Environmental

 Risks  of  Offshore  Oil  Exploration  in  the  

Barents  Sea  
 
Heike  Vester,  Marine  Mammal  Biologist  and  Bio-­‐acoustician,    
  Ocean  Sounds,  Lofoten,  Norway  
Felipe  Matos,  Marine  Mammal  Biologist,    
  Ocean  Sounds,  Lofoten,  Norway  
Richard  Steiner,  Professor,  (University  of  Alaska,  ret.),    
  Oil  Spill  Environmental  Adviser,    
  Oasis  Earth,  Anchorage,  Alaska  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
September  4,  2014  
 
Abstract  
 
This  paper  briefly  discusses  the  risks  posed  by  offshore  oil  and  gas  exploration  to  
the  marine  ecosystem  of  Svalbard,  the  Barents  Sea,  and  East  Greenland  Sea.    
Norway  is  currently  expanding  its  offshore  oil  exploration  activities  further  
north  in  the  Barents  Sea,  and  two  substantial  and  unacceptable  risks/impacts  of  
this  activity  are:  1.  Harmful  underwater  sound  from  seismic  surveys,  and  2.  The  
possibility  of  a  major  oil  spill  from  an  exploratory  well  blowout.      The  paper  
discusses  the  sensitivity  of  the  marine  ecosystem,  including  the  marine  protected  
areas  of  Svalbard.    And  the  paper  reports  the  distribution  of  the  1166  cetaceans  
observed  during  a  research  cruise  in  the  region  from  18-­‐30  August  2014.      
 
In  its  current  oil  exploration  in  the  region,  Norway  fails  to  comply  with  the  Best  
Available  Techniques/Best  Environmental  Practice  (BAT/BEP)  requirements  of  
the  OSPAR  Convention.    For  instance,  Norway  does  not  require  marine  mammal  
monitoring  and  mitigation  protocols  for  seismic  surveys  as  do  many  other  
countries.    This  means  that  marine  mammals  in  the  region  may  be  exposed  to  
harmful  underwater  noise.      
 
Further,  as  Norway  does  not  require  drilling  risk  to  be  reduced  to   As  Low  As  
Possible,”  Norway  clearly  fails  to  meet  BAT/BEP  safety  standards  for  exploratory  
drilling,  such  as  those  now  required  in  the  U.S.    This  exposes  the  ecosystem,  
including  the  Svalbard  coast,  to  an  unacceptable  risk  of  a  major  oil  spill.    The  
Statoil  blowout  scenario  analysis  for  two  of  its  exploratory  wells  was  found  to  be  
inadequate.    Even  so,  the  modeled  worst-­‐case  blowout  for  one  exploratory  well  is  
an  840,000-­‐barrel  spill,  which  would  clearly  be  catastrophic.    Contrary  to  the  
Statoil  scenario,  a  spill  of  this  magnitude  would  likely  spread  north  to  the  marine  
protected  areas  and  coasts  of  Svalbard,  and  persist  for  years.    The  impacts  of  
such  a  Barents  Sea  spill  are  compared  to  the  long-­‐term  severe  ecological  impacts  
of  the  1989  Exxon  Valdez  oil  spill  in  Alaska.  
 
Given  the  environmental  sensitivity  and  risks  involved,  the  authors  suggest  that  
all  activities  related  to  offshore  oil  and  gas  exploration  in  the  Barents  Sea  should  be  
suspended.      

1
I.  Introduction  
 
A  research  cruise  was  conducted  on  the  Greenpeace  ship  “M/V  Esperanza” from  
18  -­‐  30  August,  2014  along  the  coast  of  Svalbard,  the  Barents  Sea  and  East  
Greenland  Sea,  transiting  approximately  1620  nautical  miles  (Figure  1).    The  
voyage  began  in  Longyearbyen,  Svalbard  (780  N),  and  ended  in  Tromsø,  Norway  
(690  N).    The  ship  transited  shallow  waters  of  the  current  oil  exploration  area  of  
the  Barents  Sea  continental  shelf  southeast  of  Svalbard,  including  Bjørnøya  (Bear  
Island),  and  along  the  edge  of  the  continental  shelf/continental  slope  southwest  
Svalbard.    
 
Observations  were  conducted  by  one  to  four  observers  from  the  ship's  bridge  
virtually  continuously  while  underway.    Quantitative  observations  of  all  marine  
mammals  were  recorded,  and  qualitative  observations  of  seabirds,  coastal  areas,  
and  currents  were  noted.        
 
Regarding  Statoil's  current  exploratory  oil  drilling  programme  in  the  Barents  
Sea,  the  company's  Blowout  Scenario  Analyses  for  the  2014  Penguin  and  Isfjell  
wells  were  reviewed,  and  brief  observations  were  made  of  the  Isfjell  project  
presently  being  drilled  by  the  semi-­‐submersible  rig  "Transocean  Spitsbergen"  
(Statoil,  2014).    A  radio  call  was  placed  to  the  Transocean  Spitsbergen  while  near  
the  Isfjell  site,  asking  for  drilling  safety  technical  details  of  the  project,  but  rig  
staff  declined  to  answer  any  questions  and  deferred  all  questions  to  Statoil  
headquarters  in  Stavanger.      
 
A  phone  call  was  then  made  to  Statoil  offices  in  Stavanger,  asking  for  details  on  
safety-­‐critical  issues  including:  what  backup  rig  is  on  standby  to  drill  a  relief  
well,  and  its  location;  the  location  of  the  capping  stack  to  kill  a  blowout  in  the  
event  the  Blowout  Preventer  (BOP)  failed;  the  last  test/inspection  of  the  BOP  on  
the  Transocean  Spitsbergen;  whether  there  is  a  government  inspector  onboard  
the  rig;  whether  the  well  design  and  drilling  plan  had  been  approved  by  an  
independent  professional  well  engineer;  the  status  of  the  drilling  schedule,  etc.    
Statoil  communications  staff  was  unable  to  answer  these  questions.    This  made  it  
more  challenging  to  evaluate  the  current  operation  and  the  risk  it  poses.      
However,  as  discussed  below,  Statoil  and  the  Government  of  Norway  likely  do  
not  meet  Best  Available  Techniques/Best  Environmental  Practice  standards  for  
offshore  oil  exploration.    The  authors  consider  this  unacceptable  for  offshore  oil  
drilling  in  sensitive  Arctic  waters.  
 
The  authors  conclude  that  the  serious  environmental  risks  posed  by  offshore  oil  
exploration  and  development  in  the  Barents  Sea  warrant  an  immediate  suspension  
and  prohibition  of  offshore  oil  exploration  and  development  in  the  region.      
 
It  is  noted  that  such  an  offshore  drilling  prohibition  is  not  without  precedent  in  
Norway.    The  Norwegian  government  has  prohibited  offshore  oil  drilling  in  the  
Lofoten  Islands  to  protect  the  area’s  rich  tourism  and  fishing  economies  
(FNI/DNV,  2012),  and  87%  of  the  marine  waters  within  Svalbard’s  territorial  
seas  (out  to  12  nautical  miles),  including  Bjørnøya  (Bear  Island),  are  currently  
designated  nature  reserves  or  national  parks  and  protected  under  the  Svalbard  

2
Environmental  Protection  Act  (NMOE,  2011).    However,  as  is  discussed  below,  it  
is  important  to  note  that  Svalbard’s  Marine  Protected  Areas  remain  vulnerable  to  
impacts  of  oil  exploration  activities  elsewhere  in  the  Barents  Sea.  
 
II.  Environmental  Sensitivity  of  Svalbard/Barents/East  Greenland  Seas  
 
The  Barents  Sea  is  one  of  the  richest,  most  unique,  fragile  and  vulnerable  marine  
ecosystems  in  the  world,  with  some  of  the  largest  concentrations  of  seabirds,  
marine  mammals,  fish,  and  other  marine  life  in  the  world  ocean.    The  northern  
and  eastern  area  off  Svalbard  is  seasonally  covered  by  marginal  sea  ice,  which  is  
an  ecologically  important  feature,  and  of  relevance  regarding  oil  spill  risks.      
 
The  region  along  the  polar  current  front,  reaching  to  Bjørnøya,  where  southward  
flowing  polar  waters  meet  northward  flowing  waters  of  the  Norwegian  current,  
is  known  for  its  nutrient-­‐rich  water,  high  plankton  productivity,  spawning  
grounds  and  migration  routes  for  fish,  is  thus  an  important  feeding  area  for  
seabirds  and  marine  mammals,  and  of  “great  importance  for  biodiversity  and  for  
biological  production  in  the  entire  Barents  Sea-­‐Lofoten  Area” (NMOE,  2011).    As  
such,  the  polar  front  region  is  designated  a  Particularly  Valuable  and  Vulnerable  
Area  requiring  special  attention  in  the  Integrated  Management  Plan  for  the  
Marine  Environment  of  the  Barents  Sea-­‐Lofoten  Area  (NMOE,  2011).    The  entire  
Barents  Sea  region  is  recognized  as  a  globally  significant  marine  ecosystem,  
important  for  the  ecotourism  and  commercial  fishing  industries.      
 
Marine  Mammals      
 
Nineteen  species  of  marine  mammals  inhabit  the  area:  12  species  of  whales,  5  
species  of  true  seals,  walrus,  and  polar  bears  (Norwegian  Pilot,  2012).    Polar  
bears  (Ursus  maritimus),  walrus  (Odobenus  rosmarus),  bearded  seals  (Erignathus  
barbatus),  ringed  seals  (Phoca  hispida),  harbor  seals  (Phoca  vitulina),  narwhals  
(Monodon  monoceros),  killer  whales  (Orcinus  orca),  long-­‐finned  pilot  whales  
(Globicephala  melas),  beluga  (white)  whales  (Delphinapterus  leucas),  bottlenose  
whales  (Hyperoodon  ampullatus)  and  Bowhead  whales  (Balaena  mysticetus)  
inhabit  the  region  year-­‐round.    Other  whale  species  such  as  blue  whales  
(Balaenoptera  musculus),  fin  whales  (Balaenoptera  physalus),  humpback  whales  
(Megaptera  novaeangliae),  and  minke  whales  (Balaenoptera  acutorostrata)  are  
migratory,  undertaking  long  migrations  between  equatorial  waters  in  winter  and  
polar  waters  in  the  ice-­‐free  summer  period.    These  migratory  whales  spend  most  
of  their  time  (8-­‐9  months)  in  the  Svalbard/Barents/East  Greenland  Seas  for  
feeding  (Kovacs  and  Lydersen,  2006).  
 
The  field  observations  were  made  from  a  high  deck  (bridge-­‐level)  on  a  72m  long  
vessel,  the  M/V  Esperanza,  using  Steiner  Skipper  7x50  binoculars.    The  species,  
number  and  GPS  coordinates  of  each  sighting  were  recorded,  as  well  as  possible  
feeding  behavior.  Whenever  possible,  photographs  were  taken  for  later  photo-­‐
identification  of  individual  whales,  using  a  Canon  EOS  D1  Mark  IV  camera  and  a  
100-­‐400mm  lens.  The  entire  duration  of  the  research  cruise  was  tracked  using  a  
Garmin  Etrex  20.  
 

3
In  only  11  days  of  observation,  seven  species  of  whales,  dolphins  and  porpoises  
were  observed,  with  a  total  of  1166  individuals:  fin  whales  (n=301),  humpback  
whales  (n=31),  minke  whales  (n=93),  sperm  whales  (n=46),  Killer  whales  (n=8),  
Atlantic  white  beaked  dolphins  (n=664)  and  harbor  porpoises  (n=23)  (Table  1).    
As  well,  ringed  seals,  bearded  seals,  and  one  beached  herd  of  approximately  45  
walrus  were  observed.  
 
The  cetaceans  were  mostly  aggregated  in  specific  areas,  and  several  whale  
feeding  "hotspots"  were  identified  along  the  continental  slope  southwest  of  
Svalbard  (300  -­‐  900  m  depth),  and  along  the  underwater  ridge  off  southeast  
Svalbard  that  stretches  from  Hopen  Island  southwest  to  Bjørnøya  (Bear  Island)  
(Figure  1).    It  is  along  this  underwater  ridge  that  the  polar  front  forms  between  
the  cold  (10-­‐40  C)  southward  flowing  polar  waters  of  the  East  Spitsbergen  and  
Bear  Island  currents,  and  the  warmer  (30-­‐100  C)  northward  flowing  waters  of  the  
Norwegian  current.  Along  the  edge  of  the  continental  shelf/continental  slope,  
nutrient  rich  cold  water  from  the  deeper  areas  upwells  toward  the  surface  where  
it  provides  a  rich  food  source  for  many  species  (plankton,  krill,  squid,  fish)  that  
are  prey  for  whales  and  dolphins.  Populations  of  ice-­‐dependent  seals  are  
declining  across  the  region  (NMOE,  2011).  
 
Seabirds      
 
The  region  also  hosts  "one  of  the  largest  and  most  important  seabird  
communities  in  the  northern  hemisphere"  (Mehlum,  1989).    Large  populations  of  
seabirds  inhabit  coastal  cliffs  in  Svalbard,  including  Bjørnøya,  for  breeding  and  
chick  rearing  in  the  summer.    These  include  little  auk  (Alle  alle),  fulmar  
(Fulmarus  glacialis),  black-­‐legged  kittiwake  (Rissa  tridactyla),  Brunnich's  
guillemot  (Uria  lomvia),  common  guillemot  (Uria  aalge),  black  guillemot  
(Cepphus  grylle),  and  several  skua  (Stercorarius  sp.)  and  gull  (Larus  sp.)  species.    
There  are  15  established  seabird  sanctuaries  along  the  Svalbard  coast  to  protect  
critical  nesting  and  chick-­‐rearing  habitat  (Norwegian  Pilot,  2012).  These  
breeding  colonies  constitute  extremely  dense  concentrations  of  seabirds,  often  
with  hundreds  of  thousands  of  birds  within  a  few  km2  area,  staying  in  the  
immediate  area  over  extended  periods  of  time  (May  -­‐  September).  As  such,  these  
seabird  colonies  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  risks  of  oil  spills.    Most  seabird  
populations  are  declining  across  the  region  (NMOE,  2011).  
 
Fish  and  Invertebrates  
 
In  addition,  the  region  is  important  habitat  for  many  fish  populations,  including  
herring  (Clupea  harengus),  capelin  (Mallotus  villosus),  cod  (Gadus  morhua),  saithe  
(Pollachius  virens),  and  haddock  (Melanogrammus  aeglefinus).    Some  of  these  fish  
populations  provide  important  prey  for  whales,  dolphins,  and  seabirds  in  the  
area.    A  Fishery  Protection  Zone  (FPZ)  is  established  in  waters  off  Svalbard  out  to  
200  miles  offshore  (Norwegian  Pilot,  2012;  NMOE,  2011).      The  productivity  of  
zooplankton,  pelagic  fishes,  mesopelagic  squids,  and  other  invertebrates  
supports  the  large  concentration  of  marine  mammals  and  seabirds  in  the  region.    
Certain  fish  populations  are  declining  across  the  region  (NMOE,  2011).  
 

4
Protective  Management  of  Svalbard  
 
In  recognition  of  the  unique  and  sensitive  environment  of  Svalbard  and  its  
surrounding  waters,  the  Svalbard  Environmental  Protection  Act  establishes  strict  
environmental  standards  for  all  human  activities  in  the  region  (Overrein,  2014).    
The  purpose  of  the  Act  is:    
 
"...to  preserve  a  virtually  untouched  environment  in  Svalbard  with  respect  
to  continuous  areas  of  wilderness,  landscape  elements,  flora,  fauna,  and  
cultural  heritage."  
 
The  Act  further  stipulates  that  human  activities  must  not:    
 
"...harm,  pollute,  or  in  any  other  way  damage  the  natural  environment  or  
cultural  heritage  or  result  in  unnecessary  disturbance  to  humans  or  
animals."      
 
Accordingly,  much  of  Svalbard  and  its  coastal  waters  are  designated  as  Protected  
Areas.    Today,  65%  of  Svalbard's  land  area  and  86%  of  the  marine  areas  within  
the  territorial  seas  of  Svalbard  are  designated  Protected  Areas  (Norwegian  Pilot,  
2012;  Overrein,  2014b).  
 
And  in  recognition  of  the  severe  impacts  that  would  be  caused  by  a  large  oil  spill,  
the  Government  of  Svalbard  prohibits  ships  using  heavy  fuel  oil  from  the  waters  
of  many  Svalbard's  National  Parks  and  Protected  Areas  (Norwegian  Pilot,  2012).  
 
Clearly,  the  waters  and  coasts  of  Svalbard,  the  Barents  Sea,  and  East  Greenland  
Sea  are  recognized  for  their  ecological  and  economic  importance,  as  well  as  their  
environmental  sensitivity.      This  area  is  a  global  ecological  treasure,  and  should  
not  be  exposed  to  the  risks  of  offshore  oil  development.  

III. Offshore Oil Exploration  

 
While  Norway  has  for  decades  been  a  major  producer  of  offshore  oil  in  waters  of  
the  North  Sea  and  Norwegian  Sea,  it  has  only  recently  commenced  oil  
development  in  the  more  northerly  Arctic  waters  of  the  Barents  Sea  (NMOE,  
2011).    The  government  estimates  that,  in  the  Norwegian  sector  of  the  Barents  
Sea,  “the  statistical  expected  value  of  undiscovered  resources  is  945  million  Sm3  
oil  equivalent  (about  6  billion  barrels),  which  corresponds  to  37  %  of  the  total  
undiscovered  resources  on  the  Norwegian  continental  shelf”  (NMOE,  2011).    
Most  of  this  is  expected  to  be  in  the  southern  Barents  Sea,  off  the  Norwegian  
mainland,  in  the  Nordland  and  Troms  districts.  
 
As  discussed  in  the  Integrated  Management  Plan  for  the  Marine  Environment  of  
the  Barents  Sea  and  Lofoten  Area  (NMOE,  2011),  at  least  85  exploration  wells  
have  been  drilled  in  the  southern  Barents  Sea,  about  half  of  which  showed  the  
presence  of  hydrocarbons.    In  2007,  the  Snøvhit  gas  field  off  Finmark  became  the  
first  offshore  gas  field  to  come  into  production  in  the  Norwegian  sector  of  the  
Barents  Sea.    And  the  Goliat  field,  85  km  northwest  of  Hammerfest,  is  the  first  oil  

5
field  to  be  developed  in  the  Norwegian  sector  of  the  Barents  Sea  (NMOE,  2011).    
The  Goliat  field  is  scheduled  to  begin  production  in  2015,  to  be  loaded  to  a  
Floating  Production,  Storage,  and  Offloading  (FPSO)  tanker.  
 
In  summer  2014,  Statoil  drilled  five  exploratory  wells  in  the  central  Barents  Sea  
(Figure  2),  about  300  km  southeast  of  Svalbard,  at  approx.  73  N.  Latitude.    While  
the  initial  three  wells  -­‐  Apollo,  Mercury,  and  Atlantis  -­‐  did  not  report  commercial  
quantities  of  hydrocarbons,  the  company  plans  to  continue  drilling  the  Penguin  
well  (423  m  water  depth)  and  Isfjell  wells  (426  m  water  depth)  just  20  miles  to  
the  southwest  of  Penguin.    
 
In  addition,  the  Norwegian  Petroleum  Directorate  commissioned  a  2D  oil  
exploration  seismic  survey  of  the  central  and  northern  Barents  Sea  in  summer  
2014,  across  a  permitted  survey  area  of  approximately  50,000  square  miles  
(Figure  1).  This  seismic  survey  projected  extremely  loud  sound  from  a  towed  air  
gun  array  (for  sub-­‐seabed  acoustic  profiling)  from  the  seismic  ship  "M/V  Artemis  
Atlantic"  with  the  company  “Dolphin  Geophysical.” These  2000  psi  air  guns  can  
produce  sound  source  levels  as  high  as  259  decibels  underwater  (thousands  of  
times  louder  than  a  jet  engine),  and  at  low  frequencies  ranging  from  5  -­‐  300  Hz.      
The  underwater  sound  from  the  2014  NPD  seismic  survey  almost  certainly  
reached  into  several  of  the  Marine  Protected  Areas  of  Svalbard.  
 
As  our  observations  clearly  show,  fin  whales,  minke  whales,  humpback  whales,  
sperm  whales,  killer  whales,  Atlantic  white-­‐beaked  dolphins,  and  other  marine  
mammals  and  seabirds  were  travelling  and  feeding  in  the  area,  and  were  
exposed  to  these  seismic  air  gun  pulses.    Such  low  frequency  oil  exploration  
seismic  noise  is  known  to  travel  over  3,000  kilometers  in  the  ocean  (Hildebrand,  
2006),  and  exert  masking  effects  for  blue  and  fin  whales  up  to  2000  km  away  
(Siebert  et.al.,  2014).  In  addition,  offshore  oil  drilling  itself  projects  noise  from  
rotating  drill  bits,  the  dynamic  positioning  engines  of  rigs,  support  vessels,  etc.,  
into  surrounding  waters  at  over  190  dB,  over  a  somewhat  broader  frequency  
band  from  10  Hz  -­‐  10  kHz  (Hildebrand,  2006).  
 
Environmental  Risks  from  Oil  Exploration  
 
The  risks/impacts  of  offshore  oil  exploration  generally  include  underwater  noise  
from  seismic  surveys;  noise  and  habitat  disturbance  from  exploratory  drilling;  
discharge  of  drilling  muds,  cuttings,  and  produced  waters;  and  the  potential  for  a  
major  oil  spill  from  an  exploratory  well  blowout.    Importantly,  in  recognition  of  
the  sensitivity  of  the  Barents  Sea  marine  ecosystem,  the  government  of  Norway  
has  adopted  a  “zero-­‐discharge”  policy  for  oil  drilling  in  the  area,  requiring  
reinjection  of  drilling  muds,  cuttings,  and  produced  waters  (NMOE,  2011,  and  
Report  No.  38,  2003-­‐2004  to  the  Storting).    This  requirement  for  Barents  Sea  
exploratory  drilling  “is  considerably  stricter  than  the  standards  that  apply  on  
other  parts  of  the  Norwegian  shelf”  (NMOE,  2011).  
 
The  authors  applaud  the   zero-­‐discharge  policy  for  the  Barents  Sea,  but  
conclude  that  there  remain  two  additional,  and  unacceptable,  environmental  

6
risks  from  offshore  oil  exploration  in  the  region:  A.  seismic  exploration  noise;  
and  B.  a  major  oil  spill  from  an  exploratory  wellhead  blowout.      
 
A.  Seismic  Exploration  Impacts    
 
The  seismic  surveys  conducted  in  the  region  have  the  potential  to  exert  
significant  deleterious  effects,  both  at  short  range  and  long  range,  on  the  physical  
health,  behavior,  distribution,  communication,  feeding,  and  social  dynamics  of  
marine  mammals,  particularly  cetaceans.    There  is  an  extensive  scientific  
literature  documenting  the  effects  of  underwater  noise,  including  oil  exploration  
seismic  arrays,  on  marine  organisms,  in  particular  marine  mammals  (Yazvenko  
et  al.  2007;  Erbe  &  King  2009;  Breitzke  &  Bohlen  2010;  Gray  &  Van  Waerebeek  
2011;  Hildebrand,  2006;  Gordon  et.al.,  2004;  Weir  and  Dolman,  2007;  Siebert  et.  
al.,  2014).    These  effects  can  include  hearing  loss  (temporary  or  permanent),  
masking  of  communication,  physiological  stress,  acoustic  resonance  in  air  
cavities,  organ  rupture,  behavioral  responses,  avoidance  of  critical  habitat  areas,  
decompression  sickness,  and  mass  strandings  (Hildebrand,  2006;  Gordon,  2004;  
Siebert  et.  al.,  2014).  Seismic  survey  activities  take  place  on  a  yearly  basis,  
creating  chronic  underwater  noise  pollution  in  the  oceans  for  months  at  a  time.  
The  effects  of  cumulative  underwater  noise  pollution  are  still  poorly  understood,  
however  stress  in  marine  mammals  related  to  anthropogenic  noise  exposure  has  
been  conclusively  proven,  and  prolonged  exposure  to  (noise)  stressors  is  known  
to  cause  significant  impacts  to  marine  mammals  (Wright  et  al.,  2007).  
 
While  the  Government  of  Norway  requires  seismic  vessels  to  carry  a  fisheries  
observer  to  ensure  the  survey  maintains  "a  safe  distance"  from  fishing  vessels  
(MPE/MCFA,  2014),  it  does  not  require  marine  mammal  monitoring  and  
mitigation  procedures  as  is  standard  practice  in  other  countries,  including  the  
U.K.,  U.S.,  Canada,  New  Zealand,  Australia,  and  Brazil  (Weir  and  Dolman,  2007).  
These  seismic-­‐marine  mammal  mitigation  programmes  generally  require  Marine  
Mammal  Observers  (MMOs)  on  the  seismic  and/or  support  vessels,  gradual  
"soft-­‐start"  procedures,  shutdown  of  the  air  guns  when  marine  mammals  are  
detected  within  prescribed  safety  zones  around  the  array,  Passive  Acoustic  
Monitoring,  and  time/area  closures  for  seismic  surveys  in  marine  mammal  
sensitive/critical  habitat  areas  (e.g.,  breeding,  feeding,  or  migration  routes).      
 
Without  such  a  seismic  monitoring  and  mitigation  programme  in  Norway,  it  is  
possible  that  marine  mammals  in  the  Barents/East  Greenland  Sea  are  exposed  to  
close-­‐range  seismic  blasts  causing  rupture  of  internal  organs  or  permanent  
hearing  damage  (permanent  threshold  shifts),  thereby  significantly  degrading  
their  ability  to  feed,  reproduce,  socialize,  and  communicate.    In  this  regard,  
Norway  is  failing  to  comply  with  the  Best  Environmental  Practice  requirement  in  
the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Marine  Environment  of  the  North-­‐East  
Atlantic  -­‐  OSPAR  Convention  (see  discussion  below).    As  a  result,  migrating  
whales  are  not  protected  in  their  critical  migration  and  feeding  areas,  and  the  
more  social  toothed  whales  are  not  protected  on  their  feeding  and  breeding  
areas.    
 
 

7
B.    Blowout  Spill  Risk    
 
Secondly,  there  is  clearly  a  risk  of  an  oil  and  gas  blowout  (loss  of  well  control)  
while  drilling  an  exploratory  well.    Statoil's  spill  risk-­‐reduction  standard  for  its  
Barents  Sea  drilling  programme  is  to  reduce  spill  risk  only  to  As  Low  As  
Reasonably  Practicable,  or  "ALARP” (Statoil,  2014).    The  ALARP  standard  implies  
that  some  risk-­‐reduction/safety  measures,  which  the  company  deems  too  costly,  
may  not  be  implemented.    
 
However,  for  an  ecosystem  as  unique,  productive,  and  sensitive  as  the  Arctic,  
including  the  Svalbard/Barents/Greenland  Seas,  the  ALARP  risk  reduction  
standard  for  offshore  drilling  is  inadequate,  and  it  clear  that  all  such  activities  
should  be  required  to  reduce  risk  to  As  Low  As  Possible,  or  "ALAP,"  regardless  of  
cost  (Steiner,  2011).      
 
This  higher  risk-­‐reduction  standard  for  Arctic  offshore  drilling,  as  originally  
recommended  by  Steiner,  2011,  was  subsequently  endorsed  by  the  UK  House  of  
Commons  Committee  on  the  Arctic  (UK,  2012),  and  Fridjof  Nansen  Institute/Det  
Norsk  Veritas  (FNI/DNV,  2012).      
 
The  2012  FNI/DNV  report  stated  the  following  regarding  this  higher  standard  of  
risk  reduction  for  Arctic  offshore  drilling:  
 
It  is  not  given  that  an  equivalent  risk  level  as  in  the  North  Sea  is  adequate  
for  the  Arctic…”  
 
Industry  should  be  prepared  for  high  societal  expectations  in  terms  of  
what  companies  should  pay  in  order  to  lower  the  risks  associated  with  
economic  activities  in  the  Arctic.”  
 
Risk-­‐based  management  systems  should  demonstrate  that  risks  have  
been  reduced  to  an  agreed  level  or  ALARP.  However,  this  still  leaves  the  
possibility,  albeit  very  unlikely,  of  a  low-­‐probability,  high-­‐impact  event  
occurring.  This  is  why  in  some  cases  it  may  be  decided  not  to  expose  
highly  sensitive  or  important  ecosystems  to  the  risks  associated  with  
drilling  for  hydrocarbons.  For  example,  Norway  maintains  a  moratorium  
on  drilling  in  the  sea  areas  off  its  Lofoten  Islands,  due  to  their  significance  
for  the  fishing  industry  and  tourism.  Thus  the  net  benefit  to  society  for  
opening  up  the  Arctic  to  resource  extraction  has  to  be  seen  in  relation  to  
alternatives,  for  instance  not  utilizing  the  resources  or  having  to  rely  on  
other  energy  sources  in  the  future.”    
 
It  has  been  argued  that  acceptable  risk  levels  for  the  Arctic  should  be  
well  below  industry’s  usual  standard  (for  instance  ALARP)  and  rather  
reflect  an  ‘As  Low  As  Possible’  (ALAP)  standard,  regardless  of  cost.  Such  
an  approach  might  not  be  sustainable  from  a  business  perspective,  but  in  
society  there  may  be  an  understanding  for  higher  reasonable  costs  to  
lower  the  risk.”  
 

8
The  FNI/DNV  report  goes  on  to  warn  however:  
 
  “…in  some  cases  there  exists  no  best  available  technology  –  for  instance,  
  for  recovering  oil  between  or  under  ice  floes,  where  the  risks  could  be  
  considered  to  be  above  tolerable  levels.”  
 
The  FNI/DNV  implied  endorsement  of  ALAP  for  Arctic  offshore  drilling,  rather  
than  Statoil’s  commitment  only  to  ALARP,  was  cited  in  their  presentation  to  the  
ONS  Summit  2012,  co-­‐sponsored  by  Statoil.      
 
As  well,  Statoil  is  a  multi-­‐national  company,  with  operations  in  36  countries,  
including  the  U.S.  and  the  Arctic.    Thus,  the  company  is  well  aware  of  the  
improved  drilling  and  seismic  survey  regulations  around  the  world,  including  in  
the  U.S.        
 
The  new  offshore  Drilling  Safety  Rules  in  the  U.S.,  with  which  Statoil  must  
comply  in  its  U.S.  offshore  projects,  resulted  from  an  exhaustive  technical  review  
of  all  safety-­‐critical  offshore  drilling  issues  in  U.S.  waters  subsequent  to  the  2010  
Deepwater  Horizon  tragedy,  which  cost  the  lives  of  11  crew  and  spilled  over  4  
million  barrels  of  oil  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.    As  well,  a  new  Arctic  offshore  
drilling  rule  is  currently  in  development  by  the  U.S.,  government  (drafted  by  the  
U.S.  Department  of  the  Interior,  and  currently  awaiting  approval  by  the  White  
House).    
 
The  2012  U.S.  offshore  drilling  rule  established  new  casing  installation  
requirements,  new  cementing  requirements,  requires  independent  third-­‐party  
verification  of  blind  shear  ram  (BSR)  capability  and  subsea  Blowout  Preventer  
(BOP)  /  capping  stack  compatibility,  requires  new  casing  and  cementing  
integrity  tests,  establishes  new  requirements  for  subsea  secondary  BOP  
intervention,  requires  function  testing  for  subsea  secondary  BOP  intervention,  
requires  documentation  for  BOP  inspections  and  maintenance,  requires  a  
Registered  Professional  Engineer  to  certify  casing  and  cementing  requirements,  
and  establishes  new  requirements  for  specific  well  control  training.    Statoil  is  
well  aware  of,  and  required  to  comply  with,  all  such  rules  in  its  U.S.  drilling  
operations.  
 
The  OSPAR  Convention  (to  which  Norway  is  a  party)  states  that  Best  Available  
Techniques  (BAT)  and  Best  Environmental  Practice  (BEP)  for  a  particular  process  
“will  change  with  time,  in  light  of  technological  advances,  economic,  and  social  
factors,  as  well  as  changes  in  scientific  knowledge  and  understanding” (Appendix  
1.3,  OSPAR  Convention).    Clearly,  the  new  U.S.  offshore  drilling  safety  rules  
reflect  such  “advances  in  scientific  knowledge  and  understanding,” and  are  the  
very  sort  of  advance  in  BAT/BEP  that  the  OSPAR  Convention  requires  parties  to  
incorporate  into  all  offshore  drilling  programmes.  
 
By  definition,  ALARP  is  not  BAT/BEP.    Thus,  Statoil’s  stated  commitment  to  meet  
only  ALARP  as  a  risk  reduction  standard  (Statoil,  2014)  clearly  demonstrates  
that  Norway  does  not  meet  the  required  BAT/BEP  standard.  In  this  regard,  

9
Norway  specifically  contravenes  its  legal  obligation  to  meet  BAT/BEP  standards  
as  required  by  the  OSPAR  Convention.      
 
Similarly,  Statoil's  Barents  Sea  drilling  projects  do  not  meet  the  BAT/BEP  
standards  required  by  Directive  2013/30/EU  on  Safety  of  Offshore  Oil  and  Gas  
Operations  (EU,  2013).  The  2013  EU  Drilling  Directive  substantially  enhances  
offshore  safety  requirements  throughout  all  EU  member  states.  In  particular,  the  
new  EU  drilling  directive  requires  that  offshore  operators  clearly  identify  all  
major  hazards,  conduct  risk  assessments  of  such  hazards,  and  implement  a  
robust  risk  mitigation/risk  reduction  program  to  As  Far  As  Possible.    This  equates  
to  a  risk-­‐reduction  standard  of  ALAP,  rather  than  the  ALARP  standard  that  
Statoil  pledges  to  meet.  And  while  Norway  is  not  an  EU  member,  it  is  obliged  by  
the  OSPAR  Convention  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Drilling  Directive,  as  
BAT/BEP.      
 
It  is  also  not  clear  whether  the  Blowout  Preventer  (BOP)  used  by  the  Transocean  
Spitsbergen  on  these  exploratory  wells  meets  Best  Available  
Techniques/Technology  (BAT)/Best  Environmental  Practice  (BEP)  
recommendations  of  the  American  Petroleum  Institute  Standard  53  -­‐  Blowout  
Prevention  Equipment  Systems  for  Drilling  Wells  (API,  2013).    Statoil  is  required  
to  comply  with  this  standard  in  its  U.S.  offshore  operations,  and  is  implicitly  
required  to  meet  this  BAT  standard  by  the  OSPAR  Convention  and  the  2013  EU  
Drilling  Directive.    In  a  phone  conversation  with  Statoil  in  Stavanger,  the  authors  
inquired  about  the  BOP  used  by  the  Transocean  Spitsbergen, in  particular  when  
it  was  last  tested/inspected,  but  the  communications  staff  was  unable  to  answer  
the  question.  
 
Inadequate  Oil  Spill  Model  
 
As  Statoil  has  chosen  to  use  the  less  stringent  risk-­‐reduction  standard  of  ALARP  
in  its  Barents  Sea  drilling  programme,  there  remains  a  significant  risk  of  a  major  
oil  spill  from  the  exploratory  wells.    In  fact,  the  company's  Blowout  Scenario  
Analysis  models  a  worst-­‐case  blowout  scenario  at  the  Isfjell  well  (at  426  m  water  
depth)  of  1,750  Sm3/day  over  77  days  (but  ranging  up  to  3,000  Sm3,  lasting  from  
34  -­‐  97  days),  for  a  total  release  of  134,000  Sm3,  or  about  840,000  barrels  of  oil  
(Statoil,  2014).    For  the  Penguin  well  (at  423  m  water  depth),  the  company  
modeled  a  worst  case  blowout  of  1100  m3/day  (about  7,000  barrels/day),  over  a  
blowout  duration  of  40-­‐77  days,  using  a  maximum  duration  to  complete  a  relief  
well  of  70  days,  thus  giving  a  total  worst-­‐case  release  of  about  77,000  Sm3  or  
490,000  barrels  of  oil.    In  either  case,  these  would  clearly  be  disastrous  events.    
In  fact,  even  a  spill  one-­‐tenth  the  size  of  the  modeled  worst-­‐case  spill  would  be  a  
major  marine  oil  spill,  with  serious  environmental  consequences.    
 
While  Statoil  assumes  that  such  a  blowout  would  be  a  low  probability  (.000176  
for  Isfjell  and  .000226  for  Penguin),  such  a  spill  would  clearly  be  of  high  
consequence.    In  addition,  such  historical  probability  analyses  do  not  accurately  
gauge  risk  in  complex  systems,  such  as  offshore  oil  drilling.    In  particular,  such  
statistical  probability  analyses  should  not  be  relied  upon  to  assess  spill  risk  in  
Arctic  offshore  drilling.    Regardless,  the  worst-­‐case  spills  modeled  for  these  two  

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wells  would  be  of  global  significance,  and  would  cause  severe,  long-­‐term  harm  to  
the  marine  ecosystem  across  a  vast  area  of  the  Barents/East  Greenland  Seas,  
including  the  coast  of  Svalbard.    This  risk  has  not  been  adequately  evaluated  or  
mitigated  by  the  Government  of  Norway  or  the  company.    
 
The  precise  trajectory  of  a  spill  would  depend  on  specific  current,  wind,  and  sea  
ice  conditions  across  the  region  at  the  time  of  the  spill.    But  given  the  general  
ocean  current  dynamics  in  the  area  of  the  Penguin  and  Isfjell  well  sites  (which  
are  only  about  20  miles  apart,  and  at  the  same  water  depth),  much  of  the  oil  from  
a  wellhead  blowout  at  these  sites  would  flow  to  the  northwest  with  the  
Norwegian  current,  across  the  continental  shelf,  past  Bjørnøya  (Bear  Island),  and  
along  the  west  coast  of  Spitsbergen  and  the  Svalbard  archipelago.  Another  
component  of  the  spill  would  likely  flow  to  the  northeast  along  the  polar  current  
front,  and  then  circle  back  to  the  southwest  along  eastern  Svalbard  with  the  Bear  
Island  and  East  Spitsbergen  Currents  (NPI,  1989,  and  Norway  Pilot,  2012).        
 
The  area  likely  impacted  by  a  major  blowout  is  precisely  where  the  authors  
encountered  most  marine  wildlife  in  the  August  cruise,  in  particular  hundreds  of  
whales  and  dolphins,  and  thousands  of  seabirds  (Figure  1).    These  species  would  
likely  be  exposed  to  such  a  major  wellhead  blowout  at  the  drilling  sites  to  the  
south.  However,  the  Statoil  risk  assessment  for  the  Penguin  well  states:  “In  the  
case  of  whales  (toothed  whales  and  baleen  whales),  an  assessment  was  made  of  
the  potential  for  conflict  based  on  [the  animals]  distribution.  The  potential  for  
conflict  for  all  species  was  considered  to  be  very  limited.” Our  findings  clearly  
contradict  this  conclusion,  as  the  Statoil  assessment  underestimates/ignores  the  
significant  risks  to  marine  mammals  in  the  area.  
 
A  worst-­‐case  scenario  spill  blowout  of  840,000  barrels  from  the  Isfjell  well  
would  spread  hundreds  miles  from  the  site,  and  could  cover  over  20,000  km2  of  
ocean  surface.  By  comparison,  the  1989  Exxon  Valdez  spill  in  Alaska  (which  
spilled  less  than  half  the  Statoil  projected  worst-­‐case  blowout  release  for  Isfjell)  
spread  over  600  miles  with  ocean  currents  from  the  spill  site,  and  impacted  an  
area  of  over  16,000  km2  of  Alaska's  coastal  ocean.    As  well,  oil  will  degrade  much  
more  slowly  in  the  cold  waters  (e.g.,  4° C),  and  air  temperatures  (4°  -­‐  9° C)  in  the  
Barents  Sea  region  even  in  summer,  increasing  its  persistence.      
 
A  significant  flaw  in  the  Statoil  Blowout  Scenario  Analyses  models  is  that  they  
apparently  only  project  the  spread  of  oil  over  just  the  duration  of  the  blowout,  
and  neglect  to  model  the  continued  spread  of  the  large  amount  of  oil  that  would  
remain  in  the  water  long  after  the  blowout  has  been  stopped.  Oil  from  a  worst-­‐
case  blowout  would  remain  in  and  on  the  water  for  months  after  a  blowout  is  
killed.  Thus,  oil  would  continue  to  spread  beyond  the  boundaries  predicted  by  
Statoil's  models,  almost  certainly  along  the  coasts  of  Svalbard.  Further,  the  
absence  of  significant  wind-­‐induced  turbulent  mixing  on  the  Barents  Sea  in  
summer  would  significantly  reduce  physical  dispersion  of  oil,  thus  increasing  its  
persistence,  and  expanding  the  spread  of  the  spill  north  along  the  Svalbard  coast.    
 
Additionally,  the  Statoil  spill  risk  model  neglects  to  consider  subsurface  oil  and  
gas  plumes  that  are  known  to  form  from  seabed  blowouts.    If  subjected  to  

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different  current  regimes,  such  subsurface  plumes  can  travel  in  different  
directions  than  surface  slicks.    Subsurface  plumes  of  methane  and  benzene  were  
found  from  the  1979  shallow  water  (50  m  water  depth)  wellhead  blowout  at  
Ixtoc  1  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  were  found  to  exert  significant  effects  to  the  
offshore  pelagic  ecosystem  during  the  2010  Deepwater  Horizon  spill,  also  in  the  
Gulf  of  Mexico  (Lippsett,  2011).        
 
Clearly,  Statoil's  modeled  spill  trajectories  dramatically  underestimate  the  area  
potentially  impacted  by  a  blowout,  and  are  therefore  inadequate.    While  the  spill  
model  for  the  Penguin  well  projects  a  spill  to  flow  northward  (correctly  so),  the  
trajectory  model  for  Isfjell,  (which  is  only  20  miles  southwest  of  Penguin),  
inexplicably  projects  relatively  even,  circular  spreading  around  the  well  site.    
Such  a  trajectory  does  not  seem  plausible  given  the  strong  northward  flowing  
Norwegian  current  across  the  region.    And  given  that  the  Penguin  and  Isfjell  
wells  are  only  20  miles  apart  and  at  the  same  water  depth  (about  425  m)  and  
location  along  the  continental  shelf,  the  different  spill  trajectories  modeled  by  
Statoil  for  the  two  wells  are  even  more  perplexing.    
 
Further,  there  is  no  attempt  to  address  spill  risk  over  longer  distances  and  longer  
periods  of  time,  such  as  along  the  coasts  of  Svalbard  (which  would  almost  
certainly  be  oiled  in  a  worst-­‐case  blowout  from  either  well),  or  to  address  the  
impact  to  most  marine  species  in  the  region.    The  spill  trajectory  assessments  do  
not  address  risk  to  marine  mammals,  seabirds,  or  to  most  fish  and  invertebrate  
populations.      
 
The  authors  consider  this  a  serious  flaw  regarding  the  environmental  risk  
assessment  of  the  exploratory  drilling  projects,  and  unless  and  until  this  
inadequacy  is  corrected,  the  projects  should  not  be  permitted  to  proceed.      
   
Spill  Response  Plan  
 
In  general,  the  Statoil  spill  response  plan  is  overly  optimistic  in  its  assumed  
effectiveness.    In  actuality,  there  has  never  been  an  effective  mechanical  recovery  
of  a  large  marine  oil  spill.    It  is  expected  that  this  would  hold  true  for  a  major  spill  
from  the  Statoil  wells  in  the  Barents  Sea.    However,  the  response  plans  in  the  
Blowout  Scenario  Analyses  fail  to  recognize  this  reality.    The  response  plan  for  a  
well  blowout  does  not  adequately  address  the  technologies  and  capability  of  
collecting  oil  at  the  failed  wellhead.  
 
The  calm  weather  conditions  that  can  occur  in  the  Barents  Sea  in  summer  may  
aid  mechanical  oil  spill  recovery  efforts  (booms,  skimmers,  etc.).    However,  these  
same  calm  summer  conditions  would  also  make  the  use  of  chemical  dispersants  
ineffective,  as  sufficient  wind/wave  energy  is  needed  to  mix  the  dispersant  with  
a  surface  oil  slick.  
 
The  authors  recommend  that  an  unannounced  (surprise)  worst-­‐case  blowout  
response  drill  be  called  by  the  government  at  the  Isfjell  or  Penguin  sites  (if  
drilling  is  continued),  and/or  the  Goliat  or  Snøvhit  sties.    These  response  drills  
should  require  full  BOP  function  testing,  deployment  and  attachment  of  the  

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capping  stack,  fitting  wellhead  spill  collection  equipment  and  deployment  of  
surface  collection  vessels,  surface  mechanical  response  (booms,  skimmers,  etc.),  
and  deployment  of  the  relief  rig  to  the  site.  
 
Oil  Spill  Impacts  -­‐  Comparison  with  1989  Exxon  Valdez  Oil  Spill  in  Alaska    
 
It  is  now  widely  accepted  in  the  scientific  literature  that  ecological  impacts  of  
major  marine  oil  spills  can  be  severe  and  long  lasting.    Oil  spill  impact  studies  on  
the  1989  Exxon  Valdez  oil  spill  in  Alaska  are  perhaps  the  most  relevant  to  
understanding  potential  impacts  of  a  major  spill  in  the  Barents  Sea,  thus  a  brief  
summary  of  these  findings  is  presented  below.      
 
On  March  23,  1989,  the  Exxon  Valdez  had  just  loaded  1.3  million  barrels  of  crude  
oil  shipped  from  Alaska’s  Arctic  south  through  the  Trans  Alaska  Pipeline  to  the  
Valdez  Marine  Terminal.    After  a  series  of  simple  navigation  errors  on  its  
outbound  transit,  at  12:04  AM  on  March  24  the  single-­‐hulled  tanker  slammed  
into  a  well-­‐charted  reef,  rupturing  8  of  the  ship’s  11  cargo  tanks.  Most  of  the  
250,000  barrels  of  oil  in  the  ruptured  tanks  flowed  out  in  the  next  12-­‐hours  of  
falling  tide.    
 
The  toxic  crude  oil  spilled  into  a  productive,  pristine,  cold-­‐water,  coastal  
ecosystem  -­‐  Prince  William  Sound,  Alaska.    The  spill  occurred  at  the  time  of  
critical  biological  productivity  in  spring  -­‐  herring  were  moving  near  shore  to  
spawn,  migratory  seabirds  and  whales  were  returning,  juvenile  salmon  were  
emerging  from  streams  into  near  shore  waters,  harbor  seals  and  sea  otters  were  
beginning  to  pup,  and  the  spring  plankton  bloom  had  just  commenced.    
 
The  response  and  "cleanup"  were  spectacular  failures,  as,  despite  industry  and  
government  promises  to  the  contrary,  little  equipment  was  on  hand,  much  of  it  
didn’t  work,  and  a  strong  storm  quickly  spread  the  oil  beyond  control.  Despite  a  
$2  billion  cleanup  attempt  by  Exxon,  only  about  7%  of  the  spilled  oil  was  
recovered  from  the  water  and  beaches,  and  the  ecological  damage  was  
extraordinary.  
 
Exxon  Valdez  oil  eventually  spread  over  10,000  square  miles  of  Alaska’s  coastal  
ocean,  as  far  as  600  miles  from  the  site  of  grounding.    Over  1,500  miles  of  
shoreline  were  oiled,  including  three  national  wildlife  refuges,  three  national  
parks,  wilderness  areas,  a  national  forest,  and  extensive  areas  that  had  been  
inhabited  for  millennia  by  Alaska  Natives.  
 
The  ecological  effects  of  the  spill  were  devastating,  and  persist  today  -­‐  25  years  
later  (EVOSTC,  2014).  Virtually  everything  associated  with  the  sea  surface  was  
significantly  impacted.    Organisms  ingested  oil  through  feeding  and  inhalation,  
and  skin/fur/feathers  were  oiled.    More  marine  mammals  and  seabirds  were  
killed  directly  by  the  oil  than  in  any  industrial  disaster  in  history.  The  acute  
marine  mammal  death  toll  included  over  22  killer  whales,  likely  several  gray  
whales,  thousands  of  sea  otters,  and  hundreds  of  harbor  seals.  Direct  mortality  of  
seabirds  was  estimated  at  300,000  -­‐  645,000,  with  an  additional  reproductive  
loss  of  over  300,000  chicks  the  following  year.    Some  seabird  colonies  lost  60%  -­‐  

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70%  of  their  breeding  birds.    The  1989-­‐year  class  of  herring,  that  was  spawning  
in  the  near  shore  zone  just  as  the  oil  arrived,  was  entirely  eliminated.  And,  much  
of  the  intertidal  zone  was  essentially  sterilized  by  the  toxic  oil.          
 
Beyond  the  acute  biological  damage,  there  were  profound  sub-­‐lethal,  chronic  
impacts  -­‐  brain  lesions  in  seals,  reproductive  failure  in  birds  and  mammals,  
genetic  damage,  blood  chemistry  effects,  morphological  deformities,  reduced  
growth  rates,  altered  feeding  habits,  liver  damage  in  otters  and  seals,  eye  tumors  
and  viral  diseases  in  fish,  and  general  overall  physiological  impairment.    Oil  was  
found  to  exhibit  toxic  effects  down  to  concentrations  as  low  as  1  part  per  billion  
(ppb).  
 
Some  of  the  ecological  damage  did  not  manifest  until  several  years  later.  Herring  
populations  collapsed  for  the  first  time  on  record  four  years  after  the  spill,  as  did  
some  of  the  region's  salmon  runs.    Herring  is  considered  a  cornerstone  species  in  
the  ecosystem,  being  a  critical  prey  item  for  many  other  species  including  
seabirds,  seals,  sea  lions,  whales,  and  fish.    And  the  extensive  mortality  in  sea  
otters  in  western  Prince  William  Sound  caused  cascading  ecological  effects.      
 
Importantly,  today  most  of  the  fish  and  wildlife  populations,  habitats,  and  
resource  services  injured  by  the  Alaska  spill  have  yet  to  fully  recover.    Some  
populations,  such  as  pigeon  guillemots  (same  genus  as  the  black  guillemot  in  the  
Barents  Sea),  herring  (same  species  as  herring  in  the  Barents  Sea),  and  the  AT1  
pod  of  killer  whales  (same  species  as  killer  whales  in  the  Barents  Sea)  are  listed  
by  the  U.S.  government  as  not  recovering  at  all.    In  fact,  the  genetically  distinct  
AT1  killer  whale  pod  is  expected  to  become  extinct  as  a  direct  result  of  losses  
due  to  the  oil  spill.    As  well,  there  is  still  a  substantial  amount  of  residual  oil  in  
beach  sediments  of  the  oil  spill  region,  and  it  is  still  relatively  unweathered  and  
toxic.  This  remaining  oil  is  expected  to  remain  in  beach  sediments  perhaps  for  
centuries.  The  injured  Alaska  coastal  ecosystem  will  likely  never  fully  recover  
from  this  spill.  
 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Alaska  spill  was  at  60°  N  Latitude  and  spread  with  
currents  to  the  south,  while  a  spill  from  the  exploratory  wells  in  the  Barents  Sea  
would  occur  at  72°  N  -­‐  73°  N  Latitude,  and  would  spread  further  north.    Spilled  
oil  in  the  Barents  Sea,  particularly  on  sheltered  inshore  beaches  of  Svalbard,  
would  likely  be  more  persistent  than  even  that  in  southern  Alaska,  and  
environmental  damage  should  be  assumed  to  be  comparable  to  that  reported  in  
the  Alaska  spill.  
 
IV.    Conclusion  
 
Given  the  above  concerns,  the  authors  conclude  that  the  environmental  risk  from  
offshore  oil  drilling  in  the  Barents  Sea  is  unacceptable,  and  respectfully  suggest  
that  all  activities  related  to  offshore  oil  and  gas  exploration  in  the  Barents  Sea  
should  be  prohibited.    Norway  has  significant  energy  and  economic  alternatives  
to  Barents  Sea  petroleum  development  -­‐-­‐  alternatives  that  present  lower,  more  
acceptable  environmental  risks  and  impacts.    
 

14
At  a  minimum,  offshore  petroleum  exploration  in  the  Barents  Sea  should  be  
suspended  until  the  following  five  conditions  are  satisfied:    
 
1.  A  more  complete  scientific  understanding  of  the  marine  ecosystem  is  
developed,  including  identification  of  all  time/area  critical  habitat  areas  
for  marine  mammals,  seabirds,  and  fish,  at  risk  from  oil  exploration.  
 
  2.  A  detailed,  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  environmental  impacts  of  
  seismic  surveys  and  oil  spills  in  the  region  is  conducted.    
 
3.  A  rigorous  Marine  Ecosystem  Monitoring  and  Mitigation  programme  is  
instituted  for  marine  seismic  surveys.  This  should  include  a  sonic  
safety/exclusion  zone  around  seismic  arrays  to  protect  marine  mammals,  
seabirds,  and  fish  from  acoustic  impacts  of  the  arrays,  and  protocols  to  
shut  down  a  seismic  array  if  species  approach  or  enter  the  exclusion  zone.  
Sound  propagation  measurements  should  be  conducted  in  seismic  survey  
areas,  and  should  be  applied  before  permits  are  issued  in  order  to  
establish  the  sonic  exclusion  zones  to  prevent  damaging  and  disturbing  
marine  mammals.  In  addition  this  kind  of  noise  pollution  must  be  
prohibited  during  the  time/area  of  migration  of  the  large  whales  along  
the  continental  shelf,  and  at  all  times  in  feeding  and  breeding  for  marine  
mammals.  
 
4.  A  realistic  worst-­‐case  oil  spill  trajectory  model  is  developed,  modeling  
the  persistence  and  spread  of  oil  over  at  least  a  6-­‐month  period  beyond  
the  termination  of  a  blowout,  including  spread  along  the  coasts  of  
Svalbard  and    the  ice  edge.  This  must  include  consideration  for  dispersion  
of  underwater  plumes.    And,  a  worst-­‐case  blowout  spill  response  drill  
should  be  staged  by  government  and  industry.  
 
5.  A  Best  Available  Technology/Best  Environmental  Practice  risk-­‐reduction  
programme  is  developed  for  offshore  oil  drilling  in  the  Barents  Sea,  using  
"As  Low  As  Possible"  (ALAP)  as  a  greater  risk-­‐reduction  standard.    This  
must  meet,  or  exceed,  the  new  standards  being  developed  by  the  U.S.  
government  for  Arctic  offshore  drilling.    
 
Acknowledgments  
 
The  authors  wish  to  thank  Greenpeace  International,  Greenpeace  Norway,  
Greenpeace  Nordic,  and  in  particular  the  crew  of  the  M/V  Esperanza  and  
campaign  staff,  for  their  assistance  in  all  aspects  of  our  Svalbard/Barents/East  
Greenland  Seas  research  mission  in  August  2014.    
 
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15
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17
  
Table  1:  Overview  of  species  and  sightings  onboard  M/V  Esperanza.

Species Scientific  name N  of  Sightings   N  of  sightings  at   N  of  sightings  at  
(Amount) Continental   Barents  Sea
slope

Balaenoptera  
Fin  whales 47(301) 29 18
physalus

Humpback   Megaptera  
13(31) 4 9
whales novaeangliae

Balaenoptera  
Minke  whales 17(93) 6 11
acutorostrata

Physeter  
Sperm  whales 23(46) 20 3
macrocephalus

Killer  whales Orcinus  orca 1(8) 1 0

Atlantic  white   Lagenorhinchus  

32(664) 21 11
beaked  dolphins albirostris

Harbour   Phocoena  
4(23) 0 4
porpoises phocoena

Total 137(1166) 81 56

18
  
Figure   1:  Map  gathering  all  cetacean  sightings  onboard  M/V  Esperanza,  ship  trajectory,  
location   of   relevant   boring   wells   and   gross   area   of   a   seismic   survey   taking   place   at   the  
time   (NPD14001,   source:   npd.no).   All   observation   points   represent   the   ship’s   position   at  
the  time,  except  for  when  a  RHIB  was  used  (into  Hornsund  and  on  the  south  tip  of  Edgeøya  
Island,  as  shown  in  the  track).  Notice  the  high  abundance  of  cetaceans  at  the  continental  
slope.  (Map  source:  Natural  Earth  at  naturalearthdata.com).
 

19