splits what it doubles, by addins
itself to it, and the reflected o r doubled is also split jn ir5df. Because
the possibility of reflective duplication must b i n 4 M within it,
the reflected is divided by its reflection in iadf. An original division
of the reflected must double the dual relation between the doubk and
the original if thc original is to lend itself M duplication at all. The
originary duplicarion eliminates the possibility of establishing a last
source, origin, and original, installing instead an infinitc reference
between originals and doubles. The dual relation of the simple and
rhc secondary, ofthe original and Be double, bemmcs derivative of
this ,structure of dividing reference, or infinire duplicity.
According to the requirements of technical philosophy, one may
want to understand this structure of dupliciry, which doubles the
relation between the simpIe (edos) and its simulacra (&h~ or eibon)
as a simulacrum itself. A simulacrum, as dehned by Plato. is a copy
of a copy, a double of a double, which itself signifies an original.
Within philosophy, the simulacrum is indced dependent on an on-
tology, since the nontrutb Qf the copy of the copy is l i k e d to the
truth ofthe premt rcfcrcnt of which the first copy is the tmc repe-
tition. Therefore, the subtle excess ‘of truth and ontology that the
origjnary duplication designates cannot be qualified simply as a sim-
ulacrum. To call ir by this name r u i r h philosophy is not only to call
it by one of the names of t h a t which is severcly condemned by this
discourse as spurious, if not bad duplication (and repetition), but also
to strip it of its most unsettling implications. To name the originary
duplication-that is, a doubling anterior to thc metaphysical oppo-
sitions of truth and nontruth-a simulacrum is to continue to speak
within these comforting oppositions. Yct what this asks us to conceive
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 257

is a simulacrum without an ultimate ref-, in other words, a non-

Platonic simulacrum. Indeed, the original duplication, doubling the
opposition between copy and original, is neither p d e d nor fol-
lowed by any refmnt, prcscnce, or unbreachcd identity. Theoriginary
duplication, or non-Platonic simulacrum, initiates but also displaces
the rneraphysical opposition of original and copy, and of the copy of
a mpy, into a complctely diffcffnt field. Doubling, mnsqucnrly, is
no longer derivative of present onta or of their totality; it is no longer
a phenomenon within the world, but rhat within which the on& and
their images, phantasms, or simulacra c a n e themdvrs out. To cite
Derrida: “lmagine that mirrors would nor be in h e world, simply,
included in the totaIity of all o m and zhcir images, but that things
’PTCSC”~,’ on the contrary, would be in them. Imagine that mirrors
(shadows, reflections, phantasms, e t r ) would no longer be compre-
hended within the structure of the ontology. . but would rather
mvelop’it in its entirety, producing here or there a particular, ex-
tremely derrrrninatc effect” (D,p. 324). As such a non-Platonic
simulacrum, rhe originary duplication escapes binary logic. As an un-
Aaggingly dislocated and displaad identity, a5 an identity that inccs-
santly refers to another (double), it i s not governed by opposition and
contradiction. The concept of the ncgarive i s unable to cover up its
play; on the contrary, its status mnsisrs of doubling the play of the
ncgative and inscribing it within itself as one ofits many possibilities.
The hncdon a€ such an originary doubling serves as a matrix for
rhc simultaneous posibiliry and i m p i b i l i r y of any self-present en-
tity. It accounts for the fact that any OH can come into p r c x n a only
by immediately producing the possibility of its duplication. Included
in the at once of the originary duplication is the necessity of each
appearing on to be able to appear as such only by reflecting, mirroring,
or doubling i d f in another. No on can come into p-ce without
simultaneously referring to something it is not. At me, then, means
hat the movement of duplication to & accounted for is rhat of a
simultaneous opcnjng and dosing of the possibility of self-reference.
-At once” means that the being-prrwnt (urn) in its truth, in the prrscncc of
its identity and in the identity of ih prcsmcc,is doubled as man as it ,appears,
as won as ir prexnrs irrclt 12 Q ~ ~ C ~ im , essmcc, a$ thc possibility of its
T Sirr
own most proper non-truth, of in p u b t r u t h rdlccfed in the icon, the
phantasm, or &e simulacrum. What is is not what it is, identical and idemid
to itself, unique, u n l m it nddr to itserf the possibility of being repented as
such. A d iK idmtiy is hollowcd out by that addition, withdrzws itself in
the supplement that prcscnts it. ID,p. 168)
zzs ON DECONStRUCTtON

To say that the originary duplication accounts ot once for the classical
apposition of the double and what is doubled, by demonstrating rhat
rhe original can appear solely on the condition that it is (possibly)
doubled, ism maintain duplication as rhtexplicamy “MUSC,” instead
of dialectically deduang it from a presupposed anterior unity. To
account ot once for the duplicity of the double and what is doubled
is to double the “cause” of duplication, and to think a primary “dou-
ble rootedness.”
The general theory of doubling attempts both to lcgitirnise and to
undercut the possibility of dialcnis and speculation. The possibiliry
of dialectically comprehending the opposition between what is dou-
hlcd and I t , double asa relation of exteriorization and reappropriation
of the double as the negative of what is doubled is logically dependent
an the originary duplication according to which no on can refer in
in appearing to irseli except by doubling itself in an Other. Since the
possibility of all identity is depcndenr on a refcrral to Other (and
therefore on il limitcd possibility), the unity between identiv and
difference, berween what is doubled and the double-or, as Hegel
would say, between reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other-is
derived from an originary duplication which is never sublated in the
procas of speculative reappropriation of the Other. Although I shall
return to this in mate detail later in this chapter, lot the mament 1
would like to emphasize anorher critical irnplicarion of this general
theory of doubling.
The general theory of duplication not only undercuts speculative
dialectics bur reaches beyond phenomenology as well, in particular
in its Husserlian form. Derrida’s critique of Husserlian phenome-
nology does not focus only on the privilege Husserl attributes to the
instance of the riving presence, nor is it limited to Husserl’s bending
of the form of all experience to this essentially metaphysical motif,
whethcr it cantems cxpcrimcc in general or, more particularly, tran-
scendental experience. In addition to this criticism, and to his ques-
tioning of banxendcntal phenometmlo&s unaddtedd complicity with
the mundanc, Derrida asks thc more fundamental question whether
“the phenomenological model [is] itself constituted, as a warp of
language. logic, cvidcncc. fundamental s w r i t y , upon a woof that is
not its own? And which-such is the most difficult problem-is no
longer ar all mundane?” (OG, p. 67).As Dcrrida insisrs, such a
question is undoubtedly provoked by ccrrain devclopments in Hus-
serl’s phenomenology itself. Yet phenomenology cannot entirely Ecr-
tify this qucstion. which refers phcnomcnology “to a zone in which
 d SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 219

is ‘principle of prinaples’ (as we 5ec it, its metaphysical principle:

the original self-eviderrce snd presmce of the thing icwlf in person)
is radically put into question” (WD, p. 164). As a m a m r of fact, the
theory of originary duplication dislocates and displaces this principle
of principles. If it is tnte that the principle of prinaples of pheno-
menology hingm on the possibility of the self-presentation of the thing
itself, originary duplication puts the very possibility of that which is
called a phenommon radically into question.
From the very beginning of Western philosophy, the nation of
phenomenon has b a n linked to the movement of duplication. Thus,
for instance in the philosophy of Plato, phenomena double the mtos
on as the bccoming perceptible to the senses, that is, as the nonidcal.
As derived from the self-pracnce of truth, phmomcna for Plato are
of the order of phantasms, icons. simulacra. and so on. At least since
Kant, however, phenomena have no longer been understood as mere
appearances (Schein), but rather a5 that which appears to rhe sen=
(Erscheinungm), in contrast to the noumena of which they are, so to
speak, the doubles. This motif ofduplication is tied up wirh Husserl’s
undcrsranding of phenomena as much as it is with Kant’s; indecd for
Husserl, phenomena are appearances reflexively bmt upon them-
selves, and thus capable of presenting themselves in themselves. As
Husscrl makes quite clear throughout Philosophy as Rigorous Scimce,
only those appearances of which reflection is an intrinsic part can be
called phenomena.15 The phcnomcnality of phenomena-that is, their
quality of appearing as rhcmxlves to rhemsclves-disrinyishcs them,
insofar as they consricure the realm of meaning, from all sheer, rnun-
dane existence. As pure appearing itself, phenomena are opposed to
what is, to what appears, and of course to mere appearances as well.
Yct the general rheov of duptication qusrions precisely the pas-
sibility of distinguishing, in a clear and distinct manner, between
appearing and what appcars, bcrwccn phcnorncna as the nuclei of
meaning and presence, on the one hand, and the mundane appear-
an=, which lack all constituting immancnt intuiting, on the other.
Still, Husserl makes all other differences depend on this difference.
For him, “rheunhcard [the remarkable, amatinhand soon]diHertnct
b m the appearing and the appearance.. . ( h e m the ‘worId’
and ‘lived experience’) is the condition of all other differmm” (OG,
p. 65). Derrida argues, however, that this difference is preceded by
theoriginary duplicaiionofwhich it is but a traqsince the movement
of the self-prmtarion of the phenomenon in pure appearing, in
pmcnting itself m suck to an intuitive consciousness, alrcady pre-
210 O N DECONSTRUCTION

suppascs a movemcnt of doubling without which the appearing could

not dare to itself* In other words, in order to p m t itself a5 such,
rhe phenomenon must already have divided itself. Precisely this dif-
fercnce is what bafflcs appearing and limits to a secondary role the
unhearddf and remarkable diffmncc between appearing and ap-
pearance. With the thought of such an originary duplication, more
originary than the difference between phenomena and the world, the
possibility of clear-cur distinctions bccomes altogerher questionable:
“What is lifned, then, is not difference but thedifferent, thc diffcrends,
the dcadable exterioriry of differing terms. Thanks to the confusion
and continuity of the hymen, and not in spire of it, a (pure and impure)
difhrence inscribcs itself without any decidable poles, without any
independenr, irreversible r m s . Such diff ercnce wirhout presence a p
penrs, or rather baffles the process of appearing, by dislocating any
orderly rirneat the centerof the present” (D,p. 210). It isas impossible
to bend the language of phenomenology, with its oppositions of ab-
sence and presena, so that it may name this irreducible doubling that
reduplicates thc unheard-of difference beovcen appearing and a p
pearance a5 it is to account for it within phenomenology, because this
originary doubIing docs nor prcscnr itself us such. This originary
doubling i s not a pure and infinite opening for the experience of
phenomenal meaning; it is, in structural terns, in withdrawal, in
disappearingasan opening; ir is impossible to phenomcnohgize, since
in arternpting to do SO, it aIways becomes more invisible.
T h e invisibility of rhe infrasrrucrure, of originary duplication as the
impurc apcning in retreat from the difference capitalized by phe-
nomenology, seems to be linked to a powerful motif in classical phi-
losophy according to which what makes visibility possible must iaelf
remain invisible. If that source were seen, i t would blind the beholder.
“Visibility should-nor bc visible. According to an old, ornniparcnc
logic that has rcigncd sincc Plato, that which enablcs us m scc should
remain invisible: black, blinding”‘* According to this logic, one cannot
face thc source of light, one cannot speak of that which makes speech
possible, because one cannot withstand so powtrful a plenitudc. Yet
the morif of rhis invisible source of light, this unheard souroeof spcech,
is anly the negative image of what I have called the irreducible and
originmy doubling. If thc absolute origin of vision or speech is marked
by invisibility and inaudibility, it is hecause, as Dcrrida has demon-
strated in “Plaro’s Pharmacy,” what is epekt-inu t e ortsks
~ should not
be perceived as an already divided (and hence impossible) plenitude.
As we have mn, for structural reasons. rhat which, as the absolute
ground. d m not bclong to the totality of what it makes possiblc
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING za 1
~ ~~

cannot possibly Qffcr itself to perception (invalidating in this manner

the possibility of percepdon in general). Consequently, to speak of
this ground as rhc blinding origin of visibility-that is, to subject it
K) h e ethico-heoretical code of philosophy-is to continue to speak
in the language of that which that origin makes possible. T h i s coded
blindness to the originary duplication that dividcs origins r o b s du-
plicarion of irs most pristine katum,
Now,how does this originary duplicity, which doubles the classical
opposition of rhat which is doubled and is double, make reflexivity,
sprmlarity, and ultimately autoaffection possibleand, in making them
possiblq trace their limim as well? To answer t h e questions, let us
circle back to the artempt to ritcrate Derrida’s thought with rcspea
to that tradition in phiksophp that, in the aftermath of Hcgcl’s spec-
ulativc solution of the aporetia of retlecrion, sceks new ways to come
m grips with this problem. In what follows, I shall also show how
deconstruction i s to be ~ e e nas a critique of reflexivity (and implicitly
of all the other themes and motifs that are in complicity wirh this
major philosophical theme).
mar, then, is the general strucnire of auro-affection? Dcrrida has
andyzedrhis smcrurt in Spcechmd Pbenommatl in particular, under
the form of the “hcating-on~lCspeaL”constitutive of the meta-
physical privilege of speech. In the system of the hacing-onexif-
speak, the cxterioriry ofthe vocal significr is expcriend as effacing
i&lf entirely in the very moment of in untrance, with the cffem that
rhc subjca of uncring comes into an immediate relation with the hul
meaning of his spnch. The m m r e of auto-affection consisrr of
“giving-onaclf-a-prrscncc,” of mastering all cxterioriry in pure in-
rrrioriry, by asimilaring and idealizing ir, by mourning its passing,
Auto-affection is the suppmsion of diffmncc or duplication. It is a t
the basis of a dream of immediacy, spontaneiy, and undivided xlf-
presence, the dream of a mode of being that would not have to borrow
horn outside itself anything forti@ to its own spontaneity. Yet, al-
though auto-affcnion in this sense is mn mormot~sphantasm, it is
irreplaceable because it is, in essence, the s t r u m r e proper of a p e -
ricncc, insofar as experience i s always crPn;cnce of presence. Dcrrida
writes in Of Gramutology:
Auto-affection is a universal SMEN~C of cxpericncc. All living things i r e
opablc of a u r o a f f ~ o o And
. only a being capable of symbalizing, that is
m ray of aum-affecting, may In i d f be e k e d by thc othcr in general.
A u w a f k i o n is the conditionof an cxprricna in general. This pssibiliq-
anothcr name for Wc”-is a gmcral stmmrc articulated by the history of
life, and leading to complex and hierarchical o p t i o n s . Autwaffcnion, the
zzz O N DECONSTRUCTION

as-for-itself or for-itwlf-subiectivify-gains in power and in in mastery of

the other to the. cxtcnt &at its power of repetition idrdizes i d f . H m
idealization is the rnovcmmt by which rcnsary exteriority, thar which affects
mcorservcsmeassi~ifier.submitsirself tomy powerofrepetition, m what
thcnmfoward appcan to mc as my spontancity and scapes me less and
less. (OG,pp. 165-1661
Despite the fact that auto-affchon is a universal strucrurc-the
very condition of experience {of rhe Other)--and whether or not it
explicitly gives rise to the “phantasms” Dcrrida alludes m, auto-
affection has a border, an “absolute overboard.”” “Auto-affection is
a pure speculation” (OC.p. 1$4),writes Dcrrida. The border of the
pure autarchy of auto-affection, or pure speculation and spefularity,
concerns both the possibility and newssiry of what, in thc context
from which this last quotarion has been drawn, i s understood ,a5 a
mere chimera.
Auto-affection has been characterized by in exclusion ofdiffemnce.
n i s exclusion is essential for aura-affccrion M be auto-affection, for
it to achieve an immediate and sponraneous identity in self-presence.
Yet paradoxically enough, “auto-affection constirum rhc same (owto)
as it divides the same” (OC, p. 166). Most generally, the structure
of auto-affection requirfs a minimal division of the samc in order for
this same ro constitute itself as irself. This minimal division takes on
manifold s h a p . Ir cxplzins why auto-affection is possible only through
an immediate exiting from interiority and why the same as rhe same,
the retroflecrcd sarnc, must affecr irself by Otherness. Thus the pres-
ence that is ,achieved in auto-affection i s a supplement for a lack of
self-presence, an absence that structuralty haunts the self-affecting
self. In short, “ U K C d y irreducible hetem-affection inhabits-intrins-
ically--rhe most hermetic auto-affection” (VP, p. 5 6 ) . As a result,
and as Derrida has demonstrated in the case of Rousseau, who was
vividly aware of this, in “affecting oneself by another p a n c e , one
compts oneself [makes oneself other] by oneself [on s’olt2re soi-
mime]” (OG, p. 153).Moreover, since the presence one gives oneself
in auto-affection is possible only on condition of a prior privation of
presence, and since each such presence is itself an idealized substitute
lor another absent prescnce, auto-affmion leaves an impregnable
worldly residue. Apart from thc trace of absence that continues to
cohnbir rhe presence one gives oneself in auto-affection, apart horn
the “narrow gulf that separates doing horn suffering” wherein one
receiva the Other. auto-affection “admits the world as a third p3rty,”
whosc spact remains irreducible (OG. p. 165). All these residues,
which prevent rhe general s t r u m r e of auto-affection from dosing
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING Wf

upon itself and from achieving a faultless self-presence, are essential

cracks, a b m q icarts, without which there would bt no such thing
as auto-affection. A5 P result, the auto constituted in auto-affection
is constituted as divided, as differing from itscIt
Aura-affccrim, as this brief analysis clearly indiates, yields to the
general infrastmctural laws, to the law of supplcmcntarity. For in-
stana, as Derrida points out with respect to Huscrl’s w n a p t of d f -
pmencc: “What we would ultimately like todraw attention tois rhat
the for-iwlf of self-pmence (~r-sicbJ-rradidanally determind in
its dative dimension as phenomenological self-giving, whether reflex-
ive or pre-reflexive-ariscs in the role of supplement as primordial
substitution, in the form ‘in the place of (fiir ctwas), that is,. ,. in
the very operation of significance in gcneml. me for-itsdfwould be
in-the-phce-of-irrerf;. put for-itsdL instead of itrtlf‘ (SP,pp. 88-89).
Furthermore, it also yields to a fundamental law of duplication-
’ ’

more preciwly, of reduplication-as we shall see.

To give oneself a prcsmce entails relating CD o n e l f ; rhis is the
meaning of auto-affection. Still, if one can achieve sclf-prcscn~ex-
cIu$iveiyby referring tooneself, autc-affectionalsoimplies a condition
of df-division. The difference of self-division yields nothing less than
that angle at which it is necessary to fold o n d f upon oneself. This
angle is, so to speak, the inexreminable evil char insinuarm inelf
within the relation to onseIf, bacause of which the full interiority
aimed at in auro-affection remains deferred. la possibility hings on
what will never allow it 10 close upon imlf fully, namely, an insrance
of spacing. Thmforc, the inrcrioriy, however successfully produced
in a u t o - a W o n , appears to be dependent on srrumrt6 of finitude;
a certain outside inhabits this interiority. which is thus prevented from
fully coinciding wi& itself, Yet without the impurity of this outside,
a self could not even hope to aim at coinciding with imlL
This angk, which strumrally constitutes auro-afkction, is not an
empirical exrerioriry, not any particular remainder Ich standing i n the
process of giving-aneMIf-a-prnce. “Such a separation in cffm re-
mains ungraspable in linguistiq poetic, or phenomenological terms”
(M,p. 288). As an example, Detrida, in discussing VaILry, formulate
the problem of rhc “hcaring~neselfk” in the hollowing way:
Nci~rrinlcformnorrhcconanro~aruremmrwuldwcrsrii~ mincrinric
differem h r m the mmcc I am pronouncing hen+now, in my soallcd
speaking voice, which soon will return to the silence from w h i h it p d s ,
very low in my voice or on my page, and thc =me mrcncc m a i d in an
inner instana, minc or yours. The wo events are I $ different as pa6diblc as
wmis, bur in thc qualinrivc dewriprim of events, in the derrrminndon of
zz4 O N DECONSTRUCTION

prcdicarivc traits, form or mntent. the principle of dirmnibility, the mnapt

of diffcrcncc evade us. Like theseparation that disjoint$rhc circlt, a certain
tangcncy here appcan TO be borh null and infinite. (M.p. 2881

The difference, the spacing, the angle ar the hcart of self-affection is

not an extcriority of the order of either form or content. It is a
diffcrmcc causcd nor by “cxrernal prolalion which accidcnrally would
come to interrupr the circle,” but by a disjunctive folding point thar
occurs in the circuit’s return to itself. “‘The circle turns in order to
annul the cut, and therefore, by the same token, unwittingly signifia
it. The snake biles its tail, from which above all it does nor follow
that it finally mejoins itself without harm in rhis suctssful auto-felario”
(M,p. 289).
A t stake is thus the structural disjunction of an altering difference
without which no auto-affection would be possible, bur owing to
which it is also, rigorously speaking, impossible. The difference in
quesrion accountsd once for the possibiliry and impmsibiliry of auto-
affection, withour dialectically annulling the disjuncture. This differ-
ence or originary duplication, which docs not belong to simpie ex-
teriority. which is of the order of neither content nor form, and which
is not a lchover rhat the self or the same was incapable of assimilating,
is a structural agency or instancc whose nonthematiration is precisely
thc condition under which auto-affection can work succssfully. It is
thus not a negativity or a conrradiction within auto-affection. Suc-
cessful auto-affection functions precisely as a sublation of contradic-
tions. “The negative is its business and its work. What it excludes,
whar rhis very work excludes, is what d m not allow irxlf to be
digested, or represenred, or stated-does not allow itself M be trans-
formed into auto-affection by excmplorality. It is an irreducible het-
e r w e i c y which cannot be eaten either sensibly or ideally and which-
this is the tautology-by ncvcr lctting itself be swallowed must rhcre-
fore muse itself to be vomited.”‘*
it now becomes imperative to understand thar rhc originary du-
plication, which parallels the difference auto-affection attempts to
resolve by its spcculativc and spccular enterprise, is not a mere dou-
bling but is rather a duplicmion that has the S ~ N C ~ U W of an angle, a
fold, or rather of a re-fold or re-mark. Owing to this angling of
duplication, originary duplication is originarily divided, or doubltd.
It is a principle of duality duplicared by itself in such a manner that
its own “reflection” divides it in depth. For this reason, originary
duplicarion is better characrerized as reduplication. Only because of
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 235

its strumrally abyssal cundidon can the minimal smcturc of redu-

plication.assurne the double function of constituting and dcconsti-
tuting auto-affection on both a p r d e c t i v e and a reflective level.
Wcrc it nor doubly double, it would funmion as a theological principle
of dualism, as an ultimate and infinite instance. The originary dupli-
cation’s reduplication is preciscly what infinitelyprevenrs it from be-
coming a sdf-suficient ground. Of &is self-division in reduplication,
of this folding of duplicity upon itself, Deaida notcs the lack of
coinciding: “The fold i s not a form ofreflexivity, If by reflexivity one
means the motion of consciousness o r self-presence thar plays such a
determining role in HegeI’s speculative logic and dialectic, in the
movement of sublation (Aufiebung) and negativity (the esccnce is
reflection, s a the~ greater Logic),then reflexivity is but an effcct of
the fold as t&t” (D,p. 270).
As concerns auto-affection, Derrida’s philosophy is aimed at “dis-
dosing the remaining angles of round frames”(VP.p. 94). Since auto-
affection is not only a pure speculation, in the m s e that it is the
dream of total autarchy, bur also correlatively, in the mse of a mral
rdlection, Demda’s regrounding of auto-affection mncern5 specu-
lationand reflection, spccularity and retlevivity as well, Auto-affection
and what it promises, undivided self-proximity, is not only the much
Iongcd-for fulfillmcnr of mctaphysical desire; it is also that which is
experienced, paradoxically, a idmtical to death. Rausscau’s anxieties
concerning the state of plenitude he so desired arc a good example
of the threat h a t total self-reflection represents. This insight into the
paradoxical nature of philosophy’s reIation to the absolute as some-
thing dreaded as well as desired lcads Dcrrida. panicularly in his
analysis of Rousseau, to thc recognition that this apparent contra-
diction can be accounted for only if one assumes t h a t diffcrcncc al-
ready inhabits indifferent proximity. Yet if the ilIusion of indifference
or the dream of total scif-reflection by auro-affection is dependent in
rhc first place o n a difference (a doubly double fold} around which
the dream of the abolition of ,diIfcrence can be drcamt, then a con-
tradiction such as the one I have just referred to acquires a status that
can no longer be addressEd by traditional means of problem solving.
If difference must breach indifference, inasmuch as it reposes on the
possibility of auto-affection, thm those aporias and contradictions
traditionally associated with reflexivity take on an entirely different
meaning from that which they possess in rhe discvurse of philosophy,
since within it thesc riddles cannot hope to be solved. from the mo-
ment the possible domination of rhe source by what has flown from
236 . ON DECONSTRUCTION

the source is ruled out by a recognition of the source’s originary

structural duplicity, problems such as the spatial and temporal hia-
tus= b e w e n the source’s constitutive function and the return to that
source in the operation of self-reflection, the difference of Icvels bc-
tween source and whar ha5 been made possible by the source, and so
on gain a different meaning.
With this insight, the traditional phibsophical paradoxes and con-
tradictions berornc lcss symptomatic of rhc originary duplication than
of the very instances of division mnstitutivc of auto-affection and
self-rcfleaion. From thc perspective of the know[edge based on au-
toscopy and autogosis--that is, of the knowledgc made possible in
setf-reflection and speculation as absolute self-reflecrion-these apo-
rias have the form of mnrradictians. Each of the conflicting arguments
may be shown to contain the negation of the other, and thus to be
susceptible of sublation in a dialectical logic. Yet for the philosophical
perspecrive that 1 am daborating here, the pandoxcs of reflection are
neither unresolvable problems nor manifestations of the negarive,
which would yield to a dialectical process whereby the conflicting
arguments would be overcome, but rather the very “presence” of
heterogeneity, of a certain cxterioriry a t the heart of all self-relation.
Whereas the heterogeneous, the exterior, bcgins only at the limits af
the hoped-for totality that metaphysical philosophy beliores i t i s able
to think, for Derrida it sfam in that interiority itself, at the very point
a t which it must fold wpon irsclf to be itself, auronomous and au-
mrchical. From this perspecrive the elements of the aporias of reflec-
tion evade all final solution, since their “contradiction” is the very
condition (of possibility and impossibility) of whar is aimed at. They
are not, for rhat matter, witness to a pseudoproblem; although there
is no intrinsic way ofsolving them. a law regulates their “contradic-
tion” to the extent that thcy are mnstitutivc difficulties. In order for
any self or any speculative totality to retare ro itself, either a t one
blow or through a process of mediation, immediately o r as a resulr,
there musr be a supplernenrary rrair. While referring to itself alone,
such a self muscat once rcfer to an Other, indefinitely. Whilc referring
to itself (only), it must repeat itselfIn duplication and duplicate itself
in repetition. Butsccordingto thelogicof duplicarion,this alsoimplics
that what is doubled becomes doubled. A5 a result, Derrida can state
t h a t “the origin of the speculation becomes a difference” (OG, p. 36).
Speculation is bared OR rhe structural repeatability of a mark, as well
as on the structural relation to Other. Most imporrant. it is dependent
on infrasrmcntral re-marking w on the re-fold, which, as we have
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 237

seen, is not itself a reflexivity. Because of this angle, whkh cannot be

t h e m a t i d from within mflcxiviry o r speculation. the rcfkxivc totatity
differs from itself in irseif at the moment it relares to itself. Because
of this angle of reflection, the ring of reflecrion doe not dosc itself.
It bars reflection forever from rejoining a unity, from achieving a
unity or totality. Hence one can say “that the sprmlar agency, far
from constituting the I in its properness, immediately expropriates ir
in order nor to halt its march.” Instead offaIding the self into itxlF,
instead of embracing the totality of all the reflexive determinations,
sprmlation or absolute reflection. thcmirror of reffection, “manifests
in rhis double lm the singular operation of a multipiying division
which transforms the orj$n inro effect, and the whole into a part”
(M,p- 285).
Dissemination is the name by which the in-advancc divided unity
is uffmcd. T h i s i n a d v a n d divided unity of the infrastructures is nor
the p o l y m i c dispersion of a once unicary meaning but is, as we have
seen, an always open rnsemble of structures, presupposed by the
project of unity and totality and affirmed by reflection and specula-
tion, without their knowledge, as the limit of their possibility. The
general rhmry of dnplicarion or duplication outlines in rhis manner
the l i t s of the philosophical presuppositions of the-philosophy of
reflexivity-prpuppositions of an original spontaneity, of productive
imagination, of intellma1 intuition, and w on-as they have been
made explicit by Hcgel, who could then resolve the traditional aporias
of reflexivity in the speculative manner we have witnessad. Derrida
has made it quia clear that insofar a an originary intuition pnsup-
poss an originary synthesis, it is a myth, a “liction” (see for instance
W D . p. 226). No virgin substance or homogeneous and organic unity
precedes or superintends rhe originary duplication and the “system”
of the infrastruirtures. T h e myth of a unity is onIy an effect made
possible and irrevocably undercut by reflection itself, insofar as it
must rely, in order to take place in rhc firsr place, on what it cannot
hope m reflect. What lies beyond the mirror, on the other side of the
speculum, in the beyond of rhe presuppositions of the philosophy of
reflection-that is to say, the“systcm” of the infrasuucrurts-cannot
be undersrd in m of unity, synthesis, tonliry, and &he like, or
in tcrmsofspontancity, without engaging in a conceptual monstrosity.
Dmida, addressing the problems of the more originary origin of the
infrastructures, writes, “The spontaneous can emerge as the pure
initiality of the event only on the condition that ir does not itself
present itself, on the condition of this inmnaivable and k h u b k
238 ON DECONSTRUCTION

passivity in which nothing can present itself m itself* (M.pp. 296-

297). In other wards, spontaneity can be ascribed to originary du-
plication only on the condition that it withdraws (itself) in the very
act in which it allows reflexivity to dream its dream of achieving
homogeneity and unity. The “spontaneity” that “grounds” in rhi5
manner the spontaneity of synthetic reflection at the heart of alt phi-
‘losophiesof identity evades all the characteristin of true spontaneity.
Ir is scandalously passive and is in constanr rctrear from prcsenrarion
and sclf-prcscntation. I t is iefinitcly divided.
T h e generalization of reflexivity, which 1 claimed a t one point to
be the first step of its deconstruction. thus implies a breakingthrough
of the tinfoils of the mirrors of reflection, demonsrrating the uncer-
tainty of the speculum. In this first step of the deconsmction of
reflection and speculation, the mirraring is made excessive in order
ther it may look through the looking glass toward what makes the
speculum possible. To look through the mirror is to look at its reverse
side, a t the dull side doubling the mirror’s spccular play, in short, at
the ruin of the mirror. It is on rhis reverse s i d e - o n the tinfoil-that
disscmination writes itself, remarks Derrida {D, p. 33). On this lining
of !he outside surface of reflection, onc can read rhe “ s y $ m ” of the
infrastructures that commands the mirror’s play and determines the
angles of reflection. Yer since this fail is made af disscminatcd struc-
rural instances, the mirror‘s tinfoil necesnarily becomes sernitran-
sparent and, as a cornlaw, only semirctlecrjvc. Reflection, thm. appears
to be affected by the infrastructures that make it possible; it appears
broachcd and hrcached as an inevitably irnpcrfect and limited Schri-
nm. Total reflection is a limited play, nor because of some defect
owingto itc. finitude-as Hegel has shown, it is a twEy infinite play-
but because of the struauraliy limitks play of the undecidables rhat
make it possible, which the mirror’s play cannot accornmodatc with-
o u t a t the same time relinquishing the telos of its operation: the
actualization of the unity of at1 thar is reasonable At 6rsr thc mirror
that Derrida’s philosophy holds up Ktms ro show us only its a i n ;
yet this opaque t i n is also transparent. Through it one a n obscrve
the play of reflection and speculation as it takes place in the mirror’s
mirroring itself. Seen from the inside this play gives an illusion of
prfection, but observed through the tain, ir appears ‘limitcd by the
infrastructural agencies written on its invisible side, without which it
could not even begin to occur. In all its perfection, thc specu’lar play
shows itself incapable of reflain& of sublaring its limits.
In short,unlike 3 certain criticism of reflexivity, Derrida’scriticism
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BElNG 219

does not rtjcct reflection and speculation in favor of total immediacy,

nor does it prcsuppasc ,an originaty unity by virtue of which the
traditional problems af reflexivity can be dialectically overcome in
absolute reflection or speculation. Dcrrida's debate with reflection
and speculation is not dependent on the mentially philosophical prob-
lem of the aporias, contradictions, or negations of reflection, in t e r n 5
of which it rchscs to criticizc or soIve the pmblcrns of reflection. As
we have sten. both operations are intrinsically speculative. Focusing
on an analysis of those heterogcneoua Instances that arc the "true"
conditions of possibility ot reflection and speculation without being
susceptible to accommodation by the intended totatity, Derrida's phi-
losophy reinscribes, in the strict meaning af chis word, reliemion and
speculation into what excceds it: the play of the infrasnucture ln-
stead of disposing of reflexivity in an empiriast or positivist manner
(rhcsurst way for it to reenter through the backdoor), the philosophy
wc havc been considering rake rdlection's exigencics seriously. It is
the only way 20 trace the limits of reflection without falling prey to
the fictions on which it is based.

THE GENERAL SYSTEM'

In describing a number of particular infrastructures, I have shown
that they are susceptible to a classification of sorts and thar, by over-
lappin& replacin& and supplementing one another, they form a cer-
tain system.W e also SIW that wveral of the infrasmaurcs r c p r m t
conditionsof the possibility and impossibility of systernaticity in gen-
eral, or of what I havc calkd the general system. In what follows, I
shall py to show more precisely what sort O ~ S ~ S ~ Uone
I I can attribute
to infrastructures and aim in what sense they can be said to make
systematicity in general possible (and impossible).
Lct us first recall that systematicity is an csscntial philosophical
rquircmcnt. In the system, knowledge lays itself out and thus camcs
to know itself. The system as a complm and in i w l f ' n e w a r y order
of foundation in which philosophical truths acquirc their required
internal coherence and unity is a function of the philosophical desire
for sclF-concepmalization. As I havc said, infrastructures arc cconom-
ically and strategically minimal distributions or constellations-ar-
chesynthescs-of cssentialIy hetcrogcnwus prcdicatcs. T h e pnndple
articulated by each singular infrastructure applies ta iuelf as well,
and although each one of the by right in6nitc number of infrasrruc-
turn can bc replaced (or supplementcd] by another, they are n o t
240 O N DECONSTRUCTION

synonymous with or even identical to one another. Thus one can see
dearly how infrastructures contain the possibility of tying clernettts
together into a totality of foundation, as well as of self-thematization
and of element mmbinacion and transformarion.
Since inhastmctures combine heterogeneous predicates, however,
and apply to themselvm only the better to unground thcmxlvcs, they
also appear ra be strangely ambiguous or ambivdcnt. Ycr it is not
the sort of ambiguity that would be wimcss to an absence of clarity
in the process of their determination, to the negativity of a lack of
precision, to vagueness or looseness of terms, in short to semantic
confusion, nor is ir an ambiguity concerning the meaning of the in-
frastructures, owing to some polysemic richness. Ambiguity in these
senses is always a function of presence-that is, of an ultimately self-
i d c n t i d signification-as i s demonstrated by the possibility of the
dialectical sublation of ambiguous meanings, whcreas rhe ambiguity
of the infrastructures is not the positive sign of a dialectical or spec-
ulative stare uf affairs. Finally, this ambiguity do= not signify the
cnigrna of all truth as an unmnccaling. Indeed, the ambiguity of the
infrastrumres i s not univacal in a higher sense. It docs not simply
coincide with what Heidegger calls zweideurige Zweidmtigkeit. an
ambiguity grounded in a gathering (Versummlung) or unison (Eln-
&lung), whose uniry itself remains ~nspeakablc.’~ Thc specific ambi-
guity of the infrastrunums cannot be sublated or made to sound in
unison. If determinacy requires self-identity, then the ambiguity of
thc infrastructures has no houndarics.
For all rhcsc reasons, i t i s advisable M avoid the term ambigflity
altogcthctin characterizingthe infrastructures. By analogy to G d e l ’ s
discovery of undecidable propositions, Derridn suggests that they be
qualified, provisionally, as undecidablcs. In an essay publishcd in
193 1, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Marhe-
matica and Related Systems,” Gildel demonsrrarcs rhar mcralogical
sratemmrs concerning the completeness and consistency of systems
any mare mmpkx than logical systcms of the first order cannot he
demonstratedwithin these sysrems.m Derrida, in ~rsSerninuii€~n, tran-
scribes Codel’s theorem in the following terms: “An undecidable
proposirion, as Girdcl demonstrated in 1931, is a proposirian which,
given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an an-
alytical nor dcducrive conscquencc of rhosc axioms, nor in bonrra-
diction wirh chela, ncirher true nor false with mpert to these axioms.
Tertium dniur. without synthesis” (D, p. 219). To call the infra-
structures undecidablm i s thus not merely to stres the essential in-
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 24I

mmpletenss and inconsistmcy of their 1evd of farmaiizadon. Wnhout

denying the philosophical i d a l of exhaustive deductiviiy-in other
words. of the possibility ofdctcrminingcvtry clcrncnt of a multiplicity
a5 either an analytic cowquence or as a contradiction of a system
ofaxioms said to govern that multiplicity-the undecidability of the
inhastructures questions that ideal from a structural point of view.
Finally, as Dcnida remarks in Positions, to call inhastrumrcs un-
deudables is to stress that they arc “unities of simulacrum, [oQ ‘fake’
verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included
within philosophical (binary) opposiiion, but which, however, inhabit
philosophical opposition, misting and disorganizing it, withour ewr
cowrimring a rhird term, without ever leaving room for a solution
in the form of speculative dialectid’ (P,p. 43).
Before continuing this analysis, let us recall thit Derrida empha-
sized that infrastrucnlres were to be called undecidablc only by anaI-
ogy. The notion of the undecidable, he remarks in his Inrroductias
to the Origin of Ccm&y, in its very negativity, “has such a sense
by some imducibie reference to the i d n l of decidability.” Its,revo-
lutionary and disconamng sense “remains sscntially and intrinsi-
caIIy haunted in its scnse of origin by the relm of decidability-whosc
disruption it marks“ (0,p. 53).Yet what is being thought under the
titie of the infrasrmcturts transcends the pmjcct of d.$nirmcss itself.
Thtrefore, undeciduble must be understood to refer not only to es-
sential incompletcncss and inconsistency, bearing in mind their dis-
tinction from ambiguity, but also to indicate a level vaster than that
which is encumpassed by the opposirion bcnvm what is decidable
and undecidable.
As “originnry” syntheses, or economic arrangements of traits, the
undecidabls constitute both the medium or the clement between the
bmy philosophid oppositions and bawcEn philosophy and its Other,
as well a$ F ~ medium
C that e n c o m p a s s t h e e coupled terms. They
arc undmdabk k u x they suspend the decidable opposition be-
c w m what is true and false and put a11 the concepts that belong ta
the philosophical system of dccidability into brackets. By virmc of
their constituting a 5paa in b e t w a n conceptual dyads and, at the
same time, comprising hem, the infrastrucrural undecidable are “rhe
,mediumin which opposita arc opposed, the movement and the play
that links them among themselves, revens them or makes one side
cross over into the other” (a. p. 127). Their undecidability, their
“floating indetermination,” permits the substitution and the play of
the conceptual binary oppositions, which, by turninginto one another,
242 ON DECONSTRUCTION

become incapable of denominaring and defining the medium from

which t h q cmergc (D,p. 93). Thus, if one calla infrastructures ’*am-
bivalent” or “ambiguous,” ir is in the sense that they do not offer
themselves to mastery in terms of simple and clear-cut distinctions.
Indeed. conceptual couples and their play essentially represent norhing
other than thc attempt to bring the play of the medium of the un-
decidables to a stop, to make rationat what, according to their implicit
and explicit ethos. can only be irrationa1,ro appropriate it, to identify
it by forcing a self-identity upon it. The restricted play of the philo-
sophical conccptual cauples p r o d s 10 this task by trying to recon-
stitute the undecidables as dialecrical conrradictions susceptible of
cvenrual dissolurion; bur, Dcrrida notes, undecidability “is not con-
tradiction in the Wegelian form of contradiction” (P, p. 101). The
undccidahlcs. on the contrary, arc what suspend decida‘biliry in a11
its forms, particularly in its dialecrical form of a mediation of mn-
rrarics and of that in whish decidabtlig and definiteness came them-
selves out. Above all, the “ambiguity” of undecidables is rigorously
irreducible and irresolvable because of its csscnrially nonsemnntic
character. Speaking of the “hymen,” Derrida says:
“Undecidability” i s nor cnuscd here ‘by snmt enigmatic quivecality. some
inexhaustible ambivalence d a word in a “narural” language, a d srill less
by some ”Uegmsinn der Onuorte” (Abel). 1n dealing here with hymen. it is
nor a matter of repeating what Hegel undcmok ra do with German WO&
like AtrJbebmg. Uridl, Meinen, Bei5picl. cfc., marveling over that lucky
accident rhat insrrlls a natural language wirhin the elcrncnt of sprcularivc
diakctica. What c o u m here is not lexical richtms. the semanric irrfinirencss
of 3 word or concept, ia depth a t breadth, the sedimentation that has pm-
...
duced insidc it two contradictory layers of signification what counts hem
is the formal or syntacticat prosir that compoxs and daornpscs it. {D.
., 22a)
The undecidability of infrastructures results from the syntnciir U P
rangment of their parts. But what does Derrida mean by syntax?As
opposed to semantics (and pragmatics). as anothcr major aspcct of
the grammatical construction of sentences (and of the general rhmry
of signs), syntax refers traditionally ro the formal arrangements of
words and signs, to their connection and rclation in phrases or sm-
tences, as well as to the establishedusagesof grammatical construction
and the rules deduced ihcrefram. Derrida’s use of thc concept of
syntax, however, is not simply a reference to the formal properti-
of laoguage insofar as thcsc arc traditionally considered to refer to
the articulation of the ,signifieds. Indeed form is just another name
for prcscnce, Derrida notes. His use of syrrrnv docs not imply the
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEJNG 24 ?

traditional subjection of synrax to semantia. In distinction from the

grammatical opposition of the syntactic and the semantic, of farm
and amrent, and so on, Dcrrida's USE of syntax is intended to undo
rhcse appositions systcmarically. Syntax is conrrivtd by DerCjda as
being irreducibly in cycesd of the semantic, and cunsequcntly as dis-
equilibrating thar traditiond p a m a t i c a l and philosophid distinc-
don. How,then, are we to think such M ~"'irrcducibkmass of the
syntactic over the semantic!" (D, p. 221). Such an ex= rakcs place
where it can be shown that the fotmal properties of language ate not
simply a function of signifieds, of the cuntent of rhe words, but that
they arc arranged in and intrinsically dependent on a syntax of their
own. Yet if it can be demonmated that fonal syntactic properties
can be syntactically cumposcd and decomposed, a 5yntoz of sy"tux
comes info play, along with the problem of the simulacrum, which,
as wc have m, is no longct s u b j m to crurh at, in the case of
syntax, M the content of the words. In "The Double Session," Derrida
has shown that the writing of Mallarrni is precisely such an attempt
to explore the possibilities of syntactical excess. It is, therefore, a
litmature in which "the suspmx is due only to the placement and
not to the content of words" (D.p. 220).
Now, the syntactic excess raponaible for the infrastructures' un-
decidability s t e m h r n the fact that their formal arrangmcncs, dis-
positions, distributions, or constellations of predicares refer m a
supplmenrary mark. The infrastructure ofremarking or of the dou-
ble'mark demonstram this essential character of infrastructures in
general, which consists of their being folded upon themselves in such
a manner that they rhmsclvts became a paradigm of the law they
r e p r a n t . Inftasrmcturesapply to themselves. The arrangemmr that
they r e p m m t is always rearrangement by thcmselvcs. For this reason
they are, as we have seen, in cotstant displacement, incapable of
assuming any stable identity. By re-marking the syntactic dispasition
with a supplementary syntactic trait, the infrastrucwzs can no longer
be brought to a semantic halt. lficy seem 10be purely syntactic; yet
since t h e purely "formal" or syntactic strumres or knoa of inrer-
scctions are their own paradigm, they also, unquestionably, signify
and are tfius not purely syntactic. "Through rhe re-marking of its
stmantic void, it in fact begins ro signify. Its semantic void s i p i f i s ,
but it signifis spaang and articulation; it has as ia mcanIng the
possibility of syntax; it orders the play of meaning. Ncitbcr purely
syntactic nor purely srmmrric, it marks the amcutatcd opening of
rhnt opposition" [D, p. 222).
The infrastructures thus float indefmirety between the possibilities
u1 ON DECONSTUWCTIOH

d the scrnanric and the syntaaic, in short of meaning. Thouph not

purely syntactic [or, for that matter, purcly xmantic), they are in a
position of anteriority and possibiliry M both aspects of language,
precisely htcausc of the ex- of the syntactic over meaning-that
is, ofthe re-marked syntax-of a syntax t h a t arranges (itself]. It is in
this $ e m that I shall continue t o speak of thc infrastrucrurts as
syntactically undecidable. After having demonstrated, in “The Double
Session,’’ that the infrastructure bymen is undecidable because of
syntaaic re-marking, Derrida writes:

What holds for “hymen” P!H) holds, mrutis mutmdis. for all othcr signs
which, like phormokon, supplcmcnt. differmce, and othcrs, h a w a double,
mnmdimry, undecidable vahc thar always dcrircs from heir synrar whether
the lamer is in a scnse “internal,” articulating and combining under thc same
yoke, huph’hen, two incompatible meanings, or “external,” dcpcndmt on
the ccdc in which the word is made ro funcrion. Bur the syntactical cam-
position and decomposition of a s i p renders this alternative b m m n internal
and external inoprative. One is simply dealing with greater or lessor syn-
tactical units at work, and with economic diffcrcncLs in condensation. (D,
p. 2211

Because of this undecidability, the infrastructures can serve as “orig-

inary” s p t h c s q without, at thc same time, lending themvlvcs to a
movement of (teleological or archaeological) reappropriation: “these
points of indefinite pivoting +. + mark the spots of what can ncver be
mediated, mastered, sublared, or dialecticized through any Erinnerrrng
or Aufiebung” {D, p. 221). If they mark dialectics as sterile by un-
dercutting the possibiliry of a reduction of their undecidability through
sublarion, how much more do they evade nondialectical philosophy
and its reflexive oppositions!
As undecidables, infrastmcturcs rerpmble syncategorcmata. Like
hosesecondary p a m of discourse, disringuishcd in grammar and logic
fmrn the medieval William of Shyreswwd ro Huss~rl’sLogical In-
rrestigutions. which, in contradistinction to cattgoremara, arc un-
dosed cxpmsions that have no determined and fixed meaning,
undecidabb also predicate jointly. They cannot function as terms
and thus are not of the order of the phone sematrtike. ,Similar to
qncaregoremata 5uch as and, or,not- if, every, some. only, i between,
expressions that cannot be used by rhernsclvcs but only in conjunction
with othcr terms, infrastructures are essentially uscd together with
predicates. categoreman, or concepts with respect to which they ex-
ercise a specific organizational function. Yet syncategoremata, which
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BElNG 24 1

arc considered logicaf constants dttermining the logical form (as in

Buridan), never relare to themselv- in the complex manner that we
have seen to bc m c of infrastrucrum. If rhcy never signify their own
semantic quasivoid, it is because the ethical orientation of grammar,
giving priority to categoremata, a n n o t afford to blur i a hierarchical
and clear-cut distinctions. As Matlarrni‘s texts reveal, however, syn-
categorcmata such as in between oror lend thernselvcs to an operation
of re-marking. Speaking of mrre, “in herween,” Derrida stccsses that
“it can be nominalizcd. turn into a quasi-catcgortm. receive a dcfin-
itive article, or even be made plural“ (D, p. 2U). When 1 speak of
thc infrasrmmres a5 syncsrcgorrrnata, it i s i n this scnx af a non-
reflexive doubling of their incomplete meanings.”
For the remainder of these reflections i r i s imperative to recall that
Derrida’s references m syncangoremara occur in the context of “The
Double Session.” that is, in a n essay that sets out to pmvc thc irre-
ducible excess of syntax Over semantics. This demonstration i s framed
by a cririque of rhemadc criticism and its overevaluation af the role
of the word, in both philosophy and literary criricism. As the totaIiry
of Derrida’s work clearly indicates, in paKiCUlar but not exclusively
Of Crommutology, t h i s critique of thematic criticism i s aimed at the
mainsmam of Wsrern philosaphy, which until recently ignored and
trivialized the difference between words and sentences, between se-
mantics and syntax, by confining the latter to a lateral role a t best.
All of Derrida’s work is engaged in a systcrnatic cririquc of rhc status
accorded to the word, the noun, in order to uphold t h e secondarincss
of the syntactical; it is perhaps the most radical arrempt ever made
a t allowing syntax an independent form. To condudc this part of the
present study. ler us restate what has already been sufficienrIy devcl-
oped, namely, that Demda’s criticism of the ward, of semantics, in
favor of the forms of syntactic constmaion is also aimed at what he
perceives as phenomenology’s (partiCUhdy Husscrlian phenomenot-
opv’s) continuation of metaphysics. What dl1needs to be devdopcd
i s thar this critique is linked to Derrida’s compler continuation of
Husserl’s project in L o g d Iwesfigutiuns of a universal and a priori,
in short, “pure logical grammar.” Dcrrida continues this idea, which
HusKrl never dcvclopld, in a Eomplcx rnanncr, bccause his critique
of phenomenology, of the values of prcsencc that it shares with meta-
physifs in general, of form as another name for prcscncc, of semantics,
themadsm, and so an radically displace what he calls in Positionr
the “rcmarkablt project of a ‘purely logical grammar’ thar is more
important and more rigorous than all the projem of a ‘general rea-
246 O N DECONSTRUCTION

s o n 4 grammar’ of seventeenth- and eighncnthsentury France. proj-

ects that certain modern linguists refer to, however” (P,p. 32).
Before elaborating on this project, I should add a bricf note on
Derrida’s indebtedness to Husscrlian phenomenology. Not infre-
quently one hears the opinion that Husserlian phenomenology is a
dead end and that, consequently. any attempt to continue the qum
rioning of that philosophy is doomed to failure from the start. CEr-
tainly what is true of other philosophcrs is tnre of Husml as well:
by evading what is worthy of questioning in their texts, they all lead
us to dead ends. As far as Dcrrida is concerned, his rclarion to Husserl
is at lcasr threefold. Firsr, ir is a relarion, ro usc Granel’s words. m
“simply the greatest philosopher who appeared since the Greeks.””
To put it differently. it is a relation to the philosophical as a battle
of gods and giants about being (gigantomuchin peri tes oersias). as
Plato calls it in Sophist, as well as to the philosophical in all ia
technical and thematic richness. Second, Derrida’s relation to Hus-
serlian thought is radicatly critical of the metaphysical implications
of thc projcct of phenomcnology itself, as has been amply docu-
mented. Third, it is a continuation and radicalization of a number of
motilstn Husscrl’sown works thatarc~pableofunhingingthemajor
metaphysical themes a t the center ofhis philosophy, such as the idea
of ,a primordial axiomatical grounding, the ideal of deductivity in
general, the idea of evidence, and the idea of the idea itself. Yet to
‘contend, as I d o here, that Derrida continuer Husserl (and this is true
of his relation to HeidcKcr as well) precisely o n those issues that
foreground the classical erhico-theoretical decisions constitutive of
philosophy as philosophy is also to say that such a continuation is at
the same time a decisive break with the idea of tradition. continuity.
Ocdipality, and so on. Indeed, since the matifs in question arc of such
a nacure that they themselves are radically mom fundamental rhan
the possibility of continuity, and since, moreover, they cannot bc
developed within rhe philosophical discourse as such, their contin-
uation is possibleonly from a perspective that ie marginal with respccf
to the history of philosophical development. From this standpoint,
the fact that Derrida may have discovered t h m motifs in Husscrl’s
works is, in a cerrain way, rsdically contingent.
Now, let us rccall, in as succinct a manner as possible, what the
project of a pure logical grammar corresponds to. Logicui Invesii-
gationr. in which this idea is set forth, are preliminary investigations
requircd by Hurserl’s anticipated project of a pure lopic or theory of
theory, a logic thoroughly different from what one commonly calls
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING w7

epistemology or theory of science, which would govern the implica-

tions of rhe very possibilrty of a n idea such as knowing. In these
preliminary examinations. Husserl is soon led to the insight that such
a pure logic would have ra include, as at l e a s ont of i t s parts if not
i t s foundation, a purely logical grammar, a logic that would be a
purely formal mapping our of the primitiue essential conceprs or the
ideal singulna contained a priori in the very content or meaning of
certain genera, such as knowing. Indeed, i f such a purely logical in-
vestigation of what constitutes the idea of knowing anreriar to its ob-
jective validation and “intentional fulfilmmt” must also, necessarily,
investigatc the laws related to rhese primitive concepts, laws that
organize the ideal singulars canstirutive of the gcnera, then the task
of k i n g these a priori laws would be incumbent on a discipline such
as a purc logical grammar. T h i s grammar must not be mistaken for
a “universal science comprehending all pamcular grammars as con-
tingent spccifications,” Husserl warns us in Logical Invcstigutiotrs.”
Unlike such a science, which would srill be empirical, the pure logical
grammar is mdusively concerned with that field of l a w relative to
the pure semantic forms contained a priori in rhe idea of knowing.
Such laws affectthcsc forms insafar as rhey regulate their compound-
ings and rnodiiiarions and watch over their meaningfulness, even
bcfare rhse forms and their possible combinations cnrcr the mth
relations drat are the object proper of logic in a cogent sense. The
sense or non-sen= of these forms is b a d on rhese laws, indepmdent
of the obiectivity and validity of these forms, which themselves depend
on their prior scmanric fullness. The purely logical grammar is thus
a form-theory of meaning or intentionality prior to all possible ob-
jective validation of meaning or intenrional fulfilmenr. The ta5k of
this mmempirical logic i s to pmvide rradirional logic with “the ab-
stractly possible farms of meaning, whose objective value it thcn
becomes i t s first task to determine” {p. 522). I t i s important here to
mention that on more than one occasion, Huswrl conceived of these
forms of meaning, of t h e l a w of essence that regutare the primirive
elements and structures of meaning, as trivia, PS obvious mrnmon-
places. Yet these trivia, which are “intrinsically prior in the sense of
Arisrorle,” behind whose obviousness “the hardest problems l i e hid-
den,” and which have never been thtmatized by the logicians, become
the m e obica o[ the project of a pure logic, i f not, for Husserl, of
philosophy in general, .specially since philosophy could be called
“paradoxically, but not unprofouttdly, .. . the science of the mvial”
,(p, 528). Now, what arc rhcse trivia, these forms of meaning, which,
14 f3 ON DECONSTRUCTION

although they make n o knowlcdgc possihIe, are still hill of meaning

because they obey certain rules? What arc thae trivia that are the a
priori ,conditions of the intelligibility of discourn?
The primitivc forms of meaning that constitute the whole semantic
tealm are the format taws that govern “thc Formation of unitary
meanings out of syntactical materials falling under definite categorim
having an a prion’ place i n thc realm of meanings, a formation ac-
cardingrosyntoctical laws whichare likewise fixed apfiori,and which
can bc rcadily secn to constitute a fixed system of forms” (p. 513).
Thus, rhe pure logical grammar or form-theory of meaning faces rht
task OF fixing in a system the categorical and synta~ficalprimitivc
laws built a priori into thegeneral idea of meaning. As Husserl poina
out, this sysrem of caregarical and syntactical laws f d o w i n g from
the generic essence of meaning as such, which i s constirutive of the
articulation of i t s dements. is an ideal framework and. as the csscncc
of all speech as such, holds a position of primacy over all actual
languaga and their empirical grammar. For rhat reason, it is to be
celled a “pure logical grammar’’ (p. 526).
At this point it should not be difficult to see, by analogy with the
trivia in Husserl (and with what Heidcgger ha5 thcmatizcd under rhe
name of the most obvious or most simple), rhar rhe infrastructures
to some cvrenr continue Husserl’s (and Heidegger’s) research into the
a prioris of meaning (including that of Being). In dismssing Husserl’s
projm of a purely logical grammar in Speech otrd Phenomena. how-
ever, Derrida also points out that irs formalizing power does nor cover
the whole field of possibility for language in general, to the cxrcnr
that it “concerns only the logical u priori of language,” and rhat “it
is pure [ogiculgrommdr”(SP,p. 8). In spiteofits interest i n thc system
of rules rhar make a discourse, properly speaking, a discouae, and
not non-sense. beforc any objectivc fulhlment of the meaning-inrcn-
tinn, pure logical grammar remains “governed more or less imme-
diately by the possibility of a relarionship with objects” ‘(SP, p. 71).
Indeed, “the purification of rhe formal i s [icselfl guided by a mncept
of 5enw which is itself derennined on the basis of a relation with m
object” (SP,p. 98). Derrida, apart from insisting that there are modes
of sense that do not point to any possible obieas, also sets out to
demonstrate that the rigorous distincrion i n Hussert bchvccn mtaning-
intention and its possible fulfitlment by an intuition of an obiem is
itself possible only becausc all meaning-intention is structurally res-
ramentary. I n other words, ir functions only because it is always
already supplcmenting a lack of actuality. T h e discovery of thc in-
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEtNC 4 9

htructures extends Husscrl’s project of a purely logical pmmar.

The expansion ~f its formalizing power impiics a reinsniption of the
logical as merely one of a pluraliiy of linguistic functions. Whereas
in Huwrl the primitive Iaws of essence of all meaning prior to its
validation are all laws concerning the unity of meaning, thus giving
priority to rhe categoricalover the syncategorical and the syntacrical,
rhc infrastnrctum question the very differences k c e n the a priori
and the world they open, as well as thc difference between the Eat-
egorial and lyncaregorical, between rhc semantic and the syntactic.
In this sense the infrasmcrures and their system are anrerior, in an
unheard-of way, to a phenomenology of meaning, that is, in short,
TO phenomenology. Rtflecdng on those u n t b e m a t i d differences, the
system of the infrastructurcs p d s “by right” the discourse of
phenomenology.
Having cstabiishtd that much, l a us now r i r d e back to thtgmeml
sy~rem.It now becomes possible to determine it as a system of un-
decidablcs, of syntactically re-marked syncategoreman articulating
prelogical and Iateral possibiliris of logic. To put it differently, rhe
sysmn can be vicwed as 8 synrax of an infinity of “last“ syntactically
overdetermined syntactical objccrivitics. To characicrizz the general
system in thew terms not only serves to conclude all that has brm
laid out up to this point but also, and above all. indicates a decisive
poinr at which this system leaves the philosophical realm of phe-
n o m m o l w . This point is that of a radicalized, no longer phenornc-
nologirablc notion of syntax. Dcrrida’s concept of a remarked syntax
undercuts, in fact d e a n s m a s , Husserl’s distincdon, made toward
the beginning of Idem, in paragraph 11, of formal ontoIogical syn-
tactical categories and formal ontologicalsubsmtive categorim. This
distinction bccumrs important to the whole project of Idear. since it
allows Husserl m make the syntactical forms and their carcgories
depend on what he t e r n thc “ultimate content-laden srrbstrutn as
the nucleus of all syntactical consirucli~ns.)’~~ As a result, “syntactical
ohjcctivitics appear in the formal region of objectiviti- in gmcral. as
detivntiues of these ultimate substran, that is, of objecrs which m c
m h g m conrtrudions o f a symtaaico-catgorid k i d , [and] which
contain in thcrnselvcs no f u n h r vestige of tbosc ontological f o r m s
which ate mere correlates of the functions of thought” (p. 70). As
uhimdte !ems, which no longer contain in themselvs any residue of
syntactical formation, they ere “pure and syntactically formless in-
dividual units,” and/or “ultirnatc substantive [Suchhakip]cssenm”
(p. 74). In one of the most classical gesturrs, Husserl, afrer having
250 O W DECONVITRUCTION

opened the radical formal province of pure obiecrivities, makes syn-

tactical categories secondary to those tcrms, which as eide or rode ti
(as essence5 or individualities) link substance (orcsiu), in the fullest
and most primary sense, to presence. The remarked and undecidable
infrastructures arc thc ourcome of a deconstruction of these hierar-
chical distinctions in the purcly formal region of the logical, distinc-
tions ’by which form is subjecred to conrent, syntax ra sernanrics,
purely formal forms to nonformal forms, thar Is, to singularities or
,identical subiect marten Csachverhrrlre). T h e system of these infra-
s t m a u r n as one of syntactically rc-markcd syncategoremata is a sys-
tem that escapes all phenomenologizarion as such: it constantly
disappears and withdraws from all possible presentation. In privileg-
ing the syntactical in the sense in which I have been developing it-
t h a t is, in rhc sense of re-marked, doubled sytactic structures no longer
suspended from semantic subject matters of whatever son-the gm-
erul system spells our thc prelogical conditions of logic, thus rein-
scribing logic, rogechcr with irs implications of prescnce and evident
mcaning, intn a scries of linguistic funcrions of which the logical is
only one among others. Dcrrida remarks in “Limited Inc.”:

The rnaner we arc di~curringhere concern the valuc, pooribili~y,and system

of what is called logic in general. The law and the effects with which m
haw been Ilealing. . .govern the psibiliry of every logical proposition. . .
No constituted logic nor any rule of a logical order can, therefore, provide
a decision ~r impose it5 norms upan these prclogicol possibilitics of logic.
Such possibiliries arc nor ”logically” primary or m n d a r y with q a r d to
other possibilitics, nor logically primary or secondary with regard to logic
itself. They arc bpologically?) alien ro ir, but not as irs principle, condition
of possibility, or “radical” foundation. ( L i , p. 235)

As the systcrn of thew impurc and nonideal grounds. grounds so

different from what they ground as to be thoroughly alien m ir, the
system of rhe infrastructures is also the exposition of what I have
rtrmcd haerolopv. T h e general s y s t m , then, i s the system of what is
Other m the Ioggos-Orhcr, however, not in the sense of absolute,
that is, abstracr opposition, or in the sense of the Other of the same,
but rather in rerms of what i s alien to irs own self-thematizarion. I t
is thc system 01 what, in spite of its thorough altcrity to the self-
understanding of thought, is presupposed by such thought, precisely
insofar as its handed-dom goal is rn secure its own foundation in
itself and by itself.
By taking thc classical cxigencirs of philosophy to their logical end,
 A SYSTEM BEYOND BEING 25 =
without, however, giving in 10 its nhico-rheomical, ethico-onto-
Iq+al, ahi~teld0g;Cal.or ahico-plitical decisions, Dcnida brings
philosophy to a certain close. This, however, is an armmplishmmt
in an unheard-of scnw. Opening the discourse of philosophy to an
Other &at is no longer simply its Other, an Other in which philosophy
becomm inscribed, and which limits its ultimate pretension 10 sell-
foundation (a pretension independent of philosophial orientation),
is an accomplishment that marks not theend bur the structural limits
of philosophy’s autonomy and autarchy. Philosophy mmcs to a dose,
paradoxically, bccaux in hctcrological presuppositions constitute it
as, necessarily, always incomplete.
 PART THREE '

Literature or
Philosophy?
 10

Literature in Parentheses

w
In a recxnt text, or more prcsiwly in the text of his thcsis defense in
1980, Derrida reminded his commitme that his most constant interest,
men more con.mnr than his philosophical inrcrcsr-if this were pos-
sibl&was in litcrarure. that writing that is called literary. In fact his
first thesis, in 1957, was to have been entitled “The Ideality of the
literary Object.” As originally pianned, this thesis was to have put
the Husstrlian rcchniqucs of transcendental phenomcndogy in the
service of “a neur theory of Iiterarurc, of that very peculiar type of
ideal objm that is thc literary object.”’ My contention is that Der-
rida’s marked interest in literamre, an interest that began with hi$
questioning the p a r t i d a r idcaliiy of literature, has in his thinking
never Ied to anything remotely resembling literary criticism or to a
valorization of what literary critics agree m call littraturc. Paradox-
ically, Detrida’s inirial inquiry into the idcality of rhc literary objcct
had the effect of situating his work a t the margins not only of phi-
losophy bur of literature as wll.
Such an observation d o n not man, however, thst Dcrrfda’r phi-
losophy is wirhout any relevance to Iiteary criticism. Rather it implies
that the impoKanCC of Demda’s thinking far the disciplinc of literary
criticism is not immediately evident, and that any statement of its
relcvana to that disciplinc rcquircs amain mediating s t c p ~bcforc-
hand, So-called daconmuctive criticism, which, however important,
is but an offspring of New Criticism, has not, m my knowledge,
undcstakm t h a e preparatory steps and has done little marc than
apply what it takes to be a method for reading literary texts to the
unpmblcrnatizcd horizon of its discipline. As a result, thc genuine
impact that Derrida’s philosophy could have on literary criticism has
256 LITERATURE OR PHlLOSOPHY?

not becn, or a t best has hardly been, noticed. T h e following remarks

arc not intended to offer a “true” vcrsinn of dcconstrunive criricism
but only to clarify some of the preliminaries which any deconstruaive
criricism would have to observe.
If it were possible to draw one major proposition from Dcrrida’s
stawnents on Iitcramure, it would ceminly not be that evcrything i s
literature, but on thc contrary that “thcre 15 nv-or hardly any, ever
so M e - h r a r u r e ” [D,p. 223). How arc we to understand this
seemingly provocative claim?What this statement first of all suggcsn
is that Aristorle’sproduction of theconcept of lireraturc in the Podia
(in the aftermath of Plato’s determination of p m r y as mimesis) in-
augurates the history of literature as a history in which rhe certification
of literarure’s birth, the declaration of its name. coincides with its
disappearance. Literature, says Derrida, was born of that history,
which lasted until thc ninaecnth anrury. and dicd of rhat history (El.
pp. 338-339, 183).
The inrerprcrationafmjmesisassuhjKtrormth,asamimetologism
that proclaims the priority and precedence of the imitated over imi-
tation, suhjcctn litcrature to a sratiis of mctaphoric scmndariness.
Accordingly, lirerature possesses no specificity of in own and is re-
ducible lo its signified, its message, the truth it expresscs. Yielding
from rhe outset to the constraints of its phttosophical concepruali-
zahon, litcramre, like philosophy, includes “rhe project of effacing
itself in the face of rhc signified content which ic transpom and in
general tcachcs.”ThcspCcificity of philosophy and lirerature alike rests
on this systematic curtailment of the signifier. Consequently, rcading
i s in csscnce always a transcendentar wading in search of the signified.
Dcrrida writes of “rhe entire history of texts, and within it the hbrory
of litcrzry forms in the West,” thar it “has almost always and almost
cvcrywhere, according to some fashions and across very diverse ages,
Icnt itself to this mnscendenul reading, in rhat search for the sig-
nified” ( O G , p. 760).
What is more, rhis philosophical inauguration has not only gov-
srncd the reading of literature but has dcrcrmined the rnodc af its
writing as well. With the exception of certain rare exarnpls, literary
writing has subjugared itself to rhc constraints of the concept and co
the crhos of philosophy. Literature, then, speaks rhe voice of philos-
ophy. I t is a merc proxy, stillborn. There has hardly ever been any
literature, if literatiire is supposed ID mean something other than
philosophy. The contemporary trend-a rrend that begins wirh carly
Romanticism-of minimizing the diffcrcnce benvcen literature and
 LITERATURE IN PARENTHESES 157

philosophy is at i n s t to some extent an involuntary recognition of

this state of affairs. I t rcmains within the tradition of literary sccon-
dacincss.
W h e n Denida asserts that today, or more spnifically from Mal-
Iarm6 on;a &main derermincd furrn of “literary” pramice announces
thc subvemion of logocentrism (P,p. la), that certain t e r n seem “to
mark and tu organize a Structure of resistance to the philosophical
conceptuality h a t allegedly dominated or comprehended them, wherher
directly, or whether through categories’derived from this philosoph-
ical fund” (P. p. 69), certainly this is not simply in ordcr to assert
that literature has finally found irs specificity or come into its own.
Indeed, if that specificity is understood to be constituted by “litcr-
ariness,” a second reading of Dcrrida’s statement concerningthe scarc-
ity of literature becoma possible.
It is well known that the question of literariness was first formulated
by the Russian Formalists in order to dcrminc’whar, in literature,
remains irreducible to the message, to metaphor, m the voice, and so
on. Yet as Derrida has argued, this intcrcst in “pwrc litcraturc,” in
the “litenmy element,” “in what in literature passes through an ir-
reducibly graphic text” docs nor k ’ l i t e r a t u m from its philosophical
or Iogomtric subjugation, for it t i s “the p b ofform ma determined
substance of expression” (OG, p, S9), Undoubtedly the emergence
of the question of lirerariry has permined the avoidance of a certain
number of thematic reductions, of misconstructions owing to a i r m -
scmdenfual reading; yet such a h s on the irreducible literariness of
the graphic (as opposed to the phonic) substance leads to a symmetric
limitation and restriction of the play of form. This respect for the
literariness af P work of arr consists, indeed, in rhe mere isolation,
“in order ro shcltcr it, (09 a formal specificity of the literary which
would have its own proper essence and truth which no longer have
to be articulated with other ihcomical or practical fields” IF,p. 70).
Literariness or lirerariry,’therefon, dmores the essence. rhc mrh.
the literary-being and the being-literary of literature. By making all
literature exemplify this one essence of literature, however, literature
is, once again, condemned m nonexistence. If we thus determine the
essence of literature (as that which confers being upon it), litcraturc
once more loses i t s specificity, at the very moment when it seemed
most firmly established. Hence Demda’s wariness of the concept of
literarity, and likewise of its opposition to the stubborn aurhoriry of
mimctologism. Mimetologism and literariry are the birth and death
of literature through philosophy. What has been r e p m e n t d and de-
258 LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

ermined under the name of literature throughout the history of Iir-

erature, from Plaro 10 MallarrnC, has almost always yielded LO either
mimetologism or literariness, says Dertida. Ultimately, neither the
one not the other has put the authority of philosophy into question.
Thcrcfore, thc a n m p t to play out rhc fact that phiIosophy is always
written, that it in marked by literariness, and that phiIosophy’s desire
to control and eliminate the ,opacity of its signifier must necrssarily
fail is at bcst an empiricist argument against thc domination of lit-
erature by philmophy. In exchanging one essence fur anothtr, this
Platonic inversion of sans only confirmsthe supcrioriry of philosophy.
Given the insufficiency of these two intcrpretations of the propo-
sition that “rhere is n o - o r hardly any, ever so little-Iirerature,” we
must examine a third possibility. If, as Derrida asserts, with Mallarm6
literary writing became a thrust or a point of msisrance against the
dominant concept of literature; if, as he gocs so far as to state, it was
normal that the breakthrough in philosophy “was more secure and
more penmaring on the side of literature and poetic writing” (OC,
p. 921, the question arises as to what, in the end, endows literature
with such power. As we have seen, undcr no drcumstances can this
power flow from its mimrrological or literary (formal) quality. Lit-
erature. or what was called literature up to the nineteenth cenmry,
does not undermine philosophy through its content or through an
empirical cxces of writing on the page. Rarhcr, if the first brcak in
the most entrenched Western tradition of both literature and philos-
ophy stems from litcrary or poetic writing’s destruction of ”the tran-
scendental authority and dominant category ot the episime: being”
(OG, p. 92), rhen this vacillarion could have been achicved only
through its “generalized putting-in-quotation marks of literature, of
the so-called literary text” (D,p. 291). In other words, it is by sus-
pending its being as literature that literature becomes capable of chal-
lenging philosophy’s dominant categorization. Literature pwts irsclf
between quotation marks by opening itself to the absolute loss of its
meaning, whether of content or of form. Lircrarure becams a radical
interrogation of philosophy. and of most past litetarure as well, nor
only by refusing its foundarion in il. preceding and pdor being of
meaning but also by disclaiming any formal csxnce a5 mncerns its
substance of expression. Therefore, Dcrrida must regard the use of
the tcrm Iiteruhrre for that sort of literary writing with suspicion,
since ir “subjects the concept to belles-lettres, to the a m , to poetry,
to rhcroric, and m philosophy” (P,p. 69). He musr write “literature”
ot “literary” between quotation marks precisely because the new
 LITERATURE IN PARENTHESES 259

practiu of this SORof writing "supposes a break with whar has tied
the history of the litet.;lry a m ro the hisroty of metaphysics” (P,p.
11). “Litmturc” rhus acquircs a subvcrsivc funEtion with regard to
philosophy and thc literature under in dominion. not by nsroring its
specificity at any m$t but, pndwly, by recognizing that it can effect
such a subversion only by hardly being literature. ‘‘titera~m’~ (is)
almost no tircrarure. It appears, then, that thc disruptive and subvcr-
sive effects of “litapture” are directed not against logoceotric phi-
l~sophyalone but against literature as we15 to the extent that rhe
latter submits to philosophy’s demands. Hence, what subverts phi-
losophy is not in fact k a t u ? C , f o r it also solidti the very foundations
of literature, depriving it of its external foundation in philosophy, or
in other words of its be in^. l n d d “literature” has a greater power
of fomaliution than literamre and philosophy alike. Is a recent
interview ~Demdasmted, “My ‘first’ desire certainly did not Iead me
toward philosophy but r a t h a t w a r d literature, no,toward something
which literarum accommodatcs more Easily than philosophy.’*z
In the light of this third interpretation of Derrida’s statement on
the scarcity of literature, let US bridty reflect on the nature of the
argotnatation that I have laid out. After arguing that there is hardly
any literamre because all literamre is either mimcrological or for-
malist, Derrida makes thesmpcnsion of k i n g a major characteristic
of “literam.” tn a movement that rcscmbla, to the point of con-
fusion, a phewmmologicat mnsrrndcntal reduction in which liter:
atutc is subjcmed to a sort of epochs, bracketing its mimcrological
and formaEia determinations, Derrida,rather than producing the to-
be-eltpected cssena of literanrrc, yields a radically nonphcnomcnol-
ogizablc structure. Indeed, DerriNs parenthesizing of literature re-
veals whar I would call the epochal rhanmr of “limarurc” itself.
“Liferamre,” instead of having a true &cc of its own, a standing
in being, appears to bc characterizable only by its structure of brack-
eting, which puts the mnscendenta1 authority and dominant category
of being into quesrion. Thereby, however, ”Iiteran~re’s”epochal na-
ture is nor only no longer in the service of being but also radially
displaces phenomenological reduction. In short, Dcrrida‘s interest in
the “idcaliry” of the lircary abim pmnirs the pradumon of a struc-
ture of bracketing that escapes phenomcnoIogitation, that cannot be
beheld in person, and which is thus what allows for the phcnome-
nological W c s m c h u while at the same time drawing its irreducible
limits. The noMsKncc of what Derrida has called “limamrc” is an
“ideal” structure of p a m t h t s i d s g which has no foundation in being;
260 LlTElUTWRE O R PHILOSOPHY?

it is basically a f u n d o n of the debate concerning the status of phc-

nomenological idealities and the method by which t h q become ap-
prehensible. “Litcraturc,”’ then, is scarcely of the ordcr af being. It
has as little being as.ray. a between, a corner. an angle. “Lirerature’s”
subversion of both philosophy and literature, of both rmth and the
simulacrum, as Derrida remarks at the beginning of ‘‘The Double
Scssion,” proceeds from its status a5 a between, forming a certain
corner. a certain angle, with respectto both litentureand phiIosophy.
This angle. which resists thc history of philosophy and literature, is
further determined by Derrida as the “general text.’’ From what has
already bccn established, text in this wn5e is nor rcstricted to writing
on the p a p , nor doe5 it irnpIy that borh literature and philosophy
are de facto always written.
Before elaborating in some detail on Derrida’s concept of the gen-
eral texi a5 a struaure of nonreflmivc re-marking and retrait, I should
like to nore that “literature,” or the gcneral rext. as that which forms
an aoglc with both philosophy and literature, i5 what limits both
discourses, whose authority is marked by this margin and thus de-
pendent on it. From this it also become obvious what the subversivc
function nf the general texts consists of. The general text does nor
annihilate literature and philosophy; rather, by puttingthcir authority
“back into thc position of a mark in a chain that this authority
intrinsically end illusori[y believm it wishes to, and does in fact, gov-
ern" (P,pp. 59-60), it assigns thcm their respective places. In other
words. by reinscribingthe discourses of philosophy and litemure into
their margin, thc gcneral text unwttln their pretensions to authority
and autonomy, and “grounds’’them in what they do not control. The
deconstruction effected by [he general text i s both 3 destruction and
J “regrounding,” or rcinscriprion. In short, [hen, in terms of the
classical language of philosophy, “literature,” or the general text, is
a grounding agency for philosophy and literature in thcir differcncc,
Yet since “literamrc” is a nnnphcnamcnnlogizable srmcrurc, it also
ungmunds what it makes possible.
Consequently, if Dcrrida puts the transcendmtal authhorily of thc
categories of p h h o p h y , in particular that of being, into question,
o r if he questions whethcr the liremry operation yields ro rhe philo-
sophical dcmand ofevaporating thcsignitier on behalf of thesignificd,
it is nor in ordcr to annul them but rather to understand them within
a system to which they arc blind. Without thc general text as rhar
which inscribes literature and philosophy within t h a t angle that marks
them from a cerrain outside, no philosophy. no logoccntrism, no
 LITERATURE tN PARENTHESES 26I

authority of being would he possible. Without the general text, there

wouldbe noliteratumorwhat hasbecncalledliteraturein thehistory
of literature. Also, it is owing m the “constituting” marginality of the
general text wirh rcspm to Iiteraturc and philosophy that, despite
their own ideology, ncither philosophy nor literature is ever simply
and entirely governed by a message, a form, or their dialectical in-
terplay. Thus, although it is only in the modem practice of writing
that the dominant rtprcsenntion of lirerature is pracrically decnn-
structed, it is “well understood that long before these ’modem’ texn
a certain ‘literary’ practice was able to operate against this model,
against this representation. But it is on the basis of these last texts,
on the basis of the general configuration to be remarked in them, that
one can best reread, withour retrospective telmlogy, the law of the
previous figures” (F,p. 69). Only on the basis of marginality, which
modernity rcprescnts with regard to the entire tradirion, ha5 mod.
ernity, as that which already breachsthat tradition from within, been
able to become manifest in the first place. Yet it must not be forgotten
thar although the philosophical and literary text may always fail to
evacuate or minimize the encompassing power of language at the
benefit of the signified, such is indeed the project af philosophy and
literature; consequently, they must be studied from this point of v i m .
Literature and philosophy are constituted by the attempt to efface
thernsctvcs before their content or aesthetic message.
Therefore, it should be apparent that literary criticism, in all its
traditional forms. is not simply to be dismissed. Literature, or what
has been called by that name, is a province within the general text;
and since wirhin rhcse (however unscrrling) boundaries it is charac-
terized by the project of achieving transparency for its message, Iit-
crary criticism as the dihplinc that presupposes the decidability of
meaning prior to the literary text is a legitimate offspring of rhc very
project constitutive of literature. Thus, the principles organizing dif-
ferent critical reading arc not simply to be refuted or criticized. “They
are legimitate. fruitful, m c , ” says Dcrrida, especially if “rhcy are
informed by a critical vigilance” (WD, p. 174). These readings are
prrlecrly valid, ar lcast insofar as literature prior to the nineteenth
century is conrerncd. Yet it is obvious thar the delimitarions nf that
criticism rcquircd by Iitcrary writing since Mallarm6 are not without
certain retroactive effects on traditional criticism. For the time being,
let us consider only the cast of traditional literary criticism. To begin
with, let us recall t h a t the sclf-effacing and deferential doubling of
literature in the form of critical commentary is rooted in the history
262 LITERATURE O R PHll.D5ORHY?

of philosophy, determined a$ the history of “the reflection of poetic

inaugurarion” (WD, p. 281. Knowingly or nor, valunrarily or nor,
literary criticism has been determined as the philosophy of literature.
This essential link to philosophy also explains “the security with
which the commentarpconsiders the scIf-identity of rhe text. the con-
fidence with which it carves out its contour, [and which] goes hand
in hand with the tranquil assurance that leaps over the text toward
irs presumed content, in rhe direction of rhe pure significd” ‘(QG, p.
159). Yet tbat which a u t h m i m the commentary-the metaphysics
of the commcntaq-does minimal violence to the works of literature
because this metaphysics already governs the works commented upon.
The critical cammenary seems to be commensurate with traditional
literary works. Literary criticism, then. is a philosophy of a literature
which has from the outset yielded to the categories of philosophy, or
in other words to literamre as snch. The critical enterprise is, as its
name reveals, a philosophical enrerprise. 11 is linked to the possibility
of the brinein-that is, to the possibility of decision-of a mastery
of the meaning or signified of the literary text. Since the crirically
assurcd and secured identity and prior cxistencc of rhc meaning or
the signified of literature is what literature exemplifies, literary criti-
cism as such is part of what Dcrrida has called the antologicdl inter-
pretation of mimesis, or metaphysical mimetologism,
One of the more specific narncs For such a critical approach to
literature is thematic criticism. Although in Derrida’s work it Seems
robe linked closely with rhe names of Jean-Pierre Richard and Gaston
Bachelard, it is indeed a variety of phenomenological criticism rep-
resenrative of all criticism oriented toward content, meaning. or thc
signified. This becorncs obvious when, in “The Double Session,” Der-
rida circumscribes thematic criticism. It is, he writes. “at work wher-
ever one tries to dctermine a meaning through a text, to pronounce
a decision upon it, 10 decide that rhis or that is a meaning and that
it is meaningful, ro say that rhis meaning is p o d , posable, or trans-
posable as such: a theme” (0, p. 245). Generally speaking, a theme
i s a correlate of attcntivencss. the result of an anentional act in which
the mind i s applied to an object or ‘10 that which regulates such an
act. More broadly defined, it is meaning .or rhe signified. A theme is
a more fundamenral notion than meaning o r the signified, however,
because it d e n o t s the minimal unit of meaning or signification. I t is
“a nuclear unit of meaning posed there before the eye, present outside
of its signifier and referring only tn, itself, in thc last analpis, even
though its identify as a signified is carved out of the horizon of an
 LITERATURE IN PARENTHESES 263

infinitt puspectivc’’ [D,p. 250).Manifest or invisible, empty or full,

the theme is an originary-that is, a constituted-unity or substance.
As such a consdtud unity, the theme e x d s c s a rotdting function
with regard to all the signiiiers of a literary wo&. The theme sKum
a work’s .unitary meaning, i t s inner continuity. It is in the logic of
thematism to be monistic, monological: therefom, the totalization to
be achieved by a theme can succecd only if rhere is no other competing
theme.
And yet a structural semantics that proelaims po€yscmy or P plu-
rivivocaliry in meaning-a polythcmatism in shorr-dws not in p M -
ciple diffcr h
m h e monathcmaticpDsitian. By opposingthe pIurality
a
of mmning to the linearity ofrhe monothematic which always anchors
itself to the “tuteIary meaning, [to] the principal signified of a t m q
that is, its major rcfcrenr,” amaural scmanrics undoubredly rcpre-
y n t s an advance over what prcccdcd it; ncvcrthclcss polythcmatisrn
mains “organized within the implicit horizon of a unitary mump-
tion of meaning” (P, p. 45). In Dissmrination, Dcrrida writes: “Po-
lysemy always ~ U Uout in multipliades and variarions wirhin the
h o r i z ~ n a. t least, of some integral reading which contains no absolute
rift, no sc11stlcss deviation--the horizon of the final parousia of a
meaning a t last deciphered, revealed, ma& p-t in the rich collec-
rion of its determinations” (D, p. 350). However belated such a final
moralization might be, however far off its realization remains, it
S M I ~ by right the multiplicities’ reassemblage into a unitary totality
of the meaning of a c a t and thus secures the totality of the text as
well.
All coetcnt-oricntad literary critiasm accupics h e in-between Peld
staked out by these two critical approaches, mono- and polyhema-
rism. Whether philosophical. sociological, or psychbanalydcal, con-
tcntaicnttd criticism pnsuppogs that a mare or less complex simple
mesning (theme) can be construed as the unifying agency of 8 literary
work. Whatever its specific nature, the theme is a unity of meaning
that SCNCS to constitute the literary work as a totality. To the extent
that this tetmlogy of factual and instantaneous or delayed and ideal
retotaliunon also rep-rs rhe very guidclinc of the opcrarion of
almost all literary writing-the horizon of its vorrloir-dire-thcmatic
criticism of all shades is undoubtedly a very legitimate approach to
such writing.
Before elaborating, however, on the essential limits of thematic
criticism with respec7 ro b t h modern literamre and wrirlngcomposcd
in a thematic perspdve, I should emphasize that Derrida’s criticism
264 LITERATURE OR PHlPOSOPWY?

of thematism, as well the relativeimporrance hc gives to rhe marrnmt

of thematic criticism, must be understood as a hnaion of his debate
with phenomenology in general. His critique must bc placed in thc
context of the phenomenological problematics of thematization and
of thc unthematizcd.
Husserl conceives of rhematization. as he dcfines it in Idem?as the
articulate formulatian of what was somehow already implicit in an
unthernatic, unthought, and unpredicated manner in the primary nat-
ural standpoint, an attitude toward the world that is also characreristic
of the natural sciences. Thematization objectifies the unthcmarizcd of
the natural standpoint in a n articulate judgmcnt. What is the unthc-
matized in question? It is the natural standpoint’s implicit assumption
of the factual exisrencc of what it encounters in the real world around
ir. As Husserl has shown, this thetical positioning-as the being out
there of what natural mnsciousncss cncounters-is grounded in the
originary general thesis (Cenerulrbesis) of the natural standpoint, ac-
cording to which constiousnea has as its correlate a present reality,
an existing world, and only such a world.’ Themarization, then, is a
predicative taking in of the originary universal thesis, which in this
manner can become, together with the narural standpoint which grounds
imlf in it, the object of a phenomenological e p o c h . T h e antinatural
standpoint that is philosophical reflection puts the unthought of the
natural amtudc into phcnomcnolagiwl parenthais in order to unearth
a truly radical unthernartzed upon which the very possibility of the
general rhesis of rhctic natural consciousncss depcnds. This phenom-
enologically unthernatizcd is thc phenomenon of the intentionality
of consciousness, a relation of consciousness to its correlate that is
prctheric in t h a t it docs not posit the existence of the intenrum.
Phenomenology thus appears as a superior thematization. as the ob-
jectifiatian of transccndcntal and ideal structurcz of consciousness.
Whereas, in its Husscrlian form, phenomenology is an attempr ro
“themarize” the unthernatized transcendental structures of conscious-
ness, phenomenology in Heidegger’s early philosophy determincs the
unrhematizable as essentially in withdrawal from the “rhematiza-
rims” to which ir lends itself. wirh this, the unthematizable escapes
all possible objcclificdiia and predication. but bccomes its very con-
dition of possibility.
When Derrida points to an irrcducible phenomenological non-
thematiration of the opcrativc and nonthcmatic concept of Idea in
Husserl’s work, it becomes obvious that he is continuing the
phenomenological problcmarics of rhematization, yet with the dcci-
 LITERATURE IN PARENTHESES r6r

sNe difference that instead of philosophiz!ng in the perspccrivc of a

passiblc and evmtual r e c u p t i o n of thc unthematizcd, Ikrrida shows
the irreducibiliry of phenomenological nonthematization to be the
very condition of possibility of phmammalogy’s thematic approach
(see 0,p. 141). If at first Dcrrida’s debate with such L necessary
unthematiuble ~ c m to s prolong its Heidcggerian interpretation. it
must, however, be remarked that by tying thc irreducibly unthc-
matizablc to the pmblmatics of the difference b e e n h e unthc-
m a r i d and the themadzed, Derrida also removcs it from the sphere
of jurisdiction of detbeio in that the latter unfolds only as and in that
d i k c e . Derrida’s critique of thematic critiarm, literary or philo-
sophica1, is a challenge to phenomenology insofar a5 it quesrions the
ultimate possibility of an End,sti&ng through thematiution. Its scope
reaches far beyond the problemarics of literary criticism and find5 its
meaning in hi$ debate with phenomendogy.
A Erst insufficiency of rhc literary variety of thematic criticism is
that it d m nor rake the formal and synracriml aspect of Iituanrce
into account. Thmatic criticism, in ptincipb, is not interested in the
code, in the formal crafting, the pure play of significrs, the way a text
is a m b l e d , the technical manipulations of the text object, and 50
on. If it deigns to consider thew aspccts of literature at all, it is only
to subiugatc them to the semantic. In general one could say, with
Derrida, rhat thematic criticism excludes from its field everything char
is not of the order of the word. of the “calm unify of the verbal sign”
(D.p. 255). Hence the importance of fomlt3t or mucmrolirt crir-
icism as oppaed to mntent-orimted thematic criticism. But as Der-
rida has argued on s e v d oaasiorm, formalist or struauralisr aiticism
is as insufticient as thematic criticism, and can no more than the lamr
measure iw1f against literature, because in focusing exclusively on
the formal aspca of a text, it overlooks “the genetic effects o r the
(%istorical,’ if you will) inscription of the text read curd of the new
rcxt this airicism itself wriics” (P,p. 47). Moreover, formal and
strumtalist criticism is oblivious to the text in its uniqueness insofar
35 the diaplvcry of the formal or srmmral arrangement of the text
is dependent on an tidctic d u d o n that lays that arrangement bare
as the text’s essential mrh. The "structure whost essential perma-
nence bemmes the prime preoccupation” oi the structuralist com-
mentary mtralizco the specificity of the text and raises it to the status
of a merc example of the transcendental structure or universal esencc
of thought (WD, p. 170).
It thus appears that both fonns of criticism are rigorously m -
166 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

plcmentary and complicitous. Once again, ir must be emphasized that

these two brands of criticism-which togcthcr with dialectical aiti-
cisrn exhausr in principle all rhe possibilities of lirerary criricism-arc
not simply to be reiected, to rhe extent that, wirhin thc history of
literature, litcrature has indeed conformed to philosophy. Yet one
cannot avoid remgnizingthar if certain literary texu, a certain lirerary
wriring, as Derrida points out, put philosophy into question, rhen this
subversion will also cause the various forms of literary criticism to
vacillare. It philosuphy is subvencd by cenain lirerary rexls, rhen all
forms of literary criticism established in thc shadow of the multiple
philosophies are similarly threatened. ,One could go 50 far as to say
that rhc very rcasons why Dcrtida i s intcrcstd in literature are reasons
that subvert the very possibility of the institution of lircrary criticism
3s such. This subversion takes place through the tracing Qf the limits
of lircrary criticism. 11 is thus a subversion rhar is nor absolurc, rhar
is by no means an annihilation of literary criticism. but that is a
decapitation, so to speak, of its prercnsions, and thus an assignment
of its lorus. Thetefote it is equally right to say that thc very future
of the insrimtion of Iiterary criricirm hingB on its deconstruction,
Sincc Maliarmi, say, modern lircrary texts offer t h a t writing that
delimits both farms of criticism (and particularly the thematic); it
delimits them to a degree thar not only makcs apparent criticism’s
inability to account for such writing, but suggesn rhar the appropri-
ateness of criticism to what has hitherto been called literature is itself
questionable. Throughout his work, Demda h a s tried to dcrnonsrrare
thar this 501-1 of text will always defy and baffle criridsm, not because
criticism wil! not yet haw sufficiently sharpcncd its analytical mols,
but for more esmtial rcawns that preclude the decidability all crir-
icism presupposes. indetd, such rcxrs rigorously swcep away the pos-
sibility of decision, of mastering their meaning as unity, that is. of
mastering their meaning at all. But the fact rhat these texts cannot be
thematically exhausted in terms of content or form does nor a t all
imply, as Detrida points out in Spurs, that one ought to abandon the
warch for their meaning. Such a conclusion would amounr to an
oesrheticizing and obscurantist reaction by the hmnmeuein, that is,
hy understanding. This search fnr meaning should nor be abandoned
but rathcr intensified, and in such a manner as to account for the
ultimate possibility of these texts’ meaninglcssness. The gesture of
thought required to, deal with the structural possibility of mcaning-
lessners, however, is thoroughly alien to the critical gesture, which
prm~pposesthe decidability of its atrentional obiecr, its theme. Bur
 LIIBRATVRB IN PARENTHESES 267
. -. .-

s i n e he m a 1 s t r u m m of h c possibiIity of the meaninglessness of

certain text6 owes its muctural status to the impossibility of its own
thcmatization, the gcshtrc of thought that takes this stmruccural pos-
dbiliiy into account m w t d f i m ia unthematiubility. It must, in other
words, affirm an ultimatc impossibility of knowing this n o n t h m t i c
condition of possibility, an impossibility that is the rcsult neither of
its unfathomable depth nor of thc finitude of its human beholder but
rather of the mmral nature of this condition. Indeed, such a struc-
ture must withdraw itulf from being mastered in totality, from being
decidable, from being itself a theme if it is to account for the possibiliry
of the meaninglcssncss of a text. If it m l d be hilly determined, in
fact, it would bt the text’s ultimate meaning and would no longer
account fur its essential undecidability. If, in ?be last resort, the un-
thcmariuble because undecidable agcncis of modern literary texts-
agencies that am not at the order of imagc or concepq mntcnt or
form, but that arc textual structum-radically subvert the possibility
of literary hermeneutics, it is becausz they represent the limits from
which understanding and knowing become posi;blc. Thcrefore, un-
demanding its gesture of unifying deciphering must be pushed
to cxaspcration in order to account as rigorously as possible for i t s
sauctural limits. Consequently, far from &ng a SOR of empiricist
agnosricism or skepticism. &canstrumion is. so to speak, a hyper-
cognition of a m t h beyond truth, “a supplement of rmthIcss truth,”
to thc extent that it aIso i n s c r i h the structural limits of cugnition-
thus, however, radically altering the concept of cognition as such.‘
At this point the question of the relation bctwrm deconstruction
and literary criticism may lend iwlf to a more decisive cliuification.
Undoubtedly Derrids’s opinion i s that literary criticism &Is to ac-
count tor the specificity of the literary work of a- c~peciallyinsofar
as it proceeds rhematically. This spccificity is lost at the mornem we
bring to it, as K-Feidcgger says, “only this or that dull sense of un-
ambiguous meaning.”s What is wrong with literary cridasm, to refcr
to Heideggcr oncc again, is that it aperimas too liKk in h e neigh-
borhood of the work and that it exp- its already diminished
expcricncc tcm crudely and too titeraily.~Yet this critique of criticism
is not motcd in a moral or aesthetic indignation over criticism’s in-
ability to catch the subjtctive existence, the originality and force of
the work, or the singularity of the beautiful. I t i s just as little an
invitation to take hold of &at uniqueness by further and further
decomposition. T b i s critique of criticism acknowIodgm, h t of f,
that the flaws of Iirerary criricisrn owing to the uniqumcss of works
26 8 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

of literature are inrrinaically linked to literary criticism’s status as

comrnenrary. As commentary, cenainIy the discount of criticism pre-
supposes rhe works’ uniqueness. But as commentary it can onty turn
that work into on example of a universal rruth. Lirerary criticism can
ovcrcomc thcse fatal dcficicndcs only under the condition that “it
destroy itself as commentary by exhuming the [originrryl unity in
which is embcddcd rhc differcnms” h r w e e n work and commentary,
force and signification, litcramre and philosophy, and so on. (WD,
p. 174). Such a libcration f m m its $tam5 a5 mere cornrncnwry would
coincide with its liberation from philosophy. If literary criticism were
to opcn irsclf toan cxchange with literary writing, ifit wereto become
strcntive to what takes place in tcxrs. parricularly in modern rexrs,
it-in essence a philosophy of literature. and thus dcpcndcnt on the
master discourse of philosophy-would have to do so all by i t d f . In
one of his first essays Derrida writes: “Criticism, if it is called upon
to enter into explication and exchange with literary writing, some day
wit[ not havc to wait for this resistance first to be organized into a
‘philosophy‘ which would govern some methodology of aesrhetin
whose principles criticism would reccive” (WD, 28).
Yet this independence cannot imply a rejection of all analytical
appmachm to the tcxt. Once again, this would rcpresent a mere
aesthetic response, programed by philosophy. Literary ctiticisrn must
manage a place for the reduub[ingcarnmenmry, for its epistemological
project, lest it become entircly aubjenivc, illusory, and lirnitcd. Wirh-
out rhe recognition of and respect b r all the classical exigencies,
critical production runs thc risk of becoming idiosyncratic and of
authorizing irself to advance almost anything. What is neccsary, thcs,
if literary criticism is to address literary writing is a connection of
deconsrrucrion and scholarship, of deconstruction and tradition. The
program thar Drrrida developed for a “science” of grammatology is
also valid far a literary criticism tibcratcd from philosophyl “Now a
reflection mu5t clearly b t undertaken, within which the ‘positive’ dis-
covery and the ‘deconstruction’ of the history of metaphysics, in all
its concepts, are controlled reciprocally. minutely, laboriously” (012,
p. 83). If such a “critical” discourse, liberated from philosophy but
extremelyaw;lreal thc latrer’s exigencies, were roachiwe anexchange
with literary writing, this exchange would not takc placc by pacti-
cizing the critical discourse, as the Romantics intcndcd. but through
rcflecring on the originary unity in which is embedded the differenas
that organize the litcrary and critical discaurscs. Whereas a poeticiza-
tion of the critical discnursc would lead to P mutual overcoming of
 LITERATURE IN PARENTHESES 269

both in a higher, fulItr synthetic unity, and woutd thus yield to the
most d m c n t a r y tclos of philosophical thinking, a reflccrion on the
originary unity in which literature and criticism are embedded main-
tains their differcncc and respective uniqueness, whilc at.the same
time accounting for this difference. The originary unity by which
criticism and litcramre come into an exchange precisely insofar as
they are unique d w s not, therefore, repraent a more primitive or
higher synthetic unity preceding or fallowing the process of differ-
enriation. It must be a unity of the order of that which Derrida has
cafted “infrastructures.” In other words, a “critical” discourse in full
respect of the uniqueness of literature would have to be a discourse
produmve of such infrastmcrurcs, also called “signifying structures.”
The contact between lircnry writing and criticism is established
when the latter exhibits the phenomenologically unthematizable un-
ities, that is, the nonsyndretic unities rhat organize and limit the con-
ceptual differences rhat make up the critical discourse. It is here that
one can glImpsc what dcconstructive literary criticism could be about.
Without confounding itsclf with the deconstruction of philosophy,
the specificity of a deconstructivc literary criticism would procccd
from the signifying structures rhat reinscribe, and thus account for,
&he differences consrimrive of the literary work and the critical dis-
course. Except marginally, Derrida has not systematically undertaken
m establish the particular infrastructures ,of the critical discourse.
More than once he has shown a variety of forms of literary criticism
m L absolutely insensible m the most insistent operations of literary
writing. Yet while questioning the OngiMry nonrynthetic unity of
literature and philosophy, Derrida has, by reading literary writing
iaelf, exhibited precisely those s t m m r e s of rextuality and “literature”
with which literary criticism is to enter into exchange. Still. thc kind
of infrastrumrcs that underlie this exchange have not yet been de-
veloped as such.
The phcnomcnologically unthcrnadzabk unities-that- is, supple-
mentarity, rnise-m-dyme, and re-mark-that Derrida has exhibited
in his rcading of literary texts are numerous, as arc tho= (writing,
ICXI, quasirnecaphoricity, and so on) thar resu1d at first h m a dc-
construction of the philosophical discaurse. A certain brand of literary
criticism has avidly appropriated these notions in a thematic manner,
losing sight of what these notions were initially meant to achieve. In
addition, only o n rate occasions have the critical discourses in which
they have been accommodated opened themselves to these notions
via a deconsmction of themselves as critical discourses. Such a de-
z70 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

canstruction, howwer, is the condition under which they would have

been able to establish contact nor only with literary writing but with
thc dcconstruction of philosophy as well.
Just as any possible extrapolation of Derrida's philosophy for Iit-
eraty criticism can be fruitful only if even his developments concerning
literature and literary criticism arc undcrsrood within the boundaries
of his debate with the phdosophy of phenomenology, all the so-called
infrastructurcs can be put to use in literary criticism only on the
condition chat their mtus is fully recognized, as well as their purpose,
or what, precisely, they arc to achieve in Dcrrida's controversy with
phenomenology. Of the many infrastruaum that catch the literary
critic's eye, of the many issues of interest to the critic and upon which
Derrida has elaborated, such as genre, mimesis, plot, event, fictton,
and rn an, I shall examine only three notions, which have bEtn ap-
propriated by a certain criticism: writing, text, and metaphor,
 13

The Inscription
of Universality

. .
w
WRITING
Rather than dia&sssing i n derail the numerous analyses in which Dcr-
rida has developed the nation of writing, I shall attempt only to define
in p m a l the system of csRntial predicates which he calls miring.
Before I venture a definition, howcwr, it is imperarive to outline the
context in which the problemtics of writing becomes a subjea of
meditation.b r Dcrrida. Since this cantext i5 manifold, I shall n s t r i a
the discussion to certain instanccs in which “writing” becomes prob-
Imstizcd.
In the first itmane the notion of writing becomes a crucial issue
in Kknida’s work early as Edmund Hysscd‘s Origin of Geometry:
An brmdrrcrion. As Dcrrida points out, it i s a t lean striking that
Husserl, in “The O r i ~ ofn Ceornerry,” resorts to the vmy p i b i l i t y
of writing-in flagrant disregard of the conrcrnpt in which writing is
held throughout the history of philosophy-in otdcr to 5 m m the
absolute ideal objectivity, and thus the traditionaliration of meaning.
H d argues that without such srriptural spatic-rcmporality and
the ultimate objecdficstion that i t pcnnlts. alf meaningwould “as yet
remain captive of the de /act0 and actual inrmtionality of a speaking
suhjcct or armrnunity of speaking d i e m ” (0, pp. 87-88). The
uldmce liberation of idcality, ie highat possibility of cotrsticurion,
that which inaugurates its itcrability and ia rdation to a universal
transcendental subjectivity guaranteeing its intelligibility in the ab-
sence of all actually present subjective intentionality, is &us the pos-
sibility of being ~ r i t t ~ nN.ote that it i s not the factuaI spatio-
tempotalization by writing that cmurcs mcaning’s ideality but, marc
271 LITERATURE O R FHILOSOPHY?

primordially, only its possibility. Considering the context, writing “is

no longer only the worldly and rnnernorechnical aid to a truth whose
own being-senscwould dispense with all writingdown.The possibility
or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply
cxtrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objecriviry: it is the
sine qua non condition of Objectivity’s internal completion” (0,pp.
88-89). Hence, the effcct and thc value of rranscendentaliry bemmc
linked in a n essential manner to the possibility of writing.
In rhe second instance; as Derrida has shown in Of Cwmmntology,
the artempt m account for the principle of differcnct, ditfcrentiality
or diacriticity, as conditions of signification, forces Saussure, in spite
of hi5 initial condemnation of writing, to fall back a n scriptural met-
aphors. H m ,itappeaa that meaning is dependent on a determination
through alterity, on an irreducible relation to otherness. SinceSauwre
is concerned with linguisric mcaning, and since the Other par cxcel-
Ience of s p m h is writing, the recourse to scriptural metaphors to
cxposc the principle of differentiality cannot be fortuitous.
In the third instance, in “Plato’s Pharmacy.” Dcrrida demonsrratcs
how Plam, in Phaedrus, a k r having severely rejected Thot’sinvention
of wriring as a mnemotechnical roo1 because of its dctnmcntal effects
on living memory, cannot avoid turning to a “meraphor” borrowed
from the order of the very thing he is trying to exclude-the order
of the simulacrum--at thc prccisc moment when hc trim to ‘define
the specificity of thc living discoursc that he wants to OPPOSC to
writing. By determining rhc living discoursc as an inscription of truth
in rhc soul, the self-presence of speech, o r rhe intelligible, is made to
hinge srrumrally, as far as its possibility is concerned, o n the empry
repetition of writing. or thc copy, previously cxcluded.
And in the fourth instance, on several occasions Derrida has pointed
out rhe “contradiction” that exists between the philosopher’s con-
demnation of writing and the necessiry of effectuating this condem-
nation in writing. Thus, for instance in Marges, “the philosopher
writesagainstwriting,wriresin~rdertomakegood thelossof writing,
and by this very gesture forgets and denim what occurs by his hand.”
If ir is true that this “contradiction” is in no way contingent, then
philosophical ideality, its logocentric ethos, is constituted ”from its
first breath as a system of differential traces, that is as writing before
the letter” (M, p, 291). T h e discursive valorization of the phew-
logmcentrism in short-appcars to be irrcducibly linked ro the cxrc-
riority, altcrity, discontinuity, and delaying effecr of writing.
However succinct. these four contextual examples shodd $uFf;cc
 THE INSCRIPTION O F UNIVERSALITY 171
. .

to indicate that the problem addressed under t h t titk of “‘wridng”

concerns rhe paradorid economy of the philosophical condemnation
and [metaphorical) rehabilitation of writing. I t is, therefore, of grcar
importance thar we realizc that rhe analysis of the constitutive func-
tion of writing far idcatiry, transmdentaliry, signification, speech,
philosophical discourse, and so on docs not imply a rehabilitation of
writing as it has been determined by philosophy. Nor da these analyses
entail any mvahation of literary writing with respect to philosophical
dimurst. Derrida, from Of Grummarology on, has repeatedly sug-
gested that the question cannot simply be one of reversing the tra-
dirional hierarchy in order to make writing innocent {OG, p. 37).
Nar can it be a question “of returning to writing its rights, its su-
periority br is dignity” (D, p. 182). ”Nothing would be more ridic-
ulously mystifying than such an ethical or axiological rcvmal, returning
a prerogative or some elder’s rigbt M writing” (P,p. 13). Indeed, such
a rmorarion of writing to a prclapsarian state, beyond thc debased
and degraded field of history, would still yield ro the category of
a h m t m t , which “is prcciscly the rcpresenintim of writing, of its
situation in the philmphica1 hierarchy” (P,p. 53). Therefore, ail sub-
stitution of a graphoantrism for logocentrism is thoroughly cxcludcd.
The order of dependencc between speech and writing cannot be ar-
gued. As longas one thinks of speech and writing in conceptual terms,
writing must efface itself M o r e speech as its truth. As I have suggested,
Derrida’s analyses pursue a different goal, aiming M establish the law
that governs the “contradictions“ of philosophical discourse, the law
that cxpIains why and how what is supposedly pure, ideal, transm-
dental, and sa on is unavoidably contaminated by its opposite, and
why speech in ia purity cannot be thoughr cwccpt by referring to
writing. To deconstruct the eihico-thcorcticalhierarchy of speech and
writing-a deconstruction that includes an account of the factual
return of debased writing in the form of metaphors (for instance) in
the very attempt m dcsmibt the puriry and self-premoc of the logo-
is to m s t r u c t the signifying structure or system of referral that ac-
counts for both exclusion and contamination.
The name that Derrida gives to this infrastructure, or rather, as we
shall see, duster of infrastructures, i s that of the archesynthesis of
“writink” or more properly, gcneral m i t i n g o r a r c h e 4 g . As such
a synthesis, arche- or prom-writing is nKssirily “aansnndmtat” in
thc sense that I have csrablishcd. Since, as a law, it is able to account
for the economy that organizes dre various relations of speech and
what is commonly called writing, it exceeds the conceptual symmetry
Z7A LITERATURE OR P H l t 0 5 0 P H Y !

of speech and writing. Derrida writes, T h e concepts of general: wrir-

ing can hc read only on the condition that they be departed, shifted
outside thc symmetrical alrcmatives from which, however, rhey sccm
to be raken, and in which, aher a fashion, they must also remain”
(WD, p. 272). The concepts of writing and speech, as they are com-
monly used, cannot sewc ta explain archc-writing. Writing, in its
colloquial sensc, as the visiblc and c d c d scripr in the world, is only
the metaphor of general writing (WD, p+ 209). Major writing, as
Derrida calls rhe arche-synthesis of writing in the context of his essay
on Bataille, and which is opposed to minor writing, is not reducible
to the sensible or visible presence of the graphic or the “literal” (P.
p. 65). General writing, having nothing mundane about it, is beyond
being, epekeim ter ousius (D, p. 168). In short, writing, in the x n x
of arche-writing, a concept that has h e n so easily accommodated by
so-called dcconstrunionisr criticism, has little or nothing to do with
the (anthropological, subjerrive, and so on) act of wiring, with the
psychological pleasures and displeasures to which it gives rise, with
an instrument of notation or communication, or with an aesthetic
and merely self-referenrial signifying pradicc. Nor only have the so-
called deconsrructionists misconstrued the signihcation, and conse-
quently the status, of arche-writing; philosophers have as wcll. Taking
“writing” in Derrida to mean the scriptive and worldly practice of
writing, a practice that would differ from its usual philosophical intcr-
pretation ro the extent that the object it is about is no longer the
world but texts, Rorty, for instancc, in “Philosophy as a Kind OF
Writing,” is bound to misunderstand it as literary writing’ Writing
in Derrida’s sensc i s not determined by whar i t i s about, nor ha5 it
anything essentially in common with the signs prcscnr on the page,
or with the (lirerary or philosophical) production of these signs. Nei-
thcr is it thc esscoceof thc literal sign or of the act QF its engendering.
Despite itsquasitransccndental status, or precisely because of it, arche-
writing is not essence. It has no proper value of its own, positive or
negative (D.p. 105). Arche-wriring is only, it one m a y say so. the
quasitranscendcnral synthesis that accounts for the necessary camp
tion of the idealities, o r transcendentals of ail sorrs, by whar they are
defined againsr, and at the very moment of their constirution. Arche-
writing is a construct aimed at resolving the philosophical problem
of the very possibility (nor primarily the empirical fact, which always
suffers exccptions) of thc usurpation, parasitism, and contamination
of an ideality, a generality. a universal by what is considered its other,
its exterior, its incarnation, its appearance, and SD on. Ir is nothing
 THE INSCRIPTIOH OF UNIVERlALITY *?<
. ...

butthe“originary” structural unity that accounts for the philosophical

‘“contradiction: or instance. rhat the ethos of philosophy, the value
of the proximity in the “hmring-oncsclf-svk.” can establish i d f
only through a reference to what it is not-writing-as well as to
what it resents as the pncticc of writing. It is not writing i d f rhar
is at issue here but the system of relations that link ir to speech. It is
h i s system that Demda names general writing. If Dtrrida persists in
calling this system writing, aIthough writing in the vulgar m s e is its
dssimulation in the form of a metaphor, it is because, he admits,
arche-wriring e.scn~Alycommunicarcs with thc vuigar concept of
writing, insofar as, historically speaking, writing has signified by its
situation “the most formidable differend’ from speech (OC, p. 56).
Writing or itrodicr, arche-writing, is, tviihin the boundaries of phi-
losophy, a most likely name for thc originary structural unity in ques-
tion.
Rather than k i n g the d o c double of spadr, pro-writing is
h a t synthetic structure of refern1 that accounts for dre fact that in
the play of diffcmm berwtcn, say, s p c h and writing, ideality and
writing, meaning and writing. philosophical discourse and wriMg,
lo name only those to which I have already alluded, the pole allegedly
p-r in and of itself, which allegedly refers to itself alone, must in
fact constitute itself through the d m c n t that it abascs. Because this
synthetic structure demands the detour of all self-referential, self-
d k x i v c , and self-present elcmcms through the Other, archc-writing
can b said to be the u n i y of differen= that opens and comprehends
language as the common mof of both spec& and writing. Obviously
enough, this detour is also what fundamentally limits all self-appro-
priating B u s . Thus writing, in Demda’s sense, links together in one
structure the possibility of xlf-reflexive ideality and in irreducible
limits, both awing to h e same referral to mhhrmm, without which
no ideaIity could ever hope to hound itseIf.
A5 the oriinary diHercncc within which an dcmcnt can bcgin to
refer 10 itself on the sole condition that it refer to rhe clement it abases
as exterior to it, and which seems to bc entirely derivative, ar&e-
writing is a synthetic concept of SORP. One might wish to call such
an originary synthesis ideal in the sense that Kantian rranscmdental
functions are ideal. Yet how could a srrumtc that accnunis far both
the possibility and impassibility of idealities still d m e to be called
“ideal,” particularly s i n e the originary synrhsis in question, unlike
Kanrian originary Synthescs, i6 not a strucrure ofuNficationand to-
talization? Although synthetic, because it links together in one struc-
274 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

ture of possibility self-reference and reference to Other, the miry of

archewriting cannot be a totality precisely becausc it is a strunwe
of referral to Other, and hence of self-deferral. In the same way that
this smcturc allows nothing m be a mere self-present element in a
system ofdifferences, it Eannot present itselF as a mere self-contained
structural totalky either. Thus, dmplrc i t s seemingly ideal status, it is
an idea not in the Kantian but rather in a Husserlian sense, provided.
of course, that one takes into consideration Derrida’s analyses of that
notion in Edmrrnd Hwml‘s Origit~of Geomehy. Archewriting, while
not being reducihk to any ordinary intraworldliness. is not, for that
matter, simply transcendental or ideal. It is in be a synthesis which,
by rcspccting both orders, erases their distinction. Arche-writing fore-
grounds this distinction by opening the difference between the origin
of the world and intraworldly being. In a srrange way, arche-writing
is at once both more and lt5s rranscendenral than the Kantian wan-
wendental originary syntheses.
As I have suggested, archewritink instead of being one synthesis.
i s a duster of synrheses. In Of Cramarology. Dcrrida holds that
arche-writing opens “in one and rhesarnepossibility, temporalization.
as well as relationship with the other and language” (OC, p. 60). In
other words, arche-writing is a cluster of infrastructures. It is rnadc
up of the infrastrucrurcs differance (spadng/tempnrizarion). arche-
trace, irerability, and so on, which Derrida analyzed separately and
in great detail following his discovery of the problematics of arche-
writing. If rhc infrastructurc~ are minimal synthess, thm general
writing is 3 synthesis of syntheses. Writing in the sense of archewriting
is thus a possible name for what I have called the system of the
infrasrmcrures. It names the “unity” of inscription in general. But it
i s cqually corrccr ro say thar writing is only a represenrative of the
infrastructures in question. Because the inhartructures do not exist,
because they arc not entitia, not beings-present, writing a n n o r be
said to be the archc-trace, diffcrancc, or itcrability itsdf. Derrida’s
assertion in Of Grommotology that “writing i s one of rhe represen-
tatives of the trace in general. it is not the trace itself’ holds true for
all other infrasrrumures ,as well (OC, p. 167). Therefore, the task of
thinking the infrasrructura1 chain itl g c n e d remains, even if, in order
to think this generality, we must setde for the structural Iimirs of
gencraliry itself.
Letuslinger fora momenton thcnaturcoftheunityofthccomplex,
because clustered, qnthcscs OF writing. The individual and singular
infrastructural syntheses arc synthcses in a ncw sense. Thesesynthcscs,
 THE lNSCRlPTlO?4 OF UNIVERSALITY 177

which “originariIy*’ ground the classical distinctions of the One and

the manifold, the Self and the Ocher, essence and ics appearmm. and
50 on, and thus replace and rrintcrprct the classical unity of meaning,
are not dialectical syntheses. They d o not reground the distinctions
of the Onc and the manifold, thc Self and the Other, as would a more
essential totality, with respeft to which the elements would be the
bipolar and separated representations. The unity that characterizes
the infrasrmcrurcs i s not that of the One as opposed to the manifold,
nor char of rhe dialenical One encompassing barh rhc Onc and the
manifold,T h e infrastructures have the unity of thediffmnccbctwecn
the One and the manifold and their dialccrical synthesis in the One
that dialectically encompasses both. Since within the unity of this
difference both the opposition and the sublation of opposition takes
place, this unity is more originary than eirher. Thus Ers unity grounds
the Onc while at the same time representing its limit. Although a
unity, it is not om unity, not an csscna, origin, ormtality. It is plural
by namrc. Gmral writing as a duster of infrastructures, however, is
plural not only bccause it links a variety of xlf-dcporting structures
but also bccause it is operative on variety of Icvels. All these diffcrcnt
lcvcls of writing do not form onc fotality. “There is mom than one
kind of writing: the different forms and genrcs are irreducible” [D,
p. 242). By nature rherc can be no such thing as a mono-writing;
writing is plural by a n c c . To suspm “writing” of monism is sheer
absurdity; rhe different forms and genres of writing call for rigorous
disrinaion. The pluralidm of writing, however, is not a liberal-hat
is, ultimately totalizable (and hence monistic]-pluralism but is wit-
nes to a savage pluralism, embracing heteragcnous forms of writing.
What these irreducible forms of writing have in common is the gen-
eraliry of wriring as the produaion of generality and irs limitation.
“The heterogeneity of different writings is writing imlf, the graft. It
is numerous from the first or it is not” ( 0 ,p. 356). T h e generality of
writing consists in the operation of referring to irreducible Othernss,
of grafting onc form of writing onto another. In short, it rcprcscnts
the genetaliry of inscription.’
Inscription in general is rhcreforc w bemnsidercd as the spccificiry,
SO IO speak, of the clustered synthesis of arche-writing. Znsm$tion in
gmeral-that is to say, the gmerality afthe inscription or institution
ofthcgmem-is the feature common to a variety of infrastrumres
linked together in what is called gcnml wriring. Writing as archc-
writing is thus not reducible to the production of durable signs, It
affirms the originarity of the trace us rram over the general and uni-
278 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

versa1 in what most properly d d n e s them-heir self-suffrdent one-

ness. Ncedless M say, any ammpts by lirerary criticism to seek self-
authorization in the Derridean notion of wnnng would have to con-
front rhc full philosophical impact of its delimiting thrust. At stake
is not only the universality of the discourse of literary criticism but
also its t~capiscaltcrnttive tendency of parricuirrizarion and private
wlf-discovery. Nor is thc Iamr free of the claim to generahy; if it
wcre, it would not bc heard.

Towmd an Entirely Different Tar

On several occasions, Derrida has clearly emphasized rhat rhe g m -
cralization of the concept of the text in n o way imp1ic-s a “theology
of the Text” (D,p. 258). In Positions he pIainly acknowledges rhat
the “necessary generalization of the concept of text, its mension with
n o simple exterior limit (which also supposes the passage through
metaphysical opposition),” must n o t wind up “[under the influence
of very precise interests, reactive forces determined to lead work astray
into confusion) . . . as the definition of a new self-interiority, a new
‘idealism’ if you will, of the text” (P,p. 66). The literacy criria, as
well as those philasophers who have been speaking of tcxtualIsrn,
pantextualism, text-fetishism, and things of that sort with respect to
Dertida’s philosophy, therefore share a similar if not symmetrical
confusion.
Before attempting to dcfrne precisely what Derrida ntcans by the
“general rext,” I should like ra enumerate rhe traditional ways of
understanding to?. Paradoxically, these traditional meaning of tmf,
from which Derrida’s concept of text must be clearly set off, also
happen to be thosc attributed to Derrida by literary critics and a
number of philosophers. We can distinguish r h m kinds of conccpts
of texr:
1. A text can be dcrermined as the sensibly . .oa,aCnble.
- empirically
encounrerrble transcription of a n oral discourse. as a material opacity
that rnusr efface irsclf before its oral reactivation and the meaning it
represents. In the same way. however. as writing in the sense of arche-
writing has little or nothing in common with the scripNra[ figurcs o n
the page, “text” in Derrida’s understanding is not reducible “either
to the sensible or visible presence of the graphic or the ‘literal’ (P,
”

p. 6.5).
 THE INSCRIPTION O F WNIVERSALIW z79

2. A t ~ x tmi be detcrmined as an intelligibk obi-. According to

this conception, which is indeed the prevailing one, a t a t is thought
to comespond to the signifying oiganization of diacritically or differ-
entially determined signifiers and significdr. In order m prove that
this definition of lnct cannot coincide with Derrida‘s “general text,”
let me merely quote the following pawge from Dissemination: “a
text is never truly made up of ‘signs’ or ‘signified ” (D,p. 261).
3. Another, and perhaps final, concept conceives of rezt s the
dialectical sublation, either a5 ”form” or “mntent,” of both its sm-
sible and ideal determinations.Unlike the previous definitions of text,
which, by virtuc of thcir opposition and isolation, could bc t m c d
intellectual (vcrs*m&s&sigc) concepts, the dialectical dmrmina-
tion of mrt i s its reasonable or rational concept. All chose analyse
that link a text’s sensible and intelligible constituents, as well as the
ctyrndogics, allusions, implications, and mu-mtmdws of all sorts,
d h i n one totality of cithcr form or content, understand lcrt within
the limits of speculative philosophy (Idealist or Romantic). By exhib-
iting thetext as the totalily of a positioningand reciprocal annihilation
o~oppositio~asthcplayofamutual IimitadonofselfandOthcm~,
the rcxt is determined as the milieu, the element of Aufhcbung, or,
which is the same, of the dialectical exposition of that which is impiicd
in its very concept (KWim Begrife el&@ Instead of recalling Derrida’s
sustained critique of 5uch a conapt oftext, it is enough here to rccall
his lapidary remark, “The text excludes dialectics” (D.p. 122).
T h e generalid mncept of ttxt wcrridts all three definitions, “all
those boundaries that form the running border of what used m be
u l k d a text.”’ Yet docs this dehiration and conxcutivc gcnerali-
zation of the conapt of the text imply that thm is nothing outside
the text, rhat myrhing is t a t , and that all that is is only text? One
knows the indignarion excited by Dcrridn’s proposition, taken out of
context and ttansformtd into a slogan, “ I I fi’y a pas de h o r s - r e ~ r e
( T h m is nothing ou&& rhe e t ) ” (OG.p. 158). ,A5 rcccntly as 1983
a Critic could still write that “the most distinctive elcmcnt in Dmida,”
and “of coursc the elernenr that has appeilcd to S D ~ Cof the experts
about t u t e l i t e r a r y critis,” is his “reduction of thought and ex-
perience to ‘tcwrualiy.’ ’’*Before stablihing that the statcmmt that
&em is no “extra-nxt” d m not allow the infenncc that all is, them-
brc, text-and this even lcss if one understands “text” in any of the
traditional manners-and beforc venturing an interpretation of the
proposition in qucsdon, one ought to recall that according to Dcrrida
the generalircd concept of text i s precisely t h t which ex& the
280 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

traditional determination of text as a totality. In whatever terms-

empirical, idealist, or dialmical--text is dcfined, it always implics a
dosure upon itself with a dear inside and outside, whether it is the
empirical closure of the unity of a corpus, the intelligible unity of a
work, or the dialectical totality of its formal or thematic mcaning.
Yet if the general text delimits the traditional rotaliring concepts of
what ha5 bccn called text, it also implies rhat thc entirdy different
text, because it is no longer a totality, has no inside or outside. The
gmetalized text ,is not somcrhing that is closed upon irself in such a
manner that its limits would demarcate an inside from an outside. As
“Living On” argues, thc general text is rather that border iself, from
which the assignment of insides and outsida takes place, as well as
where this distinction ulrimsrcly collaps~s.
&fore I fakc up this definition of the general tcxt, la us remernbcr
that the idca of an outside makm sense only with regard to the com-
mon notions of text. The generalization of thc tcxt, however, is not
an exrension or application of the traditional conccpt of the texr ro
irs traditional autsidc. Derrida writes in “Living On”: “lr was never
our wish to mend the rcassuring notion of the text to a whole exfra-
textual realm and to transform the world into a library by doing away
with all boundaries, all framework, all sharp edges.. . ,but rhat we
sought rather to work out the theorctical and practical system of thew
margins, these borders once more, from the ground up.’” In Posirio~s,
after cautioning against an idealism of the text, Derrida remarks that
“we must avoid having the indispensable cririque of a certain naive
relationship to rhe signified or rhr referent, to xnse or meaning,
remain fixed in a suspension, rhar is, a pure and simple suppression,
of meaning o r rcfercncc” (P,p. 66).In orhcr words, the rejection of
the text as a totality dependenr an a unifying last reason or tran-
scendental signified does not simply mean thesupprmion ofthc text’s
rcfercntiality.
Indeed, Derrida has never contested that tcxts, or for that matter
“literarure,” are mimeticor referenrial. T h e DoubleSession”i5 ample
proof of rhis. W h a t Derrida calls the general texc is characterized, if
not conrtitutcd, by rcfercncc, hut that does not imply that the term
rcfers to a rcfcrcnt thet would come to stop and thus exhaus its
refercncc. Thegeneral tcxt is mimetic, but itsmimcsisisnot suspended
upon an uhimateimitatedand isthusnotsubjectto truthasudequatio,
or even, as Uerrida argues in “The Double Session,” M rrurh as
abtheiu. Bur, as he remarks in this essay, although thc referent is
lifted, “rcferencc remains” (U,p. 211). Though truth is set sidt from
 r H E INSCRIPTION OF UNIVERSALITY 183

the general text, relation to truth, pmjcctcd coinciding, m a i n s . In

shorr, then, the general text is rrboilr, yet without a decidable rekrmr
that could saturate, in the last instance, is referral to Otherness.
“There is no extra-text’’ means just h s : nothing outside the text can,
like a last reason, assume a f d f i h g function (€rfullunssfun&tion]of
the textual referrals. It certainly does not permit the conclusion that
there is nothing else but m t s , or for rhat matter, that all i s language.
Atthls point it should also becomeclear what philosophical problem
is met by ihe general text. If rht text is characterized by tcference,
and if no extra-texr (the existence of which is nor being put into
question) can ever hope to saturate the tcxt’s referring function, then
it represents, phcnomenologjcally speaking, an intentionality without
an intenturn. Such a decapitated or M e a d e d intentionality, because
it lacks a decidable inmturn. cannot be fulfilhi by a corresponding
extraintentional referent. The text, as defined by Dcrrida, does not
do away with the phenomenological idea of intentionality. On the
contrary, it inscribes and displaccr the intentionality of consciausn~ss
with i o corresponding inhntum and irs possibly fulfiIIingobjccc. From
agroundingperspecrive, the text asan intentionality without intentum
is of a greater power of fonnaIizadon than phenomenological inren-
tionality, since the unsaturatable relation to Otherness that charac-
tcrirs it can serve as the matrix to account for the possibility of
phenomenological inrcnrionality, and thus of the principle of all prin-
ciples, evidence, as a ntccssary cMa. As such it can scwc to account
also for the structural impossibility ofa final coincidentx of intention
and its intcntum.
Besides interpreting Dcrrida’s statement “there is no e%tra-tcxt” to
mean that all is texr. critics pro and con have also infcmd from this
statement that the r a t is a b u t itself. Bur if the text is characterized
by structures of referral without a referent, then it can be as little
about itself as it is about something extratextual. Dcrrida could just
as wcll have stated there i5 no inside ofthe text. As the textual structure
~f the re-mark demonstrates, for structural reasons the text has no
identity or self wirh which to coincide. Though the text necessarily
refers to itself, this movement never comes m completion. In addition.
all =If-referral. as shown in “The Double Session,” Is grafted on a
srrunurally endless refcml to other determinate texts, thus making
a11 textual sdf-reflexivity ultimmb impossible.
To sum up, then, what does Derrida mean when he claims In Of
Crdnmratology thar there is no extra-re%t,or when in D*snninaion
he writes, ‘’There is nothing befarc the text; there is no pretext that
282 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

is not already a text” (D, p. 328)? Rarher than negatingthc existence

of everything besides the text, these stanrnentr simply indicate that
the general text [“literature” which i s not litcramre) has no extrarex-
tual signified or referent. no last reason, whether empirical or intel-
ligible, at which its referring function could came to a final halt. It
also means that the generalized text does not refer to something out-
side the system Qf referentiality that could do without being rcfcrred
to, but that is referentiality is such that it extends abysmalIy out of
sight without, however, entailing the text’r self-reflexivity. T h e ab-
sence of all extra-tar, about which one could decide independently
of the textual system ot referral, implies that there is no one final
meaning ta the text. Again, it must be repeated that this is so not
because of the general text’s semantic wealth or unfathomable depth,
nor because of the finitude of irs human decipherer, but for structural
reasons.
let me add that although there is no extra-text with rspect M the
general text. it docs not ~OIIDW from this that the novel, the pocm,
the short story, or more generally the literary. work of art, has no
extra-text. First. the absence of an extra-rcxr is affirmed in the case
of the general ~ e x only
t and not of the traditional, reassuring ‘because
totalizing, concepts of text. The novel, the poem, the short story, and
so forth may depend o n the preexistence of a Mtalizing referent or
signified outside the text, especially if they are conceived within thc
perspective of mimetologism. But it may also be that their meaning
cdnnor be exhausted in such a manner. If thar possibility exisrs at all,
however, it must be accounted for. The notion of the general text is
nothing other than a philosophical *‘construct’’which gives that es-
sential possibility its full importance.
Since all literary criticism hinges on the possibility of dccidability
with respect to an extra- or intra-text, the notion of the general text
ruins the very projea of that discipline. But at the same rime, the
notion of the general text opens a horizon of new possibilities in
literary studies. The concept of text that we arc thus invited to think
has to be understood in an infrarrructural sense. What this means is
that the concept of the general text is to be thought, beyond the
distinction berween empirical and merely universal concepts, a5 a
“truly” or general idedconcepr. Nothing empirical or abstractly uni-
versal-absacted, that is, from empiricaI r e p m t a t i o n s - m a y enter
thc dacrminarion of the law of the text. To interpret the general text
in an infrastrumral sense is not, however, to make the text one
infrasrructurc. A5 we shall JCE, it is on the contrary like writing a
 THE INECRIPT~ONOP UNIVERSALIW 283

clustcc of infastructum. To render this infrasauctural sc~lseof the

text more precise, we must next determine its ontological status.

Of Ttxhtnl onrorogy
Like Sam’s inquiry “What is lituamc?” the more m t question
“what i s a text?”-&c titk of an essay by Paul Ricaur publish4
in a fesaduit for H. C.Cadamer-is a htrmencutiml question whose
modatirics and fonn anticipate the The question “What is a
text?“ asks for the whamcsr, the essence, the being of the text It
consequently prc~upposa,by its very nature as a qurstion mnarning
the ti&iof the text. the arisrmce, thc bang (orabsence as a negative
mode of preacnc~)of the essence of the textualicy of the text. Tur-
tuality, in this sense, grounds the bcing of the text, caum the text to
comc into presence, into cxistencc. Of coursc, rcxrualiry as rhc on-
tol~gi~al gmund of thc text can a m p t a variety of dctaminations.
corresponding mpeaively to the & r e dcfinitions of ttxt ourlincd
above whetha dcttdrred by empirical or i d d criteria or as a
synthesis of both, tcxtuality is an esscncc or subrtancc, that is, a more
authentic and mnre fundaments1made of k i n g rhan h a t of the WXM
which, in their empirical vuicry, depend on it a~ to their last reason.
Yet if texcualitg in this m ge is to account for the being or presence
of texts, of the empirically given tms,it mum unqucstionably fail,
since it i s imelf a mode of being (however authentic or otiginary).
Thus it is incapable in the last instance of explaining the being of the
text. As Heidcggcr would have said, ir is as if one wanred to derive
the sourn h onr rhe river. The ontological horizon which inevitabiy
comprises the qumion “What is a m?” limits the arplicarory pawcr
of tcxmality as an answer to the “nature” of texts.
It is my amtation that, with tht notion of the general text,Dcrrida
transcends tlK opposition of text and termality, of appearance and
-ce, by paradoically denying all ontological status ro rhe general
t a t . “There i s no present text in general, and there is not even a past
present tcxt, a text which is past as having bten p m t ” (WD, p.
211). If, acmrding to Aristode’s definition, essence is what has bccn
(to ti cn eim], then the gcncral text certainly is no -a. Indeed,
the v e r a l text’s “prcontolqgial” and “pmscndal” status cnablcs
it to account for the fundamental ditficultics that all theories of tex-
rualiry must fact: to haw to pmuppwe in their explanation precisely
what they are s u p p d 10 account for--the beingar prtsmcc of their
object.
Z8A LITERATURE OR PHttQSOPHY?
~~~ ~

In what follows I shall attempt to clarify further the notion of the

general text by mmmcnring on a seemingly contradictory statement
by Derrida in “’Thc Doublc Scssion”: ”If thc texr does not, to the
letter, exist, then there is [if y a1 perhaps a text“ ID, p. 270). What
this sratcment claims is t h a t thee mny be a tcxt only on condition
that, to the letter. o r literally. it does not exist. The proposition con-
tends that in order for a text to bc there, ir must bc deprived of all
property, ownness, essence, and so on. It is a statement that makes
the bcing there of a text dependent on its Endcpcndcnce from what
one usually associates with the text, the existence of thc letter (or
signifier), as either a material or ideal subsrratum. Thc being them of
a text is thus made to hinge on the nonexistence of the text as either
an crnpirical substratum or an intelligiblc essence. In short, the text
is said to be there only if it i5 not+if it is not endowed with being, if
it lacks presence. Obviously this cannot mean that there would be
text mlely k obsentiu, as one could hastily caonclude; absence is an-
other mode of prcwncc and bcing. One must, consequently, qualify
Derrida’s statement as follows there is perhaps a text if it doe5 not,
to the letter, cxist, which i s not. howcver, 10 say that it would therefore
be a nonpresence, a nonexistence. an absence, or a mere nibil negu-
tivum.
What rhe statement enunciates, that for a text t~ be there it must
not exist, i s not reversible. The noncxistcnce of the tcxt is not P
sufficient condition tor there to be a text. This is marked by the adverb
perhaps, akhough this meaning d o a not, as we shall see, exhaust that
words function in the proposition. These few remarks may clarify in
part thc meaning of Dcrrida’s statement, but they do not do away
with the obscure and seemingly contradictory nature of a statement
that afhrms that the being-rhcrcof a tcxt depends on its mnexistence.
Yet thcrc is nothing contradictory a b u t this statement, for IDbe there
and to exisr do not mean the same thing. Instead of being synonyms,
thcy rcprcscnt two entirely heterogeneous lcvels of description. To
exist means to be present. to be endowcd with being and meanin&
and applies to the order of both the scnsihk and the intelligiblc. To
exkt is a qudilication of phenomena in the Husserlian sense. To be
there, or more precisely there is. which translates the German es gibt.
has, first of all, the ideal meaning this Expression has in mathematics.
Second, there is scrves to exprm the pure idea of the pure possibiliry
ot a meaning in specie: there is is thus to be said of truly general or
ideal corrapa. Third, there is characterizes thc modc of giveness of
phenomena in general, and of Being in particular, as thc phenomenon
 T H E INSCRIPTION O F UNIVERSALITY 28 T

par exccflcncc. According m Hcidcggcr, k i n g as the radial ground

of all beings mnnot imlf be; it only has the mode of being there. If
Being were m exist, if ir were to bc endowed wirh being, it would be
a ground unable to account for that which it has k e n summoned to
explain: the k i n g of being. Derrida, who through a meditation on
the general text aims at repunding or rather reinscribing the dif-
k r c n a bctwcen text and temality. bemeen the empirical manifold
of texts and the text’s ever-prcmt csscnce, a t first UMS &is Heideg-
gerian qualification m characterize the general text. There is, perhaps,
a general text.
The general. text accounts for the difference between texts and
m a l i t y , both of which are endowed with modes of being, or pm-
cnce. an[y on thc condition that it (the general mr) docs not exist.
Yet it does not partake in any ontology, however fundamental. The
question what is the general tcxt is an illegitimate question. To ask
rhe hermeneurical question of the m n c e of the general text is to
confuse issues and to mix levels of thought.
Indeed. if the general text is in a position to account for the on-
mlogical status, or rather ontological illusion, of texts and their tex-
tualicy, iris because iris nota phenomenon. Thereforethere is,perhdps,
a general text. It never appears (bs nrch). i t never bccomcs present us
such in either a sensible or intelligible mode. Ir cannor, therefore,
become the objra of a perception, whether such a perception is an
apperception or an intuitive act of ideation. Dcrrida writes at the
beginning of “PIato’s Pharmacy”: “A text is not a text unlcEs it hides
from the first corner, from the first glance, the law of its composition
and the rules of i t s game. A text remains, howevcr, forever impcr-
ceptible. Its law and its rules arc not, however, harbored in the in-
accessibility of a secret; it is simply that they can never bc booked,
in the present, into anything that could rigorously bc called a per-
ception“ (D,p. 63). The gcncral text escapes all possible phenom-
enologization. Instead of appearing a3 such, it disuppears. “What
disappears,” Dertida -plains in Edmund Hurserl’s Origin of Ge-
omety, “is what is annihilated, but also what ceases, intermittently
or definitely, to appear in fuct y e t without affecting in being or being-
sense’’ (0. p. 931. This possibility of disappearance without dissolving
into sheer nothingntss characrerim rhc status of the general text with
respm to what is phenomcnologirable-the phenomenon of Being
in particular.’
As we have seen, the general text accounts for the terruuIdiffkcrrcc
(or the difference between the tcxo and tcxruality) m the extent that
286 LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

it disappears, that is, to the extent that it is not a phenomenon en-

dowed with existence. presence (and meaning). It is widmt, then,
that thc relation betwrcn the gcncral tcxt and what it accounts for
can no longer be thought in traditional terms. It can certainly not be
a relation of crnanation, engenderment, or creation, nor can it be a
relation of derivation, of constitution, or even of possibility. Both
series of relations b e w e n ground and what is grounded presuppose
the uristcnce, presence, phenomenality of the ground. Whm Dcrrida
s t a m that “if the text does not, m the lcttcr, exist. then ?herei5 perhaps
a text,” hc at first suggests the possibility of thinking the relation
bctween a ground such as the general text and what it accounts For-
texts and their textual essence, within the scope of the Heidcggerian
problematics of the gift (Gabel. Es gibt is indeed to be translated as
“it givcs” and not simply a5 “there is.” Heidegger’s attempt M think
the gih of Being is an attemptta think, in a more fundamental manner,
the relation between what as ground must be cntircly hcterogcncous
to what ir grounds and what is grounded. Although Demda borrows
theexprason esgib? from Heidegger and a d d r w a problem similar
to the one concerning the ontico-ontological difference, it is nor put
to work in the same way. As we shall see, Drrrida’s transference of
the problematicE of donation to the question of the general text results
in a n even more radical regrounding or unsettling, if you will, of
ontology than does Heidegger’s invesrigtion inro the question of
Being.
Indeed,Dertida notes in Dissminurion that thcgeneral err, which
is never present but in constant withdrawal, “has no proper, literal
meaning; it no longcr originates in meaning as such, that is, a5 the
meaning of being” (D, p. 229). “No present in truth presents itself
there, not wen in the l o r n of sell-concealrncnt” (D. p. 230). The
question of the text clearly dernarks itself from the quenion of Being.
As he chows in “The Double Session,” the general text whorstruaurc
of remarking folds the text upon it(selfl in a nonsymmecrical and
nonteflcxive manner defers, discards, or sets &ing aside (il’kurt).
The general text marginalizes Being, being itself the margin of Being.
As the margin of Being. rhc general text has no ontological status;
with rcgard to Being it is neither absent nor present, since both modes
of temporality and of being are particular to Being alone. In “The
Double Session” one reads with respect to the figure of thc hymen,
which is just one figure of the general text: “At the cdgc of Being, the
medium of the hymen never becomes a mere mediation of work af
the negative; it outwits and undoes all ontohgin, all philorophemes.
 THE INSCRIPTION OF UNIVERSALITY 287

all manner of dialectics. It outwis themand-as a cloth, a tissue, a

medium again-it enveiops them, turns them over, and insaiibcs them”
(D, p. 215).
Now, the 6ei.g there (es gibt) of the text indicates preciscly this
marginal status of the general text with regard to Being. Although
“nothing says the present better, it seems, than there is,” it, rather,
points at a “scission” (a.p. 307), at the cut-off of Being, of the
.
present, of presence. This “them is . . is in the prescnr only through
the ‘illusions’ of statement or utterance’’ (D, p. 3 11).The being rbere
of the text stts the existcncc, the pmencc and the signification of the
text aside; ir suspends it on its margin. The being rbm, in Derrida, thus
characrerim that which makes the margin, which rakes piace as the
margin of k i n g (and of what i s ) , in short, the nonphenomenologiz-
able. In Ln Yiritd en peilrtirre we read, “There h frame. bur the frame
does not exist” (VP,p. 93).
We must, consequently, recognize that the relation of being there
(or donation) to what is, m what exists, to whar is present in tither
a sensible or intelligible manner. is one of framing, of marginality.
Applied to the general text, this would mean that it frames or mar-
ginalizes that which it accounts for, texts and textuality. In short, the
general text, in its rclation to the phcrtornenologizable, to the texts,
m their essence, to Being in generai, no longer preserves “the or&
ofdl dppeurunce, the very process of appearing in general,” the order
of truth (D, p. 192).The general text questions what this order pre-
supposes-the possibility of distinguishing between e w n m and a p
pearanm, between phenomena and what they allow to come into
appearance. lndnd the possibility of decision hingts on that of the
perception (Anschurcutrg)of the thing itself (die Suchese~bst)in perso*,
or as Merlcau-Ponty would have said, in f l s h and blood. tn its relation
to the texts and to textuality as their essence, the general text is a
nonphenomenologizable “ground” which by virtue of the mode of
its givenness-its being there-broaches and breaches the difference
within which the distinction characteristic of the order of appearance
takes shape. Yet by opening the pbssibiliry of such a distinction, the
general text also circumscribes the decidability of what is thus ser free
into opposition.
Here, in pamcuIar, it becomes clear that Derrida’r investigation of
thc general text and its particular 5 t a t u s with regard to k i n g is part
of his systematic debate with Heidegger. Whether or not the norion
of text ha5 becn borrowed from literary criticism, Derrida’s U K of ir
implies a radical rethinking of this notion in the direction of whar
288 L I T E R A T U R E O R PHILOSOPHY?

one may call the unthought of Bcing, its yiclding to the p r o m s of

appearing. Whcn Derrida srates that there is no extra-text but the
gencral text (onty), then chis also mcans that Being itself, in order to
be the gift of Being, must already be within the text. Without its
”textual” margin, Being could n o t fulfill its fundamental role as the
ontico-ontological difference, which in Heidegger preserves the order
of appearanrc. But at the samc rime this margin severely limits the
grounding fumction ,of Being. This relation of reinscription to Being
and to Hcidcggcr’s rncditationon “Dif-ference”charactcrim the Dcr-
ridean concept of tcxt. Although the notion of the general text is not
limited to this debate with Heidegger-and m rcpreseniinga solution
for a specific philosaphical problem-it receives its essential deter-
minations from this debate.
Unlike Heidegger’s concept of king, which accounts in si funda-
mental way for the ontireontological difference, there is nothing
“fundamental,” “profound,” or “deep”about thegcneral text. Ir does
not function as what onc used to call an essence wirh rcgard ro what
it makes possible through reinscription. On the contrary, the general
tcxt functions as the margin of thc opposirion of texts and textualiry,
as the frame of rhe textual difference. Without this margin no texts
could be, no essence could ever hope to set t a t s free. Yet one cannot
[egitimatcly claim of a margin, of the general text, that it engenders
or constitutes that which it is the margin of, texts and tcmaljry. One
cannot Even contend rigorously thar it is a relation of conditions of
possibility. Yct what exists, rhc text and texnrality, is possible only
because thcre is a text. What exists, thc detcrminable and decidable
text. is possible only because it is inscribcd into the margin of an
indetcrminablel text. To cite again:

There is such a general text everywhere that {that is, cvcrywhe~c)this dis-
mury and ik order (essence, sense, truth. meaning, consciousness, idcdiv,
etc.) are nvrrflowd. rhar is, everywhere that rhcir authority is put back into
the position oi a mar&m a chain that this authority intrinsically and illusorily
believes it w i r h n tn, and does in fact, govern. T h i s gencral text is not limited,
of murse. as will (or would) bc quickly understood, to writings an the page.
The wricing of this text, moreovcr, ha5 rhe extcrior limit only 01 a certain
remurk. Wriring on the pagc, and rhcn “lirerature.” arc drtcrmined types
of this re-mark. ( P . pp. 59-60]

Thc general tcxc functions as thar which delimits and rcndcrs possible
the limirs of the empkicity and immediacy of the writing on the page
on thc one hand and of “litcramrc” on the other, a$ well as of rhc
 THE INsarrnoN OF UNIVERSALITY 289

empirical plurality of the sensible and palpabktexts and oftbe essence

or tatuality shared by them. Roland Barthes,making use of Lacanian
rerminology in his essay “From Work to Tcxr,” formulates this re-
lation very succinctly by saying that the work is the text’s imaginary
tail.’ As what broach- and breaches the apposition of text and ICX-
mality, the general text accounts for the possibility of an essence of
texts by limiting, marginalizing, or framing it. The general text, sl-
though it makes tcxtuality possible, also makes it impossible, since
rextualiry as the essence of existing tern is srrucrunlly incapable of
csscntializing the pius or minus, the more or less of its margins. It
one decided, however, to call texttrafity the general text, one would
have to make this concept express the lack of an essence of texts. To
speak of tcxtuality, hen, would imply &at discoums and “literature”
have no final and last essence, that there is nothing pmpcr to dis-
coucscs and literature. no discursivity, and no such thing as literarity
or literariness us such.

A System of Traces
As 1 have mentioned, the text in the infrastructural sense is not one
infrastructure but a composite of tt~fsefundamental subunits. The
text io never consrimred by what one calls signs or signifiers-that is
to say, by units signifying a signified outside the tern-but by traces,
A text in’the infrastmmnl sen= is a fabric of traces, a systcm of
linking of t r a q in other wards a network of rcxtual referrals ( r e n d s
teuhrek). Bccausc of this dtlrcntiat network, this dssuc of traces
endlessly referring to something other than itself yet neva to an extra-
text that would bring its referring function to a clear stop, the general
text is by nature heterogeneous. It tics in with Othemm in an irred-
ucible manner; the threads it cornbincs am nor of rhc same order, and
its interlacing of thew filaments is not subjected to an ultimate unity.
Thus the text in an infrastrucrural sense leads back to Derrida’s cri-
tique of the Platonic concept of symploke discussed at the end of Part
I. Although a “system,” againsr which thc prcscnr, living, and con-
scious repmentation af the text stands out in relief, the text is con-
stitutcd by a mode of linkage that is not odented by oneness and
totality. This also explains why Dcrrida expressed reservations as to
the representation of the text as a fabric Not only is the weaving
metaphor an all too amsanal, aesthetic, and empirical representation
of the general text, which impinges upon the rather abstract and
quasitransmdend status that it has in Denida, but the philosophical
190 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

past OF this image governed hy rhe category of unity also makes ir an

inappropriate description of the general tat. If the general text is a
fabric or interlacing at all, it is not because it interconnects homo-
geneous threads into one totality but precisely because. in an almost
nonsmsible, nonanrheo’c manncr. it links hrrPmgenmus forces, which
constantly tend to annul the tern’ precarious unity, a unity constituted
by an cssential incompletion, As a system of textual referrals, of
differences and differences of differences, a text, therefore, cannot be
a torality. Yer if the text is impassible to totalize, this is due not to
the excess of an infinite richness of content, meaning, or intention
butm structural rea5on~.As Derrida has noted, it is thevery structure
of the textual agency as a system of referrals that turns “the ‘whole’
into the too much or the too little of the text” (D,p. 246). m e ideal
of rotaliry is thoroughly foreign to the text; it is the text’s imaginary.
What this mcans is that the text cannot be totalized by a themc
constituted independently ot the play of the text, a theme that would
supcrvise its own inscription as wcll as the signs through which it is
expressed. Nor can the text be a formal totality. All Formal self-
rcflcaion of thc wxt f a m structural limirs similar to thmc owing to
totaliration by content. The fate of these totalizations, based on 3
preexisting signified or a formal self-repremtation, is decided upon
by what Derrida calls the reserve of textual operations which takes
place dccp in back, in thc shadow of the pharmacy, 50 to spcak.
Yet one may perhaps want to objcct arthis poinr that ,inOf Cram-
matology. Dcrrida contends that Rouswau, fat instance, “inscribes
textuality in the text.” that he “tells us in the text what a text is,”
that Rousseau’s text “tells u s in writing what writing is” (OG, p.
163).Is not this “self-consciousness” of the text, the discursive rep-
resentation by which a tern rcprpvena its own mots, a clear sign of
thc text’s self-tcflexivity? First, two things need to be rigotously dis-
tinguished: the self-reflexive Strata of texts on the one hand, and on
the other the textual operations in the background that both permit
such reflection and prevent it from finally coinciding with itself. After
arrributing the text’s self-refleaion to the discursive actual, living, and
conscious representation of a text, Derrida writes: “If a text always
gives itself a a r t a i n rcprcsentation of its own roots, tho% mats live
only by that representation, by never muching the soil, so to speak.
Which undoubtcdly destroys their rodicrrl essence, but not the neces-
sity of their rarinating funcrion” (OC, p. 101). The circumscribed
discourse in which a rext presents itself i s a representation thar is
constanrly overrun by the entire system of the text’s own resources
 THE INSCRIPTION OF UNIVERSALITY 29 1

and laws. A t the same time, since rhfs repmenradon plays an organ-
izing tole i n the structure of the text, it must be accounted for, and
it musr be accounted for by the very ccsourccs and laws of rhc text.
If Dnrida can sag i n Of Grnnu~foalogy&at a theme such as
“supplemennriry” is nor only one rheme amongd m in a chain but
also that it describes h e chain itself, “the beingdain of a textual
chain,” this does not imply t h a t t h e whole chain would be governed
by this one heme, This theme docs not reflect the whole chain, i f
reflection means what it ha5 always meant, a mirroring reprentation
through which a self reappropriates itself. Instead of decting the
cham of the text into it&, “supplemcntariry” rc-nrrlrk rhar chain
in the same way as it i s inelf *marked, that is, put back into the
position of a mark within the rema1 chain. Reflexivity is only an
cffcct of what Dcrridn has called r e - w t k . and which Ihave analyzed
in some detail in Part 11. The iUusion of a reflexive totalization by a
theme or a concept i s grounded in the rcprcmtarional effacement of
their position as marks within the chain that they tend to govern.
Because of the remark, self-reprentanon and xlf-reflection never
quite take place. A rheme or concept can o d y desipan rhc rwct m
a m ; that is, its rrprmmtation is t h e repre+mtanon of a rcpmen-
ration. Yet instead of produang a raruration of dilfemcc, the rcp-
resentation of representationkeeps the difference endlessly open and
thus pments any ultimate self-repmentation or self-presence of the
text.
The illusion of self-reflection of a text is witness only to the rep-
rcscntationalfunction ofa text,nor to its representationof something
outside the text or its self-representation. It is an effect of the text’s
namm as a system of referral. T h e gmcral text i s generalized repre-
sentation, or as Dmida also d l s it i n “The Double Session,” gen-
eralized refnmcc. Wihin such a sysrm, no xlf-reflection or self-
representationcan coincldc wirh i d f to constitute itself as p ’ c s t ” ~ ,
because as repmentation i t is already inscribed in the space of rep-
etition and splitting or doubling of the self- Thus, the m c t u r e that
bcst chatadzco thc text, and at the same timc accounts for the
necessity and essential l i m b of a text‘s sclf-refl&on, i s the s r m c t u r ~
~f the re-murk. in which a11 tcxtuaI traces arc not only elements of
referral but arc also overmarked by the space of their engcndcrment
and inscription. The rc-mark, by which the text is folded upon finelf,
is not, then, to be mistaken for a reflemon. The ande of rhc remark
by which tbe text as text is folded back upon itself exduds “any
passibdiry of its timng back over or into itself‘‘ (a.p. 251). “The
19z LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

fold is nor a form of reflexivity,” Dcrrida concludes (D,p. 271).

Instead, like the or& in “Living On,” it kccps all "reflecting mpm-
sentation from folding back upon itself or reproducing itself within
itself in perfect self-correspondence. from dominaring or including
inelf, taurologicaHy, from translating irself into its own rorality.“’
At this point, where the structure of the general text has revealed
itself as onc of rckrcncc and rc-marking-as a system of re-marked
traces-it becomes clear that the texr can set k i n g aside precisely
because of irs structure of generalized rcfercncc. Yet since the structure
of re-marking is,, as t have tried to show, an extension and tadicali-
zation of rht logic nf thc rrair, wirh which the larcr Heidcgger con-
tinued his elaboration of the question of Being, the text a5 constituted
hy thc rc-mark can also set its own being aside. Indeed, in the same
way as the rrait of Being is at once the retreat (retrait) of Being, the
mark that is folded upon itself. the re-marked rrace. also retreats in
its being. It is rhe constant casting aside of its own being. This, then,
is one more reason ro undcrstand Uerrida’s notion o f texr as an
attempt to come m grips with the Heideggerian question of Being.
for Derrida inscribes this casting aside of Being into the text of the
logic of thc rrait, which. for Weidegger, may have nmained subservient
to the question ~f the mcaning of %tin& What Derrida thus calls the
text, instead of being governed by Being, makes Being a function of
the general text. The text, rather than being primarily the body or
the ideal form of a literary written work, as arc rhc objccfs of litcrary
criticism, is, if taken in an infrastmctural sense as the general text,
the nonunitary fabric of laws that allow for thc possibility of Being.
These laws, which at once inhibit Being from articulating irself with-
out difference, thus making it ultimarcly impossible, are those of the
cluster of infrastructures linked together in the macrosynthesis of rhe
text. Conscquenrly, text as undcrsrood by Dcrrida is the nonphmom-
enologizablc strumre of referral and remarking whosc nortunitary
fabric is the quasitranscendental frame “constitutive” ofphenomena
in the Husserlian sense-more broadly, of essences, last reasons,
grounds. as opposed m what thcy allow ‘to appear-and of Being, as
thc phenomenon par exccltmce in all its radial difference from bcinp.
As an irreducible background, the general text undercuts the order
of all appearancc. While lending irstlf to the philosophical operation
of the krine:n and its effects of decidability, the general text remains
in retreat and reserve from everything that comes into its own within
its frame, either by an interruption of the unlimited process of ref-
crencc or by a sclf-reflection owing tn the illusory effect of the re-
 THE INSCRIPTION O F UNIVERSALITY 293

mark. H e n q although the general text is a condition of possibility

for phenomena (and all they entail: ideality, presence, purity, and so
on),it is also their mnditian of impossibility. Ncedlcss to say, if the
notion of the general text is to bccame an operative m n q t of liter-
ary criticism at all, its function in Derrida’s debate with Husscrlian
phenomenology and Hcidcggcr’s philosophy cannot simply be over-
looked. The conrexi of this dcbarc alone makes the general text a $ig
nificanr [em, and determines its specific features and implications.
Na mere invocation or magical conjuration of this term can make
up for the indispensable reconstrumon of its actual context.

METAPHOR
Derrida’s insistcnaupon the fact that philosophy, from its beginnings,
has conceived of itself ss a discourse entirely transparent to Being and
free of all figurative use of language has fostered the mistaken opinion
that Derrida’s aim would be to challenge or “dcconsttua” the regim
scientidnrrn by playing literature and its metaphoric use of language
off against this discipline that pretends to dominate all other disci-
plines. Nothing, however, could be more inaccurate than to confound
the deconstruction of philosophy wirh a nonargumcntative. literary,
and metaphoric play. This belief is i n c w m not only because of its
reductive understanding of literature but, as we shall see, far other,
more essential reasons.
Derrida has never lehtheslightcst doubr that metaphor is by M ~ U E
a rotfaphysical concept, In spite, or rather because of its negativity,
it belongs to the very order and movement of meaning: the provisory
loss of meaning that metaphor implies is subordinatcd to the teleology
of meaning as one moment in the proass of the df-manifestation of
meaning in all its propriety. T h e philosophical concept of metaphor
(and there is no other) makes metaphor depend on the absolute par-
ousia of meaning.
Metaphor denoresa reality derivarive of proper meaning whether
thc metaphoric displaamcnt is seen as a rnament of toss anticipating
a future recuperation or only as an ornamental and exterior supple-
ment to proper meaning, Instead of uncritically revalorizing meta-
phor, instead of simply playing it off against philosophy, Derrida’s
repetition of the question of metaphor is an interrogation of the phil-
osophical concept of metaphor, of its limits, and, as is to be wen in
“‘White Mythology,” of philosophy’s atrempt to question systcmad-
cally the metaphorical origins of its concepts. In other words, Der-
2qA LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY!
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

rida’s reformulation of the question of metaphor i s concerned with

the fundamental complicity between the philosophical dererminarion
of the conccpt of metaphor and rhe apparcnrly subversive arrcrnpr to
challenge philosophy on the grounds that its concepts arc hidden
tropes. Rather than participating in rhis double enterprise, Derrida‘s
efforts involvc an analysis of the presuppositions of this problematic,
and an attcrnpt to dclimit the rnctaphysical and rhetorical schemes
that constitute it. This analysis implies a profound suspicion of the
concept of metaphor as a metaphysical concept; consequently, one
never finds Derrida flirting with this mncept of metaphor as if it
posscrscd within irs limits and all by itself any decisive proprieties
that would be portntislly subversive of logocenrrisrn.
Yet thcrc is of coursc no such thing as a purely rnctaphysical con-
cept. If concepts could bc purely metaphysical, they would m i s t all
questions concerning them. As a mulr, Derrida can nonetheless point
ta a certain irreducibility of metaphor with respect ro its possibility,
and short of its rherorical repetition and philocophEcal concepmali-
zation. Focusing on this specific irreducibility, Derrida shows meta-
phor to bc the metaphysical name for something “older” than the
philosophical distinction between the proper and the metapharic (SP.
p. 103), and which might thus bc in a position toupset the conccptual
columbarium of philosophy. Consequenrly, rather than simply ar-
tempting to rcvcrsc thc classical hierarchical opposition of the proper
and the figural, the philosophical and the metaphoric, Dcrrida aims
at something that is only very improperly called metaphoric without
k i n g proper in itself. Being no longer either metaphoric or literal, an
allegorical illustration without a concept or a pure concept without
a metaphoric scheme, the irreducible in question can no longer be
referred ro by the M ~ of L metaphor; indeed it is properly unnamable.
As Dcrrida has argued in “The R e m i t of Metaphor,” the sort of
metaphor in quesrion is in withdrawal; ir Being of rhc order
neither of the concept nor of the metaphor, the irreducible in question
escapes the order of the noun in general, within which, as Derrida
has shown in his analysis of Arisrotle’s Poetics and Abetoric, rhc
philosophical elaboration of metaphor takes place, an elaboration
that links metaphor, via a theory of mimesis,to the doctrine of being
or ontology. It is unnamable not because of some Romantic nostalgia
for the ineffable, nor because the limited faculties of man as a finite
being would be too narrow to cxprcss what ovcrpowcrr thcrn, but
because of this irreducible’s exorbitant position with regard to the
opposition of the proper and the figural, Being and beings, God and
 M E INSCRIPTION OF UNWERSAtltr 295

men, a position.that =p the logic that ties logos and Being to-
gether. Dcmda r c h to it as quusimckrpkricity, or simply nieta-
phoricity.
Metapboricity, then, is not a quality that presupposes an already
constituted and philorophicalIy determined metaphor. Nor is mcta-
phoricity the savage production, unrnediated by concepts, of meta-
phors as a quahy amibuted to, say, literary language. As that which
opens the play between the proper and thc metaphoric, and which
metaphysia can only name as that which it makes possible, meta-
phoricity is not endowed with those qualities traditionally attributed
to metaphor but rather with attributes which in traditional philosophy
would be called constituting or transcendental. Metaphoriciry is a
transcendental concept of som. Yet ir does not follow that Derrida
would simply do away with the m-callcd ornamental and poctic func-
tions of metaphor, reducing them, as does philosophy, to a literary
border phenomenon of philosophy. T h e absmcc of such a dmgarive
gesture, however, does not mean, as is ,often assumed, that Derrida
would turn the littraryqualitics of metaphoricity against the conccp-
ma1 Ianguageof philosophy, with its desire for univmality,exactitude,
and clarity. In truth, the notion of rnetaphoricity as advanad by
Derrida is neither opposed to the philosophical concept of metaphor
(and therccan be noorher), nor simply identical wirh whatphilosophy
calls the ornamental poetic function ofmetaphor; nor docs it view
metaphor as a moment in the proccss ofmeaning. Metaphoricig, in
Derrida’s sen- refers to somethingsmrchrraf~phenomenal, to same-
thing of the order of the concepruat. the rransctndenral, but which
in spite of it5 heterogeneity to thc socalled real world also combines
with the supplementary and ornamental modc of rhe rhetorical figure
of poetics. As the result of a dcstmcrion of metaphor, and co ips0 of
the proper and the literal, maaphoficiry yields a strumre that ac-
count5 for the difference between the figural and the proper, and which
comprises properties that are by right “older” than those traditionally
attrihuted.to the transcendental and the empirical. Since, as an
“originary” synthesis, metaphoridty is more originary than what I
have formerly referred to as transcendcntality, and since it also com-
bines with rht most emrior qualities of metaphor, with mctaphorb
exrcriority to the concept, 1 shall try to define it as a nonphenom-
enologizablt quasitranrcdental.
The following anaIysis of “White Mythology”’is an ammpt ‘EO
characterize a bit more fully the status of metaphoridty by examining
the different ways in which Dcrrida is led 10 ciaborate this notion. I
296 LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

have alrcady stated that metaphoricity is something structurally phe-

nomenal that serves M account for the philosophical difference be-
tween the proper and rhc figural. I t is evident that this notion is
altogether different from what either the literary critic or the phitos-
opher designates, or would dcsignatc. by such a notion. This gap
widenrevcn further assoonas wcexplorethepmblem thatthis notion
of metaphoricity ultimately serves tn address in Dcrrida's work. Such
a demonstration. however, requires a detour of sorts.

The Multiple Senses of Being

As Heidegger himself points out, his interest in philosophy was awak-
ened by his reading in 1907 of Franz Brcntano's disscrtation "On the
Several Senses of Being in Aristotle" (1862)." Studying Brenwno's
analysis of the multiple ways in which being i s expressed (polfukos
legomemon}. Hcidcgger h g a n ro reflect on the primary and hnda-
niental meaning of Being p r e s u p F e d by t h e e multiple senses. It is
important to recall herc that within the problematical horizon of
classical philosophy, the question concerning the unity and the man-
ifold of the senses of Being is none other than that of analogy. Indeed,
a tradition that srarrs wirh scholastic philosophy has Arisrorle derer-
mining the relation between being and its multiple W$ES in terms of
this figure of thought. It is precisely within this same tradition that
Brentano situates his own investigation of the problem. Although
Heidcgger's fundamental philnsophical concern is not subsumed undcr
the cxplicit title ol "analogy." it is clear that his invesrigation into
the qucsrion of the mcaning of Being. or into rhat of the differcncc
0s difference, is essentially an attempt to come to grips with the
traditional problem of analogy, whcrhcr ~r not he mentions that
notion. In what follows, 1 shall try to substantiate this poinr with a
brief analysis of some paragraphs of Being and Time."
Whether o r nor certain philosaphie explicirly reflect on the prob-
lem of analogy. all wcraphysia, insofar as it i s concerned with thc
unity in difference, must understand itseIf primarily as a philosophy
of analogy, as Puntcl has most farccfully ,argued. Although "analogy"
acquires the explicit status of a philosophical issue only with Plato,
analogy, as the problem of the idcntity that lets differences [as well
as thc various linguistic arri~ulatinnrof king). came to the fore was
already a, if not the, major figure of thoughr in philosophical thinking
from irs very inception." Up through Aristotle, analogy hadthe mean.
ing ,of mathematical propanion, relarion, ratio, correspondence, thus
 THE 1NSCRlPTIQN O F UNIVERSALlTY t97

reflecting its origin as P mathematial concept formulated by &he 4.-

thagoreans. It did not signify a simple relation or a simple proportion
but a system of relations or proportions. Puntcl writes, “Analogy i s
a relation of relations, a proportion of proportions, in short, a cor-
respondence of relations.”“ According to this originary meaning of
analogy, the unity or the identity thar difference presupposB, and
which mediatcs between what is different, becomes manifest in the
similitude of opposing but back-stretched relations. As a matter of
,fact, the wholc problematic of analogy i s one of determining these
relations. As I have mentioned, scholastic philosophy extended the
problem of analogy to the question of being and made Aristotle the
first thinker to have determined being in such a manner. Indecd, the
Scholastics mntendcd that Aristotie conceived of the relation between
the different senses of being and being irsclf as one of similarity by
analogy. Ever since Ockham’s view that thcrc i s no analogy of being,
this question has been an issue in philosophy. I cannot atrernpt here
to develop in full this most difficult problcm. nor can I dimss Aub-
enque’s thesis, in L e Problme de I’gtfe chez Arktore, that the Scho-
lastic position docs not correspond to Arismtle’s thought, but that
the doctrine of the analogy of being rcprments, on the contrary, a
PIamnitation of Aristode.” Nor shall 1 linger on R i m r ’ s contention
in The R d e o f Metaphor that the entire theory of analogy is no more
rhan a pseudoscience, the result of theological presure on a Spccifi-
a l l y philosophicaldiscourse.5‘ Suffice it to say that the fundamental
reason why these and other authors rcjeci the idca of an analogy of
being i s that they contend that Aristotlc knew only the m a t h m a t i d
notion of analogy as a quanrirative proportion which, srrictly speak-
ing, could not be applied to the rclarion between the meanings of
being and k i n g itself, for k i n g itself can no longer be posited in
relation to an Orher.
T h i s argument would seem to be substantiated by the fact that
Aristotle never applies the concept of analogy-a concept which he
uses on scveral other occasions in the stria msc of a relation of
propomon-when speakingot the multiple meaningsaf being. When,
for instance, at the beginningof Book 4 at Metuphysics he writes that
‘‘ ‘being’ has K v c r a l meanings bur that they a l l have a central rcfercnce
to some one nature [pmshen kai miun fina physin) and are not entircly
differcnt things that happen to have rhc same namc [homonymas],”
he does not u s rhe word mdogy.” Moreover, the pros hen in rhs
proposition, instead of signifying a cormpondmce of relations, in-
dicates only the simple relation of a manirold to an originary oncncss,
298 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

with m p c m to which everything dse is derivative and dcpendcnt. In

the aftermath of Trendelenburg’s attempt to Save the analogy of being
by elaborating a qualitative ptoportionaliry, and hcnm a concepr of
analogy more general than its first and original sense as quantitative
proportionality, Brentano, following in this Scholastic tradition, also
assumed a second type of analogy in order to explain rhe relation in
Aristotte between the nongeneric cancept of bcing and its diffcrcnt
senses.’*T h i s second type of a n a l o g is not, however, one of pro-
portionaliry (quantitative or qualitative) but, as the Scholastics called
it, one of attribution, or, to USE Brentano‘s wotds, one with respect
to o n e and the same t m i n u s . Being. according to Brentano, has rhc
unity of analogy, a unity that gmundc the manifold and caregorial
senses of being, because its different meanings relare to it in an ad
unum relation. Being’s equivocal meanings ate c o n n e d M the unity
of a nonaccidmtul name (homonymos). Although of diffcrenr mcan-
ings, the categories relate to B common name as to a common origin
by virrue of an analogy of artriburion. They are indeed not cntircly
different things that happen ,rackfenrally) to have the same name,
bur refer to one necessary name as the source of their plurality. The
miry at this homonymon is rhe nongeneric unity of analogy. For
Brcntano, therefore, being i s douhly analogical: its different meanings
relate to it according to the analogy with r e s p m to the same terminus,
and. as Trcndclenburg has shown, they also form an equality af re-
lations. Indeed, although Arisrotle in Book 4 does nor use the term
analogy wirh regard ro the qucstion of the rnulriple sensm of being,
hc ncverthcless says in Book 5 t h a t whatever is related as a certain
thing to another, and “bears to each other the mme ratio or relation
that another pair has” (osu eCei os ullo pros d o ) . is analogical.” Yet
ir i5 such an quality rhar Acistotle claimed for his categories. and
which, along with an and ousiu, are, according to Brenmno, the majot
Senses in which being is said.
For what follows, ir is important to nore that thc theory of thc
analogy of being implilg that being is in itself relational. Yet as Puntel
has, intimated. this %If-relationality of bcing prewpposn that “being
is in itself and as itself difference, Le,, a self-relation that repeats itself
in and rhrough itsclf.”l” Only to the cxtcnr char being is differcncc
can it be said robe analogical. Although this conclusion may not have
b n n rhematited in the aadirion rhst stretches from Aquinas ro Bren-
tano, the crirics’ bbjecrions to the doctrine of the analogy of being
may well in essence pivot around this issue of difference. In any case,
it is as a doarine of thc difference of bcisg that the theory of thc
 THE INSCRIPTION OF UNIVERSALITY s99

analogy of being is of interest ro us here. I t is only in this perspective

that this doctrine is taken up again by both Heidegger and Derrida,
as 1 shall now ammpr 10show.
As an inquiry inm Ihc manifold senses of Being from the perspcmive
of Dnsch, Hcidegger’s investigation in Being ,and Time at first con-
tinues the classical prablernacics of analogy, for ir displays a n o n e
neric conocption of Being. As “the transcendens pure and simple,” to
quom Being and Time, Bcing lies beyond what is, beyond all imagi-
nable ontic determinations. Heidegger conceives of his fundamental
theme in a genuinely Aristotelian sense as “no sort of genus of behg.””
But the m e reawn for xcing Heidegger’s philofophy as a contin-
uation, even as a radicalization, of this tradition is that his investi-
gation of the different modes of saying Being is an investigation of
Being as the difference chaG within Being as ,a terminw, makes ir
possible for one made of umring k i n g to relate-analogously-t
that terminus, in the two senses of analogy 1 have distinguished. The
differma of k i n g a5 a diffcrence of the same is the tirlc under which
Heidegger engages his dcbate wirh the traditional philosophical prob-
lem of analogy.
In Being and Time this problem takes shape as the m-stnrchrre of
the understanding of Being, After having dablishcd that understand-
ing and states-of-mind (Verstebetr and B&dfichkeitJ are fundamental
exi5tmtiuh.7 of the being of the Du-exitientialia which sccurc the
primordial disclosedness of D a s h as Being-in-the-world-Heid-er
completce the stmcturcs of D a e i n by adding to it not language but
the possibility of language. In section 32 of Beingand Time, Meidegger
starts out by demonstrating that understanding is made explicit (aus-
driicklich) &rough inmprctation (Audepng). The analysis of inrer-
prctation in the sense of Awkgung (bemenmein)is an intermediary
step in the discovery of the third fundamental structure of the Dusein.
which isdiscaursc (Redel.Dimurseisindccd thepossibilityofspeech.
It i s imperative to understand in what way interpretation is said to
make explicit what is implicitly understood or sensed by the Dusein,
We must realize that interpretation of what is understood must take
place, according to the strurhrrul status of Dusein (which, one must
repeat, is therefore not just another name for subject or formthropos),
in an essentially prelinguistic, nonprogositiond, prepredicativc, and
nunthematic manner. The Daslin encounters rhe chings thar surround
it primarily as thing that serve this or that purpse, and not as pure
things or objects upon which it subsequently bmows determining
attributes. Hence, the interpretation of what is understood circum-
3m LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

specr*eIy is characterized by the structure of somPthIrrgussomething.

Heidegger writes: “That which is, disclosed in understanding-that
which is understood-is already accessible in such a way that its ‘as
which’ can be made to stand out explicitly. The ‘as’ makes up the
structure of the explicitncss of something that is understwd. It con-
stitutes the interprcrarion” (p. 1891. In other words, inrcrpreration is
the laying out (Auslegm) of the primary articulation of what is undcr-
stood according to the as-structure, which is an a priori artkUlatiOrI
(Gliderung, ArribuLtion). Intcrpreratian makes explicit that all un-
derstanding is primarily articulated according to the structure of
“something as something,” or in other words ”with regard to some-
thing” (mf e h a s bin). Heidcggcr calls this primary articulation of
undemanding and inrerprerarion Redc, which one may translare as
“discourse,” if one keeps in mind that it marks a srmctural level of
articulation anterior by right to all possible linguistic UttEraMCC. As
“the arriculation of intelligibility,” discourse is coeval with states-of-
mind and undemanding and prccedcs all predicative and thematic
expression and vocalization of understanding and states-of-mind (pp.
104-10s). As the third fundamental existmtiale of the Duseiv it
represents the very possibility of vocalization, of speech, of speech
am, of language as the mundane or worldly mode of the being of
the logos. Discourse in the sen= of Rede is merely a translation of
logos. It signifies rhe “logical” aniculation of Dasein”spreundcrsrand-
ing of Being and thus corresponds to the onrologically fundamental
strumurn of the meaning of Being. The meaning of Being hinges on
i t 5 articulation in tcrms of the as-structum.
The “ c x i s t e n t i a l - h e r m ~ e ‘as’ ~ ~thc name Heidcgger eves
~ ~ ~”c in
to the primordial us of all interpretation that understands circum-
zpectively, in other words ”with regard to something’’ (p. 201). T h i s
m is the fundamental structure of the logos as discourse, as the primary
articulation of understanding and interpretation, and achiwes the
originary dis-covering and dis-closure, which Hcidcgger latcr calls thc
primary opening, wirhin which propositionat predication may (ormay
not) come forth. I shall not deal herc with the leveling modifications
that are required to transform the existential-hcrmeneuri~1us into
thtapophmticm which isitselfthestructure of possibility of assertion
(pp. 196-21Ol.u Let mc Say on[y that as little as vocalitation is an
attribute of the logos as Re&, it is just as little an integral part of
assertion. Yet iust as logos asRedecontains the possibilityof language
in thc form of the structural determination of exprmedness (HiR-
ausgesprochcnheit), ir also contains rhe possibility of assertion in the
 THE IHSCRtPTIOH OF UNIVERSALITY 301

maural form of what is called Attsppmcheffheir, and which en-

sum that stating a n become communicative revealing. These smc-
ruraI dclcrminadorw are strumrally phenomenal and belong to an
order altogether heterogeneous to that of factual rcalization and vo-
calization. L am concerned hcrc only with thcsc originary smctum
of the logos, apart from its factual and contingent vocalization. T h e
strumres a n not dixovcrcd at the cxpcnx of the logos’s vocalization
bur inrcribe it as a possibility.
Having characterized, with Hddegger, bgos as discourse-that is,
as constituted by the articulation of inteltigibility aceording to the as-
smcrurc-1 must point out that rhe primary disclosure achieved by
the as-structure is a t the same rime a primary covering-up. Indeed,
since the a s m m r e uncovers ”with regard to,” it veils und reveals
in the same Thus, Heidcggcr has inscrikd an originary false-
hood into the very articulation of the logos, which will allow him,
with one structure, m explain why propositions cun be wrong. Illhe
as-strumre as the primary articulation of the understanding of Being,
made explicit in interpretation by the logos as discourse, is rhus a
structure that makes all understanding of Being by Doscin srrunurally
dcpendmr on circumspectivc inference. Everyrhing, as it were, is
understood primarily not by focusing on the thing as such but with
regard to something else, say, to the wkuf-for of the thing. As far as
the meaning of &ing is concerned, it can be known only us its diffcrent
-. Since rhe ofigi~ryamculawn of h e undemanding of king-
its intcrpremion-prccedm any particular determination of Eking,
and since each such particular senx of k i n g is s m m r a l l y covered-
up Being, Being icself is always only in its own deferral. Bting is dif-
ference; it is analogical in the sense that it is articulated within inelf
a s the unity of its selfsame scnscs. Being i s nothing in itself, but it is
the very “Iogieal” articulation of its own understanding within which
ir appears in a multitude of irreducible senses.
Ricocur, in The Rule of Metephor, shows a certain awareness of
the continuity b c n m n the traditional problematic of analogy and the
philosophies of Heideggcr and Dcrrida, when, in Chapter 8, after a
discussion of the problem of the analogy of being in Aristotle and of
the andogia entis in Thomas Aquinas, he discusses Heidegger’s and
Dcrrida’s treatment ofmetaphor. Yct becau~eRicoeur is primarily
mnccrncd with warding off any intrusion of @a into philwophy,
he m a i n s blind n, the ha that Hcidcggtr’s and Dtrrida’s investi-
gations inn, metaphor and mctaphoricig are not simply pOnica1 in-
quiries but are based on a philosophicd cancept of metaphor, and
302 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

are thus a debate with that philosophicd concept. Moreover, he tails

to sce that this debate is engaged with the classical problem of the
analogy of being. One can perceive the real continuity of all these
problematics only by recognizing that thc concept of metaphor in
Heidegger and Derrida is not simply one of poetic rcsemblance but
o m that receives a transcendental qualification from the field it is
applied to, to use Ricoeur’s words-a qualification similar to the one
that RictKur powerfully demonstrates in the case of the analogy of
being, and with regard to the concept of the mufogio I n t i s , both of
which are said to k nonmrraphorical theories of analogy (supposing
that metaphor is one with pocric resemblance).
I should now like to argue that Derrida’s treatmmr of metaphor
is a resumption not of what Hcidegger explicitly developed about
metaphor bur olthc more fundamental structure of the logos and of
the much older problem of the analogy of being. Consequcnrly, I shall
attempt to show that Derrida’s critiqvc of the philosophy of language
or of linguistics opens itself, not unlike Heidcgger’s critique, to an
exploration of ground structures which account for the phenomenon
of language. Yet, as we shall see, the status of these ground structures
in Derrida is, for essential reasons, very differcnr from what I shall
call the immanent or tinite transccndcntal strucrures in Hcidcgger,
Since analogy is, according to Aristotle, not only one genre of
metaphor but thc metaphor par cxcellcnce insofar as it is based on
an cqualiry of relations, the doctrine of the analogy of being-what-
wvcr the meaning of analogy may be-indicates that a certain meta-
phoricity is constitutive of the vety uniry of being, The as-structure
of understanding unearthed hy Hcidcggcr characterizcs understanding
and the saying of Being as hinging on a movement of transfer. The
relation “wich regard ID” in thc primary mode of circumspemive
understanding makes all understanding of something understanding
of sonerbitlg us somctlJing. A movcrncnr of epiphora. the movcmcnc
constitutive of metaphor, is present in all understanding of the ds
what. With this, we face a clear continuity between the traditional
problem of the analogy at being, Heidegger’s investigations into the
fundamental structures of the logos. and, as we shall see next, Der-
rida’s treatment of the problem of meraphor.

The CmeruEi~tiotlof Analogy

Before embarking on an analysis of “White Myrhology,” I should
fim establish that my linkage of Derrida’s treatment of rhe concept
 THE INSCRIPTION O F WNIVERSALITI 303

of metaphor to the question of the analogy of being ,is not an artificial

impsirion but is supporrtd by the texts. Indeed, Derrida cxplicidy
recognizes thar his analysis af metaphor CUKinto the probIerns de-
lineated by h e analogy of being. What remains irnpIicir perhaps i s
thar rhesc analyses of ntcraphor arc intrinsically C O M C C ~ C ~ with the
problem of the analogy of being. After having m i n d e d Bcnvcnistc,
in “The Supplement of Copula,” that the very possibility of a science
of language hinges on a knowledge about the c s m m of whar i s called
‘‘category,” Derrida writes:
The uttgories arc the figurn (sbbmrotu) according t6 which thc “sit+Ee
term” bring is said in thar ir is said in several ways, thmgb -1 tropes.
Thc system of the angorin i s the system of being’s turns of phrm. It brings
the pmblmnaticaf thcanalogybf king, i n i r l u i v ~ l n c s s o r u n r g u i v o c a l ~ ,
into mmmunianon with rhc pmblmatic of the metaphor in general. Ar-
ktotle explicitly links fhcr problmatics in affirming tbt & t b m metaphor
caordinarcr irxlf to he analogy of pmparrionality. Which wodd suffice to
pmve that the qucstion of metaphor is no mare 10be asked in the margins
of rnetaphysim than metaphorical style and the usz of figurn is an a-q
anbcllishmenr or secondnry auxiliary af philosophical discourse. (M, pp.
183-184)
The problcm of metaphor, then, is clearly s m to encroach upon
both the problems of analogy and being. Any inquiry inro mctaphor
is tbus per sc an investigation into the possibility Qf the univocality
of being. Yet Derrida does not explicitly address the problem of the
relation of his analysis od metaphor in general to the problem of the
analogy of being. Although he claims in “White Mythology” that all
the features that ,distinguish metaphors i n the theory of metaphor
seem m “belong to the great immobile chain of Aristotelian ontology,
with its theory of the analogy of Being” (M,p . 236),and that the
privilege that Aristotle attributes to the metaphor by analogy shows
that “this privilege articulates Aristode’s entire timaphorology with
his general theory of rhc analogy of &ing” (MBp. 242), he refrains
from clarifying this relation. “We cannot undertake t h i s problem
ha,” he writes, referring the reader to the studies of Aubenque and
Vuillemin (M, p. 244). Still, throughout his work D e m d a has re-
peatedly linked the problem of analogy and metaphor, and has sys-
tematically questioned the relation of thcsc two figures with respect
to the problem of being.
Although in rhe Poetics, Aristotle conceived of analogy as only one
species of mcraphor-metaphor by analogy-in his Rhetoric i t be
comes the paradigm of mctaphor. “Analogy is metaphor par excel-
‘1Od LITERATURE OR P H I L O S O P H Y ?

Ience. Aristottc ernphasizcs this point often in the Rhetoric,” not=

Derridi in ‘‘White Mythology” (M, p. 242). Such a privilege m a k a
the whole of Aristatle’s rnetaphorolngy dcpendcnr on his general r h o
ory concerning thc analogy of being. “Metaphor in general, the pas-
sage from onc existent to another, or from one signified meaning to
another, [is] authorizrd by the initial submission of Being to the ex-
istcnt, the a n d o g i d displacement of Being” (WD, p. 27). Elsewhere
he writes. “Metaphor, thus, as an effect of mimesis and homoiosis,
[is] the manifestation of analogy” (M, p. 238). In other words, analogy
is a phenomcnally more fundamcntal made of transport t h i n the
epiphorn constitutive of metaphor. Metaphor and the movement of
epiphoru arc to be thought against the background of and with respect
to the mart general problematic of analogy.
It is in parricular in his analyses of Condillac and Kanr that Derrida
has pointed out that this *‘fundamenral analogism” (AF, p. 83) from
which metaphor is derived is not only a principle of methodical and
universal linkage for philosophy but a general principle par excellence
insofar as it concerns rhc proper name of bcing. Indccd, within me-
taphysics, analogy ensures h u h the continuity of all derivation and
thc homogenization of opposite atden (M,pp. 31 1-312). Thus, for
instance in Kant, “the recourse to analopv, the concept and the effect
of analogy, are or make the bridge itself,” as and through which the
Third Crifique bridges ihe abyss berween the two absolutely hcter-
ogcnmns worlds of Nature and the EthicaI (VP,p. 43). The analogy
“brings together without-concept and concept, the universality with-
out concept and the universality ,with concept. the without and the
with” ( V P , p. 88). It serves to seal up (cicufriserjthc gap and to think
the diffcrcnee (VP, p. 43).
But the function of analogy is not exhausted by establishing such
continuity and homogeneity through a relation of proportionality or
of attribution between homologouselcments. “Thheanalogical pro-
is 3150 a refluence towards the logos. The origin is rhe logos. The
origin of analogy, that from which analogy procceds and towards
which it returns, is the logos, reason and word.’’ In metaphysics,
analogy is suspended upon the nonanalogical iogos as its origin. In
“Econornirnesis”we ,read t h a t what “regulates all analogy and which
itsclf is not analogical, sincc it forms the ground of analogy. [is] the
logos of analogy towards which everything flows back but which
itself remains without system, outside of the system that it oricnts as
its end and its origin, its embouchure and irs SDUICC.”I~ As Derrida
has dcmonstratcd in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” a certain dominating and
decisive hierarchitation takcs place between the terms of the relariotis
 T H E INSCRIPIlON OF UNIVERSALITY W C

thar enter into mrrcspondcnce in a relation af analogy. This hicrar-

chizing authority of logocentric analogy mmm from the fact &at one
tcm within the relation of relations comes to name the relation imlf.
Consequently, all the elements thar make up the rtlations find &them-
selves compriwd by the structure that names the relation of analogy
as a whole. That name, ultimately, 1s that of the logos (see D. p. 117).
Suspended at the nonanalogical ground of the logos, analogy is
dominated by the proper name of rhe log05 ourside and beyond lan-
guage, which, according to Derrida, is“ana1ogy through and through”
(SP,p. 13). Dependent on the proper saying of Being by the logos,
the initial submission of Being to what is in the analogical displace-
ment becomes sublated in the nonanalogical ground. And yet what
Demda’s analyscs consistently show is that the attempt 10 name anal-
ogy proprrly, and consequently to ground it in that name, takm place
only through analogies of analogies. As a result, the “analogy makes
itself endlessly abysmal” (VP, p. 43). Ir continues to belong to lan-
guage and to the l a m of difference, relation, and proportionality
which characterize it. Thus, although the analogy sewcs to connect
the heterogeneous and to homogenize rhc diffcrenm at the benefit
of it5 allegedly external ground (the logos), analogy also engenders,
as Condillac knew, a negative product, “rhe analogue of the analogue,
the useIess and vain simulacrum of discoutse, prattle, nonSens.e,” in
short, the frivolour (AF, p. 83). The message of this double of analogy
is that the proper or literal meaning of andogy is analogical. Hence
analogy is the rule, nor logos.
In light of what 1 have tried to develop up to this point, the gen-
eralized analogism that I have pointed out must serve to account for
a t least two things: The first is the fundamental analogism in meta-
physics which, under the form of the analogy of being, secuces the
univocaIity and the proper name of Being through an idealization and
a simultaneous destruction of analogy by casting metaphor against
metaphor in a war of languagc against itself, in short through the
metaphysical Aufbebung of analogy, metaphor, and all other rhetar-
ical figures. Even in Heidegger, where it is clear that “Bcing is nothing
outside the existent” and that “it is impossibIe to avoid the ontic
metaphor in order to articulsteBeing in language,” Being itself is still
said to be “done in its absolute resistance to e v q metaphor" (WD,
p. 138), And the m n d is the ineradicably analogical nature of the
proper name of Being and the irrcducibie plurality-Nothingness-
that separates the different senses of Being and haunts Being’s proper
name precisely insofar as it is a proper name.
One may argue, as Ricoeut does in The Rule of Metuphor, that
306 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

the introduction of the prohlcrnatics of analogy into the transcen-

dental discourse on being is the r e d of an exterior pressure of the
discourse of theology upon the discoursc of philosophy. One may
also argue, as he does, that philosophical discourse maintains irs sov-
ereignty by stripping rhc mathematical norion of analogy of its con-
ceptual rigor, a loss through which it acquires the necessary
transcendental qualities of the CeId to which ir is appficd. Onc may,
in addition, recognize in this reduction of the nation of analogy a
movement similar to Hegelian Allfiebung through which a notion
foreign to the philosophical discourse is turned into a truth of being.
Yet however one attempts to explain away the impaa of the question
of analogy on that of being, the simple f a n that the notion of analogy
mn and m w t be brought to bcar upon the question of being shows
that this notion profoundly affects the very concept of bein&.It can
be surmised that this aftecrion cannor necessarily be entirely controlled
by Artfiebung. If the concept of being-the concept of that which is
supposed to be the most original, unique, and irreplaceablc-can be
affcacd at all by analogy, then this possibility has to be accounted
for and must be inscribed into the concept of being i d f . [f beingcm
be said in different senses, it is because the name of being i s not a
proper name. In that case, however, analogy or metaphor docs nor
surprise being from the outside. T h e possibility of bcing affected by
analogy must, then, come to being from the inside. Indeed, it is the
very idea of a unity of being, the idea of a being as such. of being as
thought (01s Cedochtes), that requires the inner doubling of being in
order to appearrrssuch. Thc space of this inncr doubling within being
is the original space of analogy or metaphor in general. T h e analogy
of being reveals what Derrida, in Of Grammurology, calls “a meta-
phoricity, and elementary transference” (OG, p. 292).This irreducible
metaphoriciry of the us nrch cannot be sublated in a gesture of ideal-
ization, because the space of doubling and repetition rhar it opens,
within which being can be rclatcd to itself, is the very condition of
idealization, Ideation, or the beholding of the general, of the universal,
is the intuition of the as what of species and singularities. Yet the
generality of the as wbai, that which corresponds to the proper, literal
,meaningof singularities, is the accomplice of analogy or metaphoricity
in general. Indeed, it is “from the tmpe that we learn about the status
of literal, proper meaning, the matus of that whichgives itselfus proper
meaning” (M.p. 2801. Hencc, gcncraliry, universality-rhat Is, the
“origin in general”-is clearly derivative of derivation, of the gen-
erality of analogy or mctaphoricity. 1 shall discuss in marc detail this
 .THEINSCllPTlON OP UNIVERSALITY 307

compliary b c m n rhe general as the proper, rhe QI~~~II, &in& and

so on, and a general analogism which a t the same time constantly
disappropriatesand particularizesrhe general, as I engage i n a n anaty-
sis of “Whiee Mythology.”

Quasimetap h i c i t y

One would be sevcrcIy misguided if one cook “*WhiteMyrholagy,”

as Ricocur does in The Rule ojMetqbw , as an m a y developing
some thesis or truth about the concept or reality of metaphor. To do
so wauId be m miss Dcrrida’s whole srgummt, and to atrriburc to
Derrida one or several of the traditional philosophical or rhetorical
positions on metaphor that arc dealt with criticallg in that may.
“White Mythology” i s not primarily concerned with metaphor. From
t h e outset, Derrida makes it clear rhac metaphor is a philosophical
mnccpt through and through, and thar i t fosters a continuist [diach-
ronic and symbdic) conception a t the cxpcnse of the systematic, the
syntactic, and the arbitrary. T h e subordination of the syntactic is
inscribed in rhc most invariable traits of rhe conccpr of metaphor to
n c a valorization of metaphor, say over concept-a
such an c ~ t ~ that
philosophicalthesis par exceilence-is radialIy excluded by the prem-
iscF of Dcrrida’s philosophy. “White Mythology’’ is a text concerned
wirh h e diffwmce (andits economy) bnvccn metaphor and mnocpt.
If we assume that both arc irreducible to one another, Dcrrida ex-
amines here the more general analogy that allows metaphor and con-
cept m reIate to one another and organizes the cxchangcs that take
place b e e n them. Focusing on the regulated play within which
these exchanges take place implics rhc (relative] autonomy of both
metaphor and concept, and precludes any h n l resumption of the
conapt by metaphor.
From this perspective. the pbilkphical positions on metaphor
displayed in the essay-that philosophy is a whirc mythology on the
one hand and on the o&+r that phdosophy i s frce of all metaphors-
arc not positions an which to capitalize, but whose impiiut logic is
rather to be exhibited. This logic belongs neither to a rhetoric’ of
philosophy nor to a mecaphilrisrrphy; it repmenrs the larger vista of
a discourse on figure no longer restricted to a regional or specific
science, linguistics, or philology. As soon as o n e rdects on the con-
ditions of possibility of a gcncral metaphorology according to which
alF philosophical concepts would be hidden, worn out, or dcad ma-
aphors, the need for a more embracing discourse on figure becomes
3Q8 LITERATURE OR I'HILOSOPHY?

evident. Following the prcsupposirion of ruch a (philosophical) po-

sition to its logical end-the belief that one can demystify the dis-
course of philosophy by forcing it to deliver the metaphorical d e m i a l a
of its concepts-Derrida demonstrates that the conditions of possi-
bility of a general phitosophical metaphorology are hy right its con-
ditions of impossibility. Indeed, if a general metaphorology that
systematically invcstigares the meraphorical credentials of philoso-
phy's conceptuality must presuppose the concept ofmetaphor, then
at least one concept, thc concept of mctaphor, nccessarily escapes the
enterprise of accounting for thc metaphoricky of all philasophical
conceprs. At tcasr one mcraphor, thc rneraphor of thc conccpt of
metaphor rcquired to makc a phifosophical metaphornlogy possible,
escapes thc cntcrprise ~Fclassilicationas well. f h u s the metaphor that
escapes a general metaphorology, the metaphor of metaphor, rhe
metaphor of the philosophical concepc of mctaphar which one pce-
same5 in order to reduce all other conccpk ro the metaphors they
conceal, can, of course, no longer be a simple metaphor. It cannot
merely be identical with the improper figure of a proper concept,
which, however, is not to say that it would be a more fundamental
proper concept. 7)le metaphor of metaphor, since ir is no longer
derivative of a mnccpt. or a n ultimate signified, signifies a misa en
abyme of the philosophical concept of metaphor. As a relation of
figure to figurc. of thc improper 'tothe improper, it is indicative of a
different articulation betwcen metaphor and conccpt, which Derrida
substitutes for the classical apposition.
Thc larger vista of a discourse a n figurc M which Dcrrida refers is
primarily concerned with this other articulation. It is imperative to
see that this articulation is not some common essmce of both concept
and metaphor, not a truer definition or proposition that would em-
brace both in a moreglobal concept. As thccondirionsof irnpossihitiry
of 3 general philosophical metaphorology have shown, this dillerenr
articulation is rhar ofa general mctuphonkity on which rnetaphorol-
ow's claim reuniversality is based.This general metaphoricityenables
metaphor and concept to enter into a relation En the first place, and
thence to indulge in a murual cxchangc. It is an articulation that
allows a concept to bc a n idealized counterpart of a sensible image,
without, however, lending itself co any final reduction ra its sensible
substrate. T h e general meraphoricity organizes thme exchanges, their
gmeralicy and universality, wirhout cvcr having been thematizrd in
traditional philosophy.
1 shall now try to characterize in more detail the irreducible meta-
 T H E lNSCRlPTlON O F UKIVERSALITY 309

photicity’in qustion. The following lengthy passagc helps sum up

the conditions of impm$ibiliry of a philosophical metaphomlogy:
Metaphor m a i n s , in all incssmtial char;lcrerisdcs, a classid philosopheme.
a meraphyriul concept. It i s therefore enveloped in the field h a t a gcncral
metapbornlogy of philosophy would wek to dominate. Metaphor has been
issued from a nenvork of philosophemcs which themselves cormpond to
mpcs or to figurn, and t h e philosophenm a f t contemporaneous to or in
a systematic mlidariry with thesc tmpesorfigum.This stratum of “tutelary”
m o p (hopes “insritullun“l, the layer of “primary” philoxlphtmcs (assurn-
ing hat the quotation marks witl MWC as a sufficient precaution here), cannot
be dominated. It cannot dominate imlf, cannot be dominated by whar it
itself has engendered, has made to grow on its own soil, s u p p o d on its
own base. ’ihmbrc,it gm “nrridaway” each rime that om of itr pmdum-
here, the concept of mctaphor-attempts in vain to include under its own
law the totality of thc field to which the product bclong. If one wished to
conceive and to class all the metaphorical pssibilitis of philosophy, one
metaphor, at least, always would m a i n excluded, outride the system the
metaphor, at the wry Icast, withour which rhr concept of m a p h o r could
not be constmad. or, KO ~yncoparcan entire chain of masoning. the mcra.
phor of metaphor. This extra metaphor, remaining outside the field that i t
allows m bc circumxribcd, extracts or absrrams itself from this field, thus
subtracting irwlf as a metaphor I-. By virtue of what wc rnighr entitle, for
economical reasons, tropic supplcmcnrarity, since rhe extra rum of s p c h
becomes the missingrurnolspcech, the taxonomy orhistory of philosophical
metaphors will nwcr make a profir. T h e statc nt $talus of the complcrnent
will always be denied to the interminable debhcmce of the supple-
..
ment. Tbc field is mver muratcd. (M, pp. 219-2203
Let us recall that both metaphor and concept are philosophical
concepts. If a general metaphorology claims that all concepa arc
worn-out metaphors, &en thc same must b true of che philosophical
conccpt of metaphor. Yet this metaphor ot metaphor must remain
unthernatized if a general metaphorology is t o auccecd a t all (and thus
to fail). T h e metaphor of metaphor is therefore the “founding” trope
of the pmjm of a metaphorology. As a tutelary or instituting trope,
as a “first” philosopheme, as a “dehing rropc” ,(M, p. 255), a5 Dcr-
rida also calls it, the metaphor of metaphor forms a system with a
chain of other such “archaic” tropes, giving the character Df a %at-
ural” language to the so-called “founding” concepts of philosophy
(the&. cidos, logos. and sa on). But, asks Derrida, “can these de-
fining tropes that arc prior to all philosophical rhetoric and rhar
produce philosophemcs still be called metaphors!” (M,p. 255).
A concern wirb the founding cancepm of the entire history of phi-
3 10 LITEIUT’URE OR pHiLosornu?

losophy docs not coincide with rhe work of the philolo&, etymol-
ogist,or classical historian of philosophy, nor with that of the rhcmrician
of philosophy. In other words, scmng out the defining tropcs of the
founding canceprs of philosophy, such as the metaphor of mcraphor,
neither proclaims the literary or poetic nature of phiIosophy nor gcn-
eralim metaphor as a figure. The Nietzschean “generalization of
weraphoriciry by putting into ubyme one determined metaphor,” Dcr-
rida notm, “is possible only if one takes the risk of a continuity
between the metaphor and the conccpt” (M,p, 262). Indeed, such a
generalization of metaphor may weU signify the pamuria of the proper
and the concept. Insofar as rhe invesrigarion inro the rropological
rnovemmts at rhe bask of the grounding concepts of philosophy lends
itself to a generalidon, it is onc t h a t decanstitufts the borden of
the propriery of philosophemes.
Of this generalization Derrida remarks in Dissminulion that “since
everything becomes metaphorical, there is no longer any literal mcan-
ing and. hence. no longer any metaphor either” (D,p. 2 5 8 ) . W h a t is
bcing generalized here is neither the proper nor the improper, neither
metaphor nor COFI EE~LOn rhe contrary, it is something that explodes
“the reassuring opposition of the metaphoric and rhc proper, rhe
opposition in which the one and the other have never done anything
but reflect and refer to each other in their radiance” (M. pp. 270-
271). The generalization hinted at by the metaphor of metaphor-
general rnetaphondry--is that of the logic of contamination and of
the contamination of the logical distinciion h e e n concept and 6g-
urc. Thcrefore, what is thus generalized can no longer be dcsignated
by the philosophical names of mctaphor, trope, or figure, much less
by the philosophical name of concept. In short, the metaphor of
metaphor, or mom generally the founding tropes of thc founding
concepa, are not, stcim~y,speaking,tropes. As Dcrrida asks i n “Plato’s
Pharmacy,” how muld the heart of all mctaphoricity bt a simple
metaphor? Hence, Derrida has recourse to Fontanier’s notion 01 ca-
tachresis in order to characterize the instituting tropes or the primary
(de ”‘premierde@) metaphors as the ”nantrue meraphorn thar opened
philosophy” (M,p. 259). Indeed, thcse “forced metaphors” o r ca-
tachreses are none other than violently creative tropological move-
ments which, within language, found the values of propriety. For the
5ame reason for which rhe metaphor of metaphor is a mise en a b y m ~
of the conccpr of metaphor-the absence of any ultimate mnccpr of
which this metaphor would be the metaphor-the metaphor of met-
fphor i s also B carachresric production of concepts (and subsequently
 THE IHSCRlPTlON O F UNIVERSALITY 111
~~~ ~ -

of metaphors of these concepts). Conxquently, the metaphor of meta-

phor is a nonaue metaphor, a “philosophical phantom” of metaphor
(M.p. 2581, at the basis of the philosophical values of propricty,
concepruality, Being, and so on and heir dcrivarives, such as impro-
pricry, figurality [metaphor), nothingness.
In the essay “The Retrait of Meraphor,” Derrida advances his
elaboration of the 5mmre of metaphoridrg, or quasimetaphoricity
as he calls it here, by analyzing a tropic movement which is comple-
mentary to the vioIent catachresticproduaion I have outlincd. In this
essay, the articulation that is said to be more originary than the
distinction of meraphor and concept, that splits, interseas, and recuts
ir, is analyzed in rerms of the Heideggerian notion of trait (Zlrg). The
rrair, wrircs M d a , “is their common origin and the seal of their
alliance, remaining in.this singular and different fmm them, if a trait
could be something, muld be properly and fully originary.”“ Yet rhc
quasimctaphoriciry of the trait through which a relation or reference
in general is traced, by which something UIPIcome to the fore in the
f i ~place,
t also implies an otiginary withdrawal, a retrait or retreat
of the trait. bnscquently, within the ntachrcstic production of rhe
instirutingnonrrue tropes. metaphoriciry does not reveal itself as such.
On the contrary, btcauw the trait is by essence rehait, the act of
insrimring, groundin& and defining, inaugurated by the “6m”tropes,
is self-effacing. I t is by the remit of the trait h a t the originary tropic
movements of metaphoricity permit rhe likes of the propcr, h e mn-
cept, Being, and SD on to come forth as the vcry oblirerarion of their
relation to the trait.
At this point let US rcRm on what Dcrrida’s inquiries into the
question of metaphor aim a t As is well known, the problematic of
thc trait, for Heidegger, is linked to the question of Being. The trait
of k i n g reveals itsclf in its vcry withdrawal. Now, wc have seen that
the question OF metaphoricity is that of the genetaliation of some-
thing anterior to what is traditionally considered to be general and
universal. It mnccms the genera1 conditions (and limirs) of general-
ization. By tying the problem of this more “originary” genrraliry to
the problematic of the trait as r e h i t , Derrida makes ir dear that this
more “primary” generality-beyond and a t the root of the distinction
of the proper and rhe improper, the concept and metaphor, the literal
and thc Cgural+annot bc a more proper general. It cannot be cx-
hibited as such. Moreover, by Iinking the pmbimatic of this gener-
ality anrcrior to the yneral to the Hcideggcrian notion of the Zlrg a~
Ewtrug. Derrida shows that his explotation of metaphoricity i s also
312 LITERATURE O R PHILOSOPHY?

an attemptto cometogripswith the question of Being. Moreprecisely,

it isan undertaking chat inquires into the gcneraliry of the most general
and proper-the generality of Being. I t is an attempt to link. in one
nonphcnorncnologizahlc synthesis, the general o r universal and Being.
From everything that has been said thus far, it should be clear that
the linking of Being to the no longer metaphysinl concept of quas-
irnetaphoridty do= not promulgate, in a Nierzschean or Renanian
fashion, a metaphorical origin of Being. Such an enterprise is grounded
in etymological empiricism. What we are dealing with here is, on the
contrary, a sort afrrsnscendmtal undertaking. Lct me cummmt briefly
on the folhwing passage from Writing and Diffwmce:
Every philology which allegedly n d u m the meatling of king to the meta-
phorical origin of the word“&iog,” whatever the historical (scientific)value
of its hypothesis, misses the history of the meaning of Being. This hisrory is
to such an extent the history of a liberation of being as mncems the deter-
mined existent. that onc may mmc to think of the eponymous existent of
Being, far cxamplc, respiration. as one cxismnt among others. Renan and
Nictzschc, lor example, refer tn respiration as the ctyrnological origin of the
word Being when they wish to rcducc the meaning of what they take m bc
a concept-thc indetcminatc p e r a l i t y of Being-to its modest mcnphor-
..
ical origin ,Thus i s exptrincd all of empinral history, excrpt precisely for
thr csrcntial, that is, the thought that respiration and non-respiraimn me,
lorexarnplc.And arcin a detcrmimd way, amungothcronticdcfcrminations.
Etymological empiricism, the hidden root of all empiricism, explains every-
thing except that at il given moment the metaphor has been thought us
metaphor. that is, has becn ripped apart a5 the vcil of Being. This moment
is the emcrgencc of the thought of Being itself, thc wry movement of m e
taphoricity. For this emergence still, and always, occurs bcneath an o r b n
metepbor. As Hcgel says somewhere, empiricism a[ways forgets, at the very
lean, chat it employs ‘the words tn be. Empiricism is thinking by meraphor
without thinking the metaphor us sucb. (WD. pp. 138-139, translation
slightly modified)

The Fallacy of empiricism as outlined here affects both thegeneral

project of B philosophical metaphoroIogy and the attempt to explain
philosophy (and the question ,ofSting) by in linguistic, literary, or
metaphorical origins. The enterprise of reducing philosophical con-
cepts to iigurcs of specch, tropes, and particular rhetorical operations
amounts to a facto-genetic description, with the help of available
empirical tools, of what by right absolutely resists these empirical
linguistic roots. Without denying the utility and legitimacy of such
reductions, “such attempts. however, would have their full value only
 THE I A S C R I ~ T I O AO F UNIVERSALITY 3x3

insofar as they would be conducted with the certainty thar everything

is spoken of then except the reduction itself, except the origin of
philosophy and history t h m s e h s and as such” {O,p. 132). l n d d ,
what thc empirical erymalogism andlor mpatagism cannot account
for is the rift in the fnite linguistic and mpologiul figure through
which it derignats nothing less than Being. In Wriritrgutrd Difference
we read: “Supposing that thc word ‘Being’ is derived from a word
meaning ‘respiration’ (or any other determined thing), no etymology
or philology-as such, and as determined sciences-will be able to
account for the &ought for which ‘respiration’ (or any other deter-
mined rhing) becomes a d m i n a r i o n of k i n g among others” (WD,
p, 139), What all rhcsc rmpirical approacha cannot hope to account
for is the interruption of metaphor by rhe thoughr of mcraphor as
such, by which rift metaphor as such, or metaphoricicy, becomes
thinkablcas themovcmcnt of k i n g itxIt Without thcthinkingof mct-
aphor as metaphor, one particular rnmphor could not be raised m
the status 08 naming k i n g as that which renders metaphors mere
existenrs. Being, then, is absolutely resistant to metaphor, as Hcideg-
ger claimed, because (as the ontico-ontological difference) it corrc-
span& to the vety movement of metaphoricity irselt Consequently,
to investigate mcraphoriciry as Dcrrida docs i s to continue, in a certain
way, the Heideggerian quenion of Being. As I have explained, both
Heidosgcr’s exploration of rhe fundamental srmctllre of the logos,
the as+truUtTUCe, and Derrida’s exploration of rhc i d u c i b l e meta-
phoricity of the foundingtropcs reprcxnt debam with thc much older
problem of the analogy of being, and are thus related to rhe question
of Eking as such, and particularly insofar as this question penaios ro
the being of language. For Heidegger, the being of language r a i d s
in the as-stru~turccharactcrisricof rhc logos; far Dcrrida, it coincides,
within the context of this given problematic, with metaphoricity as
previously outlined.
But to the exrent char Heidcgscr’s notion of Bring, according M
Dcrrida, is also a proper name, a proper unified meaning outside the
system of differences and metaphors that it makes passible-in other
words. a metaphysical concept-Dcrrida’s inquiry into quasimcta-
phoricity is also an a m p t to di$place more radically the question
of king. Dcmda achIms this displacement f i r s by demonstrating
that king, rhc proper, and so o n do nor csape rhc chain and system
of difkrcnca (ll n’y a pas & bars-r.te) and s m n d by ”deepening”
the qusrion of k i n g through a systematic exploration OT the rnovc-
mmm of quasimcraphoricicy h a t it designates. Schematically, the first
314 LITERATURE OR PHILOSOPHY?

demonstration t a k a place in “White Mythology,” whereas ‘The Re-

mait of Metaphor” addresses the second aspea of the displacement.
In “White Mytholqy” everything developed with r n p n t to the proper
name of the sun as implicated within the general law of metaphorical
v a l u ~also applies to king. If the proper name of thc sun cun give
rise to heliotropic metaphors,if the sun, this “nonmetsphorical prime
mover of metaphor, the father of all figures” (M,p. 243), can be said
to “ *sow.’ then i t s name is inscribad in a system of relations that
constitute it. This name is no longer the proper name of a uniquc
thing which metaphor would avefinlte; it already has begun to say
the mul!iplc, divided origin of all wed.” (M,p. 244)Similarly, the
proper and the essence of Being can be said analogously. Being is not
One or unique: “the determination of the truth of Being in presence
passes rhrough rhe detour of. .. [a]mrpic system” (M. p. 254). Al-
though the concept in its universality is irreducible to metaphor, fig-
ure, or trope, i6 status m concept (its intelligibility and universality)
hinges on its possibility of lending itself to rnetaphorization. General
metaphoriciry, o r quasimeraphoriciry, i s the name for that possibiliry
that inaugurates rhe conccpt’s universaliry. At the same rime it limits
this universality by virtue of its generality, a generality that cannot
be subsumed under universality inasmuch as the latter has grown o n
its soil.
T h e displactmcnc of chr: question of Being is thus twofold. On rhe
one hand, it appears 10 be inmibed in a system of differenm: on the
other, it appears to be a function, of quasimctaphoricity. In wizh-
drawing, the forthcoming trait makes it possible for something such
as k i n g to come forth as thc proper name hors-tcxte for a nonme-
raphorical origin of metaphors. Meraphoriciry names the “origin” of
an unavoidsblc illusion, thc illusion of an origin. Obviously emu&,
the “origin” of what ha5 always been construed as origin can no
longer be understood in terms of origin. The concept of origin (urkh)
is a founding concept of philosophy. The instituting tropes which, in
a catachrestic movement, give birth to that concept cannot be original,
first, and elementary in the sense of origin, or derivative of the found-
ing trope’s act of founding, To cite again, “Supposing char we might
reach it (much if, 5cc it, cornplchcnd it?) this tropic and prephilo-
sophical resource could not have the archeological simplicity of a
proper origin, the virgjnity of a history of beginnings” ( M , p. 229).
Yet therc is still one more reason why the instituting mopes cannot
have the simplicity of an origin, a reason that may be coeval with the
founding mope’s production of the concepr of origin. This reason
 T H E INSCRIPTION O F WWWERSALIIV 315

concern the plunlity of the tutelary tropes: “Metaphorn The word

i s written only in the plural. If there wcrc only one possible metaphor,
the dream a t the htart of philosophy, if one could reduce their play
to the circle of a hmiIy or a group of metaphors, that is, to one
‘ceniral; ‘fundamental,’ ‘principal’ metaphor, there would be no more
true metaphor, bur only, through the one true metaphor, the assured
legibility of the proper” (M, p. 268). This plurality of the defining
tropes, of the imduciblc mctaphoricity. contributes toward charac-
terizing in depth the sort of transcendental status of this prephilo-
sophicai resource. T h e irreducible metaphoriciry of the instituting
tropes-tropes that are not preceded by any pmpcr sense o r meaning
but arc the “origin” of sense or meaning-is nsmHaIly of the order
of syntax. The last chapter of “White Mythology,” which demon-
strates that an exploration o€the founding tropes of philosophy can-
not be a meraphilosophical enrcrprise comparable to Bachclard’s
metapottics, opposes this value of syntax to the primarily thematic
and xmantic understanding of metaphor in traditional philosophy
and poetia: “Now,it is because the metaphoric is plural from the
outset that it does not escape syntax” (M,p. 268). The inamcable
plurality and miduary syntax of the mnaphoriuty of the founding
tropes leads to a dissemination of the metaphorical in the prelogical,
within which metaphor destroys itself+It is a detrucdon that “ p a w
through a supplement of syntactic resistana, through everything (for
example in modern linguistics) that disrupts the opposition of the
xrnantic and the syntactic, and especially the philosophical hierarchy
that submits the latter to the former” (M,p. 270). How, then, are
we to characterize the irreducible metaphoricky to which a decon-
struction of the philosophical discourses on metaphor gves rise, that
is, an opersrion that fallows a cerrain logic of thcse d i m u r n to its
necessary conclusion, and that recognizes the necessity of marking
off that result from its homonym within the d i m u r x of philosophy!
The irreducible mctaphoridty of the instituting tropes of philosophy
is to bt characterized as a struchrrc of instituting, of grounding. of
deiining, which qud structure, and by virmc of i n plural and residuary
syntax, eliminates itself as origin. This self-dsrmction of metaphor,
although similar in so many ways to thc Hegclian Aufiebung of
metaphor in the paro~siaof meaning, is totally different from it, if
for no reason other than the abscncc of all rclcology. This self-de-
struction of metaphor allows Derrida to write, “Metaphor, then, al-
ways camcs ics dearh within itself’ (M, p. 2711. This death within
metaphor rearha beyand the traditional apposition of dead or Iiving
3r6 LITERATURE O R rwLosoPw?

metaphors, that is to say. beyond the grid within which Ricoeur

attempted m m m e r Dcrrida.
Metaphoricity, because of its s t r u w r c and the problems i t a r m u n s
for, is rhus not co he confused with its empirical (philosophic or
literary) hamologue. In Derrida’s sen% mctaphoricity is a shucturc
of rcferral that accounts for the possibility and impossibiIity of the
philosophical discourse, yet not insofar as this discourse may be con-
strued as literary (sensible, fictional, and so on) because of irs inwi-
table recourse to rneraphor and poetic dcvises, but insofar as it is a
getreruldiscolrrseon the trtiiwrsal. The literary dimension of the philo-
sophical tcxtis by nature incapable of pointing to, let aloneacmunting
for, this constituting nonorigin,ofphilosophy. Seen in this perspective,
mctaphoricity is a transcendental concept o{so.ts. Although iris likely
that the term I pmpme will meet with a g o d bit of disapproval, I
shall call rnetaphoricity a quusitramcendentol. With quasi- 1 wish to
indicate that mctaphoricity has a structure and a function similar ro
transcendentals without actually being one.
In conclusion, let me elaborate briefly on whar I understand by
such a notion. Ir certainly makes sense here to define the qeasirran-
scendental by demarcating it from that to which it seems tocorrespond
in Heidegger’s philosophy, from what I should like to call finite or
immanent transcenden&. Awaiting further sysrcmatic and technical
clarification of the notion of a finite manuendental, and its differcnce
from and conrinuity with Kant’s a priori forms of objmive knowl-
edge-farm5 that characnrizc the finite subjectivity and reason of the
human suhiect of cognition-I shall all finite thosc structures in
Heidegger’s fundamental oncology that characterize Duein. Since
Dascin is, according to the Heidrggcr af Being and Time, the ex-
emplary locas of the understanding of thc meaning of Being-that is,
of the Zrosscendens pun! and simple-the finite transccndenrals are
those existential structures that constitute Being as Being understood
and interpreted. It is clear that such a detcrmination of the transcen-
dental in Heideggcr’s thought hinges upon Heidegger’s concepr of
finitude, insofar as it pcrrains to Dusein or man (Mensch) and in
particular, after the so-called Kebre, to Being irsclf, although the term
of finirudc is, as Birault has shown in his excellent study of Weidegger,
no longer rnentioncd after Weidegger’s Xant and the Problem of Msm-
physics. IS 11 is a concepr rhar has lirtle or no relation to the Judaeo-
Christian idea of finitude. A5 Birault has demonstrated, Heidepgcr’s
concept of finitude does not coincide with the ontico-ontological idea
of a summum ne-enr in its diffcrence fmrn L summum em. Nor can it
 THE lHSCRIPTlON O F UNIVERSALITY 317

be conceived of in terms of the classical or modern forms of the oub

on or the me on. Rather, Hcidegger’s finite concept of thc tnnscen-
dental is a function of his investigation into the scrtlctures of the logos
of k i n g , whether this investigation is pursued in thc perspective of
an analytic of the Dosein or, as after the Kehrc, in the pcnpactive of
Being itself.
whereas Heidcgger’s discovery ofthe finite tranxwdentals is the
result of his philosophizing logic, the logos of Being, Dcrrida’s quasi-
transmdenta~sare a function of his inquiry into the condrtions ,of
possibility and impossibility of the logic of philosophy as a discursive
enterprise. (Discursive is meant here to include the conceptual, h e -
torjcal, argumenraiive, and textual order of philosophy as the thought
of unity.] The quasimnsandcntals-metaphoridcy, for instance-
upon which pbilosuphy’s universality is grounded are no longer rim-
ply transcendcntals, for they represent neither a priori structum of
the subjective cognition of objects nor the structures of understanding
of Being by &he Dasein. The quasiaanscendenlals are, on the contrary,
conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the very con-
ceptual difference between subject and object and even ’between Da-
ein and Being. Nor arc quasimnscendcntals Cnite, as one could provc
by pointing to Derrida’s persistent critique of the notion of finitude.
Instead of being situated within the traditional conceptual space that
stretches from the pole of the finite to that of infinity, quasitranscen-
dentah, more importanr, are at the border of the space of organized
contamination which they open up. Unlike the finice transcendental
smmm that preserve the difference between the a priori and the
empirical order (though for Heidegger, Being is clearly not exterior
to the cxistent) bccausc they represent answers to fwdumentul qucs-
tions, onto-phcnomenotogid or not, concerningthe essence of k i n g ,
the quasiuanwndentals an: siruarcd ar the margin of the discincdon
between the transcendental and the anpirical. They teinxribe “the
opposition of fact and principle, which, in all its metaphysical, on-
rological,and transcendental forms, has always functioned within the
system of the question what is“ (OG, p. 75). Therefore, the quasi-
ztanscendmtals cannot be said m account by means of mom rodiwliy
fundamenral concepts-say. by a more radica1 concepr of presence
(Anurem~)-for the presence (Pr;iretrJ of metaphysics. By dislocating
the opposition of fact and principle-that is, by accounting for this
conceptual differencc as difference-the quasimnscendentals, instead
of being more radical, seem to be characterized by a certain irreducible
erratic contingency. This contingency of the Derridean transccnden-
318 LITERATURE OR PHrLOSOPHY?

tats. their aleatory heterogeneity, is, however, nothing less than that
of the structural crrnmainrs t h a t simultaneously open up and close
philosophy’s argumentative discursivity. The question of the quasi-
rranscendental, of ,quasimetaphoriciry in this case, is a judiciary ques-
tion in a new scnse. Instead of inquiring into the a priori and logical
credentials of the philosophical discourse. Derrida”s hetcrology is the
setting out of a law that is written on rhc tinfoil of the mirrors between
which thought can either maintain theseparation of fact and principle
in an endless reflection of onc another, ar sublatc thcm in an infinite
synthesis.
Again, it must be emphasized that Derrida’s developments con-
cerning meraphar cannot simply, without mediation, be integrated
into literary criticism. First of all, meraphor as a figure and trope-
and that is the only way in which it affects the discipline of criticism-
i s overcome in Derrida‘s work by the more general nation of rneta-
phoriciry. Second, owing to the particular status of this quasitnn-
scendental, dcrermjned by the very sptcific phiImophical problems to
which it mponds, Derrida’s theory of metaphoricitycannot beof any
irnmedkte concern to literary theory. Finally. the problematic of me-
taphoridty is also a radical challenge to the generality and universality
of a discipline such as iirerary criricism. Only when rhtsc difficulties
have been acknowledged by a discipline that at the same timc would
have to frce itself from its status a5 a regional discoursewithout bcing
tempted to elevate itself into a new regina rcinttidnrm could literary
criticism acquire thc independent means to open itself to such issues
as those I have discussed. This, however, would also imply that literary
criticism had o p e d itself to a new kind of “rationality” and a new
practice of “knowledge.”
 Nom
Bibliography
Index
 Notes

IntroduEtion
T. Scc my *’ ‘Smung’ and “ h u n g ’ : Norn on Pawl dc Man,” Din-.
arifirs, 11, no. 4 (Winter 19811, 36-57, and cspccially “In-Diffcrmce to
Philosophy: Dt Man on Knnr, Hcge!. and Nicrzuhe,” in Reudmg de Mum
Reading, ed. Wad Codeich and Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: Usivcrsjty of
Minnesota Press, 1987). A h all. see Stefan0 Rosco, “An lnrcrvicw with
Paul dcMan,” NWOUO Comntc. 31 (19841,303-314, where De Man himsclf
spcako of this diffcrcncc between his own work and Dcrrida’s.
2. Barbara Johnson, “Taking Fideliry Phi[osophically,” in DiHermce ,
in TramlaFion, cd. J. F. Graham (Ihaca: Cornell Uniwrsiry h ,1985), p.
143.
3. Jacqus D d d a , “The lime of a Theis: Punctuations,” in Philos-
ophy in France Tmby, cd. A. Montefiori (Cambridge: Cambridge Univmiry
P-, 1982). p- 39.
4. Edgar Allan be, “The Pudojncd M e t . ” in ,PM@ mrd Tuks ( N m
Yo&: Library of America, 1984). p. 694.

I. Dcfining Rdectian
1. Dieter Hmrich. Identitrst m d Objekriuitit: E k U~tcmrchrmgiibn
K m b hunszertdmlale Dedvlttion (Hcidclbcrg: Carl Winter, 19761, p. 83.
Here and elxwherc throughout this book. whcrc no translator is named. the
translation is my own.
2. Edmund Husrcrl. I&. trans4.W. L. Boyce Gibwn (New York:
Humanitics Prcss, 1969). p. 191; Johann Gortlicb Ficbtc, We&, cd. 1. H.
Fichte (tkdtn: dc Gruym, 1971),1,67.
3, Hans Blurncnbcrg, “Licht ah Metapher dcr WahrhGt,” S d k m
Gme*u/c,10, no. 7 (1957).
3 z= NOTES TO PAGES r7-28

4. Herbert Schnidelbach, R&xio# und Diskurn: figem einn h g i k

der Pbilnsophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977). pp, 6Sff. For the following
brief characterization of the history of reflection, I am greatly indebted to
Schnldelbach’s study.
5. lrnmmuef Kant, Criliqlre of Pme Reason. trans. N. K, Smith [New
York: MacMillan, 19681, p. 267.
6. [bid., p. 287,
7. Hurrcrl, I d e a pp. 215, 219; SCC also Martin Hcidcggcr, Rolego-
nrmc evr Geschidrre de$Zeithtif(f$.GesmIdvsgabe, XX {Fmnkfurr: Klos-
termann, 1979), p. 132.
8. Apart from the more narrowly psychological or introspective sen%
of re&?don. thc“na~ralistic”mnccptof reflection. thcrcacc obviously more
rypes of renecrinn than those Ihave distinguished here. For a more exhausrive
review, see the entry “Reflexion,” by Hans Wagner, in Handbitch Phihso-
pbischer C m d b q r i f f e ,ed. H. Krings et al. {Munich: Kirscl Vcrlag, 1973).
pp. 1203-1211. Scc also Hans Wagncr, Philosophic m d Rcflcxion (Munich:
Reiohardr, 1980).
9. Hans Hcinz Holz, ‘‘Die Sclbstinterprctation d t r Seins,” in Hegel-
Juhrbuch (Munich: Dobbeck. 1961). 11, 83.

2. The Philosophy of Reflection

1. Ccorg Wilhelm, Friedrich Hegel, Fuirb and Knowledge, tmm. W.
G r f and €4.5. Harris (Albany: Stare University of New York Pms. 19771,
p, 189.
2. Georg Wilhelrn Friedrich Hcgel, Phenomenology of Spirit. trans.
A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Prcss, 1979). p. 18.
3. As to the determination of reffection as freedom. Hcg4 shows that
this m 3 i n s an abstracr determination whose refation ro the obiective world
i s one of an endless procerr of approximation. ofa StrtGcn or Soflrn.
4. H-I, Faith and Knowledge. p. 77.
3. Eugkne Flcischmann, Ln Scimce universef/eou fa lop+? de ,Hegel
(Paris: Plon, 19hS),p. 138,
6. jean Hyppolire, Figures de 10 pens& philosophiwe (Paris: Prrsscs
Univcrsiraires dc France. 1971). I, 195.
7. Flcischmann, La Science universcfle,p. 183. Rcischrnann continues:
“In afl c a s e docs Kanrian mediation have this rcflcxivccharamr .. . : r h m
arc two separate t h i n g defimcd as in opposition. and one is in search of a
third to link them together. This third element i s not a “thing’ properly
speaking, but a ‘relation’ (Vo.hiiir~nisJ,i.e.. an entirely pejorative term for
Hegcl ... It is impossible M tic the separated and bipolarly opposed clcmenrs
together by means d an exterior link situated behueen both” (pp. 183-184).
8. Hegel, Foith and Knowledge. p. 72. Subsequent references to this
work will he cited parenrherically i r i the ICXC
 NOTES TO FAGES Y.9-44 3 53

9. Gmrg Wilhclm Fricdrich Hcgel, Science of Ldgil.trans. A. V. Miller

INcw Yo& Humniries Press, 19691, p. S89.
10. Fritdrih Wilhelm Joseph Schclling, Systrm of Tranmmhtul I&
slim, mnr. P. Heath (Chrrlottnvillc: University Pms of Virginia. 1478),
pp. 14-31.
11. H-I, Phrnommologyof Spirit. p. 10.
1L Je8n Hypplirr. Logiqrrc ei c*islmce (Faris: Prrsxs Univmitaim
dc France, 1953, p: 106.
13. Hegel’s amque of reflerrion a n thus alsa k viewed as rhe radical
dcparmrc of a philosophy of integral immanence from the idea of a beyond.
Hyppohc describes this aspect of Hegel‘s criticism of Kant’s philosophy of
reflection in rhc following nrms: “Hcgetian philowphy rcjccrs alt transcend-
cnu. It ia the attcrnpt at a rigomus philosophy that could claim to remain
within the immanenr, and not to lcavc it. There is no other ,world, no thing
in imlf, no transcendence, and yet hire human dmughr is not condemned
to remain a prisoner of its finitude. It surmounts iself, and what it m e a l s
,or manifests is king iwlwlr’(Figures, I, 159).

3. The Self--De5rrucrion of Rtfleccion

1. See a h Qominiquc Dubarle, ’‘Lazogiquc de la &exion s la tran-
sition dc la Iogique de f‘em a ccllc de I’csuncc.” in Die Wismschafi der
h g i k m d die Logik der R q L d o a , ed. D. Hcnrich, Hegel-Stdiefi, rupplc-
mcnr 18 (Bonn: Bouvicr, 1978), p. 174.
2. Gcarg Wilhclm Fricdrich Hcgel, The Difference between Fichte’s
m d Schelling’s System of Philosophy, trans. H. 5. Hams and W. I k f (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 19771,p. 94. Further rcfcrences
to this work will be cired parenthetically in the text.
3. G r o g Wilhclm FEicdrich Hegel, ScmtceofLogic. trans. A. V. Miller
(NewYork: Humaniticr Press, 1969), p. 611.
4. For the differcna in the use of +prcrrlolive in the early Schdling and
Hcgtl, scc Klaus Diking, “Spekulaoon und Redexion;’ in Hegcl-Studmen
(1969),V. 95-128.
5. See Wcmcr &&cr, ‘%pckulation,” in Hmrdhcb philosopbischcr
cmrdbcgryfe, td. H. Krings ct al. (Munich: K k I Vcrlag, 1974), V, 1368.
6. Ibid., p. 1370.
7. Paul Rimcur, The R v k of Metaphor. mans. FL k r n y V o r n n b
University of Toronto Pms, 1977), p, 300,
8. Hans-Gmtg Cahmcr, Truth and McrM (New Ymk: Seabury P w s ,
197s). p. 423.
9. Hegel, Scimce of Logil, pp. 440441.
10. Ceorg Wlilhelm F S r i c h Hegcl, W d c in m m i g B a n d m (Frank-
fum Suhrkamp, 19701, XI, 271.
3t 4 NOTES TO PAGES 45-57

11. Ccorg Wilhclm Friedrich Hegel, Phmommofogy of Spirit, trans.

A. V. Millcr (Oxford:Oxford Univcrsiry Press, 19791, p. 38.
12, The categorial distinction between subject and prcdicatc an which
habinral (material or formal) rhoughr is b a d prcsuppmes. as J o d Simon
har demonstrated, an implicitly static rvnception of language SeeJosef Simon,
“The Carcgorics i n the ‘Habitual’ and in the “Speculative’ Proposition! Ob-
xwations on Hcgcl’s Concept of Soena,” trans. C. Heilbrunn, Coneem-
pomry G m m Philosophy, 4. D. E. Christensen cr al. (University Park:
PcnnDylvania State Univursiry P m s . 19831, II. 122-1U.
13. Conrp, Wlhclm Friedrich Hcgcl, Faith m d Knowledge. rrans. W.
Cctf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of N m York Prcss, 19771,
p. 80.
14. Jcan Beaufret. “Hcgcl ct Fa proposition spPculativr,” in Dialogue
uvec Heideggcr (Paris: Minuit, 1973), 11. 115.
15. Werncr Mam. Absolute Reflexion urrd Spruche (Frankfurt: Klor-
tcrmann, 1967). p. 16.
16, Wcgcl. Phenomenology of Spirit. pp. 38-39.
17. Martin Heidcggcr, “Seminar on Hcgcl’s DiffmrachrifL” The
Southwestern lournal of Philosophy. 11, no. 3 (ISSO).3R.
18. This solution of the reflective differences on the level of judgment
p d n , in Scimce of Logic. t L birth of thc Conupt, which alone i s thc
true synthesis of these nllcctive difficulties insofar as. i n ir. syllngism and
self-consciousness bxome tdcnrical.
19. Hegel. Phhmmrrenohfl ufspiril, pp. 39-40.
20. M a n , Abrvluie Reflexion. p. 22.
21. Sce ibid., pp. 3 1-32, and Gadnrner. Twth snd Method. p. 423.
22. Rimcur, The Rub of Mcrophar, p. 304.
23. Jean Hyppolire, Logique el existence (Paris: PTCFSCI
Univcrsitaircs
dc France. 19S~3),pp. 9 4 4 5 .
24. Ibid., p. 9.5.

4. Identity, Totality, and Mystic Rapture

1. Cmrg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The D i f f m c e h e h e n Fichle’s
m d SchelfmgS Systcm of Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and W. Cerf (Al-
bany: State Univerriry of New York Press, 1977). pp. 181. 162. Further
refetrnces to this work will be cired parenthetically in the text
2. Ccorg Wilhclm Friedrich Hegcl, Faith utrd Knowkdge, trans. W.
terf and H. S. Harris (Albany: Statc University of New York Pms, 19771,
p. 132.
3. Gmrg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science nfLogic, trans. A. V. Miller
(New York: Hummitics Press, 1969), p. 414.
4. Before disringuishing this concept of totality from its Rornanricmun-
terpart, Icr us linger one momcnr tanger on how i t muln from a dialectical
 NOlTS TO PAGE <7

ovcrcomingof thcaporiasofscflccrion. 1have argucdlhatHcgcl’sspcculativc

critique of the metaphysics of reflection brings to tht fort the idea of totality
as the ground presupposed by all retlcctive separation. But in order t~ grasp
what disringuishtx Hcgcl’e concept of tutdity, and thus his critique of the
philosophy of teflection, fmmm that of Fkhtc, Jacobi, Schelling+ and FrEcdrich
Schlqel, one must undersrrnd ihc way in which rhc progressive evolution
or %If-consuucrionof the Absolute or all-encompassing torality takes place.
As we have yen, the totaliry is moted in a sysrematic mediation of t h e
opposed plcs created by the separating action of understanding. T h i s m e
diation can best be graspcd in Hzyl’s discussion of the nflmive detctrni-
nations. For Kant, the reflective dctcrminadons are the most universal laws
normatime of rhinking. They are h e categories of understanding by which
an entity perceived as singular be nmssarily r e l a d to another such entiry.
The reflective determinations fix the diffcrenr ways in which understanding
links one entity ro another. Yct for Kant, particularly in Critique ofludg.
mort-and for f i c h e as wcll-the reflective determinations are determi-
nations of undmtandiig and farm n@dantinomies As Fichte’s system dearly
dcmonrtratcs, tcflectivc dcrcrminations remain ruspendcd in antinomid
synthcxs, which arc not truly dialectical because rhcy opm up to an infinite
or rathcr endlcss p m of mcdiation. I\s Genrg Lukia has obsccrved, one
of Hegel’s most important methodologicaldiscoveris is that thcv reflective
determinations are not static but are dynamically linked to the passage from
undcrsranding ro Reason. Hcgel rccogniaed thar rhey arc essential to the
overcoming of the difference, which is abyssal to underscanding, between
appearance and essence, the singular and t h e universal. See Ceorg Lukdcs,
Zur Onralogic &s Gesclkdufilichen Stins (Neuwicd: Luchtcrhand, 1971),
p. 84.
Although thc m f l m i v e dctermina&n. appear to b.esmriuf dcnmma-
dons (Wesmbeiren)compared to thc singular entities of permption, and thus
5ccm resistant to any possible invcrsion into their apposite, Hegel demon-
straw, in the water Logic in particular, &at the rcfleciive determinations
arc not cLwnccs entirely indifferent to and indepndcnt from onc anothcr
but are. on the contrary, entirely dominated by Pasidnew, that is, by their
relation to Other. Bur if the categories’ verningly wlf-sufficientand isolatcd
nature hinges on their relation m othet categories, tbey can IY) longer be
rigidly o p p o d to what they m e to explain: the obiccts of perception. Nor
can rhey any longer be juxtaposed to each other. Thus the categorim, or
d e c r i v e determinations, appear as par4 of a whole, of the Absolute, or
more prcciscly, they ere shown 10 acquire their conmnness only in tbc
pasage they bring about from their abstract isolation as determinations of
understanding to determinations of the thinking of the Absolatc. Hcgel em-
phasizes their rtlarivc ncccpoity, i f not indispensability, with rcspect to the
passage from philosophical d m i o n to sprmlrtion. Tbihir passage appcan
m be the rcpulr of a n inner dialectic of the reflective determinations rooted
3 26 NOTES TO PAGES 58-69

in their Po~itdncss.by which the negarivity r 4 t j n g from their relation ro

one another causts them to evolve progrssively into the developed totality
of hought, which they could not but presuppose as their. and their object’s,
common gmund.
It is thus imporrant to realize thar for Hcyl, the absolutc mtaliry i s not
a vagw idea but a gmund rhat truly assumes its p u n d i n g furdon when
cxpoundcd in all in logical ramifications.

S. Post-Hegelia* Criticism of Reflexivity

1. I shall not mamime hem the ways in which speculative mflcction
coincides wirh or differs from the Romantic nurion of reflcxiviry, bur shall
mmtion only that Hcgcl ~ v c r c l ycriticized the Romantie lor their religious
mysticism and for prolonging the Kantian dichotomia rather than corning
ID gxips with them. I inrcnd rocximine this particular problem in P different
study.
2. Gmrg Wilhclm Friedrich He@, Pbmattmology of Spin?, trans.
A. V. Miller (Oxford: Orfard Univmiry b s , 1979). p. 12.
3. H a n s k r g Gadamer, Truth und Method [NewYork: Scabury Prm,
19751, p. 308.
4. Dieter Henrich, “Hcgcls hgit d t r Reflexion: Ncuc Fassung,” in
HrgcCSnrdicn. Supplement 18 (Bonn: Bouvicr. 19781, p. 305.
5. For a more detailed dtfinition of the procedure of manrttuction,
see Dieter Henrich, Idmirut wnd Obiekfivilur (Heidclbcrg: Carl Winter,
1976), p. 10.
6. The w d rophroqme is untranalatabk in English. It refers, however.
to somerhing at the intersectinn of self-knowlcdgcand temperance, with mn-
France understood to consist i n an easy and natural self-remint grounded
not in graceless and difficult self-discipline, but in thc pleasure of knowing
oneself to bc tempcrate.
7. Plara, Collected Dialogues, ed. L Hamilton and H. Cairn3 (Prinmon:
Princeton University I’M. 19691, p. 113, see 167c-c.
8. Hans-Gcorg Cadamer. “Vorgcstalan dcr Reflexion,” in Snbjektiv-
iriit u d Memupbysik: Festschriff f i r Wol/gung Crumer, cd. D. Henrich and
H. Wagner (Frankfurt: Klosrrrrnann, 19691, pp. 138ff. See PISO Hcrbert
Schnadelbach. Rcflcxion und Diskkurr (Frankfurt: Suhrkarnp. 14771,p. 101.
9. Chnracrcrized by the property of self-movcmcnt, the platonic soul,
not suphrosyne. suggests an antcccdenr TO absolute retlcction. Absolute re-
flcnion is defined as selt-muvrrnenr of the Concept o r Notion, as a movcment
rhat i n the very act of in forward drivc Nrns amund and upon , i d 1within
itself.
ID. S e x m Empiricur, Against the Logicims, trans. R. C. Bury (Cam-
bridge, Mass,:Harvird University Pms, 19571, pp. 163-164.
11. Dieter Hcnneh, “Rchte’s On(tinal Insight,” trans. D. R. Lachm-
 MOTES TO PAGES 6+ar w7

man. in Contonporary Cmnrm Rbilorophy. ed. D. E Chrimsm ct el.

(Univmity Park: PcnnsylmniaState Univmity Pres, 1982). I, 20.
12. [bid.. p. 21.
13, Ibid., p. 22;see dso Dimr Henrich, ‘rWbstbcwusstscin: Kririschc
Einldtung in cine Tha~rie,” in Hmetrrurik m d Diafebtik, cd. R Eubner
et al., (Tiibingcn: Mofir, 19711, I, 265-266.
14. Henrich. “Ficha’s Original Inright,” p. 21.
15. Henrid, ‘%lbsrbmusaracin,” p. 267.
16. Henrich, “Fichre’s Ori-1 I n s i i t ; ’ p. 22.
17. Henrid, %Ibntbwosocin:’ p. 280.
18. Henrid ~ c m tso link his theory of a stlflm mKiousncss to Slur
srl’s themy of mnrciousncsli in Logicdl Inwsrigorionr (especially in it6 first
version).HusscrI had tried to establish by this theory 4Aih he lam aban-
dontd) that IO assume a “subject” or “df” as a constitutive principle or as
an irreducible rnanmr of eansdaumas ir only Mp i t a ratio nmard, which
explains nothing. Su Konrad Cramcr, “Erlebnis: T h e n zu Hegel’s Thmrie
dcs Selbsthewussstins mit Rijcksicht auf die Aprien cines Grundbegriffs
Nachhegdschtr Philosophic,” in Hegel-Studinr, Supplemcnr 11, cd. H A .
Gndnmcr (BowBouvicr, 1974), p. 547.
19. Ulrich Pothast, Ubbn einige hagm dm Selbs?be&urrg (Ftanklort
on the Main: Klmrermmn, 19711, pp. 76-77.
20. bid., pp. 104-105,
21. Walter Schulz, Das Problem dw Absolvinr Retlrrion (Frnnkfurt
Klcstcnnann, 19631, p. 17.
22 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
23. Ibid., p. 31.
24. GeorgWilhelrnFdcdrich Hqel,S&eofh.#c, rranr.AV. Miller
fNcw Yotk: Humnnidp b, 19691, p. 405.
25. Cramer, “Edtbnis” p. 594.
16. Ibid, p. 603.
27. Emst Tugendbat, Selbstbeunrpstwin ruedSclbst6estimmrmg (frank-
fait: Suhtkamp, 1979), pp. 33-34.
28. hid, p. 57.
29. Schrddclbach. Re@~ion wd Diskurn, p. 136.
30. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Beyond Refkction
1. Arirmtk, Metuphysk, mns. R. Hope (Ann Arbor: Univenicy of
Michigan k, 197s). 1041a15.
2. Friedrich N d c , On #he C*lwbgyof Morals and E c e Homo,
d W,Kaufmaon (New York: Vintage, 1969). p. 15.
3. Ibid.. p. 2S4.
77.8 NOTES T’W PAGES 81-108

4. Wilhelm Dilthcy, Sckecred Writings. rrans. H. P. Rickman (Cam-

bridge: Cambridge Univerrirj Prm, 1976), p. 242.
5. Martin Hcidegger, Being and Time, mns. J. M a q u a m e and E. Ro-
binmn (lnndon: SCM, 1962). p. 175. Furthcr rcferrncrs t~ this work will
be c i t d parcnthctically in the text.
6. Martin Heidegger, The Bmic Problems of Phmonrmo~qy,trans.
A. Hofstadter (Blmmingron: Indiana University Press, 1982).p. 175. Furrhcr
rchrenccs to this work will be cited parmtbcticatly in the text.
7. Diercr Henrich, “Hegels Logik dcr Reflexion: Neuc Fassung,” in
HcpI-Studicn. Supplement 18 (Bonn: Bouvicr. 1978). p. 307.
8 . Martin Heidegger, Hegel’sConceptofExperimce. trans. K. R. Dove
(NewYork: Harpcr and Row, 1970), p. 147.
9. Werner Ftach. Negozion rrnd Andcrshcii: Ein Beifrag zwr Probk-
nuriik der Ltzztinrplikution (Wunburg: Ernrt Rcinhadt Vcrlag, 1959), p.
45. Funher references to this work will h cird parcntherically in the rexr.
10. Such a distinction between two concepn of heterogeneity i s remi-
n i w t of a similar distinction i n rhe work of Cwrges Baraille. See my a s a y
“L‘Almanach hetirologique.” Nuom Corenle, 66 (19751, 3-60.
I I. Plato, Tbe Collected Dialogues, ed. E. Hamilton and H.Cairns
(Princeton: Princeton Universirj Prcss, 19801, pp. IOlStf. Rcfercnm to this
work will be tited partnthctiully In the texr.
15. Flach thorsccms tosharewith Platothe thcmcofcornplcmcntarity.
Although Flach’r complcmmrarity of rhe one and ihc Other seems to bc
quite different from Plato’s complcmcnra~virtues, whose mrnplemcntarity
is a function of their nryatively deretrninrd conrcnt within one whole, the
question remains whether Flach’s heterology is not already programmed by
Plato.
13. In responx to an cssay by R I).Cumming, “The Odd Coupk:
Hcideggcrandkrrida,” The Rsuiew ofMctapbysks. 34, no. S (1981). 487-
521, let us nore that instead of illustrating in an exemplary fashion a certain
limitarion af Derrida’s reading of a famous Van Cogh painting In “Resti-
tutions,” in h VerifP en peinzwc. a6 Cumming suggests, Derrida’s ehnier
of the shoelam as a guiding thrcad, constantly untied and rcknottcd i n his
snalynr, opens up rather than c l m his reading nor only ro a reinscriprion
of Heidegger’s and Shapim’s interprmation within his uwn but in particular
to the decisive question of symplokc. Instead of a limitztion, the choice of
the laces proves ro be a 61 mnducteur toward a dcmnstmction of the tra-
ditional conccpr of symplokc and its rcarrangcmcnt. so as to makc it capabk
of including that kind of heterogeneity that is disruptive of torality.
14. Hegel, The Differenre between Fiche’s and Schelling> Syrte-m of
Philosophy. trans. H. 5 . Harris and W.Cerf (Albany: State Universiry of
New Yurk Press, 1977), p. 15%
15. Aristoile. Mcluphysics. 1006b10.
 NOTES TO PACES rog-rr7 329

7.Abbau, Dcsimktion, Qecasrruction

1. I have written elsewhere of &e relation o l dmnstru&n to hyper-
n$&on in Merleau-Pony. !%ce“Dcconrmction as criticism,” in GIflb 6
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U n i m i r y Press, 1979). pp. 177-215.
2. Edmund Husscrl, Experience o n d j d g m c n t , trans. J. 5. Churchill
and K. Amcriks (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univeniry Press, 1973), pp.
47-48.
3. David Cam, PbctromL.ndugynndrhe Pmblm of H i m n y (Evamtm,
Ill.! NorrhwcsternUnivmify Press, 19741, p. 231; see alsopp.200-231 and
pp. 261-265 for a more detailed dmloprncnr of the prcvious argument.
4. For the manner in which this whole pmblem i s linked to the qumtion
of finirude in Knsxrl’s l a w work, xe 0, p. 105.
5. Edmund Humrl, Idem. trans. By. R. Boyce Gibson (Ncw York:
Humanities , P 1?69),p. 147.
6. Martin Heidcgser, The Basic h b l m s of Fhmommology, tans.
A. Hobtadtcr (Blwmington: Indiana Univmiry Press, 19821, pp. 22-23.
7. Jbid., p. 21.
8. Martin H c i d w r , Scing und T k ,rani. J. Maquarrie and E
Robinson (London: SCM. 1962). p. 63.
9. Ibid.. p. 44.
10. Mcidcggcr, Busic Problem ofPbcnornmofogy, p. 21.
11. Ibid., p. 22.
12. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
13. Emsr Cassircr and Manin Hrid-r, Dkbut mr Ie Kmtisnrc # lu
phitowpbk (Duuos. Mum4 1929) et ~rrniik m de 1929-1931. 4.P.
Auknque [Paris: kuchesnc, 19721, p. 24.
14. Manin Heidcggcr, On thc Way to bngwgc, tram. P. D. Hcm
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 96.
IS. Heideggm, Being a d Time, p, 44.
16. Martin Hrideggrr, ”On rhc k i n g and Conception of P h s i s in
Arimde’s Phy5ia B, I,” mns. T.J. Sheehan, Man und World, 9. no. 3
(August 1976), 241.
17. Ibid., pp. 225-226.
18. %id., p. 226.
19. Manin H c i d e w , tdmtiry ard Diffmw, mns. J. Stambaugh
(Ntw York: Harprr and Row, 19691, p. 52.
20. Ibid.. p. 49.
21. Mnrtin Heid-r, The Qw& of M g , mans. W. Kluback and
J- T.Wilde (NewYork: Twayne, 19$8), p, 103.
22. Hcidcggr, ldmtify a d Difference, p. 64.
23. Martin Heidcbgcr, Besic Writimp, cd. D. F. Krcll (New York:
Harpcr and Row, 19771, p. 236.
430 NOTES TO PACE5 II7-Ij8

24. Mamn Hcidcgger, The Qwrior Concerning Tecbnofogymrd Other

Essays. trans. W. Lovitt (NewYork: Harper and Row. 1977), p. 1 RD.
25. Ihid.
26. L‘Oreille de l’mtre: Texvs PI dibarr auec ]acques Derrida, cd.
C.Lcvsquc and C. V. McDonaM {Montreal: Vlb Editcur, 19B2),pp. 116-
119.
27. Jacques Dcrrida. “The Time of P Thesis: Puncrualions,“ in Philos-
opby in Frmce Toduy, cd. A Montefiori (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982). p, 44.
28. 1,’OreiIlede I‘aune. p. 118.

8. Deconstwctivc Methodology
1. Gmrg Wilhrlm Friedrich Hcgcl, F‘he~~ornrn~!ogy
of Spirit. trans.
A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). p. 29.
2. Ceorg Wilhrlm Friedrich Wegel, The Science of Logic, rrans. A. V.
Millrr (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 826.
3. Jacqucr Dcrrida, “hLangue er le dismurs dc la rnhhode,” in Re-
cherchts sur la phihophie cf le Iunguge. no. 3 (Crcnoblc: Univcrsiti dcs
Sciences Socialer de Crcnoblc, 19831, pp. 44-48.
4. Sec also W D , p. 263,whrrc Dcrrida r e f m to Hegel as one “wha is
always right, as mon as one opens onc’s mouth in order 10 amcutaremeaning”
5 . See Vincent Dewombcs. Modem French Philosophy. trans. I.. Scott-
Fox and j. M.Harding (Carnbridgr: Cambridge University Prrss, 1980). p.
139.
6. See a k a Jacques Dcrrida, “Economimesi~”rrans. R. Klcin. Diacri-
tics, 11, no. 2 (Summer 1981), 22.
7. Paul Ricoeur. The Rule of Metaphor. trans. R. Czcrny Foronro:
Univemity of Toronto Press. 19771. p. 287.
8. Louis blchusscr, For M m r , trans. B. Brcwster (London: NLB. 19771,
p. 194.
9. 5cc Sigmund Freud, Tbhe lnrerprctution of Dreams, rrans. J. Strachcy
(Ncw York: Avon Books, 1965), pp. 152-153, andJoResand Their Relation
to the Unconscious, trans. J. Strachey (NewYork: Norton. 1963). pp. 62,
205.
LO. See, for insrancc, Jacques Dcrrida, “The Retrait of Mttaphor,”
trans. F. Gasdner c t al., Enclitic. 2. no. 2 (Fall 1978). 19.
11. “Ourwork, Prefacing” is thc introduction to D i s s m k r i o n . “Titre
I prfciscr,” Nuow cmmmte. 28 (19111). 7-32.
12. Friedrich Schlegef’s Lucinde and the Frugments. trans. P. Firchow
{Minncaplis: University of Minnesota P m , 1971), p. 247.
13. Derrida’s criticism of neurtaliry aims not only at a m a i n ncu-
trnlizing a s p a of Hqelian diafmics hut atso at Hurscrl’r concept of “ncu-
rraliry-modificatiun.” which is cnrircly different from that of negation: scc
 NOTES 10 PAGES 139-173. 331

Eibund Husscd, I&, mans. W.R. Boycc Gibson (New York Humanities
Refs 1969). pp. 306H. For reasons ofbrevity, however, 1 shetl not bnhcr
invatigarc &is linc of thought.
14. It is intemting to note in passing that this Romantic conccpnon
af pnetry and literary criticism w a s the first to c a m the epithet nihiliaic,
which now saves trpditionalist criria to d s i g a n deconnruaive criticism.
15. “Inasmuch as one of them [Fichtc refers hcrc TOopposite perccpa]
is further dctcnnined, the other is likewise, simply because they stand in a
relation of interdmnnination. But for rhc 5ame reason. ont of the two must
bc detcmincd 6y its& and not by the other, since otherwise there is no cxir
fmrn the circle of interclctermination.” Johann.Gottlieb Fichtc, The srience
af Knowledge, trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Pms, 1982). p. 210.
16. Hegel, Scima of hpk, p. 433, Further rcfercnccr to this work
will be a d parmthctimlly in the text.
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of P m Rwcorr. trans. N.K. Smith (New
York: MaMilEan, 196R), p. 9.
18. In this context, Dmida’s in- in autobiography must be partly
explained by his ongoing &bate with thtdassical problem of philosophical
accounting. Indced, one of the b a r n of autohiapphy i s h e clrssical tom
of rhe mcomiunr,. by which the autobiographical and biographical =If-con-
xiousecss of an individual is shaped in the pubtic square. See, for instance,
M.M.Bakhtin. The Didogic Imuginutiom, trans. C. Emerson and M. Hol-
quist (Austin: University ofTexas Press, 19811, pp. 130-135.
19. As a point of inmest it should be mentioned that the pmbFem of
the infrastructure implicitly informs Demda’s intmducrion to Husscrl’s Or-
i g h of Geometry. It is important m note that what this intmductiona m p
is nothing 1- than to show the possibility of history. Indeed, it is in t h i s
context that the idea of infrastructure is fitst put ro work.
LO. Jacqu- Dcmda, “The Time of a Thcsis: Punctuations,” in Philos-
ophy in Frmw To&, ed. A. Monafiori (Cambridgc: Cambridge University
Prrpr, 1981). p. 45.
21. Martin Heidtggcr, Po-, hngmge, Thowghi, mans. A. Hofstad-
ter (New York: H a m and Row, 19711, p. 24.
12. Sac also Dcrtida, “Emnomintsis,” p. 4, for a dimmion of he
relation of restricted and gcncrrl economy. Dmida wrim, “Their rclation
must be one neither ofidentity nor of contradiction but must be orher.”
23. Plato, Timaeus 52b-c, in The Collcaed Oielogues. trans. E. Ham-
ilton and H.C a i r n s (Princeton! Princeton University Pms, 19B01, p. 1179.
24. Dmida, “Emnomimcsis,“ pp. 22-24.
25. M a m n HcidcgSa, Nie&. I. Thr Will io , P o w us Art, trans.
D.F. Krcll (New YO&: Harper and Row% 1979), p. 209.
26. For further discussion of the two rrcps of dccanmuetion, see my
essay “Drmnstnrction as Crincism,” Glyph 6 (Baltimom Johns Hopkins
112 NOTE5 TO PACE5 175-201

University Prcus, 19791, pp. 177-21s. Considering rhat the t e r m that is

privileged by the mcrsal of hicrarchicaf bipolar mnmptual appositions is
only the first step of dcmnstruction, a step by which the phantoms of the
beyond of philosophy becomesingled out, i t is improper to believe that this
reversal would imply a valorization of t h e phantoms. How indeed muld
an image or concept rhar SETVCS to hold rhc Oihcr of philosophy in check be
valorized? Writin& for instance, is nothing bur a ncgarive way in which
philosophy has deak wirh rhc beyond of irs own dixnurw. For this reason.
ir is absurd 10 accuse Dcrrida of a son of graphoccntrism wirhour cvcn
remarking that such a notion is a mntradiaion in terms. T h e xwod step of
deconstruction, in which the negative image is bestowed wmrh traits repressed
within the metaphysical determination of the cuncepr of wriring-mits rhat
bccome libcratcd to their hul force of generality-radically d i s p l a a the
negative imagr 01 the beyond of philosophy that is writing. The infrastructure
called archc-wriring i s an “outside” of thc discourse of philosophy and no
longer ha5 anything in common with i t s negative image, except for the name.
The accusation ~Cgraphocfnrrismis thus emonenus for t h e two rcasons a t
leasr.
27. Hcgcl, Pbenomcnology of Spirit, p, 40,

9. A System beyond Behg

1. P l a n The Collected Dialopes, 4.L Hnmilton and H. C a i r n s
(bnccton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 744.
L Manin Hcidcggcr, The Essence of Reacon, trans. T. Malick (Ev-
anston, 111.: Northwestern University Prcrs, 1969). p. 9311.
3. Yet a5 Dieter Hcnrich has remark&, ir was Ficbte who first u+ed
this concept. in rhe coniexr of an elucidationof the suucmte of rhc self (Ich).
Scc Dieter Hcnrich. “Fichtc’s Original [nsight,” trans. D. R. Lachtermsn,
Conremporury Getmon P h i h o p b y (University Park: PennsylvaniaState Uni-
versity Prcss, 19821, I,30.
4. Martin Hcidegger, Being ond Time. trans. J. Macquanie and E. RQ
binson (London: SCM. 1962), p. 170.
S. Mamn Heideggcr. h g i k : Die Frage nach der Wahrhei!. Gesam-
tousgobe, XXI (Frankfam Klmtermanu. 1976), p. 226.
6. Werner Flach, Negution und Andersheit: Ein Beitrag zur Prubie-
mdrik drr Lanimplikarion (Munich: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1959), p. 18.
7. Ihid,, p. 44.
8. Rodolphe Gaschi, “Nontotalization without Spuriousnew Hegel
and Dcrrida on thc Infinite? Tbr~oournul oftbe British SoEiay for Phmome-
tralagV (Fall 1986).
9. Edmund Husscrl, Logicaf Inwsrigutions, trans. J.N. Findlay (New
Ynrk: Humanities Press, 1970). I,274.
10. Ccurg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. En?rkfopadicd~PhilosOpbisEhen
 NOTES TO PAGES 201-267 111

Wksmchf&n, 11, Wcrhe m erumrztg 6&& (Frankfort: Suhrkamp, 19701,

1% 35ff.
11. Martin Heidcggcr, O n Time m d B e , cran5. J. Stambough (New
York: ltarpcr and Row, 19773, p. 16.
12. For the similarity bawccn the supplcment and tht p h a m l o n . see
0, p. 109; brtwm the supplement and the pnmgorr, SEC VP, pp. 65, 69,
74.
14. Dmida has anal+ this aspect of the rc-mark under the name
retrait in his article ‘*The R m i t .af Meaphar,” rrans. F. Casdner n al.,
hditk 2, no. 2 (Fall 19781, 5-33.
14. Ibid, p. 18.
15. Fdmund Husxrl, P&ronrmology md thc cririr of Philosvpby,
mns. Quende Luer (Near York: Harper and Row. 19651, pp. IObff.
16. JacquesD C d , “Living On: Border Lines,’’ in Deconstructionm d
GiticLm. 4.H.Bloom CI PI. (NewYork: Scabury, 19791, pp, 90-91.
17. Jacques Derrida, “Emnomimesis,” trans. R Ktcin, Diam’tics, 11,
no, 2, (Summer 19811,ZO.
1 8 , Ibid., p. 21.
19. Martin Heidcggcr, On the Way to h n ~ etrans. . P. D. H e m
{Ncw~Yotk:Harper end Row, 1971), p. 192.
20. Kurt Gdel, On Farmuly Undecidable Proporitions of Principiu
M & m t i c a m d R e l S y s k m s , rrans. 8. Mcltar (NewYork BaslcBooks.
1962).
21. kc atso in this context the rclermce in “Thc Double Session” to
the rhmrid figure of the syllepris ( D . p, 220).
22. cirard Grand, Traditionis Tfadirio (Paris: Caltimard, 19721, p.
71.
23. Edmund Husscrl, h&uJ Invcstigalions, 11 {l977),p. 527. Further
refmncls m this work will be cited parenthetically in the text.
24. Edmund Husscrl, Idcas, trans, W. R. Boyce Gibson (hkw York:
HumanitieE Press, 19691, p. 74. Further references to this work will be cited
parenthetically in the tcxt.

10. Literature in Purenrbescs

1. J a q m Darida, “The Time of a fh&: Punctuations,” in Philos-
opky in frnnre Tooday. ed. A. Monnfiori (Cambridge: Cambridge University
h,1982). pp. 36-37.
2. “Derrida I’insoumir,” Le N m l obseruutenr, September 9, 1983,
p. ss.
3. Edmund H d , Ideas, transK.8. Gibson (New York: HurnmidcE
Pms, 1969),pp. 105-110.
4. Jacqu~lmda.“LivingOn:BordcrLi~,”rrar. J.Hulbcrr,in Dc.
constnrcrion and Criticism, 4.H.Bbom et a!. (New York: Seabury Prcsq
19691, p. 1.39.
5. Martin Hcidcgser, On rhe Way to L u n p g e . trans. F. D. Hem
mew York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 192.
6. Martin H c i d w , Potty, language. Thought. mas. A. Hofsadtcr
{New York: Harper and Row, 19711, p. 36.

11. The Insm‘ption of Universalify

1. Richard R o y , Consrqtmices o{Pmgmdm (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 19821, pp: 90-109.
2, Let us recall that cverything that I have developed so far about
wriring is valid for “literature” as wll. “Ijrcramre” ma i s necessarily plural,
and thus calls for the clear distinction of its different genre.. Instead of
dreaming of a romantic rnixturc of a l l gcnns-rhe dream of the literary
absolrm or rranscendennl pocrry-“lircranrrc” is a grafting according to
well-defined l a m of what in C S X ~ C C remains distinct. See. for instance, D.
pp, 243 3nd 244. as wrll a$ “The Law of the Genre,’’ Glyph 7 (Baturnore:
Johns Hopkinr Univer~iryPress, 1980), pp, 202-232.
3. Derrida. “Living On: Border Linci,” trans. J. Hulbcrt, in Qecom-
smrction and Criticism.ed. H.Bloom ct al. (Nov York: habury Prcss, 1979),
p. 83.
4. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., “Derrida’s Axioms.” London R m k w ~f Books,
July 21-Augusr 3. 1983. p. 17.
5. Dcrrida, “Living On,’* p. 84.
6. Paul Rimcur. “Qu’tst-u qa’un texte?” i n HmrrenRIllh und Di-
akktik: Festschrift [Gr Hans-Ccorg Gadumer, FI (Tirbingen: Mohr, 19711,
pp. 181-200.
7. Because of this impossibility of phmomenologizing the text in gen-
eral, the text cannot be sawed, as Ccoffrcy Hamnan claims it must be in his
recent b w k Saving tbe Text (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Prcss,
19811. In the preface fa this study, Hartman explains: “By calting this baok
Suuing the text 1 do not imply a religious effort in the ordinary sense: the
allusion is to the well-known concept of ‘saving rht appearances’ (sozem za
pharnomenu), and my title suggests rhar we are still endcavoring to conven
thinking xa thr fact that texts cxid’ (p. m). T h e orpression ‘%asave the
phcnomcna” mcins tm rcconcilc obscmed and ,admitted facts wirh some
theory or doctrine with which they appear to disagree. But in the prcscnt
contextit alsoimplirsthatHarm~nis settingout, alrhough notin an ordinary
religious effun. tu save the text as an existing phenomenon against a phi-
losophy such 3s Derrida’s in which the icxt’s phenomtoality is being put
into qumtion. To Sgve the text is indeed an operation that rrstores the qualities
of cssencc, presence, and, eo ipso. meaning to the tcxi. Yet in YI doing, i t
renders null and void rhe explicatory p w e r of a notion such as the general
 NOTES TO PACES 286-318 33s

tst. Instead of facing the problem that the di&rena between texts and
m h r a l i t y rcprexnta, the operation of saving the tcxt reinstalls i d f in an
~qucrtionadtcrmal ontology.
8 . Roland Barths, “From Work to Tern,” in Texwul S&utCp*5, cd.
J. Hsrrri (Irhacr: Cornell University Pms, 19791, p. 75.
9. DoTida, “Living On,” p. 10%
10, J a q w Dcrrida, “The Rehuh of Mcraphor,” trans F. Gasdnrr et
at.. Enclitic, 2,no. 2 (1978), 13.
11. Martin Hcidcpper, “My Way to Phcnonrmology” in Otr Tinre and
Being, tram. J. Srambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972), p. 74.
12. See L. B m o Punul, An,ilogicrrnd Crrchichtlichkit: Phihophie-
pschichtIi&km?is& Vmrch iibn ~ R S Grundproblm der Mewpbysik
(F~iburg:Herder, 1969).For thclatcr Hcidcggcr and the problem of analogy,
sce pp. 455-531 ofhnrel’s study.
13. Sec Ekrhard jiingel, Zum UrrpMig cfm Andogie bei Punnenides
lard Hcmklir (Berlin: Dc Cruyter, 1964).
14. Puntel, Andogie und CLwkicbrlichkrit, p. 16.
15. P i m Aubcnqut, L P m b l h d e I’itre cbcz Aristote, 2d cd. (Paris:
P- Wnivmitairrn de France, 19661, pp. 199-20s.
16. Paul Ricocur, The R d e of M1*rphor. trans. R. Czerny (Toronto:
University of Toronto P,197773, pp. 259-280.
17. Aristmlc, Metdpby5k5, trans. R. Hope (Ann Arbor: University of
,Michiganprc9, L97S), IQ03a3S34.
18. Franz Brmtano, On the Scueruf S m c s 0fSri.S in Arirtotte, trans.
R. George (Berkdcyu: University of Califomin Pmsa, 1979, pp. 58-66.
19. Atistotle, Melqphyjiu, 1016b34.
20. Puntd, Atdogie md Gerchid*llhLcit, p, 56.
21. Manin Hcidcggcr, Bskg and Time. trans. J. Maquame and E.
Robinson (London: SCM, 1962), p. 63. Furrhtr refmnocs m this work will
bc a d parmrhctia!ly in hc text.
22. For more detail, see also Mamn Hcidcggr. h g i k : Die Fruge nuch
d n Wahrhcit. Gewtmtausg&, XXI (Frankfurt: KImtcrmann, 19761, pp.
1s3ff.
23. Jacqcsucs Dcmda, “Emnomimcais,” trans. R Kltin, Diumtics, 11,
no. 2 (Summer 1981), 13, 19.
24. Derrida, ‘The R e m i t of Metaphor,” p. 28.
2S. Hmri Birpult. “Heid- er la p d e de la finitude,”’ R f y ~ rItr-
imutiunak de Philorophic, 62 (19601, 135-162.
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brifischpr V m v c h iiber das tirmtdpmblem der Merupbysik. Frciburg:
Hcrdcr, 1969.
Ricocur, Paul. “Qu’cst-cc qu’un tern?” 13-1 Hmnen&#ik rmd Dialekrik:
Fertrchriftfir W&. Cudamer, vol. Z pp. 181-200. Tiibingcn: Mohr,
1Y71.
-. Tbe Rule of Metaphormtrans. R. Czemy. Toronto: University of
Tomnro Press, 1977.
Rittcr. Joachim, cd. Historisches Worrerhch dm PMosophie. vols. 1-6,
Darmsradr: Wisrenschafilichc Buchgcwllrchafr, 1471-3984.
Rorty, Richard. Consequences of I’ragnralism. Minneapolis: Univmity of
Minnesota Press, 1982.
Schelling Friedrich Wilhelm Jweph. System ~ f l i m r ~ r e n d mrdcuiism,
t~f mns.
P. Hcath. Charlo~tcsvillc:University Pms of Virginia, 1978.
Schlegel, Friedrich. Lurinde and the Fopmenrs, trans. P. Firchow. Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.
SchnBdclbach, Hcrbcrt. Reflexion und Diskurs: Frugen einm Logik der Phi-
losophie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1Y77.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 341

Schulz, Waalm. Di75 Problem dtr Absolurm Ref?erh. Frankfurt Klosrrr-

mmn, 1963.
Scxms Empiriw. Aguht h c rogicimrS trans. R G. Bury. Cambridge, Mass.:
Hanard University Press, 1957.
Simon, Josef. “The Cartgorics in the ‘Habitual’ and in h c ‘Spaculazivc’
Proposition: Ob~wationcon H-l’s Concept of Science,” trans.
G. Heilbrunn. In Cantempamy German Phifosophy, vol. 2 (1983), ed.
D. E. c b r i s r c n w ~CI at., pp. 112-137. University Park: Pennsylvania
Stare University Prcss. 1983..
Tugendhat, Emsr. &lbstbewvsstsrin und selbsrbcslimtnung. Frankfurt:
S u h r h p , 1979.
Wagner, Hans. Philosophic und R q h i o n . Munich: Rtinhardt. 1980.
-. “Rdlaion.” In Hmdbuch philosophischer Crundbepiffe. ed.
H. Krings et al., pp. 1203-1211. Munich: K W l , 1973.
 Index

A h , lU9-lllq113,llS. 120.124 &jamin, Wdnr, $

8
- 61
Aafounting, philoropldal, 141- Lnvmiwe, Emik, ZLU
143. ISI,ISb. 161-163. 175. u6 Binult, Hcnri. 316
A e n i m i ~mntandcnral, 114 l x ZW B l a n c h , MaUfice. UI
Aklbeia, W, 165 Bmnno, fnnz, g,&%198
Xltllutw, taria. Lu Buridam. John. 245
Arnbiyiq, 2wI.240-242
A n a l w , d Ixiw, 98-99.296-199. Csn; David. U&4U
301-307. Ltl Casrim. Emm, W
Apprmcptian. m a g m d d vniry of,9 Caahrrria, 310-311.314
Aquinq -.
27-32, 47, S2,7l-7& 86, aP
4298.301
Arche-ma. lR7dA 197,2pb. 212.
h i .172-173
ticm,
&#to,
43
17-11.B. 3 , 8 ! $ 8 4
22L scc a h Trace Caim&~ % U
opparilonm, 1
Arktatle, L 15.4679.86. lob. 145, Con-, 28.45,46.46. SO, 53,62.4S,
197.2M. 247. U6.283.294.296- 73, 103. 122. t4I. 314nt8; philowphi-
299,301. W , ull=3114 ot. 126-130.134+ 137.162. KL 17.L
As-srmburr. 29?-30L 1L1 174-175, 18FllB.1 9 J . Z D O . ~
Aubcnpvs Piarc, 297.3Q.3 2I9,294,307-3 11.3 14.3 I7
Ausiin, J. L. 26 Condillsc Ericnnc. 3W. X!5
Aurarfftction, 1 4 1?4-19S, U L U 6
Aumblagnphy, el, 331n18
Conmdmon, 4dt 63,78, m 9 2 . 9 5 .
g?,
l04> 126-128.129,132-133~
Bachdrrd, Cpnon, L6L 112 135-13b.137.140-142.14Y. 149,
Bpnhs, Roland, 289 174,204-205.127.231.
Fhtaillc, k w . 103, 160. 161,274. 214,242
328ni0 Coputa, m49
hcing, 21.84.98.177.246.284-2B6, Cramcr. Konnd, 7L327nt 8
296-299.306.313: and liiennrcc. Critirr. 66
258-2604 md rn283-288,X Cntiaw d m a m m m k & 2. l a
&in& 64,115-86,87,112,1f3,114- 141,255-2.56,269,274; literary, 141-
117.119.149, 181.203-2M,Z48. U261-269.178, 2&318; the-
184-288. % 299-300.302- macic. 245. 262-266.262
307, J 11-3 1 q, 316 Gumming, R. D.,328nl3
344 INDEX

Derek. pZ-SS. 203.299-300.316-317 &sen=, B,119-tZO. 14bl42.149-

Dmnrreuaion,?. 102. 109. 111. 118,
120.121, 122, 123,114. 126. 118.
135-136. 137-138.14l-144,
147,151.i . w - 1 ~ 7 .isn. 160, 161.
1 6 3 - 1 7 6 . 1 7 9 - 1 ~ 0 , ~1-268.
q 29-31. 32, 33.40. $3. 5b.56,5¶. 60.
293; and mflmion, & D l 173,211. 68-74 139-140. 324-326n4,331nlS.
2511-239.m2=2!?2 332n3
&Man. Paul, h 3 2 l n l FiniruJc. 84, 179-180. 184. 21s. 218.
& S a u s w ~ Fcrdinmd, 131. 132. 136, 233.316-317.323n13
mZz
z flarh, Wernm. 88-95, 97,99,101-104,
h a n n . Rent. 13, 14. IS, 16. 17, 18. IRZ-IRJ,31Bn12
19, 25.30. 41, 46. 5 % 62,66. 78. 80.
82. ~ 3 . 8 4 .&r
- 26
Ucischmm. Exent.
Fononicr. Pierre, 310
DFrlnrbion, 1 B 11M14, 118, 119, Fragment. l Z L l 8 l l
mu4 Freedom, 14-1$,26.54.60.62.61. 84.
Drtrrmination, 37-39,46,89-92,94, 174.322n3
Llk rccipmal. SS. 139-142; ~ R m i v e . Freud. Sigmund, %, E,186
37. SP. 102. 140. 237,524-316n4;
wlf-dcarminanon. 40,45, 53, 122,
llp=142 Cadrmtr, Hrm-Garg, 43.45,64,t24h
Dircriticiy.SN Ditlmnfirliy m
Dirlccric. 21,33*49-50, 60,fd. && % 9% 185-185.2?4,276.277-
C=ncralin.
91, 91. 94. 96. 98-99. 102, 104. 122. 278.306-307. .311-31& 314,316.
~~z-~s~.~~s.zw-~o~.u~.zs~- 317,318
241. &L LT?, 279. L82 W e l . Kun, 240
Grammar, 2% 2 4 5 . m Hk pure la&
95. 1IxI. 104, ISO. 153. E!?,
Differancc,
194-205. W ,211. u1 cdl, 145-2411
D i f f c m x r . 87-88, 93.94. 102. 104. 127. Grmcl. Gcrard. & 246
130. I3I.150-151. lS4. 156, 187- Grriyh. Jan.1
J 193. 194-195. 196. B lKL
W Gmund, 72-73, 77,82,89-93, IW.103,
203-LOz, 215. 229-230.232. ll4-lt6, 118.I20, 141-143.148-
213-236.26S. 27s. 285-2116. 288. H$,154-156,160-161, lZL 181,
E?L 2%298-299.301, 304,317; 183,216,254 286
on~co.onmlogical,116.117-118, 148,
LQMM, 2 ~ 6inn,
, 313,316
Diikrmtialir,. 131.201-203,2M, 272
Dilkrrntiarion, a105. 221
Dilrhy, Wilhelrn, Q Q k4
Dirseminirion, 237. lls
Oissymmctry, 137-131. 173. Lu
Dualism.. -137. DS
llupliution,91,93.94-95. 155, 155,
ZI2,215-216.111,220,1LS-23R. u1s

Empiricism. radical, l a 186

E p r k r i t r . I# ouridi, 127,210. 274
Fqochr. SIE Rcduttinn, phmomno-
lugid
Equiprimmdirli~. a 9 3 191-184.22S
 INDEX 341

J d i . Redrich Hanrich. 31, a

324
32W
H&q. 8<135,89-93.95,9?, Jnspers. Kad, 82
Johnson, &Ib.n. 1
IS.?, L% 216,220,222,L14, 236. Judgmcnr. I8.28.30.46-49. 82.90,92,
277. JIB 93.94, lOs-IlU. ?.a
Herrmlogol,
HerrmlOgol, 53. W-93.95.1110,l82-
--_,
111 -.
271
183,151 Kant, Immanud, 14.15. 17. IS, 19.20,
Hanolcpy. 88-97.100-105. & u U.23-34.42.43.47-49. SO. S1,5&
m w 318 53. 56, 5 9 , 60,61-62, 68, 71, 73a80,
Hwnrchv. 155.
Hicnrchv. VI a 3 , 1 1 i , i u , 130,14~,151,158, 179,
Hdgran. S h Z . 6 200-101,229,275-276,3M, 316.
H ~ I n-
~ , ti+ a 322n7.3Un13.521-326n4. SYnl
H d . Edm~nd5 7%14.19-20.70,
80, 82.flS.98. lO!J-llZ. 114,1111.
119, 120, 126, t50,158. 1111, 183,
194,197,200-201, L28-229.
233.244-250.255. ,284. 271,276.
284. 292=293,3UnIS, 33On13.
331nl9
Hpjdim, Jnn. 27.34.51.323013

Idtaliq. SBC Idcatintion

Ikbutim, 184-185.192-193,
195.214-216. no.zu. 231-212.
271-172.274.Ulh
Idmri6pban. 211,Llh
Identity. 54-51, q88,93,127. 173,
177. I87,21CZIS. 219,M,U?-
228.231.281.296
fhniry, 37-39.44, 5#. 179-18(1.184,
21 I, g17A218,225& u23235.
239.317
lnfnamrmrr 7+9S, 101,t42143. 144,
147-154 ~28.159.160,162.163,
.-
.
16~-166.170.172.173-174.183-
I84,18S,2CUl, z Z ? . l Z S . 237,
21¶-245.24&Ul?.69-1~, 276-
277.331n19; system 01. ln-17A.l80$
181.183-115.186.194,221.237-

.--
Immriauliv.2if. 248.264.171,ZM
Inmition, i d l m a l , 29-33.37.53. 58,
71, 72.82. U 7
34.6 INDEX

Mcnphomlogy. 307-109.312 Putkra. Yltich. 71-71.26

Mtthdd. 8& W Pmmflcxivc. 82-85.I19.133.235
Middle. T*r Mcdium h u m i t i o n . 75. 76. 80. 86-88.94,
Mimtsis, LKL u14 9L ull
Mimcrologtfm. 2.56-160.161.282 Pmwition. apculatiuc, 4 6 4 9
Puntd. L Bruno. 29&2!38
Nrpytion. 37.9D. 92.94.96, l0.2 Pythagofunism. 297
v ss.W-9s.s7.
~ ~ ~ ~ i57, i y . 101-104.
L2z, 204-205, 227-228. 234- Rappan. L6a=161
L!!i28& R e a m . 29.36.38-41.14, $3-54.57.
Moplatonism. l6 59,63, 7L 210
Ncurraliwrmn, 137-142. 154,159, 171, Rmnsrmmon. 6 5 . 3 2 6 J
173. 330" I3
Mirnrrhr. Fricdrich. RO, 81. 84, 12S, 135.
154, 171. 186,310.311
Notion. Sm C o n q t
Hovalir, ltl
Ockham, Wtlliwn ui. 177
Ongin, 131-132. 156, 157-161.lh2-
174, 180-182, 190, 206-207,
lO9-2L 1. 226,277,314
Orhrr. a& 63, 91-95.97.98. 100-
158-1- % 173,
182-183.187-189.190-194.199,
mi, ~os,z~~,~iz,ais,uo,~
215, a 150-25 I ui-u6
Othcmms, Q PI-95, 100-104, 124.
B 232.277.2Wl. 189
om, Rudalf, ml
hfmnyrnic,- 1 174
Ptnncnidcr. 116
Phenr.mmolc@z.mmr. lirnia of,-8S
3 185-186,212-223,~
21.1.2SO. 259-260. ZAS. 287,292.3l2
Phmorntnology. 7, 119-120, 120-151,
157, 162. in9, ZLB-L~O,245-246,
14% 2S5. Lkl-265.270
Phcnomnon. 219-210. ZB4-2R5, 281.

htD, 5 7, 56. 65-67, 86, 95-97.98,99,

122. 126. 134.142. 153,
162. 171, 175.177,21$+ 226-227.
129, 246. & Lr8, a
289. Rr-mark,2 0 0 , 2 m 224. a 243-
%297,328n12 244.260, 281,288.2Xk2.93
Pluralism. Srr Pluralin Rcnan, Emtsr, 312
Plurality, 7-8, & 160, 162, Rcpcnrine. W 2 1 2 - 2 1 6 . 1 ~ Z U
180, l ~ l - l 8 4 . ~ 2 ~ 2 7 R7r t m, t ,~225. ~ 260. 192. u
Positin& IS. 37>6.3. 92. 158.264 R R l c d . 171-17133t-332n26
Poirioning. Src PositmB Richard. Jean-Pierre, zht
 tNDEX 347

RidKrr, Hcinrich. 91-9L UL? S a m u r t , 80.86.88.9.1.129. t4Z, 143-

~l-r, Paul, 41,IS. 50-51. 128.283, N 180.181,102,l07
291.101-302, % 3 307, 31 6 Submviry, 13-14. 10. 21.25.26.40.
Ranantidun. 18-59.60.61, KL?, 53.54.60.62.64.69.71. 74. 80. 84,
137,13~-142,lLZl, U 85.110-11 1.15(I.l74, ,232,271
156-157.268.194.324td, 316nl. Ictblatian (Awfirbunb), 41.9s. 103. 116,
334n2 205,110, 135, %%1
R m . Richard. 174 279.306. U S

Spploke, 93-9R 289-290.328nlJ

Saint Augmim. U Sputegortrn. 244=1111
Sam,Jun-Paul. 283 Suntar, 126, I7.R. 159+ 162, 165,
Mapirn. Mryer, 328nl3 242-245. 246.249-2Sn.265. 307.
wlllcr. Msx. L? 3 I5
Schrllin& Ftidri& Wilhdm Joxph,1 3 5ynmrris. sbsolua, 89-91.151-1S3.
&ZS. 29.30-33.40.54. S6.58.59, 183; ietrasrmrmrd, 100, 153-154.
324-326d 2~U4,3lZLZZ7
khlcgd, Fracdrich, % 324-3264 S p c r n , 58-59.1S9. 165,169,178-WO.
Schnldelbach, Hrrben, 5 322d 183,193-194.% 124,
Schdarnciun. 297-2?8 2+8,219-292. Src alro I n l r u m r + h
Schulz, Wdicr. u=LI s p u r n of
Scima. doublc, 172-173 Syrtem.ocity. rn 180.
S . f f d i o u m c a a , 14-16, IS. 19,28.30. urn
3 2 . 4S, 47, 51.68-71.72.74.76-77,
~ 9 ~ n 6lv
. 143.162.rn
klf-idsltity, 70,77, 192-193,203,213-
116
SCXNSEmpiricuh 62
Shaemakm, Sydrq, 6
% m o o d , William of, Iu
Simon, joscf, 324nlL
S i d m , 226127,243. I Z
Skcptiuwn. 674% 70,71r 7% %$. 8%
wm
S0ctnt.q 6546
Sophism, the. 6S Thou& 32.42.44-45,62,89,92-93,
Sapphmye. &fJ, 326nn6,S 95.99-101.117.111.125. LUL
Spa=, 1%112.193,1p&2L12
Spaciag. 193. 1911-202.2OJ.lM, U J - I

234.242 Tinfoil. SeeTain

S s a r i w . 23.27.29.30.3Z 40,42- Toraliry. 22,32-34.36-4t. 44.45.50,
4?,49-53, 54, 5 9 , 6 4 65. 72. S?, 5$-59,@4.62-64, 70.74,81, #I,87-
pa74' 101-m. 105, no, UI- ?Va 95-97. IU-123. 124.127. 129,
232, 314-326d 145-146. IS3.174,179-18O,lSZ.
201,211.220-221. 23h-LU. 276-
348
Tncr. 129, 157, 186-189. 192, 193,
64.84. 114. t 6 l 1 B & a
172 274.276. 2W.302.316-
1Ls
Ttan.grmion. l a 16p=Izp
Tmndclmburg, Fricdrrfh A,. LPB
Truth. 3 j 3 3 1W.ILI-lZZ,I43,
150. 174, 179. 2M.214-215,218,
223,214-227.167, &I
Tugcndhrr, Ern% 76-77
INDEX
UndKidrbiliy. 7.95. 162. 177,
144.249
Vdcr(. Paul. 2.33
Van W. V i w n r . 321n13
Vurtlmn, Jukp, m
Whitrhcad, A t M North. Z$=X
Wiaprtcin. Ludwig 68
W"tinb 132.133, 157.166-167.171.
175,177. 181, 193,271-278.27g.
E& lirerary. a ?.Z3