SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8,
1997 to this Court. He alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had
not indicated the proper Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this for at
least three years already. This matter was being brought in the context of Rule 138,
Section 1 which qualifies a that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." In his comment, Atty.Llamas claimed
that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his Income Tax Return that he had only a
limited practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. And being a senior citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the
payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with
the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest
belief, he was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No.
7432, §4, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merited the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was appropriate.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP); MEMBERSHIP DUES;
PAYMENT IS REQUIRED TO LIMITED PRACTICE. — Respondent can engage in the practice
of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432; SENIOR CITIZENS
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES; PAYMENT OF
MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION DUES ARE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. — While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED BY
MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER TO PUBLIC AND COURTS THAT HE HAS PAID HIS IBP
DUES. — By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting
to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE, EXPRESS
WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIS IBP DUES AND PLEA FOR MORE TEMPERATE APPLICATION OF
LAW. — Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman
M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction
the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using thisfor at
least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal
in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the
end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a
member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple
farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
upon. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court;
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. LLjur
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary. prLL law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for and to all courts in the land.
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of SO ORDERED.
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final ||| (Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 569-578)
action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent
is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005.]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, 1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member
of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as
provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of
an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors
of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's
directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the
bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual
dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to
inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been
stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by
the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues. EcSaHA
In his reply 4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is
the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment
of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering
that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims
that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to
active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility,
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 — which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to
impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted
by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. DSIaAE
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such
case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay
dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject
to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, 11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure
to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED.
He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees
for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of
this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the
practice of law. HSaEAD
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga andGarcia,
JJ., concur.
||| (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., B.M. No. 1370, [May 9, 2005], 497 PHIL 535-
544)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971
Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for
re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question,
Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a
grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the
Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this
was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without
formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request
answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might
not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were
not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power
to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol.
I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971
Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is
one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having
brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang,
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation,
the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo
"to show cause within ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also
required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70,
rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs
on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court
to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-
110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No.
954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo
Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-
checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in
the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject
of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook
bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were
summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de
Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that
he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in
that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated
on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their
memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned
to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on
the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4
with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11,
1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not
know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as
reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more
to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at
that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially
the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political
Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the
last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400)
which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained
a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in
remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I
had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade
to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it
was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the
result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the
code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ...
I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached
thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from
item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof,
and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59;
rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I
wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up
to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review,
and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such
revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet
been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at
my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not
appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit
to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I
submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my
aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass
the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus
was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular.
At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge
of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the
examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review
and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to
my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject,
the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would
make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the
word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the
identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and
without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial
Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to
review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given.
He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address
such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items.
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of
the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent
acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from
the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
— the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having
been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt
in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve,
in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated
April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the
paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one
subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners
shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results
of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they
be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them
checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring
those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner,
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made
of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who
obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As
the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said
subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that
the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter
being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier,
leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my
way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket.
I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket
that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that
would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List
as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital,
our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting
in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b)
On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge;
and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the
youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work
which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still
fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the
two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as
Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one
(1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in
the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-
check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there
was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very
highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of
only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led
to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed
of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco
post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang
"bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo
and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do
not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit
of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of
Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous
in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their
work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from
the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of
facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation
and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to
the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof
for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just
before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian
while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and
there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline
of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine
will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's
word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from
64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he
re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo
in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if
the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the
attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate
the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-
75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo
went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of
examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said
examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that
this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of
the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo
acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with
the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then
the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent
Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing
the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the
general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is
746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol.
V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency
is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was
long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile
Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law
tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo
was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71;
Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not
have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613
and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the
usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the
said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that
particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is
84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1
& 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from
66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points,
more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution
of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath.
It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent
Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on
the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order
was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial
correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23,
rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian
— whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions
committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm.
Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the
investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the
1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo
too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's
well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each
of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and
in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in
one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one
passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original
average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the
great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with
the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only
one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be
submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image
of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled
out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971
Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained
failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase
of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law
of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give
his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away.
Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela
Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind
for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it
was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN
THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela
Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them
back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg
and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86,
rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were
contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The
alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to
him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room
of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated
by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in
Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but
Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an
examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects
except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was
on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number
1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee
agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their
the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang. III
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the A
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re- stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
made by respondent Lanuevo to him. International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re- established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar --
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.). 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
subjects, as follows: In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
Labor Laws 3% composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of
Taxation 69% the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
Mercantile Law 68% each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
in Political Law are as follows: who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
BA Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
weighted points and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his
Civil Law 75% 75% = " functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
Taxation 69% 69% = " circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
———————————————— evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
two (2) other failing grades. These are: correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
Political Law 70% thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led
Taxation 72% to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as B
follows: Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
BA others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
Labor Laws 75% 75% = " character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
Civil Law 89% 89% = " moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
Taxation 72% 72% = " filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
weighted points testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
Remedial Law 88% 88% = " pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = " applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is
————————————————— for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4% the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.). convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
Lanuevo. which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already
Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
Montecillo was 71%. not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent
the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form
disbarred. provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of
that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required
the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has
not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56,
rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the
Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention
of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries
in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case
in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations
seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741).
Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding
from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied
for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony,
was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from
the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against
him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which
should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS,
102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case
despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of
the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and
his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up
to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as
WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this
present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment
[Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and
(c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54
Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or
re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee
who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration
or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or
re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should
have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter
to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the
increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of
Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the
words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points
higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be
the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh.
1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "...
he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase
the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be
done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he
left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be
more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the
grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.;
see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..."
(Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to
induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among
them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from
any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case
No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with
the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve
the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of
their duties relative thereto.
V not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due
to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho
and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the
late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore
cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this
out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until
this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or
an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that
he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said
bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair
public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a
house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April
5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription
— April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or
less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the
amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank
deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used
or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister
in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00)
is not reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to
furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house
and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 —
date of instrument;August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973,
the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch
20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the
GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in
his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his
listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956
VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with
respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent
Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent
Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in
view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on
March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount
of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a
& e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements
of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but
they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent
Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter
become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 —
up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
— 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with
the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior
Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and
Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and
beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver —July 31, 1951, which is also the
date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he
was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-
87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a
copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E.
Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not
even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries
of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings
(Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside
the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board,
he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational
benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the
course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E.
Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol.
VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with
the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar
only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of
the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and
does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and
was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as
a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US
army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9
May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of
Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks
to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever
strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No.
1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E.
GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 810 . January 27, 1998.]
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath-taking was
held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. The conviction stemmed
from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a
fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul
I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was
discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the
Court's most convenient time" attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character. On July 15,
1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty.
Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to
comment thereon.
The Court stated that it shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan admits that "he is not, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has
become morally fit and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession
of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or
allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate
participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the
latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission
to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who
have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court,
nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently
allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath.
The Court then resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas Jr. to take the lawyer's
oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the
payment of appropriate fees. STcADa
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR; PETITION TO
TAKE LAWYER'S OATH AFTER DISCHARGE FROM PROBATION, GRANTED; CASE AT BAR.
— The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or
allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate
participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the
latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission
to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well to exclude those who have
been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is
willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al
Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. Petitioner
Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant
conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his
deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan.
The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. Let it be
stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select
witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to
live strictly accordingly to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino
To Take the Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely
hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society." ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby
resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign
the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of
appropriate fees. DaHcAS
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J p:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations, 1 His oath-
taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996
which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should
(he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval
of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites
of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW,
sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of
the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was
granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case
considered closed and terminated. LLjur
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be
allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching
thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique
discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of
Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers (d) a member of the IBP
Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose,
Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica,
Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application,
resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul
I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert
D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
"1. He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and
hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.
"2. He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated
March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries
which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan
was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with
his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and
his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder,
since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when
they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence
of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People
vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
"3. He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out
of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his
house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons,
on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they
reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the case. cdll
"4. As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high
hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely
demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
"5. He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this
matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court." 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan admits that "[he] is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner
since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to
the noble profession or law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or
allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate
participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the
latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission
to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who
have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court,
nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently
allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's
oath. 4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge
himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul
I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a
mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the
presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach
at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case
of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19,
1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society". 6
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to
take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court,
subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to
petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
||| (In re: Cuevas, Jr., B.M. No. 810 (Resolution), [January 27, 1998], 348 PHIL 841-847)
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN
THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI'A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685
and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in
front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit
the face of Melendrez' wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows
that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor,
advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that
the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases
that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and
terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that
these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are
made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act
of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables
a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that
"a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there wasno valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is,
he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is
not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of
the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer's
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Meling's membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended
until further orders from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however,
did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot
and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar is ripe for resolution and
has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right
but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with
any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal
that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that. IaDcTC
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining
whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against
him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture
of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the
occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the
Shari'a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein,
an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used the
title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a
contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be
part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only
be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the
Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a
public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in
the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari'a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar
as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED
for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
||| (In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154, [June 8, 2004])
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER,
SR., respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives
upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a
reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and
improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document
in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for
alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a
notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was
not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before
the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying,
"Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering
to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the
law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and
authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office
secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time
record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems,
Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed
him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty.
Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about
because Atty. Ferrer's clients filed a case for falsification of public document against
Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her
thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty.
Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did
not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer
was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter
had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were
still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty.
Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to
the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He
alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board
his son's taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the
tricycle's passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the
victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and
blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in
its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve
as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have
"the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and
that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case
filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty.
Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty.
Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the
plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been
falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also
found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence
of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-
225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter
to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case
to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8On May 22, 2008
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation 9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer's motion
for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors' IBP Notice
of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty.
Ferrer's comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further,
he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned
Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner
erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he
imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in
Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that
the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. aHIDAE
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and
without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions
of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and
"FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with
concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious
misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in
violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar,
for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY
the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information
to form a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies
and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for
said falsification and distortions.” 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings
despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all
times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at Atty.
Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented
a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he
supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng
pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na
rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit
Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the
start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the
legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation. SaIEcA
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due
process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 18 So long as
the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the
allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude,
arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a
lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr.
from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record as an attorney
with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
||| (Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, [March 26, 2010], 630 PHIL 524-533)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in San
Jose, Antique filed a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming
a member of the Bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and
attempting to assault complainant in the latter's office. In his Comment, respondent
Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact
that complainant had ordered an employee to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys"
from hanging around in the Public Attorney's Office. Accordingly, the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that respondent committed the
acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and
warned that repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court found the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well
taken. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times. In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which
he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an
explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be
settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case. Thus, considering that this is the first offense,
Atty. Pefianco was fined in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) and
reprimanded.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; LAWYERS MUST CONDUCT
THEMSELVES WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD THEIR FELLOW
LAWYERS. — Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATED BY A LAWYER WHO MEDDLED IN A MATTER WHICH HE
HAD NO RIGHT TO DO SO. — In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which he
had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an
explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be
settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case. Respondent said he was moved by the plight
of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the
settlement of her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent
should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to demand
that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the
case with the widow.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT'S MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS WAS NEGATED BY THE WAY HE
CHOSE TO EXPRESS HIS INDIGNATION. — Even when he was being pacified, respondent
did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two
of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public
Attorney's Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of
Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage.
Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down
the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever
moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. — Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found
GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and,
considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more
severely. TDcHCa
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of
the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to
assault complainant. IASTDE
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of
the Public Attorney's Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while
Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw
the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani
talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point,
respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at
Atty. Salvani and his client, saying,"Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga
kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala." ("Why do you settle that case? Have your
client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.")
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco's outburst and asked him to
cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to
explain to respondent that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the
criminal case could be settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the
same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the
latter's client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it
easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but
shortly after he again started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene
with respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice
outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorney's
Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he
heard respondent Pefianco saying: "Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno
ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo." ("Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me
out of the PAO, what an idiot.") Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his
finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At
this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him
to observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant
said respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to
complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the
Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the
Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so,
respondent tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, "Gago ka!"("You're
stupid!") Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondent's blow and
complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del
Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to
corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the
crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to
take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an
employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from
hanging round in the Public Attorney's Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the woman's case,
complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public
Attorney's Office. He claimed that two security guards also came, and complainant
ordered them to take respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainant's claims,
however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and shout
at him, "Gago ka!" ("You're stupid!")
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against
complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that
respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed
not only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his
actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned
that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked
the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm
complainant's allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him
and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 1 admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are
duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly
and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at
all times. 2
In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused
the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani
why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact
tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the
case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been
murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the
money. Be that as it may, respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous
did not give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the
accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being
pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to
calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went
to the Public Attorney's Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at
the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal
rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to
express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby
FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action
in the future will be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Alcantara v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, [December 3, 2002], 441 PHIL 514-520)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3149. August 17, 1994.]
CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the
latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a
certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a
deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly received from
the United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed
of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid.
Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City.
The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the
aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City
post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,
Geesnell Yap filed a complainant for injunction with damages against complainant.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting
and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on 23 January 1985,
preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post
office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of
court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address
to Mandaue city. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May
1985 expanding all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to
complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to
withdraw the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainants'
counsel of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent
Attorney Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again
without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerino B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap
of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the
amount would be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest
of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was
approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment,
based on the following allegations:
"7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and
signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them
or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the
same;
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the
settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new
lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the
documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards
to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat; . . ." 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant, Atty. Roland B. Inting
had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico
Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the
compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was
informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers.
Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the
compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited
by Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are
indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4
October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to
any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on
the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was
hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985,
complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the
lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five
percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the
P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest
of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is
required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to
complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys.
Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from
informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and
earlier quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the
trial court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel,
respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was
the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly
and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party
not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law."
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this
Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Likong v. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, [August 17, 1994])
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6290. July 14, 2004.]
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-
TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie
Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law
office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing
herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting
marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which states
that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil
Registry of Manila 2 and the National Statistics Office (NSO) 3 prove that norecord of
marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two
are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 4 and
Felicisimo Tenorio III. 5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver
Tenorio 6 and John Cedric Tenorio, 7 another date and place of marriage are indicated,
namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor
Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to
the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and
benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement "Isang bala ka lang"
to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of
deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were
married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No.
2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City. 8 Her husband has no prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the
contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document.
Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch
respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the
Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate
of Registration of Business Name. 9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to
the estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June
1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent
likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka
lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the
complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after
receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from different
people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but
she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically
motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should
they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The
respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations
for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the
dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would
submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder
to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached
affidavits would constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the
affiants. 11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the
illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office 12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner;
and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card 13 signed by the
respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her
husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an
instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law
firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show
that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when
confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Officebearing her signature, she
admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. 14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12
February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage
contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then
presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of
the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the
birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were merely an
oversight. 15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and
Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November
2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a
misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on
Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the
charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent
guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which
lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as
Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729–20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered
his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for
failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the
said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from
reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a
similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely. HAaDcS
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and
adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally nointerest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case
should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving
his case by convincing evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for
the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet
convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling, 18 we held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case
to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law. 19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one.
His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of
the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as
senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are
listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. 20 That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the
respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is
a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.,"
bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes
it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as
attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
||| (Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6290, [July 14, 2004], 478 PHIL 378-389)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where
Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso
where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of
the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8
February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices
specified Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. IDTSaC
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for
a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000 but
Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of
Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary. Busmente alleged that he
did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer 1
presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente's
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente
claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her
separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan,
as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente's designated office
address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente's only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived
with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente's
staff, alleging Macasieb's failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284
to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso's case in her
affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb
withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that
Macasieb was still working at Busmente's office in November 2003 as shown by the
affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if
Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until
2005, which belied Busmente's allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice
law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa's
connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente's allegation that his signature on the
Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he
failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time
he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice of law for not less
than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, 3 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with
modification by reducing the period of Busmente's suspension to six months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI
stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample
signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the
same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of
Governors denied Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela
Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. 5 The Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes
it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 7 ESCacI
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The
only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in 2000 and that
Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with
Macasieb, another member of Busmente's staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa's practice should have
ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284.
The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil
Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the
case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No.
9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue
representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente's claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted
a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case
No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one
and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the
questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there
were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14
November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-
Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as
three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed
property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these
other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he
only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmente's allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by
Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza
Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed
by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for
Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the
Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other
court records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we
believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so
since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which
she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty.
YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms
and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense
are not present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false; SIDTCa

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of

facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not
so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would
have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just
presumed that she has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short,
she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case
No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to
prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice
of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011], 677 PHIL 1-9)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L.
BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration,
against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder (Atty Jarder) for
violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document,
Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. HICATc
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004
from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to
a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and
corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-
employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August
2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to
meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was
not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature
appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo's affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia
of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally
dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel's signature posed a
prejudicial question to the Complaint's validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman
ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty 3 be
filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of
Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and that
the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed
against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various
offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency
of evidence. The dispositive portion states: IaDTES
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA
3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED. 4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack
of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner.
The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was
not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005
by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-
complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints
and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the
same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging
in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due
to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents
admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft
all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty.
Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the
secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as
secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the
parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory
conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On
the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed
to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that
they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to
the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective
position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants' position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents' position paper dated 23 October 2006.
AHDaET
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found
that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two
years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise
certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
. . . . In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature
appearing in the complaint filed against complainants' Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J.
Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings
that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were
found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his
obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent
was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds
the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices
sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippine[s'] Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under
the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of
"command responsibility". . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar
in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law
firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure
that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and
other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent
Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the
IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year. HAEDCT
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his
Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his
separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration
and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied
both complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board
found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and
affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office
of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is
a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we
held: AacDHE
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes
it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to
sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading
to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court,counsel's signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2)
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's signature to a pleading, it
is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal
effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to
believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However,
Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he
gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed
with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo,
however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.
This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved,
had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in
allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the
finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. AHSaTI
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one
year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. Jarder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in
this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Tapay v. Bancolo, A.C. No. 9604, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 1-10)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23467. March 27, 1968.]
AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER, for Himself
and as General President, ATTY. JOSE UR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell and for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISPUTE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO A MAIN
CIR CASE; CIR HAS JURISDICTION. — The CIR has authority to adjudicate contractual
disputes over attorney's fees, where as in this case, the said controversy over attorneys'
fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu,
which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. This is so, because once the Court of
Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it
retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents
related thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT THAT UNION PRESIDENT SHOULD SHARE IN THE
ATTORNEYS' FEES. — The alleged oral agreement that the union president should share
in the attorneys' fees is immoral. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement
in terms clear and explicit. The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He
may seek compensation only as such president.
3. ID.; ID.; STIPULATED FEES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE; DUTY OF COURT. — Because of
the inequality of the situations between lawyers and laborers, courts should go slow in
awarding huge sums by way of attorney's fees based solely on contracts. Contracts for
legal services between laborer and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end
that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former. Considering the
circumstances of this case the 30% stipulated attorneys' fee is excessive. An award of
25% is reasonable.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J p:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-
Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union,
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said
union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor
practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made
respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief
engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or
Roberto Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30,
1956 and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957,
answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed
their answer dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified.
Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the
remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and
Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos,
Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido
Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered judgment,
which provides, inter alia that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be
reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which
should have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages
from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements,
minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime," and that the eight seasonal
workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company
(Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at
the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are
actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-
off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March
28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did
not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became
final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the
actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its
Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the backwages due the
ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the
ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for
reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963
in the same case — CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu — a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He
alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case 70-
ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the
Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof that he "had actually rendered legal
services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-
Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to
give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent
to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's
fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length of
services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien,"
which in part reads:
"3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956,
had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his
Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%)
of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of
said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English
language are hereto attached as annexes 'A' 'A-1' hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above entitled Case was already decided in
their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this
Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to
Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also
Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the
latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said
Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's
fees be reduced to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as
originally agreed upon in 1956."
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a
document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal —
thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof — of Atty. Leonardo
C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu,
effective February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his
discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and
ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated
contract for attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants'
motions for reconsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also
respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads
in part:
"(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of
P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees;
xxx xxx xxx
"(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent
company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may
collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to
existing auditing procedure; . . ."
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with
respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no
jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as
attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was
denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed
by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June
11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of
the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys'
fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten
employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from
contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled
to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a
case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and
limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of
the main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction.
And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired
jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the
case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto. 5 Expressive of
the rule on this point is this —
"4. It is well settled that:
'A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all things reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for
the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be
called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original
causes of action.
'While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate
its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies
the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stingers'
Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for
the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement
of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or questions ancillary or
incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may
thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action,
would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S.
pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano
vs. Serrano L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the
main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would
otherwise, be outside its competence." 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate
would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is,
that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which
renders the judgment 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure,
where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into
court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent
of his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point is the
recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967 A Phild. 142, 141, January 30,
1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was
made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial
Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, . . . it likewise had full
jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for
attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point — the ten (10) successful complainants in
CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated
by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys'
fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10
successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and
satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)."
Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 — before the
48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of
whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only
by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union
intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that
Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the
decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the
union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and
Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees shall be divided equally ("share and
share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union
president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to
respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the
above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme
Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted,
too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in
the attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear
and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the
attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An
agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral.
Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to
receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
"The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found
under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply
rooted in this jurisdiction . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis
whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable,
because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court
in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be
subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands
that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source
of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe et al. vs.
Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees
between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 10, 1964 and
have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is
right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid, hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations
Bachrach vs. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138." with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of
Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees for both.
With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other
successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 No costs. So Ordered.
Considering the long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of
their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum to Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and
their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes Fernando, JJ., concur.
the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume
that they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner ||| (Amalgamated Laborers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-
Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the 23467, [March 27, 1968], 131 PHIL 374-386)
inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in
awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in
the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is
to benefit the complainant laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from service.
While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to
bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share
of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is
not a windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services
between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair
share of the benefits be not denied the former.

5. An examination of the record of this case will readily show that an award of twenty-
five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal
services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner
Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of
record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The
pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an
association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of
"Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied
though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez &
Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.

We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and
Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to
CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him
about the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately
copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as
motions in connection with the case."

Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their
professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize
Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of
Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell.

On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for

Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he
filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding
the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed
a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that
were fled later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of
the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes
to the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous too,
were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that
petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys'
fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.

6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty.
Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In
the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in
excess of the amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein.
15