Dana de La Fontaine, Thomas Stehnken (Eds.) - The Political System of Brazil-Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2016)

Dana de la Fontaine · Thomas Stehnken
Editors
The Political
System of Brazil
The Political System of Brazil
ThiS is a FM Blank Page
Dana de la Fontaine • Thomas Stehnken
Editors
The Political System

of Brazil
Editors
Dana de la Fontaine Thomas Stehnken
GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für acatech - German Academy of Science
Internationale Zusammenarbeit and Engineering
Maputo Brussels
Mozambique Belgium
Translation from German language edition:

“Das politische System Brasiliens” by Dana de la Fontaine and Thomas Stehnken.
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ISBN 978-3-642-40022-3 ISBN 978-3-642-40023-0 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0
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Abbreviations
ABDI Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial

ABECITRUS Associação Brasileira dos Exportadores de Cı́tricos
ABEF Associação Brasileira dos Produtores e Exportadores de Frangos
ABIC Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Café
ABIEC Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Exportadoras de Carne
ABIOVE Associação Brasileira Indústrias Óleos Vegetais
ABIPECS Associação Brasileira da Indústria Produtora e Exportadora de
Carne Suı́na
ABRASEM Associação Brasileira de Sementes e Mudas
AGAPAN Associação Gaúcha de Proteção ao Ambiente Natural
AGF Aquisições do Governo Federal
ALALC Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio
ALBA Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América
ALCA Área de Livre Comércio das Américas
ALCSA Associação de Livre Comércio Sul Americana
ANL Assembléia Nacional Libertadora
ARENA Aliança Renovadora Nacional
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China Group
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Group
CAIT Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
CASA Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações
CASEMG Companhia de Armazéns e Silos do Estado de Minas Gerais
CCIBC Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Brasil–China
CCJ Comissão de Constituição e Justiça
CCT Conselho Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia
CDES Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEAGESP Companhia de Entrepostos e Armazéns Gerais do Estado de São
Paulo
CEASA Centrais de Abastecimento de Minas Gerais
CEPAL Comision Economica para América Latina y el Caribe
CFEMEA Centro Feminista de Estudos e Assessoria
v
vi Abbreviations
CFP Comissão de Financiamento da Produção

CGT Central Geral dos Trabalhadores do Brasil
CIBRAZEM Companhia Brasileira de Armazenamento
CIMA Conselho Interministerial do Açúcar e do Álcool
CIPA Comissão Interna de Prevenção de Acidentes
CLT Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho
CMN Conselho Monetário Nacional
CMS Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais
CNA Confederação Nacional de Agricultura
CNC Conselho Nacional do Café
CNI Confederação Nacional da Indústria
CNDI Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Industrial
CNPA Conselho Nacional de Polı́tica Agrı́cola
CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico e Tecnologico
CNPC Conselho Nacional do Cacau
COBAL Companhia Brasileira de Alimentos
CODI Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna
CONAB Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento
CONAMA Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente
CONCLAT Conselho Nacional Classe Trabalhadora
CONSAGRO Conselho Nacional do Agronegocio
CONSEA Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar
CONTAG Confederação nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura
COP Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CPLP Comunidade de Paı́ses de Lı́ngua Portuguesa
CSP Central Sindical e Popular
CTB Central dos Trabalhadores do Brasil
CUFA Central Única das Favelas
CUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores
DAS Direção e Assessoramento Superiores
DIP Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda
DEM Democratas
DOI Destacamento de Operações de Informações
DOU Diário Oficial da União
EMBRAPA Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária
ECA Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente
EU European Union
FAFEG Federação das Associações de Favelas do Estado da Guanabara
FIESP Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo
FINEP Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos
FNDCT Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico e Tecnologico
FOCEM Fundo de Convergência Estrutural e o Fortalecimento da Estrutura
Inst. do Mercosul
FS Força Sindical
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
Abbreviations vii
GDP Gross Domestic Product

IBAMA Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e Recursos Naturais
Renováveis
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı́sticas
IBSA India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICMBio Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade
IEDI Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial
IIRSA Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional
Sul-Americana
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária
INPE Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais
IS Innovation System
ISI Import Substitution Industrialization
IWF Internationaler Währungsfonds
LAK Lateinamerika und Karibik
Leite Brasil Associação Brasileira dos Produtores de Leite
LULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry
MAB Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens
MAPA Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento
MARE Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado
MC Ministério das Comunicações
MCTI Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação
MD Ministério da Defesa
MDA Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário
MDB Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
MDIC Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior
MDS Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome
MEC Ministério da Educação
MERCOSUL Mercado Comum do Sul
MMA Ministério do Meio Ambiente
MMC Movimento das Mulheres Camponesas
MME Ministério de Minas e Energia
MRE Ministério das Relações Exteriores
MS Ministério da Saúde
MST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
MTST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto
NCST Nova Central Sindical de Trabalhadores
NEAD Núcleo de Estudos Agrários e Desenvolvimento Rural
OLPR Open List Proportional Representation
PAC Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento
PAS Plano Amazônia Sustentável
PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro
PCdoB Partido Comunista do Brasil
viii Abbreviations
PDC Partido Democrata Cristão

PDS Partido Democrático Social
PED Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento
PEP Prêmio para Escoamento de Produto
PEPRO Prêmio Equalizador Pago ao Produtor
PFL Partido da Frente Liberal
PH Partido Humanista
PL Partido Liberal
PLR Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados
PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
PND Programa Nacional de Desestatização
PNMC Polı́tica Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima
PPA Plano Plurianual
PPB Partido Progressista Brasileiro
PR Partido da República
PRB Partido Republicano Brasileiro
PRN Partido da Renovação Nacional
PRONAF Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar
PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro
PSC Partido Social Cristão
PSL Partido Social Liberal
PST Partido Social Trabalhista
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores
PTB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
PTdoB Partido Trabalhista do Brasil
PV Partido Verde
RBJA Rede Brasileira de Justiça Ambiental
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RICD Regimento Interno da Câmara dos Deputados
SAB Sociedades de Amigos de Bairro
SACU South African Customs Union
SBT Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão
SEMA Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente
SISNAMA Sistema Nacional do Meio Ambiente
SNCR Sistema Nacional de Crédito Rural
SPM Secretaria Especial de Polı́ticas para as Mulheres
STF Supremo Tribunal Federal
STJ Superior Tribunal de Justiça
STM Superior Tribunal Militar
SUS Sistema Único de Saúde
TRF Tribunal Regional Federal
TSE Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Abbreviations ix
TST Tribunal Superior do Trabalho

UDN União Democrática Nacional
UDR União Democrática Ruralista
UdSSR Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken
UGT União Geral dos Trabalhadores
UNASUL União de Nações da América do Sul
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
ÚNICA União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar
USA United States of America
USD United States Dollar
VEP Valor para Escoamento de Produto
WRI World Resource Institute
WTO World Trade Organization
ThiS is a FM Blank Page
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Dana de la Fontaine and Thomas Stehnken
Part I Historical Legacies and Socio-economic Inequalities

2 A Historical Legacy: The Development of the Brazilian Industrial
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Amado Luiz Cervo
3 Continuities and Discontinuities in Brazilian Political
and Institutional Life: Past and Present Dilemmas
for Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Arim Soares do Bem
4 Socio-economic and Regional Conditions in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Martin Coy
Part II Checks and Balances in the Political System Since 1988

5 Political Institutions and Governmental Performance in Brazilian
Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi
6 The National Congress and Brazil’s Parliamentary Elite Under
the Lula Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Ana Galvão
7 The Brazilian Electoral System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Jairo Nicolau and Julia Stadler
8 The Judiciary in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Leonardo Martins
Part III Institutions of Interest Representation

9 Political Parties and the Party System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Juan Albarracı́n
xi
xii Contents
10 Lobby Groups, the State and the Relationships Between

the Branches of Government in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Renato R. Boschi
11 Industrial Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Political Power . . . . . . 183
Eli Diniz and Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
12 Brothers in Arms? Trade Union Politics Under the Workers Party
Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Waldeli Melleiro and Jochen Steinhilber
13 Social Movements in Brazil in Urban and Rural Contexts:
Potentials, Limits and “Paradoxes” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Marcelo Lopes de Souza
14 Media and Media Policy in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva
Part IV Policy Fields

15 The Brazilian Economic Policy: From the Crisis of Import
Substitution to the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento . . . . . . 265
Stefan Schmalz
16 Innovation Policy in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Thomas Stehnken
17 Economic Policy, Agricultural Policy, and Land Reform
in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Gilberto Calcagnotto
18 Environmental Policy in Brazil. Tensions Between Conservation
and the Ideology of Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Andrea Zellhuber
19 Social Policies in Brazil: From Inclusive Liberalism
to Developmental Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Bernhard Leubolt
20 Gender and Politics in Brazil Between Continuity and Change . . . 367
Antje Daniel and Patricia Graf
21 Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Between Self-Determination
and Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Dana de la Fontaine
About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
Introduction
1
Dana de la Fontaine and Thomas Stehnken
The turn of the year from 2010 to 2011 marked the end of the 8-year term of
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party (PT). His time in office
was exceptional in many ways within the democratic history of Brazil and his
departure from office also occurs in the midst of unique conditions: never before
had a Brazilian president completed his term with higher approval ratings at around
80 %1; nor had Brazil ever had a president from the working class; and never before
(except for the milagre econômico—the economic miracle—in the late 1960s to
early 1970s) had Brazil been regarded internationally as an upper middle income
country. Ultimately one could say that never before had Brazil been so close to
becoming the “land of the future” Stefan Zweig wrote about in the 1940s, as well as
achieving the image the country has of itself as middle power within a multipolar
global system.
In light of these positive developments, many commentators often forget that
Brazil is still marked by extreme socio-economic disparities which, among others,
express themselves through social exclusion and widespread political apathy.
Against this background, one cannot escape the impression that in the Brazilian
presidential system, the power to make political decisions is focused mainly on the
presidency and that the Congress represents privileged interest groups rather than
fulfilling the role of an open and effective legislature. In a number of policy areas it
also becomes clear that a deeper analysis of all the positive news discloses
1
www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/846792-4-em-cada-5-brasileiros-consideram-governo-lula-otimo-
ou-bom.shtml (last accessed: September 11, 2014).
D. de la Fontaine (*)
GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Maputo, Mozambique
e-mail: danadlf@yahoo.com
T. Stehnken
German National Academy of Science and Engineering, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: thomas.stehnken@gmail.com
# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 1

D. de la Fontaine, T. Stehnken (eds.), The Political System of Brazil,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_1
2 D. de la Fontaine and T. Stehnken
significant social conflicts as can be explicitly seen in the cases of the social,
environmental and land reform policies.
What differentiated the Lula government from its predecessors is that it recov-
ered the Brazilian State’s capacity to address the persisting structural challenges
and to conceive policy-making in a more innovative manner. These new possi-
bilities are the result of a reform process that had also received an important
contribution from the previous government under Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(1995–2002). On the one hand, it cannot be overlooked that the return to democracy
implied a liberalization of the political system through which the political role of
the armed forces decreased, and political parties, unions, business associations, and
social movements were able to progressively develop. On the other hand, room to
maneuver was regained thanks to both the economic stability reached under the
structural reform process of the Plano Real in the mid-1990s, as well as the
reorganization of national finances through the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Lei de
Responsabilidade Fiscal). Such flexibility for state action had not been available
during the so-called Lost Decade(s), with its debt crisis and the structural adjust-
ment measures in the 1970s and 1980s.
The contrast between the Cardoso and the Lula administration was mainly
marked by the transition from a more reluctant to a pro-active governance
approach, which became especially clear in foreign policy: while Cardoso was
struggling to win the confidence of international investors and to promote the
reliability of the domestic financial market, Lula was able to appear with a much
more demanding attitude. Already at the beginning of his term, in the context of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in Cancun 2003, he acted as a
spokesperson for other developing nations and demanded a better market access
for agricultural products into the markets of industrialized countries. Thanks to the
international trust developed by Cardoso, as well as the to fact that growth policy
remained aligned with financial stability and international competitiveness
(as stated in his “Letter to the Brazilian People”), Lula’s administration did not
become suspect of creating a “leftwing-populist” State project, sealed off from the
world market, as occurred with Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. The fact that Lula
was already repaying the countries debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
by late 2005 clearly marked this tendency.
Lula’s two consecutive terms in office lead to economic growth and widened
social policies, which brought about 40 million Brazilians out of poverty and into a
fast growing lower middle class. One of the main reasons for Brazil almost not
being affected by the international financial crisis between 2008 and 2010 was the
strength of its domestic market as well as its growing ties to China, which became
Brazil’s number one trading partner, surpassing the US and the EU. But, as Brazil
had to learn very fast, China has not proven to be a stable trading partner: the
dragon’s need for Brazilian commodities as iron ore, beef, chicken, soy or orange
juice is bound to high fluctuations, making the Brazilian economy susceptible to
crisis. Furthermore the administration Lula also faced severe internal challenges. It
became clear that also a government run by the PT was not free of corruption and
bribery. The mensalão scandal between 2003 and 2005 showed deep cracks in the
1 Introduction 3
image of a party that claimed integrity and commitment with the democratic ideals
of its voter constituencies and members. Lula managed to stay in power with
charisma and high popularity. Would it have been possible to run for a third term,
surely Lula would have won the elections.
Having been part of a Marxist guerrilla group, imprisoned and tortured under the
military government in the 1970s, current incumbent Dilma Rousseff had an even
more radical political background than Lula. However, most observers were not
really afraid of a radical left turn in Brazil with her in the presidency, as it was the
case before Lula took office. Having been an important part of the Lula admini-
stration, serving first as Minister of Energy and Mining and then as Chief of Staff
and having been named by Lula as his favorite candidate to follow him in office,
Rousseff was very familiar with government business. The question was (and is), if
that was enough to run a country and to become an accepted leader, especially being
the first woman in the highest office in Brazilian politics—in political arena
characterized rather by machismo than by gender equality. Looking back at her
first term in office since 2011 one could critically say that Rousseff basically did
manage to keep the Lula administration running and to distance herself from
immense corruption scandals related to PT cabinet members, members of congress
and senate, state governors, coalition partners and state owned companies. The
scandal around state owned oil giant Petrobras—titled as mensalão 2 by opposition
leader Aécio Neves—shook the country in 2014 and showed how susceptible the
Brazilian economic and political system remains to corruption and to rentier state
tendencies. For sure, Rousseff became a respected leader in and outside Brazil with
high support in the polls. But, unlike Lula, she is characterized by a lack of
charisma and she did not manage to unite the highly divergent political and social
forces within the country. With Rousseff the presidency has been marked by
technocracy and less by proximity to the divergent sectors of society (as it was
the case during Lula), by this stressing her image of an “iron lady”.
Rousseff was one of the main heads behind the big modernization plans in the
Lula administration and she has been guided by strategic policy plans as in the area
of transport and energy infrastructure—with little space for objecting opinions
coming from the population. The immense delays and social protests during the
preparations of the 2014 Fifa World Cup in Brazil is one of many results of this
governance style. Furthermore the economy slowed down under Rousseff (what her
administration mainly blames on the international financial crisis), facing an eco-
nomic recession. The result was made very clear in the recent Presidential elections
in October 2014. Rousseff did not achieve the required absolute majority in the first
turn and even in the second round she won with only a very narrow margin,
achieving 51.6 % compared to 49.4 % achieved by Aécio Neves, the candidate of
the biggest opposition block around PSDB (supported by former PT member
Marina da Silva, who had lost in the first round with 20 % of the votes). Rousseff’s
main support came from the poorer regions in the north and northeast of the
country, while she missed to gain the support of the business community and
middle class sectors in the southeast of the country around São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro. The signs that Rousseff had lost touch with these sectors were already
visible before: Since 2012 the economy is not growing mainly due to lacking
investments of the Brazilian private sector and, consequently, low productivity.
Social unrest unloaded in 2013 with a wave of protests all across Brazil, mainly
reclaiming social investments in public education, transport and healthcare. The
problem was, that Rousseff in a certain way had lost the room to maneuver, which
the previous governments of Cardoso and Lula had. The growing budget deficit and
inflation rates earned Brazil decreasing rates by international rating agencies in
2014. This situation brought critical analysts to the conclusion, that the Brazilian
growth model had reached its limits. So—in a certain way—Brazil seems to be at a
crossroads and the path chosen by Rousseff for her second term in office will have
major impacts on the economic, social and environmental development of the
country in the years to come.
For sure fiscal discipline will be the central focus in Rousseff’s second term in
office and it is said, that the new cabinet will take a good look at Lula’s first term in
office and retake successful economic and fiscal measures.2 Rousseff started with
first steps in this direction, for instance by changing high rank posts in her cabinet
naming Joaquim Levy as new finance minister, replacing Guido Mantega, who
served as finance minister since 2006. Together with the new Planning Minister
Nelson Barbosa Rousseff hopes to better achieve fiscal discipline and fiscal surplus.
It is to see if Rousseff will be able to manage the juggling act of introducing
unpopular fiscal cuts with surely negative consequences for social programs as
bolsa familia, at the same time creating a new government with trustworthy
members (shading light into the corruption scandal around Petrobras and PT
politicians), coping with the divergent interests of a huge coalition and, finally,
keeping a peaceful social environment in Brazil.
In this sense, who wants to understand Rousseff’s steps for her second term in
office will learn a lot by looking back at the recent institutional history of the
Brazilian political system as well as to the progress and constraints that shaped the
different policy fields in the last decade in Brazil, especially under the Lula
administration.
1 Objective and Approach of This Book
Since the return to democracy in 1985, to the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva, former union leader and head of the Workers’ Party (see Table 1.1), the
political system of the Federal Republic of Brazil—the largest country in Latin
America, with about 190 million people—underwent a comprehensive transform-
ation process, which went gradual and sometimes unnoticed. The central question
of this book is how the Brazilian political system has developed in the last 30 years,
2
“Brazils Rousseff to announce new economic team”. Discussion between Brazilian Chambers of
Commerce Member and Director of King’s College Brazil Institute Anthony Pereira with
Bloomberg’s Anna Edwards on “Countdown” (Source: Bloomberg).
1 Introduction 5
Table 1.1 Brazilian Presidents since 1985

Term of office President Political party
1985–1990 José Sarney PMDB
1990–1992 Fernando Collor de Mello PRN (now PTB)
1992–1995 Itamar Franco PSDB (then PPS)
1995–1999 Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1st term) PSDB
1999–2003 Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2nd term) PSDB
2003–2007 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (1st term) PT
2007–2011 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2nd term) PT
2011–2015 Dilma Rousseff (1st term) PT
2015–2019 Dilma Rousseff (2nd term) PT
since its return to democracy. Mainly based on research perspectives from the
social sciences, the focus of this book lies on the institutional structures as well
as on the actor constellations and conflicts of interest within the different levels of
opinion and decision-making.
Due to unfavorable framework conditions, after the adoption of the 1988 Consti-
tution, the Brazilian political system was repeatedly accused to be prone to a certain
underperformance or even to a sort of “un-governability”. The main argument was
that the presidential system, in combination with the multi-party system (a system
termed as presidencialismo de coalizão by Sergio Abranches in the 1980s), would
not lead to good governance. The typical conflict between the executive and the
legislative branch in a presidential system would be increased through the fragment-
ation of the political parties. However, the articles that deal explicitly with these
issues (see Chaps. 5 and 9), clearly show that a reorientation has taken place in this
regard. Instead of focusing on the deficits or flaws, an evaluation of the Brazilian
political system should rather emphasize on the success factors through which
political stability has been achieved, in spite of the supposedly problematic insti-
tutional conditions. Hereby, the thesis of an “ungovernable” Brazil is no longer
tenable and it was the primary objective of this volume to present a different picture
of Brazil.
During the administrations of Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff, the political system
undoubtedly generated a number of achievements that, initially, it would not have
been considered capable of doing. They went from economic stabilization and
restructuring the governments’ financial budget, to decreasing the traditionally
high inequality of income and implementing an effective poverty reduction stra-
tegy. All this occurred in the absence of the general political reform (reforma
polı́tica) that was so often demanded since the end of the military regime. In recent
years, the political system actually worked in quite the opposite way, i.e. through
small and sometimes tedious reform efforts which frequently went unnoticed.
Although the political process is still marked by a series of deficits in terms of
democracy, the country is definitely not ungovernable. Armijo et al. (2006: 768) say
it straight out when they state that “[. . .] in an odd, highly incremental, and arguably
frustrating fashion, the system does work”.
The contradictions that have emerged from the reform process of the Brazilian
political system since 1985, are examined in this book from diverse perspectives.
The individual articles critically assess Lula’s time in office, lining out develop-
ments during the first term of the Rousseff administration; they contextualize the
achievements and omissions of the last 12 years of government, while taking the
socio-political and economic conditions into account.
Finally, this volume also closes a significant gap in recent research on Brazil. So
far there is no in-depth analysis that deals exclusively with the political system of
the country from a historical and comparative perspective. Most system-oriented
publications have appeared in Brazil itself and in Portuguese, remaining largely
inaccessible for the international market. It was therefore a major concern of this
book to integrate high rank and internationally widely recognized Brazilian aca-
demics. This volume was first published in Germany, being then translated and
updated for an English speaking audience. In this regard we would like to thank the
incredible effort of the authors and our team of translators in producing these texts.
Our special thanks goes to Nicole Nucinkis, Janine Deselaers, Linnea Andersson,
Lisa Armbruster, Emilia Pati~no and Lisa Haug.
2 Organization of This Collection
In Part 1, Brazil’s political system is embedded in its historical, political and socio-
economic contexts. From a historical perspective, the most important cornerstones
are (i) the legacy of the 1930s developmental State (Estado Novo) introduced by
Getúlio Vargas, (ii) the progressive governments of Quadros and Goulart in the
1950s/1960s and (iii) the military dictatorship of 1964–1985. In turn, the political-
institutional analysis is specifically centered on the various regime changes and the
transition phase in the 1980s that brought democracy back to Brazil. This analysis
gives a general idea of the main political actors, alliances and conflicts involved.
The socio-economic contextualization provides an overview of the existing
inequality in terms of income, property, race, ethnicity, gender, and location
(rural/urban), and places these in the context of the economic liberalization taking
place since the 1980s.
Amado Luiz Cervo provides a historical overview of the origin of the Brazilian
industrial model, a sort of “big picture” of the economic development process. The
historical legacies since the arrival of the Portuguese king in the nineteenth century
are analyzed and put into correlation. Cervo identifies the contradictions between
the agricultural and the industrial development model that, for a long time, were in
antagonistic positions and prevented the formation of an integrated economic
model. Only recently it was possible for both sectors to coexist on equal terms,
thus allowing Brazil to also take over a leading role in Latin American integration
agreements.
Arim Soares do Bem’s article is a detailed analysis of the constitutional history of
Brazil that discusses key aspects of the political-institutional settings. He points out
the scope of action that existed within different regimes and illustrates how political
1 Introduction 7
transformations triggered by the State apparatus generated changes in the relation

between State and society, while other aspects proved to be resistant. In summary,
he finds that, despite some ruptures in the political and institutional history of
Brazil, all the transitions were characterized by the rapid adaptation of the political
elite within the newly established power structures, and that negotiation processes
among the elites were always crucial for political change.
In addition to the developmental and constitutional framework, the economic,
social and territorial disparities are also decisive factors that influence the Brazilian
political system. The article by Martin Coy discusses these aspects from a social
geographical point of view and, in the process, he turns the attention to the great
complexity that permeates all areas of public life. In spite of the recent improve-
ments in poverty reduction, Coy identifies a number of challenges in the social and
economic sector, which result from the structural disparities in the country.
Part 2 deals with the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and
judicial branches. First, it addresses the peculiarities of the Brazilian presidential
system that were defined by the 1988 Constitution and which, in its current form, is
probably unique. Second, through separate analyses of the three powers, it asks to
what extent the constitutionally defined system of checks and balances actually
exists nowadays and how the political competencies have shifted over time. In this
section it becomes clear that in recent years a fundamental reevaluation of the
Brazilian political system has taken place. The authors identify mechanisms that
focus more on the stabilizing aspects of the system instead of searching for the flaws
of the young democracy.
In the first article, Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi show
that the political institutions and parliamentary modus operandi ensure the exe-
cutive’s capacity to act, in spite of a number of—ultimately only theoretical—
inadequacies. In the context of the institutional structure established in 1988, the
country showed itself capable of overcoming, at least in part, apparently insur-
mountable problems as, for instance, currency stabilization, economic growth and
redistribution. The negative impact of a fragmented parliament and the personal
interests of parliamentarians are not reflected in the functioning of the executive.
Instead, the opposite is the case. The executive generally controls the work of the
legislative branch and is also very successful with its own legislative initiatives.
The analysis shows that the internal variables of the decision making process, i.e.,
the legislative power of the President and the centralized organization of the legis-
lature, compensate the negative effects. It is clear that the aim of the Constituent
Assembly was actually reached: to increase the ability of the government to impose
its agenda.
In the next chapter, Ana Galvão portrays the work of the legislature and analyzes
the composition of the Congress and Brazil’s parliamentary elite under the Lula and
Rousseff governments. These PT Presidents represented a sector of Brazilian
society which, previously, had not been understood as part of the country’s political
elite. This brought up the question if, after Lula took office in 2003, the different
social and economic sectors of the society became more adequately represented in
both chambers. The results show that the parliamentary elite is in a process of
change in the Chamber of Deputies. For instance, more women and new profes-
sional groups are now accessing the lower chamber and a generational change is in
the coming. Nonetheless, some old patterns persist, e.g. the dominance of certain
professional groups and the high educational level of the deputies. On the whole,
her analysis shows that during the last 12 years there has been a gradual—yet not
fundamental—transformation of the parliamentary elite of the country.
The article by Jairo Nicolau and Julia Stadler presents the electoral system
which is closely associated with how the executive and the legislative powers
operate. The Brazilian system of open list proportional representation has often
been characterized as a major political and institutional barrier and accordingly
stood in the center of the frequently discussed extensive political reform (reforma
polı́tica). The article is an introduction to the complexity of the Brazilian electoral
system and explains its most important rules, system components and the main
reform approaches since the 1988 Constitution. According to the authors, the
debate about the need for a comprehensive reform is as old as the system itself
and is demanded by representatives across the entire political spectrum. Neither
Cardoso nor Lula or Rousseff tackled the reform. Nonetheless, the authors conclude
that the absence of this reform should not be understood as an inability to reform.
Leonardo Martins’ article on the judiciary follows the trend of institutional
reevaluation, and questions the longstanding assumption that the judiciary is
weak and merely subject to the power of the executive and legislative branches
of government. The article provides an overview of (i) the judiciary in the context
of division of powers; (ii) the organization and structure of the courts of justice; and
(iii) the reaction of the political system in response to the Constitution. Contrary to
the assumptions made by traditional Brazilian checks and balances theorists, the
judiciary is constantly acquiring more power and is thereby gradually moving into
the center of the constitutional competencies.
Part 3 describes the various channels of interest representation in Brazil that
include political parties, interest groups or associations, trade unions, social move-
ments, non-governmental organizations as well as the media. In a consistent conti-
nuation of the previous analyses of the executive and the electoral system it begins
with Juan Albarracı́n’s examination of political parties in Brazil. In this article, he
discusses the most important and sometimes contradictory findings about Brazilian
political parties, the party system itself and its development since 1985. First, he
presents a portrait of the fragmentation, polarization, and institutionalization of the
party system and then turns to the legal framework and the new developments
since 2002. Albarracı́n questions the assumptions made about the deficient role of
political parties in the Brazilian Congress as well as the stabilization of the party
system for they were based on analyses that had been solely centered on the defects.
He concludes that Brazilian parties have a different purpose and meaning within the
political system than they do in Western Europe—but this does not mean that they
are automatically deficient. This is clearly demonstrated by the stabilization of the
party system and the position of the parties in Congress.
1 Introduction 9
From a historical perspective, Eli Diniz and Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira show
how the established contract between the private sector and the government came to
an end since the end of import substitution industrialization and as a consequence of
the reforms of the 1990s based on the Washington Consensus. The authors point out
that a new national development strategy cannot be identified. Due to a subtle
process of de-industrialization and extremely low growth rates in the 1990s, the
political participation of industrialists became weaker as did their political influ-
ence. Since Lula’s election as president, in 2002, Brazil is going through a transition
from an economic system ruled by the market to a system with stronger State
control. To foster a long-term economic growth process, a national development
strategy should be formulated jointly by the government and the industrial sector
(as occurred between 1930 and 1980). Such a strategy has to respond to the national
reality and be founded on solid fiscal health, low interest rates and a competitive
exchange rate, without neglecting the issue of social justice.
Renato R. Boschi, similar to Figueiredo & Limongi and Diniz & Bresser-
Perreira, also presumes the existence of a strong executive branch and tackles the
question of how the relations between the State and interest groups or associations
have changed since Lula’s government. The traditionally strong corporatism in
Brazil, through which the major industrial associations and the unions have had
exclusive access to the political system, was eroded by the market-oriented reforms
of the early 1990s. The more recent developments in the relationship between State
and society suggest that the State is returning to a much more active role. Ulti-
mately, the traditional corporatist agreements are still identifiable and the relations
between State and society are increasingly marked by consultations with civil
society as well as their political participation.
While the previous articles focused on the entrepreneurs, Waldeli Melleiro and
Jochen Steinhilber portray the Brazilian trade unions. Under Lula, former chairman
of the federation of trade unions, Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), the
unions have achieved more leeway. The new policy of organized labor (Novo
Sindicalismo) is characterized by stronger militancy of the unions within the
companies, their nature as a social-movement and their alliance politics with
other political forces. In the recent past, the Brazilian labor movements have
demonstrated a high level of strategic flexibility and they have re-aligned their
strategies in relatively frequent intervals in response to changes in the political and
social contexts. Also under Lula, the unions of this novel movement were able to
combine power resources in new ways and partially expand them. The structural
strength of the labor movement was increased by the dynamic in economic growth,
the focus on the internal market as an engine of growth, the favorable employment
trends as well as the growing importance of large companies. Nonetheless, the
growing differences between parts of the social movements and the government
also affected the relationship with the trade unions.
Next, Marcelo Lopes de Souza puts the social movements under the microscope.
He compares urban and rural movements and asks why urban movements in Brazil
are so much less significant than those in the countryside. The urban activism of the
1970s and 1980s, lost its importance in the 1990s. The so called “new social
movements” that fought the military regime can therefore no longer be seen as
influential social movements and the more recent activism of the second generation
movements of the 1990s are yet in an embryonic stage. In contrast, in the rural
areas, the level of organization of the landless peasant movement MST has grown
considerably since the 1980s. Thus, they can exert strong political pressure and
have the ability to articulate on a national as well as on an international level. The
reasons for this development can be found in the relatively greater complexity of
interests in the cities, in addition to the success of the PT in absorbing and
channeling the interests of urban civil society towards the political activities of
the party and the participative spaces in the local PT governments.
The last article on the intermediary institutions discusses the media and media
policy. In his historical overview, Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva shows how,
initially, the media in Brazil constituted an important source of information, but
only for a small group of people. Furthermore, the quality of journalism was—and
is—not especially high in most of the federal states (estados) and particularly in
small towns. During the military dictatorship control of the communications media
grew and those who did not voluntarily become aligned with the established order,
were subject to censorship. In the context of the political democratization in the last
phase of the military regime, Brazilian journalism already acted independently and,
in part, critically in regards to all government levels, institutions, individuals and
enterprises. Lula’s entry into government permitted previously excluded persons
and ideas to enter the media.
Finally, in Part 4, individual policy areas are examined more closely. In the
analysis it becomes apparent that there have been new and generally positive
developments, but a deeper examination highlights the fact that there is still
considerable room for improvements in specific policy areas. In his article on
economic policy, Stefan Schmalz looks into the assumption that there has been a
slow re-orientation process in Brazil that favored the return of the developmentalist
State. Accordingly an economic model with more State influence gained strength,
quasi as a counterpart to what happened within the neo-liberal model in the early
1990s. The gradual and negotiated transition to a new developmental State model
(novo desenvolvimentismo) was possible through a social democratic alliance at the
parliamentary level after the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Under Lula the
system obtained a new quality, above all through massive programs for infrastruc-
ture development (programas de aceleração do crescimento, PAC I and II).
Nonetheless, this development model is still considered contradictory as environ-
mental and rural conflicts remain unsolved. Thus, despite the income growth, the
rural population is still excluded from the modernization project while the high
concentration of land property continues to exist.
A component of this development model is the expansion of foreign trade which
can only succeed with the help of competitive and innovative companies. In this
context, the country’s innovation policy plays a critical role. The article of Thomas
Stehnken shows that even though the Lula government provided a new dynamic to
innovation policy the expenditures for research and development (R&D) remained
comparatively low and were not nearly enough to overcome existing structural
1 Introduction 11
deficits. The Brazilian innovation system is still characterized by a strong State

influence and a rather low tendency of the private sector to invest in R&D. The
current conditions are preventing an improved performance of the Brazilian inno-
vation system, in particular the following: (i) the missing links between research
and the private enterprises; (ii) the petty role this policy field plays on the national
political agenda; (iii) the yet modest gross national expenditures for R&D, in spite
of some increases; and (iv) the persistently high (even though decreasing) income
inequality. These challenges in the Brazilian innovation system will remain the
same for the Rousseff administrations.
Gilberto Calcagnotto examines the conflict between economic policy, agri-
cultural policy and land reform. Especially in the agricultural sector, the changes
in the last 30 years have been dramatic and this is clearly reflected in the growth
of the agricultural industry (agribusiness). Landownership was characterized by
a strong concentration in all the development stages, which, in turn, led to
serious social problems such as migration and urban unemployment. The rural
social movements opposed the concentration trends more or less successfully. But,
although the agricultural strategy of the PT lead administrations during the last
years allowed the coexistence of agribusiness and small scale farming, it was not
able to enforce a qualitatively improved land reform. Demands of a long overdue
land reform have not been met as it did not tackle the existing concentration of large
private estates.
In the chapter on environmental policy, Andrea Zellhuber analyzes the negative
environmental impact of the Brazilian growth model. She explores the tension
between environmental protection and growth ideology which has even increased
in the last years. The environmental policy in Brazil is characterized by the contrast
between an advanced legal framework on environmental issues and the actual
political determination of priorities in public investment policy which ignore
environmental regulations. Many of the implementation problems are related to
the institutional framework. Fundamental difficulties often arise from the absence
of implementing regulations and a clear division of competencies between the
various environmental agencies. Environmental protection will be seriously
restricted as long as agribusiness and the extractive sector remain the central
engines of the economy.
Bernhard Leubolt deals with the current development of social policy against the
background of Brazil’s historically determined socio-economic structures. Social
policy was shaped by each development phase. It began in the context of voluntary
welfare services in the days of slavery, developed through the granting of the
worker rights during the Estado Novo, and culminated with the comprehensive
social rights that are guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution. Through the establish-
ment of minimum standards of social security, the previously patrimonial State
experienced a democratization process. Essentially, Lula and Rousseff continued
with the social policies of Cardoso and focused on the poverty reduction and
income transfer strategies, which, under Lula, became more successful.
As occurs with the area of social policy, gender policy is clearly dependent on
historical and structural factors. This issue is investigated by Antje Daniel and
Patricia Graf. Indeed, under the Lula and Rousseff administrations, the situation of
women has improved in some respects; in other areas, however, gender inequality
remains present. Current gender relations are not only a result of present transform-
ation processes but instead are determined by historical experiences. Although
certain roles and gender patterns persist, the women’s movement initiated impor-
tant processes of change when becoming stronger in the 1970s and 1980s. The
Brazilian experience may serve as an example of successful use of political leeway
by women’s movements, which exert political pressure on different political levels
when the opportunities to influence seem actually limited in institutional terms.
To conclude, Dana de la Fontaine investigates the continuities and ruptures in
Brazilian foreign policy since the 1980s. On the basis of a historical analysis, she
states that Brazil has always been in a conflictive relationship between its external
dependence and the search for international autonomy. Since the development of
modern Brazilian foreign policy in the 1930s, through its cooperation with, as well
as its opposition to, the United States, the country was trying to establish itself as a
sovereign power in South America and pursue its ambition of becoming a super-
power at the international level. The transition to democracy in the 1980s marks the
strengthening of a liberal foreign policy, which had reached its peak under Cardoso,
before it diversified under Lula and Rousseff. It remains to be seen whether the
relationship with China, promoted by Lula as an alternative international partner to
the USA and the EU, will create new room for maneuver or rather mark the
beginning of new dependencies.
Part I
Historical Legacies and Socio-economic
Inequalities
A Historical Legacy: The Development
of the Brazilian Industrial Model 2
Amado Luiz Cervo
Abstract
Amado Luiz Cervo provides a historical overview of the origin of the Brazilian
industrial model, a sort of “big picture” of the economic development process.
The historical legacies since the arrival of the Portuguese king in the nineteenth
century are analyzed and put into correlation. Cervo identifies the contradictions
between the agricultural and the industrial development model that, for a long
time, were in antagonistic positions and prevented the formation of an integrated
economic model. Only recently it was possible for both sectors to coexist on
equal terms, thus allowing Brazil to also take over a leading role in Latin
American integration agreements.
1 Introduction1, 2
Upon arriving in Brazil in 1808, the Portuguese King, Dom João VI, adopted two
economic measures that revealed him as a visionary statesman: he opened the ports
to foreign trade, thereby ending the colonial regime, and he authorized and
encouraged the construction of factories, thus giving the first impulse for economic
progress. The legislation derived from these measures—implemented 200 years
ago—established the guidelines for two currents that were to compete over the
control of the economic system ever since: one current of economic and political
thought considered the free market as the strategic priority for the country’s
economic development; the other conceived Brazil’s industrialization as the
1
This text is based on Cervo (2009).
2
Please see Abbreviation glossary for all abbreviations.
A.L. Cervo (*)
University of Brası́lı́a, Brası́lı́a, Brazil
e-mail: alcervo@unb.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_2
16 A.L. Cervo
strategic priority. Since then, both currents have constantly been linked to national
and international developments: on the one hand, throughout history, they have
alternately prevailed over one another in defining Brazil’s political life and its
society’s development; on the other, they have shaped the country’s model of
international integration, on which its future also depends.
2 The Opening of the Ports and the Foundation

of the Industries Under Dom João VI
When the King of Portugal fled from his country because of Napoleon’s invasion,
England demanded exclusive access to the Brazilian market in return for its support
in moving the Portuguese Court to Brazil. The Royal Letter (Carta Régia) of
January 28, 1808, by which the Brazilian ports were opened to friendly nations
(i.e. ultimately only for England), offered England great trade benefits, for it was
enabled to take over a large part of the Portuguese trade. But it also served Brazilian
interests: both King Dom João VI and his advisor José da Silva Lisboa, Viscount of
Cairu (Visconde de Cairu), dreamed of a modern Brazil, that would not only be
agricultural but also industrial. The form of liberalism they conceived—which was
also reflected in the opening of foreign trade—was understood by both as an
instrument of progress, intended to assure a balanced economic development of
the then expanding capitalist sectors: industry and agriculture. As a part of this
strategy, the Royal Letter was followed by the Decree of April 1, 1809, which
liberalized the production of manufactured goods and encouraged its expansion.
Likewise, an official license was passed on April 28, 1809, specifying concrete
incentives for the establishment of factories in the country. These measures that, to
some extent, constitute a cornerstone of the Brazilian industrialization process,
were not in the interests of the British Foreign Minister George Canning nor in that
of English merchants and industrialists, who claimed the Brazilian market for their
manufactured goods, without having to compete with other nations friendly to
Brazil, especially the United States.
England’s pressure for the economic liberalization of the markets of those
nations that had attained their independence was felt on the entire American
continent during the early nineteenth century. In this context, the second War of
Independence of the United States should be interpreted as a resistance movement
against the British “open-door policy” (promotion of free trade), while the signing
of the free trade agreements with most Latin American countries, during this period,
should be understood as a submission to English diplomacy and economic interests.
The incentives given by the government of Dom João VI had positive effects on
various regions of the Brazilian territory. Factories spread and gave rise to indus-
trial centers such as the one in Barbacena, in the State (Estado) of Minas Gerais.
Unable, however, to resist the pressure of the English government, Dom João VI
found himself forced to sign the free trade agreement of 1810 between Brazil and
England, and thereby yield to the English demands. These established a preferential
access for their manufactured goods of that industrialized country to the Brazilian
2 A Historical Legacy: The Development of the Brazilian Industrial Model 17
market because of an existing 15 % ad valorem tax. This regulation practically

implied an exclusive market access for English goods (regime do exclusivo)
offhandedly requested by the British government.
The constraints put on the expansion of Brazilian industry in 1810 seriously
damaged the initial industrialization boom that had been strategically embedded in
the open ports policy of 1808. Through the English open-door policy under which
the countries of the periphery had to maintain their doors open to central capital-
ism—the independence process of the 1820s was ultimately also subject to English
control. This caused political controversy within the Brazilian government
institutions, regarding the industrialization issue. One side agreed with the English
liberal model of free trade, while the other perceived the positive effects of the
industrialization incentives. The industrialist current had been introduced into
Brazil with the arrival of the Portuguese Court and would intermittently thereafter
fight against merely being considered a secondary issue within the political arena
where nation-building ideas were put forth.
3 Independence: Liberal Treaties and Deindustrialization
The English trade agreement of 1810 was renewed in 1827, after being adapted to
the advances of industrial capitalism. It became the inspiration for other 20 treaties
signed by Brazil with other capitalist powers between 1825 and 1828. The Brazilian
parliamentarians then called them the “system of treaties”, while recent historians
rather view them as the “unequal treaties”.
Although it was not the prerogative of the deputies and senators to make
decisions concerning the treaties through which the diplomacy under Dom Pedro
I exchanged the Brazilian market for the recognition of the country’s independence,
these agreements were introduced into the debates of the Parliament founded in
1826 and they triggered major controversies regarding the issue of industrialization.
The book “Hist oria da Fabrica de Ipanema” (History of the Factory of
Ipanema), written in 1821 by Nicholas Pereira de Campos Vergueiro and published
the following year in Lisbon, preceded this debate. It tells the story of an iron
factory in São Paulo, that was one of the results of Dom João VI’ industrialist
policy, and uses its success as an example of the feasibility of the country’s
industrialization, in favor of which it presents well-informed arguments:
(a) Brazil has surplus agricultural wealth that must be destined for industrial
activities to establish an economic balance between the two sectors.
(b) As occurred with the iron industry, Brazil should start by creating the bases and
conditions that will further the development of new industries.
(c) The initial motivation for industrialization must come from the state, through
incentives, since the “capitalists” act only based on the calculation of profits
and these would not exist in this phase if the state acts on behalf of the national
interest.
18 A.L. Cervo
(d) The success of the state as promoter of the industrialization process is

conditioned by political rationality. This means that first the base industry
has to be created and its branches encouraged later. Technical schools have
to be opened, more jobs made available and wages increased. In conclusion, it
is necessary to provide the country with the adequate infrastructure to reduce
the price of its products.
Vergueiro’s main argument is to attribute the state the central role in promoting
the nation’s industrial orientation. He shared this political stance with MP
Raimundo José da Cunha Matos, who, in the very first days of the Parliament of
1826, submitted a draft law to the Chamber of Deputies that established that public
procurement contracts should necessarily be awarded to national companies.
Although Vergueiro supported him, the project succumbed to the interests of the
agricultural sector that controlled most of the Chamber as well as the national
production. This politically and economically hegemonic sector was interested in
promoting the import of the manufactured goods it consumed and in facilitating the
export of the agricultural goods it produced. Consistent with his vision and tireless
as a political agent, in 1827 Cunha Matos founded the National Industry Rescue
Society (Sociedade da Indústria Auxiliadora Nacional), whose magazine, The
National Industry Rescuer (O Auxiliador Nacional da Indústria), was first
published in 1833 and continued throughout the nineteenth century. Both the
Society and the magazine were dedicated to promoting knowledge, debating
ideas, and offering education and technical training for industrialist producers.
Vergueiro and Cunha Matos associated the industrialization process with foreign
trade policy, strengthening the national state, and incentives provided by the state.
This economic strategy based on three pillars was adopted in the international
context by other countries that were becoming industrial powers in the nineteenth
century. In Brazil, however, the advocates of free trade and agricultural exclusivism
refused to support ideas and projects that would enhance the country’s industrial
orientation, even though they realized that this perpetuated the structural economic
imbalance and the society’s lack of development. In doing so, they hindered the
construction of Brazil as an economic power in the way Vergueiro, Cunha Matos
and other public men aspired.
Therefore, a necessary debate was launched around the two currents of thought
that existed since Brazil was founded as an independent nation. These currents,
linked to the foreign policy, control the nation’s fate: to remain a primary economy
as an agricultural country or to evolve towards maturity and become an industrial
economy. The first trend remained dominant in the political sphere for it served the
interests of the socially hegemonic group. However, the relevance of both sectors
was acknowledged through the coherence of the debate held and was thereby
introduced into Brazilian economic thought, which, in theory, put an end to their
confrontation.
4 The Return of the Industrialist Current and Its Effects

in the Mid-nineteenth Century
The hegemony of liberal thought installed itself in the political arena around the
time of Brazil’s Independence. The liberal representatives wanted to avoid three
measures that the industrialist current of thought demanded from the state: the
protection of national industry, the government incentive programs and the conse-
quent strengthening of the national central state. Liberal thought in Brazil, respon-
sible for founding the nation, remained identical to its original formulation for two
centuries, as expressed by Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, in 1827: “The industry
[. . .] needs no other guidance than that of the private interests, always more
intelligent, more active and more vigilant than the authority [. . .] Our utility lies
not in producing goods and genres in which the foreign producers are better.”
When the “unequal treaties” expired in the 1840s, the controversy that had
existed when Brazil gained its Independence reemerged in the political debate
and the public opinion with even greater vehemence. The foreign trade policy, as
defined in the treaties and subserviently accepted by the state, was nationalized.
Thus, the people in power had to rethink the direction of the country’s construction:
would it perpetually remain only a primary economy or would it, simultaneously,
become a modern industrial economy.
From that moment on, the industrialist current imposed itself in the political,
economic and social arenas, demanding a foreign trade policy adequate to the
development of the industry and not only destined to provide the treasury with
tax revenues. The Independence heroes, such as Vergueiro (Cunha Matos was
already deceased), retrieved their old discourses, while the early purely liberal
thinkers, such as Vasconcelos, changed their views. The country’s industrial orien-
tation dominated the political sphere and pervaded the public opinion in such a way
that it created the first generation of Brazilian entrepreneurs and gave the industrial-
ization process a renewed impulse.
The prevailing economic and political current of that period was based on the
concept of “industrial revolution”, through which consciousness of the inevitable
need for structural change was spread. There was social consensus that the time had
come for Brazil to become a part of the historical movement of capitalism and reach
its economic maturity by multiplying the amount of factories, as the advanced
nations of Europe and the United States had done. Parliament thus conceived a
modernization project for the country, consistent with its industrialization orien-
tation and, in 1844, established tax levels adequate for the promotion of the
domestic manufactures.
As a consequence of this political and social environment and the measures
taken by the state, historians refer to this period as the first industrialization wave
although it was in fact the second, and they identify the Baron of Mauá, the most
important Brazilian capitalist entrepreneur of the nineteenth century, as an icon of
this time. They go on to point out that neither the hegemony of the industrialist
current nor the industrialization process itself were able to significantly transform
the country’s history. They conclude that the project of the 1840s generation did not
20 A.L. Cervo
succeed due to British pressure, the instability of the customs tariffs, the shortage of
skilled labor for the industries and, above all, because of the lack of interest on the
part of the large landowners, who were satisfied with exporting primary goods
which enabled them to import the manufactured goods they desired and so live a
luxurious life in Court, the cities and on the private estates ( fazendas).
5 A Century of Primary Economy
The failure of the mid nineteenth century attempt at industrialization needs to be put
in perspective. While it is true that the economic structure did not change, a trend-
setting change did however take place in the mindset of the Brazilian state appara-
tus. Industry and agriculture were no longer considered conflicting sectors but
rather vital and complementary sectors, essential to progress, and appropriate to
the interests of the entire society. A national issue was solved.
Nonetheless, the agricultural sector remained the driving force of the economy
until the 1930s, by subordinating the authorities in power: the public representatives
and activities, as well as the foreign policy, embodied in the diplomacy of agricul-
tural export. The dominance of the agricultural sector not only survived the regime
change from a monarchy to a republic in 1889, it actually became stronger in this
phase. On a political and economic level, the establishment of the republic did not
imply a change of strategy. But there was a change of elites: the old imperial
aristocracy was replaced by the new rich; the coffee barons. The old leadership—
that had considered the national interests with certain objectivity—was substituted
by a new social group that was willing to act ruthlessly in favor of its own interests,
which did not necessarily correspond with those of the nation.
5.1 Industrialization with the Opening of the Production

Process: 1930–1989
The country’s desire to industrialize—which was the incentive for the revolution of
1930—was the underlying collective subconscious since the country’s inde-
pendence. The Getúlio Vargas period turned industrialization into the hegemonic
current of thought within the political system, the governmental actions, and when
dealing with both the society and the country’s international integration model.
This developmental paradigm then spread across Latin America through differ-
ent experiences in large and small countries. But its most coherent, continuous and
rational implementation was carried out in Brazilian politics, i.e. through its
government and society, where it obtained its best results for 60 years, precisely
because of this continuity.
The industrialization process was never interrupted, even though the different
governments did not always implement this long-term strategy with the same level
of performance. Ultimately, the process proved that current of Brazilian economic
thought wrong that conceived it as an Import Substitution Industrialization model.
It had never crossed the leaders’ minds to replace the imports, especially not
authorities like Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek and Ernesto Geisel who had
obtained better accomplishments and greater results through industrialization.
Based on a conceptually correct point of view, since the 1930s, Brazil’s industrial
orientation was understood as a good in itself and a top priority of the political
actions, under which the model of international integration had to be subordinated.
To substitute imports was not an objective nor a model, but rather a consequence.
Development was pursued in stages: the first stage introduced the manufacturing
industry (indústria de transformação), the second focused on base industries, and
the last on creating third generation ventures and technologies. These phases should
not be taken as distinct periods, because they sometimes appeared intertwined in
simultaneous projects; however they do mark an industrial evolution over time.
The foreign companies only had a secondary role in the industrialization process
that had a strong domestic focus. To spread the factories across the country, the
manufacturing industry attracted foreign businesses and technology to Brazil, and
thereby opened the productive sector. The development of the base industry,
however, was only possible with the emergence of large national companies that
grew over time. These benefited from protectionism of the central state and were
dedicated to the domestic market, without worrying about the productivity that is
required of businesses that operate under the conditions of the international com-
petition system.
Analysts of the Brazilian industrialization process point out the successes
obtained: the country’s modernization, the employment growth in urban areas,
the increase in labor income, and especially the continuity of public policies. But
they also identify the distortions of the process: currency instability, excessive
protectionism, the low productivity to which the enterprises had become adapted,
and unsolved social disparities.
The Argentinean experience poses the best parameters for a comparison with
Brazil during its developmental period, from 1930 to 1989. On the Brazilian side,
there is clearly no return on the country’s decision to focus on becoming, in the first
place, an industrial nation that, nonetheless, still gives direct and continuous
support to agriculture, considered a secondary sector, essential to national interest.
On the Argentinean side, the question of which orientation should be the country’s
priority—agricultural or industrial—was not solved, thereby triggering cycles and
counter-cycles of conflict between the two sectors. The instability was reflected in
the political representation during the conflict between the traditional liberals of the
Union Cı́vica Radical and the Peronistas, who, from a historical perspective, did
not develop a clear position. Moreover, the military regimes of the two countries
also acted in opposite ways: the Brazilian military regime gave the industrialization
process continuity and, within a framework of state corporatism, strengthened
business associations as well as trade unions; in contrast, the Argentinean military
government decided to destroy them.
In Brazil, the industrial leaders did not conflict with the agricultural sector. Quite
on the contrary, since 1930, agriculture—the old source of national wealth—
22 A.L. Cervo
remains present in the government’s development strategies. The following three

examples intend to confirm this hypothesis:
1. Among other measures, in 1931, Getúlio Vargas (Presidencies: 1930–1934,

1934–1937, 1937–1945, 1951–1954) convened the International Coffee Confer-
ence that brought together producers and consumers in São Paulo. The Confer-
ence gave rise to the creation of the International Coffee Bureau, based in
Geneva, whose aim was to control the price of this commodity in the inter-
national market. In midst of the then worldwide consumption crisis, in a desperate
move, Vargas promoted the burning of large amounts of stock to prevent the price
of coffee from falling further. The state served the interests of agriculture.
2. Juscelino Kubitschek (Presidency: 1956–1961), who is considered an important
exponent of Brazilian developmentalism (desenvolvimentismo) because of his
successes, established his government strategy through the Target Plan (Plano
de Metas). This Plan included five priority areas for political action, in the
following order: energy, transportation, agriculture, industry and education.
Because these sectors were considered development propellers without whose
simultaneous drive sustainable development would not be reached, they all
received the same governmental attention.
3. Among other economic problems that Ernesto Geisel (Presidency: 1974–1979)
had to deal with, he encountered the effects of the oil price crisis that threatened
the Brazilian industrialization process. For this reason, the Second National
Development Plan (II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento) focused on two
pillars for industrialization, that were considered to be fragile and required
strengthening to ensure the continuity of the development process: the energy
sector and base industry. In the case of the first pillar, the agricultural sector was
asked to associate with the industry, especially the automobile industry, through

the National Ethanol Program (Programa Nacional do Alcool—Proálcool). The
Proálcool program was the starting point of today’s ethanol production.
These examples confirm the natural association that existed between agriculture
and industry in the Brazilian development process. The creation of the Brazilian
Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), in 1972, which concentrates on
the generation of national technologies for agriculture, as well as its performance to
this day, ratify the assumption that, in the eyes of the government and in the attitude
of the society, these two basic sectors of the economy are complementary and
create the necessary structural balance for the development process. The parallel
promotion of agriculture and industry, together with the perseverance of these
policies through time—going beyond the governments, and the different political
parties and regimes—have guaranteed that the country’s industrial orientation
continues to be its most important good, and they have also promoted agriculture
in such a way that the agricultural industry (agribusiness) has reached the highest
level of systemic global productivity making Brazil the world’s largest food
exporter.
6 The Opening of the Market in the 1990s
During the 1990s, a brief phase of economic instability was detected in Brazil.
Under the banner of neoliberalism, the opening of the consumer market and the
privatizations occurred in the form of a shock treatment and put the continuity of
the national industrialization project at risk. Denationalization, sale of the fixed
assets of Brazilian companies, penetration of foreign enterprises into strategic
sectors (especially the communications industry), foreign trade deficit, negative
payment balance, economic stagnation and de-industrialization were some of the
effects of the first opening phase.
Fortunately, the country had advanced enough in the organization of workers
and employers, and in the development of the production system, to be able to react
and control the opening trend that the leaders of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso
period wanted to push forward, unrestricted and unlimited, as had occurred with the
management leaders of the Carlos Saúl Menem period in Argentina.
In this phase, the employers’ and workers’ organizations put pressure on the
political representatives to slow down the economic opening process. As a conse-
quence, the liberalization process was adjusted to the adaptation capacity of the
country’s industrial plants. In this time, a real technological revolution also took
place (in the context of new developments in information and communication
technologies) and the level of systemic productivity rose. In spite of the political
flexibility that the leaders of the Cardoso period displayed in regards to the negative
consequences of the “asymmetrical globalization”, at the beginning of the twenty-
first century they were replaced by a new group that came into power. The group
consisted of a center-left trade union and employer’s coalition. The country’s
industrial orientation was saved and, indeed, reached new heights.
7 Multilateral Reciprocity and Economic

Internationalization in the Twenty-First Century
From the point of view of the leadership of organized social sectors, the consumer
markets and economic internationalization are the two features that characterize
globalization in the twenty-first century. Both government and society aim towards
these: the first, by requesting multilateral reciprocity at an international level
through diplomatic action, and the second, by promoting the outward expansion
of domestic enterprises.
The new political philosophy of Brazilian diplomacy was made public during the
WTO conference, in Cancun in 2003, when it motivated the creation of the G-20
group. This group of emerging countries set out to elaborate rules and schemes for
international trade, that would have beneficial effects for all countries and not only
the developed ones which, until then, imposed their interests within the logic of
centralized capitalism. “We created the G-20 in Cancun, when the United States
and the European Union tried to impose an unfair agreement that virtually left their
agricultural subsidies untouched and offered little or no space for the interests of the
24 A.L. Cervo
developing countries, while at the same time it demanded disproportionate

concessions from these”, wrote Celso Amorim, Brazilian Minister of Foreign
Relations (2007).
The new social philosophy of internationalization of the Brazilian economy was
expressed in the slightly clumsy words of the ‘worker-President’, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva, when he gave a speech to the entrepreneurs at the World Economic Forum
in Davos in 2005: “One thing that I have systematically provoked among the
Brazilian entrepreneurs is that they should not be afraid to become multinational
companies, that they should not be afraid to make investments in other countries,
because it would be very good for Brazil.”
It appears that the multilateral reciprocity had little progress due to the unreach-
able understanding between the rich and the emerging countries in the WTO
regarding the reform of the UN and the Security Council, and in issues such as
environment, health, food, and human rights. Brazilian diplomacy did not expect
that their relentless defense of reciprocity would help block the creation of rules and
schemes for the global order. Nor did the old capitalist center expect that a new
chapter in the history of multilateralism would be written in Cancun, where an end
was put to the rule by which a predetermined consensus from the center would be
obediently accepted by the periphery.
As a compensation for the fact that they did not achieve multilateral reciprocity,
the internationalization of the Brazilian economy occurred as Lula had suggested.
In 2007, with its US$108 billion of direct investments abroad, Brazil reached the
second place among the emerging countries, according to data from the Brazilian
Society for the Study of Transnational Corporations and Economic Globalization
(Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização
Econômica). Although Brazilian companies diversify their investments around the
world, the South American region is their main target and, in this region, primarily
Argentina, since the government of Nestor Kirchner overcame the crisis and the
country’s industrialization began moving again.
8 South American Economy: A Brazilian Project
This brief retrospective about the economic history of Brazil is enough to under-
stand the nature and the reasons for the continuity of the Brazilian economic project
for South America during the past two decades.
It is a developmental project, based on a state-centered industrialization strategy,
regionally negotiated with the participation of all the governments. It began with
the unification of the markets, through the ALCSA under the government of Itamar
Franco. This was followed by the regional infrastructure integration plan in IIRSA,
under the government of Cardoso, and culminated with institutional, productive,
energetic and economic integration through the establishment of the UNASUL
under the government of Lula. The Brazilian project rejects hemispheric trade
integration (FTAA), bilateral free trade agreements and even the
Mercosur-European Union agreement to create a free trade area. From the Brazilian
perspective, all these possibilities profoundly affect the internal order and the
country’s integration in the international scene in such a way that they undermine
the country’s industrial orientation, i.e. the political and national top priority.
Although the Brazilian idea of a united South America as a center of global
economic power concurs with the Argentinean view, Brazil’s main partner within
Mercosur does not show the necessary continuity in the pursuit and construction of
this project. On the other hand, Brazilian interest clashes with the Chilean model of
neoliberal roots and a primary-export orientation, open to free trade agreements.
The Brazilian view also differs from the inwardly oriented projects in Venezuela
and Bolivia. In short, in the twenty-first century South America presents such
diversity that it is difficult to coordinate in the political and even more so in the
economic sphere, in terms of commercial, financial and corporate developments.
9 Latest Developments Under Dilma Rousseff
The Brazilian industry is struggling under the government of Dilma Rousseff, who
took office on January 1, 2011. According to the IBGE, the industry’s share of the
gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 30 % in the twentieth century to 14 % in
2012. This is a result of the growth of the primary sector as well as the low level of
technological innovation in the industrial and service sectors.
The industrialist associations, especially the CNI and the FIESP, identified the
difficulties for the industrial sector: increase of the state bureaucracy, high taxes,
poor infrastructure, falling exports due to the absence of bilateral agreements on
free trade, especially of manufactured goods to Latin America. After the failure of
the WTO and the proliferation of the Free Trade Agreements, the absence of an
industrial strategy and of a new foreign trade policy are perceived as the two major
obstacles for the industrial sector. The era of great economic strategies ended with
the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Rousseff’s government has
maintained previous and created new efficiency barriers. These internal causes,
and not the economic crisis in the global north, brought about the decline of
economic growth, exports, and foreign trade surplus. Brazil’s performance, com-
pared to other emerging countries, becomes mediocre under the Rousseff Govern-
ment and its global competitiveness has remained low.
Although Rousseff’s government gives continuity to the association between the
central state and the society, that is, between the public and private sectors, for the
modernization of ports and airports, and the construction of roads and railways, it
does not stimulate the enthusiasm of the entrepreneurs as had occurred before. The
dialogue between government and society lost the depth that characterized it
previously, thereby discouraging productive investments and technological
innovation in a country where the central state remains very important.
26 A.L. Cervo
References
Amorim, C. (2007). A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil. Brası́lia: FUNAG.
Cervo, A. L. (2009). A construção do modelo industrialista brasileiro. Diplomacia, Estratégia
e Polı́tica, 10, 75–87.
Continuities and Discontinuities
in Brazilian Political and Institutional Life: 3
Past and Present Dilemmas for Democracy
Arim Soares do Bem
Abstract
Arim Soares do Bem’s article is a detailed analysis of the constitutional history
of Brazil that discusses key aspects of the political-institutional settings. He points
out the scope of action that existed within different regimes and illustrates how
political transformations triggered by the State apparatus generated changes in the
relation between State and society, while other aspects proved to be resistant.
In summary, he finds that, despite some ruptures in the political and institutional
history of Brazil, all the transitions were characterized by the rapid adaptation of
the political elite within the newly established power structures, and that nego-
tiation processes among the elites were always crucial for political change.
1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss key issues of Brazilian political and insti-
tutional life, focusing on the analysis of its discontinuities and continuities. To this
end, it highlights the mechanisms that shape political change and the role of the
actors that organize electoral and political party systems. In doing so, it discloses
the pacts and alliances, as well as the bonds between political parties and social
classes. It also points out the limits of the articulation of the social groups that are
excluded from the political game and the constitutive elements of their struggle for
acknowledgment. By determining the nature and extent of the political transform-
ations, this chapter privileges the analysis of changes brought about by the state
apparatus and their relationship with society, and it points out which elements of the
Brazilian political culture have resisted social transformations.
Translated from Portuguese by Janine Deselaers and Nicole Nucinkis.

A.S. do Bem (*)
Universidade Federal de Alagoas, Macei
o, Brazil
e-mail: arimdobem@yahoo.com.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_3
28 A.S. do Bem
2 Constitutional Continuities and Discontinuities (1824–

1988)
The construction and institutional transformation of Brazilian politics cannot be

assessed without looking, if only briefly, at the constitutions enacted since the early
nineteenth century. Several contemporary currents of political and sociological
thought have revisited the constitutional theories, based on the assumption that
through constitutional texts one can glimpse the political actors and the most
significant influences in a given society, and also evaluate the type of process
followed to define rules, procedures, and commitments that are a part of the
political game (Arato, 1997: 6; Vieira, 1997: 54). According to the objectives
proposed, we will restrict ourselves to a very specific and schematic reconstruction
of the constitutional contents, focusing on those aspects that are more closely
related to the political participation mechanisms through representation. This will
enable us to understand the limits of the articulation of different social groups, as
well as the legal form that regulates the political process.
2.1 The Constitution of the Brazilian Empire of 1824
The historical context that preceded the first Brazilian Constitution of 1824
(Constituição Polı́tica do Império do Brazil 1824) was rather turbulent and not
only expressed conflicts between radical-liberal democrats and conservatives, but
was also marked by the political resistance against the Portuguese re-colonization
attempts. The analysis carried out by Prado (1947: 98) on the Constituent Assembly
of 1823, which was prematurely dissolved due to the aforementioned conflicts,
suggests that the constitutional project completely left out a process of popular
participation in the new political order, in much the same way that the Brazilian
independence in 1822 had taken place with the virtual exclusion of the lower
classes. Prado (1947: 100) points out that while the political system adopted by
the Constituent Assemblies in Europe expressed the demands of the “Third Estate”
(especially the commercial bourgeoisie and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie)
against the feudal nobility (the social class of the landowners), in Brazil the
opposite took place: it was the landowners who rebelled against the local and
Portuguese mercantile bourgeoisie, striving to construct a national context from
an eminently elitist and “classist” perspective.
The Constitution of 1824 was marked by its discriminatory position against the
political rights of the entire working population (this included slaves1) as it assigned
1
Because slavery continued to exist after Brazil’s independence, the difference between citizens
and slaves was subtly infiltrated into the legislation. This made the concept of “individualization of
punishment” difficult, and it also hindered the formulation and ample application of the 1830 Penal
Code of the Empire (Soares do Bem, 2006b: 79). In spite of the gradual legal humanization of
slaves, the cruel and violent punishments established in the Philippine Ordinances (Ordenações
Filipinas 1603–1830) remained in force. According to Linhares da Silva (2004: 119), the Code of
3 Continuities and Discontinuities in Brazilian Political and Institutional Life: Past. . . 29
far reaching powers to the parliamentarians and absolute power to the Emperor
(Gohn, 1995: 30). It also reserved the national representation offices for rural
landowners. The election of deputies, senators and members of the General Provin-
cial Councils were to be carried out through indirect elections. The “active
citizens”, a concept that excluded servants, day laborers, and cashiers of commer-
cial establishments (in short, any citizen with an income below 150 bushels of
cassava flour), were to choose their representatives within their Parish Assembly.
These representatives, in turn, were commissioned to elect their national and
provincial representatives. In the first selection phase the following were excluded:
(i) foreigners; (ii) people under 25 years of age (this did not apply to married
persons, military personnel, university graduates nor the clergy); and (iii) those
whose annual income from realty, a job, an industrial or a commercial activity was
less than 100,000 Réis. According to Article 93, all those who could not vote in the
Parish Assembly (Assembleias Paroquiais) were prevented from being members or
from voting for the “appointment” of any national or local authority.
The income requirement to participate in the election of deputies, senators or
members of the Provincial Councils went up to 200,000 Réis. The people from this
group that proved to have an annual income of 400,000 Réis could, in turn, be
nominated for deputy. For the Senate, only citizens over 40 years old, with an
annual income of 800,000 Réis, could be elected. The ‘elections’ were made
through triple-lists and the Emperor chose one of the names listed. It should be
stressed that this Constitution did not even mention the exclusion of women,
something common in the western world at that time. It is also important to note
that the constitutionally recognized political powers—the executive, legislative and
judiciary branches—included a fourth state power: the Moderator. Through this
power the Emperor could dissolve the House of Deputies, enact amnesties and
approve or suspend resolutions passed by the Provincial Councils, among other
prerogatives.
2.2 The Constitution of 1891
Although the Magna Carta of 1891 (Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos
do Brasil 1891) expanded the representative form of government, it was also
marked by the representational vacuum, which characterized the Constitution of
1824—and what can be found in almost all the Brazilian constitutions. Strongly
inspired by the Constitution of the United States of America, its characteristic was
the granting of increased autonomy to the municipalities and the former provinces
(Provı́ncias), since then called States (Estados). According to this Constitution, all
citizens who registered for military service and fulfilled the legal requirements were
the Empire, “Does not grant the slave civil rights nor does it acknowledge him as a legal person
but, at the same time, it transforms him into a defendant and indirectly allows him to use the
system of justice to claim certain rights, especially those regarding his physical integrity when
threatened by the owner.”
30 A.S. do Bem
given the right to vote. However, this “universal” character of the citizen’s vote lay
only in the elimination of the abovementioned income-based criteria (voto
censit
ario); meanwhile, illiterates (the voters’ signature on the ballot became
mandatory), beggars, and cloistered religious people were still excluded from
voting. It is worth noting that the formal exclusion of analphabets and beggars
produced exclusion criteria that practically ended up reaching the same social
groups that had previously been excluded through the income-based criteria.
Similarly, women remained barred from so-called ‘universal suffrage’. Even
though the right to strike was prohibited, the right of assembly, freedom of
expression and press, the confidentiality of correspondence, and the habeas corpus
were guaranteed (Gohn, 1995: 57). Hereafter, elections became direct and formal
requirements to run for legislative offices were reduced.
The Moderator power that gave the executive far reaching powers in the
Constitution of 1824 was abolished, and only three independent powers were
maintained: the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Nevertheless, the
members of the Constituent Assembly who were responsible for drafting this
Constitution (Prudente de Morais and Rui Barbosa) included seven paragraphs in
Article 1 of the Transitional Dispositions to ensure the transformation of the
Constituent Assembly into a permanent Ordinary Congress (Congresso Ordin ario),
during the first presidential term.
2.3 The Constitutions of 1934 and 1937
The Constitution of 1934 (Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil

1934) was primarily inspired by the Constitution of the Weimar Republic of 1919
(known as Weimarer Reichsverfassung), but also in the—likewise federal—Span-
ish Constitution of 1931. This Constitution was important for institutionalizing the
reform of Brazil’s socio-political organization. Contrary to what one might think, it
did not exclude the rural oligarchies, dominant during the Old Republic and the
Empire, but it did, nonetheless, bring the military, the urban middle class and the
industrialists into the game over power (Fausto, 1997). According to Fausto’s
analysis on that period’s power structure:
In spite of the existence of certain friction, there is a fundamental complementarity amongst
the country’s dominant economic centers [. . .] between the agricultural and industrial
sectors, under the hegemony of the coffee bourgeoisie. This results from the formation of
the industrial fraction, which was born with the progress of the coffee businesses and that
depends on them for its own survival. (1997: 64)2
2
Translated by Jeanie Deselaers and Nicole Nucinkis. Original text: “. . .não obstante a existência
de atritos, há uma complementaridade básica, nos núcleos dominantes do paı́s [. . .] entre os setores
agrários e industriais, sob hegemonia da burguesia do café. Isso decorre da pr opria formação da
fração industrial, que nasce com o avanço dos neg ocios cafeeiros e deles depende para a sua
propria sobrevivência”.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1964) analyzed the industrial bourgeoisie’s inabil-

ity to overcome the demands presented by private interests and instead spread its
own class interests by formulating a project aimed to promote Brazil’s development
and organization, based on the industrialization trend. Cardoso showed that until
the 1950s industrial growth developed in an “empirical” and residual way,
i.e. through the investment of accumulated capital in sectors that gave higher
short-term profits: “. . .in a constant process of gradual adaptation to the economic
circumstances” (1964: 83). Florestan Fernandes also exposed the Brazilian
society’s incapacity to surpass the guiding principles of the colonial regime. He
argued that the emerging urban middle class was not able to break “the circle of
power originated in the past” and, in consequence, it hooked up with regressive
social forces (Arruda, 1995: 178–179). This situation brought about a state of
compromise, characterized by the absence of radical antagonism between the ruling
classes and the marginalization of the working class (Fausto, 1997: 136–137).
Therefore, those in power ‘represented’ the social classes, “whose main character-
istic is their inability to establish an autonomous political organization” (Fausto,
1997: 94).
The 1934 Constitution, proclaimed by the National Constituent Assembly, was
the direct result of the Constitutionalist Revolution (Revolução Constitucionalista)
of 1932, which exerted pressure and forced the initiation of the constituent process
in 1933. Since the so-called Revolution of 1930 (Revolução de 30), Brazil was ruled
by the interim government of Getúlio Vargas, who remained in power until the end
of World War II. Getúlio’s interim government went on for 4 years and thus lasted
even longer than the Constitution of 1934. Officially, it was valid for 3 years, but in
fact was suspended in its first year by the National Security Law (Law No. 38 of
April 4, 1935, and reinforced by Law No. 136 of December 14th of the same year).
This law defined military crimes, crimes against the political and social order, and
against state security. Based on this National Security Law, the National Liberation
Assembly (ANL),3 which had been organized by the Communist Party of Brazil
(PCB), was dissolved in 1935.
The 1934 Constitution, with its distinctly nationalistic tone, took steps towards
Labor protection and, although it had hardly any popular participation during its
design, it introduced several innovations from the Electoral Code of 1932 (based on
which universal, direct and secret suffrage was instituted). It also acknowledged
trade unions and professional associations (even if they were connected to the state
logic), it created the Electoral Justice and it extended the right to vote to women
over 18 years of age (Soares do Bem, 2006a: 1146). Despite the significant
expansion of the electorate, through the restriction that still held back the right to
vote from illiterate people, a substantial part of the adult working population
remained excluded. This population belonged to the lower social classes that
were drawn to the cities as a result of the growth process and where they sought
for a job.
3
32 A.S. do Bem
The Constitution of 1937 (Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil 1937) was
justified by an alleged threat of communist infiltration and the “fatal imminence of a
civil war”. It helped to undermine the previous constitutional order, whereby it
favored a dictatorial culmination in the 1937 coup of the Estado Novo. The Estado
Novo ‘legitimized’ itself by proclaiming a new Constitution, also known as the
“Polaca”, because it leaned heavily on the Polish Constitution that had a similar
fascist structure. This Constitution diluted some of the achievements of the 1934
Constitution, not only by destroying the trade unions’ and political parties’ auto-
nomy, but also by introducing the auditors who were appointed by Vargas to govern
the Estados. With the creation of the Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP), in
charge of censorship and control over the representation of interests, the social
movements began a clear deterioration process and were silenced once again
(Soares do Bem, 2006a: 1146). This occurred even though the Constitution claimed
to attend to “the legitimate aspirations of the Brazilian people to political and social
peace” (Constituição 1937).
The Constitution of 1946 (Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil 1946) is

considered one of the most liberal in Brazil, although it had very little popular
participation in its preparation—in spite of the strong presence of a Communist
fraction in the constitutional process. Regardless of its proclaimed democratic
nature, illiterates were still denied the right to vote. This Constitution enshrined
liberties established in the 1934 Constitution that had been abolished in the 1937
Constitution. It also presented some distortions like the so-called “surplus mecha-
nism” (“mecanismo das sobras”) through which a political party with the majority
of votes—but not the individual candidates—was benefitted by receiving parlia-
mentary seats that had not been assigned by the principle of proportional represent-
ation (Souza, 1976). Despite the distortions, this Constitution allowed for the
emergence of party pluralism and direct elections; it also reestablished the inde-
pendence between the governmental powers and installed the autonomy of the
Estados or States and the individual rights that had been suspended during the
Estado Novo period.
In spite of the formal advances, the highly centralized political-institutional and
bureaucratic structures that persisted from the previous authoritarian period placed
constraints on the legislature for a more effective intervention in the game over
political power. Although urban clientelism contributed to recover some forms of
allegedly overcome political participation, that had been predominant under the
hegemony of the rural oligarchies, it was in this period that the lower classes burst
into the political scene with certain power to exercise pressure, thereby producing
fertile social movements and empirically expanding the space for social partici-
pation. With the military coup of 1964, the Constitution underwent a number of
amendments that distorted its democratic nature and it was eventually substituted
by the Constitution of 1967.
Institutional Act No. 4 (Ato Institucional Nr. 4) of December 7, 1966, attributed the
National Congress the authority to draft the Constitution of 1967 (Constituição da
República Federativa do Brasil 1967). This led to the institutionalization of the
military coup of 1964, commanded by the “hard-liners of the armed forces”
(Toledo, 2004: 22) and backed by parts of the bourgeoisie, the sector of great
landowners, and the transnational corporations (Netto, 1999: 76). The coup strongly
attacked the attempts of social reform advocated by progressive sectors of the
Brazilian society. Thereby, the foundations of a yet young political democracy,
born only in 1946, were undermined (Toledo, 2004: 13). Having struck at a time of
severe crises of the economy, the political-institutional structures, and the political
party system, the coup helped to disarm an important mobilization of popular
sectors, trade union movements, and farmers (ibid.: 13). The coup, institutionally
orchestrated by the military apparatus (not by rebel military leaders, such as those
who supported the Vargas regime in the 1930s), first controlled the government
(i.e. the executive), then the state and its institutions, and finally the institutions that
represented the political system (Codato, 2005: 86). In this context, Institutional
Act No. 2 (Ato Institucional Nr. 2), of October 27, 1965, is noteworthy because it
transformed the multiparty system, effective since the 1946 Constitution, into a
two-party system. The main actors now were the National Renewal Alliance
(ARENA) and the opposition that had to organize around the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (MDB). As the political party scene was reduced drastically, the space
and strategies of the social classes that opposed the dictatorship were also redefined:
considering that the only opposition party, the MDB, maintained itself distant from
the popular movements (Codato, 2005: 95), the opposition of the working class was
not expressed through votes, as highlighted by Saes (1984: 227), but rather through
union strikes.
After the 1967 Constitution, Decree No. 314 (Decreto-Lei Nr. 314) followed. It
integrated various Institutional and Complementary Acts (Atos Institucionais
e Complementares) that were effective since the 1964 military coup. Similar to
the Getúlio Vargas government, the Decree established the Law of National
Security, which produced significant setbacks compared to the Constitution of
1946. By again concentrating a big part of the decision-making power on the
executive branch (the only authority apt to legislate on matters of national security),
this Constitution: (i) established indirect presidential elections, (ii) restricted the
right to strike, (iii) promoted centralization (although it formalized the defense of
federalism), (iv) expanded the military justice system, (v) introduced the death
penalty for crimes against “national security” and (vi) paved the road for
subsequent regulations to organize censorship and banishment. In this context,
Institutional Act No. 5, of December 13, 1968, should also be cited, the aim of
which was allegedly to secure the “authentic” democratic order and to fight the
“ideologies contrary to the Brazilian people”. In truth, it only achieved to institute
terror as a state practice. In 1969 the Constitution of 1967 was substantially
34 A.S. do Bem
amended by Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (Emenda Constitucional nr. 1,

1969); experts practically viewed this as a newly granted Constitution.
Commemorated as the “‘Citizens’ Constitution” (Carvalho, 2001: 199), the Consti-

tution of 1988 (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil 1988) responded to
numerous claims of the working class, that had organized itself in both unions and
social movements. This was made possible through nearly 2 years of a constituent
process involving various groups from the civil society (including a significant
participation of conservative groups). By opening new possibilities for the con-
struction of a democratic and republican public sphere in Brazilian society
(Perlatto, 2009: 1), the 1988 Constitution inverted the traditional relationship that
linked the society to the state (which marked the previous Constitutions), and
merged it with principles and fundamental rights established as expressions of the
general will. Werneck Vianna (2008: 101) argues that the functional representation
“shifted its focus from state to society” in such a way that it became possible to
establish new relationships between politics and laws, as well as create a ‘complex
citizenship’ (cidadania complexa), based on which popular sovereignty gained
relevance (Werneck & Burgos, 2002; Werneck Vianna, 2008). Even so, and
although illiterates were enabled—though not obliged—to vote, they were still
not allowed to postulate as candidates.
The members of the Constituent Assembly chose to develop institutional
mechanisms capable of guaranteeing the effectiveness of fundamental rights,
favoring the emergence of a new arena of participation as opposed to the tradi-
tional model of representative democracy, which restricted these rights to merely
symbolic functions (Werneck Vianna, 2008: 92). The decision in favor of the
concept of material equality and not only formal equality (Soares do Bem, 2007:
73) was reflected in their effort to define social rights in public policies, with
immediate application, and projecting them programmatically to ensure their
existence in the future. This position becomes evident in the verbs used to indicate
actions to be carried out immediately and in the future, aimed to consolidate the
fundamental objectives of the new Constitution: Build a free, fair and caring
society; Eradicate poverty and marginalization, and reduce social and regional
inequalities; Promote the well-being of all people, regardless of their origin, race,
sex, color, age or any other form of discrimination (Article 3, sections I, III and IV,
respectively).
Due to this programmatic orientation, a thematic network for protection of
socially vulnerable groups emerged in the years immediately following the coming
into force of the new Constitution, and various matters of collective interest were
then regulated. On October 24, 1989, Law 7853 was passed, which dealt with the
protection of people with physical disabilities. On September 11, 1990, the Con-
sumer Protection Code (C odigo de Defesa do Consumidor) was introduced through
Law 8078, which helped to significantly increase the power of the Public
Prosecutors Office, whose space of action was quite more reduced in the previous
constitutions (Sadek, 2008: 111). This, in turn, increased the use of Public Civil
Actions (Ações Civis Públicas). On July 13, 1990, the Child and Adolescent Statute
(ECA) was introduced in Law 8069—a milestone in the protection of this age group
that had been the object of instrumental, repressive, and hygienist4 policies since
the sixteenth century. On April 20, 1993, through Law 8648, an additional para-
graph in favor of the elderly was introduced to Article 399 of the Civil Code, and on
October 1st of that same year the Statute of the Elderly (Estatuto do Idoso) was
established in Law 10741. On May 20, 1993, Complementary Law 75 (Lei
Complementar 75) created mechanisms for the protection of ethnic minorities. It
also extended the power of the Public Prosecutors Office and gave it the responsi-
bility to protect these groups’ interests (Werneck Vianna, 2008: 104).
3 The Negotiated Democratic Transition

and the Authoritarian Continuities
It is a common position among scholars of democratic transitions that the models of

preceding authoritarian regimes, as well as the specific form of their dissolution and
transformation, raise fundamental questions for the analysis of the consolidation of
democratic regimes (Arturi, 2001: 16). In this regards, it is pertinent to present a
brief reconstruction of this process, especially considering that the Brazilian
democratization process was based on a package of negotiations that were
conducted under tight control of authoritarian leaders, which guaranteed the
approval of a “broad and unrestricted” (ampla e irrestrita) amnesty that, among
others, even favored the military who had been involved in crimes against the
opposition through political repression. Moreover, the “excess of guarantees”
(excesso de garantismo) (Arturi, 2001: 20) that characterized the process of reduc-
ing political tension, imposed limits on the most ambitious expectations of some
opposition groups. These eventually saw themselves forced to adapt to the obser-
vance of the advances that were possible and to desist from sustaining their radical
demand for a comprehensive agrarian reform, which was—and still is—a crucial
issue in the struggle against the extreme social inequalities in Brazil.
Having been initiated by the military so as to restore some of the civil liberties
and make the dictatorship become less conservative (Codato, 2005: 84), the transi-
tion reflected existing internal conflicts of the Armed Forces. This did not, however,
constitute a substantial change in the position of the groups that sympathized with
the dictatorship. At least not until the transition developed its own dynamic through
4
Hygienism is the legacy of European racist social theories that had far-reaching impact among
Brazilian intellectuals of the nineteenth century. The Statute of the Child and Adolescent put an
end to this heritage, regarding the ways to protect poor children and adolescents. But already in the
1930s and even in the nineteenth century many voices were raised against hygienists policies.
Although they are not identical to the German holocaust, they did play an important role in
developing strategies aimed to the ‘whitening’ of the Brazilian population.
36 A.S. do Bem
the abolition of Institutional Act No. 5, as well as the resurgence of the social
movements and a new unionism.5 In fact, Codato (2005: 99) identifies the existence
of a sort of rearrangement (reacomodação) of the political forces within the
universe of the elite, which eventually led the military to a secondary position
without, in fact, losing some of their privileges.
Indeed, it should be noted that the 1988 Constitution was only possible as a
consequence of the processes triggered from that long, slow and gradual democratic
liberalization process, initiated in 1974. Arturi (2001: 16) distinguishes three
specific moments that marked the Brazilian democratic transition in recent decades:
(i) the first moment is associated to the beginning of the dissolution of the military
regime and includes the governmental periods of the last two military presidents,
Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) and João Batista Figueiredo (1979–1985); (ii) the
second moment is linked to the process of constructing democracy during the
administration of the first civilian president since the military coup of 1964, José
Sarney (1985–1990); (iii) the third is associated to the consolidation of the new
democratic regime, with the first president elected by universal suffrage after the
military coup, President Fernando Collor, who governed from March 1990 until his
removal by an impeachment process in December 1992.
The administration of President Geisel (1974–1979) was marked by a slow,
gradual and supposedly ‘safe’ liberalization process. The recognition of the un-
expected victory of the opposition party (MDB) in the elections of November 1974
(federal and state deputies, and senate representatives) did not hinder the closure of
Congress in April 1977, and rather, it stimulated it. This enabled the promulgation
of a series of measures that changed the electoral legislation in detriment of the
opposition, so as to ensure a majority in Congress for the ruling party in the 1978
elections; thereby the president would be chosen through the Electoral College in
1979 (Arturi, 2001: 17). It is worth mentioning that the imposition of changes on the
electoral legislation was a permanent feature of the military regime and always
aimed to ensure the ruling party’s supremacy on all government levels. With the
repeal of Institutional Act No. 5 by Constitutional Amendment No. 11, on October
13, 1978, censorship on radio and television activities were eliminated, the habeas
corpus restored, and the death penalty and life imprisonment were abolished.
This context enabled the acceleration of the opening process, based on transitory
dynamics that forced the government to respond to the opposition’s pressure, which
eventually led to losing control of the ‘safe’ transition in the last years of President
Figueiredo’s administration (1979–1985). The transition process, as emphasized by
Codato (2005: 94), acquired “a logic of its own”, giving business sector, and the
middle and working classes an increased intervention power in the political game
5
According to Codato (2005: 96): “New unionism was a different way of organizing the workers
as compared to the state’s official labor unions (created after 1930), and also a different way of
presenting their wage demands. The key aspect was to attempt to negotiate the issue directly with
the businesspeople without the mediation of the Ministry of Labor”.
and, thereby, it gave rebirth to civil society. On the one hand, the abolition of the
two-party system (ARENA and MDB) and the—although limited—restoration of a
multiparty system in 1979, divided the opposition and concentrated the ruling party
around a new party, the Social Democratic Party (PDS). On the other, it also
fostered new forms of articulation with the social bases, in the context of the
numerous strikes of metal and steelworkers that led to the foundation of the
Workers’ Party (PT) in the early 1980s.
It is thus clear that the democratic transition process developed through a
combination of structural and transitory factors. One important transitory factor
was the explosion of a bomb in a car occupied by the military in a parking lot in
Riocentro in 1981, where well-known artists—who stood out due to their oppo-
sition to the military regime—had gathered to celebrate Labor Day. The episode
was orchestrated by right-wing military, who disagreed with the path the transition
had taken towards the end of 1979, and led to the resignation of General Golbery do
Couto e Silva from his post as Chief of Staff because he insisted on determining the
facts of what had happened and the punishment of those responsible (Arturi, 2001:
19). This episode was proof of the internal marginalization of the “hard” sectors of
the regime and the impossibility of stalling the democratization process (Arturi,
2001: 19), which stimulated the dissatisfied militaries to withdraw to their
headquarters.
The extraordinary victory of the opposition in the 1982 elections (for governors
of the Estados, and state and federal deputies) changed the political composition of
the House of Representatives. The ‘slow, gradual and safe’ liberalization project
collapsed while the emergence of various popular movements was encouraged,
such as the campaign for direct presidential elections, also known as “Diretas j a”.
This broad mobilization led to both the fragmentation of the ruling political elite
and the popular legitimization of the opposition, now partially in power. Despite the
extraordinary importance of the campaign carried out by Congressman Dante de
Oliveira, elected by the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) in
1982, the proposition to amend the Constitution was rejected through maneuvers
orchestrated by politicians allied to the regime who obstructed the minimum
number of votes necessary for its approval. In the face of this defeat, the liberal-
ization process remained controlled ‘from above’ (Arturi, 2001: 20). The Electoral
College chose Tancredo Neves as president on January 1985. However, he became
seriously ill the eve of his official inauguration on March 15, 1985, and died on
April 21, without having been able to assume office. In his place, the elected vice-
president José Sarney (1985–1990) took over; i.e., the same “leader of the govern-
ment forces that overthrew the constitutional amendment for direct elections a few
months earlier” (Arturi, 2001: 20). For this reason, Codato (2005: 99–100) argues
that it would be more accurate to characterize the Sarney government, not as a
transitional government, but as the last government of the “cycle of non-democratic
governments in Brazil,” because, despite his civilian status, he maintained political
privileges of the military and merely established a “democracy in tutelage”
(democracia tutelada).
38 A.S. do Bem
The main characteristic of the liberal democratic regime’s consolidation period

that had begun in 1990 was the constant clash between the legal achievements of
the 1988 Constitution and the implementation of neoliberal reforms. The latter
included administrative and fiscal reforms of the central state, flexibilization of the
labor market, privatizations and adjustments of the macroeconomic policies based
on “pacts” with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Lenardão,
2008: 202; Ramalho, 2008: 133). For Pochman (2001: 148), these policies have
helped to “de-constitutionalize labor legislation”; what Comparato (1999: 16)
refers to as a “continuous crime” of unlawful appropriation of popular sovereignty
by “kleptomaniac politicians.”
It was in the early 1990s, particularly under the government of President Collor
(1990–1992), the first president elected by direct vote after the military regime, that
Brazil effectively aligned itself with the operative principles of the world market by
implementing flexible standards (Ramalho, 2008: 141). There is a general consen-
sus that the “neoliberal modernization” process implemented then contributed to
revitalize and deepen historic legacies of Brazil’s political culture, such as
patrimonialism, corruption and clientelism, that stimulated “private appropriation
processes and corruption of the state apparatus” (Lenardão, 2008: 203, 205). All
this led to President Collor’s impeachment, in December 1992, and prevented him
from continuing with the “ambitious privatization program” (Petras & Veltmeyer,
2001: 20) that had been initiated through the National Privatization Program
(PND).
Given the massive mobilization of the “painted faces” (“caras-pintadas”) that
occupied Brazil’s streets in protest against the person who had tried to put the fight
against the so-called Maharajas6 on his governments’ agenda and then ironically
found himself engaged in a tremendous corruption scandal, the subsequent govern-
ment of President Itamar Franco (1992–1995) had little opportunity to continue the
programs begun under Collor. Besides these transitory aspects, President Franco
had “certain reservations in regards to a complete opening of Brazil to external
controllers” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001: 20). These reservations, however, were
dropped during the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–
2002), who aggressively resumed the implementation of the neoliberal programs.
4 Discontinuities and Continuities of the Governments

of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva
A “strong and independent” government was required to implement the series of

unpopular measures such as those inherent to neoliberal policies. Such a govern-
ment was embodied by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, supported by an
alliance of center-right political forces, which included the bourgeoisie and the
6
The term refers to corrupt politicians who gained their wealth illegally.
regional oligarchies, and thereby enabled a “new conservative pact”7 (Lenardão,

2008: 198, 205). By November 1995, the president’s office released the Master Plan
for the Reform of the State Apparatus (Plano Diretor da Reforma do Aparelho de
Estado), which was approved by the State Reform Chamber on September 21st that
same year. One of its main authors was the Minister of Federal Administration and
State Reform (MARE), Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira. The Master Plan was justified
based on the argument that it played a major role in “creating conditions for the
reconstruction of a modern and rational public administration”, and in promoting
the establishment of a “managerial administration based on current ideas of effi-
ciency and management” (Presidência da República, 1995).
By classifying the government activities into different segments, the aforemen-
tioned Master Plan established distinctions between: (i) Sectors of exclusive state
activities (Setores de Atividades Exclusivas de Estado), e.g., taxation, supervision,
public safety, diplomacy, basic social security, sanitary regulations, acquisition of
public health services, environment, subsidies for education, among others;
(ii) Sectors and services not-exclusive to the state (Setores e Serviços Não-
Exclusivos de Estado), i.e., the social and cultural sectors, and services of public
interest in general; and (iii) between both of these and the market-oriented produc-
tion sectors (Setores de Produção para o Mercado), i.e., state-owned enterprises
which were planned to be fully privatized. It is impossible in this context, to discuss
all the implications and consequences of this Plan, which was implemented exten-
sively during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two terms (Araújo, 2006: 13).8 How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that it was the cornerstone for the privatization
7
According to Lenardão (2008: 199), “The main composition of the coalition that elected
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was formed by the PSDB, the PFL and the PTB”. Beside these
parties, Gomes (2000: 28) also includes segments of the PMDB and the PPB. A brief comment on
these parties is necessary: The PSDB was founded in 1988, among others by Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, and although it describes itself as a center-left party, critics and intellectuals considered it
a center-right or plain right-wing party. Its symbol is a blue and yellow toucan, which is why its
members are called “toucans”. The PFL is the main heir of the former ruling party of the military
period (ARENA) and is known for its corrupt practices and its “updated” right-wing program
(Lenardão, 2008: 199). The PPB, also formed with representatives of the old ARENA, is a party
“with clear rightist orientation, representing the interests of Brazilian businesspeople, especially
from São Paulo” (Lenardão, 2008: 199). The PTB was originally founded in 1945 and existed until
1965 when it was dissolved with the introduction of the two-party system. After the political
amnesty, this party was recreated in 1979 and received its new register by the Superior Electoral
Court (TSE) in 1980. In spite of declaring itself a nationalist party, and defender of labor rights and
unionist autonomy, the party cooperated in the defense of neoliberal policies. The PMDB was
founded in 1980, integrating many politicians who were part of the MDB, which had congregated
the opposition at the time of the two-party system during the military regime. It has a centrist and
corrupt orientation and is “among the main parties in Congress, and the least coherent and
consistent in performance” (Lenardão, 2008: 199).
8
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s long permanence in office was enabled by a constitutional
amendment (Amendment No. 16, June 4, 1997), which institutionalized the reelection of the
executive posts within all the governance levels by adding } 5 to Article 14 of the Constitution.
Cardoso benefitted from this measure and became the first reelected president of Brazil.
40 A.S. do Bem
program in the areas of telecommunications, mining, iron and steel industry,

electricity, banks, railways, etc., that characterized the Cardoso government.
Cardoso led the privatization process by resorting to executive decrees, favored
by the legislative continuity based on the 1988 Constitution. This continuity
referred primarily to the maintenance of “many of the legislative powers attributed
to the executive during the authoritarian regime” (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995).
Despite having encountered resistance, even among his coalition partners in Con-
gress, Fernando Henrique Cardoso managed to approve several decrees through
political patronage and by offering subsidies for the favorite projects of some of the
members of Congress (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001: 27).9
The economic reforms that were primarily of a macroeconomic nature had
different effects: while privatizations overturned several strategic functions of the
ministries (Araújo, 2006: 19) and generated great unease in many sectors of the
society, monetary stability and inflation control were surely responsible for
Cardoso’s reelection in the first round of the 1998 presidential election (Almeida,
2006: 12; Singer, 1999: 26). All this, in spite of the fact that the overvalued Real had
contributed to generate important imbalances in the trade market, deepen the
external debt (ibid.: 32), increase unemployment (Alves da Silva, 2004: 16) and
drive the social inequalities to their highest level (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001: 29).
After the economic reforms, Cardoso initiated a broad social re-form. He
suppressed labor rights and, based on the budgetary deficit argument, proposed to
privatize the Social Security System (Previdência Social), but he was not able to
fully carry out this intention due to tax restrictions. However, Constitutional
Amendment No. 20, of December 15, 1998, changed certain rules of the 1988
Federal Constitution in regards to the Social Security System. It imposed imported
losses to those insured by foresight or Social security and increased the average
retirement age, thereby achieving a considerable reduction of state expenditure for
this sector. Similarly, the expenditures for public education (Silva, 2005) and health
were also cut.
Despite the budgetary cutbacks in the abovementioned sectors, President
Cardoso—who until 1997 had maintained a position of ‘benevolent ignorance’
regarding the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) (Calcagnotto in De La
Fontaine, 2005: 60)—increased the budget of the National Institute for Coloni-
zation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) considerably, from R$1.5 billion in 1996 to
R$2.3 billion in 1997 (ibid.: 61). This marked a turning point in land reform and a
turning away from the repressions against the Landless Movement, which had
occurred in the context of the massacre in Eldorado do Carajás (State of Pará) in
1996, where 19 MST members were murdered. Nevertheless, in the following
9
Between 1999 and 2002, Fernando Henrique was bombarded by numerous attacks, some of
which came from within his own political party. Among these attacks it is worthy to note the
following: Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) of the judiciary system and the banks;
suspension and dissidence on the part of the representatives of Congress, and the attempts to
install the CPI to investigate allegations of corruption in his government (Almeida, 2006: 178–
179).
years, the budget of the INCRA was again reduced and, in 2002, reached an even
lower level than it had in 1996 (from R$1.5 to R$1.3 billion). It is striking that this
low budget for land reform was only minimally increased during the first years of
the Lula administration (from R$1.5 billion in 2003, to R$1.7 billion in 2004, and
R$1.4 billion in 2005) (ibid.: 63).
After his fifth attempt10 to ascend to power, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–
2010) took office on January 1, 2003. In his inaugural speech, at the National
Congress in Brasilia, he pronounced the famous words: “Hope has overcome fear
and the Brazilian society has decided it is time to tread new paths” (Lula da Silva,
2003: 27–28). It is clear that in the 2002 elections he had to give up the radicalism
of his party, the Workers’ Party—PT (born from the labor movement that created
the new Brazilian unionism), and also dramatically change some of its fundamental
political and ideological orientations. There is consensus that the more moderate
tone had already been used in the 1998 elections (Almeida, 2006: 178, 200) and that
this reflected internal changes of the Workers’ Party, which even led to the
development of certain breaks and dissidences. The 2002 campaign sought to put
distance between the candidate Lula and the image of a strike supporter and
advocate of radical changes to the economy (Almeida, 2006: 210). Therefore the
campaign distanced itself from the MST and from the comprehensive agrarian
reform it had supported in previous years when it led the PT to be the only party
not to sign the 1988 Constitution. Lula promised the national business enterprises
that he would give continuity to President Cardoso’s economic policies and main-
tain some of his achievements. He also guaranteed the International Monetary Fund
he would comply with the obligations regarding the external debt.11 And to the
popular sectors, he pledged to unite various forces to fight unemployment and
strengthen the state in matters related to the imminent social issues.
This change in attitude brought the candidate positive dividends. It reduced the
resistance of the country’s businesspeople and facilitated Lula’s reconciliation with
the businessman José Alencar, Senator of the Liberal Party (PL) for the State of
Minas Gerais, who became Vice-President. The coalition with the Liberal Party, led
not only to the end of hostilities with one of the strongest industrial associations of
Brazil, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), but it also
brought along substantive gains in the area of fund raising for the campaign, as well
as a 22 % increase of television campaigning during free airtime (Almeida, 2006:
217). However, the PT was accused of opportunism for transforming its political
platform, making it “more appealing to the elites” (Almeida, 2006: 216), and of
“ideological liability” (Antunes, 2006: 160), when it strategically approached the
10
In 1989, he lost to Fernando Collor in the second round. In 1994 and 1998, he lost to Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, in the first round. In 2002, he was defeated by José Serra, and in 2006 by
Geraldo Alckmin: in both cases in the second round.
11
The “Letter to the Brazilian people,” of June 22, 2002, was emblematic of this moment. Lula
was facing a crisis that brought down the stock market and increased the risk for foreign
investments in Brazil. Through the Letter he sought to calm down the investors and ensure the
stability of the financial market.
42 A.S. do Bem
Liberal Party to maximize the votes in its favor. In consequence, the PT suffered a
period of internal tension that led to the fragmentation and dissent of its more
radical wing.
It is also true that the pragmatism that allowed the PT to come to power also
forced it to become more integrated into the traditional political game (Miguel &
Coutinho, 2007: 100), including its “ethical lapses”. These were associated to the
illegal financing of election campaigns, money transfers to political parties in
exchange for their support of the PT candidates, and the diversion of public funds
to buy votes of parliamentarians through monthly payments—a procedure that led
to the neologism of “mensalão” (monthly allowance)—and caused the resignation
of Lula’s Finance Minister, Antonio Palocci, in March 2006 (ibid.: 101, 112).
Although Lula upheld an orthodox position regarding the economic policies
initiated by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, he introduced a new cycle in Brazilian
politics (Martinelli Freitas, 2007: 66). Except for maintaining certain continuities
associated to the monetary stability measures, Lula implemented a series of actions
that indicate important discontinuities with the previous government. In terms of
social policies, there were several advances in comparison with the minimalist
social agenda of Cardoso’s government (that had introduced income-transfer
programs to low-income families), such as: the National Program of Guaranteed
Minimum Income (Programa Nacional de Renda Mı́nima), linked to the School
Scholarship Program (Programa Bolsa Escola); also the Food Scholarship Security
Program (Programa Bolsa Alimentação) and the Gas Supply Program (Auxı́lio-
G as); all of which were markedly paternalistic welfare programs of a clientelistic
nature (Silva e Silva, Yazbek, & Di Giovanni, 2008: 30).
As of 2003, with the Lula administration, a quantitative and qualitative transfor-
mation took place in these policies. The emphasis was placed on the fight against
hunger and poverty, as demonstrated by the Zero Hunger Program (Programa
Fome Zero), officially launched on January 30, 2003 (Martinelli Freitas, 2007:
70), and by the increase of budgetary resources to achieve the proposed goals. To
this end, in January 2004, the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against
Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome) was created.
And in July 2003, a unification process of the four national income-transfer
programs (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Vale G as and Cartão-Alimentação)
was launched. Among these social policies aimed to combat poverty, it is worth
mentioning the real increase of the minimum wage.
Although the Unified Health System (SUS) has become one of the largest health
systems in the world—thanks to an increase in the budget from R$17 billion in 2000
(during the Cardoso administration) to R$40 billion in 2006—the sector is still
deficient. Emergency services are overloaded and preventive services are precari-
ous; in consequence, the private health sector, accessible only to the middle and
upper classes, is increasingly expanding (Martinelli Freitas, 2007: 68). Moreover,
part of the reform of the Social Security System (specifically the retirement
pensions), that was initiated under Cardoso and overruled by Congress, was finally
approved during the Lula government by Constitutional Amendment No. 41 of
December 19, 2003 (Emenda Constitucional 41/2003), causing significant losses
for the retirees, who now had to contribute with 11 % of their pensions, besides
imposing certain restrictions that undermined the public civil service (Martinelli
Freitas, 2007: 69).
Regarding foreign policy, there has not been a significant break with Brazil’s
historic paradigms nor with Cardoso’s position in this area. Nonetheless, Vigevani
and Cepaluni (2007: 275) stress that the changes in Lula’s government are in “the
emphases given to certain options that were previously opened.” This placed the
two presidents within very different diplomatic traditions. For Vigevani and
Cepaluni (2007: 283), the historical struggle of Brazil for its autonomy can be
divided into three types of foreign policies:
1. autonomy through distance (autonomia pela distância), pre-dominant up until

the government of José Sarney and characterized by the belief in a partially
autarchic development, with emphasis on the internal market and “that opposes
certain aspects of the agenda of the powerful countries to preserve national
sovereignty;”
2. autonomy through participation (autonomia pela participação) which aligns
with the international regimes, “even those of a liberal nature, without losing
the capacity to manage foreign policy.” A good example of this type of approach
was Cardoso’s government when it sought to influence the formulation of the
principles and regulations of the international system. The failure to comply with
the Patent Law was an important aspect of its interventions and it brought
countries like India and South Africa closer to Brazil, anticipating the creation
of the G-3; and
3. autonomy through diversification (autonomia pela diversificação) which implies
the diversification of international partners and strategic options, a style that
marks the Lula government.
Roberto de Almeida (2004: 162) highlights that the “exemplary activism” of

Lula’s foreign policy, best reflects the original proposals of the Workers’ Party,
especially in matters related to the defense of the sovereignty and national interests.
This was visible in the eminently critical stance assumed towards globalization and
trade liberalization, which contributed to increase Brazil’s capacity to intervene in
international affairs. While Cardoso developed a kind of moderate multilateralism
(ibid.: 166), Lula built a leadership that earned him widespread recognition both in
international trade negotiations and in the political articulation of developing and
emerging countries (India, South Africa, China and Russia). Lula also intensified
the relationship with Latin American countries and strengthened the South-South
cooperation. Whereas the Cardoso government promoted a de-politicized multi-
lateralism (ibid.: 170), the Lula government reinstated the development issue on the
political agenda, by recovering the debate on the North-South differences, and by
leading a series of alliances and pacts to benefit the developing and emerging
countries (Fernandes de Oliveira, 2005: 3), among which Brazil arises with visible
prominence (For more details on the Brazilian Foreign Policy see Chap. 21).
44 A.S. do Bem
In summary, it can be said that, in spite of some of the here outlined

discontinuities in the political and institutional history of Brazil, all the transitions
were characterized by a rapid adaptation of the political elite within the power
structures and that the outcome of the negotiation processes among the elites was
always crucial for political change (Ribeiro da Cunha, 2010: 15). Ribeiro da Cunha
(ibid.: 16) argues that such negotiation processes among the elites are a constant
feature of the political system and that they still exist even after the end of the
military regime (1964–1985) as a foundation of the liberal democracy, which, in
turn, was recovered with the 1988 Federal Constitution. This also entailed that the
last two heads of government (Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva), prior to Dilma Rousseff, who were originally from the left-wing political
spectrum, ended up representing the interests of social and political actors who they
had previously fought against (ibid.: 16). The tradition of such long negotiation
processes was also expressed in the verdict of the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo
Tribunal Federal) of April 29, 2010, when it ruled against the position of large
sectors of the civil society (ibid.: 39) that had demanded the Amnesty Law of 1979
be changed. Accordingly, government actors can still not be legally prosecuted if
they tortured or murdered the opponents of the regime during the military
dictatorship.
Regarding the current president since 2011, Dilma Rousseff, the first woman to
run the government, it is worth noting that she was elected with 12 million votes
more than her opponent and she is the first representative of a generation that grew
in the struggle against the military dictatorship that gained access to power through
free elections (Amaral, 2011: 302–303). During the administration of former
President Lula, Dilma Rousseff took over as head of the Ministry of Mines and
Energy (2002), then as his Chief of Staff (2005), and in 2010 was chosen by the PT
to be their presidential candidate.
Many of the actions that contributed to Rousseff’s victory at the polls began
under former President Lula, whose reelection in 2006, in many respects, was
thanks to the programs created and implemented by Rousseff, such as the Light
for Everyone Program (Programa Luz Para Todos), My House, My Life Program
(Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida), as well as several urbanization programs for
favelas in Brazil’s larger cities. All of these were aimed to strengthen regions with
the lowest Human Develop (the value of one minimum wage in Brazil is currently
approx. US$300).
Of all the programs designed and led by Dilma Rousseff, the most ambitious is
the Economic Acceleration Program (PAC), launched at the beginning of Lula’s
second term in 2007. The PAC provided substantial public and private investments
to improve the country’s infrastructure (roads, trains, power plants, ports, airports,
pipelines, transmission lines, etc.). Although there had been various problems in the
expansion of airports and the improvement of public transport, the PAC 2 was
launched in 2010, with investment targets of R$1 trillion until 2014 (ibid.: 170).
Hence, it is evident that Dilma Rousseff has not only given continuity to the
policies developed by the Lula administration, but is also responsible for the
creation and deepening of various social programs responsible for Lula’s
reelection. This contributed to shifting an important part of his constituency from

the middle class to the low-income segments (ibid.: 160). In her inaugural speech
on January 1, 2011, Rousseff emphasized the importance of fighting poverty for
Brazil to be able to become a developed nation: “We cannot rest while there are
Brazilians who are hungry, while there are families living on the streets, while poor
children are abandoned to their fate” (Ibid.: 301). If recent facts provide us with
evidence that leads us to acknowledge that Brazil today is “a different country”, it
is, nonetheless, not incorrect to also argue that it still has a long way to go to achieve
a full and solid democracy. This was clearly reflected in the massive public
demonstrations that took more than one million people to the streets in mid-June
2013, in over 100 large, medium and small-sized Brazilian cities (Veja, 2013). To
understand the multiple implications and consequences of this movement—the
strongest and most unexpected movement since the Diretas J a—is a task yet to
be accomplished.
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Socio-economic and Regional Conditions
in Brazil 4
Martin Coy
Abstract
The article by Martin Coy discusses the aspects of social ruptures and inequal-
ities from a social geographical point of view and, in the process, he turns the
attention to the great complexity that permeates all areas of public life in Brazil.
In spite of the recent improvements in poverty reduction, Coy identifies a
number of challenges in the social and economic sector, which result from the
structural disparities in the country.
1 Socio-economic Conditions and Geographic Structures1
Brazil has always been characterized by economic, social and geographic dispar-
ities that reflect the country’s heritage, its development styles and their outcomes,
and, in the past years, surely also the consequences of its integration into the
globalization process. At the same time, Brazil has recently become a stage for
many dynamic socio-economic and political processes that emphasize its claim of
being the leading power in the South. Even basic indicators show that Brazil—the
largest and most populated country in Latin America—plays a key role in the global
context. The country ranked fifth among all nations regarding population (currently
approx. 193 million) and area (approx. 8.5 million km2), and in past years it has
reached the sixth place in terms of economic output (measured by the volume of the
gross domestic product, GDP).
Brazil is the world’s largest coffee, sugar cane and orange producer, and it is
competing with its ‘rivals’, the United States and Argentina, for first place in beef
1
M. Coy (*)
University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
e-mail: martin.coy@uibk.ac.at

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_4
50 M. Coy
and soy production (Almanaque, 2013). Regarding mineral resources, the country is
also among the most important extractors worldwide and is in the top ranks, for
example, in terms of iron ore, aluminum, and various steel-refiners (Coy & T€opfer,
2009). Crude oil extraction has a promising future, particularly since large offshore
deposits have been discovered and are being exploited with Brazil’s modern mining
techniques. It is worthy to note that among Brazil’s ten largest companies,
four enterprises work in the sectors of energy, raw materials, and steel, namely:
the parastatal oil company Petrobras as well as Vale do Rio Doce, Gerdau, and
Usiminas (Almanaque, 2009: 92).
All this highlights the significance of primary production of agricultural products
and raw materials for Brazilian economy and its export sector. Even though since
the 1960s the industrial sector has been very dynamic—as a result of the long-term
import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy—terms such as “primarization”
or “re-primarization” are returning to the discussion about the country’s economy
and export sector.
Although European and U.S. markets are still highly relevant for Brazil’s export
(and import) statistics, Asia (particularly China) is continuously gaining impor-
tance. Despite an ever closer involvement with the globalization process, since the
beginning of the neoliberal economic opening process in the early 1990s, the
country seems to have passed the recent global economic and financial crisis
more or less ‘unharmed’ (Busch, 2010): the GDP grew significantly in 2010,
Brazil’s currency is stable, the foreign debt problem has been overcome, and,
contrary to the worldwide trend, direct foreign investment is increasingly
significantly.
Brazil’s current macro-economic strength is matched by a new regional and
global political orientation (Grabendorff, 2010). The country’s claim of being a
global power becomes visible in its efforts to strengthen regional integration in
Latin America. Brazil harshly fought back George W. Bush’s unpopular project of a
Pan-American free trade zone. Now that it is off the table, Brazil is trying to give
various regional integration projects, such as the Mercosul, Unasul or the Amazon
Cooperation Treaty, a new boost. Priority, however, is given to its position in the
global political arena. Brazil sees itself not only as a spokesman for Latin America
but for the third world countries as a whole. It is demanding a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council and is using its membership in the group of the G-20 countries
to influence global governance structures. It is also engaged in the UN Blue Helmet
peacekeeping missions and claims the leading role among all Portuguese-speaking
countries.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva achieved a positive economic and geo-
political balance during his 8-year administration. Nevertheless, he and his successor,
President Dilma Rousseff, will have to ask themselves about the country’s socio-
economic conditions as it shows one of the highest income inequalities and occupies
an inglorious eighth place in terms of income concentration, worldwide (Almanaque,
2009: 122). In the context of significant disparities that still persist between the
regions, the country’s heritage, power relations, and development styles have carved
themselves into its society and geography on different levels. These are the
4 Socio-economic and Regional Conditions in Brazil 51
benchmarks against which the success or failure of the ‘development’ measures are
to be assessed.
Brazil’s geographical structure, marked by serious inequalities, can be described
as follows (Kohlhepp, 2010: 91): two large-scale patterns of regional disparities
characterize the country throughout its history and remain until today. The first
pattern is the contrast between the coastal region and the rest of the country, known
in Portuguese as the “interior”. Ever since the Portuguese colonization, the main
part of the population settled along the coasts, which became home to the most
important urban areas as well as the country’s main economic centers. In contrast,
the interior is far less populated. The second pattern is related to the north-south
divide, which is particularly reflected in the differences between regional develop-
ment dynamics.
The country’s most important economically active areas can be found in the
Southeast region, where the megacities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as well as a
belt of dynamic urban-industrial centers, are located. At the same time, the South-
east is one of the major agricultural regions, originally based on coffee plantations,
and that is also characterized, nowadays, by world-market oriented citrus fruit
production and large-scale sugarcane industry for ethanol production. Of the
Brazilian population, 42 % live in the highly urbanized Southeast, where 55 % of
the country’s GDP is generated (values for 2012 and 2010). Initially based on small
and medium-scale agricultural activities, the South region was for a long time the
most important region for agricultural modernization. Moreover, in connection
with the modernized agriculture, important manufacturing centers have developed
in the region, in the cities of Porto Alegre, Curitiba, and in other smaller southern
cities.
The stagnating crisis of the semi-arid Northeast region contrasts with the
dynamic spaces in the Southeast and South. The Northeast has had the main
migration outflow for several decades now, together with parts of the South that
suffered the displacement effects of mechanized farming. Some migrants are
moving into the formerly peripheral areas of the Midwest and the Amazon, by
continuously expanding the agricultural frontier since the 1970s (Kohlhepp & Coy,
2010). However, the most common migration destinations are traditionally still
major metropolitan areas and recently also rapidly growing medium-sized cities of
the Southeast. Many displaced people from the rural areas see their only chance of
survival there.
By using the Human Development Index (HDI) as an indicator—although quite
limited—of a country’s socio-economic development, we can see that Brazil has
worked itself up on the global scale from the 73rd place in the year 2000 to the 57th
place in 2007 (with a value of 0.816) (Kohlhepp, 2010: 101). When narrowed down
to the regional differences within the country, facts reveal that the States of the
Northeast are at the lower end of the scale, with HDI values at the level of African
countries. In contrast, the values of the dynamic Southeast are close to those of
some countries of the northern hemisphere. Thus far, the comparison that is often
made of Brazil with a “Belindia” (a combination of Belgium and India) seems
fitting.
52 M. Coy
Despite the efforts of various governments in recent decades to reduce these

differences by repeatedly implementing large-scale regional development
programs, the political and economic conditions required to solve the problems
described have by no means been achieved. This is due to the fact that political
decisions, economic and social changes, as well as geographical processes are
increasingly influenced by globalization. The transformation of the political context
in the 1990s, to a large extent, is co-responsible for this trend. In the 1980s, Brazil
fell deep into the so-called ‘debt trap’ and had exorbitant inflation rates, which, over
the years, shattered the country’s economic foundation and the people’s living
conditions. When the country turned to the International Monetary Fund for help,
the consequences were similar to those in other third world regions: the country
agreed to far-reaching structural adjustment measures, following neoliberal
principles. Accordingly, phrases and terms such as “reduction of the state budget
deficit” and “protectionism”, on the one hand, and “deregulation” and “privati-
zation”, on the other, became key concepts of Brazil’s official political discourse
during the 1990s. Although economic growth always came together with concen-
tration of wealth, and not its distribution, the gradual withdrawal of the state’s
social and regional policies aggravated socio-economic disparities and strength-
ened socio-geographical fragmentation.
Given the fact that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had a humble background and grew
politically within the unionist movement and the leftist opposition, when he took
office in 2003, hopes rose among many Brazilians regarding the new president’s
attitudes and actions. They hoped he would have more sympathy for people’s
everyday problems and that he would create a political counterbalance to the
escalating social disparities that were a consequence of the neoliberal trend of the
preceding years. Issues of social justice would not simply pay lip service under
President Lula. Fundamental structural problems, such as the issue of agrarian
reform, were put back on the political agenda after years of stagnation; environ-
mental problems were no longer dismissed as collateral damage of a growth-
oriented policy; and finally citizen participation was increased at all levels, thereby
empowering the most vulnerable. In this context, the concept of citizenship
(cidadania), the exercise of civil rights, became one of the essential political
slogans of the Lula era and state welfare policies received a high priority.
The major efforts to eradicate poverty, that were connected with the social
programs Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) and Family Grant (Bolsa Famı́lia) (Coy &
Schmitt, 2007: 36), undoubtedly obtained worldwide attention. In 2008, nearly
13 million families nationwide benefited from income transfers and other monetary
aids through Bolsa Famı́lia (according to official data of the Ministry of Social
Affairs); this is more than one fourth of all Brazilian households. Regional
differences in the distribution are interesting: although megacities (São Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro) have more weight in absolute terms, it is mainly the Northeastern
region, where the highest proportions of beneficiaries can be found and where, in
some of the smaller communities, up to 100 % of the population received such
transfers (Coy & Théry, 2010).
2 Structures and Development in Rural Areas
Looking at population growth and distribution, it becomes obvious that rural

regions are losing significance in comparison with urban areas. While in 1960,
55 % of all Brazilians lived in rural areas, merely 15 % of the then approximately
184 million inhabitants did so in 2007. The rural population is also rapidly decreas-
ing in absolute numbers: between 1991 and 2000, about four million people
migrated elsewhere. These figures indicate the extent of the rural exodus in Brazil
in recent decades, a process which is regarded as a consequence of traditionally
uneven agrarian social structures, in combination with a socially unbalanced modern-
ization policy.
Since the 1960s, the agricultural sector underwent a modernization process that
was explicitly promoted by the state and was associated with significant social
consequences for rural areas (Neuburger, 2010). The “Green Revolution” was its
model, and it was founded on agricultural and regional policy instruments that were
essentially based on four pillars:
1. The establishment of minimum prices and a highly subsidized credit policy.

2. The establishment of governmental agricultural research and advisory services,
with the aim to develop and disseminate agro-technological innovations.
3. Sectoral programs to promote individual production areas (e.g., biofuel produc-
tion from sugar cane).
4. Regional programs to integrate peripheral regions (e.g. agricultural colonization
in the Amazon region).
In this context, especially in southern Brazil, agro-industrial complexes were

developed, in which production of intermediate goods (e.g. agricultural machinery,
agro-chemicals), and marketing and processing of agricultural products were com-
bined. Insofar, agricultural modernization and industrialization were closely linked.
The increasing integration of the agricultural sector into global economic
circuits is a result of Brazil’s agricultural modernization. The motor of this growing
involvement in global processes was especially the soy boom that began in the
1960s and 1970s in the South region and was successively taken over by the
Midwestern States in the last 30 years. In only a few years, formerly peripheral
regions of the interior, in particular the State of Mato Grosso, moved up into the
leading group of soybean production regions. Regarding the dimension of the
production structure, the highly mechanized large farms in these particularly
dynamic regions significantly differ from the production areas in the South. In
recent years, soybean production is constantly expanding further towards the
Northwest, near the Amazon, and the Northeast region.
The most recent developments in rural modernization enclaves of the Midwest
show how peripheral regions are aligned to the globalization process within the
deregulation framework. After an initially strong commitment on the part of the
state, e.g. in the creation of infrastructure, private capitals of national and inter-
national origin are now taking over the production initiatives. Multinational
54 M. Coy
corporations of the agricultural sector are involved in seed production and bio-
technology, while foreign donors are financing key development programs. In this
context, in addition to the social costs, environmental pollution caused by mono-
culture soybean cultivation (degradation of landscapes, erosion, water pollution,
etc.) is enormous.
In summary, it can be said that three agro-social systems coexist simultaneously
in Brazil’s rural areas (Coy & Théry, 2010). In one system there are new, modern-
ized forms of agriculture and livestock farming that are integrated into powerful
agro-industrial, often globally organized complexes, which are linked with other
forms of production, distribution, and consumption. However, in comparison with
their production levels and capital volume, they absorb a small amount of labor.
The opposite is found in the North and Northeast (and to a lesser extent in the
South) where there still are regions with high agricultural activity that is often
mainly focused on subsistence farming and is hardly integrated in economic
circuits. And finally, since Brazil continues to have significant land reserves,
there are recently explored areas in the northern Amazon region, where the
incorporation process into the national economy is yet underway [see Structure
and Change in the Brazilian Amazon, in Kohlhepp and Coy (2010)].
In response to globalization trends in rural areas that are pushing small-scale
farmer families and landless people more and more onto the economic, social and
political margins, it is precisely the most harshly affected groups—particularly
landless people—that are reacting in recent years. These marginalized groups
responded with new forms of organization and actions so as to enforce their
interests, even if it was necessary to go against the state and the economic elites.
In this context, the largest organization so far, the Landless Movement (MST),
founded in 1984, needs to be mentioned. The MST goes far back, to a long tradition
of political resistance in rural areas (Neuburger, 2010). Through numerous land
occupations, they intend to force the state to expropriate unproductive large estates,
and to subdivide and distribute them to the landless.
Although the MST has become one of the largest extra-parliamentary opposition
forces in Brazil, state policies continue to lag far behind the real needs of landless
families’ settlements. Nonetheless, the visible successes of the Landless Movement
are perhaps the most astonishing developments in rural areas in the past years.
Through their actions, Brazilian agrarian reform was put back on the political
agenda. It is also undoubtedly thanks to the MST that responsible politicians,
planners, and civil society organizations are recently again addressing the needs
of small-scale farmers. However, a lasting solution to the problem itself—through
the promotion and consolidation of small-scale agriculture—is still pending: the
traditional small-scale farmers sector, which is responsible for a large part of food
production, remains neglected. In conclusion, the negative impacts of agricultural
modernization are clearly reflected in increasing social disparities in rural areas. For
more information on this issue see Chaps. 13 and 17.
3 Structures and Development in Urban Areas
In only a few decades, Brazil has gone from a predominantly rural into a largely
urbanized country. While in 1940 around 70 % of the population lived in rural
areas, this percentage has dropped to below 15 % today. The growth of the cities is
even more impressive if you look at absolute numbers: in 1940, only about
13 million people lived in cities; in 2008, it was an estimated 150 million. Only
in the decade of 1980, until then the strongest phase of urban growth in absolute
values, Brazilian cities grew by over 30 million people.
The urbanization process is part of profound economic and social restructuring
that seized the country during the last decades of the twentieth century. By now,
Brazil is no longer an agricultural country, and rather a major industry and service
provider, the main one in the southern hemisphere and one of the most important
worldwide for various industrial sectors (cement, steel, cars, aviation, etc.). Some
of its industrial and service companies (e.g. the mining company Vale do Rio Doce,
bank giant Banco do Brasil, media group Globo) are nowadays occupying promi-
nent positions in global corporate rankings. After having been perceived merely as
a supplier of agricultural raw materials and mining products, the country moved up
in international ranks to become an industry and service providing country, thanks
to a combination of various favorable factors. Just to mention one important factor,
the dominance of the Southeast and South regions is evident: all modern industries
are situated there and, in general, companies are much larger than in the rest of the
country. The State of São Paulo alone accounts for 45 % of all companies with more
than 100 employees, and for more than 40 % of the industries located in the entire
Southeast region, which make up 55 % of the country’s industries, and 61 % of the
GDP, produced by industrial activities (Coy & Théry, 2010). Economies of scale
still favor the concentration of industries within the economically strong region of
the São Paulo—Rio de Janeiro—Belo Horizonte triangle, as well as better access to
capital and infrastructure. Another factor is the demand volume of the Southeast
region, as it has a considerable number of consumers with high income and modern
trading systems in its large urban areas. There are also sufficient qualified workers
in the cities as well as the necessary connections to decision-making centers.
It is particularly the major urban areas that reflect the contradictions of Brazilian
society. On one side, cities are places in which rich and successful people create
their own spaces of action and representation, with their skyscraper neighborhoods,
gated communities and shopping centers—often at the expense of the old city
centers. On the other side, areas for the survival of the poor, on the outskirts or in
marginal places, are constantly growing. Today, much of the urban population in
Brazil lives in those marginal neighborhoods where, at best, there is extremely poor
infrastructure. Work and a low income are usually only provided by the informal
sector (on this issue, see Chap. 19).
The metropolitan regions of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro remain by far Brazil’s
largest urban agglomerations and are also among the largest megacities of the
planet. The growth of major cities has slowed down in general over the last years
and now, smaller and medium-sized cities are growing particularly fast—both in
56 M. Coy
the vicinity of the megacities as in peripheral regions. The problems that were well-
known in major cities, such as uncontrolled urban expansion, lack of housing, urban
poverty, marginalization, expansion of the informal sector, crime, and ecological
problems, are now being reproduced in small and medium-sized cities, even more
intensively. City councils and planning institutions are mostly overwhelmed by this
explosive expansion, especially since their leeway, in times of neoliberal policies,
is increasingly limited.
Nevertheless, the growth of São Paulo, the largest city in Brazil and by now the
largest Latin American megalopolis, is still very impressive. The dynamic eco-
nomic development of Greater São Paulo is the main reason for the great appeal that
the metropolis has for immigrants from all over the country—particularly from the
Northeast—since the mid-twentieth century. Between 1960 and 2012, the popu-
lation of the metropolitan area quadrupled, going from nearly five million to now
more than 20 million people. In relative values, the fastest growth phase took place
in the 1960s and 1970s, and then slowed down from the 1980s onwards.
The result of that extraordinary growth process is a metropolitan region that is
fragmented both in terms of its socio-economic and geographical development
dynamics and regarding its structures and daily living conditions (Coy, 2010).
The favelas, mostly built on illegally occupied public or private land, have stretched
out on the peripheral areas of the inner city, partly also in close proximity to more
affluent neighborhoods. It is well known that since 1970 the population living in the
favelas has grown disproportionately in relation to the city’s entire population. A
survey carried out by public housing authorities in the 1990s, already established
that about 65 % of the 1600 favelas of São Paulo emerged through the occupation of
public land. Approximately 50 % of these favelas were partially located on borders
of rivers and streams, and were therefore especially threatened by risk of floods.
Another 30 % were situated on hillsides and associated to high landslide risk due to
heavy seasonal rainfall. And 1 % of the then examined favelas were located on
garbage dumps (Coy, 2010). In addition to the absolutely inadequate supply of
social and basic sanitary infrastructure for the marginal districts, these facts point
out the legal and geographic situation of these districts, and their extreme vulner-
ability, which is expressed accordingly in the yearly disasters involving many
deaths.
Poor neighborhoods have certainly not disappeared completely from the city
centers. On the contrary, in the last 100 years the cortiços emerged especially in
centrally located neighborhoods of São Paulo. The cortiços are homes character-
ized by mostly sub-human living conditions (e.g. inadequate sanitary infra-
structure), serious overcrowding, and unexplained rental or ownership situations.
Often these neighborhoods were formerly much better-off but degraded after the
original inhabitants moved away and houses were taken over by the poor. The
number of cortiços remains particularly high in areas close to the city center.
In addition to this, in recent years the cortiço-phenomenon has been expanding
into other parts of the city, for example through the occupation of empty movie
theaters, warehouses, or residential buildings. The most recent data reports that
some 600,000 people live in cortiços in São Paulo, mainly in the city center, and the
tendency is rising.
At the other end of the social scale, new preferences regarding housing styles
and residential locations can be observed among the urban upper-middle and high
classes in all Brazilian cities, even medium sized cities, since the mid-1970s (Coy,
2010). More and more closed, private neighborhoods, integrally designed with
elaborate security arrangements, are being built in response to the deterioration of
the living environment and conditions in the cities, the increased social tensions and
the associated potential hazards.
The so-called closed condominiums (condomı́nios fechados), are the new
privileged neighborhoods, based on the concept of North American gated commu-
nities, but in many cases, they surpass their model in the level of isolation. The
success of these isolated, privileged districts is the most striking proof of the
increasing socioeconomic and geographic fragmentation within Brazilian cities.
The privileged groups spend their day-to-day lives in group-specific spaces and
access-controlled enclaves (residential ghettos, shopping centers, business parks).
Thereby, gated communities correspond to new “extraterritorial spaces” within the
cities and surrounding areas, and are largely beyond public control and scrutiny.
The rise of these city-enclaves also occurs at the expense of the city centers. As
boundaries between public and private space are becoming increasingly insur-
mountable, life quality in the city is less connected to public spaces, and instead
is linked to fragmented spaces and therefore only benefits those who have access to
them. Therefore, Brazilian cities are, more than ever, drawing closer to the image of
“islands of wealth surrounded by oceans of poverty.”
4 Conclusion
Specific driving forces sustain Brazil’s economic and geographical development.

The crucial economic engines are without a doubt the industry and the modern
service sector, geographically concentrated primarily on the São Paulo—Rio de
Janeiro axis, with extensions that reach Belo Horizonte and the Triângulo Mineiro
(a highly developed region within the State of Minas Gerais), and with smaller site
concentrations in the Federal District, and the States of Paraná and Santa Catarina.
Modernized agriculture and the agro-industrial sector play a similarly dominant
role in two major regions: (i) the western part of the State of São Paulo and southern
Mato Grosso do Sul and (ii) the expansion area of soy production in the Mato
Grosso and, to a lesser extent, southern Maranhão and western Bahia. Besides these
driving forces, among others, the following factors are responsible for regional
dynamics that are often limited, but still clearly visible: mining industry, fruit
cultivation in irrigated oases—destined for international markets—and tourism in
the coastal region and the interior.
Finally, the question that arises is whether or not in the years under the Lula and
Dilma administrations, the socio-economic and geographic structural patterns have
changed fundamentally. Achievements in poverty reduction, attention of social
58 M. Coy
issues, and economic growth, as well as other areas linked to the society’s develop-
ment, are clearly visible. Therefore, the conclusion most Brazilian people draw is
mainly positive. However, one cannot overlook that the general orientation of both
Lula and Dilma’s development strategy has also been harshly criticized. Although a
commitment exists at the discourse level concerning social and environmental
sustainability objectives, a closer examination of crucial documents and declar-
ations shows the persistence of a concept based on the modernization theory that
equates development (and regional development) with economic growth. Thus, for
example, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) focuses mainly on infrastructure
measures (highways, major energy projects, telecommunications, etc.), some of
which could significantly contribute to deteriorate conflictive situations, especially
in sensitive regions such as the Amazon (Scholz, 2010). The numerous mega-
events, which will dominate Brazil during the next years are more and more
criticized due to their ambiguous socio-economic and ecological effects. In this
context, it is a new phenomenon that critiques mainly come from a new Brazilian
middle class and from younger people, concerned with their own living conditions
and future. Although Brazil’s development in recent years can certainly be read as a
success story, many problems that arise from structural disparities in the country,
and that simultaneously perpetuate them, remain unsolved.
References
Almanaque Abril. (2009). São Paulo: Editora Abril.
Almanaque Abril. (2013). São Paulo: Editora Abril.
Busch, A. (2010). Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien. Der gr€ une Riese erwacht. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für
Politische Bildung.
Coy, M. (2010). Stadtentwicklung und Stadtpolitik. Sozio€ okonomische Fragmentierung und
Beispiele zukunftsorientierter Planung. In S. Costa, G. Kohlhepp, H. Nitschak, &
H. Sangmeister (Eds.), Brasilien heute. Geographischer Raum, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur
(pp. 51–73). Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert.
Coy, M., & Schmitt, T. (2007). Brasilien – Schwellenland der Gegensätze. Geographische
Rundschau, 59(9), 30–39.
Coy, M., & Théry, H. (2010). Brasilien. Sozial- und wirtschaftsräumliche Disparitäten – regionale
Dynamiken. Geographische Rundschau, 62(9), 4–11.
Coy, M., & T€opfer, T. (2009). Handel mit mineralischen Rohstoffen. Entwicklung mit Zukunft in
Südamerika? Geographische Rundschau, 61(11), 12–18.
Grabendorff, W. (2010). Brasiliens Aufstieg: M€ oglichkeiten und Grenzen regionaler und globaler
Politik. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 12(2010), 16–22.
Kohlhepp, G. (2010). Regionale Disparitäten und Regionalplanung. In S. Costa, G. Kohlhepp,
H. Nitschak, & H. Sangmeister (Eds.), Brasilien heute. Geographischer Raum, Politik,
Wirtschaft, Kultur (pp. 91–109). Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert.
Kohlhepp, G., & Coy, M. (2010). Amazonien. Vernichtung durch Regionalentwicklung oder
Schutz zur nachhaltigen Nutzung? In S. Costa, G. Kohlhepp, H. Nitschak, & H. Sangmeister
(Eds.), Brasilien heute. Geographischer Raum, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur (pp. 111–134).
Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert.
Neuburger, M. (2010). Entwicklungsprobleme des ländlichen Raumes. In S. Costa, G. Kohlhepp,

H. Nitschak, & H. Sangmeister (Eds.), Brasilien heute. Geographischer Raum, Politik,
Wirtschaft, Kultur (pp. 75–89). Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert.
Scholz, I. (2010). Wandel durch Klimawandel? Wachstum und € okologische Grenzen in Brasilien.
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichten, 12(2010), 22–28.
Part II
Checks and Balances in the Political System
Since 1988
Political Institutions and Governmental
Performance in Brazilian Democracy 5
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi
Abstract
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi show that the political
institutions and parliamentary modus operandi ensure the executive’s capacity to
act, in spite of a number of—ultimately only theoretical—inadequacies. In the
context of the institutional structure established in 1988, the country showed
itself capable of overcoming, at least in part, apparently insurmountable
problems as, for instance, currency stabilization, economic growth and redistri-
bution. The negative impact of a fragmented parliament and the personal
interests of parliamentarians are not reflected in the functioning of the executive.
Instead, the opposite is the case. The executive generally controls the work of the
legislative branch and is also very successful with its own legislative initiatives.
The analysis shows that the internal variables of the decision making process,
i.e., the legislative power of the President and the centralized organization of the
legislature, compensate the negative effects. It is clear that the aim of the
Constituent Assembly was actually reached: to increase the ability of the govern-
ment to impose its agenda.
A.C. Figueiredo (*)

IESP, State University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: argelina@iesp.uerj.br
F. Limongi
University of São Paulo (USP), São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: fdmplimo@usp.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_5
64 A.C. Figueiredo and F. Limongi
1 Introduction1
Until the 1990s there was the dominating view in political science literature that the
Brazilian political system did not work properly. This view was dominant for a
decade or so after the 1988 Constitution was enacted. According to this perspective,
the institutional choices made by the Constituent Assembly were to be blamed for
this situation. The preservation of the fundamental choices made in the 1946
Constitution, namely presidentialism coupled with the open-list system of propor-
tional representation, would render the country ungovernable. The expected con-
flict between the executive and the legislative branches—a characteristic of
presidential systems—was to be aggravated by the excessive fragmentation of the
party system (due to the proportional representation in the National Congress) and
by the lack of disciplined parties. Parties without discipline would be a direct result
of the adoption of the open list that inherently encouraged internal party compe-
tition (Ames, 2000; Lamounier, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993).
The difficulties experienced in the country, especially by the first three
presidents to rule under the 1988 Constitution, simply confirmed the accumulated
knowledge and expectations of the political scientists. The difficulties were clearly
reflected in the lack of capacity to cope with the inflationary process, and to find a
way out from the economic crisis that dominated the country, at least since the
beginning of the 1980s. The government’s incapacity to solve these problems was
attributed to the institutional framework they adopted.
The success of the Plano Real and the greater political stability experienced
during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two terms of office (1995–1998, 1999–2002)
aroused some doubts among the analysts. However, the institutional pessimism
remained. In general, the achievements of the PSDB governments were attributed
primarily to the quality of the political leadership, especially the personal qualities
of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Kugelmas & Sola, 1999; Mainwaring,
1997: 104).2 Thus, at every economic downturn or when facing an acute political
crisis, it was always possible to raise the traditional institutional argument:
presidentialism and the multi-party system do not lead to good governance. This
was evident in the evaluation of Lula’s first term (2003–2006), when the ruling party,
the PT, and President Lula himself were involved in a scandal over allegations of
corruption (Abranches, Amorim Neto, Figueiredo, Limongi, & Santos, 2005; Amorim
Neto, 2007; Hunter, 2007; Santos, 2007; Santos, Vilarcuca, & Mantovani, 2007).
However, as we intend to show here, it is not possible to reconcile the insti-
tutional argument with the country’s political experience after its return to demo-
cracy. If there was a governability crisis and its causes were institutional, then
consequentially overcoming such crises would deem for an institutional reform.
This clearly did not happen in Brazil. The structure of the political incentives, that
according to the institutional analysis would create the governability crises, was not
1
2
Mainwaring asserts: “Cardoso was a better leader than his predecessors. He was articulate, had a
clear vision of where he wanted to go, and chose capable ministers” (1997:107).
5 Political Institutions and Governmental Performance in Brazilian Democracy 65
changed.3 The president and the legislative branch still have fixed and independent
terms. Proportional representation and the open lists were also not abandoned. In
short: the institutional structure created in 1946 and reinforced in 1988 was
maintained. Even though the country showed itself capable to solve, in part, the
problems that were considered insurmountable under that institutional order, the
country proved able to obtain monetary stability, resume economic growth and
redistribute income without changing its political institutions.
The mistake of the institutional argument is twofold. In the first place, the
characterization of the presidential regime is inadequate to account for the
political-institutional order created by the 1988 constitution. The Constituent
Assembly chose presidentialism. However, the presidentialism adopted in Brazil
differs significantly from the model that is addressed in most of the critical analyses
regarding this form of government. The president and the legislators have inde-
pendent mandates and so there is a system of separation of powers. But this does not
mean that the president cannot influence the legislative work in Congress or that the
relations between the powers are necessarily conflictive.
The second mistake is empirical. The expectations of the traditional institutional
argument—regarding an executive that is unable to enforce its proposals because it
is paralyzed by a parliament that is fragmented and dominated by the interests of
individual legislators—are not reflected in practice. In Brazil, the opposite is the
case. The executive controls the law making process, it is very successful with its
own legislative propositions, and, last but not least, its dominance and legislative
successes are achieved through the consistent support of a coalition of political
parties that support the Government. In fact, the existing institutional structure
explains the empirical patterns found. The executive branch organizes the political
scenario and it is the center around which the coalition is formed and from where it
exerts its control over the lawmaking process. This is done based on the institutional
prerogatives granted in the Constitution, and through the rules that organize the
Congress and distribute the political power within it. These institutions have
provided the basis for the functioning of the governments in recent years.
In contrast to the explanations that associate the success and adequate function-
ing of the political system to certain periods of time or governments, our analysis
highlights features that are present during the entire post 1988 period. After the
return to democracy, all Brazilian governments were able to assure party discipline.
From the point of view of the institutional discussion, the important question is
whether a given and known agenda (no matter what political process and forces
developed it) faces an institutional barrier for its implementation. This is not the
case in Brazil.
In the remainder of this text we present detailed arguments and empirical support
for these statements. The first section provides an in depth insight of the insti-
tutional structure created by the 1988 Constitution. The Constituent Assembly
chose to strengthen the executive, endowing it with the necessary instruments to
3
The term “governability” (governabilidade) has several uses. We refer to its most common use,
i.e., the ability of the executive or the Government to implement its legislative agenda.
control the decision-making process. For its part, the Chamber of Deputies
(Câmara dos Deputados) revised its Internal Rules of Procedure (Regimento
Interno) in order to strengthen the role of the committees and party leadership,
thus contributing to the centralization of the decision-making processes. The next
section deals with the consequences of this form of presidentialism through a close
examination of the lawmaking process. Thereafter, the analysis of roll call voting
(votações nominais) places the focus on how the coalition operates to support the
executive. In the conclusion we summarize the main arguments we have presented.
2 The Institutional Foundations of Brazilian Presidentialism
The long and winding political transition in Brazil ended with the convening of the
National Constituent Assembly. The Assembly began its work on February 1987,
when the country was in the midst of a deep debate about its institutional structure.
The political order adopted in the past—approved by the Constitution of 1946—
was criticized and was directly and indirectly made responsible for the country’s
political instability. The social and political problems experienced in the past and in
the first years after the return to democracy were attributed to the presidential
system and to the open-list system of proportional representation. This institutional
political order was considered an insurmountable obstacle for the implementation
of the economic and political-structural reforms that would have been necessary to
halt the inflationary process, resume economic growth and redistribute income.
The Constituent Assembly ultimately disappointed the institutional reformists’
expectations. The basic characteristics of the country’s institutional order were
kept, the parliamentary system was not approved, and the electoral law was not
changed significantly. The advocates of these changes believed the institutional
conservatism of the Constituent Assembly would condemn the country to live in a
constant state of governability crisis. Presidents would be weak, and policy changes
would become next to impossible. A fragmented legislative branch, dominated by
the personal interests of its members, was deemed to constitute a barrier no
president could overcome.
Most analysts of the Brazilian political system, given their commitment to the
institutional reform agenda, would tend to highlight the continuity between the
1946 and 1988 constitutional texts. Presidentialism, proportional representation and
the open-list system are present in both constitutional texts. However, in the views
of the mentioned analysts, the provisions regarding the organization of the decision-
making processes were not taken into account (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995). In
this respect, the differences between the two constitutional texts are significant, as
can be seen in Table 5.1.
Contrary to widespread allegations, the Constituent Assembly of 1987 did not
consider all the legal provisions introduced by the military as part of the debris that
had to be swept away with the return to democracy. The current Constitution kept
all the legislative powers of the executive that were introduced by the military
government. Under the 1946 Constitution, the president only had one of those
powers (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Executive’s legislative power under the democratic constitutions of 1946 and 1988 in
Brazil
Constitution Constitution
Executive’s exclusive right of initiative 1946 1988
Administrative bills (Projetos de lei “administrativos”) Yes Yes
Budgetary bills (Projetos de leis orçament arias) No Yes
Tax bills (Projetos de lei sobre matéria tribut
aria) No Yes
Constitutional amendments (Emendas constitucionais) No Yes
Provisional decrees (Editar decretos com força de lei. Medidas No Yes
provis
orias)
Laws by request of delegation from Congress (Editar leis sob No Yes
requerimento de delegação pelo Congresso)
Urgency requests for bills (Solicitar a urgência dos projetos) No Yes
Restrictions on budgetary amendments made in Congress No Yes
(Impor restrições a emendas orçamentarias do Congresso)
Sources: Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, 1946; Constituição da
República Federativa do Brasil, 1988
The instruments contained in the 1988 Constitution grant the head of the executive
branch direct control over the legislative agenda, in terms of both procedures and
contents. As for the procedural aspect, the constitutional provisions give the president
the power to enforce the resolution of matters of his/her interest. The Legislature cannot
indefinitely postpone the deliberation of legislative proposals made by the executive.
The Constitution stipulates specific time tables for the congressional consideration of
the provisional decrees (Medida Provis oria) and urgency requests.
A provisional decree is the most powerful legislative instrument available to the
executive branch: it grants the president the power to unilaterally change the status
quo, since it goes into effect immediately. However, its significance for the func-
tioning of the Brazilian political system has been overrated. First of all, it should be
noted that this instrument, however powerful it may be, does not allow the president
to legislate against the will of the majority. The adjective provisional precisely
reflects the fact that the decree only becomes a law when and if approved by the
majority in Congress. Therefore, the difference between a regular bill and a provi-
sional measure does not depend on the majority, but rather with the time at which that
majority manifests itself, before or after the instrument’s coming into force.
The provisional decree, therefore, is not a means used by presidents who do not
have the support of the majority in Parliament. It is an instrument that ensures the
issues, the executive deems important and urgent, will be subject to deliberation.
This neutralizes the usual procedural obstacles that minorities may resort to in order
to postpone a decision. It also serves as a mechanism to protect the majorities from
debates on sensitive issues brought up by minorities, and it helps preserve
agreements between the Government and its supporting coalition. In this sense, a
provisional decree is more of an instrument for horizontal negotiation processes
between the Government and the majority supporting it in Congress, than a means
to solve vertical conflicts between the Government and the Legislature (Huber,
1996: 90–91).
It should be noted that the structure of the Brazilian Congress was also changed
after the return to democracy and this affected its power over the political agenda.
Todays Brazilian Congress is a highly centralized body. The allocation of parlia-
mentary rights and resources heavily favors party leaders. The President of the
Chamber of Deputies and the leaders of the political parties exert a rigid control
over the legislative process. They are responsible for determining the legislative
agenda, and for designating and replacing members of the permanent and special
committees at any time.4 They also nominate the members of the joint committees
of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, which are set up to analyze
provisional decrees and budgetary bills. It is worth stressing that these two types
of committees did not exist in the 1946–1964 period.
Furthermore, the party leaders have the right to represent their parties in Parlia-
ment: They can sign petitions on behalf of all members of their political parties to
push through some of the processes in the Legislature that require the approval by
the plenary. The urgency request to discuss a bill demands an absolute majority and
can be submitted up to 24 h before voting.5 In this case, the bill is withdrawn from
the committee and sent straight to the floor, regardless of whether it has already
been examined or not. The right to propose amendments to a project that is under an
urgency status is restricted. In practice, only the amendments supported by party
leaders are considered. These regulations favor the leaders, especially those of the
major parties. During the 1946–1964 period, many of these rules did not exist or
were limited by the Congress’s Standing Orders. Table 5.2 summarizes the
differences between the two periods.
The constitutional prerogatives conferred upon the executive include the exclu-
sive right to initiate legislative proposals in more than one area, as can be seen in
Table 5.1. The budget can be used as an example. The executive holds the exclusive
right of initiative on all bills involved in the budgetary cycle. These include the
Table 5.2 Rights of party leaders in the chamber of deputies (1946–1964 and after 1989)
Rights of party leaders 1946–1964 After 1989
To determine the agenda of the floor No Yes
To represent all party members in the legislature No Yes
To restrict amendments/roll-call voting No Yes
To withdraw bills from committees through an urgency request Restricted Ample
To appoint and replace members of the standing committees Yes Yes
To appoint and replace members of the joint committees No Yes
responsible for examining provisional decrees
To appoint and replace members of the joint committees No Yes
responsible for budgetary analysis
Source: Internal Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies: 1946, 1955 and 1989
4
Special committees are set up to examine issues that are assigned to more than three committees.
5
Note that this does not refer to a presidential urgency request.
Multi-annual Plans (Planos Plurianuais), the Law of Budgetary Guidelines (Lei de

Diretrizes Orçament arias), the Annual Budgetary Law (Lei Orçament aria Anual)
and the bills to amend the annual budget. The legislative power can amend the
budget, but this prerogative is quite limited as it is restricted to capital expenditures
and changes within programs that were previously defined in the executive’s bills.
To understand the effects of these restrictions on the legislators, it is necessary to
point out that neither deputies nor senators have access to public resources to
benefit their voters (i.e. to establish a personal connection between the politician
and their constituencies). Moreover, the way in which the processing and approval
of the budgetary law occurs within Congress, by virtue of procedural decisions
established by the Legislative Power itself, ultimately ties the legislators’ hands.
Although electoral laws could create incentives for a personal politician-voter type
of connection, the Constitution and the Standing Rules of Congress withdrew the
funds from the parliamentarians thereby hindering the possibility of such a
clientelistic connection (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2008).
3 The Government’s Legislative Performance
3.1 A Comparison of the Lawmaking Process in the Democratic

Periods of 1946–1964 and 1988–2012
The centralization of the decision-making process, i.e. the concentration of insti-

tutional powers in the hands of the president and the party leaders as described and
analyzed in the previous section, had a strong impact on the legislative performance
of the governments since Brazil’s return to democracy. The current situation is all
the more remarkable when compared with the democratic experience of the 1946–
1964 period.
One example in this context is the proportion of executive initiatives within the
total number of laws passed. After the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, the
executive was responsible for the submission of 80 % of the adopted laws. In the
1946–1964 period, the share of the executive was much more modest: presidents
proposed 38.5 % of the laws. The success rates of the presidential initiatives point in
the same direction. During the democratic period initiated in 1946, the presidents
only achieved the approval of 29.5 % of the bills presented during their tenure. In
the current democratic period, the overall success rate was 72 % and only President
Collor registered a result significantly below average.
The analysis of the same data within each presidency shows a structural differ-
ence between the two periods. The dominance and success rates of the executive in
the legislative process vary from president to president. The details are presented in
Table 5.3.
However, the difference between the two periods is far greater than the differ-
ence within each democratic period. While the success rates of the executive in the
legislative process of the first period are low and strong variations are clear, they are
Table 5.3 Ordinary legislation. Adoption of laws in each government, 1946–1964 and 1988–
2007a
President’s political Governmental Dominance
party in the chamber coalition in the Executive’s of the
of deputies (% of chamber of deputies successb executivec
Government seats) (% of seats) (%) (%)
1946–1964
Dutra 52.8 74 30 34.5
Vargas 16.8 88 45.9 42.8
Café Filho 7.9 84 10 41
Nereu 33.9 66 9.8 39.2
Ramos
33.9 66 29 35
Kubitschek
Quadros 2.1 93 0.8 48.4
Goulart 23.5 72 19.4 40.8
Average 24.3 77.1 29.5 38.5
1988–2007
Sarney 40.61 58.59 73.83 76.65
Collor 5.05 33.79 65.93 75.43
Franco 0 57.28 76.14 91.57
Cardoso I 9.36 71.62 78.72 84.4
Cardoso II 18.32 67.87 74.38 81.57
Lula I 11.11 58.9 77.81 73.38
Lula II 15.79 63.5 65.86 87.74
Average 16.74 56.47 71.83 79.37
Source: Cebrap Legislative Data Set
a
The first 3 years of the Dutra administration (1946–1948) were excluded due to lack of informa-
tion about the origin of the laws. The first period ran until March 31, 1964 and the second until
January 31, 2007 (end of the Legislature and the coalition for the president was re-elected and did
not change the ministries)
b
Percentage of executive bills submitted and approved during their own government
c
Percentage of laws initiated by the executive
significantly higher and more stable in the current period. The most successful
president in the first period, Getúlio Vargas, passed less than half of the proposals
he presented. In the current period the least successful president could convert
two-thirds of his proposal into laws. This indicates that this phenomenon is inde-
pendent of the president’s leadership qualities. It is also independent of the number
of parliamentary seats the presidential party holds, or the size of the governmental
coalition.
The difference between the two periods cannot be explained by the usual
institutional variables. Both periods had presidential systems and adopted the
same electoral legislation. The high success rates and legislative dominance of
the executive in the current period indicate that the centralization of decision-
Table 5.4 Laws approved, according to type and initiating institution (1949–1964 and 1989–
2012)
1949–1964a 1989–2006
Type of law (monthly average) Executive Legislative Executive Legislative
Budgetary laws 3.3 3.4 7.4 –
Provisional measures – – 3.6 –
Other ordinary lawsb 3.7 7.7 2.5 3.4
Total 7.0 11.1 13.1 3.4
Sources: Prodasen; Cebrap Legislative Data Set
a
Until 31/03/1964. The first 3 years of the Dutra administration (1946–1949) were excluded for
lack of information on the initiative
b
Including projects concerning matters in which both the executive and the legislative have the
right of initiative. Administrative laws are included, even though in some the executive has sole
right of initiative
making processes changed the modus operandi of the Brazilian political system
from its roots. The impact of the constitutional rules is evident when one compares
the number of adopted laws based on the legislative rights of initiative of the
executive and legislative powers in both democratic periods (Table 5.4).
The highest subtotal of laws passed in both periods dealt with budgetary issues.
This group includes the Annual Budgetary Laws (Leis Orçament arias Anuais—
LOA), the Laws of Budgetary Guidelines (Leis de Diretrizes Orçament arias—
LDO), the Multi-annual Plan (Plano Plurianual), and the numerous laws that
modify certain aspects of the LOA and the LDO during the financial year.
Among the latter what stands out are the additional loans and the reassignment of
funds that are usually presented in the second semester to adjust the planed
expenditures to the remaining revenues. The average number of budgetary laws
hardly differs in the two democratic periods: the monthly average was 18 laws in
the first period and 16 in the second period. What has changed, however, is that
during the first period these proposals could be filed by either the executive or the
legislative, while in the current period they are an exclusive right of the executive
power.
3.2 The Collaboration of the Legislature with Provisional

Measures
Provisional decrees represent a significant proportion of the legislative measures

that are submitted and adopted by the executive branch during the current period.
Since they allow the president to unilaterally change the status quo, it can be
assumed that all presidents used them extensively.
Provisional decrees mainly refer to administrative and economic issues. Most of
them are directly or indirectly related to macroeconomic plans to fight inflation
(Plano Verão, Plano Collor and Plano Real) or to adjustments of such plans. A
considerable number of these measures address social issues, and modify specific
aspects of the existing legislation due to macroeconomic constraints. These include,

for example, the regulation of rental prices, school fees, salary adjustments, as well
as the regulation, management and processing of funds and social security contri-
bution rates (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999).
The data and considerations presented here indicate that the issuing of provi-
sional decrees cannot be interpreted as a form of power abuse on the part of the
executive. The resulting relationship should rather be understood as a delegation of
certain areas of the state’s administration and the economy’s management.
At no point was this delegation more far-reaching than during the Fernando
Henrique Cardoso government. In fact, since the implementation of the Plano Real
for economic stabilization (initiated by Cardoso while he was Finance Minister
under Itamar Franco), a new pattern emerged in the relationship with the Legis-
lature regarding the issuing and reissuing of provisional decrees. Decrees were
reedited repeatedly over long periods of time. Furthermore, the amendments made
by Congress, through the Projetos de Lei de Conversão (PLV), also decreased
considerably. On the other hand, during this government a higher percentage of
reedited measures included modifications in the original text. Such changes may or
may not have involved the participation of the parliamentarians. Nevertheless,
considering that the debate on these modifications did not occur on floor sessions
(as it would have occurred if they were presented as a PLV) the role of the
opposition was reduced and Congress began to project an image of inactivity.
In September 2001, Congress approved Constitutional Amendment 32, which
established that the submitted provisional decrees had to be discussed and agreed
upon within a maximum of 120 days. In this way, Congress impaired the executive
because from then on the indefinite reediting of a provisional decree was no longer
possible. Among other modifications, and even though the processing time for a
provisional decree was increased from 30 to 60 days, the new regulations allowed
only one revision and re-submission of a provisional decree. Moreover, during the
last 15 days of its first edition’s validity, a provisional decree stalls the agenda of the
chamber in which it is being negotiated thereby preventing other floor deliberations
from taking place. In spite of these changes, the executive continued issuing a high
number of new decrees. Nonetheless, the revisions had to take place within the
constitutionally prescribed time, and, more importantly, the decisions on a provi-
sional decree now had to be made in plenary, i.e. publicly.
Paradoxically, the number of provisional decrees grew with the new constitu-
tional regulation. The monthly average jumped from 4.4 to 5.6. Under these
regulations, Fernando Henrique Cardoso issued an average of 7.2 provisional
decrees per month, while Luı́s Inácio Lula da Silva issued 4.97 new provisional
decrees per month, during his first term. Because the vast majority of the decrees
approved during Lula’s government (210/239) had undergone re-editions, the
delays in deciding on these decrees stalled the Congress’s agenda over considerable
periods of time. In his second government, Lula issued a lower number of provi-
sional decrees, 180, that is, 3.75 decrees per month on average.
However, the new regulations increased the participation of Congress, especially
of the opposition, in the examination and approval of the provisional decrees.
The proportion of Projetos de Lei de Conversão—PLVs- (see footnote 6) signifi-

cantly increased, which means the Legislature’s modifications to the submitted
decrees increased. These modifications do not necessarily come from the oppo-
sition. Many may arise from the demands of the executive to its own bases, since
the executive itself can no longer alter a decree by re-issuing it with modifications.
Yet the mere submission of a PLV, and the amendments to the PLV, opens a space
in which the opposition may not only act during the negotiation but also at the
moment of voting. After the amendment came into force the proportion of PLVs
increased during the last 16 months of the Cardoso government and increased even
more during the Lula government. During the latter, the frequent stalling of the
agenda was perhaps an incentive to submit other proposals as provisional decrees,
creating a sort of snow ball effect.
The proportion of roll call voting also increased in the negotiation process of the
provisional decrees. While under the Cardoso administration only 2.7 % of the
provisional decrees were subjected to a roll call vote, under Lula this proportion
reached a 37.3 %. Roll call votes are not mandatory for provisional decrees and, in
general, are demanded by the opposition to force the deputies of the ruling coalition
to assume a public position, especially on controversial and unpopular issues. These
two indicators (increased number of PLVs and of roll call votes) leave no doubt as
to the effects of both types of regulation on the negotiation process of the provi-
sional decrees: Congress has gained greater significance in the decision-making
process on provisional measures. At least, negotiations and the political stances
were forced to be made in public.
3.3 The Coordinating Role of Congress in Bills Under Urgency

Request
Looking again at Table 5.4, particularly its first two rows, it is worth noting that the
exclusive right of initiative of the executive has contributed to reinforce the
dominant role the executive has nowadays over the legislative output. There is, of
course, a difference in the two areas analyzed (budgetary laws and provisional
decrees), since the exclusivity of the budgetary proposals is defined by the nature of
the topic. In the case of the provisional decrees, exclusivity derives from the
president’s judgment regarding the urgency and importance of the topic. In theory,
provisional decrees could be submitted to Congress as an ordinary bill. Therefore, it
is a strategic choice by the executive. Albeit, in areas where the legislative initiative
is concurrent, that is, areas where both the executive and the legislative have the
right to initiate legislation, a certain balance can be observed between the powers
(except with provisional decrees). However, when analyzing the average time
required to deliberate on the decrees, it is clear that those coming from the exe-
cutive branch are approved in a relatively short period of time, significantly shorter
than projects coming from the Legislature itself. While legislative projects on
average need 1090 days to be decided on, the average for executive projects is
410 days.
The predominance of the executive and the time required for the negotiation are
directly related to deliberate modifications made in the type of negotiation process
established for legislative proposals. Besides the ordinary procedure, the Brazilian
Legislature allows for two other forms of deliberation. According to the Consti-
tution, the committees may approve bills with a “terminative character” as laws,
that is, without going to the plenary, except if there is an appeal. The other form is
through the internal parliamentary rules that allow to process bills under an urgency
request. This occurs through the approval of the request, submitted by the Legis-
lature itself, after having withdrawn the bill from the committee in charge and
referred it to the plenary with a tight deadline as well as restrictions on the
presentation of amendments.
From an organizational perspective, the fact that the legislative can file and
approve urgency requests for the approval of ordinary bills, characterizes the core
of Brazilian Legislature: The decision-making locus par excellence is thus the floor
and not the committee. When submitting requests, a party leaders’ signature is
weighted by their party’s representation in the Chamber. These requests are taken
as representing all the party members. Based on this procedural power established
in the Standing Rules, the party leaders and the House Speaker control the decisions
regarding the Parliament’s agenda. This control is particularly evident in the
definition of which issues will be considered with urgency; these decisions are
made during meetings of the party leaders, under the coordination of the House
Speaker (Presidente da Mesa Diretora), i.e., the so-called Colégio de Lı́deres.
The proportion of executive bills that were processed under an urgency request
is far higher than that of the bills submitted by the legislative. While two-thirds of
executive bills were processed under an urgency request, only one-third of the
legislative bills were handled under this modality. If the executive would not have
the parliament’s support, one would observe the opposite.
Critiques of the Brazilian political system are invariably based on the idea that
individual political interests prevail over the collective and thus that Brazilian
political parties are weak. These statements entirely disregard what goes on within
Congress. Under the Standing Rules, the political parties are strong within the
Legislature.
The approval of bills submitted by the president under an urgency request rules
out the view that the relationship between the executive and legislative branches is
inherently conflictual. If they were, why would party leaders request and the
majority approve a request to deliberate the presidential bills as urgent matters?
Congress is not an obstacle to the presidential initiatives. The evidence points in the
opposite direction: there is mutual coordination. The basis of this coordination will
be discussed in the following section.
4 Governmental Coalitions and Parliamentary Support
So far we have shown that the president and the party leaders have access to an
arsenal of institutional powers to set the agenda in Parliament. The decision-making
process follows a centralized model, comparable to that found in most countries
with a parliamentary system. This differentiates Brazilian presidentialism from the
North American model. The president and the party leaders are able to define what,
when and how issues of their interest will be voted on.
Obviously, this power also implies the opposite, i.e., the capacity to prevent the
opposition’s agenda to influence the decision-making process, moreover if the
Government holds the majority. However, as stated before, having the control of
the agenda does not exempt the Government from the need to assemble a majority
in order to support its initiative in Congress. The final decision on any matter—
including provisional decrees—rests on the will of the majority. Therefore, the
agenda set by the president and the party leaders will only be adopted if it has
the support of the majority. As will be shown here, this statement boils down to
the following simple requirement: the issues introduced by the president are
approved because the president has the support of the party coalition headed by
the president himself.
Brazilian presidents—contrary to what is usually assumed—seek to govern
through party coalitions. And this is true for both possible consecutive consti-
tutional periods. The idea that the Government has a “support base”, and that this
base is part of the Government through the control of the ministries, is already
integrated in the day-to-day national political discussion. The president, thus, is
lead to form a coalition in order to govern.
Relevant information about the governmental coalitions formed by the
presidents since 1988 is provided in Table 5.5. In general, parties that are ideologi-
cally close form these coalitions, with the exception of the Lula government.
Another strong trend has been to form majority coalitions. Given the importance
of the constitutional reforms, which require a majority of 3/5ths, both Cardoso and
Lula sought to form governments that would ensure them such “super majorities”.
In regards to this aspect, the Collor government was an exception for he never had a
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It is also worth noting that only the first two
civilian governments—Sarney and Collor—formed two party coalitions; all other
coalitions have been multiparty coalitions.
Once the coalitions that support the Government are defined, their strength in
Parliament can be tested empirically. To do so, we can rely on the fact that the
Government leader and the leaders of the major parties announce their vote before a
roll call voting. Thus, the position of the Government and the main political parties
is known beforehand. It is possible, therefore, to analyze the behavior of the
governmental coalition and the parties.
Obviously, not all roll call votes involve matters that interest the government.
Operationally, the government’s position is not known for sure on all roll calls. It is
derived from public statements of the government leader before the vote takes
place. To avoid problems that could emerge from strategic omissions (e.g., the
Table 5.5 Government coalitions, 1988–2012

Government Duration of the Seats in
coalition/ coalition Duration parliament
Presidential Political parties of
term the coalition Beginning End Days Months Nr. %
Sarney 2 PMDB-PFL Oct-1988 Mar- 518 17.3 313 64
1990
Collor 1 PRN-PFL Mar-1990 Oct- 207 6.9 119 24
1990
Collor 2 PRN-PFL-PDS Oct-1990 Jan- 108 3.6 151 31
1991
Collor 3 PRN-PFL-PDS Feb-1991 Apr- 433 14.4 167 33
1992
Collor 4 PRN-PFL-PDS- Apr-1992 Sep- 165 5.5 212 42
PTB-PL 1992
Franco 1 PFL-PTB-PMDB- Oct-1992 Aug- 329 11 268 52
PSDB-PSB 1993
Franco 2 PFL-PTB-PMDB- Aug-1993 Jan- 144 4.8 296 59
PSDB-PP 1994
Franco 3 PFL-PMDB- Jan-1994 Dec- 336 11.2 275 56
PSDB-PP 1994
Cardoso I 1 PSDB-PFL- Jan-1995 Apr- 474 15.8 290 57
PMDB-PTB 1996
Cardoso I 2 PSDB-PFL- Apr-1996 Dec- 965 32.2 396 77
PMDB-PTB-PPB 1998
Cardoso II 1 PSDB-PFL-PMDB Jan-1999 Mar- 1144 38.1 354 69
PPB 2002
Cardoso II 2 PMDB-PSDB-PPB Mar-2002 Dec- 295 9.8 232 45
2002
Lula I 1 PT-PL-PCdoB- Jan-2003 Jan- 381 12.7 249 49
PSB-PTB-PDT- 2004
PPS-PV
Lula I 2 PT-PL-PCdoB- Jan-2004 Jan- 368 12.3 319 62
PSB-PTB-PPS- 2005
PV-PMDB
Lula I 3 PT-PL-PCdoB- Feb-2005 May- 108 3.6 307 60
PSB-PTB-PV- 2005
PMDB
Lula I 4 PT-PL-PCdoB- May-2005 Jul- 62 2.1 299 59
PSB-PTB-PMDB 2005
Lula I 5 PT-PL-PCdoB- Jul-2005 Jan- 548 18.3 356 69
PSB-PTB-PP- 2007
PMDB
Lula II 1 PT-PR-PCdoB- Jan-2007 Apr- 90 3 311 61
PSB-PTB-PMDB- 2007
PP-PRB
Lula II 2 PT-PR-PCdoB- Apr-2007 Sep- 909 30.3 348 68
PSB-PTB-PMDB- 2009
PP-PDT-PRB
(continued)
Table 5.5 (continued)

Government Duration of the Seats in
coalition/ coalition Duration parliament
Presidential Political parties of
term the coalition Beginning End Days Months Nr. %
Lula II 3 PT-PR-PCdoB- Sep-2009 Dec- 459 15.3 323 63
PSB-PMDB-PP- 2010
PDT-PRB
Sources: www.planalto.gov.br; Meneguello 1998; Legislative Data Bank, Cebrap
Government does not disclose its position when it knows it will be defeated in the
voting process), issues submitted by the Government within the executive’s agenda
are included, even when the Government’s leader does not announce their vote. In
these cases it is possible to deduce that the Government wants the issue to be
approved. In order not to overestimate the cohesion of the governmental coalition,
the Executive’s agenda excludes unanimous voting (votações consensuais).
It is important to highlight that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
bills approved and roll call voting. Ordinary bills may also be passed by symbolic
vote (votação simbolica). Moreover, the same project may undergo more than one
voting because, for example, amendments can be subjected to roll call voting. In
addition to this, definitions of the procedures regarding the deliberative process—
e.g., agenda changes, urgency requests and closure of debates—can also require a
roll call voting.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to recur to roll call voting when politically
important and controversial decisions have to be made. This is because this mode of
voting is compulsory in matters that require a qualified quorum, as is the case of
constitutional amendments and complementary laws (leis complementares). When
the approval of an issue depends on the support of a simple majority, roll call votes
only take place when requested by the party leaders. In these cases, given the
Standing Rules establishes a minimum period of 1 h between the end of a roll call
and the submission of a new application, party leaders have to use this scarce
resource strategically and with moderation, in order to reserve their request for roll
call voting only for the most important and politically sensitive matters. Thus, the
legislative process itself ensures that the selection of cases represent the most
important and controversial issues.
The first step is to control if, in fact, the coalition that is formed through the
distribution of the ministerial posts functions within the Legislature. To this end,
Table 5.6 differentiates two situations: when all the leaders of the coalition parties
share a position in line with that of the Government leader, and when at least one
party leader that belongs to the coalition announces a different stance. We refer to
these situations as: “United Coalition” (Coalizão Unida) and “Divided Coalition”
(Coalizão Dividida). As we can see below, only on a few occasions (2169 of 1127
voting processes) there has been conflict within the governmental coalition. It is
worth noting that, to define a coalition as united, the criterion used is quite
demanding.
Table 5.6 Governmental coalition support for the executive’s legislative agenda, according to
party leaders’ guidelines and the votes of the political parties, 1988–2012
United coalitiona Divided coalitionb Total
Government Nr. of % of Nr. of % of Nr. of % of
coalition roll calls disciplinec roll calls disciplinec roll calls disciplinec
Sarney 2 6 90.68 2 41.57 8 78.40
Collor 1 18 95.87 – – 18 95.87
Collor 2 4 76.18 1 40.21 5 68.98
Collor 3 24 93.37 17 54.19 41 77.12
Collor 4 9 94.85 1 76.92 10 93.06
Itamar 1 8 91.19 25 73.27 33 77.61
Itamar 2 2 93.90 1 78.31 3 88.70
Itamar 3 3 94.92 1 67.63 4 88.10
FHC I 1 83 90.35 13 60.82 96 86.35
FHC I 2 217 88.32 27 69.37 244 86.23
FHC II 1 188 93.55 19 69.69 207 91.36
FHC II 2 15 92.63 1 64.80 16 90.89
Lula I 1 78 95.03 7 78.86 85 93.70
Lula I 2 30 89.93 6 76.82 36 87.75
Lula I 3 10 76.50 2 44.83 12 71.22
Lula I 4 7 90.52 4 79.96 11 86.68
Lula I 5 24 88.64 14 67.24 38 80.76
Lula II 1 14 96.52 2 48.69 16 90.54
Lula II 2 143 95.70 55 73.86 198 89.63
Lula II 3 28 95.06 18 73.08 46 86.46
Total 911 92.32 216 66.80 1127 85.64
Sources: PRODASEN, Chamber of Deputies, National Congress Journals; Cebrap Legislative
Data Set
a
Party leaders of the government coalition vote according the guidelines of the government leader
(includes cases in which at least one party leader participates or abstains from indicating the vote)
b
At least one party leader within the government coalition opposes the voting guidelines given by
the government leader
c
% of votes of the members of the parties of the government coalition
The second conclusion that can be drawn from Table 5.6 is that parliamentarians
affiliated to those political parties that are formally linked to the Government, vote
consistently with their party leaders. On average, 92 % of the parliamentary vote in
favor of the Government when the coalition is “united”. This support does not
present significant variations between the different presidents. When the coalition is
“divided”, parliamentary votes in favor of the Government fall to 67 %. This
suggests that the support the Government receives from the members of the
coalition parties is not unconditional. When party leaders stand against the Govern-
ment, the parliamentarians tend to follow their parties. This leads to the conclusion
that governmental support is party-based. In other words, the Government
negotiates its support with the parties and not individually.
The data analyzed here shows that a government’s defeat does not result from
the lack of discipline in its bases. Losses tend to occur when the Government does
not have the support of a majority in Congress, and when agreements between the
parties were not made in advance. For example, the largest number of government
defeats occurred under Fernando Collor’s presidency: 14 losses in 61 voting pro-
cesses, in which a simple majority was required. As noted before, Collor did not
form a majority coalition and many times relied on the indiscipline of the opposi-
tion, the PMDB, to win. Thus, of all the defeats he suffered, 12 were predictable
because the Government did not have the support of the political parties that held
the majority of seats. When Collor negotiated and obtained the support of the
PMDB, he was not defeated.
The contrast with the Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s success could not be greater.
In Cardoso’s eight years as president, his government only suffered 11 defeats in
205 voting processes on matters that required simple majority for approval. The
Government’s support was challenged on 221 occasions in voting processes on
constitutional matters, during which it experienced only 18 defeats. And it is
important to understand the meaning of “defeat” when it comes to constitutional
matters: it actually reflects the inability to enforce a modification of the constitu-
tional status quo. This means the Government has failed to meet the 3/5ths of the
votes required to pass a proposal and the opposition has not managed to impose a
constitutional amendment contrary to the Government’s interests. In this respect,
the executive was not defeated once. Lula’s case is not different: in his first term,
there were only nine defeats on 178 roll calls. In his second mandate, Lula was
defeated 24 times on 260 roll calls.
In summary, the results presented here indicate that the political parties are
crucial actors in the Brazilian legislative process. The decision-making process is
far from being chaotic or governed by individual interests. The floor is highly
predictable. If the positions of the party leaders are known, it is possible to
anticipate the results of the roll call votes.
5 Conclusions and Final Remarks
According to the institutional debate that followed the so-called “third wave of
democratization” (S. Huntington), the Brazilian Constituent Assembly supposedly
made all the wrong choices. No wonder Sartori (1997) referred to Brazil as a
“democracy without future”. The institutional literature has primarily emphasized
on the negative effects that the open-list system of proportional representation and
the separation of powers has on the performance of democracies. The analysis
presented here shows that internal variables of the decision-making process, i.e., the
president’s legislative power and the centralized organization of the Legislature,
neutralize the negative effects that the systems of representation and government
would allegedly generate. From the point of view of the electoral legislation,
politicians would have incentives to promote voting processes based on
personalized criteria. However, the centralization of the decision-making process
hinders their access to the institutional resources that would be needed to imple-
ment policies to assure them the political support of clientelistic constituencies.
It is certainly true that presidents cannot interfere with the duration of the
parliamentary term, but they do control other resources that politicians consider
valuable to their careers. One of the most important is the control over the
ministries, including the electoral and political consequences this entails. Further-
more, a system of separation of powers does not mean the Legislative and the
Executive will necessarily have conflicting political purposes. It does not even
guarantee that they will diverge. As long as the Constitution grants legislative
powers to the chief executive, the two powers (executive and legislative) will rarely
be separated the way the separation of powers or the checks-and-balances doctrines
assert. Finally, the idea that presidentialism and government coalitions are incom-
patible has been both theoretically and empirically challenged (Amorim Neto,
1998; Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Deheza, 1997; Figueiredo & Limongi,
2000). Therefore, presidents whose parties do not control a majority of seats in
Parliament need not engage in confrontation with the Legislature or bypass
it. Instead, similar to prime ministers, they can use their power over the agenda as
an instrument to ensure the cohesion of the political coalitions that are formed
around government programs.
The preparation of the 1988 Constitution, as well as the changes in the internal
regulations that followed, was contaminated by the fear of the Constituent Assem-
bly and the members of Congress that the legislative power could be a victim of
their moroseness and lack of expertise. The data presented here suggests that the
Constituent Assembly’s goal of increasing the Government’s ability to approve its
legislative agenda was in fact achieved. The performance of the democratic
governments in both periods was quite different, as we have shown through the
analysis of the lawmaking process and the use of roll call voting.
Substantially, the recent governments were successful in making significant
changes in the existing public policies. They enforced measures to control inflation,
to reduce government spending, and to privatize state-owned enterprises, among
others. They also approved constitutional reforms that changed the public and
private pension systems, thereby causing considerable losses to large sectors of
the population, including highly organized sectors. They changed the model and the
goals of basic social policies, in areas such as education and health. Both areas
underwent extensive processes of universalization and decentralization (see the
contribution of Chap. 19), leading to an ample redefinition of the role of the local
governments, responsible for their implementation. Finally, the progress of Lula’s
minimum income program (Programa de Renda Mı́nima) needs to be highlighted as
it is directly responsible for lifting a considerable number of families out of poverty
and extreme poverty, and also for the positive repercussions it has had on the
distribution of income. Slowly but surely, the country was able to adjust the public
accounts, consolidate the monetary stability and recover the path to economic
growth. This growth proved its vitality when Brazil showed an unprecedented
autonomy in the face of the international crisis of 2008 and, more importantly, it
reduced poverty levels and improved the terrible income distribution that
characterizes the country.
The contrast between the two periods of democratic experiences in Brazil has
clear implications for the debate on political reform and also for the theoretical
discussion on the effects of specific institutional mechanisms and the way they
interact. From the evidence presented here the decisions made by the Constituent
Assembly appear to have had the desired effect. In this sense, it would be unneces-
sary to change the system of government or further restrict parliamentary rights in
the name of “good governance” and, much less, reduce the entry of demands into
the political system. There is no reason to artificially reduce the number of parties
or, even less, grant party leaders more power. The Brazilian Government is not
immobilized by society’s excessive demands.
The centralized decision-making process significantly increases the autonomous
actions of the executive. Even so, thanks to the electoral legislation, the Brazilian
Congress is an effective channel through which different demands—of local and
corporate interests, but also broader sectors of the population—find their way into
the political system. In a setting where the executive’s agenda has primarily been
concerned with economic issues, Congress has played an important role in the
formulation of social policies. In this regard, distributive policies had been
exceptions rather than the rule. Congress passed important social laws that guaran-
tee universal citizenship rights, consumer rights, and free access to justice. It also
established punishment for discriminatory practices (based on race and gender), as
well as various forms of environmental protection. In a context of severe budgetary
constraints, it secured resources for social policies and for significant increases of
the minimum wage. Thus, Congress set its own agenda and helped reduce the
disassociation between the Government’s predominantly economic agenda and the
public agenda. The wide range of proposed reforms aimed to decrease the alleged
consociative features or, to put in the opposite way, to increase majoritarianism
(majoritarismo) in the Brazilian political system could block the channeling of
social demands through the National Congress. This would most likely reduce the
role of Congress in defining the Government’s agenda as well as its influence in the
formulation of public policy.
References
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Amorim Neto, O. (1998). Of presidents, parties and ministers. Cabinet formation and legislative
decision-making under separation of powers. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California,
San Diego.
Amorim Neto, O. (2007). Algumas Consequências Polı́ticas de Lula. Novos Padrões de Formação
e Recrutamento Ministerial. Controle de Agenda e Produção Legislativa. In J. Nicolau &
T. Power (Eds.), Instituições Representativas no Brasil: Balanço e Reforma (pp. 55–73).
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party behavior in Brazil. Comparative Politics, 32(2), 151–170.
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& T. Power (Eds.), Instituições Representativas no Brasil. Balanço e Reforma (pp. 155–168).
Belo Horizonte: IUPERJ/Ucam – Editora UFMG.
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federativo no Brasil. Tempo Social, 11(2), 63–81.
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The failure of presidential democracy. The case of Latin America (pp. 179–219). Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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Comparative Political Studies, 26(2), 198–228.
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55–109). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sartori, G. (1997). Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry into structures, incentives
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Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora.
The National Congress and Brazil’s
Parliamentary Elite Under the Lula 6
Government
Ana Galvão
Abstract
Ana Galvão portrays the work of the legislature and analyzes the composition of
the Congress and Brazil’s parliamentary elite under the Lula and Rousseff
governments. These PT Presidents represented a sector of Brazilian society
which, previously, had not been understood as part of the country’s political
elite. This brought up the question if, after Lula took office in 2003, the different
social and economic sectors of the society became more adequately represented
in both chambers. The results show that the parliamentary elite is in a process of
change in the Chamber of Deputies. For instance, more women and new
professional groups are now accessing the lower chamber and a generational
change is in the coming. Nonetheless, some old patterns persist, e.g. the domi-
nance of certain professional groups and the high educational level of the
deputies. On the whole, her analysis shows that during the last 12 years there
has been a gradual—yet not fundamental—transformation of the parliamentary
elite of the country.
1 Introduction1
The website of Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies during the Lula government pro-
moted itself with the slogan “House of all Brazilians”.2 This was not only an
allusion to the democratic and direct election of its members, but also referred to
the right of all Brazilians to political participation. Together with the Senate, the
1
2
In the election year 2010 the website’s design was changed and the slogan has been deleted.
A. Galvão (*)
Tubingen, Germany
e-mail: ana.galvao@gmx.net

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_6
84 A. Galvão
Chamber of Deputies forms the Brazilian National Congress of Brazil (Congresso

Nacional), which functions as the legislative institution on the national level. The
present National Congress of Brazil was formed following the 1988 Constitution as
a symbol of a society in transformation, which yearned for a democratic govern-
ment with more participation and decision-making powers after more than 20 years
of military dictatorship (1964–1985).
But is this description, “House of all Brazilians,” at all justified? Are all social
and economic groups within the country adequately represented in both chambers?
In view of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government (2003–2010), these questions
gain new significance; after all, this Brazilian president embodied a kind of (South-)
American dream. His life story, that of an economic migrant from the poor north-
east of the country who sought his luck in the periphery of the satellite cities around
São Paulo, likens that of many Brazilians, who still today—just like Lula’s family
in the early 1950s—migrate to the South of the country (Holston, 2008: 5). He thus
represents a group that one could not hitherto consider part of Brazil’s political
elite; much rather, he represents the subaltern class.3 As a result of this first
assessment, Lula’s election is seen as the starting point of a change to the nation’s
elite within Brazilian politics. The question arises, whether it is possible to credit
this change to the parliamentary elite of the country. Were the parliamentarians in
Lula da Silva’s government also representatives of a new elite, one which is
reflected in the motto “House of all Brazilians”?
This article will describe and analyze the National Congress of Brazil and in
particular the Chamber of Deputies. The first part will set out the historical
development and the function of the Brazilian Congress. This is followed in the
second part by an analysis of the Chamber of Deputies. Here the emphasis is on the
presentation of the profile of Brazilian parliamentarians under Luı́s Inácio Lula da
Silva’s4 government. Finally, the question will be explored as to whether a change
took place within the parliamentary elite under the Lula government. The parlia-
mentary elite under Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, will also be briefly
described, in order to gain insight into the further development of the country’s
parliamentary elite after Lula.5
3
The term “ruled class” stems from the classic elite theory of Mosca and Pareto.
4
For a detailed analysis of the profile of Brazilian parliamentarians during Lula da Silva’s first
term of office on the basis of biographic data see Galvão Alves (2008). The analysis examined,
inter alia, age, education, profession, sex and ethnic background. This analysis of the biographic
data of Brazilian parliamentary representatives is reproduced here in an abridged form.
5
For the English version of this article the author summarized and evaluated the biographic data of
parliamentarians in Dilma Roussef’s government. However, the focus of the article remains the
government of Lula da Silva.
6 The National Congress and Brazil’s Parliamentary Elite Under the Lula Government 85
1.1 The Legislative in Brazil: On the Historical Development

of the National Congress
The National Congress of Brazil has been in existence since 1822 and was formed
while Brazil was still a monarchy (1822–1889). The current division into two
chambers also stems from this period.6 Since then, the status of Congress in the
political system has been varyingly pronounced, above all with regard to its
political participation. During the military dictatorship the Brazilian Congress had
no real legislative power, although the military sought to create the impression of a
functioning democracy by means of a two-party system, which consisted of the
pro-government ARENA and the quasi-oppositional MDB [for more detail see
Rabat (2008: 726–730)].
Following the end of the dictatorship the challenge was to create a legal basis for
a democratic political system. This was carried out by the Constituent Assembly
(Assembléia Constituinte), which met in 1987 and 1988.7 The Constituinte was of
significant historical importance and promised numerous social and political actors
who had been excluded from the political decision-making process during the
military dictatorship the chance to participate in the development of a democratic
and more just state (Costa, 2008: 118; Menck, 2008: 21 f).
Following the 1988 Constitution, Brazil is a presidential democracy in which the
president holds the highest executive power, acting alongside an independent
judiciary and a legislative with two chambers.8 The federal principle and the
autonomy of the Brazilian states are also codified in the Constitution.
1.2 The Congress: Structure and Functions
According to the 1988 Constitution, the Brazilian Congress is a bicameral system

made up of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. However, these chambers are
constituted differently. In the Senate every state—regardless of population or
territorial size—has three representatives. There are currently 81 senators in Con-
gress. The Senate embodies the federal principle and ought thus to represent the
interests of the various states and districts. The senators are elected for a legislative
period of 8 years. Nevertheless, after 4 years one or two new senators are elected
from the states, as the election system provides that one third of the senate will be
newly determined each election year, or that after 4 years the other two thirds will
be elected. Each senator is elected with two substitutes (suplentes).9 It is important
6
For an historical overview see also: http://www.senado.gov.br/comunica/historia/index.htm
7
The Constituent Assembly was tasked with preparing the new constitution. This came into effect
in 1988. It is the country’s sixth constitution.
8
The bicameral system is limited to the national level.
9
In the case of the death or other hindrance of a senator the substitute takes office. Thus, for
example, after Senator Carlos Magalhães passed away in 2007 his son, Antônio Carlos Magalhães
Junior, who was nominated as his substitute, took over his father’s office.
86 A. Galvão
to note that the substitutes are selected by the parties. The voters have no influence
on the selection of the substitutes.
The number of parliamentary representatives in the Chamber of Deputies is
determined by the population of each State based on proportional representation.
According to the Complementary Law of 30 December, 1993 the Chamber of
Deputies is to be restricted to 513 seats, with each State sending a minimum of
four—as with the State of Acre—and a maximum of 70—as with the State of São
Paulo—representatives to Brası́lia. As a result the States in the north and center of
the country, as well as some States in the northeast, are represented by a smaller
number of parliamentarians in the Chamber of Deputies. The densely populated
States in the south and southeast of the country, however, are well represented in the
Chamber due to their large populations.10 Determining this proportional represent-
ation is disputed, as according to this calculation the less densely populated States,
particularly in the north, northeast and mid-west of the country, are comparatively
overrepresented (Barrios & Meyer-Stamer, 2000: 41; Kinzo, 2004: 28). For exam-
ple: the State Roraima is represented by one parliamentarian for every 49,000
inhabitants. The voters from densely populated São Paulo are thus clearly dis-
advantaged, as according to the principle of proportional representation there is
one parliamentarian for almost 590,000 inhabitants.
1.2.1 The Functions of Congress

The most important function of Congress is its legislative power. The legislative
process can be initiated in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, unless it is
related to one of the specific areas of responsibility of each chamber, which will be
discussed below.
In the Chamber of Deputies draft laws are generally developed in the so-called
parliamentary committees (Comissões Parlament arias). There are permanent, spe-
cial and mixed committees. The permanent committees belong to the institutional
structures of the Chamber of Deputies and therefore exist without temporal restric-
tion. At present there are 20 permanent committees that work on specific subjects
such as consumer protection or sustainable development. In contrast, the special
committees are limited to a maximum of one legislative period and work on specific
and generally current subjects, such as changes to the Brazilian Constitution.
Determining the legal framework for deep-sea oil drilling on the Brazilian coast
was recently the subject of a special committee.
The mixed committees are made up of representatives and senators from both
chambers. One example is the Committee for the Control of the Annual Budget.
Investigatory committees, however, have no legislative function, but are rather
created to examine particular social and political events, such as corruption
10
The statistical data for determining the number of representatives from each state is provided by
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
scandals involving politicians.11 The legislative power as well as the controlling

function of the Chamber of Deputies is legally stipulated in the Internal Procedural
Rules of the Chamber of Deputies which is in keeping with the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution. Work in the Senate is also regulated by internal guidelines that are
provided in the Constitution. Both chambers complement each other and mutually
review draft laws and decisions.
In addition to their legislative function, both chambers of the Brazilian Congress
control the governmental apparatus through, for example, reviewing the annual
budget and the operative function of the administration’s numerous organs and
institutions.12 The Chamber of Deputies also has special competencies that are set
out in Article 51 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. According to the Internal
Procedural Rules of the Chamber of Deputies, only the Chamber of Deputies may
initiate a legal proceeding against the president, the vice-president or a minister.
The Chamber of Deputies also has the exclusive power to request the disclosure of
the annual budget from the president if this is not presented to Congress for review
within the legally stipulated period of 60 days. The Senate is responsible for the
implementation of the processes, which are initiated by the Chamber of Deputies.13
Alongside the legislative function, which the Senate shares with the Chamber of
Deputies, the Senate also has special powers, which are set out in the Brazilian
Constitution, as with the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate’s exclusive rights allow,
inter alia, the execution and revision of foreign financial transactions made by the
federal government, the states and local authorities. The Senate also determines the
federal budget’s debt ceiling. The execution of the functions of both chambers is not
always unproblematic. Particularly the legislative process is often hindered or
complicated by structural deficits and blockades.
1.3 Deficits in the Legislative Powers of the Brazilian Congress
In Brazil the president always has the possibility to issue laws in the form of
so-called provisional decrees (medidas provis orias) (Pereira & Mueller, 2000:
46–48; Pires, 2008: 580–582). This legislative power of the president results in a
deficit in the legislative function of the Chamber of Deputies. During the Assemblé
ia Constituinte the then parliamentarians already did not agree on the introduction
of provisional decrees into the new Constitution. On the one hand many
parliamentarians saw provisional decrees as a mechanism lingering from the
11
An example of an investigatory committee that examined a problem from the civil sector is the
investigation into the chaos within Brazilian air traffic, which led to two plane crashes in 2006 and
2009 and to numerous malfunctions of the country’s radar system.
12
A detailed description of the functions and structure of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies can
be found in a study by Faria and Freitas do Valle (2006).
13
These and other special competencies of the Senate are set out in Article 52 of the current
Brazilian Constitution. The text of the Brazilian Constitution can be found under: http://www.
senado.gov.br/sf/legislacao/const/
88 A. Galvão
authoritarian period, during which the president ruled the country through decree
laws (Decretos-lei) and through institutional acts (Atos Institucionais). On the other
hand, as other parliamentarians argued, it should be possible for the president to act
quickly, for example, to make laws in the case of a natural disaster. This would be
possible through provisional decrees.
The 1988 Constitution determines that presidential provisional decrees may only
be introduced in extreme cases (Bethell & Nicolau, 2008: 243; Pires, 2008: 580–
583). In practice, however, the use of this legislative power became increasingly
common, even during the Lula government (see Table 6.1). The law regulating
provisional decrees certainly allows a great deal of room for interpretation, as it
does not clearly define what constitutes an “extreme case”. One possible expla-
nation for why the executive so often rules through provisional decrees is to ensure
the governability of the country. The legislative process in Brazil is often slow and
provisional decrees deal with subjects that, according to the executive, need to be
implemented quickly. Another possible explanation is the difficulty on the part of
the executive to gain a majority in Congress. A good example of this is Fernando
Henrique Cardoso’s first period in office, during which provisional decrees were
often used to govern. Cardoso did not have a majority in the Brazilian Congress. In
his first period in office, the coalition parties held no more than 35 % of the seats in
the Chamber of Deputies. Cardoso had to negotiate with opposition parties and
where necessary implement his economic reforms through provisional decrees
(Bethell & Nicolau, 2008: 259–261).
If one considers that on average 70–75 % of all proposed laws stem from the
executive (Costa, 2008; Pereira & Mueller, 2000; Power, 2000), it becomes clear
that the Brazilian Congress has not yet been able to exercise its legislative power
and its controlling function over the executive. Pereira and Mueller (2000) present
the following data in their study: between 1995 and 1998—during the Cardoso
government—805 draft laws were debated and ratified in Congress. Of these
648 (80.49 %) were proposed by the executive, 141 (17.51 %) from the legislative
and 16 (1.98 %) from the judiciary. The time necessary for the discussing and
passing of these draft laws was very different depending on who made the propo-
sition: on average a draft from the executive required 183 days in order to be passed
by Congress; in contrast, draft laws from one of the two chambers of Congress
required on average 1194 days (around 3.25 years) in order to be passed (Pereira &
Mueller, 2000: 47).
During Lula da Silva’s term of office the number of provisional decrees
remained high, as is set out in Table 6.1. However in 2009, for the first time since
the 1988 Constitution came into effect, the number of provisional decrees was
smaller than the number of draft laws proposed by Congress. In 2009 the executive
proposed 27 provisional decrees for discussion and voting in the Chamber of
Deputies, as opposed to 108 proposed laws from both chambers.14 Under
Rousseff’s government the executive continued to make use of provisional decrees.
14
Data from the Chamber of Deputies: http://www.camara.gov.br
Table 6.1 Use of provisory measures according to President

Primary provisional Re-introduced provisional
Resident decreesa decrees Total
Sarney 132 15 147
Collor de Mello 88 72 160
Itamar Franco 138 367 505
FHC (1st term) 156 2453 2609
FHC (2nd term) 185 2606 2791
Lula (1st term) 239 – 239
Lula (2nd term) 175 – 175
Rousseff (2011– 81 – 81
2012)b
Total 1194 5513 6707
a
Primary means “measures presented for the first time”
b
From the Brazilian government’s database Portal da Legislação/Pal
acio do Planalto (From the
Brazilian government’s website: http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao)
Source: Following Pires (2008: 582) on the basis of data from the Congress and the Executive
However, until the end of 2012 President Rousseff had proposed less provisional
decrees than her predecessor Lula proposed in his first 2 years in office.
The constitutional guidelines provide that Congress must deal with provisional
decrees within 60 days, either passing or rejecting them. If this does not occur
within the stipulated time period then the provisional decree is invalidated. After
this period the president can re-introduce or extend provisional decrees. Discussing
provisional decrees is treated as a priority in Congress and is thus favored over other
activities. The result of this process is often the so-called trancamento da pauta, in
English “delay or blockade of the parliamentary agenda”.
The issuing of such provisional decrees by the executive often occurs with
regard to the legal framework for determining the annual budget15 (Figueiredo &
Limongi, 2000: 74–76). The result of this is that Congress’ controlling function
with regard to the annual budget—which is developed and presented by the exe-
cutive—is obstructed or at least made more complicated. The influence of the exe-
cutive on the members of important committees is also presented as an intervention
by the executive into the legislative power of the Chamber of Deputies (Pereira &
Mueller, 2000: 48–49). This is also true of the presidential veto, which is seen as a
mechanism that restricts the legislative function of the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate. The deficits of the Brazilian Congress can not only be reduced to the strong
influence of the executive on the legislative power of both chambers. The weak
structure of the country’s party system also affects parliamentary work.
1.3.1 The Parties in the Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies is often presented as inefficient, as when contrasted with
the president’s strong power, the country’s weak party system hinders the
15
In Brazil these legal frameworks are called leis de diretrizes orçament
arias (LDO).
90 A. Galvão
competent development of the parliamentary agenda (Pereira & Mueller, 2000:

47 f.; Power, 2000: 30 f.). This can also be ascribed to the not entirely conflict-free
multi-party coalitions that governments must form in order to gain the necessary
parliamentary majority. In order to govern, the president of Brazil is often reliant on
a multi-party coalition. Thus many compromises are forged with individual parlia-
mentary representatives in order to push through the interests of the executive. This
has been set out above.
Party migration, that is, the fact that politicians are constantly changing parties,
is another of the aspects that many researchers consider as complicating Congress’
work, in particular in the Chamber of Deputies (Power, 2000). The problem of
party migration is widespread in Brazil and is partially a result of the weak
ideological profile of the Brazilian parties (Kinzo, 2004: 32; Chap. 9).
These deficits ought not only to be viewed as a structural problem of Congress,
they also weaken the executive’s power, as has been argued in many studies.
According to these studies the executive requires parliamentarians, or the parties,
to implement its laws (Pereira & Mueller, 2003: 741 f). While the president’s power
over Congress (through the decree of provisional decrees) is still very large, the
president can only rule effectively through the participation and cooperation of the
legislative. Parliamentary debate and voting on draft laws in Congress takes place
under the direction of the parties. Thus the legislative process in Congress depends
heavily on the parties.
Weak parties, multi-party coalitions, politician’s lack of loyalty to their parties,
and party migration are some of the attributes that influence and, in part, compro-
mise the legislative process in Congress (i.a. Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000; Kinzo,
2004; Mainwaring, 1999; Power, 2000). The necessity of reforms to counteract this
described weakness of the Brazilian Congress is one of the most important
challenges of Brazilian politics.
Political and institutional reforms were not discussed for the first time in relation
to the Lula government. However, the results of two legislative periods are sober-
ing: few structural reforms were implemented. Part of these reforms provided for
the regulation of party membership, in order to prevent party migration, to prevent
politicians from constantly changing parties; the introduction of a 5 % clause would
have reduced the number of parties in Congress. However, these goals were not
achieved. The first conclusion of this analysis is that the structural and functional
deficits of the Chamber of Deputies continued under the Lula government. The
implementation of these reforms, however, strongly depends on the work of the
parliamentary elite. The question of whether a new parliamentary elite entered the
Chamber of Deputies during Lula’s terms of office might explain why these reforms
were not realized.
2 A New Parliamentary Elite?
Following his 2002 election win Lula promised a “social pact” for all Brazilians and
“social justice” for the poor (Holston, 2008: 5 f). Social and political reforms—such
as institutional reform or fundamental agrarian reforms—were and are necessary to
achieve these goals. Without a parliamentary elite that supports these goals, it is
difficult for a president to promote them. The high expectations of the Lula
government were also projected onto the parliamentary elite of the country. The
question arises as to whether the parliamentarians were representative of a new
political elite, as was Lula da Silva. Is it possible to identify a change within the
parliamentary elite during Lula’s term of office?
The analysis of the biographic data of members of the Câmara dos Deputados
makes it possible to develop a profile of the parliamentarians under the Lula da
Silva government.16 The analysis will examine the politicians’ socio-biographic
characteristics: Are there more women? Are all ethnic and social groups
represented in the Chamber of Deputies? Even if the behavior of political
institutions cannot be explained on the basis of their members, but rather reflect
social and historic developments (Pierson, 2003: 103 f), the analysis of biographic
data can provide an indication of these developments. If more women are present
within the parliamentary elite, this indicates a positive development regarding the
equality of women in Brazilian society. If parliamentarians of all ethnic and
educational levels are present within the Chamber, then this is an indication of
equal opportunity and social justice. The following analysis is based on the results
of an empirical study of Brazil’s parliamentary elite during the Lula government’s
term of office on the basis of the biographical data of parliamentary representatives
(Galvão Alves, 2008). For the first time, data on parliamentarians who were elected
for the first time will be compared with data on reelected parliamentarians. The
reelected parliamentarians are here categorized exemplarily as representatives of
Brazil’s old political elite.
2.1 The Age Structure of the Chamber of Deputies
With regards to age structure, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies under the Lula
government was dominated by parliamentarians, who were born in the 1950s. Thus
politicians between 43 and 52 years of age made up the majority of the Brazilian
Chamber of Deputies, with 190 parliamentarians from this age group. The second
largest age group in the Câmara dos Deputados was made up of parliamentarians
born in the 1940s, with 164 politicians. Overall it is possible to identify a gener-
ational change: 92 parliamentarians were between 23 and 42 years of age. This
tendency is particularly noticeable amongst “new” parliamentarians, as amongst
these “new” parliamentary representatives the number of politicians born in the
16
The analysis of the biographic data is restricted to Lula’s first term of office (2003–2007).
92 A. Galvão
Table 6.2 Age structure Age group Re-elected New Total

of the Brazilian Chamber
Born in 1916 1 – 1
of Deputies (2003–2007)
Born in the 1920s 9 – 17
Born in the 1930s 34 8 34
Born in the 1940s 120 44 164
Born in the 1950s 118 82 190
Born in the 1960s 39 32 71
Born in the 1970s 3 17 20
Born in the 1980s – 1 1
Total 324 189 513
Source: The database of the National Congress of Brazil: http://
www2.camara.gov.br/deputados
1930s was strongly reduced. Thus Brazilian parliamentarians are experiencing

rejuvenation, albeit one that is progressing slowly, as a large number of older
parliamentarians held seats in the legislative period from 2003 to 2007 (see
Table 6.2).
The increase in the presence of a younger generation in the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies during the legislative period of 2003–2007 is reflective of Brazilian
society, which has a large proportion of young people. The most recent demo-
graphic census from 2010 recorded 34.2 million youths between 15 and 24 years of
age. This makes up 18 % of the total population.17 These characteristics have been
maintained under Rousseff: in 2011 politicians between 22 and 41 years of age
made up the third largest group of parliamentarians who entered the Chamber of
Deputies (86 parliamentarians). The majority was still made up of politicians
between 42 and 61 years of age (a total of 313).
2.2 The Level of Education in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
Traditionally the political elite in Latin America comes from well-educated circles
(Lipset & Solari, 1967: 457–482). The level of education is also reflected in the
social background of the elite: enjoying a good education is more likely in a higher
social class. This is no different in Brazil. Achieving a high level of education or the
being able to finance a degree is not possible for all people in Brazil. The number of
illiterate people in 2007 was 9.2 %—around 15 million people.18 The percentage of
people who have more than 11 years of education, who have completed a technical
apprenticeship, or who were able to study was 30 % for men and 31.8 % for
women.19 But, what can be said about the level of education of Brazilian
parliamentarians under the Lula government?
17
Data from the IBGE: http://www.ibge.gov.br/
18
According to the IBGE data in 2007 there were 15,628,400 illiterate people in the country.
19
Data from the IBGE website: http://www.ibge.gov.br/
Table 6.3 Overall level of education of Brazilian parliamentarians (2003–2007)

Level of education Re-elected New Total %
Primary school (without graduation) 4 5 2 0.4
Primary school (with graduation) 1 1 9 1.7
Technical apprenticeship 13 6 19 3.7
Secondary school 14 12 26 5.1
University (without graduation) 26 27 53 10.3
University (with graduation) 146 79 225 43.9
University and further studies 107 49 156 30.4
Doctoral studies 15 2 17 3.3
Habilitation 2 2 4 0.8
Not reported 1 1 2 0.4
Total 329 184 513 100
Source: The database of the National Congress of Brazil: http://www2.camara.gov.br/deputados
The analysis of the biographic data shows that the majority of the
parliamentarians who held a seat during the legislative period from 2003 until
2007 had completed tertiary studies. A comparison between “new” and “re-elected”
parliamentarians shows no significant change: 42.9 % of the “new”
parliamentarians who had studied, indicated that they had completed a degree;
amongst the “re-elected” the number of parliamentarians with a completed degree
was 44.4 %.20 This data confirms the tendency towards high education even
amongst parliamentarians who were elected for the first time. Following a deeper
comparative analysis of the data, however, other tendencies could be observed that
suggest small changes in the profile of the “new” parliamentarians. It was possible
to observe, inter alia, a reduction of the number of parliamentarians with a further
degree, such as a masters or doctoral degree, (following the completion of their
university studies) or with a second degree (See Table 6.3).
This tendency can also be observed under Rousseff’s first term. However, the
evaluation of the biographic information of parliamentarians in the Rousseff govern-
ment suggests small changes.21 While the number of parliamentarians with a
completed degree (306) rose in comparison with the Lula government, the number
of parliamentarians with further training after their degree or with a doctoral degree
was reduced (71 and 7 respectively). The results are different with regard to
parliamentarians with secondary school education: under Rousseff this numbered
35 parliamentarians (under Lula it was 26). The number of parliamentarians with a
technical apprenticeship (14) and only primary school education (8) was slightly
lower.
On the party level different tendencies can be observed: the Worker’s Party
(PT) became more academic, as many new parliamentarians (in total 38) from the
20
This does not include parliamentarians with advanced training, doctoral degrees or a habili-
tation, as these form an own category.
21
Data from the Brazilian Congress‘database: http://www2.camara.leg.br/
94 A. Galvão
Table 6.4 Level of education of Brazilian parliamentarians from selected partiesa (2003–2007)
Level of education PT PSDB PFL/DEM PMDB
Primary school (without graduation) – – – 1
Primary school (with graduation) 6 – – –
Technical apprenticeship 4 – 2 3
Secondary school 2 2 2 2
University (without graduation) 10 5 5 8
University (with graduation) 28 14 36 39
University and further studies 37 26 14 21
Doctoral studies 2 2 3 4
Habilitation – 2 1 –
Not reported 1 – – –
Total 90 51 63 78
a
Data from the largest Brazilian parties
Worker’s Party had a completed degree and most of them had undertaken further
studies after their degree. On the other hand, the party also had the largest number
of parliamentarians with only a primary school education (6), the majority who
came from the agrarian sector (Galvão Alves, 2008: 65). While on the one hand
PT’s social criticism and left-oriented politics makes it possible for politicians with
a low level of education and modest social backgrounds to participate, on the other
hand, better-educated politicians are granted very good chances within the party
(Marenco dos Santos, 2001: 45). The party thus demonstrates an effort at social
justice, as all social groups are represented within it. At the same time, however, it
is attempting to create the impression of competence by bringing well-educated
politicians into its ranks.
With this growing number of parliamentarians with an academic degree the PT
is automatically approaching the image of the largest opposition parties: DEM
(Democratas, formerly PFL) and the PSDB, former president Fernando Henrique
Cardoso’s party. While the academics from both the PT and the PSDB can be
located on the left of the intellectual spectrum, academics from DEM are generally
from a more conservative background (Galvão Alves, 2008: 65–67). The academics
from the Worker’s Party also belong to a third group which comes largely from the
middle class. Some of the “academics” among them come from economically weak
backgrounds and have worked as factory or agricultural workers, but who have
nonetheless achieved the opportunities of a better education (Table 6.4).
Under the Rousseff administration, the PT has particularly maintained the
described profile. Worker’s Party politicians under Rousseff continue to have the
broadest spectrum of educational level of all parties in the Chamber of Deputies
during the first 2 years of office. It is notable that during this period the PT had the
largest number of parliamentarians with only a primary school education (4 of the
total 8) as well as with a doctoral degree (4 of 7).
Table 6.5 Most common Profession Total %

professions of Brazilian
Lawyer 132 25.7
parliamentarians (2003–
2007) Physician 57 11.1
Teacher 35 6.8
Civil engineer 31 6.0
Farmer 24 4.7
Professor/Lecturer (as main profession) 20 3.9
Civil servant 17 3.3
Businessperson 17 3.3
TV or radio moderator 16 3.1
Economist 16 3.1
Pastor/Priest/Theologist 12 2.3
Agricultural engineer 12 2.3
2.3 The Professions of Brazilian Parliamentary Representatives
Possessing an academic title is an important feature of Brazilian parliamentarians:

the majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies have completed or at least
commenced tertiary education. This is also clear from an analysis of the professions
of parliamentary representatives: the academic professions are well represented in
Congress. Another feature of Brazilian parliamentarians is that they have often
exercised several professions before and, in part, after their term of office: during
the 2003–2007 legislative period, 157 of parliamentarians reported having had at
least two professions. This included 18 parliamentarians who performed three
(or more) different professions. Together that makes up 34.9 % of Brazilian
parliamentarians. Rodrigues (2006: 37–39) has examined the “professions” of
Brazilian parliamentarians. He groups these according to sectors, which simplifies
evaluation (see Table 6.5).
The evaluation of the biographic data indicated different patterns of professions
for Brazilian parliamentarians, however they have similar characteristics. The clear
presence of certain traditional professional groups among parliamentarians, such as
lawyers or doctors, is unmistakable.22 Interest groups and lobbyists have also
secured a place in the Câmara dos Deputados: there are also numerous farmers,
civil servants and businesspeople. The media industry is also well represented (see
Table 6.5). There are also priests and pastors amongst the parliamentarians. The
Catholic Church traditionally plays an important role within the political elite of the
country (Mainwaring, 1986). Political debates are supported or blocked by the
Church. An example of this is the discussion surrounding the loosening of abortion
22
Parliamentarians from Lula da Silva’s second period of office (2008–2011) confirm this trend:
there is a large number of doctors and lawyers among parliamentarians. According to the data from
the Congress’ website there were 106 lawyers and 57 doctors in Congress.
96 A. Galvão
laws in Brazil, which has not taken place due to pressure from the Catholic Church.
The influence of politicians from evangelical sects and Pentecostal churches is
growing within Brazilian politics.23 Rodrigues (2006) has interpreted this increase
of evangelicals in the Chamber of Deputies as a sign of its opening to less
economically privileged classes of society, as many pastors from these sects
come from modest backgrounds and have no academic education (Rodrigues,
2006: 38). Lawyers and doctors continue to be the most common professions of
parliamentarians under the Rousseff government. On the other hand, the number of
pastors from evangelical sects has slightly diminished (7). The media industry is
still strongly represented: alongside TV and radio moderators, actors and
entertainers have become parliamentarians.
2.4 Ethnic Background
In 2010 Brazil’s black and mulatto24 population consisted of 96.7 million people,25
which is 50.7 % of the total Brazilian population. According to IBGE statistics the
black and mulatto population attended school for an average of 4.6 years (PNAD
1999).26 The social indicators also suggest other factors that present the black and
mulatto population as a weak social and economic group. For example, with regard
to infrastructure, only 39.6 % of black and mulatto households27 have a sewage
system (Hasenbalg, 1991: 31–39). The data suggests that the majority of black and
mulatto Brazilians are poor: they do not belong to the elite, but rather to the masses
in the sense of Pareto (1955) and Mosca (1950) sense.
The Brazilian Congress database does not provide information about the ethnic
background of parliamentarians, as no parliamentarian is obliged to provide infor-
mation about their skin color or ethnic background. Nevertheless the passport
photos that are available on the parliamentarians’ curriculum vitae show that the
majority of the parliamentarians in Congress are white.28 Notably, there was an
extremely small number of five black or mulatto parliamentarians in the Brazilian
Chamber of Deputies between 2003 and 2007.29 In the following legislative period
(2008–2011) eight black or mulatto parliamentarians were identified. In addition,
23
The number of pastors from evangelical sects in Congress grew from 5 to 13 in Lula’s second
term in office.
24
Mulatto stands for “mixed-race” between black and white and is a standard term in Brazil.
25
Data from the IBGE website: http://www.ibge.gov.br
26
PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicı́lios) is the national data collection on the
basis of household samples. New data was collected in 2010 through a census.
27
Data from Hasenbalg’s results (1991).
28
Database of the Chamber of Deputies: http://www2.camara.gov.br/deputados
29
It is possible that this number might need to be increased by one or two politicians as the quality
of the pictures was not always good and there were not always photos together with the curriculum
vitae.
there was only one parliamentarian of Asian heritage and not a single parliamen-
tarian of indigenous heritage.
Even if the black and mulatto population of Brazil is only insignificantly
represented on the legislative level, an important step was made to improve the
presence of all ethnic groups in Brazilian politics: in 2003 a special “State Secre-
tariat for the Promotion of Equality of the Races” (Secretaria Especial de Polı́ticas
de Promoção da Igualdade Social e Racial) was created, which was led under the
Lula government until 2008 by Minister Matilde Ribeiro, who is herself black. On
the executive level Lula awarded 2 out of 24 posts to black or mulatto persons: the
singer Gilberto Gil was the Minister for Culture and Benedita da Silva was
designated to the Ministry for Social Affairs.30 On the legislative level there was
no change: Brazil’s largest ethnic group still had very little representation in the
Chamber of Deputies. The parliamentary elite remained as light-skinned as the
country’s elite.
However, under the Rousseff’s government it is possible to note that the number
of black and mulatto parliamentarians has risen to 21, which is 4 % of all
parliamentarians. The number of parliamentarians with Asian heritage also grew
to six. While this observation presents a positive picture of development towards
the broader participation of all ethnic groups in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies,
the parliamentary elite after Lula still remains mostly light-skinned.
2.5 Women Within Brazil’s Parliamentary Elite
The Chamber of Deputies was and remained under the Lula government a mascu-
line domain. The proportion of women was very small and, with 44 female
parliamentarians, made up less than 10 % of all parliamentary representatives.
The number of women in the Chamber of Deputies under Lula da Silva grew in
comparison to the Cardoso government, when only 29 women entered the Cham-
ber. In Lula da Silva’s second legislative period, however, the number of female
politicians in Congress remained steady at 44.31 This suggests stagnation. There
were also no relevant changes under the Rousseff first term in office. In 2013,
46 female politicians held a seat in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. There has
been no increase in the number of female parliamentarians in the Chamber of
Deputies under the first female president (Table 6.6).
With 15 women within their ranks, the Worker’s Party had the largest number of
women within the Chamber of Deputies. The PT is one of the few Brazilian parties
in Brazil that has guidelines within their party program for the just representation of
women in politics (Macauly, 2003). The significantly higher proportion of women
amongst PT parliamentarians is due to this party program: since its foundation, the
30
Benedita da Silva did not remain in office for long: in January 2004 she was removed following
a corruption scandal.
31
Data from the Câmaras dos Deputados website: www2.camara.gov.br/deputados
98 A. Galvão
Table 6.6 Number of female politicians in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (2003–2007)
PC
PP PT do B PFL PPS PSB PTB PMDB PSDB Independent Total
New 1 9 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 25
Re- – 6 2 4 – 1 – 4 2 – 19
elected
Total 1 15 4 5 1 2 3 7 5 1 44
Table 6.7 Professions of Profession Re-elected New Total

female politicians in the
Teacher 4 5 9
Chamber of Deputies
Lawyer 3 3 6
Civil servant 1 2 3
Physician 2 1 3
Professor/Lecturer 1 2 3
Social worker 1 2 3
Farmer 2 – 2
Nurse 1 1 2
Psychologist 2 – 2
Agricultural worker 1 – 1
Biochemist, Chemist – 1 1
Economist – 1 1
Educator – 1 1
Housewife – 1 1
Judge – 1 1
Secretary – 1 1
Translator – 1 1
TV and radio moderator 1 – 1
Not listed – 2 2
Total 19 25 44
PT has included the principles and demands of the women’s movement within their
program. The profile of female Brazilian parliamentarians does not differ signifi-
cantly from the general profile, which has been outlined above. The majority of the
female politicians who entered the Chamber of Deputies during Lula’s first period
of office also had a tertiary education. The majority has professions in the education
or the health sector (Table 6.7).
The analysis also shows that the profile of female Brazilian parliamentarians
shows different regional and party-related features. The female politicians from the
southwest and north of Brazil have a more strongly socio-political curriculum vita
than those from other regions.32 The southeast has sent more women to Congress
than other regions. Of the 44 female parliamentarians, 16 came from the southeast
(although in Minas Gerais only one female parliamentarian was elected).33 Even if
women are underrepresented in Brazilian politics, there are signs of growing
recognition and political influence of women (see Macauly, 2003). One sign of
this is that Lula founded the State Secretariat for Women’s Rights, which has the
same status as a ministry.
3 Results and Conclusion: The President, Political Change

and the Parliamentary Elite
Mudar com coragem e cuidado, humildade e ousadia, mudar tendo consciência de que a
mudança é um processo gradativo e continuado. . .34 (From Lula da Silva’s speech at his
inauguration on January 1, 2003)
The “House of all Brazilians”, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, was not free of
structural and functional deficits under the Lula government. This is evident from
the number of provisional decrees issued during Lula’s term of office. The legis-
lative process continued to suffer from the same weaknesses and problems with
which previous governments had struggled. Nor was the Lula government immune
to corruption, above all in the Chamber of Deputies. One of the Lula government’s
most notorious corruption scandals broke in 2005: the then Minister José Dirceu
was accused of paying a monthly bonus, the mensalão, to parliamentarians in
exchange for their support for government projects (Costa, 2008: 118–119).
Numerous parliamentarians as well as José Dirceu were removed from office.
This corruption scandal demonstrates an informal mechanism within a government
that constantly struggled to achieve parliamentary majorities.
Who were the parliamentarians under Lula da Silva? Were there signs of a
change within the country’s parliamentary elite? The biographic data from Lula da
Silva’s first period in office and the supplementary information from his second
term do not indicate a change. The average Brazilian parliamentarian under the
Lula government was male, with a tertiary education, in his late forties and light-
skinned. He was, most commonly, a lawyer or a doctor, and his family often had
participated in determining Brazilian politics for generations. These politicians
generally had a previous political career in local or state politics. This profile of
32
This statement is based on the analysis of the curriculum vitae of female politicians. The sources
were, above all, the biographic data of the Chamber of Deputies and the CFEMEA database
(website: www.cfemea.org.br).
33
This is perhaps related to the fact that the former PL (today PR), which was often elected in
Minas Gerais, does not have a single woman in its ranks.
34
“To change with courage and caution, with humility and audacity, to change and yet still know
that every change is a slow and continuous process. . .”.
100 A. Galvão
the parliamentary elite under Lula—according to a first conclusion of this analy-

sis—is more similar to the traditional political elite of the country than is Lula’s
own profile. However, the profile is not uniform, as there are differentiated
characteristics that suggest new tendencies. Even though 77.6 % of
parliamentarians in the legislative period from 2003 to 2007 had studied, the
number of people with an engineering background and politicians who had not
completed tertiary studies grew amongst parliamentarians who were elected for the
first time.
In the category “profession” the trend towards academic professions was con-
firmed. The dominance of lawyers and doctors remained constant. The increase in
the number of pastors from evangelical sects was new. This suggests an opening of
the Chamber of Deputies to a less privileged group (Rodrigues, 2006: 61–91).
Amongst new parliamentarian a generation change can be identified: the average
age of new parliamentarians was 45 years. This means that the Brazilian Chamber
of Deputies is gradually getting younger. Although women were still under-
represented in the 2003–2007 legislative period, there was a small increase in com-
parison with the Cardoso government. This is not the case with regard to the ethnic
background of parliamentarians, as black or mulatto politicians are still under-
represented. There is a clear dominance of light-skinned parliamentarians, which
does not reflect the reality of Brazilian society. Although over 50 % of Brazilians
are black or of mixed race, this group held only 1 % of the seats in the Chamber of
Deputies under the Lula government. In this area it is possible to identify what is
almost the sole development that has taken place under the Rousseff government, as
there are more black and mulatto people and people of Asian heritage in the Chamber
of Deputies.
Overall the results of the empirical research show that no change took place
within the parliamentary elite during Lula’s period in office. Despite this the results
confirm that the parliamentary elite in Brazil is undergoing a process of change:
there are more female politicians, politics is more accessible to people from
different professions and there are the beginnings of a generation change. However,
old patterns remain, such as the dominance of certain professions and the high level
of education amongst parliamentarians. These characteristics show that certain
features still strongly determine the image of Brazilian parliamentarians. This
was confirmed by the analysis of the biographic data of parliamentarians under
Rousseff. The quality of these new parliamentarians’ politics cannot, however, be
determined by an analysis of biographic data. While the Lula da Silva government
achieved some success in the social realm, particularly through programs such as
the bolsa famı́lia, which guaranteed a small amount of financial support for many
poor families, structural reforms, such as extensive political reforms remain incom-
plete. This is Rousseff’s political inheritance: she is expected not only to maintain
continuity with her predecessor, but above all to implement and further develop
these political reforms.
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The Brazilian Electoral System
7
Jairo Nicolau and Julia Stadler
Abstract
The article by Jairo Nicolau and Julia Stadler presents the electoral system
which is closely associated with how the executive and the legislative powers
operate. The Brazilian system of open list proportional representation has often
been characterized as a major political and institutional barrier and accordingly
stood in the center of the frequently discussed extensive political reform
(reforma polı́tica). The article is an introduction to the complexity of the
Brazilian electoral system and explains its most important rules, system
components and the main reform approaches since the 1988 Constitution.
According to the authors, the debate about the need for a comprehensive reform
is as old as the system itself and is demanded by representatives across the entire
political spectrum. Neither Cardoso nor Lula or Rousseff tackled the reform.
Nonetheless, the authors conclude that the absence of this reform should not be
understood as an inability to reform.
1 Introduction1
The electoral system is one of the most complex components of a political system.
Numerous theories concern themselves with the effects of different types of elec-
toral systems, in particular with the possible effects on the party system (Grofman
1
J. Nicolau (*)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: jaironicolau@gmail.com
J. Stadler
State University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: julia.stadler@yahoo.de

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_7
104 J. Nicolau and J. Stadler
& Lijphardt, 1986; Nohlen, 1984, 2007; Rae, 1967). Hence, the technical design of
an electoral system, whether in its first conceptualization or as part of a process of
reform, must be well thought through: proportional or majority system; which is the
most appropriate method of counting; should votes be given to the parties or to
candidates? Behind these technical issues we find highly political questions: who
will receive what kind of advantage as a result of one electoral system or another
and who risks not being elected? Who will therefore be interested in reform and
who will have the parliamentary majority in order to carry out or block reforms? In
other words: the electoral system is the subject of fundamental political interest, or
as Sartori states, “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics” (1968: 273).
The following article can be considered an introduction into the complexity of
the Brazilian electoral system, as it is almost impossible to describe all its
characteristics and answer all outstanding questions in a detailed manner. Thus
the article should be understood as a basis for a more intensive study of Brazilian
electoral rules as well as a case study for the comparative study of electoral systems
in general. The following will set out the most important electoral rules and
components of the system (Sect. 2), as well as the most important attempts at
reform in the period since the 1988 Constitution. In order to provide a better
understanding of the design and operation of an electoral system we consider it
necessary to also contemplate the evolution of the system (see also Nicolau, 2012).
In this text we will also discuss which actors occupy special positions with regard to
the reform process, as well as the role that the Lula da Silva and the Dilma Rousseff
administration and the Worker’s Party (PT) have played in the reform process
(Sect. 3).
2 The Electoral System
The Brazilian electoral system is an open list proportional representation (OLPR)

system.2 A part of the legislative is elected according to a proportional system (the
House of Representatives and the sub-national Chambers), another part according
to a majority voting system (the Senate). The executive (president, governors, and
mayors) is elected according to a simple majority voting system.
The following will first present those electoral rules, which apply to the propor-
tional voting system, before proceeding to describe the majority voting system. To
begin with, however, a number of basic characteristics will be set out: the electoral
rules are defined in the electoral code (Codigo Eleitoral n 4.737 de 15 de Julho de
1965), the electoral law (Lei das Eleições n 9.5043) and in certain parts of the party
law (Lei dos Partidos Polı́ticos 9.096/954). Elections take place simultaneously
2
For a compendium of Brazilian electoral data since 1998 see Dos Santos (2002, in particular
Chapters I–IV).
3
http://www.tre-mg.gov.br/legislacao_jurisprudencia/lei9504.pdf
4
http://www.tre-pb.gov.br/legislacao/arquivos/lei_9096_1995.pdf
7 The Brazilian Electoral System 105
every 4 years; state and national elections occur on the same day, local elections are
staggered by 2 years. As a result, all citizens are called to vote every 2 years. The
Brazilian electoral system does not provide for the artificial creation of electoral
districts. The electoral districts are thus the same as the different administrative
units (more than 5500 municipal authorities, 26 states as well as the federal district/
Brası́lia).
Voting is compulsory for all Brazilian citizens between the ages of 18 and 70 and
voluntary for the 16 and 17 years old as well as citizens over 70. Illiterate persons
are also not required to vote.5 Listing is compulsory but not automatic. All citizens
who are required to vote must register at the regional electoral court (Tribunal
Regional Eleitoral, TRE) that is responsible for their area. Since re-democratization
the number of registered voters is approximating the number of people of voting
age. Voter turnout is around 80 %.
In Brazil there is an electoral fund that provides parties with financial resources
according to their performance in the previous election. In addition there is the
so-called Hor ario Eleitoral Gratuito (HEG), which provides parties with free
public advertising on radio and television. The electoral law sets out the upper
limit for private support for parties. Private persons may donate up to 10 % of their
income and legal persons up to 2 % of their profits. In this context Speck (2006:
156) emphasizes, that “contemporary Brazilian law translate social and economic
inequality into a norm of electoral financing”.
2.1 Proportional Representation
Members of parliament (MPs) in the House of Representatives have been elected in

Brazil since 1824.6 During the period of the Empire (Império 1822–1889) the
system alternated between numbers of different forms of majority voting. Until
1880 MPs were elected indirectly in a two-step process: first electoral delegates
were elected, these delegates then elected the parliament. Since 1881 the parlia-
mentary representatives are directly elected by the voters. During the First Republic
(Primeira República 1889–1930) three different electoral systems and variations of
majority voting were introduced. From 1904 to 1930 the States were divided into
electoral districts with five representatives each. Voters were able to vote for up to
four candidates, or vote more than once for a single candidate. This period was
marked by electoral fraud and weak participation in both presidential elections and
elections to the House.
In 1932 a new electoral law came into force that modernized the entire electoral
process and took the first steps in the direction of consolidating an electoral
democracy: women were made eligible to vote, measures intended to protect the
secrecy of the ballot and electoral courts were introduced.
5
For an introductory analysis of compulsory voting in Brazil see Power (2008).
6
For an introduction into Brazil’s electoral history see Nicolau (2002, 2012).
Until the 1930s no important party or political group favored a switch to

proportional voting. Only a few intellectuals, first and foremost Assis Brasil
(founder of the liberal-republican party—Partido Libertador) promoted the pro-
portional system and developed a new electoral law in 1932.7 This electoral law
was extremely complex and incorporated both systems, according to which a
number of the parliamentary representatives in the Federal Chamber were to be
elected according to a proportional system. This system was abolished after only
two electoral periods (1933 and 1934) by the coup carried out by Getúlio Vargas in
1937, as he suspended elections, banned parties and dissolved the Federal Chamber.
Elections only took place again in 1945 as part of the re-democratization process. In
the same year elections to the House of Representatives were switched entirely to
the proportional system.
Since this period there have only been few changes to the electoral system, at
least to the manner in which representatives are elected.8 Elections to the House of
Representatives, the Legislative Assemblies (Assembléias Legislativas) and the
local councils (Câmaras dos Vereadores) currently take place according to a
proportional voting principle. The voting process is quite simple: today the voter
enters the desired candidate or party’s voting code into an electronic ballot box.
Parties always have the same voting code; candidates’ codes are communicated
during the election campaign.9 Around 90 % of the votes go directly to a candidate
and only the few remaining percent are cast for a party.
The following will discuss four basic aspects of the current proportional system:
(a) the selection procedure, (b) the open list, (c) electoral coalitions, and (d) the
distorted representation of the states in the House of Representatives.
a. Selection Procedure
Brazil uses the so-called apportionment process in order to convert votes into
mandates. This means: a Hare quota plus the greatest average.10 Hare quota parties
can take office alone or as part of a coalition. In order to illustrate the distribution of
seats amongst the parties/electoral coalitions more vividly, we will use the election
results from the 1986 election to the House of Representatives in the state of São
Paulo. 15,452,508 voters participated in the election. 3,545,914 of these votes were
invalid (voto nulo) or did not select any candidate or party (voto em branco).11 Thus
7
http://www.tse.gov.br/hotSites/CatalogoPublicacoes/pdf/codigo_eleitoral_1932.pdf, accessed:
08/11/2013.
8
Since then only two significant changes have been made: the criteria that requires the distribution
of mandates that are not occupied in the first stage (1950); and the exclusion of blank votes (votos
em branco) from the calculation of electoral quota (1998).
9
When voting, the voter must manually enter the number of the desired candidate or of the desired
list. At no point has Brazil had a ballot paper that included the name of all candidates. On the
possible effects of this kind of voting act see Nicolau (2007a, 2007b), Stadler (2008).
10
See Nohlen (2007: 117) for more detail.
11
In this example we apply the current rule that does not consider blank votes for the calculation of
the electoral quota. In 1986 this rule was not yet in place.
the number of valid votes cast (voter turnout minus brancos and nulos) was
11,906,594. In total 60 seats were distributed.
Step 1: Calculation of the electoral quota (quociente eleitoral)

The electoral quota is calculated through the division of all valid votes by the
number of seats to be allocated: 11,906,594/60 ¼ 198,443.
Step 2: Division of the party votes received by the electoral quota
Votes for a particular party are divided by the electoral quota. The whole
numbers of this division determine the number of seats, which each party will
receive. For example, the PMDB received 5,274,397 votes. This gives a value of
26,578 when divided by the electoral quota (198,443). According to this calcu-
lation the PMDB will receive 26 seats. Parties that do not reach the electoral
quota are excluded from the distribution of seats.
Step 3: Distribution of the remaining seats (sobras)
After the first calculation not all seats have been distributed (only 54). Six
seats remain unoccupied. These seats are allocated according to the “greatest
average” rule: the total number of votes received by a party is divided by the
number of seats allocated in the first calculation plus one. For example: the
PMDB received 5,274,397 votes, which is then divided by the number of
mandates allocated according to the electoral quota plus one (26 + 1 ¼ 27); the
result is that the party’s greatest average is 195,348. In the next step the
remaining seats are allocated to the parties with the largest averages. It should
be noted that in the second step the PMDB received an additional extra seat, as
its second greatest average was larger than the first greatest average of the other
parties (see Table 7.1). The overall number of mandates, that a party receives
amounts to the sum of all the steps. In this example this results in the following
distribution: PMDB (28); PTB-PSC-PL (11); PDS-PDC-PFL (11); PT (8);
PDT (2).
b. The Open List

The mandates are—as we have seen above—calculated according to the number of
votes on the entire electoral list. They are allocated to those candidates on the list
who achieved the largest number of votes. In our example, the PDT received two
seats. These will be allocated to the two candidates with the most votes on the
electoral list (regardless of whether candidates on other lists were able to gain more
direct votes). Prior to the election the “list” is merely the sum of all candidates
standing for election for the different parties (or coalitions) that are registered with
the electoral commission. It only comes into de facto existence after the election,
when a candidate’s performance has been determined and it becomes clear which
candidates have a right to the seats that have been allocated to the party. This model
is often called an “open list”. In certain countries, such as for example Portugal,
Spain, Argentina and South Africa the list is ordered prior to the elections and the
voters vote for a party or a list (closed list). In other countries, such as for example
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Germany parties order their list
but voters can still vote for another candidate on the list, thus manually changing the
Table 7.1 Distribution of the remaining seats (sobras)

Number of votes Number of votes Number of votes
divided by the divided by the divided by the Total number
number of mandates number of mandates number of mandates of seats
received in the first received in the first received in the first following
Party calculation + 1 calculation + 2 calculation + 3 steps 2 and 3
PMDB 195,348 (B) 188,371 (D) 181,875 2
PTB- 184,037 (E) 1
PSC-
PL
PDS- 182,840 (F) 1
PDC-
PFL
PT 197,654 (A) 1
PDT 194,750 (C) 1
Total 6
N.B. The letters in the brackets indicate the order of the greatest averages
Source: Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral, www.tse.gov.br
order. In each of these countries there are also additional rules to determine how
candidates with a very high number of votes but a poor position on the list can still
win a seat.
The open list has been in force in Brazil since 1945. Already in the 1950s
politicians suggested that the open list encourages competition between candidates
on the same list, consequently weakening the parties (see Chap. 9). This has long
been the main argument of critics of the open list. Over the last few years, however,
other points of criticism have increasingly come to the fore, in particular with
regard to the question of the transfer of votes (transferência do voto) among
candidates on the same list. The elections of Éneas Carneiro (2002) or Clodovil
Hernandez (2006) are often presented as striking examples of this. These were
candidates for micro-parties who individually received far more votes than the
electoral quota, making it possible for other candidates from their list to win seats
although they had received fewer votes than candidates from other parties/lists.12
Public bewilderment in the face of such cases probably stems generally from many
people’s ignorance of how the counting method functions. Voters generally vote for
their favorite candidate and are not aware that their vote also counts towards the
total for a party/electoral coalition and that other candidates from the list may thus
be elected. From another perspective, candidates with few votes profit from popular
colleagues on their list.
Brazil’s use of the open list is interesting from many points of view. A first is its
longevity. In no other country has it been in place for so long despite strong
criticism. A second reason is its application in a country with such a large voting
12
For example, in 2002 Carneiro was elected to the House of Representatives with 1.5 million
votes in São Paulo. With this number of votes he helped a further five candidates with a poor
number of votes from his party (PRONA) to win seats.
population.13 As we will see, the number of voters is particularly important with

regard to the definition of patterns of representation. A third reason is the combi-
nation of the open list with other aspects of the electoral system: very large electoral
districts, possible electoral coalitions, simultaneous elections for different posts and
finally the distorted representation of the states in the House of Representatives.
Above all the size of the electoral districts and the existence of electoral coalitions
raise the possibility that transfers of votes will have undesired effects. It is—
indirectly—possible that candidates are elected whose attention is entirely focused
on distant areas of the electoral district and whose party is not necessarily close to
the elected party.14
Desposato (2006a) has made an interesting comparative study of the possible
influence of the open list on party strength within the political system and has come
to the conclusion that institutional factors have no influence on party strength. In
other words, the open list does not—as it is often accused—lead to a weaker party
system. A Brazilian publication (Klein, 2007) addresses the subject in more depth
and compares the possible consequences of open and closed lists. As does
Desposato, he rejects the accusation that the open list leads to ungovernability
and shows that the accusation is not supported by empirical evidence.
c. Electoral Coalitions
As mentioned above, parties can compete in proportional elections alone or as part
of an electoral coalition (coligação). In order to convert votes into seats all of the
votes for all of the parties on a list are added together and any seats that are won are
then distributed across the list. There is no additional step for calculating a party’s
share of votes within the coalition. It is thus very important for parties to gain
enough votes to guarantee that they will have the highest position on the list.
Otherwise one party will simply have helped another party to power. According
to this system small parties that can only reach a smaller number of voters and who
might not reach the electoral quota can still win seats for their candidates.
This characteristic of the electoral system has led to a distortion of party
representation in the political arena. In general, coalitions tend to favor small
parties that would only have a small chance of reaching the electoral quota on
their own. However larger parties also profit from transfers of votes from smaller
parties. This is the case when smaller parties have single candidates that, as in the
example above, win a large number of votes. These, then, transfer their votes to
other candidates from coalition parties. Precisely this occasionally arbitrary effect
can lead to a distortion of the relationship between the number of votes achieved by
a party and the number of seats won—when Tiririca’s candidature was approved it
13
In 2010 this number was ca. 137 million. This is in contrast to other countries with an open list
system (see www.idea.int).
14
In Brazil there are sometimes very surprising electoral coalition constellations. There has
therefore been an attempt to contain this through the verticalização regulation. See Samuels
(2000) and Chap. 9.
was not possible to predict that he would gain any votes at all. It is important to
note, however, that of the three additional seats that were won thanks to Tiririca not
one went to his own party. Fleischer emphasizes an important aspect of this
phenomenon, namely that “in many cases electoral coalitions [. . .] do not become
party coalitions that support the newly elected government [. . .]” (2006: 142, trans-
lation). In other words, it is possible to help a party win a seat only to find oneself
soon after in opposition during the legislative period.15
Another effect of the coalition rule first becomes clear during the legislative
period. Parliamentarians from one party who let their mandate rest during the
legislative period (due to a change of office within the executive or illness) or
who resign from office (due to death or removal from office, etc.) are replaced by
the candidate with the next-largest amount of votes. Given the fact that changes of
or resignations from office, as well as removals, are quite frequent; the composition
and strength of parliamentary factions change significantly.
d. The Distortion of State Representation in the House of Representatives

One especially strong characteristic of the Brazilian electoral system is the “old
problem of the distortion of State representation in the House of Representatives”
(Bohn, 2006: 193, Translation; see also Nicolau, 1997). The Chamber of Deputies
is made up of 513 parliamentarians, elected in 27 electoral districts (26 States and
the Federal District).16 Currently, the number of seats per State is not in direct
proportion to the number of inhabitants or voters. According to a constitutional
norm a State must have a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 70 seats.17 Although
almost all States have a certain degree of distortion in their representation, the
following stand out: the over-representation (sobre-representação) of the small
northern States (Roraima, Amapá, Acre and Tocantins), as well as the under-
representation (sub-representação) of São Paulo, which according to the current
rule has 41 less seats than in the simulation.
This distortion not only indicates the inequality between population and States,
but also affects the political parties. Lists that concentrate their voting power in
States that are over-represented tend to be over-represented in the Chamber of
Deputies. In contrast, parties that campaign primarily in São Paulo and who
experience electoral success can have fewer seats in the House than their total
number of votes would suggest. Bohn provides the example that a candidate in the
state of São Paulo needs around 280,000 votes in order to be elected, whereas a
candidate in Roraima will win a seat with only 21,000 votes (2006: 193).
15
The reader is reminded of the question of the election recommendation, which was made in the
second round of the 2010 presidential election. The Green Party (PV) could not agree and did not
make an official election recommendation for either José Serra (PSDB) or Dilma Roussef (PT).
Individual members did, however, provide recommendations and these were not identical.
16
See Samuels (2006) for discussion of the size of and distribution of seats within the House of
Representatives.
17
São Paulo is the only state with 70 seats.
As we have seen, the diverse mechanisms and rules of the Brazilian electoral
system lead to an over- or underrepresentation of the states and strongly influence
the parliamentary factions in the House of Representatives. Parties within electoral
coalitions have much higher chances of winning seats, without the problem of
reaching the electoral quota. The currently valid formula favors the largest party
within an electoral district and thus leads to an over-representation of the parties
that can gain the most votes in a sufficient number of states. Similarly, parties that
are successful in the north are favored by the system. In contrast the proportional
strength of parties that are successful in São Paulo (and to a lesser degree in Bahia)
does not reflect their actual strength. In this context, Samuels (2006: 139)
emphasizes that “disproportionality has long, historical roots in Brazil”18 and
asks whether the wish to remove disproportionality—even if it is “normatively
desirable”—is “practically possible”. The normative claim in this case refers to the
basic theoretical assumption that one vote ought not to weigh more than another.
However, Samuels (2006: 140) emphasizes that those States that are over-
represented are among the poorest and least-developed States in the country and
the under-representation of, for example, São Paulo is similar to a “political price”
that one is prepared to pay for functional reasons.
2.2 The Majority Voting System
In Brazil the leaders of the executive are elected according to two different rules:
the president, the governors and the mayors of local communities with more than
200,000 voters are elected in two rounds. A candidate must gain at least 50 % plus
one of the valid votes in the first round. If no candidate reaches this number of votes
then a second round of voting takes place, in which the two candidates who
received the most votes in the first round are pitched against each other. This
process guarantees that the elected representative is supported by at least 50 % of
the voters. In local communities with less than 200,000 voters the results are
determined according to a simple majority: the candidate with the most votes
wins the election, without a second round. The senate is made up of 81 members
(three representatives from each electoral district) who have a mandate of 8 years.
Elections to the senate are decided according to a simple majority and take place
every 4 years alternately: in the first election two representatives are replaced, in the
following election only one. In the elections for only one representative the voters
have one vote, when voting for two representatives they have two votes. These are
entered into the electronic ballot machine one after the other; there is no hierarchy
regarding the decision as to which candidate code is entered first. In this case the
two candidates with the most votes win.
18
According to Samuels, disproportionality has existed since the Empire and was
“institutionalized” in the 1891 Constitution, which provided that each state would receive a
minimum of four representatives.
In the period 1945–1964 the simple majority rule was also applied to presidential
elections and the period of office was 5 years. Elections to the vice-president,
however, were held separately. This is significant in so far as the two candidates
could belong to different camps, i.e. the president was naturally from the governing
side, but the vice president could be a member of the opposition. In three of the four
presidential elections the winning candidate gained less than the necessary 50 % of
all valid votes: Getúlio Vargas (PTB) was elected in 1950 with 47 %, Juscelino
Kubitscheck was elected in 1955 (through a PSD-PTB coalition) with only 34 % of
the votes and Jânio Quadros (PDC/UDN) only received 45 % of the valid votes in
1960. Only Eurico Dutra (PSD) in 1945 was able to reach an absolute majority, with
52 % of the votes. In view of these facts the simple majority rule was strongly
criticized, the criticism was dominated by doubts as to the legitimacy of the results.
Between 1950 and 1955 the centre-right party UDN campaigned strongly against
each president from other parties and political leanings, arguing that these had not
been elected by the absolute majority of the electorate.
With the return to democracy after 21 years of authoritarian rule (1964–1985)
the question of the electoral system’s design came back onto the agenda for political
reform. The 1988 Constitution finally opted for the absolute majority rule (with two
rounds of voting if necessary), a 5-year mandate and a ban on re-election. The
criticism and debate of the 1946–1964 period strongly motivated the members of
the Constituent Assembly to select the absolute majority rule.
Over the course of the 1990s two significant changes were made to the Consti-
tution that affected presidential elections. The first reduced the president’s mandate
to a period of 4 years (June 1990). This measure was intended to introduce a balance
between electoral results of the president’s party (or electoral coalition) and the
representation of the parties in the House of Representatives. It was marked by the
experience of two presidential elections in which presidents were elected who had
weak links to political parties (Jânio Quadros in 1960 and Fernando Collor in 1989)
and who, at the time, had very fragile support in the Congress. From this moment on
the elections to the Congress, the state governments and state chambers have taken
place simultaneously. The second change was with regard to the re-election of the
leaders of the executive (president, governors, and mayors). In June 1997 the
Cardoso government and the Congress adopted a change that permits such persons
to be re-elected for one further period of office. This allowed Cardoso and the
governors that were elected in 1994 the possibility of direct re-election in 1998.
In the six presidential elections since re-democratization a second round of
voting was necessary in four cases. In 1989 Collor (PRN) only won 31 % and
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) 17 % of the votes. In the second round Collor was
elected with 53 %. In 1994 and 1998 Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) was
elected in the first round with 54 % and 53 % of the valid votes, respectively. In the
2002 elections a second round was necessary. After Lula da Silva received 46 % of
the votes in the first round, he was elected president in the second round with 62 %.
At his re-election in 2006 the results were similar (48 % in the first round, 62 % in
the second). After two periods of office Lula da Silva could not run again for office
in the 2010 elections. These elections were distinguished by the fact that in the first
round of voting a third candidate, Marina Silva (PV) won ca. 19 % of the votes. In
this election a second round was also necessary between the candidates Dilma
Rousseff (PT) and José Serra (PSDB) who gained 47 % and 33 % of the votes in the
first round, respectively. In the second round of voting Rousseff won 56 % of the
votes and thus became the first female president of Brazil.
2.3 Electoral Reform Since 1988
Electoral reform represents a special dilemma for political science. Some would
argue that every reform, especially reforms concerning fundamental policy
questions, is unpredictable and that all processes of reform thus present a dilemma.
After all, at some point we want to be able to evaluate the reform process. What can
be considered large and small or good and bad when speaking of reform? What is
special about electoral reform and why do we immediately speak of a dilemma?
When Katz (2005: 73) asks the question, “Why are there so many (or so few)
electoral reforms?” he answers with three further questions that we ought to take
into consideration: first of all, why does electoral reform make it to the agenda,
when the agenda-setters were able to be elected according to the existing rules and
ought thus not to see any need to for reform? Secondly: When do reforms occur?
Thirdly: Of what do they consist? The second and third questions are in fact part of
every analysis of reform. The first question, however, highlights the complexity of
institutional reform: the probable existence of an elite pact between those who have
reached a position of power through the existing institutional framework (be it by
election or appointment). In other words: a person who was able to be elected
within a particular system should have little incentive to change the system, thus
possibly worsening their own position (Shugart, Moreno, & Fajardo, 2007). As we
have seen with the case of proportional representation, that which is normatively
desirable is not necessarily politically desired. It is possible for institutional rules to
have a quasi-constitutional position, usually requiring a qualified majority, which
can be defined differently in each individual case.19 In Brazil, for example, the
number of seats per state is written down in the Constitution. In the case of distorted
representation in the House of Representatives it would thus require a qualified
majority (3/5ths) to change the Constitution.
2.4 Reform Issues
There have been modifications to the Brazilian electoral systems, but they are few
in number and were rarely foreseeable. Melo (2006: 55) classifies Brazil (alongside
19
In Brazil the basic type of electoral system has been modified in the Constitution and requires a
qualified majority of 3/5ths. All other elements such as the open list and the counting procedure are
simple laws and can be changed with a simple majority.
Chile) as the country “in which the reform agenda has exhibited the most
difficulties in being carried out completely” (translation). There has always been
an academic debate that has gone hand in hand with the political debate, as well as a
considerable number of proposed legal and/or constitutional amendments (emenda
constitucional), but comprehensive reforms have not been forthcoming. Let us take
as an example the open list: criticism of the list and calls for reform are as old as the
list itself. The necessity of reform was already emphasized in the 1950s and 1960s.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso also criticized the list—even before his presidency—
as hostile to the parties; however during his two periods of office he did not pursue
any reform.
Electoral system reform is the last remaining part of a larger reform of the
political system (the so-called reforma polı́tica) that has been on the Brazilian
political agenda since the 1990s. The 1988 Constitution provided that the
cornerstones of the political system should be reviewed after they have been in
power for 5 years. After a 1993 referendum selected the presidential form of
government, electoral reform (in the broadest sense) still remained as an aspect of
the reforma polı́tica. Both in theory and practice the electoral system was identified
as the root of many—apparent—problems, and as a result complaints were made
regarding the electoral system (see i.a. Klein, 2007). Numerous recommendations
for reform have been made over the years, above all in order to improve or replace
the open list and the proportional system. Soares and Renno (2006: 12) emphasize
the fact that “in less than 10 years, between 1995 and the present, around 50 legal
amendments and 10 constitutional amendments have been proposed that
recommended changes to the electoral system, the party system and the regulation
of electoral campaigns” (translation). Essentially all the aspects of the electoral
system that have been analyzed in this article have already been the subjects of
reform proposals.
In order to simplify the reading of this article and the study of complex electoral
reform, in the following we will present a short list of reform proposals concerning
the four most important issues: the electoral system, open/closed lists, coalitions
and electoral campaigns.20 We will then examine the actors with regard to the
reforms. Using the example of the recent attempt at comprehensive reform in 2007
we will highlight the problems associated with such an attempt.
In Brazil the question of introducing an entirely “new” electoral system has
never gone out of fashion. One leitmotif has been the question of whether Brazil
might not be better off changing to a majority system (known in Brazil as voto
distrital) or to a mixed system (known as distrital-misto or sistema alemão,
i.e. German system).21 In 1995 the notion of a mixed system, drawing on the
German model, was already the subject of a constitutional amendment, the proposal
20
There are obviously further important points such as, for example, rules for the coherence of
electoral alliances (verticalização) and party discipline ( fidelidade partid
aria). See also Chap. 9.
21
Katz (2005: 74) actually speaks of “fashions” and describes the electoral system as a 1990s
fashion.
was, however, set aside after it had passed through numerous parliamentary
commissions. In 2007 it was renewed and again went through the parliamentary
process, until it was set aside again. In 2003 there was a further attempt at radical
reform. Until now, however, there have never been more than intentions. It is
notable that all of the proposals have come from members of parliament from
States that are affected by under-representation.
A further point on the agenda is the possible introduction of a national restrictive
clause, similar to the German 5 % hurdle [for debate regarding these proposals see
Melo (2006: 55), in particular footnote 28]. At the same time, however, the
abolition of the restrictive clause to make it compatible with a fundamental change
to the counting procedure is also being debated.
A further extremely important subject in the debate is the possible introduction
of a closed list. As we have seen above, this is primarily endorsed by supporters of
stronger party control. Just as with the above point no proposal has achieved a
majority and most have been set aside. Still, it usually pops up again when talking
about possible political reforms. These proceedings suggest the longevity of the
debate. Even though no reform has taken place, the subject remains topical. In
addition, it is clear that the proposed reforms stem from parties of a certain size, in
other words, from those parties who have greater chances of winning seats. The PT,
for example, is often defined as the major party with the strongest party structure.
As has already been made clear, the possibility of making coalitions before
elections is almost existential for smaller parties, or as Fleischer (2006: 143) puts it,
“the smaller the state faction, the higher this “hurdle” (note: the electoral quota)
becomes for the small parties”. As a result we can also assume that above all, the
large parties will be interested in removing this rule. It is therefore not surprising
that members of parliament and senators from the PSDB, PMDB and the PFL (now
Democratas, DEM) are campaigning for the removal of electoral coalitions.
Over the last years and over the course of the reforms to the electoral system the
debate surrounding the question of electoral campaigns has also been intensified.
Above all the question of public or private the financing and media presence of
campaigns stand out. Another issue is the high costs of Brazilian electoral
campaigns, usually financed by the private economic sector (banks, construction
conglomerates, public transport firms etc.).22 During the major June manifestations
in 2013 that brought millions of Brazilians throughout the country to the streets,
many have rooted for electoral reforms, especially more control of campaign
financing. But while we edit this article, no actual changes have been accomplished.
22
In the 2012 municipal elections for mayor, candidate and incumbent Eduardo Paes declared to
have spent R$21,208,741.10 on his campaign (http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/
estatisticas-eleicoes-2012, accessed 06.11.2013).
2.5 The Actors and the Major Reforms
The traditional actors within an electoral system are the members of the Congress,
the president, the parties and the electoral courts. Within the parliamentary system
commissions are generally founded in order to develop comprehensive plans for
reform. These have differing levels of influence depending on the kind of political
system. In countries where parliamentary factions still play a strong role, an MP
s vote is generally congruent with the party/faction consensus. In Brazil this is far
more complex and a factional vote is not the rule. Using the example of the Special
Commission on Political Reform (Comissão Especial de Reforma Polı́tica23) from
February 2003 and the proposed law it developed, PL 2.679/2003,24 which later
came to be voted on as PL 1210/07,25 it is possible to clearly understand the actor’s
roles and gain insight into the problems associated with attempts at major reform.
2.5.1 The Attempted Reform of 2007

PL 2.679/2003 was one of the largest and most extensive reform plans to date. In
fact, it is the only plan that has ever made it to a vote in Congress in this form. It
included, inter alia, the replacement of the open list with a closed list, which was
directly linked to the understanding that the core problem of the Brazilian system is
that of campaign financing. After this recommendation was adopted it went to the
Constitution and Justice Commission (CCJ), which made minor changes. The
proposal was then presented for a vote in the plenary assembly despite vehement
opposition from the parties PTB, PP and PL. In their discussion the overwhelming
majority of the members of parliament spoke in favor of public financing of
campaigns, however, the removal of the open list was met with fierce opposition:
why remove a system according to which they themselves had been elected?
Subsequently more than a dozen projects were suggested; in part they consisted
of system combinations that had never been seen anywhere else in the world. Above
all these were alternatives to the closed list. Finally a last attempt was made in the
form of an alternative proposed law, a so-called emenda aglumativa, which
included a flexible list (lista mista). This proposal was also rejected.26
The decision making process was interesting for several reasons. On the one
hand some parties did not vote as a block. The party with the most votes PDMB, for
example, was divided into two almost equal camps with regard to the issue of the
closed list. On the other hand, the votes did not correspond to established political
lines (right vs. left; government vs. opposition; large vs. small parties). Only the
MPs from the PT voted almost en bloc for the proposed system. The PSDB’s voting
23
It was chaired by the Member of Parliament for the state of Rio de Janeiro, Alexandre Cardoso
(PSB) and the speaker was Ronaldo Caiado (PFL) from Goiás, for which reason the proposal was
often called Lei Caiado (Caiado law).
24
http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/Prop_Detalhe.asp?id¼147024, accessed: 07/11/2013.
25
http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/Prop_Detalhe.asp?id¼353741, accessed: 07/11/2013.
26
See Nicolau (2007c) for an overview of the voting behavior of the parties.
behavior was surprising. Although the party has always advocated electoral reform
and above all a system similar to that in Germany, they voted against both
proposals. What should have become clear is the absence of a consensus for an
alternative electoral system. Although there is a great deal of unified criticism of the
open list, conceptions of what the alternative should look like differ considerably.
2.5.2 The Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff Administrations

In 2006 President Lula da Silva emphasized that he also saw the necessity of
electoral reform, however this occurred at a point in time when it was politically
opportune for him to do so. In August 2008 his government published a catalogue of
reforms which included recommendations for a closed list, exclusively public
campaign funding, party loyalty, passive voting rights, electoral coalitions and
the clausula de barreira. As we have already seen, in 2009 reforms were adopted
as a part of which Lula da Silva had employed his right to veto. At the same time,
however, his party’s (PT) official position was for the establishment of a constituent
assembly that would deal exclusively with questions of reforma polı́tica and thus
also with possible electoral reform.27 Alongside an understanding of the citizen as
sovereign and the basic assumption that the citizen ought also be able to make
decisions regarding institutions, there is a predominant conviction within the PT
that the members of congress will have no interest in changing the current rules, that
is, the rules that made it possible for them to be elected in the first place. In other
words, they do not believe that it will be possible to reach the necessary majority of
MP votes in favor of comprehensive reform. The discussion in Sect. 2.2 will no
doubt confirm this.
Current President Dilma Rousseff in June 2013 has seen herself confronted with
public outrage and manifestations. As a political answer she even considered the
possibility of a new Constituent Assembly that should carry out a decent political
and electoral reform. This, however, was immediately discarded by academics and
public representatives. Instead, Rousseff installed a new special commission within
the Chamber of Deputies. Under the presidency of Henrique Fontana (Rio Grande
do Sul) the commission made a series of reform proposals with regard to the
electoral system and the electoral code: the abortion of electoral coalitions in
proportional elections, the adoption of a flexible list for the elections to the
Chamber of Deputies and the introduction of exclusively public financing of
electoral campaigns. To this date, November 2013, none of these proposals has
been voted in the Chamber of Deputies. This means that the upcoming 2014 federal
and State elections will still be held under the current electoral rules.
2.5.3 Electoral Courts

Another important actor in the reform process is the Electoral Supreme Court. As
seen in 2009 (with the restrictions on internet campaigns, etc.) in many cases it
27
This position is the result of a consensus between the two strongest streams within the PT. See:
www.construindoumnovobrasil.com.br and www.mensagemaopartido.com.br
provokes a mobilization of the executive and the legislative in that it introduces

provisory rules that require a political decision in order to be adopted or abolished.
In 2007, for example, the TSE made a decision regarding the fidelidade partid aria,
a binding of party and mandate. This rule prohibited the extremely refined informal
practice in Brazil of switching parties (Desposato, 2006b; Stadler, 2008). The
outcry against this was so strong that the members of parliament acted quickly
and entered the reform process. The enormous discursive authority of the TSE is
undisputed, and it has doubtlessly nipped certain proposed reforms in the bud, while
also being the first to set others in motion.
3 Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to present the Brazilian electoral system and its main
components. It has been shown that this is a system of striking longevity, which has
survived several disparate political periods. Furthermore, we have attempted to
highlight its complexity and to address a number of open questions with regard to
the necessity of reform.
When attempting to explain why there has been little reform in Brazil, despite
the lively debate surrounding reform, many non-Brazilian colleagues note that the
Brazilian political system has an overall problem with reform [“bias against
change” Ames (2001), Boeckh (2003)]. However this is not the case. Our intention
was to demonstrate that although few reforms have actually been carried out in
comparison to the lively debate surrounding reform, when one considers the
complexity of the political system, and in particular of the electoral system, the
number of reforms might in fact not be so small. In other words, one ought not to
underestimate the value of the small reforms simply because the major reforms
have not been forthcoming. As is the case with every reform, the question must be
asked of whether absence of reform must be considered an inability to reform.
Perhaps the actors have adapted to the existing rules to such an extent that they do
not allow the theoretically possible effects of the institutional design to develop.
With this we do not wish to deny that the current system continually creates
extremes that question its effects. The transfer of votes can be considered such an
extreme, when candidates who have a number of votes far below the competition
win seats and other candidates, whose parties do not enter into an electoral coalition
for reasons of programmatic congruence, do not win a seat despite winning an
immense number of votes. The elections described above were, however, protest
votes (in particular Hernández and Tiririca)—and protest votes also exist in other
countries.
What ought to have become clear is that there is no notable difference between
the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administration and preceding administrations
with regard to institutional reform. The debate surrounding the necessity of com-
prehensive reform is as old as the system itself and extends throughout all political
camps. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva each had two periods of
office in which to tackle reform. Ultimately not much remains of Lula da Silva’s
boldly announced reform program. Curiously, in the context of the 2010 election he
announced that after the handing over the office of president he would concentrate
above all on promoting reforma polı́tica. When she entered office on 1 January,
2011 the new president, Dilma Rousseff, also announced reforms and during the
2013 manifestations she announced fast actions. However, no modifications were
made in time to change the rules for the 2014 elections. It remains to be seen how
this will develop and whether developments are at all possible.
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e Outros Paı́ses. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.
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no Brasil (pp. 142–146). Editora UFMG: Belo Horizonte.
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aberta e fechada. Rio de Janeiro: Mauad Editora.
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The Judiciary in Brazil
8
Leonardo Martins
Abstract
Leonardo Martins’ article on the judiciary follows the trend of institutional
reevaluation, and questions the longstanding assumption that the judiciary is
weak and merely subject to the power of the executive and legislative branches
of government. The article provides an overview of (i) the judiciary in the
context of division of powers; (ii) the organization and structure of the courts
of justice; and (iii) the reaction of the political system in response to the
Constitution. Contrary to the assumptions made by traditional Brazilian checks
and balances theorists, the judiciary is constantly acquiring more power and is
thereby gradually moving into the center of the constitutional competencies.
1 Introduction1
From a Constitutional Law doctrinal approach, pursuant to the October 5th 1988
Brazilian Constitution, the judiciary is competent to both mediate conflicts
concerning the application and interpretation of law [e.g. Brazilian Constitution,
Art. 102(III)] and to clarify the validity of certain rules [e.g. Brazilian Constitution,
Art. 97 and 102(I)(a)]. Therefore, the judiciary serves two functions: the application
of law to the case at hand, and the control of the constitutionality of the law to be
applied to the case.
From a constitutional theory perspective, the traditional constitutional role of the
court as one branch of three, which monitors the legality of the executive and
legislative powers, is basic to most modern constitutions, including that of Brazil’s
1
L. Martins (*)
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil
e-mail: leonardomartins@yahoo.de

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_8
122 L. Martins
1988 Constitution. However, this means that the judiciary is not superior, but rather
is equal and serves a “harmonizing” role (Brazilian Constitution, Art. 2).
From a constitutional political approach this hardly hides which constitutional
body is ultimately superior in the State, although members of the Supreme Federal
Court (STF) are still appointed under Art. 101 of the Brazilian Constitution by the
President. The Court has the final say in what the law is. According to the political
science Polity-dimension, the Court is a constitutional guardian. However, unlike
Germany, Brazil’s highest Court has not been clearly awarded the dignity of a
special constitutional status.2
This paper questions the widely shared and enduring assumption that the
Brazilian judiciary continues to be very weak and, along with the legislative
power, subject to the executive.3 Judicial power in Brazil is not in fact merely
symbolic. This paper seeks to outline the actual power relations in Brazil’s political
order to understand the Judiciary as the “third branch of state power”. The empirical
findings presented here are the base for the political science description of the
dimensions of politics and policies.
This paper thus presents a historically consolidated assessment of Brazil’s
various constitutions in history and at present. Is the current Brazilian constitution
merely symbolic, or does it develop normative power for the first time in Brazilian
constitutional history? Both concepts are described in more detail below. One refers
to the form of government (polity), while the other regards the implementation of a
specific content (politics) through a corresponding action plan (policy)—especially
under the administration of President Lula da Silva. Each should reach a certain
level of correspondence to the other if we are to say that the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution in fact has normative power. At both levels, numerous ambiguities,
which historically characterize the Brazilian rule of law4 complicate the task.
2 Overview of the Judiciary in the Pattern of the Separation

of Powers
An overview of the judiciary in the separation of powers model of government

cannot be accomplished without a doctrinal analysis of the relevant constitutional
provisions. In the following, the constitutional formation of the judicial organiza-
tion and structure will be dealt with first. A study of the reactions of the political
2
Among the extensive German Literature I mention only Benda and Klein (2001: 542 et seq.).
Amongst the persistent defenders of the status of the Constitutional Court as a constitutional body
see B€ockenf€orde (1999: 12 et seq.). Literature in Portuguese regarding the German discussion see
Martins (2005: 36–39, 2011: 1–7) or in Spanish Martins (2012b: 1–7).
3
The basic assumption in question is mainly held by defenders of a strong Supreme Court in
relation to the Legislative, due to skeptical feelings towards representative democracy. See
Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and in their chapter in this book.
4
A precise and at the same time relatively broad and in-depth analysis is provided by
Neves (1992).
8 The Judiciary in Brazil 123
system on the constitutional text follows, emphasizing the identification of the main
political actors. Finally, the main conflict constellations and reform efforts are
discussed.
2.1 Judicial Organization and Structure
Since the first Republican Constitution of 1891, the Brazilian constitutional legis-
lator followed the U.S. model, establishing two separate legislative levels: federal
and provincial. Each trial, that either directly or indirectly is relevant to the
Federation, shall be determined by a federal district court judge. The federal trial
court has one judge (not a panel) who is at the start of their career.
Article 92 of the Brazilian Constitution happens to correspond almost exactly to
the German Basic Law’s (Grundgesetz) Article 92 and provides that judicial
functions shall be exercised by judges. However, Brazilian Constitution’s Art.
92 provides only a list of legal structures established by the Constitution. The
somewhat laconic Brazilian Constitution’s Art. 2, provides that the three branches
of Government shall relate “harmoniously with each other and independently from
each other”. The significance and relationship of the provisions “harmonious” and
“independent” is not concretized in further details in Art. 92 et seq. of such
Constitution.
In this respect, a clear and functional judicial prescription like the German Basic
Law Art. 975 is absent from Brazil’s constitution. Brazilian Constitution’s Art.
93 et seq. does not fill gap in the law because Art. 93 et seq. only ensures judgeship
“principles” and prerogatives. These have the characteristics of guarantees in the
public administration, not to be found in a constitution, though their real purpose is
to establish the relation between jurisdiction and other public authorities, as in Arts.
97 and 100 of the Constitution. Although Art. 5 (XXXV) of the Brazilian Consti-
tution establishes guarantees of legal protection as a constitutional right, there is no
explicit allocation of judicial power to judges.
The judicial system consists of a Constitutional Court and four Federal Superior
Courts (Superior Tribunal de Justiça, STJ; Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, TST;
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE and Superior Tribunal Militar, STM), nine
Regional Federal Courts (Tribunal Regional Federal-TRF) with the corresponding
Federal Judges, 27 Higher State Courts (Tribunais da Justiça) and the
corresponding Local Courts. Other important aspects of the Brazilian Constitution
(Art. 106 et seq.) regarding the creation of the federal judiciary, refer to the
appointment of judges (Art. 107 Brazilian Constitution) and their jurisdiction
(Art. 108 Brazilian Constitution—Regional Federal Courts; Art. 109 Federal
Judges). Art. 125 of the Brazilian Constitution defines the judiciary at the state
level and the legislative competences of the states. These two blocks of rules build
5
Art. 97(I) of the German Basic law: “Die Richter sind unabhängig und nur dem Gesetze
unterworfen” (Translation: The Judges are independent and subject only to the Law).
124 L. Martins
Supreme
Federal
Court
(STF)
Superior Superior Superior Superior

Federal Labour Electoral Military
Court Court Court Court
(STJ) (TST) (TSE) (STM)
27 Higher 9 Regional 24 Regional

State Federal Regional Electoral Military
Courts Court Labour Courts Courts
(TJ) (TRF) Courts (TRE)
Regional Federal Labour Electoral Military

District District Court District District
Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge
Fig. 8.1 Illustration of the court structure in Brazil. Author’s representation based on Oliveira
(2009)
up the ordinary jurisdiction following the same structure (federal level and state
level) compared to the United States depending on the legal subjects. Brazilian
Constitution’s Art. 111 et seq., 118 et seq. and 122 et seq. define the composition,
organization and competence of the above-mentioned superior courts, which have a
special jurisdiction (TST, TSE, STM) and their regional and local courts. Figure 8.1
illustrates the court structure.
The relationship between ordinary federal and state courts in Brazil is therefore
not comparable to that in Germany. In Brazil, federal and provincial courts have
explicitly divided responsibilities. Thus, there are no two legal levels, which could
take legal action concurrently or in succession. Rather, Federal and Provincial
courts serve different separate functions. There is no entity in Brazil that is
comparable to the German judicial organization6; there is no uniform system for
determining judge’s qualifications to hold office. The qualification for judicial
office is subject to two completely different state law examinations (federal and
provincial). Careers, salaries, etc. of federal and provincial judges are also signifi-
cantly different from each other. The internal court organization is determined by
6
Specific proceedings are usually initiated at the provincial court, which may later be appealed to
the federal judiciary that acts as guardian of the federal law. In this respect, Brazil remained true to
the spirit of the U.S. federal constitution of 1789.
the institutional law of the judgeship, which however, offers only a rough frame-
work with general guidelines.7
Considered in detail, courts are organized according to their own procedural
rules, which feature a clear democratic deficit. Taking into account the Supreme
Federal Court’s (STF) procedural rules, an excess of matters to be regulated cannot
be overlooked. Accordingly, for example, Arts. 179–187 enable the Attorney
General to demand the Court to follow a particular interpretation of federal or
state law and also of subordinate legal acts, which so far has not been provided for
in that particular form by legislators. Comparing the scope of procedural rules with
other continental European ones, like that of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, it becomes clear that it regulates too many types of proceedings. The STF’s
procedural rules present a kind of summary or consolidation of all legislation on the
organization and responsibilities of the Court. The constant reference to the
Brazilian Constitution and several federal laws demonstrate that. Additionally, in
case of conflict between procedural rules and ordinary legislation or the Consti-
tution, the latter shall withdraw first; this goes back to the simple hierarchy rule. In
this respect procedural rules do not represent a serious intrusion on the sovereignty
of the Parliament and the associated principles of democracy and separation of
powers. Nevertheless, these procedural rules contain 369 articles, including the
so-called regulation amendments (emendas regimentais). The STF’s competence to
amend gives it the power to change the original version of the procedural rules,
which along with its changes and complements, constitute a 338-page thick regu-
latory framework which gives STF the status of master of its own procedure.8
Still at the normative level, the role of the so-called “essential functions of
Justice” should not be disregarded. “Essential functions” mean state authorities
such as state and federal prosecutors and private lawyer are responsible for the
inducement of court decisions. The former is awarded a special status: not only are
they responsible for criminal prosecution, but convey, being independent from the
executive, the highly touted, so-called collective and diffuse interest9 in Brazil,
especially with respect to private companies and state authorities. Collective and
diffuse interests, goods and meanwhile also rights are understood as environmental
and consumer protection regulations.10
7
In addition, the organic law is pre-constitutional (dating from 1979) and in many respects
obsolete, since it did not adapt to the terminology of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
8
The term “master of its own procedure” refers to the role and importance of the German Federal
Constitutional Court, i.e. a cross-cultural constitutional influence. See critically: Hillgruber and
Goos (2004: 5 et seq.) and Schlaich and Korioth (2004: 23). See also Martins (2005: 35 et seq.) and
Martins (2012b: 1 et seq.).
9
See the monographic presentation of Yoshida in 2006.
10
On the special role of the federal and state prosecutors, see Tavares (2010: 1350 et seq.).
126 L. Martins
2.2 The Actors and the Normative Power of the Politics
A careful reading of Art. 92 et seq. of the Brazilian Constitution, taking into account
their respective constitutional historical backgrounds, shows that each ensemble of
judicial organs, especially those of the federation, follows the logic of the Brazilian
patrimonial state. The constitutional text allows and favors the division of the
organization of the state (critical comments, see Adorno, 1988), e.g., appellate
courts guarantee lawyer participation on the bench by means of quota system. Thus,
the nine regional federal tribunals are not filled only with professional judges, but
also by lawyers and prosecutors according to this quota: One fifth of the jobs of each
regional federal court shall, according to Art. 107(I) of the Brazilian Constitution,
be filled with “lawyers with more than 10 years of proven and continuous working
experience” and with “members of the federal prosecution service with more than
10 years of proven career”. In the highest state courts (TJ) and the upper judicial
organs of the federation (STJ, TST, TSE, STM) one may likewise find such quotas.
This quota system shows that for the constitution maker it was less important
providing the judiciary with clear and limited competence/jurisdiction, than to
make it work as the stronghold of the civil service.11 With such a constitutional
framework, it is easier to use the judicial office as a springboard for political career
or vice versa.12 In this context, the Constitution loses considerable normative power
and is in danger of becoming at best a symbolic Constitution.13 As Konrad Hesse
(1959) has stated in a clear and concise manner, the normative vacuum is filled by
political power. Thereby, the community, the country, becomes subject to the
normative power of the political and is no longer governed by normative power
of ordinary law or even the constitution. In this context, the role of an actor is not to
be overlooked, who is actually not part of the judiciary. As mentioned above, the
public prosecution office in Brazil holds competences that go far beyond the
traditional criminal justice system, which is the authorization of criminal indict-
ment. The prosecutor is completely independent of the administration. The
prosecutors’ offices are organized according to the structure of the judicial system,
both in the case of the provincial prosecutor and in the case of federal prosecutors.
The prosecutor is responsible for the legal enforcement of so-called “collective and
diffuse interests”, now referred to as “rights”.14 Thereby, they contribute to the
cause of legal controls of various matters, focusing originally and mainly on
11
See also Adorno (1988), who has shown in this historically grounded legal-sociological treatise
“Aprendizes do Poder” (in English: apprentices of power) that the young lawyers, who came from
rich families, were more concerned with holding judgeships after their graduation, than going
anywhere else to the state administration of private advocacy.
12
Examples are not missing for this purpose. Finally, one could refer to the multiple ministry
participations of Nelson Jobim, retired STF’s President.
13
The concept of a symbolic character of a constitution dates back to the treaties of the Brazilian
legal scholar and system theorist Marcelo Neves. Reference is also made to Neves (1998).
14
The special literature of diffuse and collective interests gets out of hand and has already become
a legal discipline. See, inter alia, Yoshida (2006).
environmental and consumer protection. However, the federal prosecutor works

more and more on areas that cannot be attributed to the so-called diffuse and
collective interests. Recently, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) was pushed to
decide on an extraordinary appeal (also in third instance) of the federal prosecutor’s
office, which placed a public civil action in original proceedings before a federal
magistrate (critical comments, see Martins, 2009: 207 et seq.). The accepted motion
pursued the goal to declare a pre-constitutional norm, which calls for a diploma as
prerequisite for the exercise of journalistic careers, as no longer applicable. The
decision of the individual federal magistrate should bind all judges of the Federal
Republic. However, neither the fundamental rights of freedom of occupation nor,
more specifically, the press and media freedoms, can be considered diffuse or
collective, nor is the use of a “public civil action”15 appropriate for a judicial
review despite the complexity of the Brazilian system of judicial review (Martins,
2008: 247 et seq.). This misapplication of the public civil action was not objected
by the rapporteur and the President of the STF in the respective decision—in part
they even welcomed it (Martins, 2009: 208, 228).
The Public Prosecutor, after the enacting of the Brazilian Constitution, received
competences, which in many western countries, like Germany, are entrusted to
federal and state ministries and the administration. In contrast to the direct Public
Administration, its supervisory role in both public and private sectors is detached of
any hierarchy, with the result that a relatively small organ such as a single Public
Prosecutor might invoke the Judiciary to control even legislation itself. Thus,
legislation is weakened in favor of aggrandizing jurisdictional state.16 The above-
mentioned further actors, who represent the essential functions of the judiciary, do
not have nearly the same power of impact to the judiciary or the high political
prestige as the public prosecutor’s office. Apart from the similarly equipped federal
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the public as well as the private advocacy are generally
quite subordinated. Regarding the latter, this can already be demonstrated by
comparing salaries. Apart from the manageable circle of successful private prac-
tice, private attorneys earn on average ten times less than judges and public
prosecutors and often also less than a bank employee.
15
In addition to this type of action, popular action enables each Brazilian citizen a similar
possibility to review the judiciary state (incl. legislation) and personal documents which refer to
diffuse and collective rights. One could see this as a special contribution to the realization of
participatory democracy, thereby overlooking the weakening of representative democracy. In
Germany, the popular action that dates back to Roman Law is permitted—with good reasons—
only in exceptional cases. The problem of establishing a popular act is based on the current abstract
rule, adopted by the Parliament, that a single citizen, who does not have to be affected himself,
currently and directly in this basic rights (main admission requirement of the German constitu-
tional complaint), can be called into question. There is a danger that the validity of a norm is made
subject of a general dispute process, which hides private interest. The purpose of the standard
testing shall remain the preservation of the constitutional law—and thus of their internal
consistency.
16
On Brazilian literature on the critique of a jurisdictional state see Vieira (2008: 452 et seq.).
128 L. Martins
2.2.1 Conflicts of Interest and Reform Paths

Even inevitable conflicts of interest that are not restrained by law (in the sense of the
above identified political normative power) demand a reform of the rules of the
game. It is not a question of creating a framework for important court decisions on
highly charged political issues, such as the constitutional standard tests (advisory
opinions).17 The enforcement procedure should be conducted in connection or as a
closure of the contentious proceeding in the same files and not conducted apart.18
Many did not want to touch judicial organizations. The logic was as follows:
Personnel questions should preferably not be questioned, as this would not fit
Brazil’s patrimonial image. The implementation of the goal to relieve the courts
should preferably not change power relations. Even the basic division of powers
between provincial and federal jurisdiction should not be subject to debate.19 The
federal government, according to the valid court structure, should be well protected
from the federal courts’ jurisdiction, which and per the patrimonial logic should
remain so in the future. This also corresponds to the weak federalism and histori-
cally heavily influenced centralism in Brazil (see D’Ávila, 1995). Similarly, the
need to establish an administrative jurisdiction was not seriously considered, as far
as can be seen. The mere existence of a so-called “required inspection” by the
immediate Higher Court, whenever a government interest is at stake, and even if the
law is clearly in favor of the citizen,20 shows how equality of conflicting parties is
addressed. However, this inequality between federal Union and citizens can take a
completely different scale dimension if significant economic interests are at stake:
unfortunately, miscarriage of justice and judicial corruption and injustice are
frequent facts in Brazil.21 The many scandals that have come to light since the
17
The constitutional process in Brazil is not, in contrast to the German one, subject to an objective
method. It instead enfolds as a typical subjective and contentious process in which the state
authorities and civil society organizations, which are interested in specific results of the standard
testing, shall or can defend the constitutionality of the disputed norm. Thus, it is not about the
objective clarification of doubts as to the constitutionality of the disputed norms—as provided in
German Constitution’s Art. 93(I) (2), and (2a) combined reflected in the Brazilian Constitution’s.
See Martins (2008: 247, 249 et seq., 258 et seq.).
18
This demand entered the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure in 2006 through the amendment
Law 11.382.
19
The subject was not even mentioned, even though the abolition of the legal profession of the
federal judge (a popular post amongst young lawyers) was a potential consequence. The job of a
federal lawyer is strictly distinguished from that of a regional judge. There is no state examination
in Brazil, but so-called “civil service exams” (Concursos Públicos). These exams to become a
federal judge have nothing to do with the Concurso to become a regional judge and the former can
earn three times more than the latter.
20
Art. 475(I) of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure determines, inter alia, that first instance
decisions against the Federation or a state can exert their effects only after their confirmation by
the immediate higher instance. This means that the confirmation by the higher instance represents
the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) to their validity.
21
See the periodically published reports of the National Council of Justice (CNJ): http://www.cnj.
jus.br/images/stories/docs_corregedoria/relatorios/relatorio_final_2005_2007.pdf (Accessed:
17/05/2010).
1990s, which rendered Brazilian population a little tired and dangerously insensi-
tive to the topic, confirm this finding.22 Despite the unpleasant findings, which are
deeply rooted in Brazilian history, the political leaderships, both government and
opposition, had to find a minimal consensus, to compete in the global economy if
one wants to seriously play the role of global players without any embarrassments.
It is, therefore, not surprising that for some time next to the actual legal reforms,
efforts were made to curb corruption which focused mainly on the revision of
procedural laws by means of specific amendments of constitutional foundations.23
2.2.2 The Development of the Judiciary Under President Lula’s

Government
President Lula’s “popular” government reaches its last year as the most successful
government regarding communication strategies and political marketing. This fact
makes the identification and analysis of a clear political program a complicated
matter. As a first step it is necessary to differentiate the apparent from the real.
During the electoral debate, no hints were given regarding the reform of the
judicial power. Nevertheless, one public statement Lula made at the beginning of
his presidency was a polemic one: During a congress in Vitoria, the capital of the
State of Espı́rito Santo, Lula commented on how to deal with organized crime and
described the judicial power as a “black box”. Lula said the judiciary (for the
President, a self-contained society) is a state authority that feels often untouchable.
He emphasized the need for this institution to open up towards society.24
The repercussion of this statement was the fear of a direct intervention from the
executive power in the judicial power. Nevertheless, this fear has proven to be
exaggerated. In this context, panic reached its peak in June 2003, as conflicts arose
between Lula and the new President of the Constitutional Court, Maurı́cio Correia.
Even Brazilian Harvard-professor Mangabeira Unger took position in this conflict,
demanding that the executive should open its own black box first.25
Lula and Correia resolved their differences in the meantime and the almost
institutional crisis between executive and judicial power was off the agenda in the
second year of his presidency. Regardless of the way the President chose to address
this issue, the need to reform the judicial power became evident. This institution
22
The former President of Brazil’s most important Regional Labor Court of São Paulo, the
TRT-SP, was, for example, sentenced because of defalcation during the construction of an
imposing tower, which was meant to house the new headquarters of the Regional Labor Court.
The new seat was known in public as the skyscraper of the judge “Lalau” (Nicolau dos Santos
Neto). A very concise but precise statement of the case can be found on the following link: http://
pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolau_dos_Santos_Neto (Accessed: 17/06/2013).
23
Worth mentioning are recent initiatives of the Ministry of Justice, which aim to catalyze social
calls against the structural corruption (focal point is the fight against “money laundering”), and the
proposed legislation (supported by 1.3 million people) which in the future will only allow those
candidates to the campaign, who do not show any conviction in the second instance.
24
Folha de S. Paulo, 23/04/2003: “Lula critica ‘caixa-preta’ do Judiciário e defende controle”.
25
See www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/unger/portuguese/docs/uol10.doc (Accessed: 18/11/2013).
130 L. Martins
was facing too many problems and consequently, necessary changes were intro-
duced during Lula’s presidency through a comprehensive reform of the
constitution.
In the following, we will deal with the agenda of the first year of Lula’s
presidency in order to later clarify the development of the most important consti-
tutional amendment bill.
3 Lula’s Political Agenda for the Judiciary
According to the President’s infamous saying, the judiciary is a black box, which
needs to be opened. Accordingly, the Senate Judiciary Committee worked in
cooperation with the Ministry of Justice on a constitutional amendment bill,
which existed since 1992 in various versions in the Parliament. The lengthy
legislative procedure should now be brought to a successful conclusion and bring
about the desired long-touted reform of the judiciary.
Prior to the appreciation of the objectives of the Constitutional Amendment Bill
that was to be adopted and the means to achieve it, it is worth to briefly critically
deal with the motives of the reform in view of Lula’s visible agenda for the
judiciary. The condensed and very provocative sentence expressed the position of
the new powers. It can also be interpreted as a purely disproportionate response to
the legitimate expectation, particularly in regards to the poor access to justice. But it
can also be interpreted as a showdown and an attempt of intimidation by the new
government. It is a fact that it would be difficult for the opponents of the reform to
prevent it, in the wake of substantial democratic legitimacy of the new government.
According to newspaper reports, Lula’s Minister of Justice, the famous criminal
lawyer and human rights defender Márcio Thomaz Bastos, rejected working with
the draft in the Parliament, but wanted to start anew. In February 2003, he created
the department of “modernization of the administration of Justice” with a direct link
to his cabinet.26
The new Minister of Justice Bastos let the public know very clearly that the
government’s priority was the reform of the judiciary. The reform should be
followed by further painful steps, especially for officialdom, such as the reform
of social welfare, i.e. particularly the pension rights and duties of state employees.
Beyond the aggressive attack of broad sections of the judiciary, the consti-
tutional permissible objectives of the reform remained somewhat vague. However,
a three-pillar-system can be identified. Curbing corruption in the judiciary (includ-
ing opposing nepotism), improving the guarantees of prompt (and not indefinitely
postponed) court decisions, and democratization of access to courts, including the
guarantee of equitable access. These three pillars summarize the desired goals
brought to the public’s attention.
26
The commitment of the Ministry of Justice presents itself notably strong: today there is a
permanent department called “reform of the judiciary”, which features a programmatic objective.
The demand for external control gradually declined. It has always been the issue
that disturbed judges the most, as shown by an advisory opinion sought by a federal
judge before the STF. The simultaneous strengthening of some aspects of STF
intervention and weakening of others were seen as a necessary and proper means to
the ambitious end of the reform. An external control of the court, is considered to be
questionable due to the principle of separation of powers, and thus was not deemed
necessary.
The government and its rather weak opposition agreed that the STF could stem
the avalanche of proceedings with the aid of a National Council of Justice and
simultaneously would be placed in a position to effectively combat corruption
within the judiciary. We now turn to considering how well these ambitious goals
were met in practice.
3.1 The Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 45 of December

2004: How successful Is the So-Called “Reform of the Judicial
System” De facto?
As noted above, the constitutional Amendment Act No. 45, released on December
30th, 2004, was mainly adopted to reform the highly complex legal proceedings in
favor of safeguarding the functional capacity of the courts. The first visible goal
implies—in accordance with long-standing demands from vast parts of the legal
community—a streamlining of the judicial process. The second goal, which is more
important from the perspective of the government, implies an institutionalization of
external control, which is viewed with skepticism and fear by judges. The external
control was quickly reinterpreted in internal control, as will be shown below.
3.1.1 Reform of Proceedings?

In general, the reform should reduce the unreasonably long duration of proceedings.
Means for this end include restructuring the organization of the judiciary as well as
modifying the procedural rules of trial.
Thus, constitutional Amendment No. 45 of December 2004 changed some
amendments to procedural acts, like the Code on Civil Procedure, which cancelled
or altered types of proceedings and tightened the conditions of admissibility of
appeals. However, the empirical impact of these measures is not yet fully
apparent.27
The problems and shortcomings of the attempt to reform are not at the level of
the so-called trial courts, but on the level of the legal instances, i.e. those instances
that decide on complaints and appeals to constitutional control. Particularly,
27
Nonetheless, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) strives towards ambitious goals that have
been announced in television extensively over the past few months. Afterwards, the processes
older than 5 years need to be settled quickly. Whether the quality of final judicial decisions can be
assured, is highly questionable.
132 L. Martins
problems concerning the complicated field of constitutional compliance (confor-

mity of law and the constitution) before the Supreme Federal Court (STF) are most
problematic.28 To this end, constitutional amendment No. 45 introduced a number
of innovations that, depending on their use, can contribute to further complexities.
This primarily includes the introduction of binding precedent of the STF [Art. 103
(A)] and the legal obligation to state reasons for the decisions (Art. 102 } 2).
Before addressing all the various problems with these innovations, a brief
explanation of the concept of “objective constitutional process” shall be given.
An “objective” constitutional process is characterized as not settling a dispute as
such, but makes the objective clarification on the validity of a rule to the subject of
the proceedings (see Martins, 2008: 249 et seq.). The interpretation of the consti-
tutional process, according to which it is gradually being concretized, is welcomed
by specialist literature, but often misunderstood in the sense that an objective
proceeding is (wrongly) identified with an abstract one (see for example Tavares,
2010: 305). The “objective” constitutional procedure is the opposite of litigation. It
is not a concrete procedure caused in a current case or controversy: rather, the
decision is an (legally binding, but concretely inoperative) advisory opinion. The
constitutional process in Brazil is clearly an adversarial one. This can be seen from
various constitutional requirements, such as the list of persons entitled to file one of
the four procedures of abstract norm control in Brazilian Constitution’s Art. 103.
Moreover, it should also be noted that the remaining and increased over-complexity
of the abstract (advisory) and concrete (operative) norm control proceedings, which
are only mentioned but not further specified, has led to an “own goal”, a self-
inflicted defeat, as to the objective of simplification.29
The first mentioned innovation is the establishment of a “binding decision” with
Brazilian Constitution’s Art. 103(A) through which repeated decisions equally
interpreted by STF enable it to edit a normative text that binds hierarchically
inferior instances. Direct and indirect administration as a whole and all the other
courts nationwide are bound. After all, a constitutional question is the basis, which
causes doubts as to the validity or interpretation of a rule. The STF decides whether
a law is constitutional both abstractly and concretely.30 Regarding interpretation
and given binding force, the adoption of such legally obligatory principles can, in
28
The criticism is based on the fact that the norm control system in Brazil loses its “nature” as a
system in which the individual elements are in mutual references to each other due to so many
unnecessary and improper complexities.
29
A norm control proceeding can be accomplished in many different and sometimes contradictory
ways. There is the abstract mode, in which the question of the validity of a norm, without reason
for a concrete case, is the subject. The state bodies and private organizations, enumerated in Art.
103 of the Brazilian Constitution have five different types of lawsuits. By one of them one can even
apply for the confirmation of the constitutionality of a norm, although, in comparative law
perspective, each law disposes of the presumption of validity. In addition, there are other types
of lawsuits of the concrete mode and the judicial incidental control (in Brazil, each judge has a
competence to dismiss a norm) as well as the mixed forms of popular action and public civil action
(See Martins, 2008: 258 et seq.)
30
See footnote 30.
the medium and long-term completely bypass the legislature and its democratic
legitimacy leading to the adoption of universal rules (whether for good or ill). The
problem was already recognized in Germany (see Benda & Klein, 2001: 531 et seq.,
with further references Martins, 2005: 113). The establishment of a single, admis-
sible interpretation of a constitutionally questionable norm is in fact like legislation,
but deprives the legislature the chance to improve the legal situation, e.g. via
ordinary legislation because of the constitutional interpretation of the court. Many
of the binding guiding principles adopted by the court since 2005 sound and operate
like legal regulations with general application—and no real relation to the case
which was at bar.31
If one investigates the innovations, we see further questionable future develop-
ments become apparently additional beyond subversion of the legislature. There are
three common denominators of the problems:
1. The use of binding guiding principles will not solve the problem of the
overburdened STF docket. Like any rule, binding guiding principles are open
to interpretation. Conflicts among binding guiding principles are possible. Any
of the organs entitled to seek a binding advisory opinion (abstract judicial
review) may also seek to invoke that remedy with respect to a binding decision
(Brazilian Constitution’s Art. 103-A } 2). Moreover, the STF can also ex-officio
modify the text of such abstract i.e. advisory opinions of constitutionality. This
broadens the competence of the STF greatly (jurisdiction to adjudicate) placing
the STF in the position of lawgiver not merely as to decisions ex-post, but also as
to ordinary legislation and even constitutional amendment ex ante (and poten-
tially violates the principle of separation of powers).32
2. The binding guiding principles may consequently contribute to greater legal
uncertainty instead of legal certainty—frustrating the intended purpose by their
creators. It would be better, as already indicated, to explain a rule in the
appropriate method to be unconstitutional and therefore void.
3. And finally, it can be stated that an even greater expansion of the jurisdictional or
judicial state will be facilitated results, which increasingly becomes a serious
threat to the democratic orientation of the Brazilian political system. This is also
supported by Brazilian Constitution’s Art. 103(A) since it provides that the
31
The binding guiding principle says: “E´ ilı́cita a prisão civil de deposit ario infiel, qualquer que
seja a modalidade do dep osito” (the civil liability of the unfaithful trustee is illegal, no matter what
type of fiduciary act it is).
32
The last President, Gilmar Mendes, who received his doctorate in Germany, tries to defend in
specialized literature the thesis that, for example, Art. 52(X) of the Brazilian Constitution, which
allocates the Federal Senate the competence of repeal of validity of norms that were declared
unconstitutional by the STF in a particular dispute, experienced a “constitutional mutation”.
Accordingly, in Art. 52(X) the clearly regulated force of repeal may occur only of the decision
of the STF. An amendment of Art. 52(X) of the Brazilian Constitution would be welcomed, but it
requires a clear reformation of the norm control system in Brazil and not judicial decisionism.
134 L. Martins
removal or alteration of a binding guiding principle can be carried out as

ex-officio.
The second innovation is the introduction of a requirement for the appellant to

demonstrate legal grounds in the case of an extraordinary appeal (Brazilian
Constitution’s Art. 102 } 2). Contrary to the accepted legal maxims “jura novit
curia” (the court knows the law) and “da mihi factum dabo tibi jus” (“give me the
facts and I shall give you the law”), the appellant is compelled to show the general
importance of the constitutional questions raised in the specific case. The intention
is to oblige the appellant to give explicit legal grounds for the extraordinary appeal.
The problem of this approach is that the legal grounds are not the relevant aspects
when dealing with the general importance of a constitutional question. How could a
real constitutional question develop no general meaning? That meaning is—con-
sistent with specialized publications—linked to the alleged economic, social, poli-
tical and legal relevance of the constitutional issue (see Tavares, 2010: 371 et seq.).
These four characteristics do not represent adequate criteria to differentiate
between issues that address the general importance of the constitutional questions
raised and those that do not. The idea was to give the constitutional court criteria to
sort out extraordinary appeals that do not raise constitutional questions (E.g. the
STF had to rule on a dispute between neighbors on the property of chickens). While
obviating spurious claims, the other object was not to give the STF complete
freedom to choose which cases it might review but to not concede the court the
freedom to decide upon which cases are relevant (unlike the US Supreme Court).
The requirement for the appellant to demonstrate the legal ground basis of their
complaint determines which cases the STF will determine on, is consequently an
instrument for the STF to decide on what cases to rule, in spite of the rule that
requires 8 of the 11 judges of the constitutional court to reject the general impor-
tance of the constitutional question raised in a specific case (Brazilian
Constitution’s Art. 102, } 2).
This analysis is the answer to the questions raised in the heading: The reform of
the process through the constitutional Amendment Law No. 45 was only partial:
changes were too cautious regarding the trial instances. This was compensated for
by the changes in the normative control system of judicial review and the significant
expansion of the margin of appreciation for determining the admissibility of a case
(certiorari) decision taking of the constitutional court. However, there is no evi-
dence that these aspects are linked in any way to the original intention of the
lawmakers, which passed the law for the constitutional amendment.
3.1.2 The Current Major Players: The Supreme Federal Court (STF)
and the National Council of Justice (CNJ)
The expansive power of the STF’s great position of power after the constitutional
amendment does not demand further details. It is clearly and abundantly discussed
in specialized literature, sometimes welcoming, but more often viewed critically
(Vieira, 2008: 441). However, the STF’s peak position is not so obvious anymore,
as its name suggests. Now, there is a second head on the body of the Brazilian
judicial system, which was introduced as response to the social aspirations for
external control by the constitutional Amendment Bill No. 45, the National Council
of Justice (Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ). The latter is composed of
15 members pursuant to Art. 103(B) of the Brazilian Constitution:
• The President of the STF, who is also the President of the Council under Art.
103 } 1 of the Brazilian Constitution33
• A judge of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), proposed by the same court
• A judge of the Superior Labor Court (TST), proposed by the same court
• A judge of the Provincial State Court (second instance), proposed by the STF
• A provincial district judge (first instance), proposed by the STF
• A judge of a Regional Federal Court (second instance), proposed by the Higher
Court of Justice (STJ)
• A federal magistrate (first instance), proposed by the Superior Court of Justice
(STJ)
• A judge of a Regional Labor Court (second instance), proposed by the Superior
Labor Court (TST)
• A Labor Court judge (first instance), proposed by the Superior Labor Court
(TST)
• A member of the Federal Prosecution Office, proposed by the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Republic
• A member of the State Prosecutor Office, proposed by the Chief State Prosecutor
of the Republic after a prepared list of indications of each state institution
• Two lawyers, proposed by the Federal Council of Lawyers (Conselho Federal
da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, OAB)
• Two citizens, who have remarkable legal knowledge and an impeccable repu-
tation, proposed respectively by the Chamber of Deputies (representatives of the
people) and the Senate (representatives of the states, even if elected directly by
the people)
Except for the CNJ’s President all other members are appointed by the President
after the approval of the absolute majority of the Federal Senate (Art. 103(b), }}
1, 2). Art. 103(B), } 4 of the Brazilian Constitution lists the responsibilities of the
CNJ according to the following preamble: It is for the Council to determine the
control of the administrative and financial activities of the judicial power and the
fulfillment of the functional requirements of the judges. Right from the beginning,
CNJ fought for its general acceptance, despite the skepticism of the Brazilian
people. The CNJ’s self-presentation in the internet shows its search for legitimacy,
especially in the presentation of numerous reports, statistics, didactic information
and legislative materials that can be found at their website.34 From the desired
external control little is left, considering the fact that only four out of 15 members
33
This “President identity” was introduced by the Amendment Act No. 61 in 2009.
34
http://www.cnj.jus.br
136 L. Martins
are not judges themselves. However, the self-control seems to be well received in
the legal community and—if still permitted by the scarce data—in the general
public.
The CNJ thus helps the federal government achieve the third objective of
“democratization” (above-mentioned third pillar of their agenda) in the sense of
equal access (closer to the entire social welfare program of Lula’s government than
the other two), by introducing, among other things, a kind of mobile justice that
brings the judiciary into the furthest reaches of the federal territory. Whether this
will become an inclusive state policy after the retirement of the current government
or how many other well-meant institutions soon will fade is to be seen. At the
interface between self and external control—defense against interference by the
executive power and executor of a party political agenda—sooner or later the CJN
yet needs to prove itself in case of a possible change of government.
Serious frictions between these two new institutions could not be identified so
far. In the future, this cannot be excluded, but it is rather unlikely. The judge’s
perception of the benefits of CNJ is, as mentioned, largely positive. The Council
became a professional class representative next to its work in terms of publicity,
which can take care of the tarnished image of the judiciary with means to control tax
revenues.
At the normative level it should be noticed that both institutions mutually control
each other, as the systematic reading of Art. 102(I)(r) and Art. 103(B) } 4, part III of
the Brazilian Constitution shows.
4 Judiciary Under Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency
Since the inauguration of Dilma Rousseff, in early 2011, the Judiciary has not
undergone major political or institutional changes. Particularly the relationship
between the Federal Government and the STF can be characterized as being marked
by the continuity of the previous presidency. As the gradual new composition of the
Court, one aspect strikes the eye: As the President shall appoint new STF ministers;
the first woman president implied that she would use this power to expand the
percentage of women among the members of the Court. However there was only
one woman among the four STF ministers that have been appointed by the
President.
In the first 3 years of the Rousseff presidency, STF decided on important matters,
especially one decision that, despite the lack of support expressed in the appropriate
constitutional standard, created the stable union for same sex individuals.35 It
happens that the applicable constitutional provision, Art. 226, } 3, commands the
State (command directed to the legislature) the recognition of stable union “between
a man and woman.” This constitutional provision does not preclude the legislature
to also extend special protection to homosexual stable unions, but it also does not
35
See decision STF-ADI 4.277, rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJe 198, 14/10/2011.
command so. With an unconvincing legal reasoning,36 the judges unanimously

followed the vote of the rapporteur to “interpret according to the Constitution”
the civil law provision that virtually reproduced the restrictive wording of the cited
Art. 226, } 3, of the Constitution. The ministers brought to the agenda some general
constitutional principles (human dignity, equality, personality rights) that,
according to them, would authorize such kind of contra constitutione interpretation.
Such interpretation is not supported by the current constitutional order. According
to law dogmatics, the most specific rule should have been applied over general
principles (lex specialis derrogat legi generali). That, however, does not impair the
power to enact of the ordinary legislature, guided by general considerations on the
equality principle, because such eventual extension of special protection to homo-
sexual unions created by the ordinary legislature would not be incompatible with
Art. 226, } 3, of the Federal Constitution. In fact, that provision, at the same time did
not command protection of the homosexual union, did not rule it out.
Despite the lack of legal and constitutional basis and the apparent violation of
democratic and separation of powers principles, the decision had an overall positive
impact on public opinion, and has been welcomed even by people and
non-governmental organizations involved in the struggle for equal rights in what
concerns homosexual unions, with the extension of the institute of marriage to such
unions.
Such decision, amongst others, reveals that the politicization of constitutional
judicial process not only has been maintained but expanded accordingly.37 The
political agenda of the STF is quite varied and sometimes quite liberal. The high
degree of politicization eventually involved the Court as a political actor in the
criminal case against public bodies involved in the biggest corruption scandal in the
history of Federal Republic of Brazil which came to be known as the “Mensalão
Case”,38 in an allusion to the monthly bribes perceived by organs and private
persons involved to vote legislative projects aligned to the interests of the Lula
presidency.
5 Conclusion
In summary, the following can be inferred in form of theses:
1. The judiciary, which strives for an adjustment of the application and inter-
pretation of the law and supervises the other two government branches, acquires,
as opposed to the basic assumption of traditional Brazilian theorists on the separ-
ation of powers, more and more power and thus moves gradually to the center of
constitutional perception. However, the answer to the question, whether a
36
See criticism by Martins (2013a).
37
See Martins (2012a: 113–122, 2013b, 2014).
38
See critical analysis by Martins (2014).
138 L. Martins
strengthening of the judiciary would contribute to the normative power of 1988

Brazilian Constitution, is somewhat ambiguous. From a historical perspective, a
weak judiciary is considered to be at best a faithful companion of symbolic
constitutions that did not have any normative power. On the other hand, the
judiciary, which aspires political power and also perceives this power by exceed-
ing its constitutional limits of responsibilities, contributes to the politicization of
the law and a judicialization of politics.
2. The Brazilian court organization and structure follows the U.S. model of divi-
sion of powers between federal and provincial jurisdictions. Those litigations,
which are interesting for the federal government, are subject to the jurisdiction
of the federal court. All superior judicial organs, especially the Supreme Court
(STF), including the supreme organs of special jurisdiction (labor, electoral and
military courts), are largely organized outside of the general rules of civil and
procedural law through their own rules of procedure. However, these are often
devoid of legislative basis. As one of the “essential functions of justice”, the
National and Federal Prosecutor’s Office deserves a special emphasis, thanks to
novel jurisdictional competence created by the Brazilian Constitution.
3. The view of stakeholders and the composition of the courts show that Brazilian
Constitution partly reflects the old logic of the patrimonial state. The quota
system of appointment and nomination of members of all supreme and regional
courts provides a meaningful indication of this. The thereby offered opportunity
of political influence within the jurisdiction ultimately contributes to the norma-
tive power of the political and to the relativization of the Constitution as a fixed
measure of political authority. The impact of the specific national and federal
prosecutor’s office contribute to a further politicization of the law, as recent
decisions on the so-called “public civil actions” show, which can even cause a
judicial review via advisory opinions (“abstract norm control”).
4. After the enacting of the current 1988 Brazilian Constitution, it became clear to
all that a reform of the judiciary was due. Overburdened courts and the resulting
poor service as well as corruption were the driving motivations. Particularly,
judges did not want to see changes in grassroots organization and job profiles.
5. Constitutional change initiated in 1992 was successfully brought to an end after
Lula’s presidency took office. What initially seemed to be a provocation
addressed to the judges of the new incumbent, quickly turned into generous
governmental compromises. To achieve the objectives of the reform—main-
tenance of the efficiency of the judiciary (quality improvement)—the fight against
corruption, and welfare democratization—it was not seen as mandatory to
establish an external control.
6. The question of the suitability of the reform implies a differentiated response:
the innovations in the field of judicial proceedings are counterproductive,
because they contribute to greater legal uncertainty and politicization of the
law. The new twin peaks model of the judiciary apparently promotes to 50 % the
following three objectives: quality assurance, damming of corruption and
democratization. It remains to be seen that the twin peaks model pays off in
the long term.
Acknowledgment The author would like to thank Guilherme Arruda, Jairo Moura and Dr. iur.
Eric A. Engle for reviewing the translation from German to English.
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Martins, L. (2012b). Derecho procesal constitucional alem an. Mexico City: Porrúa.
Martins, L. (2013a). Reconhecimento da união estável homoafetiva como direito fundamental pela
justiça constitucional. Revista Direito UnB, 1(1), January–June 2013.
Martins, L. (2013b). Evolução da jurisprudência do STF brasileiro no campo dos direitos
fundamentais entre julho/2011 e junho/2012: “report” das principais decisões, sua recepção
e seus impactos polı́ticos. In V. Bazan & C. Nash (Eds.), Justicia constitucional y derechos
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Part III
Institutions of Interest Representation
Political Parties and the Party System
9
Juan Albarracı́n
Abstract
Juan Albarracı́n examines the range of political parties in Brazil. In this article,
he discusses the most important and sometimes contradictory findings about
Brazilian political parties, the party system itself and its development since
1985. First, he presents a portrait of the fragmentation, polarization, and insti-
tutionalization of the party system and then turns to the legal framework and the
new developments since 2002. Albarracı́n questions the assumptions made about
the deficient role of political parties in the Brazilian Congress as well as the
stabilization of the party system for they were based on analyses that had been
solely centered on the defects. He concludes that Brazilian parties have a
different purpose and meaning within the political system than they do in
Western Europe—but this does not mean that they are automatically deficient.
This is clearly demonstrated by the stabilization of the party system and the
position of the parties in Congress.
1 Introduction1
In the years following Brazil’s transition to democracy (1985), many political

scientists both inside and outside Brazil characterized Brazilian parties as weak:
party leadership was often unable to enforce party discipline, many parties were
ultimately not much more than patronage parties (Ames & Power, 2007;
Mainwaring, 1999), extra-parliamentary party organizations were marked by their
meaninglessness, local organizations were usually absent and there was a lack of
1
J. Albarracı́n (*)
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
e-mail: jalbarra@nd.edu

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_9
144 J. Albarracı́n
mass membership (Ames & Power, 2007: 196–197). Citizens had little or no
attachment to the parties (Carreirão & Kinzo, 2004) and made electoral decisions
based on a candidate’s personality and not on party allegiance (Lucas & Samuels,
2010, among many others). Moreover, the party system was very fragmented and
not very institutionalized (Mainwaring, 1999).
This chapter summarizes a growing literature on Brazilian political parties.
Although some of the previously mentioned assessments regarding parties in Brazil
still apply, other findings have been reevaluated. Parties and the party system in
Brazil lack a number of characteristics commonly attributed to Western European
parties and institutionalized party systems. Nonetheless, a number of scholars have
pointed out that parties play a far more important role in the Brazilian Congress
than was initially acknowledged and the party system—perhaps against all odds—
has stabilized.
Throughout the chapter, I will present findings referring to different aspects of
Brazilian political parties and the party system. The first section addresses the
development of the party system since re-democratization as well as its most
important characteristics: the number of parties in the system (fragmentation), the
ideological distance between relevant parties (polarization) and the establishment
of stable patterns of party competition (institutionalization). Subsequently, the legal
framework in which Brazilian parties are embedded is introduced: laws and consti-
tutional provisions allow parties considerable discretion in the design of their
organizations, distribute important resources and set important restrictions. In the
third section I focus on three dimensions of Brazilian political parties: parties in
government, party organizations, and parties in the electorate.2 In the chapter it will
become evident that, despite all the disagreements scholars of Brazilian parties
have, they usually agree that the Worker’s Party (PT) provides a clear exception to
many of the generalizations made of Brazilian party politics. It is a well-organized,
disciplined political party that resembles the political parties of many Western
European polities.
Despite or possibly because of strong disagreements between scholars, the study
of Brazilian parties has advanced considerably and has become increasingly
specialized. Currently, scholars are more interested in exploring how coalition
party politics works (Power, 2010) as well as seeking explanations for the stabili-
zation of party competition and the party oriented behavior of politicians (for
example Hagopian, Gervasoni, & Moraes, 2009). Exploring these questions is
important since the party system stabilized and the country is “governable” in the
absence of political (i.e. institutional) reform. Nonetheless, an important and still
open question posed by Power (2010) relates to the dynamics of party politics
(specifically legislative coalitional politics) and their negative impact on the repu-
tation of Brazilian political elites and parties. This latter question appears parti-
cularly relevant in light of the massive street demonstrations that occurred in the
summer of 2013 throughout Brazil.
2
These dimensions of the political party were introduced by Key (1942).
9 Political Parties and the Party System 145
2 The Development of the Party System
The development of the Brazilian party system, since the country’s democratic
transition, has been intensively studied. The large number of parties with seats in
Congress (high fragmentation) and a weakly institutionalized party system, in
combination with federalism and presidentialism were considered to be the impor-
tant causes behind the difficulty to enact economic, social and political reform in
Brazil (Mainwaring, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999; See also Ames, 2001; Samuels,
2003).
The dramatic changes of the Brazilian party system are striking. Mainwaring
detected no less than seven distinct party systems in Brazil since 1830 (1995: 355).
The transition from one party system to the next was generally abrupt. For example,
in 1964 a military coup ushered in an authoritarian system that abolished the
previous party system and introduced a new two-party system with completely
new parties. In comparison to other Latin American countries, it is not possible to
identify in Brazil a high degree of continuity in the actors (the parties) from one
party system to next. While party systems in Chile, Colombia or Argentina include
parties with a long—at times even centennial—history despite momentous
political transformations, many of the current Brazilian parties are very young
organizations.3
2.1 The Four Major Parties: PMDB, PT, PSDB and PFL/DEM
2.1.1 Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasilero, PMDB

Brazil’s oldest (relevant) party is the PMDB or Party of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement. This party was founded in 1966 as the Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB), the official opposition party during the military regime.4 From the 1970s
onward, it played an important role in Brazil’s transition to democracy and
supported the first civilian president following the military regime. Although the
size of the PMDB’s caucus shrunk considerably from 53.4 % (1986) to 17.3 %
(2006)5 of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, it remains an important political player
in electoral and legislative politics at the federal level. Moreover, the PMDB is an
important political force in many states and local governments (Melo, 2010; Melo
& Câmara, 2012). After the 2010 elections, the PMDB has five governors, includ-
ing the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The party has been described as a
3
The constant changes of party system can be attributed to both transformations in the political
regime and the marginal importance of parties in the decision-making process within corporatist
decision-making structures. Organized groups such as business people and labor unions had direct
access to the state and did not require any indirect mediation through parties (Weyland, 1996:
5, see also Chap. 11).
4
Tancredo Neves of the PMDB was indirectly elected president in 1985. He died before he could
be sworn in. His vice-president, Jose Sarney, consequently took over as president.
5
Data from Jairo Nicolau, Dados eleitorais do Brasil (1986–2006).
“catch-all” party (Mainwaring, 1999), that is, a party that seeks to attract the
support of many different types of voters based on its low level of ideological
commitment. The PMDB is thus attested with a certain amount of governismo,6 that
is, the tendency to constantly participate in government coalitions and to seldom
find itself in opposition. An overwhelming proportion of PMDB politicians
supported the Lula and the current Rousseff administrations.
2.1.2 Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT

The Worker’s Party (PT) was founded in 1980 by labor unionists, intellectuals,
social movements, and left leaning, Catholic Church groups. The PT distinguished
itself from other parties for its left-progressive party program, its criticism of the
traditional practices of Brazilian politics (patronage, clientelism etc.), and a highly
developed party organization. Although its parliamentary presence in the early
1980s was marginal, the PT was able to steadily increase its number of seats in
Congress and incrementally win local and regional elections (Hunter, 2010). The
party’s rise to power reached a high point with Lula’s victory in the 2002 presiden-
tial elections after three previous failed bids. In 2010, the PT once again won the
presidential election with Dilma Rousseff as a candidate.7
However, the nature of electoral and governmental politics led to a number of
gradual changes within the PT (Hunter, 2010). Firstly, the party underwent pro-
grammatic changes: whereas in the 1988 constituent assembly the PT supported
foreign debt default, the nationalization of banks and radical land reform, it
successfully campaigned 14 years later with the promise of protecting price stabil-
ity, upholding fiscal discipline and respecting international financial commitments
(Samuels, 2004: 1000, 1004). While in government, the party maintained macro-
economic policies from the previous government, although these had earlier been
scorned by it as “neoliberal”. Secondly, the PT altered its electoral and legislative
strategies. It formed electoral (2002, 2006, and 2010) and government coalitions
with parties from the right end of the political spectrum, a practice it previously
rejected (Hunter, 2010). Finally, it was involved in serious corruption scandals of
the sort, which it had earlier condemned.8
6
Governismo is not an exclusive characteristic of the PMDB. Melo and Câmara (2012) suggest
that at least three other parties (the PP, PTB and the PR) also display this tendency. See the end of
this section for an explanation of the acronyms.
7
It is important to note that Rousseff is neither an established politician within the PT (“party
soldier”) nor a historical figure of the PT. She owed her nomination on the PT ticket to Lula, who
intensively campaigned for her both within the party and during the general elections.
8
The so-called Mensalão-Scandal is a clear case. In 2005 important members of the PT, including
presidential chief of staff José Dirceu, were accused of making monthly payments to members of
Congress from other parties in exchange for their support for the government’s proposals.
Recently, the Brazilian Supreme Court condemned many high-ranking PT politicians for their
involvement in the Mensalão.
2.1.3 Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB

The Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) has been the leading oppositional
force during all PT administrations. It emerged from a split in 1988 within the
PMDB and won the presidency in 1994 and 1998 with Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Since 2002 it has fielded the strongest opposing candidates to the PT (José Serra in
2002 and 2010 and Geraldo Alckmin in 2006). The economic adjustment measures
implemented during the Cardoso administration and its opposition to the Lula and
Rousseff governments made it the reference point for the center-right political
camp. The party also has a strong presence at the state level and governs economi-
cally important states such as São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Following the 2010
elections, the party controls 8 of 27 state governments that together make up 47.5 %
of the national electorate.9
2.1.4 Democratas, DEM

Democratas originated in 2007 from the PFL, Party of the Liberal Front (Partido da
Frente Liberal). The PFL was founded in 1984 by dissidents of the governing party
at the end of the military dictatorship, who supported Tancredo Neves’ presidential
bid. It was one of the PSDB’s most important alliance partners during the Cardoso
administration and dominated regional politics in many states, particularly in the
northeast. Over the last years its political influence in previous strongholds has
diminished (Montero, 2010). In 2011 it suffered a major split when the mayor of the
city of São Paulo alongside important figures of the DEM left the party and formed
the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
Based on Power and Zucco’s (2009) findings, the above-mentioned parties,
alongside others, have been listed in Table 9.1 according to their ideological
positions. Their positions relative to each other have not changed significantly
since 1990 (ibid.: 228). Nonetheless, this does not mean that the parties did not
experience absolute shifts in their ideological positions. While remaining a party of
the left, the PT’s ideological position shifted towards the center no later than 2002.
A shift to the right could also be identified in the PSDB after 1995.
Table 9.1 The ideological positions of Brazilian parties

Left Center Right
PT, PCdoB (Communist Party of Brazil), PMDB, PFL/DEM, PTB (Brazilian Labor
PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party), PDT PSDB Party), PL (Liberal Party), PP
(Democratic Labor Party) (Progressive Party)
9
Information from Folha de São Paulo: “Confira o mapa dos governos estaduais eleitos este ano”
(01/11/2010).
2.2 Fragmentation
The level of fragmentation in the Brazilian Congress is very high: In 2006,

21 parties won at least one seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The effective number
of parties10 in the chamber was also very high: 9.3.11 Moreover, the level of
fragmentation has been constantly high since 1990 (see Fig. 9.1). For a long time,
the prevailing view was that the high degree of fragmentation of the party system, in
combination with the presidential system and a federal structure would significantly
hinder the governability of the country (see Mainwaring, 1993, among others).
In comparison to federal legislative elections, presidential elections are distin-
guished by a low and indeed diminishing level of fragmentation.12 Since 1994, only
candidates from two parties, PT and PSDB, have had a serious chance of winning
the presidency (Santos, 2008: 59–60; Limongi & Cortez, 2010; Melo, 2010).13
Some third-party candidates have managed to win a share of votes; nonetheless,
they have not been able to disrupt the bi-polar tendency of presidential elections.
Moreover, no party has been able to consistently place their candidate in third place.
Thus, there is volatility in the number of votes won by the third-party candidate and
the party that wins this position (Limongi & Cortez, 2010). Recently, Limongi and
Cortez (2010) have argued that gubernatorial elections also follow a bi-polar logic.
To some extent, the patterns of competition in gubernatorial elections may be a
reflection of alliance patterns established for presidential elections, although the PT
and the PSDB are not always the “leading party” in each state election.
The divergence in the level of fragmentation of legislative and presidential
elections is not entirely surprising. Differences in the electoral system incentivize
concentration in presidential elections (majoritarian elections with a low district
magnitude) and enable fragmentation in legislative elections (open list proportional
representation combined with high magnitude in some districts). Moreover, as it
10
Simply counting the number of parties represented in Congress or the number of parties that
participate in an election does not indicate their relative importance (share of seats or votes). The
effective number of parties provides the number of “relevant” parties in a party system, where
relevance is determined by the number of seats or votes: The higher the fragmentation of a party
system (according to Rae’s fragmentation index), the higher the effective number of parties. This
index was proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).
11
The values of these measures for a two-party system can help to understand them: Rae’s
fragmentation index is close to 0.5 and the effective number of parties is, naturally, very close
to two.
12
The highest level of fragmentation measured on the Rae index was reached in 1989 with 0.82.
After this election, fragmentation in the first round of presidential elections was considerably
reduced: 1994: 0.62; 1998: 0.61; 2002: 0.68; 2006: 0.59 (Santos, 2008: 67).
13
Melo and Câmara (2012, see also Melo, 2010) introduce a path-dependent argument and
characteristics of the PT and the PSDB to explain why these two parties became central in
presidential elections. Both the 1989 and 1994 elections were critical events that established
both parties (the PT in the former and the PSDB in the latter) as the focal parties of the left and
center-right. Moreover, both parties had viable presidential candidates and formulated a clear
national project/vision for Brazil.
Fig. 9.1 Fragmentation in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Source: Own calculations with
data from Jairo Nicolau, Dados Eleitorais do Brasil (1986–2006)
Table 9.2 Share of votes and total share of the votes for the presidential candidates with the two
highest shares of votes in the first round
Year Candidate (Party) Share of votes (%) Total share of votes (%)
1989 1. Fernando Collor (PRN) 30.5 47.7
2. Lula da Silva (PT) 17.2
1994 1. Fernando H. Cardoso (PSDB) 54.3 81.3
2. Lula da Silva (PT) 27
1998 1. Fernando H. Cardoso (PSDB) 53.1 84.8
2. Lula da Silva (PT) 31.7
2002 1. Lula da Silva (PT) 46.4 69.6
2. José Serra (PSDB) 23.2
2006 1. Lula da Silva (PT) 48.6 90.2
2. Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) 41.6
2010 1. Dilma Rousseff (PT) 46.91 79.5
2. José Serra (PSDB) 32.61
Source: Nicolau, Dados Eleitorais do Brasil (1986–2006) and Folha de São Paulo (2010)
will be described in the following section, presidential elections in the past years
have been structured by the cleavage setting the PT against the PSDB (Santos,
2008) (Table 9.2).
2.3 Polarization
Findings regarding the ideological distance between political parties offer diverg-
ing insights. Some authors argue that the level of polarization has increased since
the 1990s as a result of the fiscal and economic reforms of the 1990s. Parties
supporting pro-market reform, primarily the PSDB and DEM, met the strong
opposition of more statist-orientated parties, namely the PT and its leftist allies
(Hagopian et al., 2009: 362–370; Santos, 2008). This cleavage continued through-
out the Lula administration and the ensuing 2010 presidential election and is
thought to still structure competition for the presidency. Lucas and Samuels
(2010) have pointed out that there is a lack of ideological difference between
parties from the center and those from the right (PMDB, PSDB, and DEM), even
though a two-bloc system emerged, in which only the PT is distinguishable from the
rest. Power and Zucco (2009: 230–231), however, found that polarization decreased
over the period 2001–2005, despite having increased in the 1990s. Parties from the
left, such as the PT, have moved towards the center. The same is true of parties from
the right.
Both diverging findings could be right, as they are looking at different (albeit
interrelated) arenas of competition. Electoral competition for the presidency is
markedly different from electoral competition for a seat in the Chamber (Limongi
& Cortez, 2010; Melo & Câmara, 2012). While Hagopian et al. (2009)14 and Santos
(2008) look at the cleavage that structures the competition for the Brazilian
presidency, Power and Zucco (2009) use elite surveys to identify the ideological
positions of federal deputies. Thus, the differences in the identified levels of
polarization could be rooted in the divergent structure of competition for these
posts and within the legislative.
2.4 Institutionalization
After the third wave of democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe it
became clear that parties and party systems in many new democracies lacked
features present in more established democracies (Schmitter, 1999). The most
striking difference referred to their levels of institutionalization, i.e. the regularity
of patterns of competition (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005: 142–144). According to
Mainwaring and Scully (1995, see also Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005: 146–147)
institutionalization has four dimensions: the regularity of party competition, the
linkage between the parties and society, the legitimacy of parties within society and
the institutionalization/autonomy of party organizations.
14
Hagopian et al. (2009) refer to this (macro) political cleavage around reform policies in the
1990s but do not restrict is structuring effect to presidential politics and suggest that it also affected
politician’s behavior in Congress.
Fig. 9.2 Electoral volatility (Chamber of Deputies). Source: Santos (2008: 66) (Note: Electoral
volatility is generally measured according to the Pederson index: Zero (no electoral volatility)
means that all parties received the same percentage of votes as in the previous election, while one
(the highest level of electoral volatility) means that parties that did not take part in the previous
election won all the votes)
In his seminal analysis, Mainwaring (1999) concludes that the Brazilian party
system is very weakly institutionalized. The high degree of volatility in Brazilian
elections indicated irregularity and instability of party competition (Mainwaring,
1999: 107–109). The low degree of party identification and the marginal impor-
tance of parties for voters are clear indications of parties’ lack of social roots. Party
organizations—with the exception of some leftist parties—are weak: their decision-
making bodies cannot make binding decisions and do not have any resources to
control candidates or party members who hold political office (ibid.: 88). Party
organizations are thus not autonomous bodies and are often merely instruments of
ambitious, powerful politicians. Using surveys, Mainwaring shows that parties only
enjoy a limited amount of legitimacy within Brazilian society (ibid.: 125–128; 135).
Some of Mainwaring’s findings still hold today. In a survey carried out in 2011
by Latinobar ometro, only 43 % of respondents answered that democracy would not
be possible without parties,15 indicating a low level of legitimacy of parties within
the system. As it will be discussed in Sect. 5, Brazilian party organizations have not
considerably gained (formal) organizational strength. Furthermore, the level of
partisanship in the Brazilian electorate (see Sect. 6) remains rather low.
However, the Brazilian party system has stabilized in many respects over the last
few years. Electoral volatility has decreased considerably (see Fig. 9.2). The
average volatility over the last three elections (0.15) is lower than the volatility in
a number of Latin American and Eastern European counties and is comparable with
some consolidated democracies such as Switzerland (Santos, 2008: 65–67). It is
indeed puzzling how Brazil’s party system could stabilize and improve some levels
15
Informe Latinobarometro 2011, p. 42. Available at: http://www.latinobarometro.org. Accessed
20/10/2014).
of institutionalization (especially in one dimension) while other dimensions

remained substantively unchanged.16
3 Legal Framework Regulating Parties
Federal laws, such as the 1988 Constitution, the 1995 Law of Political Parties, and
rulings of the Federal Electoral Court (TSE) regulate important aspects of Brazilian
parties. Electoral laws and other institutions of the Brazilian polity also affect the
organization and behavior of parties (see also Chap. 7).
The Constitution guarantees the right to establish a political party, as long as the
party respects principles such as national sovereignty, the protection of human
rights, and democracy. Moreover, the Constitution determines that Brazilian parties
must be national parties, therefore banning exclusively regional parties.17
The 1995 Law of Political Parties further specifies constitutional provisions and
establishes important restrictions on the functioning of parties and the distribution
of resources. According to the law only parties are permitted to field candidates for
election at all levels of government. Only individuals who were members of a party
at least 1 year prior to an election, and who are fielded by that party can be elected.
To be registered, the party must demonstrate that it has the support of voters in at
least one third of the states.18 Furthermore, the Law of Political Parties included a
threshold of 5 % of valid votes in order for a party to have funcionamiento
parlamentar, i.e. have an organizational structure within the legislative. This
provision, however, was never implemented as it was deemed unconstitutional by
the Federal Constitutional Court (STF) (Cintra & Barroso, 2007: 149).
The regulation of electoral coalitions (coligações) was also an important element
of the party law. These coalitions are essential for the survival of small parties,
which would not be able to reach the electoral threshold (quociente eleitoral) in
some electoral districts.19 A coalition of parties presents a common list seeking to
profit from the pooling of votes. Electoral coalitions do not imply any program-
matic agreements between the parties involved and do not require the formation of a
government coalition after the election. The Federal Electoral Court considerably
restricted the formation of electoral coalitions in a 2002 decision. Following this
16
Some scholars disagree with the assessment that the Brazilian party system has stabilized. Lucas
and Samuels (2010) argue that the lack of ideological differentiation between parties hampers
party system consolidation. Although Melo and Câmara (2012) disagree with Lucas and Samuels
analysis, they present evidence showing that volatility in elections for the Chamber of Deputies
measured at the state level is higher than the national average.
17
Historically, regional parties were no rarity in Brazil. During the first Brazilian Republic (1889–
1930) almost all states had a regional (hegemonic) party (Mainwaring, 1999: 264).
18
A party has to present a certain amount of signatures, equivalent to 0.5 % of the valid votes of the
previous election for the Chamber of Deputies in order to be recognized by the TSE as a party.
These signatures have to be collected in at least one third of the states.
19
For information about Brazilian electoral institutions, see Chap. 7.
decision, parties that formed an electoral coalition for presidential elections were
not permitted to form an electoral coalition on the state level with a party which
fielded a competing presidential candidate, or which was part of another electoral
coalition.20 This was changed by a 2006 constitutional amendment. Since then,
parties have been free to select party coalitions of their choice (Nicolau, 2007).
Furthermore, party law includes provisions regarding the distribution of
resources. On the one hand, it regulates the distribution of money between the
parties from the party fund ( fundo partid
ario). This fund, however, does not mean
that campaigns in Brazil are entirely publicly funded (Speck, 2005: 144–145).21
On the other hand, the law regulates the manner in which parties gain access to
television and radio. During electoral campaigns parties are provided with free
advertising time on TV and radio (in Portuguese this is called Hor ario Gratuito de
Propaganda Eleitoral, HGPE).22 The time is distributed according to the size of the
caucus in the Chamber of Deputies (Machado, 2005: 51). Parties have developed
different strategies to manage this scarce resource. Some parties share the time
equally between candidates. Other parties give popular or better-known candi-
dates—so-called puxadores de legenda—more time than others (Nicolau, 2007:
103–104). It is not surprising that the distribution of these resources is highly
contested. 23
4 The Party in Government
Only party members can be elected president, senator, deputy, governor, mayor or
city council member. Independent candidates are banned according to Brazilian
legislation. Despite this “monopoly” exercised by parties within the political
system, their importance in the decision-making process has been intensively
debated and subject to different assessments. Some scholars (for example Ames,
2001) argue that the role of political parties in the legislative is comparatively
marginal. The institutional mix of a presidential system, federalism, and a highly
20
This regulation is known as verticalização (Nicolau, 2007: 101).
21
Electoral campaigns are very expensive and are largely financed by private donations (Speck,
2005; Samuels, 2006b: 87, 95). According to the TSE, the three largest parties (measured
ac-cording to the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies) received in 2008 the following
amounts: The PT received R$19,893,312.55, the PMDB around R$19,324,268.3 and DEM around
R$14,562,240.3. The amounts for the smaller parties should also not be underestimated. See http://
www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/tse-fundo-partidario-duodecimos-2008 (Accessed 08/16/
2013).
22
The HGPE begins 45 days before an election and is broadcasted three times per week (Nicolau,
2007: 103). The commercial value of the HGPE is R$2.4 billion, which is 20 times the value of the
party fund and three times the value of all electoral campaign costs that are reported to the TSE
(Speck, 2005: 146).
23
The distribution of resources from the party fund was modified in January 2007 by the TSE and
the smaller parties received more resources. In the same year the distribution was again changed by
law in order to provide the larger parties with more resources (Fleischer, 2007: 339).
Table 9.3 Party switching in the chamber of deputies

Legislative period
(1991–1995) (1995–1999) (1999–2003)
Number of party switches 262 212 262
Number of party switchers 198 169 183
Source: Desposato (2006: 69)
personalized electoral system does not provide any incentives for party centered
behavior in Congress. Deputies are usually autonomous vis-à-vis their party leaders
and have strong incentives to pursue particularistic (and not party-specific) goals.
The powerful Brazilian executive can negotiate directly with individual deputies,
win their support for proposed legislation through patronage and pork and thus
almost completely circumvent the party leader. If a deputy’s interests are not taken
into account by a party, he/she can switch parties practically without consequences.
Not surprisingly, the levels of party switching between 1991 and 2003 in Brazil has
been one of the highest in the world, as seen in Table 9.3 (Desposato, 2006:
62, Melo, 2000, see also Chap. 6).24
In short, some scholars have argued that party leaders do not possess any
significant resources to generate party discipline amongst their caucuses, i.e. the
party leadership does not determine the voting behavior of back benchers (Ames &
Power, 2007: 205–206). Instead, the legislative process ought to be seen as a
bottom-up process in which the party leaders depend on the goodwill of deputies
and are often intermediaries between deputies and the executive (Ames, 2001: 222–
223, 237). The exception to this rule is placed by leftists parties, like the PT, which
usually display a high level of party discipline and strong control of backbenchers
by the leadership.
Another perspective, associated with scholars like Figueiredo and Limongi
(2000), emphasizes the importance of parties in the decision-making process.
They argue that the Brazilian executive manages to enact its legislative agenda in
Congress in close cooperation with party leadership and not through negotiations
with individual deputies. Parties, and not just the parties on the left, are collective
actors who play a central role in the Brazilian Congress and which achieve a
surprisingly high level of party discipline (ibid.: 158, see also in detail Chap. 5).
According to their argument, party leaders hold significant authority25 to influence
the agenda in the Chamber of Deputies. Individual deputies are weak in the face of
the strong executive and need parties to achieve a better negotiating position. This
results in a decision-making process in which the executive is dependent on
24
An interesting example of this is the case of Fernando Collor. Before he was elected president he
had changed party five times (Ames, Baker, & Renno, 2008: 110).
25
According to the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the party leaders set the agenda,
are able to circumvent the discussion of legislative propels in the committees with requests for
urgency and decide on the members of committees together with the chairperson of the chamber
(Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000: 165; Santos & Vilarouca, 2008: 71.).
winning the party leader’s support for a project. In exchange, party leaders receive
important resources from the executive (patronage, pork, policy influence) to
punish backbenchers when they deviate from the party line and reward them
when they follow. The decision-making process is seen as a top-down process in
which the party leaders determine the behavior of deputies and are able to force
cooperation. Internal legislative rules, or “micro-institutional mechanisms”
(Figueiredo & Limongi, 2008: 12), thus counteract the possible negative effects
on party discipline generated by institutions like open-list proportional represent-
ation (Power, 2010: 22). Recently, Hagopian et al. (2009) identified a tendency
towards more coherent parties in the Chamber of Deputies, which suggests a
relatively high level of party discipline in Congress. It can be observed that deputies
increasingly value the reputation of their parties and are prepared to accept the
decisions of their party leaders.
The “revisionist” view has not remained undisputed. Some, like Ames (2002),
argue that it was not clear that party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies was the
result of influence by party leadership. In Ames’ view, it cannot be inferred, based
on the evidence presented, that the president’s legislative agenda was successfully
enacted through partisan channels. Others, for example Amorim Neto (2002),
relativize the findings, recognizing the importance of Figueiredo and Limongi’s
seminal work and results but also acknowledging that more research is needed to
understand the determinants of party discipline. Pereira and Mueller (2003) high-
light that institutional differences account for the weakness of parties in the
electoral arena and their strength in Congress. More importantly, they propose
that compliance with the party line in the legislative arena provides resources
(like pork-barrel) which are crucial for success of individual politicians in the
electoral arena, given that the provision of local goods considerably influences
voting behavior. In this sense, they link both arenas and stress that frameworks to
understand Brazilian parties, and the Brazilian political system in general, that have
been portrayed as competing are, in fact, rather complementary.
5 Party Organization
Beyond legislative structures, parties have internal rules and procedures that regu-
late internal party life, establishing, for example, parameters for candidate recruit-
ment or duties of party members. In Brazil, there is considerable variation in the
way parties are organized. Within the same political system one finds arguably the
best-organized party in Latin America, the PT, as well as extremely weakly
institutionalized party structures. It is generally thought that party organizations
lack notable resources, such as control over nominations and financial muscle
(Lucas & Samuels, 2010: 63) and, thus, are overshadowed by strong politicians
and informal arrangements (Mainwaring, 1995, 1999). National party organizations
and their formal decision-making mechanisms are often described as the umbrella
organization of strong state party organizations. If at all, strong party organizations
only exist at the state level (Ames, 2001: 68). In contrast, the PT has strong national
and regional organizational structures whose importance reflects formal decision-

making rules.
5.1 The (In)formality of Rules and Decision-Making
Party law in Brazil mandates that all parties must describe in their statutes their
organizational structure, the rights and duties of party members, as well as the
internal decision-making mechanisms, e.g. the process for the selection of
candidates (Nicolau, 2007). Formally, all parties comply with these requirements
and organize party congresses, elect party executives, etc. On each level (federal,
state, local) there are similar decision-making structures and processes (Guzmán &
de Oliveira, 2003). Statutes give party organs the most important competencies in
the establishment of electoral coalitions and of the party program.
Nonetheless, informal rules are of great importance to understand how many
parties work (Mainwaring, 1995).26 In many parties, important decisions are gen-
erally not made within official party organs and the decisions of these bodies are
routinely ignored by politicians. A good example is provided by the PMDB. At the
beginning of the Lula administration, the national executive committee of the
PMDB decided that the party would not be part of the government coalition.
Despite this, a large part of the PMDB eventually joined the coalition, disregarding
the decision of the party without being expelled from the party or punished.
Informal structures at the state and local level, often linked to clientelistic
networks, are equally important. These networks have proven to be adaptable and
have been able to survive big political and socio-economic changes like universal
suffrage and industrialization (Hagopian, 1996; Montero, 2010, among others).27
Access to government posts and funds are important for politicians as the state
possesses resources (pork, patronage) that are extremely important for clientelistic
exchanges. Behind the formal party organizations of parties like the PFL and the
PMDB in the northeast and north of the country, for example, are networks of
politicians that control the above-mentioned resources and which determine which
candidates will stand for election and will get political appointments. Such
networks are usually associated to “family dynasties”, like the Magalhães in
Bahia or the Sarneys in Maranhão. Although recently leftist parties managed to
make some inroads in states previously dominated by these networks and win state
elections, these informal structures are still important factors in the politics of these
regions and of the federal level (Montero, 2010).
26
The importance of informal rules is not only a characteristic of Brazilian parties and can be
observed in other Latin American countries. Informal rules are also important, even in parties of
advanced democracies. The difference lies in the preponderance of informal rules over formal
arrangements (Friedenberg & Levitsky, 2006).
27
Clientelistic networks arrange for the exchange of mostly private goods (such as money, food,
etc.) for political support (usually votes).
The Worker’s Party stands in stark contrast to these parties as it is characterized

by a highly formalized party organization that considerably affects the behavior of
its members and that significantly shaped the process through which the party
adjusted to Brazilian party politics (Hunter, 2010). The party, for example, is able
to regularly collect fees that amount to between 6 and 20 % of the income of
government appointees or 30 % of the salary of PT elected officials (Ames &
Power, 2007: 197; see also Hunter, 2008). More than in other parties, PT members
in public office are held accountable for their actions by the party base. In some
cases, party members have been expelled because they did not follow party
decisions (Samuels, 1999: 507).28 The highest officers within the party, as well as
candidates for political office, are selected following party statutes. In fact,
controlling party governance organs at the federal, state and local level is extremely
important for all party factions as they effectively determine party policy (Hunter,
2010; Samuels, 2004).
The PT’s programmatic move towards the center has not dramatically shaken the
core of the petista party organization. Incrementally, the party has made a number
of changes allowing their candidates more leeway in the design of their campaigns.
Lula, for example, could use an NGO, Instituto Cidadania, to structure his 2002
campaign (Hunter, 2010; Samuels, 2004).
5.2 The Centralization and Decentralization of the Party

Organizations
Brazilian party organizations are generally distinguished by a high degree of

decentralization.29 Although formally the national level has extensive compe-
tencies with regard to the functioning of state and local party organizations, the
state and local party associations have a high degree of autonomy and often ignore
instructions from the national level (Mainwaring, 1999: 153). State and local party
organizations determine their own electoral coalitions, often without consulting the
national party organizations (Nicolau, 2007: 101). Regional party organizations are
often so autonomous that they can even refuse to support presidential candidates
selected by the national party organization. This was the case with a number of
regional party organizations from the PMDB and the PFL in the 1989 elections and
with the PMDB in the 1994 election (Mainwaring, 1999: 154).
28
For example, when former São Paulo major Luiza Erundina accepted President Itamar Fran-co’s
invitation to join his cabinet, the PT temporarily suspended her for defying the party’s opposition
to the Itamar government (Hunter, 2010: 117; Power & Zucco, 2009: 230).
29
The concept of the centralization of a party organization refers to the distribution of decision-
making powers between the levels of the party organization (national, regional and local levels).
The more decisions (de jure or de facto) that the regional or local level can make, the more
decentralized the party organization. In contrast, the more the national level can involve itself in
decisions taken at the regional or local level, the more centralized the party organization
(Duverger, 1959: 70).
Again, the PT provides an exception: the PT’s national party organization

controls state and local associations and thus considerably reduces their autonomy.
Although these do possess decision-making powers and can select their own
candidates, national party organs often give instructions to lower-level associations,
for example, regarding options for electoral coalitions (Hunter, 2008: 20). As the
PT considerably relaxed its electoral coalition policy over the last years, the
national party organization now helps decide with which parties an electoral
coalition is possible and reviews cases that contravene the guidelines (Hunter,
2010).
6 Parties in the Electorate
The embeddedness of parties in the electorate is an important dimension of party

system institutionalization: party competition depends decisively on the degree to
which voters identify with parties and regularly support them. A (strong) sense of
attachment to a party (or partisanship)30 renders voting behavior predictable.
As mentioned before, most parties in Brazil have had weak roots in society.
Although party membership is high—as of December 2010 the number of voters
with party membership was around 9.06 %31—the level of party identification is
low (Table 9.4).
Kinzo (2005) and Carreirão and Kinzo’s (2004) findings are interesting in this
regard. For the period 1989–2002, the average aggregate level of partisanship,
i.e. the proportion of the electorate expressing a preference for any party, was
46 % (Carreirão & Kinzo, 2004: 142). Furthermore, Carreirão and Kinzo (2004:
147–150) observe that the respondents’ level of education affects their preferences.
Table 9.4 Number of Party Number of members %

members of the largest
DEM 944,864 7.89
parties
PDT 978,799 8.18
PMDB 1,961,576 16.39
PP 1,204,117 10.06
PSDB 1,111,498 9.29
PT 1,193,792 9.97
All parties 11,970,296 100
Source: TSE http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/filiados
(Accessed 10/20/2014)
30
It is important to differentiate between partisanship as “a psychological attachment to a
particular party” (Samuels, 2006a: 1) and party membership.
31
This number is much higher than the average of 20 European democracies (4.99 %) at the end of
the 1990s (Mair & Van Biezen, 2003: 8–10). This high level of party membership in Brazil does
not necessarily indicate that parties are rooted in society, since this figures do not indicate how
actively involved these citizens are in their respective parties.
Voters who have completed high school (segundo grau) show a higher rate of party
preference than voters who have only completed primary school (primeiro grau).
Higher levels of education are correlated with higher support for the PT and lower
support for the PMDB.
Samuels (2006a: 4–5), however, shows that the share of Brazilian respondents
who are close to a political party is not significantly smaller than that in other new
democracies. Braga and Pimentel (2011) also point out that the level of partisanship
in Brazil is not significantly lower than the average of advanced democracies.
Samuels (2006a: 21–22; see also Braga & Pimentel, 2011: 277) attributes this
finding to the PT’s strong levels of partisanship: In contrast to other Brazilian
parties, the Worker’s Party invested in the formation of a large, active party base
as well as a clear party program. Unlike other parties, the PT has strong links to
social movements, academic circles, unions, and religious groups. In this way, the
PT developed a party label that is recognized by voters and a sense of belonging or
partisanship that is not solely rooted in the support of a person such as Lula.
7 Conclusion and Outlook
This chapter has presented different perspectives on Brazilian parties. One perspec-
tive emphasizes the marginal position of parties within the political system, their
weak party organizations, their lack of a societal base, as well as the high degree of
fragmentation and the low institutionalization of the party system. In contrast to this
view, a second perspective emphasizes the importance of parties and their
(surprising) discipline in the Brazilian Congress, the rising importance of parties
for politicians and the stabilization of party competition. In the search for general
statements about parties and the party system in Brazil, it is tempting to see both
sides a necessarily contradictory to one another and side with one perspective. Both,
however, offer important insights to understand Brazilian political parties. Parties
play a much more important role in the decision-making process than initially
assumed, but their party organizations remain rather informal and in some cases
closely dependent of the will of powerful politicians. Their programmatic distinc-
tiveness is clearer in presidential electoral contests than in legislative elections and
politics. They are not completely uprooted from society and patterns of inter-party
competition are more stable, but the connection with the electorate can be tenuous
for most parties.
This complexity spawns interesting questions. The (macro-) institutional frame-
work that regulates party behavior has not changed over the last years. During the
Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), as well as the Lula (2003–2010) and Rousseff
(2011– ) administrations reforms were proposed that would strengthen political
parties. Closed lists, a ban on electoral coalitions and restrictive clauses for presi-
dential elections are some of the most discussed proposals (Santos & Vilarouca,
2008: 79). To date, however, no comprehensive reform projects have been decided
by Congress. Although micro-institutional mechanisms (Figueiredo & Limongi,
2008) were proposed to explain Brazil’s governability, we do not know if these and
other arrangements that characterize Brazil’s coalitional presidentialism contri-

buted to dissatisfaction by the public with politicians and parties (Power, 2010).32
It is quite telling that the recent waves of protest (summer 2013) were marked by
strong anti-party sentiment.
Moreover, we know that Brazilian parties are definitely organized differently
and have a different position within the political system than parties, for example, in
Western Europe. More analyses about how Brazilian parties are organized (spe-
cially their informal structures) and how they relate to society are necessary. This
may allow us to make better suggestions for political reform that transcend tradi-
tional institutional recipes and respond more appropriately to the sense of political
discontent being expressed by Brazilian citizens.
Acknowledgment I thank Scott Mainwaring, Nara Pavão, and Laura Albarracı́n for their valu-
able comments and suggestions. Any imprecision or mistake remains my own.
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29(1), 1–22.
Lobby Groups, the State and the
Relationships Between the Branches of 10
Government in Brazil
Renato R. Boschi
Abstract
Renato R. Boschi presumes the existence of a strong executive branch and
tackles the question of how the relations between the State and interest groups or
associations have changed since Lula’s government. The traditionally strong
corporatism in Brazil, through which the major industrial associations and the
unions have had exclusive access to the political system, was eroded by the
market-oriented reforms of the early 1990s. The more recent developments in
the relationship between State and society suggest that the State is returning to a
much more active role. Ultimately, the traditional corporatist agreements are still
identifiable and the relations between State and society are increasingly marked
by consultations with civil society as well as their political participation.
1 Introduction1
This chapter seeks to answer the fundamental question as to what has changed in the
Brazilian institutional context; particularly since President Lula’s term in office.
During his presidency, certain innovations were introduced in the relationship
between the society and the state, restoring the latter to a more active role, vis-à-vis
the market. The focus is on the executive branch, whose historically strong role has
gained notoriety, particularly since the Lula government (see Chap. 5).
The starting point of the issue here is the central position of the executive branch
in the republican institutional framework of the Brazilian state (Boschi & Lima,
2002). Two historical factors were key for the gradual strengthening of the
1
R.R. Boschi (*)
University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: rboschi@iesp.uerj.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_10
164 R.R. Boschi
executive in Brazil. The first refers to the substantial role played by the state in
leading the economic development throughout the twentieth century, especially
since the Revolution of 1930 headed by President Getúlio Vargas, which
established the foundations for the institutional framework of the modern Brazilian
state. The second relates to the authoritarianism of the 1930–1945 and 1964–1985
periods. During these phases, under the regimes of both the Estado Novo, under
President Getúlio Vargas from 1937 to 1945, and the military regime of 1964–1985
(Amorim Neto, 2004), the importance of the executive power was exacerbated
exponentially at the cost of suppressing the legislative power. Although the 1946–
1964 period marked the democratic experience, predominantly with the presence of
mass party politics, the democracy that began in 1946 was not able to strengthen the
legislature for it was marked by political instability as the elected governments
were under the constant threat of a military coup.
Even the yet current Constitution of 1988, the milestone that marked the
transition process from dictatorship to political democracy, conferred vast powers
over public administration on the chief of the executive branch (see Chap. 3).
Among others, the following stand out: (1) the power to freely nominate and
dismiss state ministers; (2) the right of initiative to propose bills and constitutional
amendments; (3) the exclusive right of initiative over public administration; (4) the
power to create new taxes; (5) the possibility to intervene in the budgetary process.
In this context, the chief of the executive branch has the prerogative to veto any
laws passed by the legislative branch, be it partially or entirely.2 It is worth noting,
however, that an absolute majority in a joint session of Congress can override the
presidential veto.
Moreover, with the new constitution, the president acquired the power to issue
provisional measures, i.e. decrees that have the force of law from the moment they
are published in the Federal Official Gazette of Brazil (DOU) (see Chap. 6). This
gives the head of the executive branch control over the legislative process, in
addition to increasing his/her autonomy over the creation, transformation, and
termination of posts, jobs, and public functions. Therefore, provisional decrees
constitute a powerful and decisive instrument in the hands of the executive, as
they allow it to unilaterally alter the legal status quo of the country, usurping the
fiscal and coadjutant role of the legislative branch (Amorim Neto, 2004; Amorim
Neto & Santos, 2002; Pessanha, 2002; Santos, 2007). In short, in terms of presiden-
tial prerogatives, the Brazilian head of the executive is one of the strongest in the
world (Shugart & Carey, 1992), as this person also commands a vast administrative
2
Bills or draft laws (projetos de lei) are ordinary instruments of legislation. Therefore, under
presidencies that have solid parliamentary support, the ordinary legislative instruments tend to
prevail over the extraordinary ones, known as provisional decrees (medidas provis orias), in the
implementation of the government program. The executive branch also has the constitutional
prerogative to make urgency requests for bills. Furthermore, such constitutional urgency dispenses
with the vote in Congress. As such, the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate have 45 days
to assess any bill considered urgent by the president. In the case that one of the chambers does not
meet the stipulated period, the bill is immediately introduced for voting.
10 Lobby Groups, the State and the Relationships Between . . . 165
apparatus comprising the ministries, the Banco do Brasil, the National Bank for
Economic and Social Development (BNDES, one of the largest public investment
bank in the world), Petrobras (the largest national corporation), along with other
state autarkies.3
In earlier work, we interpreted the emergence of lobby groups organized around
the legislative branch, as an innovative trend in the behavior of interest groups in
Brazil (Diniz & Boschi, 1999) whose internal organizational structure was
characterized by the corporatist structures as installed and controlled by the execu-
tive branch since the 1930s. In the context of the transition to democracy in the
mid-1980s, the legislative branch acquired a central role as a sounding board for the
society; first, due to its importance in the process of re-democratization and second,
because the Constituent Assembly redefined the relations between the state and
other economic actors. In this particular case, the predominance (though not
supremacy) of the legislative became evident, especially due to its role in the
reforms implemented since the first civil government under José Sarney, which
were developed further during the governments of Fernando Collor and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, starting in the 1990s.
In the 1990s, however, amid the market-oriented neoliberal reforms and the
introduction of globalized financial capitalist parameters in Brazil, the executive’s
scope of action was broadened. At the expense of the concentration, isolation, and
centralization of the decision-making process by the high-ranking governmental
technocracy, policies and reforms were promoted to respond to the trade and
financial liberalization, the privatization of state companies, wage cuts, monumen-
tal cuts to public spending, and the creation of agencies outside the executive body
(Boschi & Lima, 2002; Diniz, 2007).
In this chapter the recent changes are analyzed in two dimensions. The first
refers to the reorganization of public space in terms of the relations between the
state and interest groups. In the second dimension, we will try to briefly evaluate the
extent to which the current model, founded strongly on state interventionism, has
adapted to the changes introduced with the reforms; be it by reinforcing the
traditionally strong executive branch, or by stimulating new forms of joint public-
private spheres through the creation of councils or assemblies (conselhos) or other
consultative bodies. Among others, we argue that the changes that occurred in the
post-reform period, especially after the first Lula government in 2003, favored the
expansion of participation spaces linked to the executive branch, without a negative
effect on the democratic representative institutions. Moreover, as a result of the
rearrangement of the bureaucracy and through the pension funds, there was an
effective incorporation of the workers’ interests in the state’s functioning and in the
dynamics of capitalism, which bestowed Brazilian capitalism with a social-
democratic character.
3
I thank my PhD student Carlos Eduardo Pinho for systematizing this information on the
prerogatives of the executive branch in Brazil.
166 R.R. Boschi
The transformations that took place through the reforms in the 1990s weakened
state corporatism as the predominant form of intermediation of interests and, hence,
altered the formulation of regulatory policies. In this period, the characteristic
corporatist representation through councils linked to the executive sphere was
undermined, with far-reaching consequences regarding civil society’s access to
the state through other institutional channels, particularly the legislative track.
However, in terms of the political practice and the representation structure that
dates back to the 1930s, corporatist legacy persisted as the basis on which new
regulation modalities were built. The creation of autonomous agencies with specific
bureaucratic structures and the status of a public corporation, which, in principle,
made them independent of the executive’s politics, caused a readjustment of the
relationship between the three branches, as well as that of the new interfaces
between state bureaucracy, regulated sectors, and consumers. With the return of
the state to a more central role in the coordination of the economy since 2003,
tendencies to strengthen the executive’s power also reemerged. Consequently, the
regulatory system was adjusted: initially through an attempt to weaken the role of
the agencies, then by maintaining the moderate role of this regulatory model that is
allegedly based on the autonomy of the regulatory agencies, and, finally with the
creation of dialogue fora between public and private actors. This includes a series of
initiatives geared towards involving civil society into the discussions of setting
priorities and formulating public policies, which in no way replicate the corporatist
model of the Vargas era, although they are founded on its tradition. As a result,
although the legislature is still an arena to forward the demands of organized
interests, the interfaces between public and private space have multiplied and
diversified, and thereby a completely new trend was created through which those
segments of society hitherto excluded from having formal access to the state now
could occupy this domain.
2 The Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch,

and the Redefinition of Public-Private Relationships
in Brazil: A New Corporatism?
2.1 The Role of the Executive During the 1930s Corporatism
As previously mentioned, the central role of the executive branch in the republican
institutional framework in Brazil is notorious, particularly since the 1930s when the
economic development model, centered on an urban-industrial axis and marked by
strong state interventionism, was developed.4 In fact, if it were possible to trace a
line of continuity in the state’s role and performance, in the Brazilian case it would
reside in the executive’s preponderance throughout the various phases of the
4
Recent comparative studies on development patterns in Brazil have highlighted this tendency as a
positive factor for industrialization (Kohli, 2004).
development process since the 1930s, beginning with the crisis of the statist
protectionist model, through the period of neoliberal reforms (which led to the
state’s withdrawal), up to the current phase, characterized by the reinforcement of
state interventionism vis-à-vis the market and by Brazil’s insertion into global
networks. This acknowledgment should not, however, veil the role of social actors
in shaping institutional arrangements, nor the dynamic of the changing relationship
between the three branches of government—particularly in terms of the executive-
legislative relations in the long run—that depended on certain circumstantial
characteristics. In the context of re-democratization and the reform period towards
the end of the twentieth century, the legislature assumed a leading role (Diniz &
Boschi, 2004), a general tendency that has been identified in the literature, despite
the acknowledged supremacy of the executive branch compared to the other powers
(Figueiredo, 2001; Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999).
The strong association and sometimes even equivalence established between
state and executive power has given rise to debates in the relevant literature either
about the instability of the representative democratic institutions or the weakness of
civil society. A perspective that reduces the state as a whole to the executive power
alone tends go hand in hand with such interpretations such as seeing the institution-
alization of the political parties as moderate, the performance of the legislative
branch as a political arena endowed with a low degree of autonomy, the submission
and low capacity of initiative of different segments of civil society, the pure and
simple control of the subordinate sectors, and, finally, the essence of the creation
process of public policies based on the isolation of decisive bureaucratic spheres
tied to the executive branch. The bureaucracy associated to the executive branch,
along with the president, ultimately, were the core of the state, understood as an
entity and the nucleus of the entire political process, particularly since 1930, when
the privileging of an industrial development model was geared towards overcoming
economic underdevelopment and corporatism was introduced as a form of
organizing public-private interest intermediation.
Corporatism, as an institutional arrangement that prevailed throughout the
developmental period, can be understood as a type of public-private arrangement
founded on the interaction between the practices of organized groups—and there-
fore directly proportional to their capacity to undertake collective action—and the
state’s action, rather than as a state objective to subordinate society and to guarantee
the economic growth process.5 In terms of the preponderance of one of the two
poles of the state-society duo, at the outset of the cycle in the 1930s, the state’s
influence certainly became much more noticeable, without, however, excluding the
5
Beyond the amends that could be made to the interpretation of the period, a brief review of
corporatism in the era of developmentalism would also be useful to understand the institutional
space upon which the new urban-industrial order rose in post-1930s Brazil. Some works discuss
the corporatist heritage of the developmental period in terms of overcoming preexisting patterns in
the relationship between society and the state. In other words, posting the question as to whether or
not the Vargas era was actually over (Almeida and Dagnino, 1994; Cardoso, 1999; Diniz &
Boschi, 2000; Tápia, 1994).
168 R.R. Boschi
possibility of collective action of private groups. But, at other times, it was civil
society and the dynamics of democratization that set the tone. This occurred in the
1980s, in the context of a progressive crisis of public policies that led to questioning
the development model and, in turn, did not allow for a process of institutional
engineering (Boschi, 1987, 1990).
2.2 The Reorganization of Corporatist Arrangements After

the Reform Phase
Even though there was not a radical break with corporatism during the reform
period, the corporatist legacy of developmentalism (desenvolvimentismo) at least
provided a framework in which new relations could be established. This was
precisely the case of the structure of representation of interests of the employers/
propertied class (patronato) and the employees/working class in the post-reform
setting. Through the reforms, the general structure began to take new shape
throughout the years. On the one hand, this was reflected in the differences that
existed between social actors regarding the resources to carry out collective
actions—in terms of an asymmetry between the social classes. On the other hand,
this was visible in the state’s control, exerted through the representation monopoly
and the union tax, based on the growing fragmentation and differentiation within
each of these classes, and the consequent expansion of its power. In the workers’/
employees’ case what prevailed were control and the impossibility of organizing
themselves outside the official structure, which led to a multiplicity of unions with
local bases and a segmentation of the umbrella organizations. In the case of the
employers/propertied class, the segmentation expressed itself since the beginning
of the reform period through the creation of associations parallel to the official
structure. This trend intensified during the 1950s and, especially, during the 1970s
and 1980s, which is reflected not least in the absence of a hegemonic entity capable
of representing the class as a whole (Boschi, 1994; Diniz & Boschi, 1979, 1991,
1992, 2000, 2004).
Moreover, in terms of access to the state apparatus, its increasing differentiation
and specialization forces the interest groups, particularly the proprietors’ and
employers’ organizations, to pursue a variety of strategies in different bureaucratic
spheres close to the executive, in different stages of the decision-making process,
and in various areas of economic policy. As has been pointed out repeatedly, the
privileged access to the state apparatus is a fundamental characteristic of an
excluding modality of Brazilian corporatism, which was referred to as ‘bipartite’
or statist (corporatismo bifronte), in contrast with the neo-corporatism of social
character that emerged in Europe, strongly influenced by the rise of social
democracy.6
6
The idea of bi-front corporatism expressed in the asymmetries between the structures of repre-
sentation of the interests of the employers/propertied class in contrast to the working class is
Therefore, it is necessary to have a less aggregated view of the state as it was

during the developmental period, differentiating the executive from other spheres.
In this way, it would be possible to disclose to what extent the legislature—
understood as the sphere of political representation—also became the setting for
the representation of interests. Such an effort would also help reveal certain
particularities of the relationship between the three branches of government and
the modalities of civil society’s access to the state that influenced the trajectory of
the Brazilian political system up to the 1980s, when the crisis of developmentalism
set in and the market orientation was recommended as an economic solution. With
the transition, some striking differences occurred in the institutional arrangement of
the relationships between the branches, placing the legislature in a central position,
both because of the progressive institutionalization of democracy and its impor-
tance in the production of laws and other regulatory frameworks in the context of
privatization. As discussed in detail in other analyses, during this period the
legislative branch tends to converge organized interest groups and introduce the
practice of lobbying as a common practice (Diniz & Boschi, 1999, 2004).
Within this framework, Congress stands out as it is progressively endowed with
its own identity and an increasing political leadership, not only brought about by the
dynamics of political representation, but also by virtue of the expansion of its
institutional position in the decision-making process. The legislature survives the
highs and lows of the political process and, although it is subjected to the
executive’s logic of intervention, it is also turning into an important setting with
its own dynamics and peculiar characteristic processes that have been discussed in
depth in previous analyses (Boschi, Diniz, & Santos, 2000; Figueiredo & Limongi,
1999).
In this way, a less visible aspect of the society-state relationship in Brazil is
revealed, namely the progressive occupation of the legislative branch by organized
interests, particularly since the Constituent Assembly of 1988 (Diniz & Boschi,
1989a, 1999). In addition, though in a more moderate form, the existence of an
influential business group is noticeable in Congress since the 1945 legislature. This
core group diversifies in the same proportion of the diffusion and increasing
complexity of the industrialization process (Boschi et al., 2000).
Even after the neoliberal reforms, the attempt to directly influence the legislative
process becomes one of many strategies the private sector recurs to. Aside from the
formation of lobby groups, it is worth noting the indirect action of entities
representing the industry in monitoring issues affecting its interests, as is revealed
in an important study on this matter (Mancuso, 2004, 2007a, 2007b). It can be
concluded, therefore, that the political representation and the representation of
interests mutually penetrate and influence each other.
Towards the end of the state-led developmental period, and particularly in the
context that followed the market-oriented reforms, both the actors’ logic of action
highlighted in the literature that identifies the existence of an official structure of representation
and a parallel structure for the case of the employers/propertied class (Diniz & Boschi 1989a,
1989b, 1993, 2000; Leopoldi, 2000).
170 R.R. Boschi
and the reconfiguration of the lobbying structure were influenced by the asymmetry
between social classes and the fragmentation within them. At the same time, they
adapted to the incentives of the new institutional order. Strongly marked by the
institutional trajectory of the old corporatism, the new environment is thus
characterized by the emergence of some new parameters (such as the voluntary
nature of collective action, contrary to the compulsory membership typical of the
old structure), which redefine the strategic positions between the different actors. In
this relative modification of roles, the change of the state’s strategic position
vis-à-vis the domestic actor’s stands out as a central element of the new order.
The corporatism of the 1930s can be interpreted as an institutional synthesis that
delineates the boundaries between public and private spaces while concealing the
appropriation of public space by private actors, which occurs through personal
contacts, ‘clientelistic’ connections, the establishment of networks, in short, in the
grey area between the two spaces. Although corporatism replicated basic social
inequalities (which, in the literature, were only interpreted from the point of view of
the state’s control of the lower classes), it also implied the mobilization and
organization of social classes through the representation of interests in the political
process.
Be it from the point of view of the state’s intervention in the field of economic
policy (Diniz, 1978) or from the perspective of the formulation of social policies
through the regulation of labor relations and the establishment of social rights
(Gomes, 1988; Santos, 1979; Vianna, 1999), the state, as the executive branch, is
founded on its intervention capacity. In both of these areas, the “expansive” aspect
of the state’s presence makes itself noticeable; one the one hand, by its increasing
intervention in the productive sector, the state defines the basis for economic
growth and creates a domestic environment for both public and private economic
actors; and, on the other, by creating conditions for the mobilization of the popular
sectors and their access to the political sphere, through the regulation of labor
relations.
This brief review is useful insofar as it highlights certain fundamental features of
the dynamics between state and society in the developmental period. First, the
possibility of participating in decision-making processes regarding the formulation
of economic policy, not only forwarded the organized interests of private groups
(that were already represented in numerous councils and administrative areas) to
the executive’s sphere, but it also established norms for the public-private relations.
These norms created the framework within which the mobilization of private
groups was induced by the state’s relative autonomy. Second, the fact that, since
the implementation of the labor laws of the 1930s and 40s, the increasingly
important social policy has implications in terms of social mobilization, particularly
considering that it operates in synergy with processes of economic growth, urbani-
zation, and industrialization. Although limited in some aspects, the scope of said
social policy, regarding both the progressive inclusion of social categories in the
concept of “regulated citizenship” (cidadania regulada), as well as its coverage and
areas of protection, reached its peak with the universalization of social rights in the
1988 Constitution. At the height of the developmental period, as a consequence of
the “economic miracle” of the 1970s, and around its turning point toward a crisis in
the 1980s, the mobilization—brought about through the social policy and the
structural transformations that took place based on the economic policy—strength-
ened the social side vis-à-vis the state side, allowing for a more organized civil
society endowed with associative vigor to emerge (Boschi, 1987; Santos, 1985).
At the end of the developmental period, around mid-1980s, the further imple-
mentation of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model proved unfeasi-
ble due to a crisis that emerged based on internal and external factors. Contrary to
the circumstances that led to the emergence of the crisis, the new situation was
characterized by a deconstruction process that questioned the state itself. The
urgency for macroeconomic stabilization in the domestic front, added to the need
for a competitive economy and the country’s integration in the globalized networks
in the external front, i.e. at the international level, established a restrictive logic
regarding the state’s radius of action. Thus began a process of deconstruction of the
previous order in all its pillars, beginning with a reform of the state itself since its
expansion proved to have been a component of the crisis in various aspects. The
conjunction of the three previously mentioned axes for this historical turning
point—i.e., economic policy, social policy, and political participation—almost
produced the opposite effect: (i) severe restrictions on the possibility of economic
growth; (ii) decline in the importance of social policy and difficulty in upholding
the constitution regarding the recently bestowed, but also the previously acquired,
social rights; and, finally, (iii) an upward trend in political participation.
The impact of the reforms implemented throughout the 1990s in Brazil is
sometimes underestimated by hasty evaluations that tend to suggest that the market
replaced the state. While a weakening of the state may have occurred, in the
Brazilian case the restructuring that was put forth is remarkable, both at the level
of the state initiatives and in the response of private actors in terms of the
re-adaptation and reconstruction of the representation of private interests. One of
the fundamental changes was the fact that the logic of state action, previously
determined by the boundaries of a closed economy and by the expansion of its
power vis-à-vis the market, now found itself permeated by the logic of the market.
In this process, the state re-equipped itself in face of the possibility of implementing
economic policy, as this axis subordinates all other dimensions of its actions in
different realms, including the political dynamic. The executive branch emerges as
the core of the reorganization of the entire institutional context whose central
characteristic was the redefinition of the state’s strategic role regarding the
organized bodies as well as the relationships between the latter. The legislative
branch does not leave the stage; on the contrary, it is strengthened and modernized,
and it becomes a regular and institutionalized reference point for organized
interests. The regularity of the electoral processes confers this instance an equally
crucial role, in which conflicts and distortions linked to the financing of political
campaigns sometimes revealed the promiscuous performance of organized interests
and the political process.
In summary, the dynamic of the reconfiguration of the relative roles of the state
and the social actors was marked by the fact that, through the strong influence of the
172 R.R. Boschi
axis of the economic policy, the modalities of intervention were redefined insofar as
the market became the basis for the relationships within the state apparatus itself,
between it and the society, and between the key organized actors. Two pillars
supported the new form of state interventionism of the 1990s: trade liberalization
and privatization, linked through the axis of economic stabilization, which, in turn,
gave them significance. On the one hand, the opening of the economy, in what
refers to the dynamic of selective competitiveness, led to a reconfiguration of
domestic capitalism, particularly in the industrial sector, with the influx of foreign
capital, the displacement of activities, and the restructuring of property in many
sectors through an extremely intense process of mergers and acquisitions. On the
other hand, privatization operated as a path for the appropriation of public patri-
mony by globalized dynamics of capital, especially in areas demanding heavy
investments and where advanced technology is essential. Both pillars provide
inputs for the stabilization policy carried out by the executive, thereby giving it
the role of strategic mediator, which ultimately expresses itself in the regulatory
policy.
At the time of the decline of the Vargas era, which coincided with an expansion
process of political and social rights granted in the Constitution of 1988, and the
simultaneous state crisis, the corporatist structure—due to its capacity to flexibly
adapt—emerged as possibly the toughest and most stable of the republican
institutions. It is therefore a kind of institutional matrix for reforms in the dynamic
of change versus permanence that tends to characterize Brazilian transition
processes.
3 New Public-Private Interfaces and the Democratization

Process in Brazil
In the most recent period, with the election of Lula da Silva as president and the rise
to power of the Workers’ Party (PT), three aspects are noteworthy in reference to
the state’s new characteristics and its relationship with society:
• First, the creation or reactivation of fora geared towards the formulation of

policy directives for various sectors, with the participation of different segments
of society, including those linked to private productive sectors.
• Second, an apparent occupation of high-ranking positions in the context of the
state’s leading elites, by groups coming from the trade unions.
• Finally, the very fact that union sectors became partners of the capitalist model
due to the increasingly central role that the trade unions’ pension funds play in
the financial dynamics and in supporting development-furthering activities.
These tendencies indicate, on the one hand, a movement towards the democrati-
zation of the access to the state apparatus in its various instances, and, on the other,
a possible inclusion of the workers’ interests in the country’s productive system.
The results of recent empirical studies regarding the increase of trade union
representatives in high-ranking positions as well as the growing economic activity

of trade unions (D’Araujo, 2009; Jardim, 2009; Santana, 2008a, 2008b) support the
assumption of a tendency towards a greater democratization of the state through the
effective integration of the trade unions, which had been marginalized with the
founding of bipartite corporatism (corporatismo bifronte) in the 1930s and 40s.
3.1 The Reactivation of Social Fora
With regards to the first aspect mentioned above, it is important to highlight the fora
that were aimed at promoting the participation of civil society in identifying
priorities for public policies and in formulating guidelines for various areas. In
this context, it is worth mentioning the most strongly institutionalized spaces since
the beginning of the PT government, which were sometimes misunderstood as a
return to authoritarian practices. But they did not, in any way, replicate the modality
of the corporatist arrangements put in place by the Estado Novo, although they
aligned with the consultative tradition that was at the basis of the Vargas era
corporatism. These initiatives were added to the central role played by the structure
of representation of business interests, aimed towards the exercise of economic
coordination. Another important activity was the reactivation of national
conferences on specific policy issues, a mechanism that existed since the 1940s,
and which is an element of the participation spaces installed by the PT through the
participatory budgets.
Thus, as part of the creation of comparative institutional advantages in the
connection between the state and the private sector, the Council for Economic
and Social Development (CDES) was founded; a state initiative that reflected the
need for broader forms of dialogue with civil society as a whole, in the context of
the new developmental model. Far from replicating old formulas and supposedly
authoritarian characteristics of the period in which the official corporatist structure
was implemented, this Council has functioned as a consultative body for the
formulation of guidelines for development policies. Aside from the CDES, the
National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI) was created in April 2004, a
body in charge of implementing the main points of the Development Agenda
(Agenda de Desenvolvimento). The CNDI, introduced as a consultative body
specifically for the definition of guidelines for the country’s industrial growth,
was responsible for the formulation of public policies for industrial and infrastruc-
ture development, the standardization of competition-enhancing business pro-
cesses, and the financing of entrepreneurial activities. Among the different areas
in which the CNDI was involved, in terms of coordinating development processes,
there was a plan for investment and systematic innovation in industries for durable
consumer goods, and also the establishment of links between government agencies,
universities, and research institutions to further partnerships through sector funds
( fundos setoriais) of the Ministry of Science and Technology. Finally, in December
2004, the Brazilian Agency of Industrial Development (ABDI) was created; an
executive agency geared towards the implementation of industrial development
174 R.R. Boschi
policies. The goal of ABDI is to “Implement and interconnect actions and strategies
of the industrial policy by supporting the development of innovation processes and
by fostering competitiveness in the productive sector” (ABDI).7
Thus, in the development field, in addition to the initiatives supporting the
private sector, we can highlight the concern regarding the establishment of long-
term institutional conditions, particularly those linked to the relations with the
private sector, focused on coordination and consensus-raising activities. In the
post-reformperiod, a specific development path was recovered, based on a modality
of innovative state interventionism, but that also presented continuity with the state
developmentalism of the twentieth century. In summary, the transition imposed by
the reforms seems to be consolidating. This is revealed in a flexible institutional
arrangement in the relations between state and the private sector, with new
consensus-raising fora and a more modern organizational structure built on the
corporatist model of the developmental period.
The national conferences on diverse public policies emerged as a second type of
interconnection between the state and civil society: both in the sense of creating a
participative corrective channel for the limitations of representative democracy in
the period between elections (to produce consensus and establish substantial
priorities) and in terms of the link itself between proposals emerging from these
fora and legislative action. The preliminary data of an ongoing study point out some
new tendencies according to which both the incidence and the role of national
conferences in the PT governments can be confirmed, though the link between these
and the legislative action has yet to be verified (Santos & Pogrebinschi, 2009).
Thus, according to the cited study, the national conferences on public policy
constitute a mechanism for the mobilization of civil society focused on stimulating
participation and deliberation to contribute in the formulation of public policy.
Preceded by several stages at the municipal, state, and regional levels, the national
conferences collected the deliberations and decisions taken at the previous levels
and, in a final document, produced the guidelines for certain policy areas. These
conferences were held for the first time in 1941 and implemented 12 times until
1988 when they finally gained more significance. By 2008, 80 conferences had been
held, of which 73 were indeed deliberative and normative. Health was the main and
most frequent issue in the conferences until 1988; this, however, corresponds only
to 27 % of the total number of conferences held to date. After 1988, other issues
gained importance: human rights (with 11 conferences, representing 15 % of the
total), minorities (8), environment (5), economy and development (4), and, finally,
education (2). It is important to highlight that of a total of 73 conferences held since
1988, 64 % occurred during Lula’s government, followed by 25 % during the
Cardoso administration. Of the various issues discussed in the different conferences
since the beginning, 97 % were approached in the 6 years of Lula da Silva’s
government.
7
On the development policy of the Lula government see Chaps. 15 and 16.
A quick assessment of these preliminary results regarding the legislative pro-

duction draws our attention to the fact that the data reveal an unprecedented growth
trend since Lula da Silva’s government. This refers to both the number of projects
that were initiated in the House of Representatives (1523) and in the Senate (510),
as well as the 170 constitutional amendments (Proposta de Emenda
Constitucional), 177 approved laws and six passed constitutional amendments, all
related to the issues discussed in the conferences. Based on the comparison with
data on previous governments—with a slight emphasis on Fernando Henrique
Cardoso’s government and health issues—the study indicates the increasing impor-
tance of participatory and deliberative practices in contemporary Brazilian
democracy.
3.2 The Increasing Number of Trade Union Representatives

in Political Bodies
Another recent phenomenon suggests there has been a progressive occupation of

high-ranking posts of the state apparatus by union representatives (D’Araujo,
2009). Research conducted by D’Araujo reveals significant information about
what she denominates as “public leaders”(dirigentes públicos) within the state
bureaucracy. The main finding is that a large proportion of union workers linked
to the CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores) and affiliated to the PT occupy
leading posts within what is known as “High Management and Advisory” positions
(DAS). These results were mainly presented in journalistic debates, after the
takeover of government at the federal level by the PT, as evidence of the dangers
of the co-optation of the state by a political party (partidarização).8 This was
mainly due to the fact that Lula da Silva’s government centralized the designation
of high DAS-positions in the Casa Civil,9 a responsibility previously delegated to
the ministries. But independently of this centralization and the fact that the presi-
dency was held by a member of the PT, the study suggests that this reflects a long-
term process that has been gradually consolidating through a historical relationship
between the CUT and the civil service, and that it is tending to become stable
regardless of what party is in power. This tendency could be interpreted as the
existence of changes in the traditional composition of the leading elites, which in
the past were always more strongly marked by the presence of sectors of the
regional oligarchy and by interests linked to the propertied class/employers
(patronato) or the rural sectors.
8
Partidarização refers to the idea of putting the state apparatus to the service of a political party.
Related to the idea of clientelism.
9
In the structure of the executive branch, the head of the executive power has the Casa Civil as an
auxiliary body to its tasks in public and political administration of the nation. The chief of staff of
Brazil is the minister in charge of said body. (See http://www.casacivil.gov.br/sobre/COMP).
176 R.R. Boschi
The most relevant information resulting from this study refers, for instance, to
the fact that these union workers are highly qualified and would be far from
constituting clientelistic strongholds (redutos clientelistas), as they are predomi-
nantly recruited from within the federal public service itself (65 %). These are
individuals with a high level of education, diversified professional experience, and
who have built a career occupying several DAS positions previously. In regards to a
possible democratization of the relationship between state and society or of an
intensification of the relations with organized sectors of civil society, D’Araujo’s
study reveals that the members of the leading elite show a high level of civic
engagement and participation: more than 40 % are union members (45 %) and take
part in social movements (46 %), and about 30 % participate in professional and
management councils (D’Araujo, 2009: 53).
The research concentrated on a group of pension fund leaders with the purpose
of estimating the presence of union leaders and members in this group. The focus
was on the composition of the executive board and the supervisory board of the
three largest pension funds, i.e. Previ (of the Banco do Brasil), Petros (Petrobras),
and Funcef (Caixa Econômica Federal). In fact, the data reveal that while the
presence of union members in the management of such funds was always high, it
rose during Lula’s government, reaching more than 50 % in the case of the first two
pension funds. The affiliation rate to political parties (27 %), in this particular case
to the PT, is equally significant.
3.3 The Participation of Trade Unions in the Pension Funds
The new role of the unions in Brazil’s political system is not only reflected in their
relationship with the PT, but also in the fact that trade union pension funds became
partakers in the financial dynamics and development funding of the capitalist
model. New empirical studies discuss the importance of pension funds in the new
dynamic of Brazilian capitalism, both from the point of view of the resources that
the state allocates for the investment in production and development (Santana,
2008a, 2008b) and in terms of the efforts to make syndical sectors partners of the
financial dynamic (Jardim, 2009).
The history and dynamics of the development of trade unions and pension funds
in the Brazilian production sector shows that these played a central role in the
domestication of the form of capitalism prevailing in the country (Jardim, 2009).
Alongside the findings mentioned above about the nature of Brazilian capitalism,
Jardim’s research presents relevant information that reveals a new aspect. In short,
the data indicates a tendency towards the effective incorporation of trade union
interests in the financial dynamics of the new model through the participation of the
pension funds. Thus, following a first movement undertaken in 1996 by the
worker’s union of the Banco do Brasil, it was possible to observe that, since the
year 2000, employees of the telecommunications sector and the petroleum industry,
as well as the leaders of the main trade union federations (CUT, CGT, and FS),
exerted pressure for the creation of pension funds for their affiliates, also
demanding to participate on the funds’ boards. The study suggests how, over time,
common interests were established between the leaders of the PT, the union leaders,
and the financial and industrial sectors. Unionists went through a conversion
process that led them to participate in the corporatist decision-making structure in
such a way as to control the unrestrained actions of financiers and rentiers. In this
context, trade union confederations established links with universities, research
institutes, consulting firms, and financial institutions, and they invested in the
training of pension fund managers (Ibid., chapters II and III).
President Lula da Silva, who had always been side by side with the unionists,
slowly began to move closer to the financial sector after his election in 2003. This
already began during the election campaign with the “Letter to the Brazilian
People” (Carta aos Brasileiros10), followed by a historical visit to the São Paulo
Stock Market in 2002. Immediately thereafter came a series of policy measures,
such as the “Public-Private Partnership Project” (Projeto Parceria Público/
Privado), the National Microcredit Program, the creation of the Popular Bank
(Banco Popular), the participation of workers in the stock market, and other
initiatives to promote social inclusion through market mechanisms, i.e. what the
author denominated as the “bancarização”11 of the working classes (Jardim, 2009:
Chap. V). Finally, through an interesting image of the evolution of syndical
thinking regarding pension funds, Jardim shows how the position evolved from
simply favoring social security in the 1970s, to an extremely critical view of
pension funds in the 80s, through a more moderate position during the first Cardoso
administration, when they began to be seen as a possible area of intervention of the
unions, to the idea of a need to expand the pension funds market under trade union
management, during Cardoso’s second government, up to the moment when, during
Lula’s first government, the unions reached a clearly defined understanding of the
pension funds as a tool for social inclusion and a means to fight a non-regulated
financial system (Jardim, 2009: 150).
A parallel can be drawn between the abovementioned movement of the Brazilian
unions and the changes in the political struggles of the social democrats once they
acknowledged the electoral competition as an instrument for inclusion. Similar to
European social democracy, where the inclusion of unions in the parliamentary
dynamic dictated a logic of action as well as a set of priorities that, in the long term,
brought about the creation of the welfare state, in Brazil the decision of entering the
financial dynamic via the pension funds has redefined the unions’ political
struggles, and supported a vision and practices favorable to social inclusion in
this environment next to social policies geared specifically towards war on poverty
and the reduction of social inequalities.
10
The letter was a statement of purpose regarding guidelines of economic policies to be followed
in Lula’s government.
11
Bancarização explains the fact that formerly excluded sectors started to have access to banking
activities through opening personal accounts.
178 R.R. Boschi
4 Conclusions
This chapter aimed to assess the changes in the nature of the Brazilian state and its
relations with society, by comparing the scenario of the developmental period with
the post-reform institutional setting. What has changed since the attempt to dis-
mantle the corporatist arrangements of the Vargas era in the relations between state
and society, on the one hand, and between the branches of government, on the
other? What adjustments did the reformed model undergo with the return to a more
interventionist position of the state in the recent post-neo-liberal scenario? More
importantly, what kind of changes occurred in the state structure and in its relations
with society when a more left-wing government, based on a political party with
unionist bases such as the PT, entered the scene via democratic elections?
Do the tendencies of a diversification of arenas tied to the executive branch
imply a draining of the legislative power with the mitigation of the main character-
istic of politics, namely the participation through the legislature and the electoral
process, as suggested in some recent discussions? Does the direct access to the
executive branch by segments of civil society and organized groups eliminate the
central position of the legislative process in politics, and, consequently, of new
dynamics that had introduced lobbying practices after the reforms?
In both moments, the regulatory activity of the executive branch stands out,
overshadowing the institutional legacy, and, thereby, generates unexpected
consequences for the institutional apparel. Although a trend towards a certain
exteriorization of the regulatory action can be observed in both public and political
arenas—including the legislative branch—and this is reflected in the achievement
of greater transparency and the elimination of clientelistic practices, the preponder-
ance of the executive branch over private interests, the market, and over the other
branches of government, remains a salient feature of the continuity between the two
periods examined.
With respect to the vertical relationship between state and society, it must be
noted that the traditional corporatist arrangements remain as the structure of the
representation of interests and as mechanism for collective action, though this
predominantly concerns the employers and propertied class. In what refers to the
horizontal relationships between the three branches of government, in the new
regulatory regime, the preponderant role of the executive vis-à-vis the independent
agencies persists, though without having established a robust, horizontal control
and accountability system.
The market-oriented reforms implemented in the 1990s, however, were not able,
as intended, to wipe out the legacy of the Vargas era in certain fundamental aspects
for the configuration of the current Brazilian political system. These aspects refer
mainly to the persistence of the institutional matrix established during that phase,
which was able to articulate the interests of the private sector and introduce new
forms of dialogue between said sector and the state. They also refer to the existence
of labor legislation that has not become flexible and is still responsible for
upholding the rights of the unionized sectors of the formal economy. Furthermore,
the continuity in the trajectory is also expressed in the active presence of agencies
created during Vargas’ second term in office, such as the BNDES, which has
assumed a fundamental role in the promotion of productive activities and the
country’s development, and, most recently, has expanded its scope of action to
the regional level.
In this new context, we can say that, through the political dimension and the
access achieved to the state apparatus by a political party and groups of syndical
origin, via the electoral road, Brazilian capitalism finally acquired a more social-
democratic facet. In addition to this, the democratization of political life, through
practices such as consultations and the creation of fora with segments of civil
society, testifies in favor of the establishment of a social corporatism, as opposed
to the state corporatism that had prevailed during the developmental period until the
end of the 1980s. With the creation of autonomous agencies, market-oriented
reforms introduced new actors, new modalities and regulatory bodies; nonetheless,
they were not capable of abolishing the previous legacy of an interventionist state
and a strong executive branch. On the contrary, the new institutions overlapped the
existing ones, and currently operate in a regulation-heavy setting, such as those that
were created in the area of economic policy, and that can also be found in other
areas through public policy regulation.
Moreover, in what refers to the role of the legislative branch vis-à-vis organized
groups, the fundamental conclusion is that the electoral dynamic does not reduce
the articulation of strong interests, but rather promotes it. Such articulation is
evident in the parliamentary committees and in public hearings focused on various
issues, including those of a regulatory nature—a result of the very performance of
the agencies themselves. The strong relationship between the activities of certain
fora, such as the National Conferences on Public Policy (Conferências Nacionais
de Polı́ticas Públicas), and the legislative work should also be mentioned, as it
reflects important underlying connections between participation initiatives
introduced by the executive and the main activities of the legislature.
Thus, in face of the fear of a possible “politicization” (partidarização) of the
state apparatus, or a supposed political oppression that—according to a conserva-
tive perspective—some of these tendencies might indicate, one can put forth a more
optimist viewpoint of the changes in the direction of the relations between the state
and civil society in Brazil. Only when a more long-term perspective is adopted, less
fixed on specific or temporary situations, it is possible to make sense of the new
tendencies. It is thus that we suggest that there has been a democratization process
of the relations between society and state, characterized by the proliferation of
consultation practices and the participation of civil society along with the execu-
tive, associated to a never-present dynamism in the legislative action in the institu-
tionalization of democracy. In this framework, the legislative branch remains a
privileged locus for the involvement of organized groups, though in a different
dynamic that does not oppose the consultation practices of the executive branch, but
rather complements them. Finally, the progressive occupation of the state by
segments of the elite of the trade union movement and, ultimately, the incorporation
of their interests within the dynamic of the productive regime through the pension
180 R.R. Boschi
funds is responsible for giving Brazilian capitalism, if not a social-democratic, at

least a less savage and excluding facet.
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Industrial Entrepreneurs, Democracy,
and Political Power 11
Eli Diniz and Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
Abstract
From a historical perspective, Eli Diniz and Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira show
how the established contract between the private sector and the government
came to an end since the end of import substitution industrialization and as a
consequence of the reforms of the 1990s based on the Washington Consensus.
The authors point out that a new national development strategy cannot be
identified. Due to a subtle process of de-industrialization and extremely low
growth rates in the 1990s, the political participation of industrialists became
weaker as did their political influence. Since Lula’s election as president, in
2002, Brazil is going through a transition from an economic system ruled by the
market to a system with stronger State control. To foster a long-term economic
growth process, a national development strategy should be formulated jointly by
the government and the industrial sector (as occurred between 1930 and 1980).
Such a strategy has to respond to the national reality and be founded on solid
fiscal health, low interest rates and a competitive exchange rate, without
neglecting the issue of social justice.
E. Diniz (*)
e-mail: dinizeli@terra.com.br
L.C. Bresser-Pereira
Emeritus Professor of Getulio Vargas Foundation, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: bresserpereira@gmail.com

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_11
184 E. Diniz and L.C. Bresser-Pereira
1 Introduction1
Between 1930 and 1980, Brazil became an industrialized country and experienced
extraordinary economic growth. This occurred under the leadership of a political
alliance whose main actors were the industrial entrepreneurs and the public admini-
stration, and whose economic development strategy was known as “national
developmentalism” (nacional-desenvolvimentismo). In its first phase, the strategy
focused on import substitution and, in the second, on the exportation of
manufactured goods; both moments were characterized by strong state presence.
However, in the 1980s, the country faced a major financial crisis, the external debt
crisis, which led to high inflation and to what was later known as the “lost decade”,
at the same time that neoliberal ideology became hegemonic on a global level.
The combination of these two factors led Brazil to submit to the new ideas
coming from Washington in the 1990s, and since then, to relinquish having its own
national development strategy. Consequently, Brazil began a gradual process of
premature deindustrialization alongside slow economic growth during the follow-
ing years. In the 1990s the participation of industrial entrepreneurs in the nation’s
political life became weaker and less influential.2 What were the reasons for the
defeat of the industrial entrepreneurs? Were there external causes? Was it inevitable
given the neoliberal hegemony of the 1990s? Or were there other reasons for Brazil
to lose its concept of national development, to stop implementing an autonomous
economic policy, and to have a much slower economic growth rate than most other
countries, even after its successful fight against inflation and the stabilization of
prices in 1994?
To answer these questions, we have divided this chapter into four parts. In the
first part, we briefly analyze the loss of the industrial entrepreneurs’ political power
in the late 1980s, as a result of the neoliberal wave and of the failure of the Plano
Cruzado in which they were strongly involved. In the second part, we show how,
after the power vacuum between 1987 and 1991, a new dominant political alliance
was created, consisting mainly of the financial sector, businesses, and multinational
industries and their interests. By following the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal
recommendations, they led Brazil into a deep process of industrial restructuration
and to the denationalization of the economy. In the third part, we start by examining
the difficulties of industrial entrepreneurs to criticize the new policies, especially
the macroeconomic policy, and to suggest alternatives. Then we focus on the
behavior of the business sector after the external debt crisis in 1998, when the
industrial entrepreneurs began to competently discuss macroeconomic policy.
Finally, after the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency, an
important and essentially political turning point can be observed: the socialization
of the business community within democratic values, rules, and practices,
1
2
This article includes and deepens some of the arguments previously developed by the authors in
Bresser-Pereira (2006a, 2006b, 2007), Diniz (1978, 2000, 2004), Diniz and Boschi (2004).
11 Industrial Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Political Power 185
especially regarding the democratic principle of power rotation. Moreover, their

critical stances and proposals also gained consistency, though this does not yet
justify the claim that a new coalition and a new national development strategy,
known as “new developmentalism” (novo desenvolvimentismo), had emerged and
become dominant in the country. The world is in a transition phase since the 2008
global financial crisis demoralized radical economic liberalism; whether Brazil will
be able to seize this opportunity in the context of a consolidated democracy, and
whether the industrial entrepreneurs, who once again are in an alliance with the
state and now also with the workers, will be able to formulate a new national
development strategy, is still uncertain.
2 The Loss of Political Power
In the early 1990s, Brazil’s compliance with conventional orthodoxy and the
Washington Consensus resulted in the loss of political power of the industrial
entrepreneurs. For the country it meant the loss of a national development strategy.
The mistakes made by the Brazilian elites after the return to democracy, as well as
the failure of the Plano Cruzado, strengthened neoliberal criticism of the national
developmental model and, ultimately, led the country to become subordinate to a
foreign hegemony. After the failure of the Plano Cruzado, the years 1987–1990
were marked by a governability crisis. Under these circumstances, in 1991 a
window was opened for a fundamental change of the ruling political coalition in
Brazil.3 That year, after the failure of yet another stabilization plan (Plano Collor),
President Fernando Collor de Mello carried out an extensive reform of the cabinet.
Under the leadership of a new economic team, the country gave in to neoliberal
guidelines and the macroeconomic policy inspired in them. From that moment on,
Brazil’s economic policy was redefined; the financial sector was given priority, in
detriment of the industry.
The new economic policy, imported from the North, radically rejected the
national-developmental strategy. Since the 1980s, this strategy had been strongly
attacked by neoliberal forces that were already dominant in the international
scenario. Instead of acknowledging its great achievements and criticizing its
mistakes, the Washington Consensus (which at the time was still establishing itself)
identified national developmentalism with underdevelopment, economic populism,
and high inflation. However, the criticisms and especially the alternative presented
were misleading. It is true that Brazil had reached a stage of economic development
in which it could no longer justify the direct participation of the state in creating
savings and the installation of primary industries. On the other hand, it is also a fact
3
The clearest evidence of this political vacuum was the defeat of three of the main leaders of the
fight for the democratic transition (Ulysses Guimarães, Mario Covas and Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva) in the presidential election of 1989, while a young and previously unknown politician,
Fernando Collor de Mello, was elected.
that the national developmental strategy suffered serious distortions during the first
democratic government of 1985–1989, which was reflected in the great political
and economic disaster of the Plano Cruzado of 1986 and the hyperinflation at the
beginning of 1990. From an economic point of view, the failure of the Plano
Cruzado was primarily due to the lack of control over inflation, which exploded
shortly thereafter. In the political sphere, its effects were no less devastating, as they
put an end to the great national and popular consensus that had formed around the
democratic transition process. This consensus had been based on a wide range of
alliances, where the entrepreneurs were a main social force, alongside the working
class, social movements and parts of the middle class. These facts, however, did not
legitimize the neoliberal alternative; they did not justify that Brazil, instead of
reviewing its own strategy, adopted economic policies proposed by its competitors
from the North.
After 1991, the ruling coalition was no longer what it had been in the late 1970s
during the great quest for democracy: a national and popular alliance formed by
industrial entrepreneurs (who had begun to withdraw from their alliance with the
military since the “Pacote de Abril”4 of 1977), the middle and working classes.5
The political leaders of this alliance—which had reached its peak with the “Direct
Elections Now” (Diretas J a) campaign—lost political power because they were
neither able to cope with the large external debt crisis nor with the prevailing high
inflation; on the contrary, they deepened the economic crisis due to the mistakes of
the Plano Cruzado. After 4 years of political vacuum (1987–1990), in 1991 a new
alliance was formed between rentiers that live off interests, the financial sector, and
foreign interests, and has since been dominant in Brazil.
For over 50 years, since the 1930s, industrial entrepreneurs that were associated
with high-level segments of the government administration had first backed the
import substitution industrialization strategy (1930–1964), and later the export of
manufactured goods strategy (1967–1990), thereby forming part of Brazil’s main
political leadership.6 From an ideological perspective, two typical principles of
capitalism—liberalism and economic nationalism—were united, with a certain
prevalence of the nationalist values. On the contrary, in the 1990s, large parts of
the entrepreneurial sector, including the industrialists, followed the new neoliberal
4
The “Pacote de Abril” was a package of laws enacted under President Ernesto Geisel through
which the forthcoming elections would be influenced in favor of the military to ensure them an
automatic majority in Congress. To this end, among others, the package established that one-third
of the senators were to be determined by the President and the sparsely populated States would
receive more votes in the Chamber of Deputies (Editors’ note).
5
The breakup of the alliance between the industrialists and the military, and their alignment with
the democratic forces was originally analyzed in Bresser-Pereira (1978). The Democratic-Popular
Pact of 1977 that led the Brazilian democratic transition was formed then.
6
Although some features of the import substitution strategy have been conserved, since 1967
Brazil engaged in a successful manufactured goods strategy. In 1965, exports of manufactured
goods represented 6 % of total exports, in 1985, 66 %.
hegemony with its far-reaching implications. Thus, somehow, the industrial

entrepreneurs were partakers of their own loss of power.
3 The Neoliberal Retreat
Given the gravity of the external debt crisis, the failure of the Plano Cruzado, the
weakening of the national political leaderships, and the significant strengthening of
the United States after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the most conservative
representatives of the Brazilian entrepreneurs, especially those coming from the
financial sector but who were also among the industrialists, were quick not only to
assume the neoliberal policies but also to become their proponents. The 1990s were
to become the years of market-oriented reforms. From an ideological point of view,
during that decade a consensus could be observed among the entrepreneurs (of all
sectors) regarding the neoliberal criticism of the economic model that had prevailed
in the previous decades. However, there was still disagreement as to the form and
the time frame for the implementation of certain aspects of the new agenda as,
for example, privatization and trade liberalization.
In 1994, the government of Itamar Franco, with Fernando Henrique Cardoso as
Finance Minister, managed to neutralize high inflation through a heterodox plan,
the Plano Real. Meanwhile the rupture with the old order, which had begun in 1991
with Collor’s ministerial reforms, was deepened. With the support of a large center-
right coalition, as of 1995, the government adopted the neoliberal economic and
constitutional reform agenda. On the other hand, despite the fact that inflation had
been neutralized by the Unidade Real de Valor (URV)7 the anchoring of the
exchange rate with the U.S. Dollar led to a brutal increase of the exchange rate
between 1994 and 1998. This increase, in combination with the liberalization of
trade and of the financial flows, led to a profound restructuring of the entrepreneur-
ial sector that drastically changed the profile of Brazilian industry. Businesses were
closed or went bankrupt, partnerships were established with foreign companies,
mergers and acquisitions were made, and there was a substantial loss of jobs in the
industry. During this period, deindustrialization and denationalization became part
of the everyday activities in the economic sector. Industries dedicated to textiles,
machinery, equipment, auto parts, and electronic products were among the most
affected.
The deindustrialization process did not extend further only because between
1930 and 1980 Brazil had built a remarkably diversified industrial sector that had
the capacity to absorb scientific and technological progress. In other words, the
manufacturing industry and its entrepreneurs showed an extraordinary ability to
cope with the exchange rate crisis (caused mainly by its overvaluation) and to
7
The URV was a pure accounting currency, whose value was set at approximately US$1. It
represented an index in the context of the fight against inflation and was the forerunner of the
country’s present day currency, the Real.
increase their productivity. The progress achieved in those years brought about
substantial changes. They translated into a broad restructuring of the country’s
industrial park and its productive structure, and led to the development of large
conglomerates under the control of international capital. The economy’s denational-
ization reached unprecedented proportions as large transnational companies
continued to consolidate their leading role, while shrinking the space of private
national companies.
The reaction of the business community was mixed. A group of industrial
entrepreneurs that was connected to the Institute for Studies in Industrial Develop-
ment (IEDI)8 maintained its opposition to the changes taking place. The reaction of
the rest reflected the wide-ranging hegemony of the neoliberal and globalist current
that had spread throughout the world. The presence of the neoliberal position at the
industry’s core became visible in the document published in 1990 by the Federation
of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP): Livre para Crescer, Proposta para
um Brasil Moderno (Free to Grow, Proposal for a Modern Brazil). The neoliberal
ideology also reached a critical point in its first attempt to lead a constitutional
revision between 1993 and 1994. At that moment, the business elites mobilized and
created “Corporate Action” (Ação Empresarial), under the leadership of Jorge
Gerdau Johannpeter,9 aimed to influence Congress in the defense of liberal
postulates. During President Cardoso’s first term, both the National Confederation
of Industry (CNI), under the leadership of Fernando Gonçalves Bezerra—industrial
businessman and senator for the State of Rio Grande do Norte—and the afore-
mentioned FIESP, under the presidency of Carlos Eduardo Moreira Ferreira—
lawyer, businessman and member of Parliament for the Partido da Frente Liberal
(PFL)—showed they strongly agreed with the priorities of the new public agenda,
particularly in regards to the so-called market-oriented reforms.
Among the losers of the reform process, any sort of prolonged reaction seemed
impossible at that time because, as a result of having been driven out of the market,
they lost the political influence they had had in the past. Prestige and power of
influence were transferred to the winning sectors and companies. In this sense, the
sale of the company Metal Leve to the German multinational Mahle was a
paradigmatic case. It was no coincidence that the newspaper Estado de São
Paulo, in its issue of June 13th, 1996, considered the sale of the company as a
positive turn of a page in Brazilian history. Towards the end of the 1990s, the
production environment became complex and unstable. Many companies and even
entire industries disappeared while others emerged and expanded. The power of
transnational groups grew and the concentration of capital intensified. While old
8
The IEDI was founded by private enterprises in the late 1980s and is considered a response to the
economic instability, low investment rates and rising unemployment. The Institute is a part of the
Brazilian corporatism tradition and emphasizes on political participation of the private sector.
Today the IEDI is an industry-oriented and globalization-friendly think-tank (Editors’ note).
9
Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter is Chairman of the Gerdau Group, a conglomerate that is active mainly
in the steel and construction industries. He is currently one of Brazil’s most influential
businessmen (Editors’ note).
leaders and leaderships lost power because they had difficulties surviving in a
context of increased foreign competition and the adverse effects of the governmen-
tal policies (such as the steady opening and stimuli for international capital), other
industrialists benefitted from the opportunities created by privatization. This was
the case of businessman Benjamin Steinbruch (Vicunha Group), who originally
came from the textile and clothing industry, took over the leadership of a conglom-
erate that included areas such as railways, ports and energy, and thereby became
president of the councils of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN), Light and
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce.10 In this case, the opportunities created by the new
liberal context resulted in the construction of a highly diversified national conglo-
merate as well as an important renewal of the leaders of the business community.
For many emerging entrepreneurs, especially those who participated in the
privatization of large state-owned enterprises in the services area and the mining
industry, such as Tele Norte Leste, Tele Centro Sul, CSN, Usiminas, and even Vale
do Rio Doce, the most promising path seemed to be to ‘go with the flow’. According
to this view, the future of capitalism in Brazil would involve an intensification of
the market model, with greater integration at the international level, and a stronger
cooperation with international capital. There was therefore an acute process of
change in the entrepreneurial sector, which was induced by the state’s actions,
namely its own withdrawal. The state defined the rules of the new economy, laid the
foundation for a new strategy, and transferred part of the national patrimony—built
over the last decades under the old model—into the hands of the private sector.
In short, this means that, in the 1990s, the national industrial business commu-
nity lost its political role in defining the national development strategy, while
simultaneously the circle of policy makers kept shrinking and decisions became
increasingly more technocratic. Under the new neoliberal guidelines, the economic
order became dominated by the logic of the large transnational corporations, whose
primary interest was the inclusion and integration of national economies into a
power structure of transnational scope, characterized by great economic and poli-
tical asymmetries. Only a very small part of the local companies—generally linked
to the large conglomerates—had the conditions to access and participate in these
structures. The remaining sectors operated under very unfavorable conditions, with
difficulties to survive the competition. Many industries perished at this time. Those
that secured their survival through mergers or partnerships with international
companies tied their fate to the success of the dominant strategy. In this new
model, the dichotomy between national and foreign company, which had been
central in the phase of national developmentalism, was delegitimized. Instead, the
concept of “Brazilian company” began to emerge, referring to companies that
settled in Brazil, invested in the country, produced locally, and created jobs.
10
Benjamin Steinbruch is also one of today’s most influential industrialists in Brazil. The Vicunha
Group he co-founded, is the largest textile manufacturer in Latin America. In the process of their
privatization, he led the consortia that bought the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) and the
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale). He is currently the director of CSN’s, one of the largest steel
companies in the world (Editors’ note).
Within the same logic, the differentiation between center and periphery lost
importance, and hegemonic countries began to be considered collaborators of
Brazilian economic development rather than competitors: imperialism and nation-
alism were not mentioned anymore, and instead people spoke of integration into a
transnational network with diverse interests.
The analysis of the entrepreneurs’ behavior during this period reinforced the
main conclusion that historic studies on the different phases of Brazilian industrial-
ization had already highlighted: its weakness as a collective actor. This weakness
existed in spite of the relative strength of some of its segments, the value of its
organizational resources, the financial strength of many companies, and the impor-
tance of the personal connections between parts of these elites and the state
authorities. The limited capacity for collective action can be explained by a number
of closely interrelated factors. These include the organizational characteristics of
the interest representation system established within the corporatist structure,
introduced in the 1930s, and especially the absence of a multi-sectorial umbrella
organization, able to act and speak on behalf of the entire business class. Other
factors were: (i) the historic inability of the industrial entrepreneurs to propose
comprehensive platforms that included the demands of other sectors, particularly
the working class; (ii) absence of tradition of agreements between different social
classes; and finally, (iii) the role of the state in formulating and implementing
Brazil’s economic policies and in inducing the pattern for the business class’
collective actions. In this regard, the concentration of decision-making power at
the level of the technocratic bureaucracy did not favor the reversal of the histori-
cally consolidated tendency of using informal connections and clientelistic
practices as a means to gain access to the governmental bodies.
In the period after the reforms, the structure of the interest representation of the
entrepreneurs became even more fragmented and specialized. In comparison with
the past, there was, however, a clear difference, since in this fragmented structure
the scope of action for the national private companies became narrower. During the
previous development periods, through a developmental strategy consistent with
the strategy to promote a strong national bourgeoisie, national companies were
attributed a very important role. This was true for both national developmentalism,
in the 1950s and 60s, and under the ideology of the military governments that,
following the “development-national security” formula, were responsible for the
implementation of the modelo do tripé or tripod model (where power comes from
the alliance between the state, large national firms, and multinational companies).
Within its diverse configurations, the developmental alliance always gave a priority
position to national entrepreneurs that occupied a clearly defined area among other
dynamic economic actors. In other words, this sector was economically significant;
it occupied an acknowledged position and fulfilled a political role as a member of
the developmental coalition.
4 The Rupture of the Neoliberal Consensus and the Return

of Industrial Entrepreneurs
In the late 1990s, the first signs of the deterioration of the neoliberal coalition
became visible, especially regarding macroeconomic policy and, in a broader sense,
the national development strategy. Due to the traumatic experience with high
inflation between 1980 and 1994, the priority given to inflation control continued
to be accepted. On the other hand, it was gradually becoming clear in Brazil and the
rest of Latin America—a region that had evidently subjected itself to the
Washington Consensus—that neoliberal economic reforms and orthodox macro-
economic policies did not lead to financial stability nor to economic development.
On the contrary, they led to greater external vulnerability as well as to the concen-
tration of income in favor of the financial sector and the richest two percent of the
population of each country. At that point, a political change at the governmental
level began to take place, accompanied by criticism of the market-oriented reforms,
and, especially, by the evidence that alternatives to conventional orthodox macro-
economic policies certainly exist.
The political changes were reflected in the significant shifts evident in the
presidential elections in many of the regions’ countries, where left or center-left
candidates were elected as heads of state. In spite of the differences between them,
the rejection of neoliberal policies was a common denominator in their campaigns.
The first to come to power was Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, in 1998, followed by
Lula in Brazil, in 2002, and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, in 2003.11 This series of
electoral victories, based on nationalist, left wing platforms, reflects the failure of
the reforms and policies promoted by transnational, hegemonic circles under the
leadership of the U.S. government. These successful, emerging political move-
ments in Latin America, besides being leftist, identified themselves with a nation-
alist position where their mobilization aimed to achieve greater national autonomy,
vis-à-vis the U.S. government which was directly associated to the Washington
Consensus, regardless of which political party was in power in that country. Such
governments seek “to bring the important decisions back into the country,” as Celso
Furtado, one of Brazil’s most influential economists, often put it. In this context, the
ability to use the existing room to maneuver for the benefit of national interests
becomes an important advantage in the definition of new strategies for the
country’s development.
On a macroeconomic level, the main problem that developing countries will
face, is having to define their own macroeconomic policy, rather than passively
accepting the policy of high interest rates and the non-competitive exchange rates,
in conformity with the precepts of the orthodox economic order. They will have to
11
These were followed by the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Rafael Correa in Ecuador
(2007), Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay
(all three in 2008), and finally Mauricio Funes in El Salvador (2009). It is also necessary to
mention the debatable defeat of Andrés Obrador in Mexico (2007).
reject the growth policy based on foreign capital in order to prevent the increase of
the exchange rate, which would ultimately weaken, if not completely destroy, the
country’s capacity to export manufactured goods.
While at the political level progress was made rapidly in the direction of more
national autonomy, change within the local bourgeoisie, specifically the Brazilian
capitalist class, was naturally slower and full of detours. Historically, Brazilian
entrepreneurs have been characterized by an ideological pragmatism, revealing an
extreme flexibility to adapt to positions of sometimes more, or sometimes less,
alignment with a more active role of the state in the defense of national strategies.
At other times, however, they identify with the transnational elites. They frequently
also adopt defensive positions, especially at times when they feel threatened by
popular movements, as occurred in the early 1960s, or when the local leaders of the
elite let themselves be controlled by economic populism and are therefore unable to
cope with the economic crisis, as happened in Brazil immediately after the demo-
cratic transition of 1985.
Towards the end of the 1990s, it had become clear that conventional orthodoxy
had failed in its goal to recover economic development—through its reforms and
macro-economic policy.12 Inflation was controlled, but thanks to a rather heterodox
stabilization plan, the Plano Real. The orthodox approaches that were immediately
taken up again by the government failed to restore the economic growth process, in
spite of the large inflows of capital that the country received since 1995. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, industrial entrepreneurs witnessed the steady erosion of
their political power as they were excluded from key economic policy decisions.
The financial crisis that the country plunged into in 1998, presented the first
opportunity for a new stance on their part. Based on their historical experience,
this change could hardly include the entire business class. Their alliance arose in the
early 1960s and led to their support of the military regime, and, once again in the
early 1980s, when the democratic transition became a national consensus. But these
were exceptional moments. On other occasions, there had always been a division
within the capitalist class. In the new millennium, the division was between, on the
one side, the industrial and commercial sectors that were oriented towards the
domestic market, and, on the other, the financial sector, the agribusiness, and the
large companies of privatized public services.
The change in the orientation of the industrial entrepreneurs’ position, towards a
national macroeconomic policy, began within the Brazilian organization that was
most closely identified with the domestic industry, the abovementioned IEDI. This
organization that brought together the 32 largest national industrial enterprises, was
founded in 1988,13 at a time of a political vacuum caused by the crisis of the Diretas
12
As of the year 2000, an extensive critical bibliography on conventional orthodoxy has been
released. Among others: Fiori and Medeiros (2001), Bresser-Pereira (2001, 2007, 2009), Stiglitz
(2002), Chang (2002 [2004]), Sicsú, de Paula, and Michel (2005).
13
The initiative to create the IEDI came from Paulo Cunha, Eugênio Staub, Claudio Bardella and
Paulo Francini, who at the time were among the most prominent businessmen of Brazil.
Ja of the Democratic People’s Pact (Pacto Democr atico Popular). The new Insti-
tute was a nationalist reaction to the internationalist trend that the FIESP had
adopted since the collapse of the Plano Cruzado. As reported by a member of the
IEDI, at a meeting in Guarujá in 1989, the attending entrepreneurs prepared the
document, “Vision of the IEDI Founders: Brazil in 2010” (Visão dos Fundadores
do IEDI: O Brasil em 2010), in which they predicted that Brazil, 20 years later,
would be “a pluralist democracy with strong political parties and well defined
ideas,” it would have a “participatory society,” and it would be “part of the
developed world; among the world’s five biggest economic powers, with a
corresponding per capita income” (IEDI, 1989:1).
This optimistic view, however, did not become a reality. The first 10 years were
difficult for the new organization because, on the one hand, the collapse of the
abovementioned pact overlapped with the political defeat of the Brazilian industrial
bourgeoisie, and, on the other, because those 10 years had been a period of absolute
neoliberal hegemony. In addition, the entrepreneurs were not prepared for the new
times; they were especially not prepared to criticize the macroeconomic policies
since, until then, they had focused on specific problems of the industrial and trade
policies. Moreover, their discourse against taxation, paradoxically, reproduced an
important aspect of the neoliberal discourse. To be more precise, the trade and
industrial policies implicitly already included a macroeconomic policy. In the
1970s, for example, by establishing an average of 50 % taxes on imports and
subsidies that also averaged 50 % for the exportation of industrial goods, the
resulting exchange rate for these assets was ultimately 50 % lower than the official
rate. This macroeconomic policy, however, was not defined by the Central Bank,
which was the main institution responsible for it; instead, the ministries of Finance,
Planning, and Trade and Industry established it through the country’s industrial
policy.
After trade liberalization and the elimination of export subsidies (1990–1992),
and also after several years of an anti-industrial macroeconomic policy—not only
because it was liberalizing, but mainly because it had been combined with an
effective, overvalued exchange rate—in 1998, the first major financial crisis after
the Plano Real opened an opportunity for the political resurrection of industrial
entrepreneurs. This opportunity came around the same time that Julio Cesar Gomes
de Almeida, professor at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), was invited to
become head of the Economic Department of IEDI, which guaranteed the Institute
new macroeconomic expertise. At the same time, the management team of the
Institute, under the presidency of Eugênio Staub, ceased to merely demand a new
industrial policy and began to criticize the interest rate policies, which were kept
very high, and the exchange rate policy (or rather the non-existence of such a policy
after the fluctuation of 1999), that did not bother to counteract its tendency for
overvaluation.14 Through a widely circulated document of 1998, “Agenda for an
14
See Bresser-Pereira (2009: Chap. 4), on this tendency, which, on the one hand, explains the
recurring external debt crises in developing countries, and, on the other, justifies an active
economic policy on the part of the financial authorities to neutralize this tendency.
Industrial Development Project” (Agenda para um Projeto de Desenvolvimento

Industrial), the IEDI triggered a wave of critical texts on the part of the Brazilian
industry regarding the prevailing economic policy—criticisms that, from that
moment on, would gain strength and coherence.
After being accused in an editorial of the newspaper Estado de São Paulo (Sept.
16, 1998) for having demonstrated “unjustifiable omission” in the fight against
inflation (as the government achieved in previous years), the IEDI leaders
announced their position publicly. In a press release of June 28, 1999, they stated
that, “. . . important results were achieved in terms of stabilization, privatization,
productivity gains, and openness of our economy.” The IEDI leaders went on to
emphasize that it was imperative to acknowledge that, “It is necessary to go beyond
a good economic environment and price stability, towards the definition of policies
to promote industrial development, within a development strategy also aimed to
structural change.” Thus, the entrepreneurs again showed their support for eco-
nomic liberalism, but they then associated it with the need for a national develop-
ment strategy, thereby rejecting the neoliberal premise of self-regulating markets.
Nonetheless, the new ideas that were beginning to be developed were not
integrated into a broader movement upheld by the industrial entrepreneurs as a
whole. The IEDI does not represent an entire social class and the entrepreneurs
themselves do not consider that the Institute’s proposals express the views of the
business class as a whole. It was therefore not possible to identify a new pact or an
agreement for an alternative proposal to restructure the economic order. In the late
1990s, after a series of financial crises in the developing countries and low growth
rates (in spite of having controlled the debt crisis and the problems of high
inflation), the neoliberal hegemonic model was already showing signs of decline.
There were many alternatives in terms of social, environmental, and industrial
policies, but there was not a clear macroeconomic alternative, nor, in a broader
sense, a national development strategy. At about the same time, a shift—although
still quite shy—began to occur within the FIESP with the election of a young
businessman, Horácio Lafer Piva,15 to its presidency in 1998. These changes in
terms of strengthening their macroeconomic competence and the ability to develop
alternatives also reached the CNI, chaired since 2002 by Armando Monteiro
Neto.16 The CNI was the first organization of industrial entrepreneurs to establish
an effective and competent economic advisory team to discuss macroeconomic
issues.
However, the change within the business class was only consolidated in the
context of two events: first, at the national level, with the election of Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva as President; and, second, at the internal level of the business
15
Horácio Lafer Piva, economist from São Paulo, with many family ties at the political level, was
FIESP’s youngest President.
16
Armando Monteiro Neto, industrialist, lawyer and politician from Pernambuco, is currently
Senator for his home State and member of the PT since 2003 (previously with PSDB and PMDB).
organizations, with the change of the FIESP’s top leaders and the subsequent
alliance between the business people linked to the FIESP and the IEDI.
In interviews conducted with various entrepreneurs, it became clear that the
return of industrial entrepreneurs to the political arena—a comeback that would be
marked by a stronger role in the dialogue with the government regarding the
definition of the country’s economic policies—received a fresh boost with Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva’s election as president, in October 2002. Except for some
important names such as Eugênio Staub in the industry, and Abı́lio Diniz in
domestic commerce, Brazilian entrepreneurs had strongly opposed the candidate
of the PT (Workers’ Party). However, when it became clear that the new president
was not going to adopt some of the radical policies that his party had advocated in
the past—such as non-compliance with international treaties and refusal to pay the
external debt—as well as the fact that he began to reveal much greater interest than
the previous government in an active industrial policy and in the defense of national
companies, industrial entrepreneurs began to support his government. Furthermore,
the more their opinions were heard, the more motivated they became to participate
in the national debate. The creation of the Council for Economic and Social
Development (CDES) and the invitation to a substantial number of entrepreneurs
to participate in this Council, granted them and the Ministry of Development and
Foreign Trade—MDIC (Ministério do Desenvolvimento e Comércio Exterior)—
which was an important forum to negotiate business interests—a greater role than
they had had since the collapse of both the Plano Cruzado and the democratic
developmental coalition that had presided the democratic transition.
With the election in 2005 of Paulo Skaff as President and Benjamin Steinbruck
and Josué Gomes da Silva in the vice-presidency of the FIESP—this institutions’
main advocates—businesses gained a leading role within the industrial sector. At
the same time, the FIESP and the IEDI started coordinating their work again.17
Thereby, the entrepreneurs’ influence on the country’s macroeconomic policy
obtained new coherence. In other State-level entities, such as the Industrial Associ-
ation of Paraná (Federação das Indústrias do Paran a), industrial entrepreneurs
began receiving support through the external participation of outstanding
macroeconomists.
In the above-mentioned IEDI document, Agenda para um Projeto de
Desenvolvimento Industrial, entrepreneurs questioned the speed of the economic
opening process, the preferential treatment that was given to foreign companies, the
closed nature of the decision-making processes, and the absence of an industrial
policy. Criticism intensified over the following years. Two years later, a new study
was published by the IEDI, under the lengthy title: “Industry and Development: An
Analysis of the 1990s and an Agenda for an Industrial Development Policy in the
New Decade” (Indústria e Desenvolvimento: uma An alise dos Anos 1990 e uma
17
The quality of the Economic Department also took another leap, now under the leadership of
Paulo Francini, a businessman, expert in macroeconomics, with ample experience in political
corporate participation since the 1970s.
agenda de Polı́tica de Desenvolvimento Industrial para a nova Década) (IEDI,

2000a). The study strengthened the argument in favor of a redefinition of the
economic policy, and it called for measures to stimulate the domestic market and
to support the national enterprises. Later that same year, the first study with a
clearly macroeconomic approach was published: “The Structure of Brazilian
Exports and the Objectives of the Export Policy” (A Pauta de Exportação
Brasileira e os Objetivos da Polı́tica de Exportações) (IEDI, 2000b). Meanwhile,
in the economic academic field, a publication by Bresser-Pereira and Yoshiaki
(2002), “A proposal of growth with stability” (Uma proposta de crescimento com
estabilidade), opened the first great national debate—since the Plano Real of
1994—about the macroeconomic policy by challenging orthodox economists to
answer the questions raised therein.18 In the same year, Eugenio Staub, as president
of IEDI, initiated a public debate program on the economic situation, called
“Polemicize” (Polemizar), and with it paved the way for entrepreneurs to become
more directly involved in the discussions on economic policy.
In 2001, Ivoncy Ioschpe took over the IEDI presidency, having been appointed
by his peers for his “entirely macroeconomic mind.” The first significant study of
the IEDI on macroeconomic policy was published that year: “Brazilian foreign
trade in the 90s and the changes after exchange rate depreciation in 1990” (O Comé
rcio Exterior Brasileiro nos anos 90 e as Mudanças ap os a Desvalorização cambial
de 1990). Other publications followed, which focused increasingly on macro-
economic issues and especially the problems to do with the excessively high
interest rates and the overvalued exchange rate. Another step forward came with
Bresser-Pereira’s article in the newspaper Folha de São Paulo (2006b) where he
stated that the “Dutch disease”19 was one of the causes of the overvaluation of the
exchange rate and the low growth rate that prevailed at that moment. This triggered
a new debate in the country in which the Economic Department of the FIESP-IEDI
alliance had a leading role. Several studies conducted by these institutions showed
that the “Dutch disease” was leading to a “premature deindustrialization” of the
country and to a reduction in the use of sophisticated technology in industrial
production. It is normal for developed countries to deindustrialize inasmuch as
their highly skilled workers migrate to sub-sectors in the services sector that offer a
higher per capita added value. But the phenomenon was occurring in Brazil in a
development stage in which other countries had continued to industrialize. The
debate on these issues gained new space in 2004, when the new São Paulo School of
Economics (Escola de Economia de São Paulo), of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas—
FGV, created the “Economic Forum of the FGV” (F orum de Economia da FGV).
This forum that was co-sponsored by the FIESP and the IEDI, and also by the
18
A dossier on this debate can be found at www.bresserpereira.org.br
19
Editors’ note: The “Dutch disease” refers to an economic phenomenon, according to which there
is an appreciation of the currency through foreign trade surpluses in one sector (raw materials),
which, in turn, acts in detriment of other sectors (industry). The supposedly positive aspects of
foreign trade surpluses thereby reverse into the opposite direction.
umbrella organization of the trade unions, i.e., the Central Workers’ Union Con-
federation (CUT) and Força Sindical (FS, also a national trade union federation),
became a privileged place for the discussion on the major macroeconomic devel-
opment issues, and particularly on the issue of the relationship between a compe-
titive exchange rate and economic development; i.e., an exchange rate, which could
be achieved by overcoming the “Dutch disease”, and the deliberate rejection of the
external debt crisis.
5 Opportunities for a New Developmental Coalition
After the financial crises of the 1990s, in the first decade of this millennium we
witnessed the failure of the neoliberal reforms; the countries that had adopted these
showed low growth rates, and rising unemployment and inequality. On the other
hand, as international literature repeatedly pointed out, countries such as China and
India that had not adopted them, showed accelerated growth rates. The success of
these and several other Asian countries, as well as Argentina’s capacity to over-
come its crisis since 2003, clearly demonstrated the fallacy of assuming the
infallibility of universal recipes. In the new intellectual environment, the rejection
of the imposed convergence and uniformity came to the foreground. The
governments’ ability to act with autonomy in the choice of paths to follow became
the basis for the explanations of the success stories. Consequently, the debate about
alternative development strategies and new forms of integration into the global
economy was recovered. One of the alternatives, the new developmental strategy
(novo desenvolvimentismo) (Bresser-Pereira, 2007), emphasizes the importance of
economic stability and fiscal balance, while it also makes room to resume the
development process under conditions of equity and sustainability. As for the
macroeconomic policy, this strategy proposes moderate interest rates, rejects both
balance of payments deficits and growth through external savings, and it suggests to
manage the exchange rate in such a way that its tendency of overvaluation be
neutralized.
The great financial crisis that began in the United States in 2007, and became a
global economic crisis the following year, confirmed the failure of the neoliberal
economic policies of deregulation and weakening of the state—policies that are
now penalizing the rich countries that had encouraged them. Although these are
regrettable facts, they also have a positive side: they constitute an opportunity for
Brazil to define a new development strategy on a national basis—a strategy that we
have termed new developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira, 2006a, 2007). How will this
approach differentiate itself from conventional orthodoxy, which claims to be the
only path to economic development? What kind of coalition would be capable of
sustaining an alternative characterized by a new approach in relation to foreign
companies, foreign trade, industrial policy, technological development, economic
growth, and the role of the internal market, as well as the urgent issues of income
redistribution and the reduction of inequality? Will entrepreneurs once again be
able to assume a central role in the articulation of a new developmental political
alliance that is different from both the old developmentalism and conventional
orthodoxy? Is it time for them to again assume an influential position in Brazil, by
actively participating in the national economic development process, recovering
political space, and contributing to the recovery of national economic develop-
ment? It is impossible to answer all these questions; however, we believe that in this
chapter we have shown that the last question is receiving a positive answer.
Currently there is consensus about the fact that in the first years of the new
millennium the center of global economy began to shift towards the developing
countries, especially in Asia. In this change process, entrepreneurs and national
governing bodies played a decisive role. It is difficult, however, to predict how this
change at the global level will affect the Brazilian entrepreneurship and the country
as a whole. As we pointed out, the changes that took place in the 1990s, especially
privatization and trade liberalization, in addition to the constitutional reforms, led
to a deep break with the past. These changes were effective in dismantling the
foundations of the old developmental order and made any prospect of returning to
the previous situation, as well as the use of old paradigms to interpret the current
context, anachronistic. However, this does not guarantee that Brazil will adopt a
new developmental strategy, which is less interventionist, less protectionist, and
rather fights for a strategic industrial policy and a macroeconomic policy based on
fiscal discipline, low interest rates, growth with domestic savings, and a competitive
exchange rate (contrary to the orthodox policy which relies on high interest rates,
growth with external savings, and overvalued exchange rates). Conventional
orthodoxy’s reforms and government policies were not effective in creating a
new development strategy because the diagnoses and recommendations made, as
well as the pressure exerted, were a reaction of the rich countries to the increasing
competition they were getting worldwide from middle-income countries, in the
context of globalization. Conventional orthodoxy was not intended for the devel-
opment of middle-income countries, but rather for the neutralization of their
competitiveness, especially through the policy of overvaluing the exchange rate.
Between 2002 and 2007, Brazil, and Latin America in general, benefited from the
price increase of the commodities they exported. This resulted in an increase in the
growth rates that nonetheless remained very low in comparison with those of other
developing countries whose growth had also accelerated.
Brazil will really only develop economically and ‘catch up’—as it did between
1930 and 1980, in the context of national developmentalism—if it manages to
formulate a national development strategy that responds to the country’s reality and
is based on fiscal health, low interest rates, and competitive exchange rates, without
disregarding the issue of social justice. Only a policy based on these lines of action
will be able to combine economic development with equity, and lead the country
into a new development stage, by prioritizing its ethical, social, and political
dimensions. After all, as Amartya Sen (1999) pointed out, more than anything
else, development requires that the main sources of deprivation of liberty be
removed, such as tyranny, poverty, lack of economic opportunities, systematic
social exclusion, negligence in the provision of essential public services (health,
education, basic infrastructure for water, and sewage), as well as economic,
political, and social insecurity. Economic growth is definitely an important compo-

nent; it contributes not only to increase private incomes, but it also allows the state
to finance social security systems as well as focalized government interventions.
Since Lula’s election as president in 2002, in Brazil we are living in a transition
period, from a market-oriented model to an economic system with greater state
coordination. Though there is certain continuity with the previous period, the
discontinuities predominate. On the one hand, the continuity of the macroeconomic
policies of the previous government indicates that the international financial alli-
ance remains influential, but since the replacement of Finance Minister Antonio
Palocci, who adopted a definitively liberal or orthodox approach, by Minister Guido
Mantega (now for almost 8 years in office), the new developmental ideas have been
strengthened. This fact was reinforced during Lula’s second administration through
the choice of Luciano Coutinho for president of the National Bank of Economic and
Social Development (BNDES). It is probably for this reason that some entre-
preneurs associate the increase in their political participation with the 2002
elections. However, the left wing, trade-unionist character of the government has
made the Brazilian bourgeoisie as a whole, and especially its more conservative and
pro-globalization sectors, feel excluded from power. Thus, they live in a contra-
diction that has always characterized the industrial bourgeoisie in Brazil: they
identify with nationalist governments because in such contexts they feel stronger
but, at the same time, they insist on their liberal and internationalist perspectives,
which bring them closer to dominant capitalism.
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Globais. São Paulo: Futura.
Brothers in Arms? Trade Union Politics
Under the Workers Party Governments 12
Waldeli Melleiro and Jochen Steinhilber
Abstract
Waldeli Melleiro and Jochen Steinhilber portray the Brazilian trade unions.
Under Lula, former chairman of the federation of trade unions, Central Única
dos Trabalhadores (CUT), the unions have achieved more leeway. The new
policy of organized labor (Novo Sindicalismo) is characterized by stronger
militancy of the unions within the companies, their nature as a social-movement
and their alliance politics with other political forces. In the recent past, the
Brazilian labor movements have demonstrated a high level of strategic flexibility
and they have re-aligned their strategies in relatively frequent intervals in
response to changes in the political and social contexts. Also under Lula, the
unions of this novel movement were able to combine power resources in new
ways and partially expand them. The structural strength of the labor movement
was increased by the dynamic in economic growth, the focus on the internal
market as an engine of growth, the favorable employment trends as well as the
growing importance of large companies. Nonetheless, the growing differences
between parts of the social movements and the government also affected the
relationship with the trade unions.
W. Melleiro (*)
Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: waldeli@fes.org.br
J. Steinhilber
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: jochen.steinhilber@fes.de

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_12
202 W. Melleiro and J. Steinhilber
1 Learning from the South?1
Following a number of years in which crisis, catastrophe and doomsday scenarios

have widely been portrayed as the likely fate of the labor and trade union
movements (see Labbe & Croisat, 2000; Müller-Jentsch, 2006), it is indeed grati-
fying that a text about trade union politics features in a book about the political
system of a country. However, the fact is that any survey of the social and political
developments that have taken place in Brazil in the past 30 years must include the
Brazilian labor movement. After all, large sections of the labor movement have had
a decisive impact on the key political moments in the country’s history during the
past three decades—from the battle against the military dictatorship that began at
the end of the 1970s, to the shaping of the constitution of 1988, and the election of
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as Brazilian president in 2002.
For (trade union) observers from the North, a precise analysis of the tendencies
and the strategies developed by one of the strongest labor movements in the South
could be of far-reaching significance. One example is the way in which, after two
decades of joint struggle based on a common political and cultural identity, the
structural relations between sections of the trade union movement and the Brazilian
Workers’ Party (PT) have in the past 10 years, under the PT government, been
subjected to a tough practical test. In contrast to developments in Europe, this test
did not end in profound mutual alienation. Moreover, Brazil has been so crisis-
resistant that it has become the cover girl of international news magazines and is
currently viewed as one of the markets of the future. It is true that among the BRIC
countries, which many commentators believe will set the coordinates for a new
trade geography in the years to come, Brazil does not have the highest growth rates.
But it does, without a doubt, have the most influential and best-organized trade
union movement. Moreover, the Brazilian labor movement is, alongside its
counterparts in South Africa and South Korea, a standard-bearer of the new trade
union politics (Novo Sindicalismo), which began to emerge in the 1980s and was
characterized by its militancy in the workplace, its status as a movement, and its
ability to build alliances. The growing criticism of established trade union strategies
(Moody, 1997) and the revitalization of the trade union movements in the USA and
Europe are two developments that have made these earlier examples increasingly
significant. The recent history of the Brazilian labor movement is a good example
of how unions—beginning with the movement for renewal that Novo Sindicalismo
represented—can in relatively short intervals re-evaluate their strategies on the
basis of new political and social conditions. In doing so, they have repeatedly
succeeded in combining different sources of trade union capacity and power to
negotiate and to prevail in a struggle.
Potentially, labor and trade union movements have at their disposal four power
resources: structural power, organizational power, symbolic power and institutional
power. Structural power stems from the position of wage earners in the economic
1
12 Brothers in Arms? Trade Union Politics Under the Workers Party Governments 203
system (which is determined by, among other factors, the labor markets, the
relationship between formal and informal employment, and the significance of
the domestic economy). It is also derived from the strategic role that certain groups
of employees play in key sectors of production (Wright, 2000: 962). In this context,
Silver (2003: 13) distinguishes between “marketplace bargaining power”, which is
related to the overall labor market, and “workplace bargaining power”, which is
related to the production process. Organizational power is, by contrast, collective
power that stems from labor organizations such as trade unions, parties and factory
committees, or from alliances with other social movements. Different forms of
structural power often require different organizational and mobilization strategies
(Silver, 2003: 92–94). Symbolic power targets the public domain and the media and
usually comes into play when labor disputes are set in a broader political context. It
manifests itself at the national level (such as in liberation or democratization
movements) or in local and municipal movements when the organizations of the
labor movement and their methods (for example, strike action) have received broad
public recognition (Von Holdt & Webster, 2008: 337). Institutional power, finally,
is the result of a combination of the structural negotiating power of strong labor
organizations and social prestige, and is defined through the system of industrial
relations, through mechanisms of participation in society, and through the institu-
tional integration of the labor unions in government activities. The special signifi-
cance of these labor relations is that they are “rooted in the fact that institutions of
fundamental social compromise have been established and are maintained regard-
less of economic fluctuations and short-term shifts in the social balance of power”
(Brinkmann et al., 2008: 25).
During the various phases of the development of the Brazilian trade union
movement over the past 30 years—the fresh start in the 1980s, the rearguard battles
fought by the unions in the 1990s and the establishment of the political project in
the PT government (Lula 2003–2010 and Dilma Rousseff since 2011)—these
power resources were mixed and remixed in many different ways. This has however
taken place on the basis of a legislative framework that has, right through to the
present day, in part served to formally inhibit the impact of structural, organiza-
tional and symbolic power. In order to fully appreciate the strategies and concepts,
the successes and defeats, and the scope and prospects of Brazil’s labor and trade
union movement, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of the main structures
imposed by labor and trade union legislation.
2 Caught in the System
In much the same way as in other Latin American countries, Brazil’s labor
organizations were for a long time essentially informal workers’ support
associations. The beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence, under
the leadership of European immigrants, of a more assertive, anarchistic labor
movement that failed, however, to consolidate itself (Boris, 1990: 56). Following
the 1930 coup led by Getúlio Vargas and the subsequent years of dictatorship,
which marked the beginning of the transition from a latifundia aristocracy to an

industrial state, the nascent workers’ movement was subsumed in a so-called
“populist pact”. The Estado Novo was an attempt to prop up the developmentalist
dictatorship with the emerging bourgeoisie and the new urban working class in
order to strengthen the centralized state in relation to the old elite in the regions. The
precondition for doing this was the social integration of the working class and the
disciplining of the trade union movement. To co-opt the workers’ movement,
numerous new rights protecting workers were decreed, including protection against
dismissal and maternity protection, as well as a statutory minimum wage. At the
same time, however, the Vargas government imposed an authoritarian corporatist
regime that effectively abolished the autonomy of the labor movement and turned
the trade unions into nothing more than an extended arm of the state. What is more,
the labor legislation introduced in 1941 effectively put labor relations under state
control (Rodrigues, 1990: 54). The system established by the Vargas government
created, for both workers and enterprises, unions that were organized according to
categories of employment. They were not permitted to engage in political activities
and their function was clearly to serve a state-defined notion of public welfare.
From the perspective of the workers, the result was trade unions with neither head
nor feet: without, that is, either national organization or proper representation in the
workplace—unions that were bound and gagged by the state. The minimal influ-
ence that they had been left with ended at the factory gate.
The official trade union system was regulated by the labor laws codified in
1943—the so-called Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT). This was, in effect,
a collection of labor laws that had been decreed between 1930 and 1943. Some
elements of the CLT can be traced back to the Carta del Lavore, the labor laws
imposed in fascist Italy. Despite a number of important modifications, which were
due mainly to pressure from the democracy movement of the 1980s, it is remarkable
to note to what extent the fundamental structures of Brazilian labor law have, right
through to the present day, withstood revolutions, political upheavals and social
transformation. Some 70 years after they were first put in place, the central pillars of
the corporatist system remain intact.
According, for instance, to the principle of trade union unity (unicidade
sindical), in each occupational category in any defined district or area only one
single union for employees and one for employers is permitted, such that these
unions have a monopoly over the representation of all workers or enterprises in the
area in question. What this means in practice is that employees have the freedom
not to join the union, but they do not have the freedom not to be represented by the
union, let alone the freedom to choose between different unions or to set up a rival
union. This represents a violation of ILO Convention 87 on the freedom of associa-
tion and protection of the right to organize, which to date has not been ratified by
Brazil. In the same way, trade union umbrella organizations—so-called central
organizations—were long forbidden. However, since the beginning of the 1980s,
such central organizations have begun to emerge in parallel with the official system.
These organizations are organized horizontally and represent workers in a variety
of occupational categories. It was only in 2008 that these central organizations were
legally recognized.
In 2001 (the year of the last survey) there were around 16,000 trade unions,
including 4000 representing agricultural workers, and 5000 workers’ organizations.
However, 55 % of labor unions were not affiliated with any of the central
organizations and therefore effectively supported the corporatist system. Official
Labor Ministry figures from May 2013 listed 10,179 trade unions, of which 25 %
were not organized in any central organization. In the past 10 years, the centralized
union organizations have apparently been able to strengthen their position in
comparison with primary-level unions. At the same time, the level of organization
has in recent years remained relatively stable, at between 17 and 18 %, with the
focus on the metalworking industry, the public sector and the banking sector. The
proportions of women (40.6 %) and men (59.4 %) broadly reflect their level of
representation in the workforce (DIEESE, 2009: 184–185). The continued strong
tendency towards a mass of unions rather than unions representing the masses has
tended to limit efforts to develop collective strategies.
In order to make the union organizations more independent from the mobiliza-
tion of their members, the state secured the financial survival of the system through
a trade union tax or contribution (contribuição sindical). This is the second pillar of
the corporatist system and it still exists today. Each and every employee, whether or
not they are organized, must pay 1 day’s wage each year to the Labor Ministry,
which then passes on the proceeds to the various trade union bodies at all levels of
the system, while retaining part of the funds for itself (10 %). In 2011, no less than
R$2.4 billion (921 million euros) flowed into the unions’ coffers this way.
The third pillar of the corporatist system is represented by Brazil’s labor courts,
which not only rule on individual labor conflicts, but also have a normative power
in wage negotiations. The courts function as compulsory arbitrators whose rulings
are binding on the negotiating parties. Until the mid-1990s, the central role played
by the labor courts meant that their decisions were crucial in deciding the outcome
of all agreements on working conditions and wages. In the past 15 years there has
been a strong decrease in the number of resolutions of wage disputes ordered by the
courts, reflecting the diminishing influence of the judicial authorities in wage
negotiations.
According to labor law (CLT) all wage negotiations between the “trade
unions”—that is, between the employees’ unions and the enterprises where they
are employed—have to begin by a set date. What is more, the unions have to be
careful that they do not overlook the fact that different dates are set for the various
occupational categories and areas. The details of the negotiating process, which
begins 60 days before the set date, are stipulated by law. The greater part of the
settlement reached does not result from any real negotiating process but from
ritualized posturing in front of regional labor courts. In practice, the majority of
settlements are reached within the structures of a “single” trade union. Since 1994,
however, there has been a substantial increase in settlements with individual
enterprises (Cardoso & Gindin, 2009: 18). In recent years, the CUT (Central
Única dos Trabalhadores) trade union confederation has been attempting to
negotiate nationwide wage agreements. Its only success, however, has been in the
banking sector.
Since there is no statutory provision for workers’ representation, the level of
trade union penetration in the workplace in Brazil remains low. The 1988 constitu-
tion does foresee the election of workers’ representatives in enterprises with more
than 200 employees, but this has never been anchored in concrete laws. The few
existing legally-stipulated institutions designed to represents workers’ interests in
the workplace—such as the health and safety committees (CIPA), with equal
representation for employers and employees, or the commissions for negotiating
profit participation (Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados—PPR, PLR) that were
established in the 1990s—are responsible merely for individual issues and often
function independently from the unions. In a number of large-scale enterprises
located in Brazil’s core industrial regions, the unions have succeeded in setting up
workers’ representations—despite resistance from the employers. There remains an
exception, however. In 2001, only 9 % of trade unions (DIEESE, 2009: 186) said
that there were union or workers’ representations in workplaces in the districts for
which they were responsible.
The development of labor union strategies in present-day Brazil must be judged
against the backdrop of a hybrid system in which the traditional corporatist
structures overlap both with new developments in the trade union movement
since the end of the 1970s and with neo-corporatist elements. What results is a
highly-complex structure of labor and trade union relations characterized by a
paradoxical juxtaposition of what are ultimately non-compatible principles, such
as paternalism/autonomy or intervention/freedom of contract. The negative impact
of the system on the emergence of a robust and autonomous trade union movement
remains considerable. The legal framework promotes the fragmentation and decen-
tralization of the union movement and severely inhibits its organizational potential.
From the registration and official designation of the organizational basis of a union,
through to the trade union tax that effectively secures the survival of most unions,
and finally on to wage negotiations, the state still plays a huge role in many trade
union activities.
However, the political changes and trade union successes of the past 30 years
have had much more than a merely cosmetic impact on the traditional corporatist
system (Rodrigues & Ramalho, 2009: 4). The unions’ struggle for structural
recognition also stands for the re-appropriation and redefinition of their power
resources, which began with a massive boost in structural power at the end of the
1970s.
3 Time of Renewal
The 1964 coup turned Brazil into an ideal investment location for companies that
were trying to escape from the radicalization of the labor movement in other central
industrial locations (Silver, 2003: 56). Brazil’s so-called “economic miracle”,
which generated high growth rates even during the global economic crisis, was
based not only on extensive foreign and state investment but also—and above all—
on the overexploitation of the workforce through forced overtime, wages imposed
by diktat, higher work density and repression in the factories, as well as the
suppression of all forms of trade union opposition (Santana, 1999: 112). It became
practically impossible to carry out legal strikes, wage increases were decreed by the
government and the positive elements of labor law were in large measure
suspended.
Because of the high level of direct investment, the new jobs that such investment
created in the metalworking industry on the periphery of São Paulo, as well as the
migration of many people who had been forced by droughts to leave Brazil’s north-
east and move to the big city, a new urban working class began to emerge—and
with it, a grassroots trade union movement. The traditional labor union movement
had focused its activities on state corporations in the oil industry and transport
sector in the former capital Rio de Janeiro. But during the course of the 1970s an
“authentic” trade union movement independent of official structures began to
develop in São Paulo’s automobile industry, under the leadership of a new genera-
tion of trade union activists, including Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who also had his
roots in the north-east. Beginning with the industrial action taken at Saab-Scania
(1978), a new strike wave was triggered at the end of the 1970s that would go on to
smash the wage policies imposed by the military government and represent both the
renewal of the trade union movement and the reconstitution of the left in Brazil.
The key features of Novo Sindicalismo were that it shifted the focus of trade
union activities to the workplace, while at the same time stood shoulder to shoulder
with movements and struggles for social and civil rights (Da Costa, 2007: 597). For
decades, companies and enterprises had been shielded from trade union activities,
but now the strongest impulse for change and renewal came precisely from within
enterprises, triggered as it was by the vehement exploitation of newly-won struc-
tural power resources. Workers in the automobile industry played an important role
in this context. Not only did they have a key position in the Brazilian workforce,
working as they did in the most important export sector in the country’s
manufacturing industry, which made a major contribution to repaying the country’s
huge foreign debt and was concentrated in large-scale plants on the periphery of
São Paulo, but they also represented a critical mass for the trade union struggle
(Humphrey, 1982: 137). To begin, nearly all strikes took place at the level of the
individual plant or workplace. Although these activities were regularly denounced
and attacked by the government as subversive and “antisocial”, the movement
succeed in reestablishing the strike in large sections of the public consciousness
as a legitimate means of trade union politics. Hundreds of workers’ committees and
works’ commissions were established during the labor disputes in order to coordi-
nate the strikes and carry out wage negotiations with companies. The real opponent
of the trade union movement in this early phase of the struggle was the state, which
in the years that followed persisted in employing tough repressive measures in a bid
to break the strike wave and prevent the unions from gaining a firm foothold in the
workplace.
The strike wave introduced new issues—such as conditions in the factories or the
social situation of the workers—into the public debate, where they became linked
with the growing criticism and resistance being exercised by other social actors.
The legitimacy of the labor union movement received a huge boost because it was
open to broad grassroots participation and willing to enter into alliances with
emerging neighborhood and community movements that, above all, addressed
problems in the provision of primary services (water, electricity or health). A
special role was also played by the grassroots Christian communities that had
been inspired by Liberation Theology. The commitment of these groups helped to
provide both the space that the strike and community movements needed for their
activities and a degree of political protection.
In contrast to the situation in, for example, South Korea, the first successes
marked by the strike movement were followed by a growing consensus within the
Brazilian labor movement that new organizations would be required to represent
the wide-ranging social and political demands that the strike movement stood for in
the public arena and, at the same time, to coordinate the diverse forms of social and
political resistance that were manifesting themselves in an increasingly mobilized
society. The foundation of the PT (1980) and the CUT (1983) helped the labor
movement to significantly extend its organizational power, bringing about a lasting
change in the topography of Brazil’s political left.
A number of important official trade unions were politically subsumed by the
new labor movement. As long as state repression did not stand in the way, it was, at
the beginning of the 1980s, the financial and administrative resources that the trade
union bureaucracies had at their disposal that made it possible for the movement to
debate future developments at countless congresses. What became apparent during
these debates, however, was that there were already very different concepts of what
trade unions stood for and fundamental strategic differences within the labor union
movement. These could roughly be divided into two blocks (Rodrigues, 1991: 28):
on the one side, there were the representatives of “authentic” unions, the trade union
opposition, and numerous Trotskyist groupings. They backed general strikes and
the rapid dismantling of corporatist structures, which they hoped would lead to
more freedom and autonomy for individual unions. The “reform block” was based
mainly on the communist parties, on liberal elements within the trade union
bureaucracy and supporters of the US trade union model. Its supporters were united
in the belief that it was necessary to defend the central components of corporatism,
that the general strike was a threat to the process of opening the country up and that
a “social pact” was the best option for shaping the transition to democracy. Despite
these differences, all the different trade union groupings took part in 1981 in the
first—and, until June 2010, only—national conference of the working class
(CONCLAT). But, after the failure of initial moves towards the formation of a
joint central organization, the left set up the CUT in 1983, while the reform block
came together in 1986 to form the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT). The
ideological tensions between the communist wing and the unions that oriented
themselves more closely to the American Business Union Model led quickly to a
split in the movement. In 1990, the largest communist grouping (CSC) joined the
CUT, while the representatives of a so-called “outcome-oriented trade union

strategy” established Força Sindical (FS) in 1991.
During the course of the 1980s, it was above all the CUT that was able to
continuously extend its hegemony over the trade union movement. It underlined its
organizational capacities by carrying out a number of general strikes against the
economic policies imposed by the government, establishing itself as the legitimate
voice of large sectors of the workers’ movement. The national scope of the
confederation, the diversity of different political tendencies within one organiza-
tion, the joint mobilization of employees in a large variety of sectors (above all the
alliance of industrial and agricultural workers), as well as the exercising of political
influence on the development of the country, were all new departures in Brazilian
trade union history and manifestations of the strength of the CUT. By the end of the
1980s it had become a central political actor. This influence extended far beyond
trade union politics and, alongside the PT and the Landless Workers Movement
(MST), the CUT helped give large parts of the Brazilian people something they had
not had before: a voice and a face on the country’s political stage.
Despite their massive criticism of corporatism, which had of course played a
constitutive role in the formation of numerous work-based trade union movements,
the CUT chose not to break with the system, but to try and change it from within.
With the takeover of many official unions, as well as the significant expansion of its
own base, it proved to be highly successful, at least until the end of the 1980s.
However, CUT’s very success in broadening its hegemony within the system
increasingly came at the expense of the original project of establishing a new
trade union structure that would facilitate democratic reconstruction. The outstand-
ing moment in the institutional consolidation of the successes of a decade of social
and labor union struggle was the new constitution of 1988. Numerous social
achievements that were set down in the constitution had been hard-won by individ-
ual unions battling for progress in their own sectors. These included the reduction of
the basic working week to 44 h, an increase in overtime bonuses, compensation for
workers laid off by their employers and the extension of maternity protection to
4 months. Although it was hardly a root-and-branch reform of the system, the
constitution did represent a major shake-up of state corporatism. In fact, it went a
long way towards abolishing the most repressive elements of state control of the
unions, guaranteeing the right to strike and giving civil servants and other public
sector employees the right to organize themselves. It also meant that large parts of
social and welfare policies became the prerogative of national forums in which
unions and other organizations enjoyed co-decision and consultation powers.
Within just 10 years, the progressive labor movement—previously so
fragmented—began to develop a strong common identity that allowed it to renew
its structural, organizational and symbolic power resources and, initially at least, to
defy the crisis that beset the international labor movement. However, the new
political and social conditions that began to be felt in the 1990s prevented the
new democratic framework that the constitution had helped create from developing
fuller shape and form.
4 The Backlash
It was only with a certain delay that many of the symptoms of the crisis that rocked
the international trade union movement arrived in Brazil. But by the end of the
1990s the neo-liberal structural changes that had taken hold in many countries in the
North also began to have an impact in Brazil. The privatization of large state-owned
enterprises, the liberalization of markets and the flexibilization of working relations
put an end to what had become known as “tropical Fordism”. The result: the unions
came under growing pressure. The deindustrialization of core sectors of the econ-
omy, high rates of unemployment and a drastic rise in informal employment, all
shook the social bases of the trade union movement, having an especially
devastating effect on the pillars of Novo Sindicalismo. Between 1990 and 1997,
the number of jobs in urban Brazil fell by around 4 %, while one in three jobs in
industry was slashed. At the same time, the rate of informal employment had risen
to 54 % of all jobs by 1998 (Souza Martins & Rodrigues, 1999: 156). In the region
around São Paulo—the heart of Brazil’s automotive industry—the metalworkers’
union was confronted by the halving of all jobs in the sector through to 1999, the
relocation of plants and a rapid deterioration in working conditions. In the banking
sector, the automation of many operating processes and the stabilization of the
financial system that began in 1994 led to massive layoffs. The public sector unions,
which had registered the highest strike rates in 1980s, were above all hit by
privatizations in the steel industry and banking sector, the budget crisis and the
decentralization of public services. The weakening of the most combative sections
of the Brazilian labor movement was reflected in a notable decline in strike activity.
The Brazil of the 1980s had been viewed as a country of industrial action and labor
disputes: strikes that changed the face of the country. But within just a few short
years the number of strikes fell from 3200 (1989) to 624 (1992) (Sandoval, 2001:
177).
With the end of large-scale strikes and mass mobilization, the social impact of
the CUT waned significantly. The unions began to devise strategies that focused on
issues directly related to protecting jobs, the organization of the workplace, or the
flexibilization of wages. The so-called ABC region of greater São Paulo once again
became a laboratory for the relationship between capital and labor. Above all in the
automobile sector, but also in shipbuilding and the toy-manufacturing industry, the
unions took part through to the mid-1990s in tripartite branch chambers that had the
role of facilitating the restructuring process. The agreements in the automobile
industry, for instance, provided for lower prices and taxes, more flexible wages,
and—in the short term—maintenance of the level of employment in the
manufacturing plants (Arbix, 1996). Furthermore, the neo-corporatist institutions
created by the constitution were, for the first time, put to the test. On a whole range
of political levels and in a variety of areas—including social security, the health
system, education and youth policies, as well as vocational training—advisory and
supervisory councils with trade union participation were established. In the health
system alone, there were 5000 such institutions in 1997. These participatory
elements went hand in hand with the idea of the “citizens’ trade union” that was
put forth by the CUT—also in order to better represent the interests of the unem-
ployed and the informally employed (Da Costa, 2007: 623).
The resulting increase in institutional power did not, however, disguise the fact
that the unions were not really capable of putting up much resistance to the
government and employer offensive. During the crisis, the focus shifted to the
level of individual plants and enterprises, where according to the law the unions
were effectively shut out and, in concrete terms, hardly represented. As in Europe,
the threat of job cuts or the relocation of large-scale enterprises in Brazil’s metal-
working industry forced well-organized unions to engage in so-called “concession
bargaining” (Cardoso, 2003), which proved no more successful. The majority of the
unions were only poorly embedded in the firms and enterprises and had no right to
information. As a result, they could negotiate only within a framework unilaterally
defined by the enterprises. Only 38 % of wage agreements between 1996 and 2002
were higher than the rate of inflation and many of the hard-fought achievements of
the 1980s were reversed. Moreover, significant elements of the compromises
designed to cushion the impact of the restructuring of working practices—
compromises that had in many case been negotiated under unequal conditions—
were simply not implemented by enterprises (Cotanda, 2008: 646).
From 1995, the Cardoso government increasingly turned the screw on the labor
unions through repressive measures to crush strike action (Souza Martins &
Rodrigues, 1999: 158), on the one hand, and, on the other, the flexibilization of
labor relations and decentralization of negotiations. A series of laws were designed
to turn the fundamentally worker-friendly framework established through the
constitution into its very opposite: the temporary suspension of employment
contracts was, for instance, permitted; temporary employment and “working time
accounts” were introduced; the profit participation arrangement provided for in the
constitution (PLR) was given concrete form; and ILO Convention 158 covering the
termination of employment was scrapped in order to make it easier to lay off
workers (Cardoso & Gindin, 2009: 5). All this was only the prelude to a law that
would put the results of negotiations above the social rights set down in the
constitution and legally stipulated norms concerning health and safety in the
workplace. The law, introduced in 2001, was blocked in the Senate, however, and
never passed. Removing this highly symbolic project from the political agenda, and
putting the brakes on the flexibilization process, was one of the first moves
undertaken by the Lula government.
The dispute that surrounded this draft legislation also highlighted the deep
political divisions that had emerged within the trade union movement during the
1990s. While the CUT rejected the law, the project was supported by Força
Sindical. This confederation—set up in 1991—promised “trade union policies
that get results”. By rejecting a more conflict-oriented approach, it had succeed in
drawing a number of important unions, especially in the metalworking sector, away
from the CUT, making it the second largest central organization in Brazil. By
openly opposing the CUT and the MST, as well as actively supporting the
privatization and flexibilization of labor relations and cuts in social welfare
spending, Força Sindical established itself as the most important social force
backing the neo-liberal governments of the 1990s (Tropia, 2008).
Meanwhile, fragmentation was also gathering pace at the grassroots level of the
labor movement. This was in part due to the easing of requirements for the
establishment of trade unions that had applied since the beginning of the new
republic in coordination with the retention of the trade union tax. Between 1991
and 2001 the number of unions increased by 43 %. These included many so called
“yellow unions” that did not represent workers’ interests, but were either set up with
the sole purpose of profiting from revenues from the trade union tax, or were
specifically intended to promote individual political careers (Zylberstajn, 2005:
100). It was not a rare occurrence for applications for the establishment of
employers’ and employees’ organizations to be made by the same person.
The CUT managed to make up for some of the losses in what had previously
been core sectors by opening up to female workers and, above all, to agricultural
laborers; while Força Sindical succeed in appealing to new groups of workers, with
the result that the level of trade union membership in Brazil did not diminish to the
same degree as in many other countries (Favareto, 2006: 38). The increasing
differentiation taking place in the production process, together with the rise in
unemployment and informal employment, as well as the growing geographic
dispersion of production facilities, the growing focus on the individual workplace
and the polarization among the leading central organizations, all meant that by the
end of the decade not much was left of the so-recently developed shared identity
within the Brazilian labor movement.
After three failed attempts to win the presidency, the progressive elements
within the trade union movement continued to pin their hopes on Lula, who was
for the first time explicitly supported by the CUT in 2002. But by this time there had
already been a shift in the political conditions for a victory for the left: while the
unions have been working to come up with new approaches, so too had the
PT. During the 1990s the PT adopted a new strategy designed to project it beyond
the historical core of its traditional social base and forge a “national coalition”. This
included reaching out a hand to the employers’ camp.
5 Good Times for the Unions?
Lula’s election in 2000 not only signaled the entry into the presidential palace of the
charismatic leader of the “new trade union movement” and the Brazilian left. It also
stood for the hope that the political project that large parts of the trade unions and
social movements had for been battling for many years would now be realized. But
the opening up of the PT to business-friendly positions during the election cam-
paign had already set a new tone (Véras de Oliveira, 2009: 12). In his “letter to the
Brazilian people” in June 2002 Lula had promised that there would be no radical
change in economic policy. Thus from the very beginning the government was
faced with the challenge of striking a fine and difficult balance—between stability
and redistribution, orthodox economic policy and socio-political priorities, market
principles and strengthening the role of the state. In effect: finding the right balance
between Davos and Porto Alegre. The new governing coalition was itself anything
but a left-wing government. Instead, it was a politically heterogeneous multi-party
alliance featuring what were in part contradictory interests. Given these strongly
diverging interests, the CUT saw the coalition as a “divided government” and it set
out to apply as much social and political pressure as possible to strengthen both the
PT wing of the government and the project of social justice. This strategy in turn
opened up the possibility of establishing a new dynamic within the trade union
movement. But it also posed major new challenges: first, the organized labor
movement would have to find the right balance between maintaining trade union
autonomy, while at the same time providing political support to a government
whose members and projects were in significant measure organically linked with
the unions’ own struggles and own history. Secondly, the CUT—as PT’s closest
social partner—was faced with the particularly complicated challenge of trying to
forge an alliance of highly diverse social movements during a phase in which it was
closely allied with a party of government. It was against this backdrop that—during
the government’s two terms in office—the CUT attempted to adopt a policy known
as “critical solidarity” with the government. It was based on trying to maintain an
autonomous capacity to develop strategies, as well as combining objections to
specific issues with a general defense of the project. Despite Brazil’s overall
positive socio-economic development, this strategy was characterized with ambi-
guity, contradictions and conflict—with the government, between the social
movements and within the CUT itself.
5.1 Prosperous Times
After years of low growth and the growing fragmentation of labor markets, the trade
unions found that the period from 2004 provided more favorable economic
conditions for pressing for higher wages and other labor market demands. The
fall in the rate of inflation, the repayment of foreign debt, the build-up of foreign
exchange reserves and the regulation of the financial sector all helped to stabilize
Brazil’s economic base. Against the background of what was suddenly, for a state
formerly racked by bankruptcy, a very friendly overall financial picture; Brazil
began to assert its huge potential in the real economy. While the new growth cycle
had, to begin with, been built on the export economy, it was the domestic market
that now took over (Joerißen & Steinhilber, 2010: 23). The third quarter of 2009
saw the 24th successive year-on-year rise in private consumption (Economist,
2009). This dynamism can be attributed above all to the stable labor market, the
creation of new full-time jobs, a steady rise in the minimum wage, massive social
transfers and high wage agreements.
The conditions for employees in the Brazilian labor market have improved in the
past 10 years. The unemployment rate has fallen from 12.3 (2003) to 5.5 % (2012),
although women and young people (15–24 years of age) are still disproportionately
affected by joblessness. It is still the case (2011) that 28.2 % of all people in work
are (pseudo) self-employed, entrepreneurs, in unpaid labor or subsistence farmers.

Only 61.3 % are actually in salaried employment—a significant proportion of
whom, however, are informally employed—that is, illegally—either in the private
(25.4 %) or public sectors (19.9 %). Also, 7.1 % of the workforce are engaged in
domestic labor, 3.4 % are domestic servants (IBGE-PNAD, 2008). But the fact
remains that the fall in unemployment is due not so much to the extension of
precarious work but to qualitative improvements in the employment structure.
Recent years have seen not only seen an increase of 18 million (2003–2012) in
the number of people in employment, but also an increase in the number of people
working under terms and conditions that are in accordance with Brazil’s labor law
and covered by the social security system. The proportion of people in formal
employment rose from 45.3 (2003) to 56 % (2012). This can be attributed above all
to the growth in employment that has mainly taken place in better-organized sectors
of the Brazilian economy, especially in large-scale enterprises. By contrast, the rise
was flatter in sectors characterized structurally by precarious working conditions.
Furthermore, it was above all in these areas—for example, in the private service
sector or the agriculture sector, in which the pressure exercised by the unions, the
step-up in workplace inspections, the regulation of micro-enterprises and the
intensification of efforts to combat working conditions that effectively amounted
to slavery—that formalized working conditions and socio-political improvements
came about. In addition, with the exception of the public sector, there has not in
recent years been any extension of atypical forms of employment, such as tempo-
rary or limited short-term employment: 95 % of all formal employees have perma-
nent employment contracts (Baltar et al., 2010: 19). This may, on one hand, be due
to the fact that the unions were able to use their strong position in the labor market
to block further proposals—including the one put forward by the previous govern-
ment to introduce working time accounts. On the other hand, the positive overall
picture should not obscure the fact that there are still structural disadvantages for
employees, such as employers’ right to unilaterally terminate employment contracts
without stating any reasons, which has contributed to the very high rate of fluctua-
tion on the job market. ILO Convention 87 was scrapped by the Brazilian govern-
ment in 1996, only 10 months after it had been ratified. Nevertheless, it was in large
measure possible to stop or even reverse the trend towards informalization of the
Brazilian labor market.
After years of austerity, family incomes and incomes from paid work began to
rise after 2004. One reason for this development was a real increase in the minimum
wage of 70.7 % between 2003 and 2012, to R$678 (January 2013). This is crucial
because one-third of all people in the workforce earn a minimum wage, which
provides the basis for a large part of all wage negotiations. The trade unions have
also taken advantage of the new conditions on the labor market to push for wage
hikes that have mainly been above the rate of inflation. While in 2003 only 19 % of
wage agreements were above this level, the same figure had reached 95 % by 2011.
In an environment of stable prices, it was mainly the lower middle class that
profited from this development: pronounced income disparities were slowly being
overcome. For the first time it was possible to reverse the downward social trend
that had been seen in the 1990s and to replace it with an upward social mobility
trend, albeit a gradual one. During the 10 years of the PT government, a new middle
class discernibly took shape, a direct result of proactive state measures to promote
upward mobility.
The economic dynamism and the clear improvement of the situation on the labor
market put the unions in a position in which they could once again reassert their
structural power in comparison with the 1990s without, in recent years, necessarily
having to threaten to use that power. Strike activity, which had fallen from 1242 to
340 strikes per year between 1996 and 2003, remained relatively constant in the
following years, at just over 300 instances of industrial action. However, since
2009, there has been an upsurge in strike activity, with 446 strikes in 2010 and
554 in 2011. The emphasis has been on strikes in the public sector (325), with fewer
in the private sector (227).
5.2 Between Institutional Integration and Trade Union

Autonomy
Large sections of the trade union movement, and above all the CUT, have
committed themselves in their political activities to constructively support the
government’s reform agenda (including tax policies, the question of land reform,
social security and the reform of labor law), while at the same time, pushing ahead
with independent campaigns and initiatives.
At the beginning of the government’s first term in office, the CUT and the social
movements pursued a double strategy: given the huge fiscal pressure that was
bearing down on the government and the influential elements, including those
within the governing coalition, who were pressing for continuity, they initially
mobilized a massive protest front in order to bolster the progressive forces and to
urge the government as a whole to move in the direction of adopting an historic
joint agenda together with the PT. While the unions stepped up the pressure from
outside the government, they also hoped to be given a stronger role in the activities
of the government. Lula responded by doing just that: by rapidly improving and
diversifying the possibilities that the unions had to represent both the interests of
their members and their ideas in the political domain, and to influence decision-
making within the government.
Initially, this all took place in a very direct way: 12 key government ministries
and hundreds of further important posts were handed to (former) executive
members and functionaries from the CUT. This was hardly a surprise move given
the political and personal overlap between the CUT and the PT. But, driven by
deeply-rooted class prejudice, large sections of the media were quick to decry what
they saw as the “republic of the trade unions”. This (dismissive) interpretation
amounted to a broad attack on the transformation of the political elite and on the
president himself, who—according to the conservative media—did not have a high
enough level of formal education. The trade union movement also managed to
profit from the fact that the government upgraded social actors in general while, at
the same time, putting an end to the kind of criminalization of social movements
that had taken place under the Cardoso government. Alongside the wide variety of
connections with the ministries—cooperating with “members of civil society” has
today become a mainstream task—the union organizations were able to exercise
influence through the creation of new mechanisms for concerted action and
participation.
More than two million representatives of social movements took part in consul-
tation processes during the new government’s first 3 years in office. Thirteen
national councils were created (Hochstetler, 2008). Alongside the Council on
Industrial Policy and the Minimum Wage Council, it was above all the Council
for Economic and Social Development (CDES) that was an important forum for the
unions. The Conselhão—the big council—is the government’s most ambitious
extra-parliamentary “machine for concerted dialogue and action”. The aim was to
set in motion a social dialogue that would bridge all the different sectors, discuss all
the major reform projects (such as reforms of pensions and tax policies, or of labor
law) and provide politicians with viable and consensual recommendations. What in
fact happened was that from the very beginning leading representatives of the
government, the unions and industry dominated the council. There was above all
criticism that very little of the council’s deliberations and resolutions was actually
found in the laws that were later passed. A number of social actors had already
withdrawn from the council by 2003. By this time at the latest, the CDES no longer
represented an institutional cross-section of a mobilized society, but instead a
neo-corporatist negotiating body. The unions had, however, secured for themselves
a very influential role: for example, the president of the CUT took control of the
chairmanship of the working group on energy policy.
By 2003, relations between sections of the union movement and the government
were already being put to the test with two divisive reform issues on the agenda: the
pension system for public employees and labor law. The aim of the pension reform
was to slash payments to 2.3 million public servants who in 2002 accounted for
about four-fifths of the deficit in the pension system. This was due to the many
additional benefits that—especially—judges and senior members of the military
had in the past been able to secure for themselves in close complicity with previous
governments. The present government hoped that, by easing the pressure on the
budget, there would be room to finance social programs, such as Fome Zero or an
increase in the minimum wage. The measures that were agreed in 2003 included the
slashing of numerous special benefits, as well as increasing the retirement age to
60 (55 for women) and an increase in the minimum eligibility period to 30 years
(25 for women). Despite resistance from within their affiliated public sector unions,
the CUT leadership supported the government’s reform project. This led to an
internal division that prompted a whole union block to leave the CUT, an unprece-
dented event. This block, which set up Conlutas in 2004, accused the CUT of
abandoning its principles of trade union autonomy in favor of its alliance with the
government (Melleiro & Radermacher, 2007: 130). Thus, just a few months after
the government had commenced its work, there was already a collision between the
overriding principle of defending Lula and his project and the specific interests of
elements within the CUT’s social base.
In contrast with the pension reform, when it came to the reform of labor law the
government decided not to present any draft legislation. What it did instead was to
hope that the unions, the employers and representatives of the Labor Ministry
would in a “great concerted effort” come up with the outline for a new law within
the framework of the newly-established F orum Nacional do Trabalho (Rodrigues
& Ramalho, 2009: 10). The goal of this draft would be to democratize labor
relations, as well as to reform the hybrid trade union system in place since the
constitution of 1988 in order to provide for more trade union freedom and auton-
omy. While no progress was made in the area of labor relations, in the area of trade
union reform the forum managed, without too much in the way of recrimination, but
with much pressure applied by CUT members of the government, to agree on
substantial changes.
The important reform points included the abolition of the trade union tax, the
easing of the monopoly of representation, the extension of the right to strike, the
legal recognition of the central union organizations, the guarantee of trade union
organization in the workplace, the introduction of a national wage agreement, the
extension of the right to wage negotiations to include the public sector, a limiting of
the influence of the labor courts and the creation of a National Council for Labor
Relations. Implementation of these measures would have created a new trade union
system that would have come very close to fulfilling the CUT’s historical demands.
However, the proposals were blocked by Congress. The already-troubled consulta-
tion process was rendered even more difficult when, in summer 2005, the PT and
the Lula government were thrown into disarray by a vote-buying scandal
(mensalão). The reform process was cut short due to the resulting political upheaval
and, instead of concentrating on the reform package, the CUT was forced to focus
on mobilizing its membership in order to ensure the government’s survival.
In the wake of the crisis of 2005, however, it became clear that support for the
reform efforts had in any case melted away and that the fragile consensus could not
be sustained: the government was weakened, the employers rejected the organiza-
tion of unions in the workplace, conservative forces within the trade union move-
ment wanted to retain the corporatist pillars and left-wing elements feared a loss of
autonomy and a growing influence of the state if the central organizations were to
be given more power. Moderate forces within the CUT were also asking themselves
whether the organization was not getting caught up in the details of the reform
program and, in doing so, neglecting other political projects. It was not until Lula’s
second term in office (2006–2010) that at least some of the proposals put forward by
the forum were turned into law. These included legal recognition of the central
organizations, trade union pluralism within individual branches and occupational
categories on both the federal and national levels, as well as ratification of ILO
Convention 151 concerning public sector wage negotiations.
While the CUT had to accept another defeat concerning one of its key historical
demands, it had at least begun to formulate its political program more forcefully
than in the 1990s. Since 2004 the confederation has focused on elaborating an
alternative development model (Da Costa & Ladosky, 2006: 11) and has engaged in
a systematic discussion of core economic and socio-political issues. The results of
these discussions have provided the bases for the mobilizations seen in election
campaigns in recent years. Within the framework of this far-reaching project, the
CUT has worked together with large sections of the trade union movement to
develop a series of (successful) campaigns. It is, for example, thanks to the efforts
of organized labor that the statutory minimum wage—upon which nearly 40 million
people are dependent—has gradually been increased (in a process set to continue
through to 2014). The government decided to take this step only after it came under
pressure from the “March to Brasilia”, organized in December 2004 in an unusual
show of unity among the central union organizations. These marches and countless
other joint actions gave the most important central union organizations the oppor-
tunity to mobilize their members to press for ratification of ILO Conventions
151 and 158, as well as for income tax reform. The introduction of the 40-h working
work without a reduction in wages and equal pay for women and men are both
currently on the agenda.
Since 2007, a particular focus of joint trade union policies has been the challenge
posed by the outsourcing of business tasks or complete functions that has led in
many instances to the drastic shrinking of core workforces. The resulting deteriora-
tion of working conditions and the informalization of employment often go hand in
hand with a weakening of trade union representation because employers refuse to
include outsourced workers in any agreements. Pressure from the trade unions led
to the introduction in Congress of a law designed to clarify labor and contractual
relations between these different groups of employees.
This renewed focus on wide-ranging issues in the fields of social and labor
policy has in recent years helped the trade union movement to regain lost ground. In
contrast to the 1990s—when rights were systematically negotiated away in
exchange for “job guarantees”—and despite the bitter defeats suffered at the
beginning of Lula’s first term in office, the unions have been able to ensure that
the overall legal framework is more employee-friendly. This was in large measure
because they had won additional institutional power. However, central economic
themes (such as interest rate policy) remained non-negotiable and it was still the
case that the interplay between critical distance from and solidarity with the
government led to considerable tensions within the organized trade union
movement.
5.3 Cooperation and Division
The fact that Brazil’s trade union movement had backed down on the issue of
pensions, together with its continued close cooperation with a government that was
openly pursuing orthodox economic policies, had opened up divisions in the trade
union movement by as early as 2004. This development went hand in hand with a
mood swing among sections of the left: while the mass protests during the first year
of the Lula coalition had been seen as mobilization in support of the government,
many social movements began to doubt whether they still shared the same goals as
the PT-led government. There was a widespread perception that the channels of
participation in the “council republic” extended as far as the hearings that took
place, but no further. There was no real provision for genuine codetermination, in
contrast to, for instance, participatory budgets at the sub-national level. It was
above all concerning the issues of land reform and environmental protection that
the hopes of numerous organizations were dashed. The PT had for decades had the
undisputed role of voice of a new and united left, but now a left-wing opposition to
Lula began to take shape. The trade union movement was also impacted by this
re-fragmentation of the Brazilian left, in terms of both its own organizational unity
and strategic alliances with other social movements.
The unions had already suffered a first wave of fragmentation in the 1990s and
from 2004 a second wave began to shake the central union organizations. There are
two key reasons for this development: first, legal recognition of the central
organizations and the resulting access to funds from the trade union tax and,
secondly, the approach adopted towards the Lula government.
Among the group of “pragmatic” central organizations newly formed on the
basis of financial considerations are the Nova Central Sindical de Trabalhadores
(NCST—2005), the União Geral dos Trabalhadores (UGT—2007) and the Central
dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CTB—2007). The NCST, which is today the third
largest central organization after the CUT and FS, bears the name “new centre”,
which is highly ironic given that it is above all concerned with organizing the forces
of the traditional trade union system that are opposed to any changes whatsoever to
corporatist structures. The UGT, on the other hand, combined three former trade
union groupings (as well as dissidents from FS) that would not, on their own, have
been able to meet the legal criteria for recognition as representative bodies,
including the stipulation that they had to be responsible for organizing at least
100 unions divided across Brazil’s five regions.
The CTB for its part emerged from a communist tendency splitting off from the
CUT. This move was initiated by the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), which
wanted to have its own central trade union organization (and the additional funding
that would go with it) for the 2010 election campaign. Particularly serious in this
context was the withdrawal of the powerful National Confederation of Agricultural
Workers (CONTAG), which responded to the division of its social base into CUT
and CTB supporters by leaving the CUT and no longer belonging to any confeder-
ation. The UGT, the NCST and the CTB have, alongside the CUT, FS and the
CGTB, met the criteria for recognition as a confederation or central organization.
The divisions and withdrawals that the CUT suffered in the course of the
negotiations over pension and labor law reform were, by contrast, politically
motivated. The two new central organizations that emerged in this way—Conlutas
and Intersindical—positioned themselves clearly to the left of the CUT. During a
congress in 2010 the two groupings had intended to form a new joint confederation,
but numerous differences prevented them from doing so (including the name of the
new central organization). Conlutas reacted by changing its name to CSP—
Conlutas—Central Sindical e Popular—but it did not receive official recognition

from the Labor Ministry.
The divisive tendencies at the level of the central organizations have meant that
Brazil does not have the kind of strong trade union based opposition that, for
instance, has been seen emerging in South Africa under the ANC government.
For a long time, the CUT did succeed in keeping diverse political tendencies under
one roof. But the influence of the parties, the approach to the government, the
constant brokering between sectoral interests and the general support for the PT’s
development project appear to have pushed the pluralism of positions within the
confederation to—or perhaps beyond—the limit.
The progressive trade union project that the CUT represented for so long
appears, for the time being, to have failed. The fact that the political parties today
have so much more influence over the trade union movement is surely a sign of the
loss of trade union autonomy. Today’s CUT is more “purely” affiliated with the PT,
the PCdoB has created the CTB and FS is moving closer to the PDT, while
CSP-Conlutas and Intersindical are linked with left-wing opposition parties
PSTU and PSOL. The result is that the progressive trade union movement can
also be divided neatly along the new fault-lines of the Brazilian left, with a left-
wing opposition on one side—denouncing the government as nothing more than
“neo-liberal”—and, on the other side, other left-wing forces that defend the
achievements and successes of the Lula and Rousseff governments.
Despite all the fragmentation and split-offs, it is important not to forget that
under the Lula government there was a rapprochement between individual union
organizations, there was overall growth of the union-based “pro-government camp”
and the most important trade central union organizations managed to agree on a
joint agenda. The CUT and FS, the two largest confederations, which had polarized
Brazil’s trade union movement in the 1990s, moved closer together during Lula’s
leadership (only once again to move further apart under Rousseff). Until as recently
as 2002, the FS had presented itself as a trade union of the right opposed to Lula.
But, to a large extent, the CUT succeeded in neutralizing FS and involved it in joint
campaigns. This strategy of integrating FS was also pursued by Lula, who
appointed the president of the PDT, Carlos Lupi, as Labor Minister in 2007. It
was a post that had traditionally belonged to the CUT.
Overall, relations between most sections of the organized labor movement and
the government and among themselves have again improved since 2005. The
criticism expressed by the unions during the first phase of Lula’s government—
criticism of orthodox economic policies, the high interest rate policy and the
independence of the central bank—began to wane during the last years of the
government, especially because of the dynamism of the domestic market, booming
purchasing power, the success of measures to tackle the crisis and the low interest
rates. The positive economic development and successes on the labor market were
also the basis for the five most important trade union organizations agreeing on a
joint document in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election (Agenda da Classe
Trabalhadora) and for their pledging to support the PT’s presidential candidate
Rousseff during the first CONCLAT since 1981.
The limited capacity of the PT to gather together a broad spectrum of interests

and ideas and to function as a catalyst for the left had an impact on the relationship
between the trade unions and the social movements, which for their part tend
largely to oscillate in their positions between the new left-wing opposition and
the PT. For most of the important organizations within Brazil’s civil society, such
as the MST, the Lula government stood for a kind of stalemate between the social
forces and was characterized, at least in part, by antagonistic interests. The initial
mood of support for and sympathy with the government was gradually replaced by
criticism of government policy. This criticism did not however lead to a full break
with progressive elements within the government. It was above all via the
Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais (Coordination of Social Movements—
CMS)—which was founded in 2003 without any involvement of the PT, and in
which all the important social movements, as well as the CUT and the CTB, are
represented—that the CUT tried to come up with a joint agenda. The beginning of
Lula’s time in office saw the mobilization of the “left in civil society”, that is,
students and women’s associations, movements representing the landless and
homeless, and the trade unions, in a bid both to bolster the “institutional left” in
the government and to remind it of the election promises that it had made.
However, by 2006 at the latest, this kind of concerted action had become much
more difficult. The MST and other social movements began to speak out much more
robustly against the government. While the CMS had worked on behalf of the Lula
campaign in 2002, 4 years later it no longer recommended backing Lula and his
government, which, it was said, had achieved too little in what the socially-
committed left saw as some of its key policy areas, such as the question of agrarian
reform. During its second period in office, the government’s even more accentuated
developmental model led to further cracks in the alliance between the trade unions
and the social movements. While the government and the unions continued to give
their backing to a relatively uncompromising growth-based ideology, the social
movements accused the government of ignoring the significant environmental and
social costs of implementing large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams,
within the framework of its growth acceleration program (PAC). The ongoing
“party politicization” of the organized labor movement also played a role in the
unions increasingly being perceived from within the social movements as a “gov-
ernment block”. Because it had more of a commitment to the overall project, the
CUT managed to come to terms with setbacks more easily than the social
movements. From today’s perspective, it appears that socio-political successes,
such as the inclusion of large parts of the lower middle class and the poor in the
growth model, have had a greater impact for the CUT than setbacks suffered in the
specific field of trade union reform. It is true that the slow reduction of inequalities,
successes in combating poverty, the rise in purchasing power, the introduction of
possibilities for participation in society and successful measures to combat the
crisis, do not in themselves amount to a new model for economic development.
But what they do signify is a palpable change in Brazilian politics and society:
change that the trade unions can also claim as their success.
5.4 A New Presidency: Breaking off Old Bonds?
The election of Rousseff as the president of Brazil in 2010 was a sign of continuity
also for the unions, offering as it did the opportunity to further consolidate the
developmental project put in place by Lula. The further strengthening of the middle
class, that could in no small measure be attributed to the most successful wage
agreements since 1996, the large number of new jobs, the development of social
programs and her image as a competent and decisive political manager, gave
Rousseff high popularity ratings.
The relationship between the government and the unions is now, however,
determined by different parameters from those that applied under Lula. The pitfalls
of the strategy of critical solidarity became even more evident with the continuation
of a “tipo Lula” mandate—but without Lula. The narrative potential of Lula’s
personal biography had been central to conflict regulation in the four-cornered
disputes between the government, the PT, the unions and the social movements.
Suddenly, however, it no longer applied and the contradictions became more visible
and virulent. The close crossover between the political leadership and the unions
and the countless—often informal—contacts during Lula’s period in office have
since been replaced by what the government side would like to see as a “business-
like” handling of the unions. Since the election of Rousseff there have been fewer
direct ties with government offices.
The unions have also been confronted with a government that gives preferential
treatment to dialogue with the employers and to a number of their demands—such
as lower non-wage labor costs and tax breaks. In order to press their own demands
and to urge the government to be more open to dialogue, the unions organized the
seventh march of the trade union confederations in March 2013, which was
followed by a meeting with Rousseff. Their core demand was that the unions’
reform proposals from 2010 should be put back on the political agenda. However,
this initiative more or less ran out of steam as campaigning for the 2014 election
was already beginning to get under way and other issues replaced the unions’
priorities.
The outcome of the meeting with Rousseff and the beginning of the election
campaign only served to reopen the divisions between the CUT and FS. The CUT
pointed to the new negotiating channels and initial successes such as the imple-
mentation of ILO Convention 151 concerning the right to wage negotiations in the
public sector. The government had already backed two changes to the constitution:
first, the granting of equal labor rights to domestic workers and, secondly, the
redefinition and extension of the understanding of slavery-like working conditions,
as well as the simplification of the punishment of such practices, which represented
the adoption and implementation of two key trade union projects. This did not,
however, go far enough for FS, which was now in opposition mode. FS president
Paulo Pereira da Silva, a member of parliament for the PDT, declared publicly that
he would not support Rousseff’s reelection in 2014 and in doing so he opened the
election campaign in trade union ranks. Rousseff reacted by following Lula’s
previous example of using the Labor Ministry as a source of funding to keep the
PDT and FS in the coalition and by appointing Manoel Dias from the PDT as a
minister. This, however, brought only a temporary halt to the power struggle among
the trade unions and the “extended” election campaign has already given rise to
fears that it will become increasingly difficult to reach a consensus between the two
largest trade union organizations.
A further shift in the political balance can be put down to the government’s
discourse, which has taken on a firmly pragmatic tone when it comes to Brazil’s
future development model. The focus is in large measure limited to stimulating
economic growth and job creation. Meanwhile, the kind of vision for the transfor-
mation of the country that Lula—despite all the contradictions—managed to
formulate is fading fast. Promoting investment and balancing the budget are the
clear watchwords. What this also means is that the battle for pay and privileges is
intensifying, above all in the public sector, with the government far less inclined
than in the past to make concessions. In 2011 there were more strikes than at any
time since 1997, most of them in the public sector. Strike action at the construction
sites for new hydro-electric power plants at Jirau and Santo Antonio (two of the
country’s most important infrastructure projects), the strike by faculty at the federal
universities, as well as the strike by federal personnel, all highlight just how great
the tensions already are between the government and parts of the (organized)
workforce.
The defensive approach adopted by the CUT in these conflicts is one reason why
the CSP-Conlutas and Intersindical have gained significance in the past 2 years.
They charge the CUT with being co-opted by the government and have been able to
hive off a number of unions from the CUT. The CUT does indeed appear to be
prioritizing such issues as industrial policy and competitiveness, as well as disad-
vantaged or precarious categories of workers (for example, domestic workers),
where its positions overlap with those of the government. In general, however,
CUT’s ambivalence towards the government has intensified under Rousseff: some-
times they soften the attacks on Rousseff and clearly bolster the PT’s position in the
government; sometimes the contradictions among the membership prompt them to
step up the criticism. But even under Rousseff the organized workforce remains one
of the strongest trade union movements in the world. However, it appears to hold a
veto power rather being able to properly (co-)determine the agenda. It looks very
much as though the unions, and above all the CUT, are going to have to continue to
adapt to a further Rousseff government.
6 Between “Core Business” and Socio-political Mandate
The election of Lula and the PT signaled the first time that a government had in part,
at least, emerged organically from the campo popular, the social movement of the
1980s. At the same time, however, it mirrored the contradictions within the
progressive camp as well as the contradictions and the power relations of the
political epoch. Trade union politics do not take place in isolation. Political, social
and ideological conditions determine strategy, possible courses of action, and the
chances of success. In this way, the progressive unions’ mixed record reflects the
favorable economic and institutional conditions for trade union politics in recent
years, but also the continued strong role played by conservative forces in govern-
ment and society, the structural hurdles to the comprehensive representation of
interests by the unions and the differences in interests and strategy among the
progressive actors themselves.
The Brazilian trade union movement, which had already in the previous two
decades been distinguished by its high level of strategic flexibility, also managed
under Lula to re-mix and, in part, extend its power resources. There is no doubt that
the economic dynamic, the focus on the domestic market as a motor of growth, the
positive trend on the jobs market and the growing importance of large-scale
enterprises, all once again strengthened the structural power of the labor movement,
which has not been much diminished by the global economic crisis. Organizational
power is today greater than it was 10 years ago, despite the split-offs of left-
oppositional groupings. This is because it has been possible to bridge the deep
divisions that emerged between FS and the CUT in the 1990s. But also because the
most important central union organizations have, despite major ideological and
strategic differences, managed to agree on joint campaigns. While the unions and
above all the CUT did not exactly become socially isolated during Lula’s two terms
in office, the growing differences between a section of the social movements and
the government did undoubtedly have an impact on relations with the unions.
Strategic and conceptual differences among the union organizations meant that
they lost some of the symbolic power that they had once within the social
movements. This could weaken the mobilization potential of the trade union
movement in the years to come, especially in view of the far-reaching political
projects still to be undertaken or completed. This was also part of the price that the
unions paid for the increase in their institutional power that was based on the close
personal interdependence and the numerous communication and consultation
channels with the government.
The strategic challenges facing the Brazilian trade union movement in the
coming years are similar to those that confront European unions. Under the given
socio-political conditions they will, however, be more difficult to master. How can
trade unions, for instance, formulate comprehensive union policies against the
backdrop of the extensive fragmentation of their social base? Where is the common
ground between being an organization that represents specific interests and the
ambition to shape society as a whole? How can the progressive elements in the
government be supported and relations with the ruling party be cultivated, without
having to pay a high price in terms of strategic autonomy and relations with other
social actors?
The challenge for the years to come will still be to develop organizational
structures and potential for struggle within the trade union movement, while at
the same time redefining the relationship between the various power resources. It
would certainly be shortsighted to look at the decline in strike activity over the
years and link this with a demobilization of the working class, to see the increased
institutional integration of the trade unions as amounting to their “nationalization”
or to see the conflicts with alliance partners as an indication of the de-politicization

of the unions. However, the pitfalls of a strategy of critical solidarity have already
become clear under Rousseff. Any continuation of this strategy can be successful
only if it takes place on the basis of a secure foundation of trade union autonomy.
This requires unions that do not shy away from conflict in representing their
interests, unions that are more inclined to see tackling problems in the workplace
as a key core task and unions that continue to work towards winning a broad and
forceful social and political mandate. It requires unions that have at their disposal
both power resources in the workplace and the strength to mobilize in the political
arena.
It is above all in a country with such glaring social inequalities, with what are
often miserable working conditions and with authoritarian structures in its
companies and enterprises that trade union politics will also mean being involved
in tough conflicts of interest in the “core business” of collective bargaining (such as
wages, industrial safety and health protection, working hours and so on). This is
why, despite all the successes, the impact of the defeat in the conflict over trade
union reform and especially over workers’ and trade union representation in the
workplace should not be underestimated.
The fact is that under Lula the union movement missed a historic opportunity to
lay the foundations for a fundamental change in relations between capital and labor.
Power and powerlessness are still clearly divided in favor of the former. Even the
successful creation of trade union networks in a number of large-scale companies
has had very little impact in changing this relationship. Legally-stipulated trade
union representatives in the workplace would not only have given the unions an
important tool to try and overcome this disparity in power, but it would perhaps also
have boosted awareness among the central organizations of the need to make
workplace-based policies a central element of their strategy. What we are talking
about here is not so much institutional codetermination, which is unlikely, nor the
one-sided reduction of trade union politics to activities in the workplace, but instead
a better mobilization of individual workforces in order, for example, to insist on the
implementation of workplace rights that have already been set down in law. What
you find in Brazil is not just the paradoxical coexistence of “official” and “hard-
won” trade union worlds. There is also the fact there are a few industrial zones in
the country’s larger cities with powerful trade unions and relatively well-developed
industrial relations, while at the same time there is the rest of the country—the
largest part of Brazil—where even the application of existing labor laws and the
realization of core labor standards would represent a revolution.
Priority must also be given to trade union policies based on solidarity and the fair
and equal representation of all employees, including precarious workers and people
working in pseudo self-employment. To date, the organized labor movement has
done very little to systematically integrate the informal sector into its policies. The
ongoing formalization of the labor market in recent years has not exactly helped to
build up awareness for this problem—despite the fact that almost half of the
working population is employed in this sector. New strategies are necessary, not
only due to the constant pressure from the formal labor market and the often still
very rigid division between insiders and outsiders in the regulated jobs market that
results from economic modernization strategies, but also in order to combat
tendencies towards a narrowing of the possible forms of trade union strategies
and organization. After all, trade union politics in front of the company gates at VW
or Mercedes on the periphery of São Paulo is something very different from trade
union politics among day laborers and domestic servants or in the bauxite mines of
the Amazon region.
Finally, in view of the extreme fragmentation of the Brazilian working class, but
also taking into account the experiences gathered in the field of trade union politics,
the organized labor movement must continue to battle on the political level for
alternative models development and progress. In this respect, the CUT should in the
coming years permit itself a greater degree of autonomy from the government and,
alongside the vertical alliance with the PT and other parties, it should once again
begin to build up stronger horizontal relations with civil society. In order to avoid
the danger of isolating itself from other social movements, it is important that it
again opens itself up to the experiences and interests of other social actors and
above all to socio-ecological questions. In Brazil, questions of sustainable develop-
ment, of resource and climate protection are always also social questions. More
than ever before the unions must therefore make these questions part of their
discussions concerning an alternative development model. However, given the
fact that the PT is unlikely to allow any political room in the government for the
convergence of the Brazilian left, the CUT must in the coming years try to fill the
vacuum on Brazil’s left—not as a party merely filling the gap, but as a pluralistic
organization of the left anchored in the workplace, in politics and in civil society: an
organization that, by working towards realizing a shared transformation project, can
rally a broad front of progressive forces in a new campo popular.
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Social Movements in Brazil in Urban
and Rural Contexts: Potentials, Limits 13
and “Paradoxes”
Marcelo Lopes de Souza
Abstract
Marcelo Lopes de Souza puts the social movements under the microscope. He
compares urban and rural movements and asks why urban movements in Brazil
are so much less significant than those in the countryside. The urban activism of
the 1970s and 1980s, lost its importance in the 1990s. The so called “new social
movements” that fought the military regime can therefore no longer be seen as
influential social movements and the more recent activism of the second gener-
ation movements of the 1990s are yet in an embryonic stage. In contrast, in the
rural areas, the level of organization of the landless peasant movement MST has
grown considerably since the 1980s. Thus, they can exert strong political
pressure and have the ability to articulate on a national as well as on an inter-
national level. The reasons for this development can be found in the relatively
greater complexity of interests in the cities, in addition to the success of the PT in
absorbing and channeling the interests of urban civil society towards the political
activities of the party and the participative spaces in the local PT governments.
1 Introduction: Urban Activism as a Mere “Supporting

Actor” in a Country Marked by Urbanism?1
According to the IBGE census, in 1950 almost one third of Brazil’s population lived
in urban areas. Thirty years later, in 1980, the census indicated that an inversion had
taken place: two thirds of Brazilians lived in cities and small towns. According to
1
M.L. de Souza (*)
e-mail: mlopesdesouza@terra.com.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_13
230 M.L. de Souza
the IBGE census of 2000, a further two decades on, almost 82 % of the population
lived in urban areas. Even if one takes into consideration a certain degree of
inaccuracy within the data, which can be attributed to methodological problems,
it cannot be denied that Brazil is a country that is strongly shaped by cities and
which is urbanizing rapidly.
Despite these prevailing circumstances the most important social movements
(and their organizations), those with the strongest influence and the greatest public
presence, clearly stem from within the context of conflicts in rural areas—though
this difference in terms of importance has reduced in recent years. Thus there is, for
example, no organization in urban areas of similar importance to the Landless
Workers’ Movement (MST). In 2003 this had “almost one million members, nearly
1200 settlements (so-called assentamentos), a network of 12,000 primary and high
schools, 88 rural cooperatives and 96 businesses for the distribution of foodstuffs”
(Lerrer, 2003: 139). Even the best-known urban movement organization, the
Roofless Workers’ Movement (MTST),2 which is found in different cities, was
formed out of the MST in 1997. It was originally part of the MST’s strategy to
organize workers in cities in order to increase the support base for the campaign in
rural areas. But, how can this be explained?
Social activism was and is an important player in Brazil, both in the cities and in
rural areas. From a not “state-centered” and conservative perspective, observing the
past, present and future of both urban and rural areas inevitably leads to a discussion
of the population’s resistance and mobilization, amongst which social movements
stand out.3
With regard to the urban environment, it has not been long since the activism
that developed within the favelas and precarious, semi-legal settlements
(loteamentos irregulares) of the urban periphery, which demanded public facilities
and technical and social infrastructure, was described as a “new social movement”.
This is not to ignore the activism that takes place within formal urban areas—
including that of the middle class—although this activism obviously differs in
terms of agenda and priorities from that which takes place in semi-legal settlements.
Strictly speaking this ought to be described as “new social activism” as not all
activism reaches the level of a movement in the narrow sense (on the conceptual
differences see Footnote 3). In many large Brazilian cities this activism reached its
2
Sem-teto (or trabalhadores sem-teto) literally means “roofless” (or “roofless worker”) in Portu-
guese. The sem-teto are different from homeless people in the English sense of the word in that
they are squatters (occupying houses and properties).
3
A brief comment on definitions: While certain authors use the term social movement in the
narrow sense to describe a specially critical type of collective action, other authors use it in a much
broader sense. On this broader definition the term describes both clientelistic and/or “parochial”
neighborhood associations, as well as social movements, which consciously pursue deep socio-
spatial changes; sometimes the term even includes collective action in the form of riots (quebra-
quebras) and looting. I belong to the first tradition.
13 Social Movements in Brazil in Urban and Rural Contexts: Potentials. . . 231
pinnacle in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s,4 when they had
already begun to experience a downward trend. Until the second half of the
1980s this activism showed characteristics of a social movement in a proper
sense and their actions influenced press reports as well as the discourse and
behavior of politicians and parties. From this point on, however, the indications
of a crisis began to consolidate. The ability to mobilize had diminished substantially
and organizations shriveled to a frozen existence or disappeared. The press and the
official political system attributed them with ever-waning importance and their
public presence shrank to a minimal level.
Currently (2013) the urban activism of the 1970s and 1980s has greatly lost
importance. The “new social movements”, as they were described in the socio-
logical literature of the 1970s and 1980s are “outdated” and can thus no longer be
described as influential. Newer activisms, from the 1990s and beginning of the
twenty-first century (which can be described as the “second generation” of “new
urban social activism” in order to differentiate them from the activism of the
previous decades) are still in an embryonic or only slightly better developed
stage. Despite this, and in part precisely as a result of this, the urban activism of
this “second generation” of “new activisms” has prompted activists to reflect on the
shortages, problems and challenges which they consider that they are facing. Not
few of these problems require consideration of the socio-spatial context within
which this activism is embedded.
For its part, rural Brazil is experiencing a rapid process of change: over the
course of the “painful modernization” which was introduced a number of decades
ago and which has gone through different phases (from the beginnings of the green
revolution to the recent trend toward agribusiness), people continue to be displaced
from their land and workers are replaced with machines. While this is leading to the
increasing depopulation of many rural areas in Brazil, in many cases “modern”
agricultural companies have not completely renounced the poor population’s man-
power, the manpower of cheap day laborers (boias-frias) and the like. Those who
have been displaced from rural areas often live in the favelas and on the periphery
of small and medium-sized cities and commute to work on agricultural land and in
industrial complexes (Fernandes, 1996: 49). In this Brazil of agricultural and
livestock farming the technical/technological modernity of agribusiness blends
with the “backwardness” of informal and inhuman work and property conditions
4
It is self-evident that this varied depending on the city and the nature of the activism. While in
São Paulo at the beginning of the 1970s “new actors entered the stage”, to use the title of Eder
Sader’s (1995) significant book, the favela movement in Rio de Janeiro experienced their greatest
moment of creativity and upheaval in the 1960s. In this period they fought against the clearing of
the favelas and suggested as an alternative that they be urbanized (Santos, 1981: 32ff). In general
the above-mentioned period of ca. 10 years can be described on the national level as a “great
moment” of urban activism that had its origins in the (disadvantaged) neighborhoods (bairros),
(precarious) settlements (loteamentos) and favelas. It was the period during which the most
important associations of neighborhood organizations (associações de moradores) on the munici-
pal and state level were founded. The protests and demands of these organizations reached their
strongest public presence at this point.
232 M.L. de Souza
(work without safety precautions, extreme exploitation of workers and even slav-
ery, illegal land-grabs, etc.).
In this context it is possible to observe on the one hand an increasing “rural
exodus” and in many respects a “colonization” of rural areas through the (large)
cities. This stretches from the economy (and the dependencies created by the
banking and financial systems, agricultural products, large wholesale chains, etc.,
to changes in class and production relations, with a decreasing frequency of tradi-
tional relationship patterns, such as the “colonato”), to culture (including influence
on values, fashion, technology, the customs and habits that develop in the big cities
and spread from there). On the other hand, the rural Brazil with family-run agri-
culture still exists and often attempts to adopt a political and cultural identity of
peasants’ resistance: resistance to the concentration of property holdings, large
landownership and agribusiness, as well as a defense of radical agricultural reform.
In contrast to the urban movements, rural resistance did not wane in the 1990s.
On the contrary: despite some difficulties, such as criminalization by the media,
state oppression and the violent reactions of large landowners, the organizational
level of landless agricultural workers has grown strongly since the 1980s and has
developed the ability to exert and articulate strong pressure on the national level and
have even achieved international recognition.
2 “Re-democratization”: A New Beginning—But in Which

Sense?
For centuries activism and protests have been manifest in Brazil, sometimes in the
form of genuine social movements and in certain cases even in the form of
(or accompanied by) revolts and popular uprisings. In rural areas this led, for
example, to symbolic events such as the War of Canudos (1896–1897). The present
article will not, however, look so far into the past. The focus here is on the milestone
that is the “re-democratization”, that is, the reintroduction of representative “demo-
cracy” in 1985, following the end of the military regime which had held power
since March 31, 1964. It will thus briefly analyze the period of social upheaval and
the demands for political reform, which preceded the military coup in 1964 as well
as the period of the dictatorial regime itself. This will be followed by an exami-
nation of what changed following the end of the regime.
Let us first examine urban activism in the strict sense. This includes movements
for which the urban space plays a fundamental role as a point of reference, with
regard to the demands (technical and social infrastructure, housing, etc.), as well as
with regard to the identity and organization of the activists (districts, favelas, etc.).
This activism has a long history in Brazil that dates back to the “improvement
commissions” (comissões pr o-melhoramentos) in the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro
from the first decades of the twentieth century. The type of action carried out by
these commissions—which were made up of or led by “respected” people from the
area such as doctors, businessmen and retired military—was petty bourgeois in
nature and generally “well-mannered”: the commissions usually played an
administrative role. This took place in cooperation with the state or private
companies, which were responsible for public services (cf. Souza, 1988: 136).
In the middle of the last century the “friends of the neighborhood” societies
(sociedades de amigos de bairro, SABs) gained importance in São Paulo.
According to Singer (1983: 91) these were traditional and heterogeneous structures
of a vertical (hierarchical) and clientelistic character. Many SABs were under the
patronage of the so-called “Janists” and were founded by the organizers of the
electoral campaigns (cabos eleitorais) of Jânio Quadros; Singer notes that they
were often founded in the context of Jânios’ 1953 electoral campaign for the post of
mayor. More than a few election committees were transformed into SABs.
Clearer characteristics of authentic social movements appeared in Rio de Janeiro
in the 1960s in the framework of the struggles of the favela inhabitants in the old
state of Guanabra (which ceased to exist in 1975 and was replaced by the new state
of Rio de Janeiro). Neighbourhood groups had already been in place in the favelas
for a long time, however in the 1960s they became more important: of the
103 organizations for which Diniz (1983: 35) had data, 12 % were founded between
1947 and 1959, 42 % between 1960 and 1967, 18 % between 1968 and 1977 (this
reduction was apparently due to an increase in repression), and 28 % between 1978
and 1980 (an increase which can be attributed to the Geisel government’s policy of
détente from 1975 onwards). On the basis of socio-economic indicators Diniz
observes, that “among the presidents of the examined associations (associações)
prevailed a low degree of socialization through other participative organizational
forms outside the favela”. From this she concludes that “a less aggressive and
combative pattern with regard to the form of action and the ability to make demands”
could be expected (Ibid.: 44). However, this interpretation does not seem to corres-
pond with certain facts: without wishing to overestimate the scope and extent of the
number of the favela activists in the 1960s who were truly capable of or prone to
use hard methods of resistance, it must not be forgotten that in the context of
the federation of favela organizations in the state of Guanabara (FAFEG), many
inhabitants of favelas fearlessly defended themselves against favela clearances and
promoted a plan for “urbanization” (urbanização) of the favelas as an alternative
(as an example, see the experience of Brás de Pina in Santos, 1981).
The end of General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredos’ government and the
indirect presidential election of Tancredo Neves in 1985 (who died before he was
able to enter office, for which reason the Vice President José Sarney took office)
officially sealed the end of the long-winded process of “political opening”, that is,
the gradual policy of détente which was introduced under General Ernesto Geisel. It
can therefore be presumed that this increase in the freedom of the social movements
(and social activism in general) provided an incentive for increased mobilization
and articulation. The reality was, however, somewhat different: in the second half
of the 1980s an increased level of the organization of activism can be seen in rural
areas; with regard to urban activism, however, there was a gradual decline in most
cities. Academia also reflected this situation, as it showed more interest for rural
than for urban activism.
Where did such a deep crisis originate and what were its causes? The following
will examine individual conditions related to the crisis in neighborhood activism in
234 M.L. de Souza
the second half of the 1980s, which can be classified as limited in time. These
include the economic crisis, the affiliation of activists with left-wing political
parties, insufficient and inappropriate adaptation to the political conjuncture follow-
ing the military regime and disappointment over the new direction of national
politics after the end of the military regime.
The economic crisis of the 1980s forced many workers to have more than one
occupation and to take on second jobs (bicos) in order to increase the family
income. This reduced the amount of time available for unpaid activities, such as
taking on a leadership role in a neighborhood organization. With regard to the
economic crisis of the 1980s it must also be noted that the precarious economic
situation in the following decade changed but did not end: rather than facing higher
rates of inflation, the main burden for workers was higher unemployment rates as a
result of structural adjustments to the economy over the course of the implement-
ation of neo-liberal macro-economic policy.
The affiliation of activists with left-wing parties was primarily related to those
who joined the authorized or newly founded leftist parties in the 1980s and were
thus less dedicated to the political activism to which they had turned during the
years of political détente and the opening of the military regime to seek shelter and
scope for action (partially due to a lack of other options).
The insufficient and inappropriate adaptation to the political conjuncture follow-
ing the military regime refers to the fact that the multiplication of formal oppor-
tunities and channels for participation after 1985 presupposed capacities that many
activist organizations could not develop. They were often not able to combine
protests and self-organization with an institutional dialogue with the state.
The disappointment over the direction that national politics took after the end of
the military regime was ultimately linked to frustration over the death of Tancredo
Neves before his taking office as president, as well as the mediocrity of the
government from 1985 (led by José Sarney).
Even though neighborhood activism was weakened in the second half of the 1980s,
unemployment and a lack of housing created a new kind of social activism in
the 1990s, primarily in the metropolises. In some cases these were authentic move-
ments, amongst which the then young sem-teto movement stands out. However, some
old obstacles still blocked the way. Factors that played a role in the crisis of the “first
generation” of the “new (urban) activism” presented a constant risk for the nascent
“second generation” of the twenty-first century. To mention only a few: the bureau-
cratization of organizations, personalism, authoritarianism and attempts made by
municipal administrations to coopt activists, the indifference and “laziness” of the
social base, “parochialism” and “territorial corporatism”, political apathy, etc.5
5
“Caciques” and personalism refer to the authoritarian and egocentric behavior of quiet a few
leaders of neighborhood associations. This helps to expose the contradictions of an activism that
even while it covers itself with clearly democratic practices is not immune to the reproduction of
socially predominant heteronomy as symbolized by the state apparatus—this is particularly the
case with many neighborhood associations (associações de moradores).
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the bureaucratization of
the organizations was linked to the inappropriate adaptation to the political con-
juncture following the military regime. Some actors, usually associations, tried to
take the form of NGOs and gave up their attempts at mass mobilization in favor of
discussion and the co-implementation of political programs. Bureaucratization
always occurs when an activist organization begins to function as a “public
authority” and thus as an appendage of the state. It also occurs when the leaders
of an organization internally behave like personalistic “functionaries” and
“caciques”, increasingly distancing themselves from the social base and compro-
mising the social power of the activism.
The authoritarianism of municipal administrations is used to describe the dam-
age caused by the behavior of more than a few administrations. These attempted to
ignore “more spontaneous” activism and to hollow it out by only accepting certain
official channels legitimacy in the participative process and by denying the activism
itself an important role in the dialogue. Another form of the hollowing out of
activism took place through the attempt to manipulate (aparelhar) associations
and thus to control them. Even more damaging than authoritarianism is often the
coopting of leaderships and organizations. While it is possible for resistance to
develop against authoritarianism, cooptation immobilizes, disarms and demoralizes
the self-organization of society with disastrous and long-lasting consequences. The
problems of indifference and “laziness” of the societal base are usually linked to the
previous problems: if “organic” activists are restricted to a minority for a long
period and this group either does not renew itself (or does so very little), two risk
factors develop: on the one hand “activist fatigue” where activists become tired of
shouldering the responsibility for the organizations; on the other hand this also
creates further stimulus for the development of “caciques”, bureaucratization or
cooptation.
With regard to “parochialism” and “territorial corporatism” it must be men-
tioned in advance that corporatism and the mentality that encourages it in Brazil
and other Iberian countries has a long tradition, even outside the trade union
context. This mentality nourishes “parochialism”—in other words it nourishes the
restricted horizon of analysis of a problem and the manner in which to overcome it
(for instance, complains about the “disinterest” of the state regarding the problems
on the specific street, semi-legal settlement or favela in which one lives, without
examining the deeper determining causes of these problems as well as of the
so-called “lack of political will” of the politicians, or without recognizing the
necessity of an activism that extends beyond the micro-level). It includes a hostile
or suspicious attitude towards the participation of people “foreign” to the neighbor-
hood (bairrismo) and makes cooperation more difficult. Social space, which does
not in itself present an obstacle as a reference point for social mobilization,
ultimately, depending on the reigning ideology with regard to the attitude towards
territoriality, becomes an obstacle to the moving from being a neighborhood acti-
vism to “an activism that stems from a neighborhood (but goes beyond it)”
(Souza, 1988, 2000).
236 M.L. de Souza
The “political phobia” (or political apathy), which goes hand in hand with
parochialism and territorial corporatism must not be mistaken for
non-partisanship towards political parties. Non-partisanship in this sense on the
part of neighborhood associations was generally proclaimed rather than actually
respected over the last decades. “Political phobia” is in fact more related to a deep
“de-politicization” and easily grows from a suspicion of professional politicians
into the simple rejection of all supposed “political” subjects.
In contrast to the crisis scenario presented here, in the 1980s and 1990s there was
a continuing increase in the organizational and fighting ability of Brazilian workers
in the countryside. The MST, which was founded in 1984 during the first National
Meeting of Landless Agricultural Workers in Cascavel (in the state of Paraná), was
at least until recently probably the largest social movement organization in the
world. In addition the MST is not the only relevant organization for agricultural
workers in Brazil: one must not forget, amongst others, the Movement of Female
Agricultural Workers (MMC), as well as the Movement of People Affected by
Dams (MAB).
The MST is usually considered a central reference point due to its weight and its
importance. It was formed at the end of the military regime and the beginning of the
“New Republic”; it is a matter of common knowledge that during the rule of the
aforementioned regime an increase in land concentration (Fernandes, 1996: 39 ff.),
as well as of income took place. The foundation of the MST was thus no coinci-
dence. Over the course of its history it strove for ever more complex goals: from
struggles over land reform to questioning the Brazilian “development model” as
part of a critique of capitalism. In the middle of all this a symbolic-political debate
took place over the term “peasants” (camponês)—a term which is rejected or
treated with suspicion by parts of the academic left and orthodox Marxists, but
which the MST and other movements of landless people see as a symbol of their
identity, their culture and their way of life (this point will be taken up again in the
conclusion).
The peasantry (campesinato), which is all too often degraded to cheap daily
wages and forced into cities where they live in terrible poverty, often does not lose
its connection to the land. Through political organization they thus hope to win the
right to return to their land, where they resist in a socio-political, economic,
organizational and even cultural manner. Over the course of this process different
aspects of the social space and their interaction with social relations becomes
enormously relevant.
At this point we will return to the crisis of urban activism in order to highlight its
most dramatic aspect. The crisis of favela activism had, as has been described
beforehand, special features in comparison to activism in officially recognized
neighborhoods. The cause of the crisis of favela activism which was present in
Rio de Janeiro from the 1980s and which from the 1990s had spread to other cities,
was and is, alongside the long-term effects of traditional clientelism (inseparable
from poverty, inequality and dependence), the effect of the increasing presence of
the drug trade in the favelas (Souza, 2000: 167–168). Even if access to reliable data
is difficult, everything suggests that the number of leaders of neighborhood
associations who have been murdered because they did not want to subordinate
themselves to the drug gangs has been very high since the 1980s. The number of
those who were willing to subordinate themselves to the drug gangs, or who were
put in place by the gangs themselves, is similarly high. Rio de Janeiro is only an
especially illustrative example; cases in which favela leaders were murdered or
intimidated by drug gangs and criminal (attempts to gain) influence over neighbor-
hood organizations have also been recorded in many different Brazilian cities. In
addition to this there is the intimidation by death squads (so-called “militias”),
which are made up of (former) policemen who are involved in various illegal
activities.
The problem of the influence of drug bands and “militias” (without mentioning
the traditional brutality of the police) is now being faced by the “second generation”
of the “new urban activism”, such as the sem-teto organization (MTST) (see Souza,
2008, 2009). An example of this is the expulsion of MTST activists from the
ocupação Anita Garibaldi (a large occupied area in the periphery of São Paulo, in
Guarulhos, which was occupied in 2001). The activists’ attempt to negotiate with
the drug dealers did not help, and they were expelled from the settlement.
Until which point can the actions of criminals restrict the growth and activities of
social movements in urban areas?6 For drug gangs that are active in the retail sector
the favelas, as well as the ocupações of the sem-teto, provide possible logistical
support. It is possible to imagine that in some cases the movements will be able to
avoid being expelled and de-territorialized by means of cunning and deceit (see
Souza, 2008: 129–130 for a similar situation of the sem-teto movement in Rio de
Janeiro). It is, however, natural to assume that there is a tendency to friction and
conflict.
Drug dealers are the “poor relations” of the drug trade; they are almost always
from poor and marginalized backgrounds and are instrumentalized by numerous
actors, from businessmen to the police. Instead of simply analyzing them as a
generic category (“drug dealers active in the minor retailing of drugs”) it ought to
be pointed out that they perform different roles and functions.7 It is possible to
construct different scenarios to describe how the relationships between activists and
criminals will develop over the next years, however it is best to proceed with
caution. It is fairly realistic to assume that the current picture provides more
space for pessimism than for optimism.
It is also possible to speculate about a further phenomenon: the militarization of
the urban question, which has resulted from the state reaction to the problems of
public insecurity. Does this not also present a threat to every emancipatory
6
As some of the articles in the Ribeiro and Iulianelli’s (2000) collection demonstrate, this problem
is not unknown in the countryside. However it is less visible here and thus receives less media
attention than the large cities.
7
From the 11 or 12 year old (or even younger) boy who usually act as olheiros (guards), vapores
(street dealers) and aviõezinhos (little airplanes, meaning distributors), to the soldados (soldiers,
meaning security, often also teenagers) and gerentes (managers, meaning those who control the
sale points), to the donos (owners or masters), who mostly operate from prison.
238 M.L. de Souza
movement? Might the legally restrictive measures and repressive strategies that are
put in place to (and under the pretext of) oppressing criminal behavior not also be
used to restrict and repress social movements? This is not merely an inference: the
history of the relations between the movements and the police and the penal system
to date has showed precisely such developments, of varying intensity. Also the
largely patronizing role of the armed forces must not be ignored. Here the threat is
not so much of an explicit and classic military coup but rather of an increasing
militarization of the urban question, which has been observed since the 1990s
(Souza, 2000: 98, 2006a: 491, 2008).
3 The Lula and Rousseff Administrations and Their Effects

on the Social Movements
With the 2002 election of the former industrial worker and trade union leader Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva to president of the republic, the feeling spread in left-oriented
sectors that finally a political constellation was in power that was dedicated to
substantial changes (such as agricultural reform). At the beginning of the term of
office in August 2003 an intellectual close to the MST, Plı́nio de Arruda Sampaio,
expressed the conviction that the Lula government would be “contested” and
“divided”, though not revolutionary: a tension within which the workers would
be able to realize most of their goals (see Lerrer, 2003: 91). What has remained of
these expectations after 11 years of PT government? The following will analyze
some questions with regard to the internal dynamics of the activisms and move-
ments and their relationship to the state apparatus.
A number of organizations are already relatively structured: the MTST, for
example, shows that a squatters organization can also express qualified criticism
of urban planning and management, as well as screen and examine the gaps in
master plans (planos diretores). However, in general the “second generation” of the
“new social movements”, despite the creation of networks and despite exchange
and cooperation among the organizations, is still incipient in terms of an active and
propositional role.
Self-management (autogestão) and non-hierarchical organizational and plan-
ning structures with regard to their activities have sometimes been explicitly or
implicitly proposed as alternatives to state-implemented planning and policy. Some
organizations have even, notwithstanding certain political contradictions, made
important steps in this direction, primarily through experiences with radical alter-
native and resistance urban planning and management (planejamento e gestão
urbanos radicalmente alternativos e de resistência). These are actions that have,
among other aims, the aim of getting to know the state’s discourse and its planning
instruments (as well as the legal and institutional framework conditions in the
context of municipal law, property law, etc.) in order to use them to their own
benefit and make use of gaps and contradictions existing in laws and official plans;
of establishing “dissident areas” that are supported by logistical and political
solidarity networks; of establishing a technical and political oppositional discourse
(as an alternative to state discourse) with regard to problems such as the housing
deficit, differences in infrastructure, public transport, etc.
The “resistance” or “insurgent” urban planning and management are indeed
carried out from the bottom up and are thus somewhat deeper and more radical
than initiatives from progressive governments in the style of participative planning
and management proposals that have been implemented in the context of favorable
political conjunctures. The efforts described here make it clear that in some cases
the actions of the movements were more than just reactive or restricted to “making
demands”. This must be understood in context, as civil society organizations
obviously have neither the legal privileges nor the economic or institutional
resources that the state has for the planning and management of land use.
Self-management and horizontality are, however, not very well distributed
characteristics among the organizations of the social movements in Brazil—neither
in the countryside nor in the cities—even if they are more present today than they
were 20 years ago. The Uruguayan intellectual and activist Raúl Zibechi, in his
striking book La mirada horizontal (Zibechi, 1999) uses the example of the
Brazilian landless workers movement and its main organization, the MST, and
presents the challenge in the form of a “new world in the heart of the old one” (ibid.:
81). At this point the present article would like to ask the provocative, inverted
question: the “old” in the “heart” of the “new”. This refers to centralized and
hierarchical modes of mobilizing, command structures and organizations.
If one looks at contemporary Brazilian urban social movements and their
organizations it seems that only a few of these are truly prepared to express a
radical and at the same time non-conservative criticism of Bolschevism and that
which it represented. There are in fact already organizations that are more or less
consciously committed to this project, however this spirit is not found everywhere.
Developing this spirit must be seen as one of the most important challenges that
faces activists.
A further challenge for contemporary urban activism is related to the problem of
organizing and mobilizing informal workers. In the age of globalization and the
euphemistically named process of “productive restructuring”, the capitalist system
in the core countries is no longer able to include and integrate the entire workforce
into the world of consumption. On the contrary: capitalism is casting out a growing
proportion of the population from the formal labor market or does not include them,
especially young people. Today we are far from the significantly better conditions
of the three decades that followed the end of the Second World War, until the
mid-1970s (a period which is exaggeratedly called the treinte glorieuses). Today
we see mass unemployment, the increasing precariousness of the working situation
and an erosion of the welfare state in the core countries as well as the hyper-
precariousness of work in the countries of the semi-periphery. In these countries,
such as Brazil, which have always been familiar with high under-employment, open
unemployment is rising and the already precarious working situation is becoming
ever more precarious. As if this were not enough, the deficient exercise of the role
of the state as a provider of public services and goods, such as health and education,
is even more reduced.
240 M.L. de Souza
In the context of an imploding working situation and a rising number of people

of working age who are condemned to chronic unemployment and under-
employment, a number of organizations from social movements have understood
that they need to go far beyond the existing boundaries of participation through
public channels and the institutional struggle. They initiate protests in which the
spatial dimension plays a strong role and in which in a certain way it defines
strategies and identities. In the midst of processes of territorialization social
relationships form (and renew) in relation to the attempt to resist the
de-integrating powers and effects of the (semi-)periphery of capitalism, especially
in an age of partial dismantling of the nation state.
To this we can add the fact that the centrality of the “proletariat” as the “subject
of history” cannot be maintained without distancing oneself from reality. This can
be traced back to the political accommodation of the formal working class (the
reduction of the worker’s movement to a corporatistic trade union activism) and has
led to the problem that social movements today see the necessity of bringing several
different social actors together—including the hyper-precariat (lumpenproletariat
in the derogatory Marxist parlance), the idle and the chronically unemployed. Up to
which point is this possible? Up to which point can a hyper-precarious environment
and economic fragmentation bring forth “revolutionary” self-organization? The
Argentinian piqueteros are a very interesting example and can be used as a
comparison with the Brazilian case—both due to their successes and to their limit-
ations. With regard to the limitations, it is clear that Brazil’s case seems even more
difficult in certain respects (the level of formal education and the standard of
information). In Argentina the movement mostly involved former workers from
formal sectors who had been made unemployed; in Brazil it involves the descen-
dants of generations of under-employed workers in extremely precarious living
conditions.
In the context of this deficiency, the Lula government catalyzed a process of
division and political weakening of urban activism. This process was affected in its
development through the weight of the government institutions acting on the
national level or institutions influenced by the government. This tendency has
continued since the previous decade: a “binding” of civil society in the dynamics
and agendas of official modes of participation (always or to a large extent
government-sponsored). Before the role of the Lula government is examined,
these tendencies must be studied more closely.
While the “first generation” movements of the “new activism” were experi-
encing a decline in the 1990s and the “second generation” had barely formed, the
first experiences of participative management and planning were multiplying. They
received a strong impulse from the experience of participative budgeting in Porto
Alegre from 1989 on, under the aegis of mayor and member of the Worker’s Party,
Olı́vio Dutra.
In a country like Brazil, which is marked by the consequences of the foreign debt
crisis and the “structural adjustments” this provoked (as well as the unavoidable
measures for budget consolidation, privatization, etc.) and in which public finances
are often in a miserable state (on differing levels of the public administration, but
especially in the municipalities), the socio-political question behind “participation”

as an instrument of governance is in the most extreme case indiscernible from a
kind of invitation to co-manage the crisis. This does not, of course, change the fact
that there are consistent experiences of participation as well (unfortunately, these
are a small minority—see Souza, 2006a). For this reason the purpose is not to
generally disqualify models such as participative budgeting and participative urban
planning, especially not when one considers that despite their limitations, some—
albeit very few—of these have been relatively effective as indirect mechanisms of
income redistribution.
The problem is, however, that beyond these intrinsic restrictions within the
channels and instances of participative planning and management (which I have
studied in detail in previous works: see Souza, 2002, 2006a, b), these channels and
instances themselves also contain potential risks for social movements—parti-
cularly the risk of cooptation, which was discussed in previous paragraphs, and
which must not be underestimated. How high has the risk been and does it remain
today? How can it be avoided or at least reduced? A part of civil society today is
already aware that it is generally tiring (and often hopeless or even dangerous) to
negotiate with the state through the participation channels that it has created. This
does not justify a simplistic attitude such as “fine, then let’s completely and perma-
nently give up all participative instances”; nevertheless it is necessary to avoid all
kinds of naivety in this context. It is often forgotten or underestimated that the state is
ultimately a heteronomous structure. In the light of this essence of the state appara-
tus, if we recognize it, the aim of trying to influence the state by means of negotiation
and participation can only coherently be regarded as a tactical goal (and can even
then only be understood as cum grano salis) but never as a strategic goal.
It can be assumed that due to the contradictions within the political process and
the state itself, there will be favorable political conjunctures as well as legal and
institutional potentials and room to maneuver. Although we must not lose sight of
the fact that social movements always and in every situation have to estimate the
risks of cooptation (Souza, 2006a: Chap. 10, Part II), it is also important to recog-
nize the necessity of preparing oneself to make use of these economic situations,
room to maneuver and potentials. If and whether an institutionalized participative
instance represents an opportunity or a risk, can only be determined with regard to
individual cases. The lesson, which can be drawn from the study of the Brazilian
experiences of the last 20 years, is that attention should also be paid to analysis of
the promising or complicated character of every situation with clear vision and high
expectations. The multiplication of the so-called participative8 instances must not
per se be seen as a reason for all too great optimism.
And the Lula administration? Did it primarily present an expansion of the
opportunities for social movements or on the contrary a new level of cooptation?
The following will first address the experiences of the urban activisms that were
8
For different observations with regard to this multiplication see: Avritzer (2002), Tatagiba
(2002), Ribeiro and Grazia (2003) and Souza (2000, 2006a).
242 M.L. de Souza
directly involved with struggles for housing and infrastructure. These experiences
will serve as emblematic examples.
Under the aegis of the Lula government the Ministry of Cities (Ministério das
Cidades) was created. It was presented as a brave and innovative institutional
solution—a state authority on the ministerial level that was able to articulate
different areas and actors, in order to facilitate discussion of complex urban
problems. Although in truth this Ministry was faced with a number of problems
from the very beginning: its small size (and the small number of employees), the
minimal resources which it had for the first years (approximately during Lula’s first
period of office), and as if this were not enough, it also had to deal with internal
conflict and structural problems. During the first years, approximately correlating
with the term of Olı́vio Dutra (former trade unionist and former mayor of Porto
Alegre—the first mayor from the Worker’s Party in the capital of Rio Grande do
Sul—and former governor of the same state) the Ministry of Cities was, however,
able to stimulate some relevant studies and debates. These first years stand in
contrast to the conventional approach that the Ministry took when Olı́vio Dutra
was replaced by Márcio Fortes (a conservative politician, appointed in the context
of one of the many compromises that Lula and the PT entered into for the sake of
“governability”). Since then the Ministry of the Cities, which today has significant
resources (thanks to the growth acceleration program PAC, which aims, amongst
other things, to stimulate the construction industry through contracts for the con-
struction of social housing—but strangely enough not for the poorest social strata)
has completely lost its aura as an innovative institution which, according to many
people, it had at its beginning.
A certain degree of conventionalism (to not say conservatism) within the
Ministry of Cities could already be observed from the beginning and this has
grown stronger over the years. Symptomatic of this is the superficiality with
which the subject “citizen’s participation” and the even more superficial and
uncritical treatment that the Federal Law on Urban Development, the so-called
City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade) received in official documents. It is clear that the
City Statute (Law Nr. 10 257 from 2001) in several respects represents an important
development within Brazil’s formal legal system—also with regard to citizen
participation, which is mentioned in seven different articles, three of these in a
special chapter devoted to democratic city administration. Nevertheless the impor-
tance of the Statute of the Cities is often exaggerated (its shortcomings have been
discussed very little to date) in a style that can be described as “technocratism of the
left” (an expression that has already been used by Nicos Poulantzas in another
context).9
9
To begin with, one ought to ask: How is citizen participation treated in the Statute? The Statute
generally refers to it in an ambiguous way—this allows an interpretation that, depending on the
prefecture, allows either a decision-making or merely an advisory role—but a merely advisory
tone dominates. Could the City Statute have included better provisions for citizen participation in
order to reduce the risk that only pseudo-participation is implemented in order to fulfill the formal
requirement of Law 10 257. This would certainly have been possible—even without losing from
The National Council of the Cities (Conselho Nacional das Cidades) was
introduced under the aegis of the Lula government. It was actually created by the
provisory measure (Medida Provis oria) 2200 of September 4, 2001 (under the
National Council for Urban Development—Conselho Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Urbano) however it was regulated and renamed by Decree
Nr. 5031 of April 2, 2004 during Lula’s first period of office. This council
represents, at first glance, an improvement in the institutional context and in
formalized participatory channels on the national level. Nevertheless it must be
taken into consideration that councils can be transformed into empty words or even
manipulated (for example through the insufficient or biased provision of inform-
ation). One obstacle is the problem of authority and jurisdiction. Although Article
1 of the Decree for the Regulation of the Council of the Cities assigns the Council
an “advisory and decision-making” function, Article 2, which lists its authorities
and jurisdictions, makes it clear that it has a primarily advisory and not decision-
making character (cf. Decreto N 5031). Not without cause the civil society
organization National Forum for Urban Reform (F orum Nacional de Reforma
Urbana) campaigned numerous times for draft legislation, which would give the
National Council of the Cities a decision-making character. The fact is that the
National Council for the Cities in its current form functions primarily as an instance
for the legitimization of government policy and less for authentic participation.
The inglorious fate of the Ministry of Cities and the restrictions on the National
Council of the Cities are both “tips of the iceberg” and are factors of a perverse
capillarity: that of a process of bureaucratization of different urban activisms.
Bureaucratization takes place when an activist organization begins to function as
a “public department” (“repartição pública”) and thus as an appendage of the state.
It also starts when the leaders of these organizations behave internally like personal-
istic “officials” and caciques, and thus distance themselves from the social base,
compromising the social power of the activism. This has clearly taken place over
the last few years: it became more prominent in an environment where activists
behave like government employees (ativistas-funcion arios), that are directly or
indirectly linked to governing parties (sometimes also with NGOs).
Some (few) urban activisms are attempting to react and re-organize within this
scenario of political ruin (fragmentation and cooptation). The best example is that
of the sem-teto, who at least in São Paulo are emulating the idea of agricultural
reforms in trying to work at a reinvention of urban reform (reforma urbana)
(unfortunately in an unsystematic manner and with little success).
The sem-teto movement’s attempt to rescue urban reform is notable. “Rescue” is
in this case a relatively appropriate expression: following an important moment of
coming together in the mid-1980s, when the possibility of influencing the develop-
ment of the new constitution through a popular amendment (“emenda popular”)
sight the fact that the Statute as a nationally applicable law cannot get lost in too small details and
that this (in the name of common sense and the autonomy of municipalities) is reserved for local
laws. Be that as it may, what will probably occur in most cases is a poor imitation of citizen
participation and nothing durable or consistent.
244 M.L. de Souza
served as a catalyzer, the idea of urban reform has over the following decades (and
largely until today) remained the hostage of the “technocratism of the left”. It was
the hostage of those who thought that laws and progressive, well-developed plans
(firstly the master plans) would balance out the decline of the urban movements in
the 1980s and 1990s and could in themselves promote great, socio-spatial changes
(with regard to this problem see Souza, 2002, 2006a). If the ideology of “techno-
cratism of the left” had in the 1990s already won many of the basic mobilizations
for urban reform, then this was to a large extent catalyzed during the Lula govern-
ment. In this context it is promising that the sem-teto movement, the MTST, whose
activism was concentrated on São Paulo, had as a main motto precisely the
“struggle for urban reform” (na luta pela reforma urbana). The fact that their
understanding of what this reform constitutes or ought to constitute requires some
specification is certainly a weakness. Nonetheless it is a starting point, in particular
in comparison with the very weak presence of this demand in the homeless
activists’ discourse in for example Rio de Janeiro (Souza & Teixeira, 2009).
The social movements need to interact more amongst themselves. Some of them
already do this (e.g. the sporadic cooperation between hip-hop groups and the sem-
teto movement in São Paulo, or the forum for organizations of social movements
which was formed in 2009 in Rio de Janeiro with the suggestive name (Re)Unindo
Retalhos—roughly translatable as (re-)linking patches); however this process is still
in its infancy. Perhaps this kind of interaction is necessary in order to prevent that
every individual movement be weakened or allow itself to be coopted, thus losing
its radical aspect. The movements ought really to partially reinvent themselves.
This is true, as we have seen, in the case of the “roofless” workers’ movement,
whose organization, MTST, is still struggling with several limitations and
contradictions.
The problem is that all this has to take place not only against the reactions of
typical enemies that are ideologically quite easy to classify (state organisms—
particularly in openly conservative political conjunctures—and formal private
capital), but also against criminal and violent actors within the context of the
“criminal-informal capitalism”, primarily the drug trade and the “militias” (who
are increasingly becoming actors within “criminal-informal capitalism”).
And in the countryside? Since its foundation three decades ago the MST, the
most important organization of the landless agricultural workers, which had
350,000 families as members a few years ago—has now dramatically shrunk. It
still continues to be a very important social movement organization, which has
apparently expanded and deepened its concerns (or in the MST’s own jargon:
“political lines”). During the MST’s 5th National Congress in 2007, 17,500
representatives from 24 Brazilian states took part (in addition to the 181 inter-
national guests, who represented 21 farmers’ organizations from more than 30 differ-
ent countries), confirmed its principles and aims. These include those aims that are
directly related to the struggle for agricultural reform (for example the struggle
against violence in the countryside and for the destruction of the disgraceful focal
points of slave labor in the country’s center, the necessity of the expropriation of
large land owners, control over the production of biofuels by farmers and agri-
cultural workers and the defense of native seeds). They also, however, include more
general subjects (such as criticism of neo-liberalism and imperialism, the necessity
of recognizing the structural causes of the problems of the Brazilian population, the
rejection of the privatization of public property and the strengthening of solidarity
and cooperation with organizations and movements from other countries), as well as
concerns and principles that stand in indirect relation to agricultural reform (such as
those related to environmental protection). However, reality is more complex than
this paragraph may suggest.
The resistance of the landless and their organizations was not easy when one
considers the violence that was carried out between 1985 and 2002 by powerful
land owners (who in 1986, shortly after the formation of the MST, formed a body
that acted on the federal level and represented their interests, the Democratic Rural
Association, UDR). This violence was not seldom flanked, supported or covered up
by the state apparatus—beginning with the disproportionate police violence against
agricultural workers, of which the 1996 massacre of Eldorado dos Carajás (in the
state of Pará) is an example. There the military police shot at 1500 landless workers
who were carrying out a protest march along a street, killing 19 people. Since 2003,
under the Lula da Silva government, the situation of the landless and their
organizations, particularly the MST, has become increasingly complex.
On the one hand, despite the correlation of powers within the government, which
benefitted agribusiness to the disadvantage of small, family production, certain
historical obligations and pressure on the behalf of the population led to an ambi-
guous government position: while there was constant tension with the National
Institute for Settlement and Agricultural Reform (INCRA)—a government organ
that analyzes whether the areas occupied by the landless workers (sem-terra) are
productive or not (in the case that they are deemed to be productive there is a legal
basis for a court order to reclaim the ownership, as a result of which the workers are
forcibly removed)—at the same time the Ministry for Agricultural Development
was providing financial resources that support organizations such as the MST, who
used the money to fund projects and activities. On the other hand the controversy
that began in 2009 regarding the allocation of precisely these financial resources
(which was made more difficult in the last few years) shows that the constantly
contradictory and complex capitalist state has been particularly ambiguous with
regard to the landless, their interests and their demands over the last years.
As if this internal tension within the government in the form of two rival
ministries with opposing interests were not enough (the Ministry of Agriculture
as the mouthpiece for agribusiness and large land owners, versus the Ministry for
Agricultural Development, which is considerably more open to the concerns of
social movements), the Brazilian legal system often takes a quite conservative
position. The person responsible for questioning the legality and legitimacy of
providing resources to benefit associations such as the MST was no less than the
former president of the Supreme Court (STF) Gilmar Mendes (The MST’s reaction
was to demand that he ought to impartially consider all forms of support by the
government, beginning with the subsidies and credits that are offered to
246 M.L. de Souza
agribusiness companies, whose production often takes place in highly critical social
and environmental conditions). In addition there is the competing role of programs
characterized as “assistance” such as above all the Bolsa Famı́lia (family grant),
which to a large extent take the wind out of the sails of the MST. In fact, it has
shrunk from approximately 300,000 families to less than 10 % of this figure in less
than a decade. Moreover, the Dilma Roussef government (elected in 2010 and also
belonging to the Worker’s Party) has shown itself further away from MST and its
agenda than the Lula administration, as a matter of “neo-developmentalist” prag-
matism in the face of agribusiness. Curiously, however, it is MST that has,
according to some critics (see for instance Passa Palavra, 2013) become even closer
to the government and even to business interests. Nowadays, MST shows itself as
weak as never before.
Under pressure from conservative bodies and parties, as well as increasingly
from the mass media (which are in principle controlled by a few large companies),
which successfully muster a considerable portion of the public opinion of the
middle class against the landless workers, even the government has not been able
to stop the increasing criminalization and condemnation of social movements and
activists who have committed themselves to agricultural reform. It has become a
common intimidation tactic to sue the leaders of the landless, particularly those
affiliated with the MST and to bring them to court. At the same time the mass
media, with its generally biased and tendentious reporting, has contributed to a
picture of the landless activists as “troublemakers” and “bandits”. An example of
this is from 2009, when MST members intruded onto a property in the center of the
state São Paulo. This property belonged to the União (federal government of Brazil)
and had been unlawfully taken into possession (grilada) by a transnational com-
pany, Cutrale; in protest the MST activists destroyed thousands of orange trees, for
which they were strongly attacked in the media—the media not only exaggerated
their reports (for example with the false information that the activists had destroyed
dozens of tractors and plundered the main residence on the property), but also
ignored the fact that this was a case of unlawful possession. Also with regard to this
case the government representatives, as is usual, took an ambiguous position: they
defended the rights of the landless to make demands, but rejected their excesses.
The legal institutions restricted themselves to ordering the immediate retreat of the
landless, without considering (as would have been appropriate) the unlawful acqui-
sition of the land by Cutrale.
The landless workers in general and the MST in particular have been able to
survive politically and at the same time avoid decisive, explicit defeats and ultimate
cooptation—in spite of its clear decline in recent years. As it is easy to recognize,
however, the challenges are extremely large, especially under the Worker’s Party
government.
4 Conclusion and Prospects: Theoretical and

Political Challenges
Let us return to the question set out at the beginning: why have the urban move-
ments in Brazil been so much less significant than those in the countryside in the
last two decades? Everything indicates that the answer to this question can be found
in the higher socio-spatial complexity of cities, in particular in large cities and
metropolises, in comparison with rural areas. Thus the complexity of the differing
interests is considerably higher, for which reason the risk of a dispersal of powers
and a non-integration of agendas and actors (individual and collective) is consider-
ably higher. From a capitalist perspective urban land represents to poor people a
geographic basis for the reproduction of labor power and only marginally and in a
“transversal” manner does it represent a means of production (for example as an
addition to the house to support the family income or as an informal “sales point” in
the middle of a public space). This fact, together with the diversity and the
economic and ideological/symbolic borders between types of work, status-levels
and ways of life, makes more difficult the articulation, in favor of socio-political
synergy, of different agendas, struggles and socio-political actors such as favela
inhabitants and inhabitants of semi-legal settlements at the urban peripheries,
residents of formal residential areas, hip-hop activists, the sem-teto, environmental
activists, and many more (for deeper analysis of this subject see Souza, 2006a:
Chap. 4 of Part II).
A further possible explanatory factor is the negative effect of the “absorption of
resources and strength” which the Worker’s Party has had on social movements. As
many authors note, when it was founded (1980) the Worker’s Party was a novelty: a
party which was committed to the institutional/parliamentary rules of the game, but
which was still quite critical and left-oriented; a party which grew out of the
worker’s struggles of the trade unions and which was strongly influenced by left-
wing forces in the Catholic church (basic ecclesial communities etc.); a party which
was neither social-democratic nor Stalinist, nor Trotskyist (despite the existence of
Trotskyist groupings within the party); a party which was neither “reformist” not
revolutionary in the Leninist sense. This party, so appropriate for the new era of the
“transitional phase of democratization” at the beginning of the 1980s in Brazil, was
from the beginning unusually well tailored to becoming a kind of privileged partner
in dialogue and possible institutional partner of the social movements on the
government level. This followed from the fact that they differentiated their
practices from the “hard” style of the Leninist parties, which tended to view
movements as mere “transmission belts” in the service of the party’s claim to
power. The participative budgeting in Porto Alegre makes very clear the PT’s
willingness, together with and partially inspired by the social movements, to
encourage certain important experiences with regard to the expansion of the
scope of action to the advantage of the participation of the population in a represen-
tative “democracy”. This opening was, however, double-sided. The party’s power
of attraction and the institutional channels of participation that it supported were so
strong that it can be compared with the attracting force of—an astronomical
248 M.L. de Souza
metaphor must be permitted here—a “black hole” on the surrounding material and
energy.
The PT played the role of a “black hole” in Brazil’s socio-political life, above all
in the cities. In the process it sucked out civil society’s energy and channeled it into
party activism and into participative instances of the local PT governments. As it
slowly declined and “degenerated”—a fact which should not be viewed as a mere
“ethical-institutional accident”, but rather as a largely unavoidable result of the
institution “party” itself, with the restrictions and conditioning that resulted from its
potential or real scope of action, the capitalist state—the PT left behind a landscape
of destruction and almost emptiness. The virtues of the PT (particularly visible
during the first or the first one and a half decades after its foundation) were both
beneficial and a trap—a trap which the social movements were not prepared to
handle. Particularly urban spaces, which had been bursting with movements in the
1970s and 1980s, strongly experienced the effects of this diversion of creative
energy and organization, as well as that of the ethical-political-ideological decline
of the party in the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century.
However, the future prospects are not entirely discouraging. It is important to
pay attention to the lessons that can be learned from the Argentinian piqueteros.
They show that the “hyper-precariat” (the chronically unemployed, the under-
employed. . .) can act as a so-called critical force and not only as a supporting
actor to reactionary powers, as Marx and Engels suggested in another historical-
spatial context. Moreover, the “hyper-precariat” can play a significant pro-active
role alongside other social groups. On this basis the experience of the piqueteros
inspires (amongst other things) a further consideration. This even further-reaching
thought refers to the following: one great challenge is showing that urban social
movements are not “structurally of secondary importance”, as Manuell Castells
clearly thought at the time of La question urbaine (Castells, 1972). In The City and
the Grassroots (Castells, 1983) this thought is still partially present but rather
implicitly than explicitly. If Castells was of the opinion in La question urbaine
that urban movements will always remain restricted, despite their conjunctural
importance, as long as they do not affiliate themselves with the structurally relevant
worker’s struggle, in The City and the Grassroots he sees contemporary urban
movements as “local” (and more or less localistic) reactions to globalization and the
(relative) pasteurization of values and lifestyles associated with it. If Castells’
provisos in 1972 seem “aged” from today’s perspective, Castells’ message from
1983 is in part even more problematic: despite some advances (such as a higher
appreciation of the spatial dimension), the author does not even attribute to the
movements a significant role in the overcoming of the status quo. This is for the
reason that overcoming the system is no longer on Castell’s political-philosophical
horizon in 1983 (and from then on ever less), instead of which there is something
like local and almost purely incremental advances. In view of the current inter-
national political and ideological economic conditions this position sounds “real-
istic” and simultaneously possesses a “post-modern charm”. However, this is a
neo-conservative way of underestimating what takes place at micro-scale, as well as
the unexpected, the unpredictable. Finally the creativity and wisdom of the people
is underestimated, as well as their skills, their rage and their resistance. It is obvious
that reactions that are wise, creative, angry and very prone to resistance are not
always “revolutionary”. They can also appear in the form of an adaptation and even
strengthen inequality. But who says that they only have to be this?
Since July 2013, several Brazilian cities have been shaking with riots that began
as protests against the bus fare increase. While the organization Free Fare Move-
ment (Movimento Passe Livre, MPL) organized relevant but spatially and socially
limited protests in the last decade, the wave of protests that could be seen in June
2013 (and which was especially important in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, where
hundreds of thousands of protesters showed their angry and indignation on the
streets) was not restricted to the traditional MPL milieu constituted by high school
and college students and young militants. Surely it is not possible to compare these
manifestations with the huge and complex “Argentinian rebellion” of the beginning
of last decade in terms of importance and implications; furthermore, typically
middle-class criticisms and demands (such as those against corruption and left-
wing parties) gradually and partly eclipsed the original agenda—which was clearly
anti-capitalist. However, at the same time when we can see the decline of MST,
urban protests seem to gain momentum again. Therefore, it seems that urban protest
is slowly beginning to be a relevant protagonist in Brazil again, even if it is still too
early to predict very significant or promising political outcomes and a significant
durability.
Despite this, other lessons can be drawn from the piqueteros, lessons which are
related to the risk of cooptation by the state—which has unfortunately happened to
a part of the movement over the last years (with the Kirchnerist organizations and
activists, that were coopted by presidents Nestor and Cristina Kirchner’s projects
and political power). Furthermore the sem-teto workers in Brazil offer important
material for study (challenges from the drug trade, competition from traditional
conservative organizations such as the neighborhood associations, the “recipes”
from the landless movement not easy to import, etc.). Moreover there are the rich
experiences of the “events” and organizations that act on the privileged stage of the
big cities of the “first world” (and also the “third”), in particular the alter-
globalization movement.
If one considers the tradition of Marx’s and Marxist thought, one comes across a
strange inversion with regard to the Brazilian reality of the last decades. It is known
that Marx and Engels thought little of farmers. In some texts they even
demonstrated light disdain and a certain degree of suspicion.10
From the classical Marxist perspective a situation in which agricultural
workers—often self-identified “peasants”, although they are obviously embedded
in completely different contexts and in part demonstrate completely different
10
For example, they express themselves as follows with regard to the civilizing role of the
bourgeoisie in the Communist Manifesto: “The bourgeoisie has reduced the land to the master
of the city. It has created enormous cities, it has greatly increased the urban population in
comparison with that in the country and has thus wrested an important part of the population
from the idiocy of country life” (Marx, 1982: 502–503).
250 M.L. de Souza
characteristics to the peasantry that Marx and Engels referred to in the middle of the
nineteenth century—rather than acting as a mere appendage of the “proletariat”
(particularly industrial workers), are taking a clear leadership role, puts the theory
in a dilemma.
It is very true that Marx and Engels, who followed the pre-revolutionary turmoil
in the Russian empire in the second half of the nineteenth century, admitted that the
traditional, Russian village community could form the basis for a later communist
development, therefore with the possibility to move directly from a “primitive
communism” to post-capitalism. They did not refrain from noting that this would
only happen if the revolution in Russia would become a “sign of a revolution of the
proletariat of the western world” . . . “so that both merged” (Marx & Engels, 1982b:
98). The peasantry would appear in tow of the workers, regardless of how high their
relevance might be in particular situations. The leadership on the way to socialism
was kept for the proletariat, not the peasantry.11
It is thoroughly plausible that the greater complexity of cities, especially in
metropolises and large cities, with regard to their greater diversity of opinions and
interests, be considered as a decisive explanatory factor with regard to the Brazilian
situation. Further efforts are however necessary in order to make deep observations
with regard to the causes of this apparent paradox.
The problem examined in this text was not that related to possible strategies
aiming at re-interpreting the social (actually socio-spatial) practices of the sem-
terra in the framework of the totality of social movements in Brazil, in order to
maintain some form of “theoretical coherence”—this effort is left to the Marxist
intellectuals who are directly linked to that movement and its organizations.
Beyond the (relevant in itself) question of the cause of this situation, the purpose
here was to make clear the problem that has resulted. Up to which point can the
organizational and strategic influences of the MST over an organization of urban
workers (employed and unemployed) such as the MTST, due to an oversimplified
(and even reductionist and stereotypical) view of the socio-spatial dynamics of big
cities and the city-country relationships, lead to errors? While it is true that the
MTST has tried to “emancipate” itself intellectually from the MST and has partially
achieved this: for example the problematic (if interesting) idea of “rural-urban
settlements” (assentamentos rururbanos) has lost importance, which was promoted
as the preferred model for spatial organization12 by the MTST. This is only one
aspect. For a small organization like the MTST, which in addition grew out of the
11
In view of the tendency of many anarchists in the nineteenth century to relate with the peasantry
in a caring and sympathetic manner rather than in a derogatory manner, from the classically
anarchistic perspective there is almost no large theoretical embarrassment. Nonetheless, Marxism,
and not classical anarchism, offers a significant part of the political-philosophical basis on which
the organization operates.
12
The rural-urban settlements would be located on the edges or in the rural-urban belt surrounding
the big cities and would allow workers’ families to have an urban occupation and at the same time
exercise subsistence farming and cattle economy. A rapid critical analysis of this proposal can be
found in Souza (2006a: 307–308).
MST, it is difficult not to see the bigger and older sister with all her power as a
reference point for successes, as well as a reference for organization and politics. It
is equally difficult to resist the besiegement of parties of the Leninist type as has
already taken place in several cases, MTST included. On the other side, the
Movimento Passe Livre has proved that instrumentalization of social movements
and their organizations by left-wing parties is not inevitable, even if the presence of
such parties can never be ignored. Not accidentally, autonomia (which in the
contemporary parlance of many movements means among other things that
activists try to keep distance from parties and their traditional “verticality” and
hierarchy) has been one the key words in the framework of the free fare movement
and related protests.
References
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Nordan-Comunidad.
Media and Media Policy in Brazil
14
Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva
Abstract
In his historical overview, Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva shows how, initially,
the media in Brazil constituted an important source of information, but only for a
small group of people. Furthermore, the quality of journalism was—and is—not
especially high in most of the federal states (estados) and particularly in small
towns. During the military dictatorship control of the communications media
grew and those who did not voluntarily become aligned with the established
order, were subject to censorship. In the context of the political democratization
in the last phase of the military regime, Brazilian journalism already acted
independently and, in part, critically in regards to all government levels,
institutions, individuals and enterprises. Lula’s entry into government permitted
previously excluded persons and ideas to enter the media.
1 Introduction1
Since the end of the military regime in 1985, Brazilian journalism holds an
independent and sometimes even quite critical position towards many government
levels, institutions, persons and companies. Nevertheless, the quality of journalism
in most of the federal states and especially in small towns is still quite low and there
is often little independence of local governments. It is symptomatically, that there is
a direct connection between the quality of journalism and the gross domestic
product of the federal states and municipals (municı́pios). Since President Lula
came to power in 2003, people and ideas that had no access before were given space
1
C.E.L. da Silva (*)
POJOR Institute for the Development of Journalism in Brazil, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: linsdasilva@uol.com.br

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_14
254 C.E.L. da Silva
within media. Even though there is still no pluralism, there is no doubt that even the
most conservative media in Brazil have opened up and are less monolithic today
than 25 years ago.
Since national independence in the early nineteenth century—when the first two
Brazilian newspapers started—the relation between communication media and the
state has always been crucial for journalism in Brazil. One of these newspapers was
printed in England and secretly sold in the only Portuguese colony of the American
continent. This newspaper was called Correio Braziliense and defended the
Brazilian independence. The second newspaper was Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro
and was the official medium of the Crown, which just had transferred their capital
from Lisbon to Rio as a consequence of the invasion of Portugal by the Napoleonic
France.
Before the arrival of the Portuguese royal family, all press activity on Brazilian
territory was forbidden. Hence, Brazil was one of the last countries on the American
continent where journalistic activities were established. Brazil’s national indepen-
dence in 1822 did not happen due to the mobilization power of Correio Braziliense
or society, but because the ruling Portuguese Prince’s decision to stay in Rio de
Janeiro even after the return of his father to Lisbon.
For a period of more than 67 years, Brazil was the only American monarchy.
This was one of the reasons why the country did not put any effort on integrating
with its neighbors. Press activities in that time took place under similar conditions
as in other countries, be it developed countries or former colonies: newspapers only
existed in order to support particular political interests (in the Brazilian case
especially the abolishment of slavery and the foundation of a republic) or political
parties. In most cases there did not exist any connection to the market, which led to
the fact that none of these newspapers were dependent on income from disposition
or advertisement. The losses had to be taken by those ones who supported the
existence of those newspapers due to ideological or political reasons.
Usually, these newspapers were used for controversial disputes outside of
parliament. If tensions within society became too big and the government felt
threatened by it, the latter could react with pressure and censorship to place their
opponents in silence. Sometimes there were acts of violence and disturbances by
groups that were opposed to the newspapers’ ideas and programs.
2 After the Republic
After the Republic’s foundation in 1889 the depicted situation changed ever so
slightly. The economy was still mainly oriented towards agriculture and only a
small elite was able to read and spend their money on newspapers. On the other
hand, newspapers only purpose was that of advertising their editors’ opinions.
The Industrial Revolution enabled many social and technical innovations in
North America and Western Europe (urbanization, overcoming of illiteracy, gen-
eral primary education, reduction of working hours, increasing wages, and also
14 Media and Media Policy in Brazil 255
faster and more efficient means of transport), which again led to the establishment
of a market dependent mass journalism.
In Brazil, the Industrial Revolution did not take place at all or only locally
limited and partially until 1950. Finally, in 1950 industrialization, urbanization and
economic growth started. It is for this reason that only in the second half of the
twentieth century that mass print media began to establish itself, even though radio
already reached a large share of the population in the 1940s—as it was a medium
which was relatively keen in consumption and independent from any reading
capabilities.
Moreover, a process took place, which was typical for countries with an asym-
metrical developing capitalism. The establishment of new communication media
in-line with general literacy led to the fact that “natural” development steps of the
communication industry, as in industrialized countries, were bypassed. Hence, a
quite specific media landscape developed including media of high and low quality
as well as independent media and media completely controlled by regional
governments.
The establishment of the Brazilian Republic was strongly inspired by the
US-American model. Accordingly, the Republic’s first constitution was more or
less a copy of the one from Philadelphia in the late eighteenth century. Many of the
democratic principles, which had been established in the US, were taken over—
even though, in most of the cases, only formally—in Brazil. The respect for
freedom of expression and speech and press freedom as a central clause of all
former constitutions goes back to the country’s legal structure and legal history.
The commercialization of electronic media (radio and TV) took place in Brazil
in 1930 and 1950 based on the US-American model: More precisely commerciali-
zation was established through public concessions on frequency to private
companies with profit goals and sometimes to foundations without earnings
purposes.
3 State-Owned Media
Usually, the Brazilian state was not the owner of communication media. Radio and
TV programs, which are called “public” or “educating” (but in reality are state-
owned), only have been funded since the 1960s. This happened on a governmental
and federal level, but always only to a small extent and none of these programs were
ever able to produce significant audience ratings. State-owned print media are even
rarer to find in the Brazilian history, with the exception of some official gazettes
(on the level of the federal states, the federal republic and the municipals) for the
purpose of publishing legal acts. A significant exception was the daily newspaper
Ultima Hora in the 1950s, which was officially owned by a private company, but
indeed, directly controlled by the federal government of President Getúlio Vargas
(1951–1954). For example, in November 2009 letters written by Vargas addressed
to Ultima Hora’s head editor Samuel Wainer became publicly known. These
writings underline the President’s massive influence on this newspaper. Vargas
256 C.E.L. da Silva
criticized the scope of the sports section of one issue and further directly interfered
in the daily agenda even in topics of no direct political relevance.
With the emergence of the technology of private TV (cable or satellite), the
number of TV programs belonging to government bodies (i.e. parliament, senate,
judicial branch, the legislative powers of the federal states, municipalities, state-
owned universities) significantly increased. Beside the diversity of those programs,
none of them ever reached a slightly significant audience rating which is only equal
to limited political influence. Even the TV network TV-Brasil, which was founded
on initiative of the government of Lula da Silva in 2007, has little impact due to its
low viewing rates.
4 Governmental Interventions
The media’s rather small political meaning and influence in no way means that the
government did not frequently try to intervene in their actions: sometimes quite
violently and without any sense of adequate behavior. In a society in which the state
controls relevant economic activities—be it direct or via companies controlled by
the state (such as Petrobras)—the state is an important actor. A powerful tool of
influence and control by the state, independent of era and ruling party, has always
been the political motivated selectivity regarding the decision on the size of the
budget for advertisement (verba publicit aria), media got allocated.
Another form of influence on mass media by the state is the granting of
broadcasting rights for radio and TV programs owned by politicians or
pro-government groups. At the same time, exactly those groups are often editors
of newspapers and magazines especially on the regional level. Nowadays, at least
one third of Brazilian TV programs are owned by politicians. This phenomenon can
especially be found in poorer regions and smaller states and cities. Political leaders
like the former Federal Presidents José Sarney (Partido do Movimento Democr atico
Brasileiro, 1985–1990) and Fernando Collor de Mello (Partido da Renovação
Nacional, 1990–1992), control—via family members or empowered agents—
radio and TV programs in their federal states of origin in Brazil’s northeast. The
majority of senators and representatives from Brazil’s north and northeastern parts
do the same.
However, such politicians are seldom linked by a formal relationship with these
programs. Nevertheless, it is not denied that it is them who actually have the power.
Sometimes these relationships become publicly known by accident. In January
2010, a mistake by the Ministry for Communication resulted in that on their
webpage about the procedure of granting TV broadcasting rights the name of one
representative from Rio Grande do Sul appeared as receiver of those rights instead
of the foundation which officially holds those rights.
However, most influential media are not those, which are controlled by
politicians. The big TV networks (Globo, Bandeirantes and SBT), newspapers
with national influence (Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, O Globo
and Valor Econômico), the most important information magazines (Veja and
Exame) belong to entrepreneurs who are not directly involved in politics. One of
those big businessman called Silvio Santos (Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão, SBT)
thought about running for President in 1989, but finally decided not to.
As the only exceptions the Di arios Associados (a chain of newspapers,
magazines, radio and TV programs) can be named as they reached the whole
country and had a disperse and broad audience in the 1950s. Di arios Associados
were owned by the journalist Assis Chateaubriand, who decided, after he became
famous and rich, to start as a politician and later became senator. Chateaubriand,
publicly known as Chatô who could be characterized as a Brazilian Citizen Kane,
was ambassador in London and had huge influence on governmental decisions until
he passed away in 1962.
A new and increasingly important development is the informal ownership of
radio and TV programs by religious groups, especially evangelical sects. The
nowadays second biggest, according to its audience rating, Brazilian TV network,
Rede Record, is owned by one of those churches (even though not officially), which
additionally have formed powerful factions in the legislatives of the federal states
and the federation. The not only religious but also political spirit and morale of
these churches is extremely empowered by their communication media which also
includes print media.
5 Communication Media in Times of the Military Regime
During the military regime (1964–1985) government wields its authority on com-
munication media in a brutal manner. Media, which did not voluntarily follow the
existing order, were subject to censorship. Many journalists were arrested and some
even murdered.
Similar occurrences have happened during the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas
(1937–1945). Those two periods are the only ones when such obvious control was
exerted in such a systematic manner. Some newspapers of the so-called “alterative
press”, such as newspapers with mainly political content (Movimento and Opinião)
or a cultural and humoristic focus (Pasquim), were subject to this censorship.
Moreover, the three traditional daily newspapers with national influence (O Estado
de São Paulo, Jornal do Brasil and Jornal da Tarde), as well as the weekly
published information magazine Veja, were affected. Further, media were subject
to this censorship as military personnel called the editors and decided the topics of
reporting. The editors met these instructions.
During the period of dictatorship, repression was carried out in less obvious
ways as well. For instance, Rede Globo de Televisão became main communication
media of Brazil in this time as it benefited of large technological investments the
government made in the field of telecommunication. A net of broadcasting towers
enabled TV reception throughout the whole country for the first time. Furthermore,
Rede Globo profited by the support of governmental authorities in getting financial
and technical support from abroad (especially of the American Time-Life), which
was forbidden by law at this time. In return, Rede Globo ideologically supported the
258 C.E.L. da Silva
military regime in their news. The main stockholder of Rede Globo, Roberto
Marinho (1904–2003) had considerable impact on some ministers of the military
governments, especially on these who were working in the field of communication.
He maintained his influence after the dictatorship, in times of civil governments.
6 The Democratic Era
Since the end of the military regime in 1985—and even in its last phase from 1979
and on, when the process of political opening up intensified—Brazilian journalism
has been acting independent of and sometimes quite critical towards all levels of
government, institutions, persons and companies. It was the press, for instance, that
played a crucial role during the Impeachment proceedings against President
Fernando Collor de Mello in the beginning of the 1990s.
The outstanding economic growth of Brazil in the 1970s enabled the most
important communication media to invest in improving the quality of their techni-
cal and human resources. Even though the level of quality of Brazilian journalism is
not the same all over the country, the work of the most important communication
media is on a relatively high level and there is no gap compared to the best media in
the western world. However, the journalistic quality is still not high in most of the
federal states, especially in small cities and rural areas and journalism’s indepen-
dence from local governments is essentially lower.
It is symptomatically, that there is a direct link between journalism’s quality
level and the states’ and municipals’ gross domestic product. With the exception of
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s most excellent communication media can be
found in wealthy federal states such as Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais
and Distrito Federal. In the northern and northeastern federal states communication
media is of a lower level of quality.
Ideologically speaking, the big media publishers normally have a conservative
position—but there are slight differences. There are some with quite liberal
attitudes and positions regarding politics and culture, defending a capitalist model
of free markets. Since Lula da Silva’s government takeover in 2003, people and
ideas formerly excluded from media get access to media. Even though pluralism
does not exist per se, there are no doubts that even the most conservative media
have opened up and are less monolithic than 25 years ago. A comparison of the
reporting on the presidential elections of 1989 and 2006 underlines this statement.
In the latter, reporting was much less biased and important parties and candidates
were relatively equally considered regarding the placing of public advertisements
and for mobilization efforts.
7 The Recent Situation of the Media in Brazil
The recent constitution of the year 1988 explicitly guarantees freedom of expres-
sion in article 220: “Expression of opinion which means the development, expres-
sion and information, is not subject to any restriction”.2 Article 5 states: “The
expression of intellectual activities, art, science and communication is free, inde-
pendent of censorship and licenses”.3 It is remarkable that the press law of the
dictatorship period was only canceled in 2009. This was one of the strictest press
laws that had ever been in force, but it has not been applied in practice for the last
25 years.
However, this does not mean that there is no limitation of freedom of expression
nowadays, as article 5 eventually grants the right of picture, privacy, honor and
good reputation (bom nome). There are a large number of cases in which judges of
low instances forbid reporting on certain affairs of persons due to the rights ensured
by article 5. However, such decisions are normally reversed by higher instances.
Although, in some cases, it takes months until a decision is made regarding such
appeals. Such cases of judicial censorship are found especially on a regional level
and in favor of powerful local politicians, but sometimes even appear on a national
level.
For instance, the case of censorship of Brazil’s most important daily newspaper
O Estado de São Paulo got lots of attention. On July 30, 2009, the newspaper got
the prohibition (whereby this restriction lasted at least until the end of January
2010) to publish articles about investigations of the federal police regarding
suspicious actions of family members of the already mentioned José Sarney—
former Federal President, recent President of the federal senate and part-time ally
of President Lula.
In several South American countries recently governed by leftist governments,
one can observe that tensions between government and communication media
owned by private companies, mostly family-owned, get more intense. Since the
government takeover of Lula da Silva in 2003 such developments can be observed
in Brazil as well, even though to a smaller extent in comparison to Venezuela,
Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador.
Lula proved to be an extremely pragmatic leader—a fact that especially became
obvious in his way to handle media. During the repeated presidential elections in
which he participated (especially in the year 1989 when his opponent was Fernando
Collor de Mello), Rede Globo informally morally supported his opponents. Never-
theless, Lula maintained good relationships with Rede Globo during his period as
President. He appeared, for example, on the evening of his election victory in 2002
in Rede Globo’s most important news program.
2
“A manifestação do pensamento, a criação, a expressão e a informação, sob qualquer forma,
processo ou veı́culo não sofrerão qualquer restrição”.
3 ´
“E livre a expressão da atividade intelectual, artı́stica, cientı́fica e de comunicação,
independentemente de censura ou licença”.
260 C.E.L. da Silva
However, at the beginning of Lula’s term of office a direct confrontation

between the President and Rede Globo apparently developed especially in the
context of countless legal actions of corruption against important leaders of the
PT government (keyword mensalão). The most ideological core of the PT govern-
ment (led by the head of the office of the President at that time, José Dirceu) started
several attempts to extend governmental control on media.
Thus, for instance, the working permission of the correspondent of the US
American newspaper The New York Times was cancelled. Moreover, there was
the attempt to establish governmental organs such as a federal council of journalists
(Conselho Federal de Jornalistas) or a national office for audiovisual media
(Agência Nacional do Audiovisual). It was feared, that such institutions could
become means of control over the free expression of opinion. President Lula,
who himself discretely supported those projects, only gave few press interviews,
did not hold any press conference for years and continuously criticized the journal-
istic behavior.
Even though this distance remained and Lula’s government kept on looking for
direct ways of communicating with the people, some factors led to the development
of a calmer atmosphere between government and communication media. This
includes the fact that journalistic investigation in the context of the affairs named
above, have not led to a diminished prestige of President Lula. In this context, the
overthrow of José Dirceu has to be mentioned as it weakened the most leftist faction
of the government. Further important factors are Lula’s successful re-election in
2006, the economic growth during his second term of office, Lula’s growing
international prestige and finally the fact that Brazil came through the international
financial crisis in 2008 without any large losses.
7.1 Presidential Protagonism
Additionally to the already mentioned media project TV Brasil, which is seen as a

failure due to its viewing ratings, the President had a weekly radio program of high
response, a blog and a weekly column published in hundreds of widely distributed
newspapers. By the end of 2009, the controversially discussed movie about Lula’s
life “Lula – o filho do Brasil” (Lula—the son of Brazil) came out, which had been
supported by many big (and also state-owned) companies and whose supporters
received remarkable tax concessions.
Furthermore, a national communication conference took place in December
2009, which was boycotted by many companies of the field. In this conference,
several draft bills and other initiatives aiming to strengthen the governmental
controlling instruments over communication media were discussed. This happened
under the term of “social control of communication” (as it was called by Lula’s
allies), but opponents considered it to be purely a way of governmental rule over
media. Some of the more conservative oriented media attacked those initiatives,
which led to a similar aggressive reaction of non-governmental organizations and
leftist parties accusing the established communication media of their bias in favor
of the opposition.
The intensification of the conflicts between the state and media in Venezuela,
Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador also heated the discursive conflict in Brazil but
with little concrete effects up to now. No independent analyst holds the opinion that
communication media in Brazil constrains the country’s governability or that
Lula’s government had planned to limit freedom of expression, which basically
had always been permitted during his periods of government.
However, on a discursive level one could recognize certain hostility by some
members and supporters of Lula’s government (partly even by the President
himself) towards traditional communication media. Some weekly or monthly
published magazines (esp. Carta Capital and Caros Amigos), TV programs (esp.
the abovementioned program Rede Record) and especially bloggers with distinct
amounts of followers (but in no case really remarkable) are aims of these attacks.
Since 2007, however, state ministers or the President only seldom attack traditional
media.
7.2 Presidential Elections in 2010
In the context of the presidential election in 2010—in which Lula did not participate
but was dedicatedly involved in the campaign of his favorite candidate, the former
minister Dilma Rousseff (PT)—a little increase of the mentioned conflicts was
observable. But, in general, one could not speak of an extreme intensification.
Major reasons for this quite calm atmosphere in the year 2010 was the good
economic situation of which all sectors of the population benefited as well as the
high public acceptance (rating at 80 %) of Lula’s performance and achievements. A
further crucial factor was the realization that communication media do not hold
such a powerful position regarding elections as it was thought for a long time. This
resulted from the fact that Lula clearly won the elections in 2002 and 2006 despite
the media’s support of his opponents (Lula was elected with an almost two-third
majority in the second round of voting).
One could say that something similar happened during the presidential elections
in 2010 as Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s favorite candidate, convinced the majority of the
electors even though most media implicitly or explicitly were in favor of one of her
opponents such as José Serra (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) or
Marina Silva (Partido Verde, PV). The first statements of the newly elected
President regarding freedom of expression and independence of communication
media have raised hope within society. Rousseff clearly stated that within her term
of office no attacks on media are to be expected. Different from Lula’s case,
Rousseff’s political initiatives quickly got the support of most of Brazilian
newspapers, magazines, radio and TV programs. Hence, the atmosphere between
media and Rousseff’s government was quite good at the beginning of her first term
in office.
262 C.E.L. da Silva
7.3 Dilma Rousseff
In the first years of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency, the relationship between the
government and the mass media somewhat eased. The new president, though
probably more ideological than her predecessor, has been much less enthusiastic
about the ideas of “social control of the media” proposed by some of her party
leaders. Soon in office, she went to the anniversary celebration of Folha de
S. Paulo, one of the leading daily newspapers in the country, well known of its
critical position to Lula and Rousseff. Her Communication Minister, Paulo
Bernardo, has been very vocal in interviews stating that “media control” is not in
the agenda of this government, and this has cost him several harsh attacks from
some of his party colleagues.
Part IV
Policy Fields
The Brazilian Economic Policy: From
the Crisis of Import Substitution 15
to the Programa de Aceleração do
Crescimento
Stefan Schmalz
Abstract
In his article on economic policy, Stefan Schmalz looks into the assumption that
there has been a slow re-orientation process in Brazil that favored the return of
the developmentalist State. Accordingly an economic model with more State
influence gained strength, quasi as a counterpart to what happened within the
neo-liberal model in the early 1990s. The gradual and negotiated transition to a
new developmental State model (novo desenvolvimentismo) was possible
through a social democratic alliance at the parliamentary level after the eco-
nomic crisis of the late 1990s. Under Lula the system obtained a new quality,
above all through massive programs for infrastructure development (programas
de aceleração do crescimento, PAC I and II). Nonetheless, this development
model is still considered contradictory as environmental and rural conflicts
remain unsolved. Thus, despite the income growth, the rural population is still
excluded from the modernization project while the high concentration of land
property continues to exist.
1 Introduction: A Slow Reorientation1
There is hardly any policy field in Brazil to which the assessment of various
observers of the past Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (PT, 2003–2010) differs
so sharply as economic policy. Especially in the first years in office since 2003, the
Government has been both severely criticized and praised effusively for its course
of action. While earlier companions of former trade union leader Lula da Silva such
1
S. Schmalz (*)
Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany
e-mail: s.schmalz@uni-jena.de

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_15
266 S. Schmalz
as Emir Sader (2005: 535) only had harsh words to spare for the continuation of the
economic orientation of the previous government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(PSDB, 1995–2002), the international financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the dominating elites in Brazil were exited. Irrespective
of these contesting assessments, there was a strong indication for a continuation of
the orthodox fiscal policy. The government generated high primary budget
surpluses, focused on export expansion, continued the policy of high interest rates
and by no means nationalized private businesses. However, as of the second term,
from 2007 onwards, the Lula government increasingly expanded government
regulation, which was particularly important in the light of the global economic
crisis of 2008–2009. As a result, the debate about Brazilian economic policy
changed: now the focus was on the question whether this new course of action
would be the beginning of a regime change (Sicsú, 2007) or if it rather constituted a
mere shift within neoliberal orientation (Paulani, 2008).
In this article it is argued that a slow reorientation occurred that facilitates the
“return of the developmental state” (Novy, 2008). This transition occurred within a
parliamentary system that only allowed for a slow yet internally agreed change of
the system due to the given distribution of power in Congress. The argument
unfolds as follows: firstly, the double crisis of import substitution and the military
dictatorship as starting point for neoliberal policy implementation is discussed
(Sect. 2). As a result of the defeat of Lula da Silva during the 1989 presidential
elections a stable majority of liberal forces established itself in the parliament
temporarily (Sect. 3). This eroded only after yet another economic crisis (the
currency crisis of 1998–1999), which enabled a social democratic alliance at
parliamentary level (Sect. 4). Just after the inauguration the PT-dominated govern-
ment began to gain control over several state apparatuses until—against the back-
ground of favorable economic data—a change in economic policy occurred in the
second term in office (Sect. 5). The result was a largely successful social democratic
strategy that seemed to have consolidated itself, as even the politically conservative
and economically liberal opposition would not touch nor change the cornerstones of
the emerged economic model (Sect. 6).
2 The Double Crisis: The End of Import Substitution

and the Military Dictatorship
The starting point for the implementation of democratic reforms in Brazil was a
dual crisis of legitimacy of the military dictatorship (Schmalz, 2008: 70). On the
one hand, the economic model that the military rulers (1964–1985) had relied on
was in crisis. Compared to other Latin America countries the Brazilian industriali-
zation model of import substitution was one of the most far-reaching. Brazil
succeeded not only in building up primary and consumer industries but also in
producing (technology intensive) capital goods. Additionally, the military focused
on massive foreign investment, interventionist economic planning, export
15 The Brazilian Economic Policy: From the Crisis of Import Substitution. . . 267
orientation and, particularly in the 1970s—as an indirect consequence of the limited

domestic market and high income concentration—rising of cheap foreign loans.
This economic model was most successful under the Medici administration
(1969–1974) with an average annual economic growth rate of 11.5 %. However,
this so called economic miracle (milagre econômico) was only possible because
centralized trade unions and employers’ organizations were banned and, therefore,
a super-exploitation of workers was accelerated (see Chap. 12). The succeeding
Geisel government (1974–1979) inherited the problems of this orientation when it
struggled with a latent economic crisis. The first oil crisis of 1973–1974 that
quadrupled the costs of oil imports, the decline of other commodity prices, and
costly foreign investments all contributed to a growing current account deficit of the
country. The government responded with the II National Development Plan (II
Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento). The goal was to initialize a new cycle of
economic growth by deepening the import substitution industrialization, continued
expansion of the capital goods industry and simultaneously promoting export
policy. Instead, however, the borrowing of cheap foreign credit moreover led to
an increase of the debt burden from US$5.7 billion in 1970 to US$71.5 billion in
1980. Due to the policy of high interest rates of the U.S. Central Bank, interest rates
in Brazil rose as well. Suddenly the debt was no longer affordable. In 1981 Brazil
entered a period of economic downturn. Thus, the 1980s were a decade of zero
growth, which is often referred to as the “lost decade” (Boris, 2009: 67).
In addition to the economic crisis, the military regime faced a significant
political crisis. First, from 1974–1975 onwards, various business associations
began to openly express discomfort against the “nonaggression pact” (Novy,
2001: 105) between state, national and foreign capital. In February 1975, they
initiated a media campaign in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo against the
“nationalization of the economy”, demanding an end to the interventionist eco-
nomic policies (Souza, 2005: 279). At the same time, the middle classes
disaffirmation of the repressive course of action against the opposition grew and
the opposition party Movimento da Democracia Brasileira (MDB) achieved some
electoral success on the local level.
In line with these actions, in 1978 the car workers of the ABC region,2 Southeast
of São Paulo, started a massive strike wave. This quickly spread to other states and
shook the political legitimacy of the military to the core. The strikes were directed
against ongoing real wage losses of workers due to ongoing inflation during the
years of military dictatorship leading up to the formation of new social movements.
The formation of independent grass roots unions culminated in the establishment of
the left-wing central trade union Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) in 1983
that harshly criticized the public cooperative system and the establishment of the
socialist oriented Workers Party (PT) in 1980. The persistence of conflict in the
countryside led to the formation of the powerful landless movement (MST) in 1984.
2
The term ABC refers to three villages of the urban hinterland of São Paulo: Santo André, São
Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul.
268 S. Schmalz
Under the pressures of the legitimacy crisis the Geisel government (1974–1979)
took first steps of social and economic opening (abertura) and reducing social
repression (distensão).
Consequently, there was a political stalemate in the 1980s. With regard to the
economy the last military government of Figueiredo (1979–1985) and the first
civilian government of Sarney (1985–1990) both were trapped in a contradicting
situation between constraints in the area of autonomy of their economic policies
and the attempt to continue the national development project through investments
in infrastructure and the industrial sector. The III Plano Nacional de
Desenvolvimento failed, just as the plethora of other stabilization programs. Yet,
while several other Latin American countries decided to liberalize foreign trade
(Dombois & Pries, 1999: 53), Brazil continued to follow the import substitution
strategy. On the domestic level, the military faced an active democratization
movement that repeatedly initiated mass mobilizations in a campaign supporting
direct presidential elections (diretas j
a) in 1984 (Rodrigues, 2003). The subsequent
controlled political opening ultimately led to the first direct congressional and
gubernatorial elections for more than 15 years, in 1982, in which the opposition
was able to win the majority. In 1988, a constitutional compromise was struck with
the social movements that paved the way to return to democracy. Nevertheless, the
compromise shaped the balance of power and perpetuated a liberal-conservative
hegemony within parliamentary structures: The (then) politically more conserva-
tive regions in the Northeast were systematically favored in the elections of the
Senate (Senado Federal) and the Chamber of Deputies (Câmarados Deputados) so
that PT received significantly fewer seats as she was strongly engaged in the
Southeast at that time (Pont, 2003: 96–98).
3 The Brazilian Neoliberalism3: “Collorstroika”

and Plano Real
The first free presidential elections in 1989 were highly politicized (Novy, 2001:
293). They stood for a political culmination of the mobilizations against the social
status quo of the past decade. In the second round of voting the political
“newcomers” Fernando Collor de Mello (PRN), supported by the center-right
3
Neoliberalism is a contested term and has led to extensive and heated debates. First and foremost,
this has to do with the fact that the term describes singular issues that are closely interconnected,
but do not have a common denominator (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2011: 25). Neoliberalism has
(a) characteristics of an ideology which is comprised of various principles such as the essential
stability of the private sector, the independence of the markets, and the solution of societal
problems through the market mechanism, monetarism or competition as a social organizing
principle, (b) Also different material concessions to the subaltern classes were revoked by
neoliberalism. Neoliberals mostly critically oppose the expansion of the public sector or union
influence, (c) In addition, neoliberalism helped create a global free market, i.e. tariff barriers
and barriers to international capital mobility were abolished. In practice, neoliberalism was usually
linked to other ideological trends.
coalition (PMDB, PFL and PDS), and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leading figure
of the PT, ended up as the remaining opponent (Bernecker, Pietschmann, & Zoller,
2000: 303). Both candidates epitomized those opposed projects that had emerged
already in the late 1970s: Collor de Mello focused on a populist anti-corruption
discourse and free-market economic policies, whereas Lula propagated a socialist
alternative.
The elections (which Lula lost by a small margin) had a crucial impact on the
country’s economic policy. In April 1990, Collor de Mello pushed for privatization
with his Programa Nacional de Desestatização that reflected the interests of the
private business sector for greater freedoms in a market-based economy (Rocha,
1994: 88). At the same time, the government opened up the markets for imports by
massively lowering external tariffs and thereby exposing the Brazilian state-owned
and private enterprises to more foreign competition. This so called “Collorstroika”
came, however, to a sudden end. The consent of the middle class dropped heavily
after the freezing of savings worth more than 2500 EUR (converted) as part of the
failed anti-inflation program Plano Brasil Novo and, in line with that, several
businessmen braced themselves against the radical opening of markets (Schmalz
& Ebenau, 2011: 53). After an extensive system of corruption of the Collor
government was uncovered, a social movement emerged that initiated a successful
impeachment process on May 1992. Upon taking office, Vice-president Itamar
Franco (at that time PRN, 1992–1994) briefly slowed down the neoliberal turn.
However, from 1994, Finance Minister Cardoso made crucial political decisions
that changed the course completely towards neoliberal policies.
The economic model initiated by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government
(1995–2002) was led by the idea that the basis for a new growth cycle would be laid
primarily by means of fighting inflation and increasing the attractiveness of the
investment climate for foreign investors. At first glance, the concept seemed to be
successful. With the introduction of the Plano Real in 1994 the inflation was
brought down to a historically low level. Because of the over-valuation of the
new currency (the Real) due to the direct peg to the US$, a significant increase in
purchasing power especially in the lower and middle classes was achieved which,
in consequence, led to a drop in absolute poverty from 41.7 % of the population to
33.9 %, according to official statistics. As a direct result of this “exchange rate
populism” (Rocha, 2002: 10), Cardoso won the upcoming elections by a surprising
majority: While Lula was leading the poll projections by 16 points in April 1994
(37 % for Lula was significantly higher than the 21 % for Cardoso) he, however,
received only 27 % in October, which is only half the votes of his opponent
(Amaral, 2003: 109).
In the subsequent two terms the Cardoso government could rely on a stabile
parliamentarian majority. The coalition of PSDB-PTB-PMDB-PFL remained gen-
erally stable, until the beginning of 2002, and integrated additional parties, for
example the right wing PPB (Tavares de Almeida, 2005: 14). For 6 years the
coalition held over three-quarters of the seats in the House of Representatives,
thus allowing an uncontested implementation of a constitutional reform that in turn
would allow for Cardoso’s reelection. Cardoso, who in fact had run in the elections
270 S. Schmalz
representing the liberal left, ironically managed to band together the Brazilian right
wings and was given considerable political leeway in the beginning. His reforms
received widespread approval coming from the marginalized urban poor in the
informal sector, moderate and right wing union representatives, parts of the middle
class, liberal intellectuals and technocrats. In particular the transnational capital
fractions that had access to the international financial markets benefited from
Cardoso’s reorientation in economic policy. The opposition was, however, severely
weakened: the market opening, privatization processes and pressure on the labor
market, forced the CUT unions to “switch from offensive wage disputes to defen-
sive job security” (Becker, 2008: 161). In answer to the electoral defeat of Lula, the
PT softened its political agendas of 1994 and step-by-step developed into a social
democratic party (Amaral, 2003: 155)—with a strong left-socialist wing.
Despite a short initial period of success, the new economic model that was
introduced through the Plano Real showed significant deficits soon after. A chronic
current account deficit and the concomitant large increase in foreign debt of
US$145 billion in 1993 to US$241 billion in 1999, a decline in the investment
rate, the inflow of predominantly volatile and unproductive capital, the risk of
speculative attacks and the associated stabilization policy using high interest rates
and high foreign currency reserves were obvious weak points of the model (Boris,
2003: 3; Rocha, 2002: 10). Economically, the Cardoso government found itself
constrained to go along with developments on the international financial markets.
This policy of stop-and-go had led to extremely short economic cycles, described
by Brazilian economists as “chicken flight” (voo da galinha). Overall, the share of
the financial sector in GDP rose to a high value of 9 %. Although the preliminary
successes ensured Cardoso’s reelection in 1998, a severe financial and currency
crisis was imminent in the context of the Asian economic crisis 1997–1998. On
January 15, 1999, the central bank had to release the exchange rate of the Real,
which devaluated by almost 50 % within eight weeks. As a consequence, a strict
structural adjustment program was administered by the IMF. The Real again lost
half of its value between January and October 2001. After only a short recovery in
2000 the Brazilian economy went back into recession.
Cardoso’s stop and go policy went hand in hand with a strong privatization and
denationalization of the Brazilian economy. Approximately US$31 billion in for-
eign direct investment were pumped into the Brazilian economy by selling state-
owned companies (telecommunication, energy, banks etc.). Some 1200 Brazilian
companies were acquired by foreign multi-national companies. Consequently the
share of capital controlled by foreign investors of Brazil’s 40 largest companies
increased from 37.5 to 45 % between 1989 and 1999 (Diniz & Boschi, 2004: 61).
The revenue of state-owned enterprises of the 100 largest Brazilian companies fell
from 44 to 21 % (Ibid.: 68). As a consequence, the classical tripé of national private,
public and foreign capital broke up for good. The sellout of the Brazilian economy
was accompanied by a tendency for deindustrialization, which manifested itself in a
decline of local production of capital goods and a decline of the share of
manufactured goods in exports (Cervo & Bueno, 2002: 473, Economist 7/2/2004:
52). Some of the privatized companies like Vale do Rio Doce or the aircraft
manufacturer Embraer, however, managed to establish themselves successfully on

the global market (Flynn, 2007; Ross Schneider, 2009).
Moreover, the neoliberal policies brought about drastic changes in foreign trade
policy (Schmalz, 2008: 120). For the first time since 1962, the trade balance was
negative between 1995 and 2000, first and foremost due to the Plano Real. The
level of import tariffs fell from an average of 41 % in 1988, to 16.7 % in 1998. In
addition, several courses were set for different negotiation processes, all of which
entailed a further opening of domestic markets as well as restricting the country’s
capacity to act in the economic policy sphere (Nogueira Batista, 2005: 73). In
addition to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the
negotiations for the Pan-American free trade agreement (Free Trade Area of the
Americas, FTAA) led by U.S. capital interests (from 1994) and the process of
EU-Mercosul Association Agreement (since 1999) were of particular importance in
this respect. The Cardoso government only counteracted the Collorstroika in the
area of foreign trade diversification and thereby challenging the position of the USA
as the major export market.
Altogether, and despite the successful fight against the inflation, a negative
assessment of the economic development under the Cardoso government can be
presented (Boris, 2003: 9): “With an average annual GDP growth of about 2.4 %
and per capita income by 1 % per year, this economic policy yielded no momentum
for sustainable development for the Brazilian economy and society.” It is therefore
not surprising that during the second term of the Cardoso government an open
discussion took place about a (neo-mercantilist) reorientation of economic policy
(Abu-El-Haj, 2007).
4 The Lula Government: A Slow Turnaround
4.1 The Continuation of Economic Policy in Lula’s First Term
In October 2002 Lula eventually won the presidential elections in his fourth attempt
with 61.3 % of the votes. The clear victory was reinforced not least thanks to the
discrediting of the Cardoso government due its weak economic and social perfor-
mance and due to the lack of a convincing alternative from the bourgeoisie. In
addition, compared to the traditional program of the PT, Lula already made
far-reaching concessions in his campaign to form a class alliance of the most
diverse losers of neoliberalism such as urban workers, domestic market oriented
industry, parts of the middle class, etc. (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005; Schmalz, 2008:
107). The former discourse dominated by class struggle gave way to the general talk
about social change (Panizza, 2004: 474). The Liberal Party (PL) was included in
this alliance by making José Alencar, a textile manufacturer, Vice-president of the
Republic. Nevertheless, the mere possibility of an election victory by Lula’s
coalition of PT-PCdoB-PL scared investors on the financial markets, which caused
an exodus of capital of around US$11 billion (Hardie, 2006). To counteract a
potential economic crisis, Lula declared in the eminent Carta ao Povo Brasileiro
272 S. Schmalz
that a government under his leadership would comply with international treaties
and pay back the high foreign debt of US$228 billion—thus openly opposing a
party decision. To ensure the realization of that promise on an institutional level, the
IMF offered a standby-loan of US$30.4 billion to the still reigning Cardoso
government, which in turn implied a continuation of the economic policy.
In 2003 when the Lula government was officially inaugurated, observers con-
sidered the continuity debt payment and austerity policy as a surety for a continua-
tion of neoliberal policy and presumably in an even more efficient way (Filgueiras
& Gonçalves, 2007: 175; Paulani, 2008: 70). The economic policy of the new
government was massively criticized. In fact, the Lula government over-
accomplished the goals agreed with the IMF of generating a primary surplus of
3.75 % by up to 4.8 % (Filgueiras & Gonçalves, 2007: 101) during his first
legislation. This policy was even continued when, in 2005, the Lula government
decided not to sign a second agreement with the IMF. In addition, the very high real
interest rates of 8–10 % were retained, that in turn benefited financial market
oriented capital fractions and stalled investments in the industrial sector. Brazil
under Lula remained the country with the highest gross profit margin on the capital
market (Kregel, 2009: 8). Due to the favorable global economic conditions Brazil
achieved an annual GDP growth rate of 3.3 % in spite of its austerity policy, which
was a rather poor result in comparison to Latin America as a whole (Filgueiras &
Gonçalves, 2007).
Moreover, the composition of the government was heavily influenced by the old
elites (Boris, 2003; Schmalz, 2008). While the first cabinet consisted of a strong
block of 14 ministers of the PT, the appointment of representatives of the bourgeoi-
sie such as, for example, from agribusiness was a clear sign of political continuity at
the same time. Former president of the Bank of Boston and delegate of the former
ruling party PSDB, Henrique Meirelles, was even appointed chairman of the
Central Bank. Additionally, the coalition had to accompany the interests of several
small parties such as PDT, PPS, PSB, PTB and PV in the government (at least
temporarily) because of a missing permanent parliamentary majority. Therefore it
had to rely on strategic alliances with parts of the opposition and eventually even
integrated the state party PMDB in the government. This is particularly why De
Oliveira (2007) concludes that the Lula government stood for a “reverse hege-
mony”: the subalterns had indeed taken over the management of some state
apparatuses, but would continue to represent the interests of the bourgeoisie.
However, at least two major upheavals could be identified: Firstly, the Lula
government quickly induced a change in foreign trade policy. The initiative to
establish the G20 (Group of 20) and the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference
in Cancún in 2003, were the first signs of this reorientation. From now on, Brazil
began to actively shape the world trade talks in changing alliances and to slow down
the aggressive demands for more trade liberalization of the North while at the same
time entering into new South-South alliances, such as the “India Brazil
South Africa Dialogue Forum” (IBSA) and a plethora of other bilateral agreements
(see Chap. 21). The reorientation was reflected also on the regional level. Already in
2003, the Lula government began to distance itself from the Pan-American free
trade project (FTAA) (Gentili, 2004: 105), which ultimately led to the dismissal of
the FTAA project with the support from Argentina and Venezuela. Likewise, the
politically similarly oriented EU-Mercosul association agreement was not
negotiated any further since October 2004 (Nogueira Batista, 2005: 132) and
talks have only continued in 2010. However, the attempt to form a regional
alternative that could balance out the power of the North was not successful.
Even though all South American States became associated members of Mercosul,
the restructuring of the trading block to a more institutionalized and socially
oriented agreement failed, for the time being, due to scarce resources (Burges,
2005). What followed was a massive change of foreign trade patterns: between
2002 and 2006, the traditional states of the center (Japan, EU, USA) lost around
12 % of Brazil’s total trade, while China, in particular, massively increased its
share. Above all this development significantly contributed to the boom in agricul-
tural exports. There was also a high demand for commodities such as iron ore.
Similarly, a shift occurred in the structure of foreign debt: the share of external
public debt to GDP of 14.3 % in 2002 was reduced to almost zero in Lula’s first
term in office, by purposefully shifting foreign debt into domestic debt.
Another form of structural policy that stood out of the neoliberal orientation was
the active labor market and social policy of the government (see Chap. 19). The
high trade surpluses of up to US$40 billion that were only achievable mainly due to
the robust growth of the East Asian economies and the high demand for agricultural
goods facilitated the reorientation in social policy–agricultural exports make up
some 4 % of GDP and about 97 % of the trade surplus (Lühmann & Schmalz, 2010).
Essentially, it was an extension, bundling and radicalization of selective social
political measures of the Cardoso Era (Leubolt & Tittor, 2008: 131). For example,
former income transfer programs were subsumed in the Bolsa Famı́lia program that
reached 11.2 million people at the end of the first legislature and supplied each
person with US$35 per month on average. Within labor market policy the
formalization of labor relations was advanced mainly to the benefit of non-whites
and women (Leubolt & Tittor, 2008: 133). In addition, the government
implemented an active minimum wage policy by which real minimum wages
were raised by a third in the first legislature, which also affected the pension
payments schemes as they depend on the minimum wage.
The broad continuity in fiscal policy while simultaneously introducing changes
in social and foreign (economic) policy were of the expression of internal conflicts
between two political axes that led to regular regroupings in the cabinet (Schmalz,
2008: 115ff). The strategic orientation of these “two souls of the Lula government”
(Machado & Neto, 2003) can be outlined as follows: Firstly, a “neoliberal axis” was
recruited from those social forces that wanted to maintain the model of the Cardoso
era or were not ready to dismiss it for political reasons. They were supported by the
financial sector, export-oriented enterprises, parts of the middle classes and the
most conservative movements of the PT and CUT. These forces had established
themselves in the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and the Ministry of Labor and intended to carry out gradual social reforms
within the given social and political framework. Secondly, the “social-Keynesian
274 S. Schmalz
axis” on the other hand, was a political current composed of sectors of society that
sought an alternative and more domestic market-oriented development model and
that was willing to hazard the consequences of confrontations with the power elites.
It comprised of parts of industrialist class and the middle classes, social movements
represented by the left PT as well as various leftist-nationalist forces. They were
primarily found within the circles of the Ministry of Agricultural Development, the
National Development Bank (BNDES) and the Ministry of Planning.
In the end, the first legislature of Lula was indeed an expression of the crisis of
the neoliberal model that had been enforced by the Collor de Mello and Cardoso
governments, respectively. Subaltern social groups now fought for real political
power to shape and to influence certain specific policy fields. However, the basic
principles of the leading economic policy orientation remained. Apart from the
landless movement (MST) no strong opposition evolved: At first it rather seemed as
if the social movements disorganized even further and the opposition left of
government—such as the 2004 founded left party PSOL—was even more
marginalized.
4.2 The Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração

de Crescimento, PAC): A New Economic Policy?
Only in the run up to the presidential elections in 2006 and the second legislation of
the Lula government were significant changes in economic policy noticeable. The
elections indicated that the social policies of the government had been crucial in
creating a new social basis of support for the government (Hunter & Power, 2007:
3). With an average of 77 % Lula obtained the highest political support in the
northeast of the country whereas in the South and Southeast, the rather traditional
PT strongholds, his approval ratings fell short of his opponent Geraldo Alckmin
(The Economist 14/4/2007). Due to this, the PT gradually began to gain influence
on parliamentary level: the PT managed to gain an additional 148 seats for majors
in the 2008 local elections, mostly in larger cities in the Northeast.
At the same time internal conflict lines in the government had changed. Finance
Minister Guido Mantega, a member of the social-Keynesian axis, who was already
appointed in March 2006, remained in office and announced a strategic reorienta-
tion of economic policy immediately after the election. In addition, Dilma
Rousseff, a trained (Keynesian) economist, had established herself as number two
in the government. The growth acceleration program Programa de Aceleração do
Crescimento (PAC), an economic stimulus package of over R$503 billion (some
US$180 billion) for the period from 2007 to 2010, was supposed to bring about the
hoped-for economic turnaround. The program has three main components
(Governo Federal do Brasil, 2009): First, it considers investments in infrastructure
and transportation sectors of about R$58.3 billion; secondly, R$274.8 billion for
projects in the energy sector; and thirdly, urban and social projects worth about
R$170.8 billion. In addition, other R$2.9 billion were invested in the PAC das
Crianças (PAC for children) (Filgueiras & Gonçalves, 2007). A significant
proportion of around R$80.4 billion went into the development of the Northeast,
while about R$180.5 billion were supposed to be invested in so called national
projects. Another novelty in economic policy was the agreement between trade
unions and the federal government on a new formula for increasing the minimum
wage after which it is expected to annually increase at the rate of GDP growth from
2 years ago plus inflationary adjustment.
In 2008 various indicators pointed towards a significant change (Novy, 2008:
368). The years 2007 and 2008 were especially characterized by a dynamic
industrial development: In 2007, for example, the capital goods industry grew by
20 % which, inter alia, contributed to a noticeable recovery in the metal industry
from neoliberal reforms (Biondi, 2008). Therefore, Brazil experienced somewhat
stable economic growth of 4.8 % annually over the period from 2004 to 2008. By
2009, the Gini-coefficient had been reduced by 0.05 points to 0.56 indicating a
socially balanced growth. Also, the development of the internal market was mas-
sively reinforced by the social and minimum wage policy so that the poorest decile
of the population and the poor regions in northeastern Brazil experienced a stable
crescimento chinês (Chinese growth) of up to 10 % annually. All this has
demonstrated a slow turn towards the model of a social democratic developmental
state that promotes a more inclusive growth model could be observed.
In 2008, the political and economic situation in Brazil was thus very stable.
Because of the steady economic growth and large budget surpluses, the Brazilian
government accumulated high foreign exchange reserves of over US$200 billion,
equivalent to 13.7 % of GDP (Salama, 2009: 29). The external debt had reached a
low of 15 % of GDP in 2007 (Steinhilber, 2008). Brazilian companies emerged
stronger so that they could expand abroad—with the help of industrial promotion
and export subsidies. Brazil has even risen to become a net creditor to the U.S.. In
July 2008 Brazilian investors amounted roughly US$155 billion in
U.S. government bonds (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009). The Brazilian
financial system was much more stable than before the government took office—
the financial market capitalization had more than doubled to 40 % of GDP, however
at relatively low levels (Salama, 2009: 39) and public banks held 40 % of the asset
portfolio. Also politically the government was in a comfortable situation. President
Lula enjoyed record approval ratings of 64 % in September 2008.
4.3 Crisis and Crisis Management
In the context of the first signs of turbulence on the US subprime mortgage market
in 2007, the business press extensively discussed a possible decoupling of the
BRIC-countries from the financial and economic crisis in the U.S. (Akin & Kose,
2007; Schmalz & Ebenau, 2011: 103). Even President Lula announced in the fall of
2008 with confidence that the crisis indeed would tantamount to a tsunami in the
U.S. but will reach Brazil only as a small wave.
The events of the following weeks should prove him wrong though. The
international impacts of the financial crisis hit Brazil in October 2008 with full
276 S. Schmalz
force and had a noticeable negative impact on the real economy in the fourth quarter
of 2008. The BOVESPA index of the São Paulo Stock Exchange fell from the
historical high of 73,920 to just 30,000 points from June 2008 to mid-October 2008
(Salama, 2009: 34). This was the worst crash since 1998–1999. Much like past
crises, this one also resulted in massive capital flight, especially in September 2008
and over the next 2 months. From August to October of that year the exchange rate
of the R$ to US$ fell from 1:1.55 to 1:2.5, only to finally reach a low of even 1:3.4
in December 2008. Still, unlike in previous crises, Brazil did not become dependent
on the IMF or other international financial institutions, simply because the country
had reduced and reorganized its public debt.
The Brazilian banking sector remained largely stable during the crisis due to the
high regulation and its commercial bank function (Schmalz & Ebenau, 2011: 67).
Only the smaller Banco Votorantim slipped into financial difficulties and was
eventually bought by the Banco do Brasil for R$4.2 billion in January 2009. Unlike
the banks Brazilian companies were hit more severely as they had invested heavily
in derivatives, which amounted to losses of up to US$25 billion (Farhi & Macedo
Cintra, 2009: 122; Steinhilber, 2008). After a short time the crisis reflected also in
production. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, GDP fell by
4.4 % compared to the previous year (Pochmann, 2009: 42). This affected, in
particular, the industrial sector, which shrank over the same period by 11.6 %,
while the agricultural and service sector even grew by 0.6 % and 4.2 % respectively.
Therefore, the crisis was felt rapidly on the labor market. In the period from
November 2008 to January 2009 approximately 800,000 jobs were lost. Also
Brazil’s export economy was hit hard by the global economic crisis. Exports
collapsed by 25.9 % from January to September 2009 compared to the same period
in the previous year, while imports decreased by about 31 %. However, the drop
was not as strong as in previous crises: Despite the dynamic development of exports
under the Lula government, which stimulated economic growth through secondary
effects, the main driver of economic growth since 2005 has mainly been the internal
market. A combination of different measures was responsible for this development
such as the Bolsa Famı́lia program, the active minimum wage policy and significant
real wage gains.
The government’s response to the crisis occurred extremely fast and was exten-
sive. The core of the economic measures was the rapid continuation and expansion
of the PAC to counter the economic downturn. Before the crisis hit Brazil only 15 %
of the PAC programs have been implemented (Steinhilber, 2008). Until August
2009 more than half of the PAC funds, some R$338 billion were spent, which
signifies that since the beginning of the crisis an additional R$150 billion have been
invested in the economy (Governo Federal do Brasil, 2009). Of that amount R$34
billion were spent on infrastructure within the social housing program Minha Casa,
Minha Vida. In February 2009, the government increased the PAC even further by
providing an additional R$144 billion, so that it reached a total volume of R$646
billion (Gazeta Mercantil 4/2/2009). By 2009, only a third of the projects were
completed, the main expenses were planned for 2010 (O Estado de São Paulo
19/01/2010). Another important measure was the earmarking of public credit in
order to counteract a possible credit crunch. In this regard the public commercial
banking system and the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES played an important
role (Governo Federal do Brasil, 2009: 1).
In January 2009 the central government awarded loans of more than R$100
billion to the BNDES, which increased the loan volume of that institution by around
43 % as (Marques & Nakatani, 2009: 11f). Also the state-owned banks—mainly
Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal—expanded their lending activities
by 36 %. In addition, the Central Bank significantly lowered its key interest rates for
the first time since Lula took office that eventually stabilized at the value of 8.75 %
in July 2009. Real interest rates fell to a historic low of around 4 % in the summer of
2009, with the country still being one of the states with the highest real interest rates
in a global comparison. Another supporting factor was that consumption was
boosted by tax cuts and wage increases. The VAT on various consumer durables
such as cars, refrigerators and washing machines has been significantly reduced or
even completely exposed. The government also continued the active minimum
wage policy. The government anticipated the wage increase of R$50 to R$465 in
2009 to February1. A second increase to R$510 followed on January 1, 2010.
Finally, the crisis was cushioned by various social policies. Of central importance
was the increase in transfer payments under the Bolsa Famı́lia by around 10 % per
month and the extension of unemployment insurance for 6 months (Pochmann,
2009).
By employing these measures Brazil made it relatively well through the crisis.
The country has suffered only a dent in the economy of 0.4 % in 2009. As a direct
result of the economic policies two immediate effects can be identified: First, the
Lula government emerged stronger politically. Shortly before the official end of his
term in December 2010, the President reached the highest approval ratings of all
time with 83 %, which even exceeded the provisional record high in fall of 2008
(Datafolha, 2010). His successor Dilma Rousseff who at first was considered a
weak presidential candidate has greatly benefited from this momentum and eventu-
ally won as the first woman ever in the second round of the Brazilian presidential
elections in October 2010.
Secondly, the political continuity indicates a more significant impact of the
crisis, namely the emergence of a consensus on the need for a Keynesian economic
policy. On the one hand, it became possible to implement further economic
reforms. The increase of resources for the PAC in February 2009 was followed
by the announcement of a second PAC right at the start of the election campaign in
spring of 2010. This program provides further investments of R$958.9 billion for
the period from 2011 to 2014. PAC 2 includes huge investments in energy and
infrastructure but also significant funding for social purposes such as the construc-
tion and urbanization program Minha Casa, Minha Vida with approximately
US$278.2 billion. The discovery of the pre-sal oil reserves also enables the creation
of a social fund of about R$280 billion which could continue to strengthen the
developmental state. In October 2009 the Brazilian government eventually
introduced capital controls. From then on a tax of 2 % was imposed on capital
inflows to counteract currency appreciation. In addition, the comparatively small
278 S. Schmalz
severity of the crisis’s impact or the successful combat of the crisis created a high
degree of legitimacy for anti-cyclical and classic Keynesian policy. Also, the PAC
was associated with overcoming the crisis. While Dilma Rousseff was portrayed as
the mother of the PAC in the election campaign, Lula promoted the fear of the
opposition candidate Jose Serra could freeze the stimulus program.
5 Neo-desenvolvimentismo: A Contradicting Model
After a stagnation period of almost three decades the Brazilian economy has
recovered and picked up growth since 2004. The attempts by the governments of
Collor de Mello and Cardoso to implement a new market-liberal model by means of
privatizations and liberalizing foreign trade must be—in spite of large temporary
parliamentary majorities—considered a failure. Since its election the Lula govern-
ment may have retained many elements of the restructuring process such as the
trade liberalization and inflation control, but at least since the second term—
favored also by a stable external situation—promoted state investment with the
PAC 1 and PAC 2. Through these measures the role of the central government as a
central economic actor have been revived, a feature which has been common from
the first government of Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945) until the era of military
dictatorship (1964–1985).
If nothing else the gradual transition occurred due to the weak position of the PT
in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and the need for broader alliances with,
inter alia, the PMDB. What is novel about the development model of “Neo-
Desenvolvimentismo” is its social orientation, which is manifested in a plethora
of social programs and is accompanied by a rapid expansion of the internal market.
The social democratic development model is, however, inconsistent despite the
successes and exists only in embryonic form so far: The financial sector remains
relatively bloated, real interest rates are relatively high and movement of capital is
largely unregulated. The appreciation of the Real also put Brazil’s foreign trade
position in jeopardy. It is also not yet resolved whether the real and minimum wage
increases can permanently be covered by productivity gains and whether the
Brazilian elites continue to support the class alliance in the medium term.
Also, the “Neo-Desenvolvimentismo” has provoked opposition from social
movements. The criticism of the second Lula government has shifted from the
social question and economic policy towards ecology (Novy, 2008: 371; see
Chap. 18) and the conflicts in rural areas (Lühmann & Schmalz, 2010). The Social
Forum in the Amazon city of Belem in 2009 showed a new activity of the Brazilian
environmental movement. This tendency is especially underlined by the resignation
of Environment Minister Marina Silva in 2008, who moved to the far more
conservative Green party and then competed for the presidential elections in
2010. First studies that estimate the damage from climate change that predict,
among other things, droughts in the Amazon or further drying of the Sertão (the
dry region in the north-east), have also led to increased environmental debates in
the Brazilian government which manifest themselves in ambitious CO2 reduction
targets and environmental support programs for the (ecological often harmful) PAC
investments, but so far remain secondary to the growth orientation.
Closely linked to the ecological issue is the growing conflict in rural areas (see
Chap. 17). In 2002 approximately 4.6 million families were landless or farming
plots, which were insufficient for subsistence. Critics point out that while 590,000
landless families were settled by the market-based land reform in Lula’s tenure, but
the high concentration of land persists despite increases in income in the rural
sector. The promotion of agribusiness by the government runs counter the demand
for land reform repeatedly articulated by the landless movement MST as a continu-
ous expansion of the surface for soy, eucalyptus, citrus, beef and ethanol is
foreseeable. The expansion of plantations could displace cattle raising in environ-
mentally sensitive areas such as the Amazon region. Also, there are calculations
that 64 % of the settlements during the land reform took place in the Amazon to
avoid conflicts with landowners (Stedile, 2007: 203). So it seems as if parts of the
rural population remain excluded from the modernization project and the most
important social conflicts of the next decade could take place in the Brazilian
hinterland. In addition, a barrier to the expansion of the internal market is
constructed because no significant wage increases within the rural population in
such a situation can be expected, which could also complicate the deepening of the
social democratic model.
In short, the economic policy under the government of Lula contributed to a slow
but gradual shift of the economic model. How deep, how inclusive, how sustainable
and how long-term oriented such a reorientation will be, will largely result from
concrete social frictions and disputes.
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Innovation Policy in Brazil
16
Thomas Stehnken
Abstract
The article of Thomas Stehnken shows that even though the Lula government
provided a new dynamic to innovation policy the expenditures for research and
development (R&D) remained comparatively low and were not nearly enough to
overcome existing structural deficits. The Brazilian innovation system is still
characterized by a strong State influence and a rather low tendency of the private
sector to invest in R&D. The current conditions are preventing an improved
performance of the Brazilian innovation system, in particular the following:
(i) the missing links between research and the private enterprises; (ii) the petty
role this policy field plays on the national political agenda; (iii) the yet modest
gross national expenditures for R&D, in spite of some increases; and (iv) the
persistently high (even though decreasing) income inequality. These challenges
in the Brazilian innovation system will remain the same for the Rousseff
administrations.
1 Introduction
In recent years, success stories dominated the headlines when it came to Brazil: The
perpetual high level of in-come inequality has slightly fallen since 1998 (Arbix,
2007a), even more notably under the administration of Lula da Silva (Lustig,
Lopez-Calva, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2012), and at least since the admission into the
illustrious club of the BRIC1 countries in 2003. Brazil is literally on everyone’s
lips when it comes to the future global economic powers. Between all these success
1
T. Stehnken (*)
German National Academy of Science and Engineering, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: thomas.stehnken@gmail.com

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_16
284 T. Stehnken
stories it is often forgotten that rural poverty, urban violence, and large regional
differences in development continue to characterize the Brazilian reality. It is these
structural contradictions that characterize the political and socio-economic reality
of Brazil and make sweeping judgments seem not very appropriate in positive and
negative ways. The same is true, ultimately, for the analysis of the Brazilian
innovation system (IS) and national innovation policy.
The innovation performance of companies as well as Brazilian innovation policy
both have long been influenced by the idea that the state is responsible for providing
the business sector with (modern) technologies. This practice took its origin
primarily in times of closed market and the import substitution industrialization
(ISI) during the military dictatorship of 1964–1985 and continues, in essence, to
this day. As part of the state-centered and inward-oriented development strategy,
public research has been massively expanded in order to provide technological
knowledge and expertise to domestic companies. As a consequence, companies
were able to pass on entrepreneurial risks to the state. The debt crisis of the early
1980s was the starting point for a new development path that put less emphasis on
internal market protection but increasingly on trade liberalization and integration
into international value chains. Hence the end of the ISI as propagated by the
military dictatorship also marked a turning point for the innovation policy of the
country. However, significant changes in behavior of the companies were not
observed mainly because successive governments suffered from considerable finan-
cial constraints and the inability to create an innovation-friendly environment.
Further and more significant changes became apparent under the Lula admini-
stration (2003–2010). The importance of research and development (R&D) for
international competitiveness was emphasized more clearly which went hand in
hand with a substantial increase in public R&D spending and more resources for
supporting private sector innovation efforts. Also, there were significant efforts for
using modern technologies for poverty reduction, as well as new opportunities for
marginalized segments of the population to use modern technologies (improved
appropriability, training, etc.).
This article analyzes the existing structural and developmental challenges of the
Brazilian IS and focuses on the innovation policy approaches of the Lula Govern-
ment. Strictly speaking innovation policy has a different focus than research and
technology policy as it aims at systemic tools to improve interaction and learning
processes between relevant actors.2 The discourse on innovation and innovation
policy is not very old in Brazil since during the ISI period the focus was more on
supplying knowledge and technologies than on creating the conditions for
companies to actually engage in innovation. The existing IS, in its current configu-
ration, has been built over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, there are significant path
2
For a good distinction see Lundvall and Borrás (2006). While the focus of research policy is the
context-specific promotion of outstanding or excellent (basic) research, the main goal of national
technology policy is to promote the development or the introduction of new technologies in the
manufacturing sector.
16 Innovation Policy in Brazil 285
dependencies from actions of the military dictatorship that were motivated by their
specific industry and economic policies and that continue to have an effect. In the
following, these path dependencies are laid out in a historical review of the genesis
of the Brazilian IS which is followed by an analysis of the main features of
innovation policy approaches during the Lula government, a first evaluation of
the results and a short overview of recent addition to the innovation policy portfolio
of the Dilma administration.
2 General Outline of Innovation Policy in Brazil
2.1 A Brief Historical Review: The Import Substitution Phase

and the Lost Decade of the 1980s
When the military junta overthrew democratically elected President João Goulart in
1964 and took over political power in Brazil, one of its main political goals was to
increase the industrialization of the country (Sangmeister, 1995). The modern-
ization discourse was strongly technocratic and there was an attempt to control
(or even steer) the industrialization process by using an interventionist development
strategy. The government basically followed the logic of List’s “infant industry”
argument by assuming that domestic enterprises should be protected from foreign
competition in the short-term by means of high import tariffs but would be able to
endure international competition without any protection in the long run. Industrial
enterprises were established by the state in those sectors with the highest import
dependency in order to lay the foundations for an economic catching-up process.
Unarguably this development strategy was highly capital-intensive and ultimately
led to an astronomical foreign debt. At the same time the strategy was accompanied
by a growth consensus (“Crescer a qualquer custo”—growth at any price), which in
itself also had a fundamental importance for the legitimacy of the military govern-
ment (Amann, 2002).3 Over a short stretch between 1968 and 1973 the Brazilian
economy grew by two-digit growth rates, a period that was coined the Brazilian
economic miracle (milagre econômico).
In the context of the ISI strategy, the military government pursued an approach
of “technological self-determination” (Bastos & Cooper, 1995: 233). By massively
expanding public R&D expenditure in strategic important sectors (as regarded by
the government that is), the goal was to initialize a process that would result in
technological self-reliance and reducing the dependence on foreign technologies.
Following a somewhat technocratic understanding of development, the government
set up public research institutions and state owned companies in dynamic sectors
that included inter alia growth sectors such as electronics, computer science and
telecommunications. In 1968 the Programa Estratégico de Desenvolvimento (PED)
3
It needs to be noted that there were no serious threats in terms of actual tasks of the military
(safety, security, etc.) after all.
286 T. Stehnken
was issued that included, to a certain extent, technology policy as a national

strategic objective for development. The reason for the expansion of national
technology policy was thus primarily based on political (modernization theoretical)
motivations. The need to import advanced foreign technologies as part of the ISI
was initially seen only within the military government and the important research
institutions (Bastos, 1995), while businesses remained reluctant and instead
continued to rely on foreign trade protection and technologies delivered by the
state. The private sector only began to develop interest in the use of modern
technology much later when financial incentives where implemented under the
PED (Bastos, 1995; Suzigan & Furtado, 2006).
The military government assigned the existing R&D facilities to those economic
institutions that should coordinate the new economic course. For example, the state
development bank BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico
e Social) was reformed so it became the main lender for technology-intensive
projects. A new institution was founded under the control of BNDES, the today
highly important Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) that was responsible
for the management of the Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico
e Technologico (FNDCT), a fund that was designed exclusively for the promotion
of R&D in enterprises. By the mid-1970s, this fund still had a volume of approxi-
mately US$200 million, and it may be a sign of misguided policies, lack of success
or of scarce financial resources that its volume shrunk to about US$40 million at the
beginning of the 1990s (Hudson, 1998: 424).
In summary it can be stated that the ISI period together with the approaches
of traditional linear technology policy were unsuccessful in terms of having led
to a self-sustaining process of technological development. The state played an
increasingly important role for technological development in both private and
state-owned companies. In addition, under the conditions of a relatively closed
market, companies have experienced only little competitive pressures and did
not undertake more than the incremental adaptation of foreign technology.
Paradoxically, although the ISI led to a substantial setting up of new industries
it also, at the same time, led to a greater dependence on foreign technology
(Amann, 2002).
With regard to applied research, the ISI period left a gloomy picture. Learning
effects did not occur via feedback-loops between producers and consumers, but
instead by relatively one-dimensional knowledge provision by public institutions.
The vast majority of all funds spent on R&D were attributable to the State. By the
end of the ISI period, companies had become used to relying on the support of
public research institutions instead of conducting their own R&D for acquiring new
and more appropriate knowledge. With regard to the country’s innovation capacity
the key issue was that ISI brought indeed new technologies into the country, but
they remained isolated and without sustainable technological adaptations (Bastos,
1995). Thus, the imported technologies were only of little economic value, parti-
cularly because the structures in Brazil for adapting foreign technologies were
qualitatively and quantitatively not well defined. Without these the liberalization
phase from the mid-1980s was not conducive for most companies, at least in terms
of using new technologies.
The success of the milagre econômico could only briefly obscure the fact that the
economic system was not built on productive and efficient industry sectors, but
heavily relied on favorable international framework conditions (low oil prices,
growth of export markets, etc.) and ongoing transfer of capital, which ultimately
resulted in a huge foreign debt (debt led growth). The outbreak of the debt crisis in
1982 marked the beginning of new economic and (albeit much later) innovation
policies.
2.2 The Negative Consequences of Structural Adjustment During

the 1980s and 1990s
The 1980s (often dubbed the “lost decade”) were marked by gradual reform efforts
in Brazil, but which yielded no significant result for the manufacturing sector in
terms of productivity gains (Amann, 2002). After years of doing business under
protectionist conditions, the organizational restructuring and repositioning in the
international markets were the main focus areas for export-oriented Brazilian
companies. The technology policy suffered greatly under the budgetary constraints
of the 1980s. Innovation efforts were neglected in this context and technological
progress was slow (Bastos, 1995).
The first more extensive economic liberalization efforts were implemented
during the government of Fernando Collor. During his short reign, the majority of
non-tariff trade barriers were reduced, state owned companies were privatized and
substantial tariff reductions announced. Due to the lack of innovation capacity and
international competitiveness the Brazilian economy faced serious difficulties to
cope with these so called structural adjustments that were put forward by inter-
national organizations (Washington Consensus). To remain internationally compe-
titive, costs had to be cut, workers and employees were dismissed and production
capacity reduced (Amann & Baer, 2002: 955). During this phase, the foundation
was laid for a development pattern based on low wages and the exploitation of
natural resources. Throughout Latin America the adjustment process of the 1980s
and 1990s has neither spawned a growth pattern based on dynamic and knowledge
based competitive advantages nor improvements of technological skills, but instead
to a continued pattern based on static advantages such as natural resources and
cheap labor (Katz, 2001). The average growth of total factor productivity in Brazil
was about only 0.7 % per year during the 1990s (Edwards, 2002: 414).
The 1990s were marked by profound changes in the international arena. While
export markets were growing the competitiveness and innovativeness of domestic
enterprises became an important determinant for exploiting the opportunities of a
globalized economy more than ever. Brazilian companies were, however, not able
to differentiate their production sufficiently. Only a few companies concentrated
their efforts on developing new products (Arbix, 2007b). Particularly challenging in
this context was the rapid economic rise of some Asian countries. Especially
288 T. Stehnken
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and later China, were much more
competitive, particularly in microelectronics. Brazilian companies could not cope
with the external opening initiated by Collor, which meant that many Brazilian
companies were taken over by foreign investors or had to shut down operations
(Cassiolato, Lastres, & Maciel, 2003). Economic liberalization alone was not
sufficient to guarantee competitiveness high enough to endure the competition on
the world market, mainly because extreme technological gaps continued to exist,
especially in terms of low technological complexity of the produced goods and
production processes. These structural difficulties continue to this day and also the
variety of export support schemes (mainly in form of tax relieves first and foremost
for small and medium sized companies (SMEs) were able to provide only limited
relief. These experiences show that a liberalization process requires accompanying
measures in terms of government support, which is challenging in times of scarce
financial scopes and an uncertain macroeconomic situation.
Besides limited financial scopes, technological development in the 1990s was
also significantly hampered by the persistent large distance between research and
business sectors. This gap was evident especially in the field of applied research that
focuses on the development of new products or processes (Schwartzman, 2002:
369 ff.). Both sides did not recognize the need for enhanced cooperation and
continues to have an effect. In this context it was a big challenge for public research
institutions (mainly universities) to orient themselves primarily at the criterion of
international scientific excellence and were less interested in considering market-
able goods. Although this orientation led to an increase in academic production
(measured in terms of scientific articles), it also led to a copying of research
paradigms from industrialized countries, thus neglecting the local circumstances
and development challenges [also similar to Albuquerque (2007)].
The inability of the federal government to support domestic companies in terms
of technology was the result of fiscal constraints (hyperinflation and several unsuc-
cessful attempts at stabilization in the 1980s, rising domestic debt, etc.) on the one
hand and a weak institutional environment that was marked by a lack of compe-
tence and was also not able to follow changes in the international arena, on the other
hand (Suzigan & Furtado, 2006). The possibilities to promote new technologies
were greatly affected by the financial constraints of structural adjustment measures,
which meant that Brazilian research institutes and companies lost touch with the
then current technological paradigm of microelectronics (Stamm, 2002). Only with
the economic stabilization under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso
new scopes of action opened up for innovation policy.
Some of the current challenges for the Brazilian IS can be traced back to the
structural adjustment policies of the “lost decade” of the 1980s, e.g. the reason for
the low private R&D investment levels can be traced back to what led to a factual
resolution of public and private research infrastructures (Cassiolato et al., 2003).
During this period, many research institutions have been closed or enterprises have
been taken over by foreign investors, both of which ultimately led to a loss of
already accumulated skills (Arocena & Sutz, 2003). The increased attention on
budgetary discipline ultimately prejudiced policies that did not easily provide
concrete and tangible results—and innovation policy is certainly one of them.
After the “lost decade” of the 1980s, the economic and political turmoil during
the tenure of Fernando Collor and the introduction of a new currency, the Real, the
first term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) was characterized by
gradual reforms that not only included macroeconomic stabilization, but also a
reform of the public sector (see in detail e.g. Kingstone, 1999; Montero, 2005).
Reforming public administration is a painstaking process, not only in Brazil, due to
the existence of informal rules and formal procedures. Public officials and other
employees of the public service enjoyed significant pension entitlements, which
they would not give up easily and thus constituting additional obstacles for reform
in the modernization of the public sector.
3 Developments During the Administration of Lula da Silva
When President Lula took over the official duties of FHC in 2003, the hopes were
high that he would change the course of long lasting structural adjustment and
gradual neoliberal reforms, and instead focus on the social question and implement
a new and poverty alleviating growth strategy (pro-poor growth). The government
partially met these demands with the introduction of the Bolsa Familia program,
but left the basic growth strategy unchanged (see also Chap. 19). Since Lula took
office, he maintained a rather pragmatic approach to globalization: “Globalization
is not synonymous with development, it is not a substitute for development, but it
can be used as in instrument for development.” (The Miami Herald 16/6/2004).
The Lula government benefited from stable framework condition that were left
by the previous government of FHC. Relatively early in his tenure Lula announced
that the promotion of innovation and greater integration into international value
chains would be its strategic objectives in (foreign) economic policy. The impor-
tance of competitiveness and knowledge of specific technologies is also evident
when one considers the rapid rise of the global export volume of the last 30 years. In
1978 exported goods and services were worth US$1307 billion, in 2008 already
US$16,097 billion (http://stat.wto.org). A growing proportion of these goods were
produced with a high technological content (Rycroft & Kash, 1999). To take
advantage of this development, it is crucial to have internationally competitive
industry sectors that are able to respond to the ever more rapidly changing technol-
ogy executive.
The Lula government benefitted greatly from stable framework conditions that
were the result of stability oriented policies of the previous government of FHC.
Early in his first term, Lula announced that supporting the country’s innovation
capacity and a higher insertion in international value chains would be strategic
goals of his economic and trade policy. The importance of competitiveness and
applied knowledge of technologies becomes evident when analyzing the rapid
expansion of the worldwide export volume over the last decades: While in 1978,
goods and services amounting to US$1307 billion were traded worldwide, this
290 T. Stehnken
volume grew to US$16,097 billion in 2008. It is worthy to note that technology

intensive goods have a constantly growing share in these exports (Rycroft & Kash,
1999). Therefore, in order to benefit from growing markets, it is imperative for
nations to have competitive industries that are able to deal with the always increas-
ing speed of technological change.
These developments on the international trading markets triggered new policy
challenges for emerging economies such as Brazil. For one, the recommendations
of the so called first generation of reforms (stabilizing the economy, liberalization
of markets) remained on the agenda, but other considerations focusing on issues
such as technological knowledge, complexity of technologies and innovation
capacity were added to the list (UNDP 2001). If considering these issues seriously,
it points out to one of the most pressing development challenges in the whole Latin
American region: Trade with high-tech and high value added products as well as the
position in international value chains is rather low if compared to the industrialized
countries and other emerging economies especially in Asia. Given the dynamics of
globalization and an increased economic openness Brazil (but also other countries
such as Mexico, Argentina and Chile) depend on competitive industries. Even
though Brazil’s export portfolio includes various product groups, the majority of
exports consists of primary and intermediate goods (soya, oils, ores, steel, paper,
etc.). The Brazilian share in worldwide trade in technology complex products is low
(except for the often cited case of Embraer in the commuter planes sector) which
leads to the assumption that there is more potential to benefit from growing
international trade markets (Table 16.1).
Table 16.1 Principal export goods of Brazil 2011, in US$ millions

Value (in Mio. Δ % 2011/ % share of overall
Product US$) 2010 exports
Minerals and ores 44,217 43.4 17.3
Oil and fuel 31,008 35.5 12.1
Transport material 25,120 15.5 9.8
Soybeans and related 24,154 41.1 9.4
products
Metallurgic products 17,387 34.3 6.8
Sugar and ethanol 16,432 19.3 6.4
Chemicals 16,234 20.5 6.3
Meats 15,357 15.5 6.0
Machines and equipment 10,457 27.7 4.1
Coffee 8700 51.6 3.4
Paper and pulp 7189 6.2 2.8
Electrical equipment 4811 0.1 1.9
Source: MDIC (2012)
3.1 Ministries and Public Institutions
Formally, the highest organ in Brazil’s research, technology and innovation policy
is the Nation Council of Science and Technology (CCT) that is directly subordinate
to the president. Theoretically speaking the CCT could constitute an important
arena for negotiations because it joins representatives and interests from different
stakeholders; including those of the business sector, the scientific community and
the federal states. However, the CCT is more of a consulting than an implementing
institution. The leading ministry is the Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation (MCTI), who together with the Ministry of Education (MEC) and the
Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) are responsible for
the drafting and implementation of RT&I policy of the country. The MCTI’s most
important agencies, the Research and Project Financing Agency (FINEP) and the
National Council of Technological and Scientific Development (CNPQ), are
responsible for carrying out and managing the large share of national research
programs and projects.
It is evident that the formal institutional framework seems to be well developed.
However, a closer analysis reveals a traditionally weak articulation and interaction
between governmental actors and that inter-ministerial cooperation seems to be
rather difficult (Stehnken, 2010). According to DG Research (2009), the political
system did not fully keep up with new challenges and requirements to national
RT&I policy. This is especially true regarding new necessary arrangements
between relevant actors and organizations such as mutual accountability, the
increasing needs for monitoring and evaluation or innovation related training and
education (ibid.).
The necessity of integrating and better coordinating national RT&I policy efforts
was already laid out in the last policy frameworks, the Green Book (Livro Verde,
MCT, 2001) and the White Book (Livro Branco, MCT, 2002). These publications
also identified further challenges for the Lula government: a permanent insecurity
about the yearly allocations for R&D, the lack of investment of the private sector in
R&D, the strict focus on the so called strategic sectors, the lacking effectiveness of
incentives such as tax exemptions, export subsidies and others (Stehnken, 2004).
Considering these reform requirements the MCT was seeking new ways and
means to support science and technological development. The main difficulty in
turning the country’s policies around was that considering decades of providing
knowledge and technologies, in the context of a developmentalist state, a mere
revision of the ministry and its research institutions would not suffice. The deep
incrustation of institutional structures was especially a challenge for the universities
(Veronese, 2006). A larger reorganization and restructuring of the RT&I bureau-
cracy did not take place due to the reluctance to cooperate on part of the academic
sector. Even smaller adjustments such as the transfer of research institutions from
the CNPq to the MCT took years to complete. Despite these challenges the Lula
government, in his second term, issued the ambitious Action Plan for Science,
Technology and Innovation 2007–2010 (Plano de Ação em Ciência, Tecnologia
e Inovação 2007–2010, PACTI 2007–2010), that was present as the cornerstone of
a new RT&I policy.
292 T. Stehnken
3.2 Action Plan for Science, Technology and Innovation

2007–2010 (PACTI)
In the face of the historical developments and the significant regional and social
inequalities it seems impossible to imagine technological progress in Brazil without
significant support from the federal government or the federal states governments.
The subnational level is responsible for some 16 % of national gross expenditures
on science and technology, with São Paulo being the biggest spender with some
60 % of all subnational expenditures. The innovation process and the development
of new technologies depend thus strongly on the capacity of the federal government
to actively support research and development and to provide suitable incentive
structures. The claim raised by Diniz (2003: 213) that “[b]razilian technology
policy still requires a strong interventionist character” is still valid today. In this
light, PACTI 2007–2010 could be seen as a mechanism of stronger federal inter-
vention by the Lula administration.
Within PACTI, the efforts of several ministries and public research organ-
izations were to reach roughly R$41 billion over the period between 2007 and
2010. The content of the Action Plan focused on four strategic priorities that are
subdivided into 21 action lines and 88 programs. The strategic priorities were:
1. Expansion, modernization and consolidation of the nation innovation system in

cooperation with the national states in order to increase Brazil’s scientific
capabilities as compared to international competitors
2. A faster development of supportive framework conditions for intramural R&D
in domestic companies in order to contribute to the national foreign trade
strategy (see below)
3. Increase of innovation funding in strategic economic sectors such as energy,
aeronautics and space, as well as the Amazon
4. Opening up the access to science and supporting the diffusion of technologies in
society in order to en-sure better social living conditions.
Considering the above mentioned structural weaknesses of the IS, these prior-
ities were reasonable and ambitious at the same time. Especially the sheer amount
of planned public spending was unprecedented in the history of Brazil and signaled
the newly gained importance of innovation policy measures and newly gained room
to maneuver at the same time. These measures should be used to increase the
international competitiveness of the Brazilian industry and, at the same time, help
to create better living conditions. However, the point is not resolved on whether
technology will become a major factor for social development in the future as
social policies (see Chap. 19). Some of the goals put forward in PACTI were by
all means impressive:
• Increase investments in R&D: Increase national expenditures for R&D from

1.02 % of GDP in 2006 to 1.5 % in 2010.
• Support of innovation in companies: Increase the share of private sector partici-

pation in total R&D expenditures to 0.65 % of GDP until 2010 (from 0.51 % in
2006)
• Improve higher education: Increase the annual number of PhD Thesis and
increase scholarships provided by CNPq from 65,000 in 2006 to at least
95,000 in 2010 with a focus on engineering sciences and related areas, in
conjunction with the new foreign trade strategy
• Consider R&D for social development: Establishment of 400 technological
vocational training centers (Centros Vocacionais Tecnol ogicos) and 600 new
public Telecentros, as well as to provide 10,000 scholarships for middle school
students.
The plan pursued the target of raising expenditures for R&D of the federal level
to 0.64 % of GDP (from 0.36 %) and subnational expenditures from 0.15 to 0.21 %.
These proportionally higher expenditures of the federal level point out to a technol-
ogy push that aims at strengthening domestic innovation capacity in a sustained
manner. These massive public efforts of the Lula administration also have to be
seen in the light of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) that was launched in
early 2008. It constitutes the largest public investment program ever and foresees
expenditures mainly in infrastructure and energy sector of some R$500 billion (see
also Chap. 15).
It is obvious that the federal government was seeking to increase its share of the
total expenditure for RT&I. Mean-while, however, private sector spending seems to
be growing at a significantly lower rate. This reflects the relative importance of
public spending and Brazil’s aim to initiate a technology push in order to build up a
critical mass of researchers and R&D institutions that are intended to lead to a self-
sustaining process. Figure 16.1 also clearly shows the differences in spending
patterns that continue to exist between Brazil and the OECD countries. Even with
an investment of such magnitude as the PACTI, Brazil remains relatively far behind
the strategic goal of, for example, the EU to spend 3 % of GDP for R&D. However,
the massive investment and ambitious plans, such as PAC and PACTI, also reflect
the growth strategy of Brazil, which is aimed at increasing international compe-
titiveness and improve social development. Given the likely long-term effects of
such investment pro-grams, it is still too early to give an assessment of whether
these programs will lead to the expected results. The implementation of such
programs, however, is characteristic of Brazil’s emerging course.
3.3 The New Foreign Trade Strategy
Well before the expansion of innovation policy was adopted as part of the PACTI
2007–2010, the Lula government had in a sense created an ideological basis, based
on additional trade facilitation measures. In order to meet these challenges, the Lula
administration was quick to announce in 2003 the new Industrial, Technological
and Foreign Trade Policy (Nova Polı́tica Industrial, Tecnol ogica e de Comércio
294 T. Stehnken
Source: (MCT 2008: 61)
Fig. 16.1 PACTI 2007–2010: expected expenditures in R&D as % of GDP. Source: MCT (2008:
61)
Exterior, PITCE). PITCE touches upon various policy fields and has long been one
of the most influential strategic guidelines of the Lula government (Pereira,
Marcelino, & Kruglianskas, 2006). Its aim is to increase economic efficiency,
development and dissemination of technologies and thus fostering innovative
activities and competitiveness in international trade. It is focused on increasing
the efficiency of domestic production, enhancing capacity for innovation and the
expansion of exports. PITCE has ever since been one of the most relevant cross-
cutting policies in the area of innovation. Thus, PITCE is an extremely important
factor that ultimately influences the design and direction of RT&I policies
formulated by the MCT.
The PITCE quickly became an influential policy with the goal of increasing
Brazil’s share in world trade volume by increasing the technological content of
Brazilian industrial goods. This strategy was not only motivated by the growth
policy but also rested on a foreign policy concept whose goal was to play a more
prominent role on the international level. In times of economic globalization,
pragmatic power-political calculi in foreign policy are inevitably linked with
foreign trade issues (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006). Since Brazil’s competitive-
ness and trade opportunities are still considerably restricted, one of the main
strategic objectives of the Lula administration was to reduce the dependency of
foreign technologies and to, step by step, enter in the illustrious club of technology
nations (a goal quite outspokenly mentioned by Brazilian foreign policy makers).
Additionally, as has been outlined before, Brazil seeks a more important role in
international politics. However, becoming a genuine power in a multipolar world is
difficult with soy and sugar cane, iron ore and oil alone. The federal government is
very much aware of this. The growth strategy based on exporting agricultural and
primary goods is a possible way to generate a foreign trade surplus and the
resources necessary for technological change and supporting the country’s inno-
vation capacity. Any long-term strategy must include technologies. Global players
need both.
From 2008 onward PITCE was continued under the headline of Polı́tica de
Desenvolvimento Produtivo (PDP). One reason for widening the scope of the
strategy was to intensify the cooperation and harmonization of innovation policy
with other policy fields and their respective development plans. Apart from includ-
ing some of the ideas of PACTI in the new industrial policy guideline of PDP there
were also coordination efforts with the national Development Plan for Education
(Plano de Desenvolvimento da Educação, PDE); health policy (Mais Saúde, direito
de todos), the Agricultural Development Plan (Plano de Desenvolvimento da
Agropecu aria, PDA) and the omnipresent Growth Acceleration Program (PAC).
What were the reasons for this new policy and the focus on innovation in various
policy fields? The lessons learned after missing the connection to the information
age and the arduous catching-up process have led to the situation that science,
technology and innovation are notably considered in many governmental
decisions—though yet not far-reaching. Since Brazil’s competitiveness and trade
opportunities are still considerably restricted, one of the main strategic objectives of
the Lula administration was to reduce the dependency of foreign technologies and
to, step by step, enter in the illustrious club of technology nations—a goal quite
outspokenly mentioned by Brazilian foreign policy makers.
The Dilma administration did not change this orientation. Instead the newly
developed National Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (Estratégia
Nacional de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, ENCTI) sought for a continuation and
deepening of PACTI. It is also important to note the continued strategic alignment
with the PDP (Politica de Desenvolvimento Produtivo, 2008–2010) and the Plano
Brasil Maior (PBM), launched in 2011 both of which have RT&I as central policy
objectives.
4 Results of the Innovation Policy of the Lula Governments

and Continuing Challenges for the Dilma Administration
4.1 First Results of the Technology Push
An assessment of long term impacts of such cross cutting policies is difficult to

carry out. The MCTI put forward a first report at the end of 2010 that presents some
initial analysis of the achievement of objectives of the respective action lines [see
296 T. Stehnken
also for the following: MCT (2010)]. Even though an isolated analysis of individual
indicators is rather unrewarding it does allow for preliminary statements about the
output of PACTI.
The preliminary data for 2010 showed that over the period from 2007 to 2010
some R$40.3 billion were drawn (recursos executados) which represents a high
implementation rate of 97.9 % of initially allocated funds. Especially the ministries
of MEC, MS and MME have exceeded their assured allocation by more than 40 %.
The PACTI contributed for the rise in resources designed for RT&I in Brazil.
The budget of the MCTI rose from R$3.6 billion to R$6.2 billion between 2007 and
2010. The FNDCT (almost 50 % of the MCTIs budget) reached R$3.1 billion in
2010. As a result of these efforts, the spending on R&D in the Brazilian economy
grew by 72 %, in real terms, during the 2000s. The investments by the federal
government in the course of PACTI were around R$40.3 billion until 2010.
The overall target to spent 1.5 % of GDP on R&D was missed. The data points
out that despite the massive in-vestments, R&D expenditures were not higher than
1.25 % (for comparison: 1.02 % in 2000). Compared to other BRIC countries and
moreover to neighboring countries in Latin America, Brazil is well positioned but
far off the disbursements in R&D of the leading OECD countries. A striking feature
remains to be the relatively low participation of the private sector: While the public
sector was responsible for some 0.66 % of total spending, the private sector
participation remained low at 0.59 %. Even though this was foreseen in the plans,
it points out to the fact that a significant change of behavior of relevant stakeholders
(behavioral additionality) did not occur.
The MCT’s available resources grew from R$1.1 billion to R$6.6 billion
between 2000 and 2010, an increase of 515 % (192 % in real terms). Over the
same period, total expenditure for R&D grew from R$12 billion in 2000 to R$44.4
billion in 2010, representing a real growth of 75 %. Also, private expenditures grew
over this period by more than 80 % to R$20.9 billion. The most important national
fund for supporting R&D reached R$3.1 billion which represents an increase of
750 %. The growth of the FNDCT is also the result of continuous deposits of the
Fundos Setorias that were able to establish themselves as a source of stable funding.
The growth in available resource not only led to a higher number of funded
projects by the MCTI’s agencies (FINEP and CNPq) but also to prolong the project
runtime of promising projects. During PACTI, FINEP and CNPq approved some
39,000 projects and allocated some R$6.5 billion (Table 16.2).
The goals regarding the granted scholarships by CNPq and CAPES were not
reached completely. While school and higher education scholarships by CAPES
met the specifications of PACTI the ambitious goal to issue 95,000 research
scholarships by CNPq was not met (83,700 or 88 %). There were also several
administrative issues with the large scale mobility program Ciência sem Fronteiras
(Science without frontiers).
One of the major institutional improvements was the creation of the Sistema
Brasileiro de Tecnologia (SIBRATEC). SIBRATEC is composed of 56 networks
consisting of research groups and domestic R&D centers (14 innovation centers,
20 centers for technological services, and 22 technology transfer offices). The main
Table 16.2 FINEP and CNPq calls between 2007 and 2010
FINEP CNPq
Approved Allocations Approved Allocations
Year Calls proposals (Mio. R$) Calls proposals (Mio. R$)
2007 22 555 771.5 39 11,140 467.6
2008 17 525 1108.9 62 10,656 978.8
2009 20 660 1300 55 7825 504.2
2010 21 1324 1256.6 50 6265 114.8
Source: MCT (2010: 40)
task of the transfer offices is to support small and medium size companies in terms
of innovations, while the techno-logical service centers are involved in matters of
quality assurance, metrology and setting new technological standards. Taken
together SIBRATEC serves to intensify the interactions between companies and
public research organizations and universities.
The biggest advances were observed in the area of technologies for social
development. As regards the setting up of vocational training centers (Centros
Vocacionais Tecnol ogicos) 471 projects were funded worth R$284.9 million and
regarding the Telecentros, 753 projects (target: 600) worth R$232 million were
supported.
4.2 Existing Challenges in Spite of Significant Progress
Despite not negating progress in the area of innovation policy, there are structural
characteristics in addition to those already outlined above that pose serious policy
challenges in this specific field (see Stehnken, 2010). A tentative non-exhaustive
list of persisting challenges may include the following:
• First, there are large differences within the country in terms of existing techno-
logical capabilities. Following the arguments of Latin American structuralism,
there are obvious social differences in the generation, distribution and use of
advanced technologies (Albuquerque, 2007). More than in any other country in
the region the polarization between modern and marginalized segments of
society is blatantly recognizable. The main reason for the political and economic
heterogeneity is the still (though declining) high income inequality which also
has repercussions on the use of new technologies (Couto Soares & Cassiolato,
2008).
• Second, relatively little is being spent on R&D. Although Brazil is a “big
spender” in comparison to other countries in the region, the expenses compared
with the OECD average are modest, at best. If Brazil wants to raise its inter-
national industrial competitiveness and to increase its share of high-tech exports
more efforts of both public and private actors is necessary in terms of R&D
spending. Table 16.3 shows the slow dynamic of gross national expenditures
298
Table 16.3 Gross national R&D expenditures of selected countries, as % of GDP

Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
South Africa – 0.73 – 0.79 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.87 – –
Germany 2.47 2.47 2.50 2.54 2.50 2.51 2.54 2.53 2.69 2.82 2.80 2.88
Argentina 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.62 0.65
Brazil 1.02 1.04 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.97 1.01 1.10 1.11 1.17 1.16 1.21
China 0.90 0.95 1.07 1.13 1.23 1.32 1.39 1.40 1.47 1.70 1.76 1.84
United States 2.71 2.72 2.62 2.61 2.55 2.59 2.65 2.72 2.86 2.91 2.83 2.77
France 2.15 2.20 2.24 2.18 2.16 2.11 2.11 2.08 2.12 2.27 2.24 2.24
Japan 3.00 3.07 3.12 3.14 3.13 3.31 3.41 3.46 3.47 3.36 3.25 3.39
Mexico 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.43
Russia 1.05 1.18 1.25 1.29 1.15 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.04 1.25 1.13 1.09
Source: http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/336607/Dispendios_nacionais_em_pesquisa_e_desenvolvimento_P_D_de_paises_selecionados.html
T. Stehnken
(GERD) of selected countries. Note that China doubled its GERD during the last
decade while Brazil’s grew by just some 20 % after even a short decline between
2002 and 2005.
• Third, private sector spending on R&D remains well below public expenditures.
Despite an increase in GERD the Lula administration was not able to overcome
this structural deficit and it continues to be one of the key challenges for the
Dilma administration in the area of RT&I policy. More privately than publicly
funded R&D is an indicator for a more competitive business sector that relies
more on competitive rather than static comparative advantages. Table 16.4
provides an overview of the distribution of national R&D expenditures in %
according to financing sector in selected countries over the period from 2000 to
2011. It is worth noting that industrial powerhouses and export intensive
countries like Germany, China or Japan show different structural patterns than
Brazil with its higher share of publicly funded R&D.
• Forth, despite the economic and political framework was somewhat stable as
compared to earlier years, it is often anything but able to stimulate innovation.
One example are the continuing high interest rates of the Central Bank of Brazil
(SELIC). One may recall that it stood at 13.8 % at the beginning of the global
economic crisis and continues to be fixed at double digit rates (10.5 % in January
2012). While keeping the risk for inflation low the Central Bank simultaneously
limits investments by the private sector including those for R&D. Thus, the
macroeconomic context is often more important than actual innovation policies
(Lastres, Cassiolato, & Maciel, 2003: 21).
A major challenge is that innovation policy is not valued as other policy areas
such as health or education policy. According to Brazilian scholars, innovation
policy is more of a second or even third tier policy due to the fact that political
decisions in this area usually have long time frames and are also characterized by
uncertain outcomes (Stehnken, 2010). Especially the long-term effects contradict
the short-term orientation of the congressmen who are evaluated by their consti-
tuents rather than by tangible assets for their constituency. A new school, a new
infirmary, but also a new bridge or a football stadium are considered to be more
important than high spending on R&D where the outcome is uncertain.
The integration of subnational actors in national decision-making processes
poses another challenge. The federal states enjoy broad policy competencies,
including in the area of innovation policy. The current forms of integration are
only rudimentary organized since there are only few arenas of negotiation. Apart
from Congress (where regional development and location policy rationales pre-
dominate) and the CCT (in which the states are rarely able to voice their needs),
there is the National Council of State Secretariats of Science and Technology
(Conselho Nacional de Secretarios de C&T, CONSECTI). However, since this
institution rarely appears and because other suitable arenas to bring national and
subnational interests in line are not yet visible, this lack of a deeper multi-level
innovation policy is a major challenge for the future.
300
Table 16.4 R&D expenditures according to financing sector of selected countries, in %

Country Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
South Africa Private – 55.8 – 54.8 48.6 43.9 44.8 42.7 42.6 42.5 – –
Public – 36.4 – 34 35.6 38.2 40.4 45.7 45.1 44.4 – –
Germany Private 66 65.7 65.5 66.3 66.6 67.6 68.3 68.1 67.3 66.1 65.6 –
Public 31.4 31.4 31.6 31.2 30.5 28.4 27.5 27.5 28.4 29.8 30.3 –
Argentina Private 23.3 20.8 24.3 26.3 30.7 31 29.4 29.3 26.5 21.4 22.3 23.9
Public 70.7 74.3 70.2 68.9 64.5 65.3 66.7 67.5 70.6 75.4 74.7 71.6
Brazil Private 44.7 43.8 45 43.8 44.5 48.3 48.2 45.6 45.5 46.3 45.4 45.3
Public 54.1 54.8 53.3 54.2 53.5 49.7 49.9 52.1 52.3 51.6 52.7 52.8
China Private 57.6 – – 60.1 65.7 67 69.1 70.4 71.7 71.7 71.7 73.9
Public 33.4 – – 29.9 26.6 26.3 24.7 24.6 23.6 23.4 24 21.7
United States Private 69.4 67.7 65.2 64.3 63.7 63.7 64.3 64.9 63.7 61 61 60
Public 25.8 27.2 29.1 30 30.9 29.8 29.9 29.1 30.2 32.5 32.5 33.4
France Private 52.5 54.2 52.1 50.8 50.7 51.9 52.3 52.3 50.8 52.3 53.5 –
Public 38.7 36.9 38.3 39 38.7 38.6 38.5 38.1 38.9 38.7 37 –
Japan Private 72.4 73.1 74.1 74.6 74.8 76.1 77.1 77.7 78.2 75.3 75.9 76.5
Public 19.6 19 18.4 18 18.1 16.8 16.2 15.6 15.6 17.7 17.2 16.4
Mexico Private 29.5 29.8 34.7 34.7 38.6 41.5 45.2 44.6 38.3 39.1 36.2 36.8
Public 63 59.1 55.5 56.1 50.3 49.2 49.8 50.7 54.3 53.2 60.5 59.6
Russia Private 32.9 33.6 33.1 30.8 31.4 30 28.8 29.4 28.7 26.6 25.5 27.7
Public 54.8 57.2 58.4 59.6 60.6 61.9 61.1 62.6 64.7 66.5 70.3 67.1
Source: http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/336709/Distribuicao_percentual_dos_dispendios_nacionais_em_pesquisa_e_desenvolvimento_P_
D_segundo_setor_de_financiamento_sup_1_sup__paises_selecionados.html
T. Stehnken
There are other aspects that deserve to be mentioned here such as, for example,
the missing intense relations between research and enterprises that prevent existing
knowledge and ongoing research from being put into practical commercial use,
let alone to be applied on a broad social basis. In addition, the interaction of relevant
actors was also limited by the fact that the highly influential scientific community
insisted on scientific autonomy and that business owners demanded more external
protection (just as yet to have less incentives to cooperate with research institutes).
Thus one of the essential tasks of current innovation policy is mainly to implement
instruments that promote systemic elements.
In the context of innovation policy the Lula government has also shown the first
signs of developing policies to involve poorer segments of society in the informa-
tion age (“inclusão digital”). However, despite this positive agenda setting there is
still a long way ahead for the Dilma administration to overcome the gap between
center and peripheral regions and privileged and marginalized social classes.
5 Conclusion
The Brazilian innovation system is characterized by a strong public influence. R&D

and the provision of technological knowledge traditionally lie in the hands of public
institutions. The institutional diversity of the funding and research landscape cannot
disguise the fact that the elements of the innovation system show only interaction.
In particular, the interaction between enterprises and public research institutions
such as universities or national research centers is expandable. The different
development strategies in the past had major impacts on the innovation perfor-
mance of domestic actors, which is why the major economic and political crises
also had a strong influence on the performance of the entire innovation system.
To consider innovation policy a distinct and recognizable policy field has no
long tradition in Brazil. For a long time, technology policy and science policy were
conceptualized more or less independently of each other. While the mere provision
of technology in the context of the respective national development strategies was
the priority for domestic enterprises, the promotion of entrepreneurial innovation
has until recently rarely been addressed by policy makers. According to the long
valid model universities and research institutes were only the beginning of a linear
chain, according to which the expansion of basic research will ultimately (automati-
cally) lead to marketable products. Therefore, policy makers neglected the systemic
elements of innovation processes for a long time but instead considered it to be a
linear process.
The Lula government has given new emphasis to innovation policy without
being able to entirely resolve the structural deficits of the past. The fact that under
the PACTI 2007–2010 public expenditures on R&D exceeded those of the private
sector may be seen as a sign that companies still rely on the public provision of
knowledge. Nevertheless, an attempt was made under Lula to place the PITCE (and
the PDP) within a broader political-ideological framework for dealing with the
challenges of globalization, according to which the technological content of
302 T. Stehnken
exported goods should be increased. During the two Lula governments, the topic of
innovation was increasingly taken up by the political agenda and policies were
implemented to bring along greater innovation capacity.
Given the long-term effects of strategic national innovation support programs,
the impacts will probably become visible only with a certain time lag. Critical to the
success will be, among other factors, the strategic consistency with which the
Rousseff government will continue the innovation policies of Lula. By the end of
2010 the new “Blue Book” (Livro Azul) by the name of “Research and Technology
for Sustainable Growth” (Ciência e Tecnologia para o Desenvolvimento
Sustent
avel) was presented at to the fourth National Conference for RT&I. The
National Conferences are the result of a long series of local and regional
conferences that aggregate the interests and needs of sub-national actors in order
to feed them into national strategies. The “Blue Book” was the basis for the RT&I
policies of the new government and basically continues the strategy of the Lula
government. Apart from the prominent aspect of sustainability the main focus is
especially on the promotion of private R&D, which became apparent in the growth
of FINEP loans. In particular the low tendency of private companies to invest in
R&D proved to be a major obstacle to innovation and economic growth in the past.
Since it is yet too early for a final judgment of the new developments in innovation
policy during the Lula administration, only future evaluations can give insight as to
whether the approaches outlined above will be crowned with success.
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Economic Policy, Agricultural Policy,
and Land Reform in Conflict 17
Gilberto Calcagnotto
Abstract
Gilberto Calcagnotto examines the conflict between economic policy, agri-
cultural policy and land reform. Especially in the agricultural sector, the changes
in the last 30 years have been dramatic and this is clearly reflected in the growth
of the agricultural industry (agribusiness). Landownership was characterized by
a strong concentration in all the development stages, which, in turn, led to
serious social problems such as migration and urban unemployment. The rural
social movements opposed the concentration trends more or less successfully.
But, although the agricultural strategy of the PT lead administrations during the
last years allowed the coexistence of agribusiness and small scale farming, it was
not able to enforce a qualitatively improved land reform. Demands of a long
overdue land reform have not been met as it did not tackle the existing concen-
tration of large private estates.
1 Introduction: Interdependencies Between Economy,

Politics, Society and the Agricultural Sector in Brazil1
Hardly any other sector of the economy was as dramatically affected by the
economic and societal changes of the last 25 years in Brazil as the agricultural
sector. The interdependencies between economic and agricultural policy and espe-
cially agricultural policy and land reform are highlighted as well as their socially
imparted contradictions. The most important questions are: Which macro-political
changes on the national and global level, which political measures, which actors
1
G. Calcagnotto (*)
Former Institute of Latin-American Studies, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: calcagnottogilb@aol.com

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_17
306 G. Calcagnotto
and interests have led to which conflicts, solutions and changes in Brazil’s agri-
cultural sector? And do they give reasons to expect or hope for reforms?
Answers to these questions shall not be given here, divided according to the
sections mentioned but in the style of a historical look back. Part 1: a con-temporary
historical analytical look at the present and, Part 2: an outlook to the near future.
The retrospect is mostly concerned with the qualitatively new period that opened up
for the democratic development of Brazilian society and politics with the end of
military authoritarianism on March 1985. After a short overview over the origins of
modern economic development characterized by industrialization—which slowed
down agricultural development—in the first half of the twentieth century, the
economic and agricultural policy measures passed during the 21 years of military
governments will be outlined. The latter have shown themselves to be crucial to the
radical changes since the 1980s under the administrations of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010).
There have been strong tendencies towards concentrating in the structure of
agricultural land property in all phases. This has led to considerable problems like
rural exodus and urban unemployment but it also gave cause for the resurgence of
social movements in rural areas and substantial conflicts, which countered the
tendencies towards concentration more or less successfully. The coexistence of
agribusiness and rural family-run farms has developed into a successful strategy
during President Lula da Silva’s term in office although it rather hindered the
strategy of a qualitatively improved land reform, which was pursued simul-
taneously and had also been temporarily successful.
2 Agricultural Policy and Property Concentration Between

1930 and 2002
2.1 Background: State Intervention in Times of an Agro-Export

Economy (1930–1990)
The global “Great Depression” in 1929 was the immediate catalyst for state inter-
ventionism in the economy and especially in Brazilian agribusiness. After the
seizure of power in the course of a nearly peaceful “revolution” through the initially
(1930–1937) democratically authorized and later (1937–1945) dictatorially govern-
ing Getúlio Vargas, the new government immediately attempted to set their social
power basis on three strong pillars by striking a “social pact” with (a) the upcoming
urban industrial bourgeoisie; (b) the organized urban workforce and (c) the agrarian
oligarchy. Aside from the state-granted industry promotion via fiscal measures and
the foundation of state-run businesses in the field of basic materials, this alliance
was based on the promotion of the production of traditional agro-export goods like
coffee and sugar, which accounted for the majority of Brazilian export earnings
at the time.
In the case of coffee the new government only had to continue the agreement
signed in 1906 in Taubaté/São Paulo between the governors of the three most
17 Economic Policy, Agricultural Policy, and Land Reform in Conflict 307
important coffee-growing states (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais) in
favor of the “coffee barons”. In its scope the state committed itself to buying the
surplus of coffee to counteract the pressure of price reductions through stockpiling.
As soon as 1931, the Vargas government, in cooperation with the National Coffee
Council (CNC), established a state-run regulation authority for the coffee sector in
the context of its centralized economic policy. Its goal was to bring together the
interests of the different factions (coffee farmers, coffee traders and banks) under
state control within the corporatist model (Saes, 1997: 69). Next to the successor
authorities for coffee, the Departamento Nacional do Café (DNC) (1933–1952) and
the Instituto Brasileiro do Café (1952–1989), the “Committee for the Protection of
the Sugar Production” (1931–1933) was established along the same pattern and for
similar purposes. It was succeeded by the Institute for Sugar and Alcohol (1933–
1990) and Wheat (1944–1990) which was active until 1990. The “Brazilian Rural
Society” (Sociedade Rural Brasileira) was and still is an important dialogue partner
for those agencies in expressing the interests of the self-titled “rural class” (classe
rural). It was founded in 1909 during the agro-oligarchic republic of provincial
governors (República Velha 1899–1930) and was the blueprint for the coffee
regulation authority. An institutional communication channel between state and
the agrarian class was thereby effectively built. The most important goal of these
authorities in times of the agro-export economy was not so much the supply of the
domestic market but the upkeep and restoration of the balance between supply and
demand and thereby the stabilization of producer prices and their international
competitiveness.
The worry about the food supply for the domestic market built up during the
Second World War and resulted in an increasingly interventionist agricultural
market policy. Its two most important tools were and are: The minimum price
policy for the production and marketing of certain basic products which expanded
to up to 45 agricultural products until 1990; and the policy of agricultural credit
which served export goals as well as the supply of the domestic markets.
The minimum price policy was introduced in 1943 with the establishment of a
Commission for the Financing of Agricultural Production (CFP) at the Ministry for
Finance. Its goal was to secure a purchase guarantee (which was not adhered to all
the time, however) for agricultural producers as soon as the market price for their
products fell under a certain minimum level. The agricultural sector was subjected
to a comprehensive system of price and supply controls since the increasingly
implemented import substitution policy. This served the goal of supporting pro-
ducer prices and simultaneously subsidizing consumer prices. In addition, market-
ing loans were available. Agrarian producers could take their products in whole or
partly from the markets or stockpile them in case of excess supply until, at the time
for payment, the producer decides in favor of one of two options. That means either
to sell the products on the market and then pay back the loan or to sell the products
to the CFP at the guaranteed minimum price.
Global market products like wheat; sugar and coffee were subjected to especially
strict regulations by the aforementioned authorities in the form of quotas for
production and marketing as well as the related price and market controls.
308 G. Calcagnotto
This system of support was further expanded to basic products like rice, corn, black
beans and cassava as well as soybeans and cotton with the foundation of the
National Supply Oversight Authority (SUNAB) in 1962. The SUNAB was com-
posed of representatives of a number of federal ministries. It regulated the distri-
bution of those products, controlled their export and import quantities and was even
authorized to confiscate private food stocks in the case of emergencies. This policy
was pursued until the end of the 1980s and led to an institutionally rigid price
system, which was replaced by a neoliberal course of the economy within the
context of the Washington Consensus. This change was further facilitated by the
fact that the mentioned price control system was increasingly ineffective since the
mid-1980s. The failure of multiple plans for the fight against inflation in rapid
succession led to a steep decline of real agricultural prices and to a drastic deterior-
ation of agricultural terms of trade. Absorbing those losses required increasing
budget support, which worsened the already extreme tendencies towards inflation.
The result was that real producer prices at the end of the 1980s were only half of
those at the beginning of the decade.
The second main instrument of agricultural policy is the lending system, which
was introduced specifically for the agricultural sector in the mid-1960s under the
name “National rural credit system” (Sistema Nacional do Crédito Rural). To its
processing organs belonged the three biggest Brazilian banks (Banco do Brasil,
Banco do Nordeste and Banco da Amazônia) and a number of additional banks from
the state and private sector. The crucial benefits to the agricultural sector were:
(a) Part of the deposits which the banks at the central bank forcibly held free of
interest could instead be used for agricultural credits at controlled interest rates—
the permissible part of sight deposits was up to 25 %; (b) Additional resources for
agrarian credits originated from the federal budget and the savings volume of
specialized agricultural banks, which were forced to use a fixed percentage of
their time deposits for agricultural credits; (c) The interest rates for rural credits
were set at a level far below market average and could not be subjected to an
inflation adjustment clause even in times of hyperinflation. This resulted in the
situation in the late 1970s and during the 1980s when rural credits had to be
allocated at real negative interest.
This promotional framework in agricultural policy had to be redesigned drasti-
cally at the end of the 1980s since hyperinflation dominated and forced the
government to take dramatic countermeasures. This included drastic cuts to the
volume of credit, the reintroduction of an inflation adjustment clause for outstand-
ing debts and calculating interest rates on the basis of the value adjusted for
inflation. This abruptly increased debts and interest rates for the agricultural sector
that was used for decades of subsidies or even negative interest rates, which
previously pampered agricultural undertakings and finally resulted in an out of
control debt crisis, which demanded urgent reform. A first liberalization measure in
the form of the abolition of export licenses for agricultural primary products
occurred in 1987, but its impact was only provisional, which further emphasized
the urgency of deeper reforms. Price controls on the side of producers and
consumers necessitated increased budgetary resources and contributed to the
acceleration instead of the fight against inflation (OECD 2005: 73–74). The time
had come for a reform of the whole rural credit system: It took the form of a
surprisingly radical liberalization under the Collor government (1990–1992), which
was continued under Cardoso (1995–2002) and counteracted in part but also
differentiated as well as expanded during the Lula administration (2003–2010).
2.2 Collor’s Radical and Cardoso’s Gradual Deregulation

of the Agricultural Market (1990–2002)
Fernando Collor de Mello assumed the reins of government as the first directly
elected president after the military regime (1964–1985) and was strongly influenced
by the Washington Consensus. This described the agenda of restoring the path to
growth after the “lost decade” caused by the debt crisis of the 1980s. In relation to
agriculture this meant a differentiated application according to Collor: On the one
hand, the state’s commitment to guarantee low food prices and agricultural import
subsidies was abolished immediately. With regards to the commodities wheat and
coffee that are traded on the world market, the markets for wheat and coffee which
had been strongly regulated for decades were dismantled by way of closing the
Brazilian Coffee Institute and abolishing the state monopoly on buying up wheat—
both of which took place in 1990, the first year of the administration. Market
regulations for sugar and ethanol stayed mostly in place until 1995 when, under
the Cardoso administration, the regulatory authorities for sugar and ethanol were
closed. Subsequently, prices for sugar and ethanol were gradually decontrolled up
until 1999 and finally the state monopoly for their purchase and distribution was
overturned. The last remaining regulatory prescription is the compulsory addition
of ethanol to petrol.
A gradual procedure was chosen regarding the dismantling of the price support
and credit system for foodstuffs because of their greater significance for the
domestic market. In light of the price increases due to considerable harvest short-
falls between 1989–1991, Collor, first of all (1990–1991), suspended all measures
for supporting agricultural prices and reduced the volume of interest-subsidized
agricultural loans. The removal of agricultural promotion combined with the
retention of an inflation adjustment clause for existing loans had the effect of an
“erosion of production incentives” (OECD 2005: 74) and led to a drastic increase in
agricultural debt. A sharp decrease of the areas under cultivation followed already
in the harvest year 1990–1991, accompanied by worries over the sufficient provi-
sion of foodstuffs to the national population (Rezende, 2000; in: OECD, Ibid.).
This required a new, relatively short era of agricultural politics under President
Itamar Franco (1992–1994) with the resurgence of price interventions and interest-
subsidized agricultural credits in order to counteract the weaknesses of the agri-
cultural market (even despite the rigid monetary policy goals). Additional solvency
for agricultural producers was created by retroactively changing investment credits
allocated for a specific purpose into marketing credits and by offering a yearlong
prolongation of credit guarantees in the form of commodities stocks. A synergetic
310 G. Calcagnotto
advantage was gained additionally by allowing agricultural credits to be settled

through product deliveries at the value of the guaranteed minimum price. In view of
extreme price fluctuations and high insecurity due to inflation many agricultural
borrowers made heavy use of the new, generous possibilities and sold their crop to
the government, which generated massive state-owned agricultural stocks.
The macroeconomic conditions changed again with the successful economic
stabilization plan “Plano Real” from March 1994 to the end of 1995 a new, short-
term period of agricultural policy was opened with generous state guarantees for
minimum producer prices in agriculture. The reason for this was that in order to
stabilize the monetary value of the newly introduced currency Real (still afflicted
by residual inflation) it was effectively pegged to the relatively stable U.S. dollar,
which lead to a creeping over-valuation of the Real. This meant in turn that
Brazilian agricultural exports that were mostly traded in U.S. dollars became
expensive and thereby lost competitiveness. Especially since the Southern Com-
mon Market—MERCOSUL—came into effect in 1995 and introduced free trade,
which brought considerable competitive advantages to imports of similar agri-
cultural products from its member countries and thus lowered domestic agricultural
prices. The macroeconomic stabilization based on over-valuation thereby balanced
the expected stabilization effects for agricultural prices.
Measures were implemented to remedy this inconsistency between macro-
economic and sectorial efforts towards stabilization. They began a more lengthy,
last period (1996–2002) in the policy of guaranteed minimum producer prices for
certain commodities and foodstuffs and served the goal of a stringent consolidation
of the state budget: (a) The link between guaranteed minimum prices and the rate of
inflation was removed. Minimum prices once determined were valid for the whole
harvest year; (b) Settling marketing loans by delivering agricultural products was
outlawed. Sales options for the current minimum price were introduced at lending
instead (see below); (c) In order to progressively reduce direct buyouts by the state
at guaranteed minimum prices, private lenders receive a premium at auctions (see
below) which corresponds to the difference between minimum and market price;
(d) Buyouts through the federal government directly from the producers and their
cooperatives were radically cut back to reduce the presence of the state on the
agricultural market even further.
2.3 Institutions and Actors in Agricultural Politics 1990–2010
The rushed modernization of agriculture in the three decades 1960s–1980s led to a

marked differentiation in rural social structure. It generated three sectors that differ
with regards to the respective developmental status in productive forces and
relations of production: a sector of strongly capitalized, technologically modernized
capitalistic agribusiness; a sector of capitalized and modernized family businesses
usually without employees; and a traditional production sector of agricultural
family businesses within the regime of small property holdings, leasing and
cooperatives (Sorj, 2008: 101). This implies that the modernization of agriculture
has reached even smaller businesses and stabilized them for long periods. In
general, the conservative modernization corroborates or even intensifies the highly
concentrated land ownership structures. During this period of accelerated agricul-
tural modernization strongly promoted by the state, the average size increased
especially in the case of agribusinesses with more than 50 ha of land (Sorj, 2008:
113). In the following decades, political mobilization intensified among affected
small-scale farmers who became landless farm laborers against their will (De la
Fontaine, 2005: 31). They pressured the state more strongly to correct the distri-
bution of land ownership but the basic pattern of concentration hardly changed
(Oliveira, 2010).
Aim and at the same time motor of this process were financially strong industrial
firms from Brazil and abroad which saw their chance in the gap that emerged at the
end of the 1950s when the old integration mechanisms of the agricultural sector in
national and international political economies (usage of agricultural surplus from
export and domestic market production for urban industrial investments) increas-
ingly failed: It was clear for the first time that production for export and domestic
market could not be increased indefinitely by expanding the cultivation area to new
lands within and beyond large-scale land holding (Sorj, 2008: 15–19). The hour of
“intensive” agriculture had begun, that of “extensive” agriculture was past. The
increasing use of chemicals and the mechanization of agriculture offered a richly
rewarding field of activity for the new import substitution strategy. Mainly because
it enabled economies of scale that infant industries could not have achieved
otherwise due to their lacking of international competitiveness.
An essential consequence of this process of modernization in the agricultural
sector is the establishment of an economically powerful and politically highly
influential complex, which has found its way into literature as “agribusiness”.
The agricultural industry (as production site of agricultural resources like tractors
and pesticides, as well as purchasers of agricultural commodities like sugar cane or
soy products) represents the “starting point for the analysis of the dynamic in
agricultural social relations in Brazil” (Sorj, 2008: 126–127). The agricultural
industrial complex has become the protagonist in the—admittedly unstable—alli-
ance between land and machine, between large- and middle-scale land holding and
agribusiness—an alliance of unequal partners in which the old large-scale land
owners play the secondary part. Both sides together signaled the way in which the
redefinition of the agricultural sector within the overall economy should be
implemented. Small-scale farmers, farm laborers and landless people lost the battle.
However, because they did not give up the fight, to this day they are still present as
social actors and achieve more or less meaningful concessions from time to time.
The aforementioned actors are institutionally and politically active in numerous
organizations. Interest groups of large-scale landowners, agribusiness firms, small-
scale farmers and landless people exist in the form of employers’ associations, labor
unions and social movements. Among the most important agricultural employers’
associations are particularly noteworthy: the National Agricultural Association
(CNA), the right-leaning conservative militant organization of large landowners
312 G. Calcagnotto
with the euphemistic name “Democratic Union of Agricultural Entrepreneurs”

(UDR) as well as the Brazilian associations of poultry producers and exporters
(ABEF), of meat exporters (ABIEC), of the plant oil industry (ABIOVE), the coffee
producers and exporters (ABIC), the pig meat producers and exporters (ABIPECS),
the seed suppliers (ABRASEM), the citrus fruit exporters (ABECITRUS), the sugar
cane industry of São Paulo (UNICA), the milk producers (LEITE BRASIL) and
others more. Among the most important representatives of employees and social
movements are the National Association of Farm Laborers’ Unions (CONTAG)
and the landless movement (MST). The interests of farmers are politically repre-
sented by a cross-party “agricultural faction” in both chambers of parliament.
2.4 The Institutional Context
The period of reforming instruments and contents of state promotion of agricultural

production was inspired by neoliberalism, but pragmatically implemented during
the 1990s. Its aim was to replace the principle of cost recovery of earlier agricultural
policies with the dual principle of the greatest possible alignment to global market
prices and the internal stabilization of producer prices. Minimum price policy is the
backbone of current agricultural policy. Not only the whole price support system
depends on it, but also the agricultural credit system be-cause the minimum
producer price serves as basis for the calculation of the upper limit of credit per
borrower.
This long tradition of agricultural policy between state interventionism and
liberalism brings about a complex, still widely applicable structure of institutions,
actors and policies:
The Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock Farming and Food (MAPA) is
responsible for formulating general strategies and policies for the agricultural sector
and implementing them. The Office of Agricultural Policy belongs to the same
ministry and is in charge of drawing up agricultural policy guidelines and
supervising government activities concerning agricultural trade and production.
The National Supply Company (CONAB) also belongs to MAPA and provides
the establishment and administration of state food stocks as well as the implement-
ation of agricultural price support policies. With branches in 25 of the 27 federal
states CONAB provides 179 storage facilities which offer their target audience a
broad range of services for stockpiling, marketing and program-specific food
supply (CONAB, 2010: 11). Another important institution of MAPA is the state-
run agricultural research and training enterprise (EMBRAPA), which is the source
of key technological innovations and adjustments to the conditions of tropical and
subtropical agriculture and livestock farming.
The Federal Ministry for Agricultural Development (MDA) was established in
2000 to replace the Special Ministry for Land Policy that was founded in the
mid-1980s to solve urgent rural conflicts (mostly concerning land holding). Since
2001, it is additionally responsible for the task of supporting and promoting small-
scale family farms (agricultural familiar). The National Institute for Settlement and
Agricultural Reform (INCRA) is associated with it. It has the task of implementing
agricultural reform, compiling and administrating the registry of agribusiness as
well as the management of public lands. It maintains agencies in 29 different cities
in Brazil. The Centre for Agricultural Studies and Rural Development (NEAD) is
also associated with the MDA and is concerned with agricultural research and
analysis as well as the task of including civil society in the implementation of
policies of rural development.
The Federal Ministry for Social Development and the Fight against Hunger
(MDS) was established in January of 2004 by merging the Extraordinary Federal
Ministry for Food Safety and the Ministry for Social Services. Its main task is to
implement the “Zero Hunger Program” (Programa Fome Zero) and especially its
component “Food supply and help”.
Noteworthy are as well the National Council of Food Supply and Food Safety
(CONSEA) with members both of civil society and government, and the National
Agricultural Credit System (SNCR). The latter comprises 298 banks on the federal,
state and cooperative level to supply the agricultural sector with state-promoted
credits under the control, coordination and supervision of the central bank.
Leading financial institutions are the semi-state-owned Banco do Brasil, Banco
do Nordeste and Banco da Amazônia. The SNCR is additionally associated with the
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), which reports to
the Federal Ministry for Development, Industry and Trade.
State and private actors participate in the formulation of agricultural strategies
and agricultural policies via diversely composed advisory committees like the
National Council for Agricultural Policy (CNPA), the CNC, the Interdepartmental
Council Sugar and Alcohol (CIMA) and the Sectorial Chamber for Sugar and
Alcohol, the Council of Cocoa Producers (CNPC), the Agribusiness Council
(CONSAGRO) and the Special Committee for Natural Resources.
2.5 Decision Making Processes
Decision making processes in agricultural policy are formally defined as follows:

The Office for Agriculture (SPA) at MAPA is responsible for determining mini-
mum prices, professionally assisted and implemented by CONAB. Decisions from
those two institutions are submitted for approval to the National Currency Council
(CMN), as well as the ministries for planning, budget and finances and the central
bank. They are passed in conjunction with MAPA as interdepartmental orders
(Portaria Interministerial, 2010). Minimum prices are announced 1 year before
sowing begins—differentiated according to main production areas. Three different
price support systems are currently used for a relatively broad but variable range of
agricultural products:
1. The traditional program “Purchase by the central government” (AGF) is

concerned with a range of products for which an official minimum price is
determined. They are primarily key products like wheat, rice and corn. Basic
314 G. Calcagnotto
foodstuffs that are especially important to the poorer population have been added
in the last years like black beans and manioc flour.
2. A marketing promotion program pays premiums to private marketing firms
(a) which, in the context of the sub-program “Premium for targeted marketing”
(VEP) from public supplies, participates in auctions for agricultural products
from public stocks and at the same time commits to market those goods on
chosen markets; or (b) which, in the context of sub-program “Marketing pre-
mium” (PEP) purchases agricultural products directly from the producer and
commits to pay the “reference price” (which is the basis of agricultural credits)
and to forward the harvest surplus to the respective consumer market. A third
sub-program “Premium for price harmonization to the producer” (PEPRO)
applies directly to individual producers or their cooperatives who commit to
sell their products in public auctions at the value of the difference between the
reference price mentioned above and the “equalization premium” (CONAB,
2010: 20).
3. Option contracts for future government and private sales at a fixed agreed-upon
price as well as for the purchase of state stocks. Additionally, CONAB’s
responsibilities were considerably expanded in a social direction under the
government of Lula da Silva in order to secure greater access to cost-covering
producer prices for small-scale farmers, for instance in the context of the
Program to Promote Small-Scale Farms (PRONAF).
The second key component of Brazilian agricultural policy, aside from the price
support system, is the already mentioned agricultural credit system, which will now
be described in detail. It was already introduced in 1965 in its three-part form—with
credits for cultivation, investment and marketing—in the context of the “conser-
vative agricultural modernization” promoted by the military regime. The financial
institutions participating in this system—almost 300 in number—take their
resources from three sources: (a) “Deposits at the central bank” are interest free
and mandatory for every bank. Financial institutions can take an amount of up to
25 % and provide them to the agricultural sector with interest subsidies; (b) From
federal budget resources and the rural savings system whereby agricultural savings
banks have to provide a fixed percentage of their time deposits for agricultural
credits; (c) Interest rates for agricultural credits were held at the lowest level of the
overall economy so that they could not compete with the pace of money value
deterioration in times of high inflation like in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in real
negative interest for agricultural credits. This means that (large-scale) farmers
oriented towards modernization were given money. At the end of the 1980s, the
fight against hyperinflation required drastic cutbacks in the volume of agricultural
credits. Interest rates were pegged to the development of inflation and the sudden
return of positive real interest rates led to insolvency in 30 % of all pending credits
on August 1995 (OECD 2005: 88). The fully fledged debt crisis in the agricultural
sector had considerable institutional consequences for agricultural policies which
all amounted to a reduction of the role of the state in financing agricultural credits—
although it was, in part, actually another source of resources for the agricultural
sector because of repeated debt refinancing programs. Refinanced and pending

credits amounted to R$21.8 billion (US$8.0 billion) at the end of 2004, among
them R$3.8 billion (US$1.4 billion) in payments which were already behind.
In summary, it can be said in agreement with a 2005 OECD report that at the
start of Lula’s government the agricultural subsidies in Brazil, quantified as part of
GDP, had declined to 3 % meaning only a fraction of the amount that other
countries like the USA (17 %), the OECD countries (30 %), the EU (34 %) or
Japan (58 %) spend on their respective agricultural sectors for the same purpose
(Melyukhina, 2005: 3). There remains a great amount of leeway for corrections in a
social direction—if the industrialized countries mentioned above are taken as
standard.
3 Economic Successes and Social Consequences

of Agricultural Policy Until 20032
3.1 Performance of the Agricultural Sector: Prices, Production,

Marketing, Productivity
It is clear from literature that macroeconomic factors with an indirect effect have a
stronger influence on the agricultural sector than sector-specific political measures.
This is especially the case if the former implicitly taxes agricultural products
more—in the form of an overvalued national currency and import substitution
strategies—than agricultural policy can promote them. In the case of Brazil,
however, this statement has to be considered carefully (Helfand & Castro de
Rezende, 2001; Krueger, Schiff, & Valdés, 1988).
On the one hand, the period of reform in agricultural policy (1987–2002)—in
contrast to the decades from 1950 to 1980—lead to the agricultural sector growing
faster than the industrial sector and in the 1990s it even overtook the growth rate of
the service sector. From 1980 to 1998, Brazilian GDP only grew 40 % whereas the
agricultural sector grew 70 %. The agricultural sector thereby balanced previously
lost parts of GDP and contradicted the common observation that the importance of
the agricultural sector for GDP declines at a linear rate the more a country develops.
This shows, according to Helfand (2003: 12–14), “what a strong impact the policies
implemented by the Brazilian government between 1980 and 1998 had.”
On the other hand, the development regarding agricultural credits and the state
of competition between export and domestic market conditions shows that specific
agricultural policies often miss the target. It is exactly because factors from outside
of the agricultural sector have a stronger impact than agricultural policies them-
selves. On the basis of the development of grain production (cereal, soy, corn,
coffee and beans), Fig. 17.1 calls attention to the fact that agricultural credits and
production only showed a parallel increase during the starting phase in the 1970s,
2
Adjusted from: Calcagnotto (2007: 98–108).
316 G. Calcagnotto
Fig. 17.1 Agricultural credits and grain production from 1970 onwards. Source: Harvest:
CONAB, Ministério da Agricultura; Agricultural credits: Banco Central (Mueller & Mueller,
2006: 5)
but show diverging tendencies afterwards: Agricultural production increased expo-

nentially since the beginning of the 1980s but agricultural credits sunk drastically.
The widening gap between grain production and agricultural credits at a reduced
rate of interest after the starting phase of agricultural modernization may be a sign
for the fact that the latter are especially relevant for financing start-up investments
(machines etc.) whereas in later phases other factors are key.
Figure 17.2 depicts the development of Brazil’s agricultural exports from 1997–
2005 whereby the whole agribusiness (including processed agricultural products
like soy cake, cocoa mass or sugar) is considered. The depicted graph shows
relative stagnation of exports in the period 1997–2000, followed by a boom in
exports starting in 2001. The development since 2001 is the result of the large
devaluation of about 45 % in 1999, even if falling international prices for Brazilian
agricultural exports neutralized the advantages of devaluation at first.
On the other hand, Helfand (2003: 13) shows that the revaluation of Brazilian
currency achieved through the stabilization plan Plano Real in the years 1995–1998
put mainly domestic market products like beans, corn, cotton, milk, rice and wheat
under strong import pressure. The import volume during this time was on average
three times as high as during the years 1985–1989 and it declined 40 % in 1999, that
is nominally about 50 % after the large devaluation in 1999 (Pereira & Carvalho,
2000: 6). Exports were not especially hard hit by the revaluation of 1995–1998
because the inputs needed for export products became generally cheaper due to the
revalue of the national currency and thus lessened the revaluation-based price
increases for exports. The production of poultry and pig meat has particularly
profited from this decrease in input prices through the import intensity of its
production process. In general, exports between 1985 and 1989 and 1995 and
1998 increased for about 34 %; those of poultry for about 130 % (Helfand,
2003: 14).
Fig. 17.2 Agribusiness and foreign trade 1997–2005. Source: SECEX, Brazilian Ministry for
Development, Industry and Commerce (Mueller & Mueller, 2006: 10)
If we are asking for winners and losers with regards to the state of competition
between export and domestic market production, then export oriented agricultural
products3 are the winners. In the time after the large devaluation of 1999, there was
an explosive increase in exports of the five most important export goods (soy beans,
soy cake, coffee beans, raw sugar and frozen orange juice) from US$5,405 billion
(1990–1994) to almost double the amount (US$10,455 billion) in 2003.4 Domestic
market products were on the losing side because they were more exposed to foreign
competition due to trade liberalization and deregulation and therefore were com-
pelled to make disproportional efforts towards an increase in productivity. The
percentage of rice imports measured against production volume rose from 6 %
(1980) to 15 % (end of the 1990s) on the whole (Helfand, 2003: 13). Even measured
against consumption, the import share of rice increased continually from 1.6 %
(1990–1992) to 6.2 % (1995–1997) and even 7.8 % (2000–2004) (OECD, 2005:
45). The drop in production regarding wheat was dramatic at 50 % due to deregu-
lation and the end of wheat subsidies. Food imports tripled on the whole from 1985–
1989 to 1995–1998 from about US$2 billion a year to US$6 billion. Regarding
beans, the import share of domestic bean consumption increased from 3.4 % on
average (1990–1992) to 5.1 % (1995–1997). However, their respective import share
dropped again in the following years (2000–2004) to 3.0 % on average because
bean producers could more than compensate for the loss of 20 % of their crop land
through gains in productivity (Ibid.). With the large devaluation of the Brazilian
Real of nominally about 50 % in 1999, food imports decreased fast (Ibid. 42) and
3
Soy beans, soy oil and cake, orange juice, sugar, cocoa beans and derivatives, coffee beans and
instant coffee, as well as beef, pork and poultry (Helfand, 2003: 48).
4
According to numbers from the Brazilian ministry for industry and trade (in OECD, 2005: 62).
318 G. Calcagnotto
considerable productivity gains appeared relatively quickly (Helfand, 2003: 13).

Despite this decline tendency, it has to be noted that Brazil is substantially depen-
dent on imports only with regards to wheat (with 55.5 % import share of domestic
consumption on average between 2000 and 2004). Other food imports have only
marginal relevance (maybe with the exception of rice) (OECD, 2005: 45). The
politically promoted export orientation of agriculture lead to an export share of
31 % in 2004 (Ibid. 46) which ranks—measured against agricultural production on
the whole—far above the share of overall exports of Brazil’s GDP (2006: 16.8 %).5
The productivity of the agricultural sector improved considerably in every way
between 1975 and 2003. Labor productivity increased, especially quickly jumping
from index 100 to almost 300,6 followed by earnings power per hectare, which
increased from 100 to almost 200, and by capital productivity which improved
below average to about 150. The outstanding productivity of the factor “land” is
certainly associated with the increased use of modern inputs like artificial fertilizer7
and pesticides. Barros (1999, cited in Helfand, 2003: 15) allocates two thirds of
productivity gains to the increased use of modern agricultural equipment and
one-third to general growth in factor productivity. Figure 17.3 offers a graphic
representation of this development by contrasting the development of cropland and
grain harvest from 1991 to 2010.
Figure 17.3 clearly shows that while the agricultural area was expanded it did not
increase at the same speed as grain production—evidence for an increased earnings
power per hectare. Other aspects affecting the increase in productivity shall be
mentioned here because they directly or indirectly affect the question posed in this
article regarding the social consequences of agricultural policy: (a) usage of
improved strains which were developed mainly through decade-long research of
the state-run agricultural research facility EMBRAPA; (b) discontinuing cultivation
on infertile soils; (c) using fertile soils on newly accessed agricultural areas with
new technologies; (d) termination of business by less efficient agricultural
producers and (e) regional relocation of cropland to previously not accessed areas
of the central western region. Due to the particularly intense technological change
here, economies of scale and large-scale agricultural businesses could emerge,
mainly for growing cotton, corn, soybeans and the associated cattle farming and
agro-industrial animal production (Ibid. 16, OECD, 2005: 47).
The below average increase in capital productivity in the 1990s (despite falling
prices for agricultural machinery) can be traced back, on the one hand, to the lack of
investment credits and, on the other hand, to insufficient access to capital and
credits for small- and middle-scale farms (Gasques & Conceição, 2000: 17).
Capital production is regionally stronger in those federal states that have a better
5
Figures from the National Development Bank BNDES 2006. In: “Sobe parcela do paı́s na
exportação mundial”. Folha online, 25/01/2007. In: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br
6
According to calculations from Gasques, Bastos and Bacchi (cited in OECD, 2005: 49).
7
Fertilizer usage increased from 4.2 billion tons in 1980 to 5.74 billion tons in 1998 (FAO data, in:
Helfand, 2003). From 1990 to 2002, the increase was even at about 140 %. Cropland was relatively
constant during that time (OECD, 2005: 50).
160
140
120
100
Area (in mil. hectar)
Production (in mil. tons)
80
60
40
20
Fig. 17.3 Development of crop land and agricultural production in Brazil (1990/1991–2009/
2010). Source: CONAB (2010: 16)
infrastructure and an input-intensive agriculture. Examples are Paraná, São Paulo

and Rio Grande do Sul where fertilizer usage is comparable to Japan and Korea
with 250–300 kg/ha (OECD, 2005: 47).
As mentioned, labor productivity increased the most—in part as overreaction to
higher wage costs on the side of agribusiness. The latter declined from Index 100 in
1987 to 55 in 1994, but as soon as 1995 it recovered to 85 because of the economic
stabilization measures of Plano Real and consolidated at over 90 in the following
years (Helfand, 2003: 50). However, agribusinesses thought themselves under such
pressure due to wage costs that employment in the agricultural sector decreased
13 % from 18.5 to 16.14 million between 1992 and 2002. This happened the fastest
in those regions with the strongest agricultural modernization: Southeast and
Central West. Here, the employment share of overall employment in agriculture
went down from 26 to 23 % or from 7 to 6 % while it remained stable in the South.
In the Northeast where the level of modernization is relatively low, the employment
share rose from 45 to 50 % (OECD, 2005: 51).
In conclusion: The massive increase in productivity of the factor “soil” was
accompanied by the even faster increase in labor productivity (from Index 100 to
300 in 1975–2003) and a still considerable increase of capital productivity (from
Index 100 to 150) (OECD, 2005: 47, Calcagnotto, 2007: 100–101). This implies
that better chances were created for agricultural income and its distribution. Yet a
deeper look into the type of this growth leads to certain disillusionment.
With regards to the size of businesses, the agricultural and economic policy of
the 1980s and 1990s favored their enlargement through export orientation and the
relocation of agribusiness to regions with cheap land and large economies of scale:
Both mechanisms promote a gradual increase of economically sensible sizes of
enterprises. Through purchase or termination of smaller farms, the number of
320 G. Calcagnotto
agricultural businesses sank since the 1980s 8–16 % (Helfand & Brunstein, 2001).
This structural tendency towards property concentration puts primarily the smallest
of the small under increasing pressure. The share of small-scale farm holdings (with
less than 10 ha) of the overall number of agricultural firms decreased from 50.35 to
49.43 % between 1980 and 1995. Their share in areas sank from 2.47 to 2.23 %.
Parallel to this, the share of large-scale farms (with more than 1,000 ha) of the
overall number increased from 0.91 to 1.01 % while their share of areas remained
practically stable (1980: 45.12 % and 1995: 45.10 %).8
3.2 Social Consequences of Agricultural Policy Until 2002
Three processes are especially relevant concerning the social consequences of the
changes in the agricultural sector during the 1980s and 1990s: The creation of
agricultural and non-agricultural income, the development of employment and the
access to landownership as well as to public assistance.
Regarding the creation of agricultural and non-agricultural income in rural
areas—where most of the poor and extremely poor people in Brazil live—an
OECD study (Ibid. 55) ascertains a positive development. Brazil’s per capita
income between 1991 and 2000 climbed 29 % and the number of people living in
poverty9 in urban or rural areas declined 18 %. On the other hand, the fact that the
number of extremely poor people declined faster in rural than urban areas should
not cover up the fact that the poorest of the poor in rural areas were the ones losing
the most income: After a detailed analysis of demographic micro data, Helfand and
Levine (2004: 183) ascertained that between 1991 and 2000 the income of the two
poorest tenths of the rural population decreased 98 % and 24 % respectively. In
other words: The income of the 10 % of poorest of the poor in Brazilian agriculture
disappeared almost completely within 10 years. 76 % of the income of the second
poorest tenth is still there at least, even though this tenth, too, had hardly anything to
lose: The extreme poverty line (ca. US$0.33 daily wage) runs three steps above, the
poverty line (ca. US$0.66 daily wage) even five steps above. For these tenths,
incomes went up more the higher the respective tenth ranked on the income scale
(for 6 %, 18 %, 35 % and 37 % respectively). Above the poverty line, rural incomes
went up 39 %, 37 % and 37 % respectively. There are, however, no details
concerning absolute numbers of affected people living in rural areas within the
8
Brazilian Office for Statistics IBGE: Census from 1980, 1985 and 1995 (OECD, 2005: 52).
9
The OECD calculates its data on the basis of the Atlas of Human Development; thereby the line
of poverty and the line of extreme poverty correspond to half and a quarter of the minimum wage
valid in Brazil in August 2000 which were R$151.00 or about US$1.33 a day (OECD, 2005: 192).
Another definition of poverty and extreme poverty is that of the Brazilian Federal Statistics
Agency (IBGE) and of Ricardo Paes de Barros, which includes as limit for extreme poverty half
of the monthly minimum wage, i.e. R$68.00 while the limit for poverty is the minimum wage at
the level of R$136.00 in constant values from 1999 (Barros, 2003).
respective tenths. Thus, there can be no precise conclusion yet regarding the stated
marked decrease in poverty in rural areas in Brazil during the 1990s.
The improvement in earning capacity for poor people in rural areas in Brazil is
not exclusively caused by high incomes from agricultural activities. Rather, this
accounts for only 70 or 60 % of rural income in the northeast or southeast (Ferreira
& Lanjouw, 2001; in Helfand, 2003: 19). The remaining 30 or 40 % are divided
relatively evenly between “non-agricultural” and “other” sources of income. The
latter are especially direct income transfers from the government in form of social
assistance or pensions. These official income transfers were the most important
source of income in the northeast for the income increase between 2000 and 2001
(OECD, 2005: 187).
Not unexpectedly, the number of people employed in the Brazilian agricultural
sector between 1992–1993 and 2001–2002 declined 13.8 % from 18.4 million to
15.8 million—the sharper the faster the speed of modernization was in the respec-
tive regions: The strongest downturn was in the southeast (24 %) and the central
west (23 %); the least in the northeast (5.6 %). The changes in the type of main
employment signal increasing productivity gains and ongoing creation of wage
labor. The downturn in employment in unpaid family workers was disproportion-
ately stronger at 24 % as that of self-employed people (7 %). The number of
agricultural employers declined more strongly with 17 % than farm laborers with
13 %. Regionally, the northeast shows itself to be the latecomer again. The most
significant change here is the shift from “unpaid family workers” to “subsistence
employees” while in the southeast and central west a much stronger decline of
employers than employees was noticeable. In the south, finally, development was
different again because the amount of working relatives and wage laborers
decreased more strongly than that of employees which implies a tendency of
capitalization of agribusiness (Helfand & Levine, 2004: 186).
An analysis of the insufficient access to landownership leads to the conclusion that
measures improving productivity and/or the expansion of businesses of small-scale
farmers or, in general, the expansion of access to land for landless families of farm
laborers (for example in the context of intensified efforts towards land reform) are
urgently necessary. This is the only way in which the agricultural sector could fulfill its
economic and social function effectively. In the northeast, for example, Helfand
determined, on the basis of an analysis of agricultural census data from 1995 to
1996, that 88 % of agricultural businesses were smaller than 50 ha—but that the
average income of farms with land between 20 and 50 ha was not sufficient to even
reach the limit of extreme poverty. In the three other regions (south, southeast, central
west), this percentage amounted only to 20 % of agribusinesses. With the poverty line
(of R$131.97, corresponding to the minimum wage according to Barros) taken as
basis, however, the estimated percentage in those three regions amounted to some-
where between 30 and 50 % of all agricultural businesses10 (Helfand, 2003: 20).
10
Since the census disregards non-monetary income, it is to be expected that non-monetary
income is underestimated in the lower income strata as well as an overestimation of the decline
in monetary incomes according to the OECD (OECD, 2005: 192).
322 G. Calcagnotto
4 Agricultural Policy and Social Consequences Under

the Lula Government (2003–2010)
President Lula da Silva designed his agricultural policy according to the reality of
the given balance of power—fitting for a savvy negotiator and former labor leader.
It is still distinctly marked by the superiority of agribusiness over other actors in the
agricultural sector. On the one hand, Lula reinforced the agricultural policy
followed up to that point with support for a technologically modern, highly produc-
tive cultivation system for large-scale farms so that agribusiness could achieve
never known growth rates (see Tables 17.1 and 17.2).
Tables 17.1 and 17.2 depict agribusiness’ share of GDP in terms of value
(agricultural production plus production and service firms upstream and down-
stream) in comparison to its contribution towards the surplus of Brazil’s foreign
trade balance. This shows that the share of GDP of agribusiness during the period
from 2000 to 2003 grew almost a third (from 4.85 to 6.390 %) and subsequently, at
around 5 % share of GDP, fell in step with the growth of the overall economy. In
contrast, its considerable and drastically increasing relevance for Brazil’s trade
balance stands out. The foreign trade surplus of Brazilian agri-business was at over
85 % of Brazil’s overall trade balance since 2005. But in the years of crisis 2007–
2009 (induced by the global financial and economic crisis), it came to the rescue of
Brazil’s trade balance by generating far more than 100 % of trade surplus and thus,
more than made up for the balance of the other economic sectors. This implies that
the export orientation of the agricultural sector (whose export share is at around
40 % of overall production) has become much stronger than that of the other sectors
of the Brazilian economy—which prompted the critical observation from some
analysts that the Brazilian development model under Lula da Silva’s administration
would go back to the paradigm from the 1930s to the 1960s based on exporting
primary goods; a scenario that would fit the interests of countries oriented on the
export of the neoliberal model. At the same time, however, many economists point
Table 17.1 Contribution GDP (in Millions)

of Brazilian agribusiness to
Year Agribusiness Total Share (%)
gross domestic product
GDP (Million R$) 2000 57,241 1,179,482 4.85
2001 66,819 1,302,136 5.13
2002 84,251 1,477,822 5.70
2003 108,619 1,699,948 6.39
2004 115,194 1,941,498 5.93
2005 105,163 2,147,239 4.90
2006 111,229 2,369,797 4.69
2007 127,267 2,661,344 4.78
2008 151,268 3,004,881 5.03
2009 163,933 3,143,015 5.22
Source: CONAB (2010: 17)
Table 17.2 Contribution of Brazilian agribusiness to foreign trade balance (in million US$)
Brazilian imports and exports (in million US$)
Exports Imports Balance
Year Agribusiness Total Agribusiness Total Agribusiness Total
2005 43,601 118,308 5,183 73,606 38,418 44,702
2006 49,471 137,807 6,805 91,351 42,666 46,456
2007 56,054 160,649 8,527 120,617 47,527 40,032
2008 69,318 197,942 11,604 172,985 57,714 24,957
2009 63,116 152,995 9,649 127,647 53,467 25,348
Source: CONAB (2010: 17)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Manioc Beans Corn Coffee Rice Wheat Soybean
Fig. 17.4 Agricultural products of Brazil’s family farms in comparison to capital firms, 2006
to the fact that an increase in national income accompanies the trade surplus and
raises the chances for redistributive income policies.
On the other hand, he adopted and considerably expanded the policy initiated by
his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) promoting agricultural
family business (PRONAF). However, agribusiness still has the strongest growth
which is indirectly shown by the highest growth lines for products favored by
agribusiness like soy and corn while the production of beans which is favored by
family farms (see Fig. 17.4) stagnates in the long term.
The alignment with supporting agricultural production through big companies
and small family farms became the dominating strategy in the agricultural sector so
that election promises regarding the implementation of a comprehensive and
economically meaningful agricultural reform fell far behind. The consequences
were twofold. On the one hand, there were considerable growth rates for agri-
cultural production with a relatively stable cultivation area. On the other hand, the
highly concentrated distribution of land was further cemented (Table 17.3).
324 G. Calcagnotto
Table 17.3 Distribution Number Acreage

of landownership
Total 5,575,489 329,941,393
according to number of
farms and acreage in Up to 10 ha 2,477,071 7,798,607
Brazil 2006 10–100 ha 1,971,577 62,893,091
Up to 100 ha 4,448,648 70,691,698
100–1,000 ha 424,906 112,696,478
1,000 and more 46,911 146,553,218
Farmers without land 255,024 0
2,500 ha and more 15,012 98,480,672
Source: Brazilian Federal Statistics Agency IBGE, Agricultural
census 2006 (in: Oliveira, 2010)
Agricultural production has more than doubled in volume from the beginning of
foreign trade liberalization and deregulation measures in 1990–1991 until the start
of Lula’s administration in 2003. It has increased another 20 % until 2010 all the
while the cultivation area has increased from just under 38 million ha to nearly
48 million ha which amounts to a growth speed many times below productivity
growth (Fig. 17.3). This is the result of increased earnings power per hectare, which
traces back to the usage of modern technology that was accelerated consciously
through agricultural policy.
Considering agricultural production, not only the first increase at the be-ginning
of the neoliberal era in the 1990s draws attention but also and especially the second
increase in 2002–2003. Then opposition candidate to the Cardoso government, Lula
da Silva, began to set new signs in agricultural policy after his electoral victory in
2002 and beginning government in January 2003. They amounted to a differenti-
ation of agricultural policy instruments so that the new state could perform more
effective interventions on both sides of the social scale—that of big agribusiness
and that of small-scale farmers.
5 Conclusions
The conclusion can be summoned up as follows: After a founding period (1930–

1964) with state interventionist macro-policy in favor of (urban) industrialization
with hardly noticeable balancing measures for the agricultural area followed a
period almost as long (1964–1989) with strong promotion of the agricultural sector
through a policy of “conservative modernization”. The goal was to increase pro-
duction, investments and commercialization. From the 1980s, this period, in the
course of neoliberal globalization, lead to a new, still ongoing phase of reinforced
integration of the agricultural sector into the production of industrial circuits
upstream and downstream on the national and global level, which has led, among
other things, to the development of globally influential agribusiness firms.
Lula’s government took office in 2003 with aspirations of realizing agricultural
reform, not only as a commitment and program of the administration, but as urgent
necessity for creating employment opportunities, food safety and socially just
development, on the one hand, as well as strategically important for a modern
and sovereign national project, on the other (MDA, 2005: 5). One ambitious goal
within the national agricultural reform program was new settlements for 920,000
families before 2007. It failed because of the power constellation reinforced by
Lula’s own agricultural policy wherein agribusiness with secondary large-scale
landholdings had the leading role. At the end of his term, the INCRA registered a
far lower number of 614,000 new settlements—the majority of which are located in
the conflict regions of Amazonia far away from the big consumer centers and were
achieved through redistributing land owned by the state. The existing concentration
of privately owned large-scale landholdings was not targeted by the implemented
agricultural reform (INCRA, 2010: 3).
President Lula da Silva’s successor, economist Dilma Rousseff, gained the
absolute majority of votes in October 2010 after an election campaign under the
motto “. . .so that Brazil changes further” which alludes to her plans, as Lula’s
protégé, for continuing the quite popular policies of her predecessor. Regarding
agricultural reform, she spoke as emphatically as well as emptily about the 43 mil-
lion hectare used for new settlements under Lula and his program for promoting
small-scale family farms, PRONAF.11 Her commitment for continuity is shown not
least by keeping in office the quite efficient economist Rolf Hackbarth who has
been head of the agricultural reform institute INCRA since 2003. Since president
Rousseff obviously intends to maintain Lula’s openness and capability for dialogue
in her relations to social movements, their hope for further-reaching agricultural
reform efforts will certainly die “last”. For most observers, however, rationally
justifiable expectations have already died.
For now Dilma Rousseff’s government has confirmed the scepticism of most
observers. Government’s performance since 2011 has shown an effective slow-
down of land reform and agricultural policies, particularly for small producers
(Polı́ticas Sociais 2014: 323). Figure 17.5 illustrates the de-acceleration of land
reform since Cardoso through Lula da Silva until—most pronounced—Dilma
Rousseff.
Certainly, in November 2013 Dilma’s government installed rapidly 132 new
land reform settlements for 30.239 families and over-fulfilled her full year target
(INCRA, 2014), but this fact does not revert the de-accelerating tendency of her
land reform policy. This tendency is also verifiable for the agricultural policy, as
confirmed by a consensus among governmental and independent experts in a high
level meeting in Brası́lia in September 2013: Accordingly, agricultural credit policy
maintains its efficiency for already established agricultural producers, but assis-
tance for small scale producers and reducing their north-northeast-south inequality
remain as challenges (IPEA, 2013a, b). President Dilma gives no reason to doubt
about her comprehensiveness regarding most social requests, but their feasibility
11
“Dilma diz que reforma agr aria brasileira põe o paı́s na ‘vanguarda’ da democratização da
terra”. In: http://www.canalrural.com.br/
326 G. Calcagnotto
748 28 238 3.532 1.990 86
Jose Sarney Fernando Collor Itamar Franco FHC Lula Dilma

1985-1989 1990-1992 1992-1995 1995-2002 2003-2010 2011-2013
Fig. 17.5 De-acceleration of land reform since 2002–2013, Number of expropriated land
properties in Brazil. Source: INCRA/SINOPAF, in: Arruda, 2013, O Estado de São Paulo,
7.10.2013, http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,2013-tem-desapropriacao-zero-no-
campo-ate-agora-imp-,1082906
depends on the competence of Dilma’s ministers Miguel Rossetto (Agricultural

Development) and Gilberto Carvalho (General Secretary of the Presidency), as
clarified at the sixth meeting between President Dilma and the Central Agricultural
Trade Union CONTAG, according to its president, Alberto Broch (Moura, 2014).
This perhaps may nourish further hope.
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Environmental Policy in Brazil. Tensions
Between Conservation and the Ideology 18
of Growth
Andrea Zellhuber
Abstract
In the chapter on environmental policy Andrea Zellhuber analyzes the negative
environmental impact of the Brazilian growth model. She explores the tension
between environmental protection and growth ideology which has even
increased in the last years. The environmental policy in Brazil is characterized
by the contrast between an advanced legal framework on environmental issues
and the actual political determination of priorities in public investment policy
which ignore environmental regulations. Many of the implementation problems
are related to the institutional framework. Fundamental difficulties often arise
from the absence of implementing regulations and a clear division of
competencies between the various environmental agencies. Environmental pro-
tection will be seriously restricted as long as agribusiness and the extractive
sector remain the central engines of the economy.
1 Introduction1
“The environment is a danger to sustainable development”. With this Freudian slip

at the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen the then chief of staff and current
President Dilma Rousseff (PT) unwillingly expressed the inherent contradictions
of Brazilian environmental policy in a nutshell.2
1
2
Folha de São Paulo (15/12/2009): Proposta de fundo do clima em Copenhague opõe Dilma a
Serra e Marina: www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ambiente/ult10007u666600.shtml
A. Zellhuber (*)
terre des homes Schweiz, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: andreazellhuber@hotmail.com

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_18
330 A. Zellhuber
Considering Brazil’s global responsibilities as one of the countries with the

highest biodiversity rates in the world, with the lion’s share of the world’s largest
continuous tropical rainforest and over 13 % of the world’s freshwater reserves,3
the government of this emerging nation seems to continue to be unable to cope with
the responsibilities. With its continental dimensions, the country encompasses five
ecological regions: the Amazonian rainforest, Caatinga (xeric scrubland in the
semi-arid north-east), Pantanal (one of the largest interior wetlands in the world,
which lies in the mid south-west, in the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do
Sul), Cerrado (savanna in the mid-west) and the Atlantic rainforest (Mata
Atlântica, which covers the area along the coast from the south to the north-east).
By global standards the Mata Atlântica and Cerrado belong to the regions with the
highest biodiversity rates and a high degree of vulnerability, the so-called biodiver-
sity hotspots.
However, the Lula government gave the impression that Brazil’s position as a
world power with regard to biodiversity was considered more of an obstacle than a
blessing with regard to rapid economic growth. Environmental policy thus entered
the public eye above all when it came to conflicts within the government regarding
major state-financed infrastructure projects. In this context the environmental
agencies demonstrated little ability to assert themselves with regard to environmen-
tal issues. Brazil’s environmental policy under the Lula government was thus
characterized by a contrast between a progressive environmental regulatory frame-
work and the pragmatic prioritization of a state investment policy, which ignored
environmental standards.
Government discourse with regard to climate protection has changed over the
last years with the effect that the government has declared ambitious targets for
CO2 reductions. These are to be achieved through an 80 % reduction of the
deforestation rate of the Amazon. However, forest conservation policy is still
treated as a department matter for which the Ministry of the Environment is solely
responsible (Fatheuer, 2008a, 2008b: 6). Efforts to maintain forests will prove futile
unless environmental criteria are taken into account in the shaping of the national
development strategy.
2 The Origins of Brazilian Environmental Policy
Already during the peak of the Brazilian “economic miracle” at the beginning of the
1970s, the military dictatorship vehemently opposed the demands of industrialized
nations with regard to environmental policy. At the 1972 UN Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm the military government took the stance that the
principle of national sovereignty had priority over environmental considerations
and that a country has the right to make use of its resources according to its own
3
The majority of this is in the Amazonian basin. It is also important to mention the Aq€
uı́fero
Guarani, which lies in the border region shared with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.
18 Environmental Policy in Brazil. Tensions Between Conservation. . . 331
priorities (Frey, 1997: 281; Scholz, 2010: 25). Nonetheless, the first UN Environ-
mental Conference contributed significantly to the gradual perception of environ-
mental protection as an independent policy field (Pádua, 1991: 151). As a result of
criticism of the Brazilian position at the UN Environmental Conference in
Stockholm the first Brazilian environmental authority, the Special Secretariat for
the Environment (SEMA), was founded in 1973 as a department of the Ministry of
the Interior (Cavalcanti, 2007: 27).
A milestone in the development of Brazilian environmental regulations and
environmental agencies was the 1981 adoption of the National Environmental
Policy Act (Law N 6.938, 1981). This formed the legal basis for the establishment
of the institutional framework for environmental policy on the federal, state and
local levels. The law defines the National Environmental System (SISNAMA),
which consists of the following levels: at the highest level is the Governing Council
(Conselho de Governo), which is made up of all ministers and which is coordinated
by the Chief of Staff Office (Casa Civil). The decision-making and consultative
body of SISNAMA is the National Environment Council (CONAMA). This has
101 members, of which 32 belong to the federal government, 27 to state
governments, 8 to municipalities and 22 to civil society. In addition, eight business
representatives and an honorary member are present. This environmental council
played an advising and also decision-making role and provided an institutionalized
forum for hearing conflicts regarding environmental policy, which set a notable
focus on social participation (Guimarães, 1991: 166).
SISNAMA’s central organ is the Ministry of the Environment (MMA). In
comparison to other ministries, such as the Ministries of Finance, Trade, Planning
or Agriculture, however, the MMA had relatively little political weight (Cavalcanti,
2007: 31; Guimarães, 1991: 184 f.). The MMA’s budget has undergone several
reductions over the last years. It has not yet been possible to implement the
principle of cross-sectorial policy, according to which environmental criteria
were supposed to flow into policy in other sectors.
The executive organ on the federal level is the Brazilian Institute of Environment
and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). SISNAMA is completed by environ-
mental agencies on the state and local levels and thus has a clearly decentralized
structure.
Environmental agencies corresponding to the CONAMA were also established
on the state and local levels, but with highly differing characteristics and levels of
political influence. As a rule, however, the political weight of these environmental
agencies is very small within local governments, this is linked to the fact that the
environmental agencies, above all at the local level, generally have very few
resources and lack sufficient professional expertise (Cavalcanti, 2007: 28–29).
An important actor with regard to environmental issues is the independent public
prosecutor (Ministério Público). As the “fourth power” in the country, the Ministé
rio Público is responsible for the legal checks and balances and the prosecution of
state offences for the protection of civic rights and the common good. The 1988
Constitution and the democratization process strengthened its specific supervisory
responsibilities in the area of environmental protection. It has specialized
332 A. Zellhuber
prosecutors, which supervise the environmental agencies as an independent body.

Thus there have been a number of sensational suits over the last years stemming
from the Ministério Público against the approval procedures for government
projects.
3 Legal and Institutional Conditions
As a result of the National Environmental Policy Act (Law N 6.938, 1981), the
course was already set during the 1980s for a number of significant points regarding
the legal and institutional framework of environmental policy (Schlüter, 1995: 90–
92). In particular, the detailed treatment of environmental considerations in the
1988 Constitution can be considered progressive for the period. Not least due to the
pressure from environmental groups, an entire chapter was dedicated to the envi-
ronment and environmental protection was anchored therein as a basic social right
(Fernandes, 1995: 92; Wehrhahn, 1994: 32–35).4 The constitution established a
complex legal system for the protection of natural resources (Scholz, Dräger, Floer,
Neher, & Unger, 2003: 24). According to this, environmental protection is a
national objective and the responsibility of all (Article 125). Every citizen has the
basic right to a healthy environment (Article 225) (Ibid.). The individual has a right
to legal action, as does the Ministério Público (Ibid.). Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of
Article 225 stipulate the protection of specific goods and regions that are of relevant
ecological importance (the Atlantic rainforest, the Amazon rainforest, the Pantanal
and the coastal region are all highlighted as part of the national natural heritage).
The Brazilian legal system views public civil action (ação civil pública) as a
controlling legal instrument, which can also be deployed to protect the environ-
ment. In this context the Ministério Público has the right to take legal action as the
advocate in environmental cases. In comparison to Germany, in Brazil civil
society’s authority to take action in order to ensure compliance with environmental
laws is very extensive (Scholz et al., 2003: 35).
A further, decisive turning point with regard to environmental law was the 1986
introduction of environmental risk assessments as part of environmental approval
procedures with the CONAMA 001/86 resolution. The procedure therefore also
involves extensive public hearings.
3.1 Difficulties with the Implementation of the Legal Guidelines
In particular the provisions regarding the environmental risk assessments have

regularly led to polemic discussions within the government over the last years. In
the debates surrounding major infrastructure projects it was repeatedly demanded
4
For a detailed presentation of Brazilian environmental law see Schlüter (1995: 88–96) and
Guimarães (1991: 200).
that the provisions be relaxed. On the other hand, civil society organizations
criticized the fact that in practice these studies often only lead to the legitimization
of such major projects (Cavalcanti, 2007: 29). According to a common criticism,
the legally mandatory public hearings were exploited by developers in order to
above all raise acceptance for the projects, rather than to provide an open space for
discussion. In many cases, for example, the hearings were held in cities far from the
populations that would actually be affected by the projects (Scholz et al., 2003:
28).5
It is possible to state that in general the implementation of these extensive
regulatory requirements was linked with substantial difficulties. Schlüter (1995:
88, 96) criticizes the marked fragmentation and unclear nature of Brazilian envi-
ronmental policy from a legal perspective, as well as the lack of connections
between the legal norms on different levels (Munhoz, 2009: 134). Many environ-
mental provisions are not known to most civil servants, judges, lawyers and
prosecutors (Schlüter, 1995: 96).6
Many of the problems regarding implementation are closely related to the
broader international context. Fundamental problems regularly arise from the lack
of provisions regarding the implementation of environmental policy and the lack of
a clear division of responsibilities between the different environmental agencies.
The implementation deficit is particularly glaring with regard to the management of
protected areas. Approximately 14 % of the Brazilian landmass is marked as a
reserve for different kinds of protection (Ricardo & Campanili, 2007: 263). Many
of these reserves still exist only on paper, as the environmental protection agencies
are often unable to guarantee the implementation of the regulations for protected
areas due to a lack of personnel and equipment (IBAMA & WWF-Brasil 2007: 79;
Wehrhahn, 1994: 37–38).7 Due to their insufficient ability to monitor reserves,
illegal clearing takes place even within protected areas. In some cases there was not
even petrol for the company vehicles or money for basic office equipment. In 2008
the environmental protection agencies had 2030 employees for all 850 protected
areas in the country. According to a spokesperson for the Ministry they would
require 9075 employees for the ideal management of the protected areas. For each
1000 km2 of protected area there are on average four staff members from the
environmental protection agencies (the global average is 27 staff members per
1000 km2; in the USA it is 33).8 Dissatisfaction with the working conditions is also
5
For a detailed critique of the environmental risk assessment procedure see Zhouri, Laschefski,
and Paiva (2005: 105 ff.).
6
For a thorough discussion of the criminal and procedural deficits see Schlüter (1995: 94 ff.). He
argues, amongst other things, that the effective application of environmental law in Brazil would
require a reform of the judicial system.
7
Egler (2002: 222 ff.) discusses in great detail the causes of the limited effectiveness of biodiver-
sity protection measures in Brazil. According to a study by WWF, 55 % of 86 protected areas that
were studied were found to be at an insufficient level of implementation and 37 % had unsatisfac-
tory management (Egler, 2002: 227).
8
Folha de São Paulo (10/03/2008): Fiscal do Ibama cuida de area igual a 3 cidades de São Paulo.
334 A. Zellhuber
reflected in the regular strikes by IBAMA employees, between 2003 and 2008 there
were five strikes (Bourscheit, 2008: 4). In 2010 there was a further wave of strikes
among conservation workers, which lasted for months.
At the local level the difficulties regarding the effective implementation envi-
ronmental policies were related to the fact that there were no overarching concepts
for regional land-use and environmental planning. Article 21-IX of the Constitution
determines that developing and implementing national and regional land-use and
development plans is a federal responsibility. However the institutional responsi-
bilities are not clearly structured and the different federal authorities with land-use
planning competencies9 are poorly coordinated (Fernandes, 1992: 47–48). Above
all, the fronts between the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of
Agriculture have hardened over the last years due to conflicts regarding environ-
mental restrictions on the expansion of land for agricultural use, which has led to
not infrequent public disputes. A typical example of such a conflict of jurisdiction
between departments is the decision regarding the responsibility for the develop-
ment of the 2008 macro-development plan for the Amazon region, Plan for a
Sustainable Amazon (PAS), which ignored the MMA.
The general weak points of the Brazilian administrative system are also reflected
in the environmental administration. The tendency towards a technocratic bureau-
cracy, the structural corruption, as well as the lack of qualified personnel (due to the
comparatively poor income opportunities) contributes considerably to the relative
failure of Brazilian environmental policy (Frey, 1997: 247). In addition, the
opportunities for the implementation of environmental policy were limited due to
the clientelistic networks and personal relationships that mark political decision-
making processes (Frey, 1997: 286–287).
The very small nature of the MMA in comparison to other departments is
particularly striking. In 2008 it consisted of R$570 million, thus expenditure for
environmental matters was merely 0.11 % of the total budget (Bourscheit, 2008: 1;
Munhoz, 2009: 137).10 In the preceding years the budget had already been cut by
33 %, from R$651.2 million (€284 million) in 2006 to R$438.5 million (191.5
million euros) in 2007; it thus had a smaller budget than the Ministry of Sport
(Ricardo & Campanili, 2007: 78).
Internal conflicts within the administration for the limited resources available
have also led to the mutual partitioning of sectoral administrations, preventing the
development of efficient cooperation between the different departments, as required
by the cross-sectorial nature of environmental policy (Frey, 1997: 287).
9
Notable in this context are the Ministry of National Integration (Ministério da Integração
Nacional), the Ministry of Defence (Ministério da Defesa), the Ministry of the Environment
(Ministério do Meio Ambiente), the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecu
aria
e Abastecimento), the Ministry of Rural Development (Ministério do desenvolvimento agr ario)
and the Ministry of Transport (Minitério do Transporte).
10
For an in-depth analysis of the Environment Ministry’s budget see Dutra, De Oliveira, and
Prado (2006).
4 Environmental Organizations as Important Actors

in Brazilian Environmental Policy
The first environmental organizations in Brazil were founded in the early 1970s
under the strong influence of the European and North-American environmental
movements (Viola, 1991: 6).11 The development of the Brazilian environmental
movement, as is also the case with urban social movements, must be examined in
the context of the political opening of the military regime under President Geisel,
who enabled the budding of a new critical and political culture (Brocke, 1993: 8–9;
Jacobs, 2002: 61; Wehrhahn, 1994: 58). Thus the environmental movement was an
important component of the democratization process of Brazilian society (Jacobs,
2002: 59).
In the early phase of their development the environmental organizations
concentrated their activities on reporting environmental damage and creating public
awareness of environmental problems (Brocke, 1993: 15; Viola, 1991: 7). The
catalyst for the foundation of environmental groups was often a concrete, local
environmental problem, such as industrial pollution or the construction of new
enterprises that endangered the environment. These spontaneous protests often
developed beyond their short-term goals into long-term social movements (Brocke,
1993: 11–12).
Characteristic of the environmental organizations was their social profile—the
majority of their members generally came from the new middle class that had
grown out of the economic upturn of the 1960s and 1970s (Brocke, 1993: 9; Pádua,
1991: 139). Their goals included spreading information about ecological interde-
pendence, the minimization of environmental damage through changes in behavior
on the individual level, and the strengthening environmental regulations on the state
level. The first environmental organizations described themselves as apolitical
(Boris, 1998: 222; Brocke, 1993: 12).12 In the initial phase until the mid-1980s
there was little contact with other social groups (Brocke, 1993: 21; Grohmann,
1995: 51). From 1984, in the context of the comprehensive mobilization of civil
society surrounding the first presidential elections following the military dictator-
ship, there was broader socio-political engagement on the behalf of environmental
organizations (Brocke, 1993: 17).
11
The first Brazilian environmental organization AGAPAN (Associação Gaúcha de Proteção ao
Ambiente Natural) was founded in 1971 in Porto Alegre (Pádua, 1991: 150).
12
For this reason they were not hindered by state repression from the military regime during the
founding stages. The activities of the first environmental groups were not taken seriously and
environmental damage was played down (Brocke, 1993: 38).
336 A. Zellhuber
4.1 The Politicization of the Environmental Movement

in the 1980s and 1990s
From the mid-1980s, boosted by the democratization process, the environmental

movement became more politicized. New currents of thought emphasized the
connection between environmental problems and overarching societal structures.
This new orientation of certain environmental organizations, called ecologismo,
also emphasized the environmental movement’s shared responsibility for the
advancement of the democratization process (Brocke, 1993: 18). Due to the grow-
ing public interest in questions of environmental protection the spectrum of subjects
that the environmental movement addressed expanded (Viola, 1991: 9). This led to
a professionalization of the movement and the development from a purely accusa-
tory approach to a more strategic orientation (Viola, 1991: 11). The attempts to
institutionalize the environmental movement also led in 1986 to the foundation of a
Green Party on the European model (Partido Verde, PV), which still exists today.
Besides this, they pursued a strategy of “ecologizing” existing parties on the left
such as the Worker’s Party (PT), that is, creating awareness amongst them of
ecological subjects (Boris, 1998: 224; Brocke, 1993: 23).13
During the 1980s and 1990s the environmental organizations developed a further
manifestation, which can be described as socio-ecological movements (Jacobs,
2002: 65; Viola, 1991: 11). The description socioambientalismo encompasses a
series of environmental organizations that did not previously concern themselves
with environmental themes, but which discovered this field of activity over the
course of their development (R€oper, 2001: 107). An example of this is the renowned
Instituto Socioambiental, founded in 1994 in São Paulo, which first primarily
campaigned for the rights of indigenous people and later increasingly integrated
environmental questions into their activities. To a smaller degree these socio-
ecological organizations also include groups that initially dealt exclusively with
environmental protection issues and which during the debate on sustainable devel-
opment have opened themselves to the social dimension of environmental problems
(R€oper, 2001: 108). Environmental groups have become more strongly interested in
questions of social justice. At the same time, social and economic problems are now
also seen to be environmental problems (Jacobs, 2002: 65).
The preparations for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) were of decisive importance for the Brazilian environmen-
tal movement and the establishment of environmental protection as a subject of
social and political debate. From 1990 onwards this led to intensified cooperation
between the different sectors of the environmental movement and the guiding idea
of sustainable development became a common denominator in Brazilian environ-
mental debate (Brocke, 1993: 24–25; Viola, 1991: 13).
13
The limits of this strategy, particularly with relation to the PT, became clear during the Lula
government.
Since then, the commitment to environmental questions and to the improvement

of quality of life have been closely linked in Brazil to questions of civil rights and
social and political inclusion (Guimarães, 1991: 219–220; Jacobs, 2002: 62). Thus
it is possible to identify a greater congruence of interests among, for example,
different organizations for the landless, those affected by dam construction, and
environmental organizations. On large campaigns regarding environmental
subjects there is extensive cooperation between the different social movements
(e.g. on campaigns against genetically modified plants, against agro fuels, eucalyp-
tus monocultures, or the loosening of the legal basis for forest conservation). It is
nonetheless too early to speak of a “greening” of classic social movements (IHU,
2010). Particularly under the Lula government it was difficult for civil society
organizations to agree on a shared agenda, as many of them were unwilling to
directly oppose government proposals due to their loyalty to the Worker’s Party.
An important point of departure for stronger cooperation between social
movements and environmental organizations is the awareness that the poorest
social strata are the most strongly affected by environmental problems. The
Brazilian environmental movement is no longer merely a middle-class phenome-
non; it now has manifestations in the most different social classes (Pádua, 1991:
140).
In a similar way to the Environmental Justice movement in the USA, which has
become an important part of environmental debate since the 1990s (Taylor, 2000:
508), more and more Brazilian organizations are pursuing the model of environ-
mental justice ( justiça ambiental).14 This is intended to express the fact that
questions of racism, social injustice and the environment are connected (Acselrad,
Mello, & Bezerra, 2009: 40 ff.). The focus of the discussion is on the socio-spatial
injustices of environmental damage, which is studied in terms of causal links with
poverty and racial discrimination.
5 The Lula Government’s Environmental Policy:

Conservation Versus the Ideology of Growth
Until Lula’s inauguration, the Worker’s Party PT was considered a reference point
for the environmental movement as it united numerous environmental activists
within its different party currents. However the Brazilian environmental movement
was gradually disappointed by the pragmatic positions taken by the PT with regard
to questions of environmental policy. It became clear that large parts of the PT were
stuck in traditional, productivist ideologies (Zhouri, Laschefski, & Perreira, 2005:
11).
At the beginning of the Lula government there were great expectations of a
stronger emphasis on environmental policy. This was strengthened by the
14
An important actor in this context is the Rede Brasileira de Justiça Ambiental (Brazilian
Network of Environmental Justice, RBJA), www.justicaambiental.org.br
338 A. Zellhuber
appointment of Marina Silva to the post of Environment Minister. This symbolic

figure of the environmental movement, who comes from a poor rubber-tapping
family in the Amazon state of Acre, was a longstanding fellow campaigner of the
famous environmental activist Chico Mendes and also had an international reputa-
tion as a credible and valiant defender of the Amazon.15
Even in the early months of her term in office she was, however, forced to accept
serious defeats. Already in May 2003 Lula issued a decree that legalized the trade in
genetically modified soya for a limited period. The decree was the result of a
lengthy legal battle by soya farmers in the south of the country who had planted
genetically modified soybean seeds that had been illegally imported from Argentina
and who were now struggling to be permitted to sell their crops. This special
provision created a precedent for the proponents of genetically modified plants
and they succeeded in gaining the Lei de biosegurança (Biosafety Law) until 2005,
which permitted both the cultivation and trade of transgenic soya. With additional
decrees at the end of 2006 the cultivation of transgenic cotton was legalized and the
following year genetically modified corn was permitted. This about-turn in policy
with regard to genetic modification was in blatant contradiction to statements made
by the PT in the election campaign, which said that they supported a moratorium on
the use of genetically modified plants for as long as their harmlessness for health
and ecology had not yet been scientifically proven (Lisboa, 2007: 37).
5.1 Lula’s Second Term: The Signs of Economic Growth
The Lula government’s second term of office was marked by the Growth Accelera-
tion Program (PAC), which was launched in 2007, accompanied by an intensive
public relations campaign (see Chap. 15). The tendency to promote growth without
concern for environmental damage, which had already stood out during the
government’s first term of office, was now consequently further pursued. From
this point on environmental concerns and the territorial rights of indigenous
populations were openly presented as obstacles to economic development.
The PAC program symbolizes the orientation towards traditional development
approaches and an economic model that focuses on the export of natural resources
and the expansion of road and energy infrastructure and which explicitly places
environmental issues and the rights of indigenous populations in the background,
treating them as subordinate to economic priorities.
Numerous contested major infrastructure projects that were partially created
during the military dictatorship but were not able to be realized due to their high
costs, received the necessary financial basis through the PAC program. Thus the
formalization of the plan to build a third atomic power plant in the same problem-
atic location in the state of Rio de Janeiro caused indignation and disillusionment
15
Die Zeit Online: Zähes Aschenputtel aus dem Regenwald, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-
09/brasilien-silva
amongst the environmental movements. With this decision the government

contradicted a concrete election promise made by the PT, according to which the
further expansion of atomic power would be foregone and both of the existing
nuclear power plants would be critically examined with regard to their security and
their cost-effectiveness.
A further great disappointment for the environmental movement was the trans
basin river diversion of the Rio São Francisco (transposição), which had attracted
attention during the first term of office. During the 2006 electoral campaign the
contested project was masked due to the controversial public disputes and the
vehement protests. With the launch of the PAC program the transposição also
gained impetus for its implementation. Within a very short period of time the
difficulties of the approval process were cleared away. A number of public civil
claims against inaccurate environmental impact assessments had resulted in delays
in the approval process. Nonetheless in March 2007 IBAMA issued its environ-
mental license. The reputation of the minister, Marina Silva, also suffered consid-
erably with those involved in social movements, as she unreservedly supported the
decision of the highest environmental authority and did not address the arguments
from experts and grassroots organizations. Even the Ministério Público’s legal suit
against the procedural errors in the environmental impact assessment did not prove
to be an obstacle. The remaining court decisions were bypassed by the government
in that they used the engineering battalion of the Brazilian military for the first
stages of construction. Construction carried out by the military in the name of the
“national interest” does not require an approval process. For the affected
populations and the protest movements, the military presence became a symbol
of the government’s authoritarian approach and lack of openness to dialogue with
regard to major projects.
The mega-dam project on the Rio Madeira in the state of Rondônia (the Santo
Antônio and Jirau projects) and on the Rio Xingu in the state of Pará (the Belo Monte
project) have also received equally harsh criticism including criticism from numer-
ous international environmental movements.16 Several suits were also filed during
the approval procedure for this project, however the Supreme Court immediately
overruled at the highest level the suspension of the construction license that a
regional judge had enacted due to deficiencies in the environmental impact analysis.
5.2 Increased Pressure on Environmental Agencies
President Lula made no secret of his personal opinion on environmental standards.

He explained in numerous speeches17 that obstacles stemming from environmental
16
For information on the international protests against the Belo Monte project see for example
www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/5756
17
O Estado de São Paulo (20/04/2007): Lula acusa Ibama de atrasar PAC e diz que far
a cobrança
dura a Marina; O Globo (29/04/2009): No Acre, Lula critica demora no licenciamento ambiental;
340 A. Zellhuber
regulations had to be overridden in order to accelerate growth. At the opening of an

agro fuel refinery in Mato Grosso he announced the necessity of economic growth
and that he would personally get “these obstacles with the indigenous people, with
the Ministério Público and with the environmentalists”18 out of the way. This
provoked storms of indignation from the social movements and NGOs:
51 organizations signed a declaration of protest against these statements.19 From
his first inauguration and more strongly since the beginning of his second term it
was the president’s declared goal to remove legal obstacles in order to speed up
approvals for infrastructure projects. In his speeches he often ridicules the conser-
vation of species.20
Brazil’s environmental policy under Lula was also marked by the contrast
between the progressive legal framework that included extensive societal partici-
pation and the authoritarian “top down” realpolitik marked by the primacy of
business interests that flout environmental restrictions. The responsible environ-
mental agencies are often exposed to strong pressure to make the requirements of
environmental legislation more flexible (Cavalcanti, 2007: 26).21
In particular the Casa Civil, which was responsible for the coordination of the
PAC program, exercised massive political pressure when the program’s timetable
was delayed. The Casa Civil gave the media deadlines for the awarding of con-
struction licenses for dam projects which were completely unrealistic from the
perspective of the licensing authorities and which were not discussed with them.22
A typical example of this is the harassment of IBAMA during the approval process
for the Belo Monte project by, amongst others, the Minister of Energy, Edison
Lobão. The hasty public announcement of the publication of the construction
licenses resulted in the directors of the IBAMA licensing department giving
collective notice.23 With this action the officials were protesting government
pressure on them to issue the environmental license for the dam.
Folha de São Paulo (29/07/2010): Lula volta a criticar velocidade das obras públicas e faz piada
com perereca.
18
O Estado de São Paulo (22/11/2006): I´ndios, MP e ambientalistas são entraves para o Paı́s, diz
Lula. noticias.ambientebrasil.com.br/
19
Reporter Brasil (24/11/2006): Entidades repudiam declaração de Lula sobre povos tradicionais.
www.reporterbrasil.org.br/
20
With regard to environmental studies of the dam construction on the Rio Madeira, which
indicated the devastating impact on the fish populations in this river of the Amazon basin, Lula
stated that people should get the Bagres out of his lap (the species of fish that the environmental
impact assessment found to be especially endangered). For further examples see www.oeco.com.
br/
21
See also O Estado de São Paulo (02/12/2009): Marina Silva considera ‘graves’ as pressões
sobre o Ibama; Época (12/01/2011): Belo Monte derruba presidente do Ibama.
22
O Estado de São Paulo (06/12/2009): “O estopim das demissões foi o Minc”, Ex-diretor do
Ibama reclama da pressão para licenciar a usina de Belo Monte e acusa o ministro do Meio
Ambiente de interferência.
23
O Estado de São Paulo (02/12/2009): Pressão por licença derruba dois no Ibama.
The reform of the federal executive agencies within environmental policy was a
decisive measure that is directly linked to the acceleration of the approval process.
In April 2007 the minister Marina Silva announced a restructuring and division of
the environmental agency IBAMA. The newly founded Chico Mendes Institute for
the Conservation of Biodiversity (ICMBio) would be responsible for the institution
and administration of protected areas. IBAMA would retain the responsibility for
the approval process. By means of this increased specialization the Environment
Minister hoped to increase the efficiency of the agencies. However critics still
suspected that the true motivation behind the agency reform was the political
weakening of IBAMA. The civil servants working within the environmental
agencies responded with strikes against the restructuring.24
The conflicts between the Ministry of Environment and the Casa Civil, which
were primarily related to the approval process for the dam projects in the Amazon,
became so acute that in May 2008 Marina Silva resigned from the position of
Environment Minister.25 The continual conflicts with the Minister of Agriculture,
Reinhold Stephanes, who defended the approval of sugar cane cultivation in the
Amazon region in the interest of agribusiness, had worn the minister down. The last
straw came with Lula’s decision to entrust the drafting of the Development Plan for
the Amazon (PAS) to the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Mangabeira Unger. Minister
Silva felt that she had been passed over, as the decision also meant that the focus in
the Amazon would be on economic development and the use of natural resources.
The president of IBAMA, Bazileu Margarido, and the president of ICMBio, João
Paulo Capobianco, left office together with the environment minister. The latter
explained in his farewell speech: “Parts of the government see the Ministry of
Environment as a central office for the awarding of environmental licenses and not
as a strategic ministry that recommends solutions. For this reason we are leaving the
Ministry.” (Fatheuer, 2008a: 57–58).
With this conclusion Capobianco gets to the heart of the dilemma of environ-
mental policy under the Lula government. The aim of Marina Silva’s government
program, which sought to make environmental policy a cross-sectoral matter that
stretched across department lines, was not achieved. Environmental policy was not
recognized as structural policy, rather the Ministry was reduced to a green fig leaf.
As Marina Silva’s successor in the post of environment minister Lula selected
the Minister of the Environment from the state of Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Minc, who
also comes from the environmental movement, but who has above all made a name
for Rio de Janeiro through its accelerated approval procedures.
As with his predecessor the new minister was put under massive pressure from
the Minister of Agriculture, Reinhold Stephanes. There were public disagreements
between the two ministers at regular intervals with regard to the changes to forestry
24
On the strikes by the employees of the environmental agencies in 2007 see the report by Folha de
São Paulo (14/05/2007): Servidores do Ibama iniciam greve contra pressão por licenciamentos
ambientais. www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u92345.shtml
25
Folha de São Paulo (13/05/2008): Ministra Marina Silva entrega pedido de demissão a Lula.
342 A. Zellhuber
laws. Since Carlos Minc has taken over the Ministry of the Environment he has
been on a collision course with the bancada ruralista, the powerful parliamentary
lobbying group for agribusiness. With 116 of the total 513 representatives, the well-
organized, cross-party bancada ruralista covers almost 23 % of the seats in the
Câmara dos Deputados (House of Representatives) and thus manages to propose
numerous pieces of legislation that favor big landowners and the agricultural lobby
(Vigna de Oliveira, 2007: 6–7).
One of the most recent examples of this is the attempt to change the Forest Law
(Codigo Florestal), which aims to considerably reduce the requirements for forest
preservation on private property. The special committee that was established to
introduce this change was dominated by bancada ruralista representatives and in
June 2010 it adopted a draft law which repeals provisions that protect forests in
flood plains and on the top of hills and mountains. In addition the draft law provides
an amnesty for illegal deforestation that took place before 2008 and a reduction of
the mandatory percentage of land set aside for forest protection on private property
in the Amazon and the Cerrado regions.
This most recent initiative follows in a long line of draft laws with a similar basic
tendency, namely the gradual relaxation of environmental legislation.
5.3 The Amazonian Bone of Contention: Forest Conservation

Versus Agribusiness
Brazilian environmental policy in the Amazon is coming under increasing critical

scrutiny at international summits and conferences and is thus under pressure. As a
result, data describing the extent of deforestation in the Amazon is regularly
debated. In 2004 a long-time peak in deforestation rates was recorded:
20,000 km2 (a rate almost as high as in the record year 1999). The government’s
reaction was to question the data from the satellite analysis by the National Institute
for Space Research (INPE) and to publish counter-studies that refuted the disastrous
numbers.26 As a result of the negative response to the deforestation rate, the
controlling authorities were strengthened.
Between August 2008 and July 2009 the deforestation rates were reduced by
45.7 % according to the INPE and were thus at the lowest rate in many years.
However, critics point out that this decline cannot clearly be attributed to the action
plan for stronger control and prevention of deforestation, but is rather more likely to
have been caused by the global financial crisis that led to reduced demand for meat
and soya. This made new agricultural development less attractive. An indicator of
the causal connection is the fact that deforestation rates rose between 2007 and
2008, when food prices reached a several year high. Deforestation rates thus seem
26
On the limits of satellite monitoring and the lack of reliable data on deforestation rates see
Bredenbeck (2009: 111).
more strongly linked to developments in the global market than to government

conservation initiatives (Fatheuer, 2009: 76).
The tendency of the Lula government’s policy in the Amazon demonstrates
particularly clearly the consequent pursuit of a development model that focuses on
the export of raw materials and agricultural products oriented towards the global
market, according to which the rights of small farmers, indigenous people and
traditional communities are overridden and ecological factors are largely ignored.
Further development and “colonization” of the Amazon is the primary focus. Major
projects, which can, in part, be traced back to plans dating from the military
dictatorship and which are proven to result in accelerated deforestation (Fatheuer,
2008b: 6), are pursued unswervingly, regardless of the storms of protest from the
environmental movement.
Many of these large-scale infrastructure projects are directly linked to the
Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
(IIRSA), a transnational strategy for the integration of South America into the
global economy in the areas of transport, energy and communication. Countless
new transport axes are intended to reduce the transport costs for natural resources.
Thus, for example, inter-ocean highways between Brazil, Bolivia and Peru would
make Brazilian agribusiness exports to the Pacific easier (Fuser, 2009).
Furthermore, according to the government’s energy plan, the increased demand
for electricity over the next years will be covered by numerous large dam projects in
the Amazon, as this is the region with the most unused potentials for hydro-electric
power.
Also, pressures on the rainforest stemming from land use by the booming
agricultural sector are growing. In the central Amazon region around Santarém
there has been a rapid expansion of soya production over the last years (Weidenberg
& Bredenbeck, 2009). The growth of Brazilian beef production has taken place
almost exclusively in the Amazon (Fatheuer, 2009: 73).27 In short, the region has
become the centre of the expansionist interests of the agribusiness, mining and
energy industries (Scholz, 2010: 26). Pressure from the agricultural and mining
lobbies to relax environmental regulations is growing accordingly.
Indicators of this growing pressure are legal changes, such as the contested 2006
Law on the Management of Public Forests (Lei de gestão das florestas públicas), as
well as the preliminary decree MP 458 (Medida Provis oria), adopted in 2009,
which simplified the legalization of illegal land-grabs in the Amazon (Bredenbeck,
2009). In December 2009 the president adopted the decree Law 7.029, which
introduced a 3 year moratorium on penalties for illegal deforestation for large-
scale agricultural projects.
27
Since 2004 Brazil has been the world’s largest exporter of beef. The number of cattle has more
than doubled in 14 years according to official data, rising from 34 million in 1992 to 73 million in
2006 (Fatheuer, 2009: 73).
344 A. Zellhuber
5.4 The International Climate Debate as an Impulse Towards

a Turning Point in Environmental Policy?
The central issue of global environmental policy over the last years has been
climate protection. Therefore, now more than ever, all eyes are on the Amazon
region, the “green lung of the world”, which Brazil carries a special responsibility
to protect.
With regard to per capita CO2 emissions Brazil is performing relatively well in
international comparison. With 1.9 tons of CO2 per capita it is 18th on the list of the
largest greenhouse gas emitters.28 This also depends on the country’s special energy
mix: 45.3 % of energy is produced by renewable sources; with regard to electricity
the share produced hydroelectrically is 73.1 % (EPE, 2009: 13 ff.).
However, if one includes the emission of greenhouse gases through changes in
land use then the situation looks quite different. In this case Brazil rises to fourth
place among the largest greenhouse gas emitters with around 7 % of global CO2
emissions. Around two thirds of Brazilian greenhouse gases occur through changes
in land use (Land use, land use change and forestry, LULUCF), this is mainly the
result of large-scale slash-and-burn clearing. Agriculture also creates a large share
of greenhouse gases, around 20 % of the total, due to the high amount of methane
produced by the massive amount of livestock (Scholz, 2010: 23).
Until recently Brazil was barely willing to make concessions at international
climate negotiations. In keeping with its status as a state that is not listed in Annex
I29 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) it is
not required to set reduction goals. During negotiations Lula constantly emphasized
industrialized countries’ historical responsibility and demanded aid money for
adaption measures in transitional and developing countries. The Brazilian
diplomats who participated in the development of the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) also took this position (Zilla, 2009a: 87–88).
They were also unwilling to enter into debates on the contribution of deforesta-
tion to climate change. Brazil always reacts sensitively to international initiatives
concerning the protection of the Amazon as these are felt to be restrictions on
national sovereignty (Zilla, 2009b: 50). Due to a narrow understanding of the
sovereignty principle Brazil does not traditionally accept outside involvement in
matters concerning the Amazon (see Chap. 1).
Yet since the 2007 Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention
in Bali (COP 13) Brazil has been open to suggestions and financial incentives to
help developing and emerging countries reduce deforestation, the so-called REDD
instruments. At the latest Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009
28
Unless otherwise indicated this data is based on the information in the Climate Analysis
Indicators Tool (CAIT), Version 7.0 of the World Resource Institute (WRI, 2010).
29
In the Kyoto-Protocol, which came into force in 2005, the members of the UNFCCC are divided
into two groups: those who have to reduce greenhouse gases (the Annex I countries: industrial and
transformation countries), and those who did not enter any reduction obligations (developing and
emerging countries).
(COP 15) for the first time President Lula announced voluntary greenhouse gas
emissions reductions goals of 36–39 % until 2020. These are to be reached
primarily through a considerable reduction in deforestation rates in the Amazon.
The aim is to reduce deforestation by 80 % until 2020. To finance this, an Amazon
fund was created at the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which was
financed with subsidies of US$107 million from Norway and US$30 million from
Germany (Scholz, 2010: 24).30
Only a few weeks after the Climate Conference the emission reduction targets
that were announced in Copenhagen were made into law. However, the Law on
National Policy on Climate Change (PNMC) does not contain any binding
restrictions, only voluntary goals (compromisso nacional volunt ario). More
detailed information as to how the 36–39 % CO2-reduction goals named in Article
12 can be achieved was postponed until ensuing decrees. This is to be based on
updated samples on greenhouse gas emissions, which should be finished by the end
of 2010.
At first glance, these ambitious climate goals suggest that there has been an
about-turn in terms of a stronger importance being placed on environmental policy.
The Lula government wants to present Brazil on the international stage as a
forerunner with regard to questions of climate protection (Zilla, 2009b: 67). How-
ever the actual implementation of environmental measures for climate protection
has left many questions unanswered. The ambitious goals are in direct contradiction
to the numerous state projects for the development of infrastructure in the Amazon
and the tendency to continuously relax environmental legislation (see Sect. 2).
The contradiction between the commitments made as part of foreign policy and
domestic backsliding is particularly striking with regard to the changes to the
forestry law (C odigo Florestal): at precisely the same time that the Brazilian
government declared that they would reduce greenhouse gases through containing
deforestation in Copenhagen in December 2009, the Brazilian parliament discussed
the reduction of forest conservation measures.
Overall the declared climate protection goals will face considerable problems
with regard to implementation as well as domestic obstacles. The implementation
of climate-friendly policies is made more difficult above all by the fact that socio-
economic development is seen as the primary goal and that agribusiness, an engine
of economic growth, considerably reduces the scope of action for environmental
policy (Zilla, 2009a: 91). Brazil’s huge territorial size and federal structure of
government are further factors, which will hinder the effective implementation of
decisions made by the central government at lower administrative levels (Ibid.). In
particular the distant forest regions of Cerrado and the Amazon rainforest, in which
the state has until now hardly made its monopoly on force felt, are of decisive
importance for environmental policy. In addition, the Amazon is of great political
importance in Brazil in regards to the defense of national sovereignty (Ibid.).
30
More information on the Amazon fund at www.amazonfund.gov.br/
346 A. Zellhuber
Climate policy measures might possibly be interpreted as the subordination of

national issues to global interests.
It is not possible to avoid the suspicion that at the most recent climate
negotiations the Lula government was, above all, interested in making a good
impression on the international stage. One reason for this is, amongst others, that
the COP 15 became a venue for the early election campaign. The sitting chief of
staff, Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s preferred successor, was consciously made the head
of the 700-strong Brazilian delegation in order to bring her into the right (green)
light. She was previously better known as the “mother of the PAC” and as a
hardliner regarding the implementation of infrastructure projects without concern
for environmental issues. On the international stage she was contrasted in particular
with her opponent in the election campaign, Marina Silva, who had made an
international name as a pioneer of rainforest conservation. The surprise candidacy
of the well-respected ex-minister Marina Silva had the effect of making environ-
mental matters of greater importance for the presidential campaign.
Whether strategic campaign questions or concern for Brazil’s international
image played a role in the most recent climate policy declarations, other clear
motives for stronger action and focus on climate policy were certainly economic in
nature. With its technological edge and possibilities for expansion in the field of
agro fuels, the government sees the climate debate as a unique opportunity to find
new markets for alternative fuels and to support the national ethanol industry. Since
the 1970s, oil crisis investments have been made into the production of ethanol
from sugar cane in order to improve energy security (Scholz, 2010: 27). In these
times of climate change, this alternative to fossil fuels has proven itself to be a
trump card. Since his first period in office President Lula has never tired of praising
agro fuels as a tried method for reducing greenhouse gases. On trips to Africa and
the Caribbean he propagates the Brazilian model of ethanol production as an
economic opportunity for developing countries and promises a classic win-win
situation: good for the climate and good for the economy.
The fact that numerous studies have disproven assumptions of the positive
ecological balance of these alternative fuels is deliberately overlooked. If one
factors the changes in land use and the fertilization of sugar cane production into
the CO2-balance then the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
ethanol is considerably reduced (Scharlemann & Laurance, 2008: 44; Zah et al.,
2007).
The Brazilian government has declared that its goal is to cover 10 % of global
demand for fuel with ethanol by 2025. This would require a fivefold increase in
sugar cane areas from 6 million ha today to 30 million ha.
In Brazil today the expansion of ethanol production has already had massive
indirect ecological and social effects. The massive livestock industry that was
previously in the boom region for sugar cane plantations—the south-east and
mid-west—has been forced to move in the direction of the Amazon, which
increases rainforest deforestation. In Brazil’s mid-west the rapid boom of the
sugar cane industry has led to the unchecked deforestation of the Cerrado forest.
One of the most diverse regions in the world is at risk of becoming a sugar cane
monoculture.31 Moreover, the displacement of food production has resulted in a

price increase in staple foods. The competitiveness of the Brazilian ethanol econ-
omy, which produces the globally cheapest agro fuel, depends not only on factors
such as the favorable climate, but also on the extreme exploitation of human labor
(the majority of sugar cane is cut by hand in highly precarious working conditions).
Overall, it is clear that the Brazilian agro fuel programs can be viewed as an
instrumentalization of environmental discourse and not as serious environmental
policy.
6 Conclusion
Under the Lula government the environmental administration was not able to
realize the cross-sectorial nature of environmental policy through efficient forms
of inter-departmental coordination and cooperation. This has become particularly
clear in the context of climate policy.
As much as one wishes to believe in the well-intended climate policy ambitions
of the Brazilian government, it remains unlikely—given the current domestic
situation—that this represents an about-turn in the field of environmental policy.
This will continue unless the economic effects of increasingly extreme weather
events peak and are directly linked to climate change in the public debate. In 2004 a
hurricane formed off the coast of Brazil for the first time since weather recording
began. In the last years, climate-related catastrophes have accumulated with floods,
droughts and forest fires in all parts of the country.
The costs and risks of climate change for Brazil are immense, but these are not
yet sufficiently perceived. Studies predict that the effects of climate change will
reduce Brazilian economic performance by 0.5–2.3 % until 2050, agricultural
yields will sink considerably in large parts of the country, and hydro-electric energy
production will be exposed to strong variation due to changes in the distribution of
precipitation (Scholz, 2010: 28). These are all factors, which will influence envi-
ronmental policy over the next years.
The current dilemma of Brazilian environmental policy is that the traditional
discourse of growth has received a green coat of paint. It is no longer the crude
ideology of growth of military dictatorship, which was justified by the exploitation
of natural resources. The Lula government was able to make use of climate policy
to establish itself as a forerunner with regard to environmental policy. This has
weakened critique of the reigning development model, which depends on the
exploitation of natural resources and the sale of natural resources and agricultural
products oriented towards the global market.
31
Last year the Brazilian government responded to increasing international criticism of the social
and ecological consequences of ethanol production with the publication of a Agro-Ecological
Zoning Plan (Zoneamento Agroecol ogico da Cana de Açúcar), which emphasized, above all, that
the Amazon rainforest was excluded as a possible area for cultivation. However the new areas
marked for cultivation cover the majority of the Cerrado forests.
348 A. Zellhuber
However these tendencies have aggravated under president Dilma Rousseff. As

agribusiness and the extractive sectors remain the central engines of the economy,
environmental policy keeps being trapped in contradictions. The Amazon region
continues to represent the main stage upon which the dispute between development
models and nature conservation is fought out. In recent years, environmental
conflicts in the region are increasing in intensity. The boom of mining industry in
the region and the huge potential for hydro-energy are major driving factors. The
construction of hydroelectric dams on the rivers Xingu, Madeira and the Tucuruı́,
expanding mining zones and road infrastructure have become vectors of deforesta-
tion. Several environmental activists in the Amazon who have denounced illegal
logging, are forced to be escorted by the National Security Force and to wear bullet
proof vests. In 2011 a wave of violence swept the region and eight activists were
killed. In general, rights violations against small farmers, indigenous people and
traditional communities tend to increase.
The internationally most reported cases are those linked to the construction of
the Belo Monte dam at the Xingu River. In 2011 the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights from the Organization of American States (OAS) responded to a
petition presented by civil society organizations asked the Brazilian government to
immediately suspend the licensing process of the Belo Monte dam project and halt
any construction work due to the impact on the traditional peoples living in the
Xingu River basin. In reaction the Brazilian government harshly declared these
requests unjustifiable and threatened to leave OAS because the organization would
be interfering with the country’s sovereignty (De Paula, 2012).
This incident is just one of example that shows that Dilma Rousseff’s environ-
mental policy is hallmarked by continuity compared to the former government.
Environmental concerns continue to be viewed as “obstacles to development” and
are explicitly secondary to economic interests.
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Social Policies in Brazil: From Inclusive
Liberalism to Developmental Welfare 19
Bernhard Leubolt
Abstract
Bernhard Leubolt deals with the current development of social policy against
the background of Brazil’s historically determined socio-economic structures.
Social policy was shaped by each development phase. It began in the context of
voluntary welfare services in the days of slavery, developed through the granting
of the worker rights during the Estado Novo, and culminated with the compre-
hensive social rights that are guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution. Through the
establishment of minimum standards of social security, the previously patri-
monial State experienced a democratization process. Essentially, Lula and
Rousseff continued with the social policies of Cardoso and focused on the
poverty reduction and income transfer strategies, which, under Lula, became
more successful.
1 The Historical Development of Social and Distributive

Policies in Brazil1
This article reflects on current developments in Brazilian social policy in the

context of its embeddedness in the historical socio-economic development.2 In
reference to the concept of distributional regimes (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005),
1
2
This article developed in the course of project N 13621 of the Anniversary fund of the Austrian
National Bank “Global finance and emerging regional modes of development”. Thanks are also
due to the Heinrich B€
oll Foundation for sponsoring, amongst other things, a research stay in Brazil
within the scope of a 3-year Ph.D. scholarship and to the members of the post graduate program
“Global Social Policies and Governance” at the University of Kassel for valuable discussions.
B. Leubolt (*)
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: Bernhard.leubolt@wu.ac.at

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_19
352 B. Leubolt
the focus lies on state interventions, which influence production and reproduction
and thus affect material living conditions. Apart from the regulation of employment
relations, and especially worker protection, this includes the construction of social
security and insurance systems as well as the provision of health care, educational
institutions etc. and, for example, the subsidization of basic foodstuffs and heating
material as well as agricultural reform.
Brazil abolished slavery in 1888 as one of the last countries in the world. Former
slaves were denied access to land and thus the chance for self-sufficiency. They
were therefore forced to sell their labor—often to their former owners and to prices
below subsistence level (Novy, 2001a: 91). Relationships of personal dependency
between the slaves and their “masters” shaped the political landscape and also
affected the rest of the population, albeit in a weaker fashion. The ever present
power of the local patriarch was only limited by his personal dependency on the
Royal Court. Therefore, Faoro (2001[1958]) designated the Brazilian State as
“patrimonial” based on Weber (1980[1922]: 580 et seq.): Authority was character-
ized by personal dependencies instead of impersonal bureaucratically regulated
social rights.
Social policy also started up under this banner and, in the beginning, could only
be attributed to the tradition of philanthropy: Voluntary welfare provisions from
slave owners and big landowners or religious organizations shaped the picture.
Social rights did not exist. The needy were dependent on their benefactors and had
to prove themselves thankful and loyal. Apart from the slow and fragmented
construction of a public school system, there was practically no state-run social
policy, let alone social rights, until the 1920s (Pochmann, 2007: 86 et seq.). Patri-
monial authority influenced Brazil since then and was only decisively modified in
1930 through a military coup and the following seizure of power by Getúlio Vargas
who could build on an alliance with the emerging industrial bourgeoisie (against the
big landowners who were dominant until then).
In a positivist manner, the new regime implemented a “modernization from
above” (Becker & Egler, 1992; Fiori, 1995). Because of the collapse in exports in
the course of the world economic crisis, domestic development had to be
prioritized. Industrialization was pushed by the state and lead to far-reaching
socio-structural changes: A relevant fraction of an industrial bourgeoisie emerged
while a socially relevant industrial proletariat developed (Cardoso & Faletto, 1976
[1969]: 94 et seq.). The industrial workers who mostly migrated from Europe were
commonly organized in unions and influenced by socialism, anarchism or commu-
nism. They demanded higher wages and better working conditions which they
could reinforce through strikes. To prevent the possible endangerment of the regime
The field research in Brazil was crucially aided by the generous support from many staff members
at the Department of Social Policy at the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) as well
as the Universities of Brası́lia (UnB), Campinas (UniCamp) and Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Special
thanks go to Daniela Coimbra de Souza for help with field research and Anne Tittor for
co-authoring a joint article (Leubolt & Tittor, 2008) which provided the background for this
article.
19 Social Policies in Brazil: From Inclusive Liberalism to Developmental Welfare 353
that was looming, or at least possible through further radicalization,3 the industrial
proletariat was integrated into the regime through the provision of workers’ rights.
This measure initiated larger-scale state-run social policy (D’Araujo, 2003). After
Vargas’ proclamation of the semi-fascist Estado Novo in 1937, workers’ rights and
social policies as well as authoritarian traits of the state were consolidated (Vianna,
2003). Gramsci’s concept of a “passive revolution” (Gramsci, 1991 et seq. [1929
et seq.]; Vianna, 2004[1997]) aptly describes the pertinent role of social policy. It is
not primarily aimed at the reduction of social inequality. It contributes first and
foremost to the selective improvement of living conditions of groups that are
especially capable of articulating political demands (like the Brazilian industrial
proletariat) and could become “dangerous” to the power block. State intervention
“from above” thus prevents revolutionary movements “from below”. The “danger-
ous” groups get co-opted into the state project, which leads to changes within the
power block but in the form of conservative modernization rather than revolution-
ary transformation.
Social welfare benefits such as the provision of housing or institutions designed
for education and health care were—in continuity with the previous stage—initially
provided by employers. But in the 1930s, a distinct tendency towards the national-
ization of these provisions became apparent. Apart from the threat the industrial
proletariat posed, the pressure from industrialists in favor of a socialization of the
costs of reproduction4 was a decisive factor. In the course of this development, the
tax basis of the Brazilian state increased and minimum wages defined by the state
(introduced in 1940) became more and more important. Those social rights only
applied to the formally employed—mostly male—urban industrial proletariat while
the informally employed and agricultural laborers (the overwhelming majority of
the wage-dependent population as well as the majority of women) were excluded
(Pochmann, 2007: 90). The most important concessions for the industrial workforce
were achieved starting in 1943 via workers rights (Consolidação das Leis do
Trabalho). These achievements had authoritarian features too, since unions were
subordinated to the Ministry of Labor in concurrence with state corporatism. In
conjunction with a ban on autonomous union organizing, this was an attempt to
avoid conflict in industrial relations (D’Araujo, 2003). The implicit role model for
this development was the Prussian model of Bismarck, however under rather
patrimonial (instead of bureaucratic) conditions. The majority of marginalized
people could not participate in the wealth produced within the frame of the
“Prussian development path” (Fiori, 1998). To them, the old patrimonial arrange-
ments still widely applied; they could not insist on their social rights but
3
In 1935, the National Liberation Alliance (ANL)—a type of left-wing anti-fascist unity front—
attempted a revolution, which was struck down after a short period of time by governmental and
fascist paramilitary forces.
4
Reproduction concerns the far reaching areas of biological human reproduction as well as the
reproduction of labor. This encompasses areas like birth, health, education etc. (Bakker & Silvey,
2008a, 2008b).
354 B. Leubolt
were dependent on familial help or philanthropic care from landowners or the

church.
At the beginning of the 1960s, social movements, which fought for more radical
change became stronger. The progressively oriented government of João Goulart
reacted with the proposal of “grassroots reforms” (reformas de base), comprising
land reform and the inclusion of the marginalized. The reaction to this was a
military coup in 1964 with civil society support by parts of the middle class,
great landowners (latifundistas) and banking capital (Fiori, 1995). Contrary to the
development in Chile, the dirigisme “Prussian way” was carried out in a conserva-
tive authoritarian manner in Brazil’s military dictatorship. Social policy was now
increasingly used as “social glue” and was even “universalized” to some extent.
Marginalized people continued to be excluded, but programs for the growing
middle class were expanded. Calls for (re)distribution voiced by social movements
was violently oppressed, consequently there were hardly any changes to social
inequality. The asistentialistic and clientelistic nature of distributional and social
policy arrangements was upheld although it has been increasingly bureaucratized.
This system existed with small changes until the end of the military dictatorship
in the 1980s. In this sense, a strongly developed structural heterogeneity can be
ascribed to this form of the welfare state. Clientelism and patrimonialism in rural
areas coexisted with selective state corporatism in urban regions. Social movements
that demanded equal citizenship rights for all under the banner of Cidadania
(Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 2004) first expressed themselves in the course of
the democratization movement. The demand for democratic participation was
linked with the demand for social rights or social security (Dagnino, 1994).
Resistance against the military dictatorship grew by the end of the 1970s in the
course of hyperinflation and poor economic growth records. Various social
movements were very active during this period, whereby the union movement in
the metropolitan area of São Paulo was of particular importance. During this time,
the Independent Unions’ Association (CUT) was founded (in 1983) as well as the
labor party (PT) (in 1980) who demanded fair wages and working conditions as
well as comprehensive social reforms. Oliveira (2006: 36) characterizes these
movements during this period as imposing “moral leadership” in a Gramscian
sense, meaning substantial opinion leadership. This predominance led eventually
to the participation of various movements in the constitutional assembly in 1988
which marked “a high point in socio-political creative will” (Novy, 2001b: 83). The
constitution, which was created in a participatory way has strong left-wing republi-
can characteristics and aims at a progressive reconstruction of the state, especially
via the extension of citizenship rights (Cidadania) and the simultaneously
established guarantee of social rights (Vianna, 2006).
One of the key socio-political achievements in the constitution of 1988 is the
stipulation of minimum standards of “social security” (Delgado, Jaccoud, &
Nogueira, 2009). Here it was established that the education, pensions and health
care system as well as public social transfers have to be universally available to all
citizens in urban and rural areas. This universalized social policy was not only
designed to benefit as many people as possible but also to be implemented
Table 19.1 Breakdown of Brazil’s welfare spending in %

1980 1985 1990 1995 2005
Sanitation 5.0 5.0 4.2 1.3 1.2
Labor market policy 0.3 0.3 5.1 2.2 2.9
Social assistance 1.6 1.7 2.3 2.1 4.8
Housing 13.4 8.8 7.2 7.3 3.8
Health care 16.9 16.4 16.5 16.1 15.2
Education 19.6 22.0 22.2 20.7 18.5
Benefits to civil servants (pensions) – – – 22.5 19.7
Social pensions 42.9 44.5 41.1 26.0 32.0
Other 0.4 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.9
Source: Castro, Ribeiro, Campos, and Matijascic (2009: 98)
democratically. Therefore, decentralized local sectorial councils (conselhos

setoriais) were established as respective decision-making bodies in the constitution.
This amounted to a prescription of comprehensive democratization for a state that
was markedly patrimonial and authoritarian. At the same time, minimum
investments into institutions designed for education and health care were enshrined
in the constitution via quotas. These widespread social reforms are even more
remarkable compared to the international trend towards a neoliberal program of
retrenchment or a conservative restructuring of social policy. In contrast, the
Brazilian trend initiated by the constitution was clearly towards the inclusion of
previously excluded groups. Examples for this tendency are the supersession of the
insurance-based health care system based on occupational status by the universalist
Unified Health Care System (SUS). But also the introduction of a public minimum
pension for agricultural laborers in the amount of the statutory minimum wage that
was not dependent on contributions. Basic education was also a target for increased
investment, which mostly happened and made inroads during the administration of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002): Illiteracy declined from 18 % in 1990 to
11.8 % in 20025 because access to public schools improved dramatically. In this
sense, there was a general universalization of social policy. In consequence, Brazil
was one of the few Latin American countries in the 1990s where state welfare
spending did not decline but rather increased (Filgueira & Filgueira, 2002; see
Table 19.1).
The 1990s were at the same time the decade of neoliberal reforms, which began
in Brazil under president Collor de Mello in 1990 and took full effect in 1994 with
the introduction of the Plano Real by then finance minister Cardoso (Fritz, 2002).
Liberal economists characterize Cardoso’s program of inflation targeting as his
most important socio-political measure because the poor population could not
protect itself against inflation-related losses. The overvalued currency encouraged
relatively low prices on imported durable consumer goods such as TVs, which have
become a common sight even in poorer districts. The downside to Plano Real was
5
www.ipeadata.gov.br
356 B. Leubolt
Source: Castro et al. 2009:97
Fig. 19.1 Brazil’s welfare spending as % of GDP. Source: Castro et al. (2009: 97)
the weakening of domestic capital, which led to higher rates of unemployment. In

addition, the policy of high interest rates had dire consequences for fiscal policy
(Vernengo, 2007). The debt service increased dramatically—as a result, public debt
increased from 32.2 % of GDP in January of 1995 to 60.6 % of GDP in December of
2002 during the Cardoso administration.6 In order to settle the growing demands of
debt servicing, socio-political funds were rededicated. This happened in particular
after the big financial crisis in 1998–1999 within the framework of the so-called
“law for fiscal responsibility” (Lei da Responsabilidade Fiscal) and the law for the
“rededication of federal funds” (Desvinculação de Fundos da União, DRU)
(Fig. 19.1).
As an immediate consequence of the combined universalization of social policy
and the non-expansion of its funding, the quality of public sector services dimi-
nished. Within the field of education policy this became apparent through the low
quality of basic education (IPEA, 2005: 70 et seq.). Additionally, there was an
exodus of the upper and middle classes from the public system towards private
schools, hospitals and insurance systems. In 1990, 86.9 % of the children from the
richest 10 % of the population went to public schools. This number went down to
only 18.49 % in 1998. Attendance of the richest 10 % in health care sank from 15.95
to 3.46 % during the same period (Ramos, 2000). Such developments have been
legitimized by the proclaimed necessity of “social targeting”: Only the “deserving
poor” should receive public support whereas the “non-deserving” parts of the
population should pay for the services they utilize. The “targeting paradigm”
enjoyed legitimacy due to the patterns of social and political exclusion inherited
6
www.ipeadata.gov.br
from the past. It was used (besides references to the problem of financial feasi-
bility), for example, as legitimization for Cardoso to reform the private sector
pension system in 1998—whereby the retirement age was increased and a maxi-
mum amount of benefits of R$1200 (which has since been adjusted for inflation)
was introduced. As part of the “targeting paradigm” benefits were reorganized as
well. The Cardoso administration, for example, abolished the subsidization of gas
and instead introduced a monthly gas allowance for cooking purposes of R$15 for
the poor. In 2001, Cardoso additionally introduced the programs Bolsa Escola
(School Scholarship Program) and Bolsa Alimentação (Nutrition Support Program)
which were comparable to a family allowance and provide a maximum amount of
R$45 a month for poor families. At least since then, a trend towards establishing
state-run programs of “targeted” income transfers can be diagnosed (Macêdo &
Brito, 2004). These changes were primarily responsible for the marked increase in
welfare spending since 1995 (cf. Table 19.1)—in conjunction with the income
transfer program geared towards designated groups with special needs (Benefı́cio
de Prestação Continuada, BPC) which was incorporated in the constitution in 1988
and regulated by the social assistance law (Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social,
LOAS) (Sposati, 2007[2004]) in 1996).
Contrary to the focus on social rights, which was laid out in the constitution, the
philanthropic tradition of Brazil’s social system was revived through political
programs under Cardoso. Aside from numerous public private partnerships in the
health sector, the program “Comunidade Solid aria” (roughly: supportive commu-
nity) exemplifies this particularly well. Under the patronage of the First Lady, Ruth
Cardoso, the state attempted to organize civil society’s willingness to help. That
meant, for example, that there would be a week’s voluntary social work in poor
quarters within the framework of university courses (Mauriel, 2006: 65 et seq.).
Another pillar of support was Corporate-Social-Responsibility (CSR)—the social
responsibility of businesses, which is also used as a tool in a marketing mix. NGOs
(especially religious ones) have played an important role since the 1990s parti-
cularly in the area of social assistance (IPEA, 2007: 88 et seq.).
The consequences of these policies on the social structure were, on the one hand,
the decline in extreme poverty and the improvement of corresponding indicators
such as illiteracy rates which caused the positive development seen in the Human
Development Index. On the other hand, employment circumstances eroded—the
informal sector grew from 53.6 % in 1992 to 55.5 % in 2002 and unemployment
increased in the same period from 6.4 to 9.2 % (ILO, 2009: 2, Table 19.1). The
functional distribution of income changed to the disadvantage of wage earners—the
share of wages and salaries in total income decreased from 45.4 % in 1990 to
36.1 % in 2002 (Vernengo, 2007: 87). The Gini index stagnated overall on a high
level (between 0.602 in 1996 and 0.589 in 2002; cf. www.ipeadata.gov.br).
The combination of reforms in social policy towards “targeting” and poverty
reduction via neoliberal economic policy reforms in the “Cardoso era” is described
in the literature (see for example: Porter & Craig, 2004) as “inclusive liberalism”:
Liberal economic policy is accompanied by targeted measures of poverty reduction
which are implemented to a greater extent in cooperation with “socially responsi-
ble” corporations. Social rights are undermined in favor of handouts. This trend
358 B. Leubolt
partly contradicts the constitution adopted in 1988, which was supposed to guaran-
tee equal citizenship and social rights for all citizens under the banner of Cidadania.
The focus on the inclusion of the poorest into society as well as greater possibilities
for political participation remained in place even though universalist tendencies
were subverted. The most important key features of the socio-political reforms
such as the right to health care in the general health care system (SUS) remained
unaffected in spite of the problems with under financing indicated above. Conse-
quently, Dagnino describes this period as a “perverse mixture between a participa-
tory project which was constructed since the 1980s around the expansion of
Cidadania and the deepening of democracy, and the project of a minimal state
which relieves itself of its role as guarantor of rights” (2002: 288 et seq.; Transl. by
author).
2 PT-Led Governments of Lula and Rousseff
The debate about continuities and breaks between the governments of Cardoso and
Lula cannot be related in its entire complexity here. For the purposes of this article,
Sallum Jr.’s (2010) argument, which ascertains the continuation of a “moderate
liberalism” or a “liberal developmental state” seems largely convincing. At the
same time, there is evidence for a return to the republican “principles based” on
state intervention, outlined in the constitution of 1988. Such an orientation corres-
ponds to Lula’s announcements during the 2002 electoral campaign: As a reaction
to tendencies of capital flight which accompanied Lula’s rising popularity in
opinion polls, he wrote a “letter to the Brazilian people” shortly before the election
in which he promised continuity in economic policy (Oliveira, 2006). At the same
time he made it clear that the most important task of his administration would be to
end hunger, which signified greater focus on the fight against poverty. The preser-
vation of the “inclusive liberal” orientation in its main features was thereby
signaled from the beginning despite promises of changes in economic policy
(Panizza, 2004). Stronger signs of transformation to the “developmental state”
(Novy, 2008; see Chap. 15) became visible only in his second term with the
establishment of the Program for Accelerated Economic Growth (PAC). This
model had already been practiced during import substitution. Its comeback, how-
ever, referred strongly to the left-leaning republican constitution of 1988, which
was to be reflected particularly in social policy.
In the area of social policy, the continuation of the Cardoso model was illustrated
by the persistent focus on poverty reduction. The central program in the beginning
was Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) (IPEA, 2007: 102 et seq.), which focused especially
on the cooperation between the state and private actors. However, the focus soon
shifted to the expansion and improved coordination of income transfer programs of
the Cardoso government in the context of Bolsa Famı́la (family allowance) (Ibid.:
104 et seq.). Changes primarily concerned the growing number of beneficiaries
(in 2009, 41.2 million people received aid; Soares, Souza, Osorio, & Silveira, 2010:
34) and the maximum amount of benefits, which was more than doubled. Income
transfers thus increased from 1.9 % of GDP per year on average between 1995 and
2002 (under Cardoso) to 2.58 % of GDP between 2003 and 2005. Transfer
payments were still relatively low in comparison to the expenses for debt servicing
which amounted to 9.4 and 7.3 % of GDP in the same period of time; however, the
increase in this area was still noticeable for large parts of the population (Antunes &
Gimenez, 2006). The socio-political community councils envisaged in the consti-
tution were responsible for the planning of distribution of Bolsa Famı́lia benefits in
79.7 % of municipalities in 2005 and served as supervisory authorities in 48.7 % of
them. These participatory councils and the establishment of bureaucratic proce-
dures prevented traditional clientelism. Beneficiaries are primarily women who are
defined as heads of the family. This bolsters the financial independence of women,
however, it also emphasizes the gender-specific distribution of roles within
families. The payout of Bolsa Famı́lia has additionally been conditioned on vacci-
nations as well as regular medical examinations and school attendance of the
children, which follows the traditional paternalistic logic rather than the liberal
paradigm. Discussions related to the sense and nonsense of those paternalistic
elements would go beyond the scope of this contribution. It is, however, a relevant
approach of criticism that the claim to Bolsa Famı́lia cannot be sued for on court
and therefore the program does not fully establish new social rights (Jaccoud,
Hadjab, & Chaibub, 2009: 221).
Similar developments can be observed in education policy: The focus on the
poor was intensified, but not according to the philanthropic and/or assistencialistic
tradition of private care, instead this happened via the introduction of new state
programs. The scholarship program ProUni belongs to the same category of
‘targeted’ social transfer programs. It sponsors the education of children from
poor families at private universities through scholarships. Additionally, there are
quota regulations for state universities, which benefit poor Brazilians and Afro-
Brazilians. This marks a difference to the previous government where access to
state universities was only facilitated via privately funded philanthropic remedial
courses for socially disadvantaged students. The quota regulations at universities
adopted in the early 2000s made an impact as well: The share of beginning students
who earned less than minimum income was 15.3 % at public institutions and only
7.1 % in private institutions. The share of Afro-Brazilian students rose from 21 % in
1995 to 35 % in 2007. An initial decline of the percentage of social expenditure
allocated to education policy (see Table 19.1) has been countered by rising expen-
diture in this area since 2005. While the focus on basic education introduced under
Cardoso was abandoned in favor of focusing on all levels of education, measures to
facilitate access for the poor remained central under Lula (Corbucci et al., 2009).
Continuities with the Cardoso administration were particularly visible in the
pension reform of 2003. Controversially debated, it marked the first deep crisis of
Lula’s government: in the context of criticism from within his own party, critics
were expelled from the PT and, in further consequence, formed the Party Socialism
and Freedom (PSol) (Sader, 2010: 27). In analogue fashion to the reform of the
private system under Cardoso, the same upper-limits to earnings and the same
period for the averaging of working time was introduced for civil servants. Thereby,
360 B. Leubolt
privileges of public sector employees have been eliminated. In the wording of

members of the government, this reform was supposed to break with the conser-
vative legacy of social policy. Critics, however, pointed out neoliberal character-
istics of the reform since the introduction of upper limits and the simultaneous
demand to cover the rest with private pensions intensifies tendencies of financial-
ization (Matijascic & Kay, 2008; Paulani, 2008).
In the field of labor market policy, however, new priorities were set: the statutory
minimum wage was increased continually—by 11.7 % between 2003 and 2005 and
by a further 24.7 % between 2006 and 2008 (Barbosa & Souza, 2010: 75). In
conjunction with the rise in social transfers and minimum pensions, which are
linked to the level of the minimum wage, this led to a considerable increase of low
incomes. This trend was accompanied by rising actual earnings (by 1.8 % on
average until 2007) (Gonzalez, Galiza, Amorim, Vaz, & Parreiras, 2009: 130)
and the decline in unemployment with simultaneously rising numbers of formally
employed persons. Combined with income transfers, this led to a reduction of
income inequality (Baltar et al., 2010: 130): The Gini index dropped from 0.596
in 2001 to 0.543 in 2009 (www.ipeadata.gov.br). Nonetheless, this index still
indicates one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world. The Afro-
Brazilian population is still disproportionately represented among the poor. How-
ever, the societal process of consciousness-raising regarding the existence of
implicit and institutionalized forms of racism that was initiated under Cardoso
was further intensified under Lula. Affirmative Action measures introduced at
universities were accompanied on an institutional level by the foundation of an
according Special State Secretary (Secretaria Especial de Polı́ticas de Promoção
da Igualdade Racial) at the start of Lula’s first term as well as the passage of a bill
against racial discrimination (Estatuto da Igualdade Racial) in 2010. However, the
historical heritage of slavery is still visible in the social structure (Theodoro, 2008).
The focus on state-supported microcredit’s for small- and medium sized
enterprises is another innovation which, in a way, represents “targeted social
policies”, as they selectively decrease effective interest rates for small businesses
and cooperatives (Singer, 2005). They are used especially in the context of the
National Program to strengthen agricultural family businesses (PRONAF). These
loans are relevant with regards to land reform because they contribute to the
funding of the cultivation of occupied lands. However, the “banking logic” in the
allocation of loans to small-scale farmers who are hardly capable of repaying them
can intensify inequality (IPEA, 2007: 215, 361). Conflicts around land remained an
important issue for social movements during Lula’s time in office and increased in
numbers compared to earlier periods. Despite his openness towards social move-
ments, land reform stagnated (Fernandes, 2010). Measures concerning social or
distribution policy mainly affected the provision of infrastructure on occupied land
(e.g. in the wake of the program Luz para todos) but not the structure of land
distribution. Changes in this area are in conflict with the economic model based on
agricultural exports and the underlying interests of agribusiness. Comprehensive
land reform is impeded by Lula’s and Dilma Rousseff’s alliance policy.
With regards to alliances, it is crucial to mention that the PT-led government is

based on a coalition arrangement with center-left to center-right parties. Many of
the submitted reform proposals have fallen short of electoral promises because they
lack the support of the coalition partners as was the case with the reform of
employment legislation (Gonzalez et al., 2009).
In addition, especially with regards to socio-political changes, it has to be
mentioned that channels of popular participation established in the 1988 constitu-
tion were revived through conferences at state and municipal levels, which lead to
63 national conferences until the beginning of 2010 (Dulci, 2010). These
conferences allowed at least partial political participation to organized civil society.
They slowed down political reforms but facilitated greater acceptance within civil
society. This acceptance was important for the second strategic change: Reviving
the active role of the state in society.
The new Keynesian-inspired strategy aimed at the establishment of a “develop-
mental state” (Campos, Amorim, & Garcia, 2008; see Chap. 15). The increase of
low incomes via income transfers and a minimum wage policy described earlier is,
therefore, explicitly an important part of this strategy (Barbosa & Souza, 2010).
Another aspect is the stop of the wave of privatizations, which began in the 1990s
and the related revival of (partially) state-owned businesses. The state-owned
development bank BNDES, for example, not only remained in state-ownership
(contrary to earlier plans) but was restructured to suit the promotion of small- and
medium-sized businesses (Schapiro, 2010). This new direction was expressed in the
context of social policy through the rejection of the philanthropic tradition present
in Cardoso’s flagship program “Comunidade Solid aria”. The corresponding return
to the republican ideals of the constitution of 1988 was made explicit via the new
National Social Assistance Policy (Polı́tica Nacional de Assistência Social, PNAS)
adopted in 2004 (Jaccoud et al., 2009).
The failure to pass a bill for a comprehensive tax reform has led to a situation
where product-related taxes such as value added tax are the most important sources
of income of the state and progression is therefore low (Santos & Gentil, 2009).
This signals not least that Lula’s government focuses on a broad alliance policy and
not on social confrontation. In the project of a “developmental state”, an alliance
between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie has already been proposed in
the past (for a critical view, see Chibber, 2004). The Lula administration started out
from this legacy, but with a bigger focus on the inclusion of marginalized parts of
the population. Income transfers and the lift in minimum wage were particularly
successful in strengthening Lula’s electoral base among the poorest Brazilians
while parts of the traditional middle class7 PT voters turned to the opposition—
partly due to the effects of the 2005 financial scandal (Singer, 2009).
7
Despite their support for the marginalized, PT voters were originally primarily well educated,
mostly unionized Brazilians from the richer south and southeast of the country. Starting with the
2006 elections this changed to the effect that those, who voted for PT because of its image as a
corruption-free “clean” party were (more than only) replaced by voters who benefitted from
362 B. Leubolt
3 Conclusion
The conservative and partially regressive structure of the Brazilian social system
was substantially weakened by the Constitution of 1988 in favor of the universali-
zation of social rights guaranteed by the state. This republican process of formal-
ization of rights and social inclusion was soon weakened by neoliberal “counter-
reforms” which were in further consequence accompanied by the trend towards
“targeting”. Thereby, the regressive impact of neoliberal reforms on social policies
was countered at the expense of the universalization of social rights. The Lula
administration reclaimed the republican values outlined in the constitution without
breaking with the inclusive neoliberal tendencies of the 1990s.
This political orientation is reflected in social policies by the continuous focus on
poverty reduction and the strong focus on income transfers which had already been
introduced by the Cardoso government and were then crucially expanded under
Lula and Rousseff. At the same time, privatization was stopped and public services
were fortified—especially in recent years. In contrast to Venezuela or Bolivia,
Brazil under Lula and Rousseff is not a state project fostering a highly polarized
civil society, but rather a “developmental state” variant of social democracy that
relies upon broad alliances in society.
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Gender and Politics in Brazil Between
Continuity and Change 20
Antje Daniel and Patricia Graf
Abstract
Antje Daniel and Patricia Graf investigate the field of gender policy in Brazil.
Indeed, under the Lula and Rousseff administrations, the situation of women has
improved in some respects; in other areas, however, gender inequality remains
present. Current gender relations are not only a result of present transformation
processes but instead are determined by historical experiences. Although certain
roles and gender patterns persist, the women’s movement initiated important
processes of change when becoming stronger in the 1970s and 1980s. The
Brazilian experience may serve as an example of successful use of political
leeway by women’s movements, which exert political pressure on different
political levels when the opportunities to influence seems actually limited in
institutional terms.
1 Introduction1
Many women’s organizations expected that the 2003 inauguration of Inácio Lula da
Silva, candidate of the Worker’s Party (PT), would result in the overcoming of
existing gender disparities in Brazil. Since the 1960s there has been a long-shared
ideological proximity between intellectuals, left-wing parties and feminist activists.
Feminist activists thus expected to enter into a continuous dialogue with the Lula
1
A. Daniel (*)
University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany
e-mail: antje.daniel@uni-bayreuth.de
P. Graf
University of Cottbus Senftenberg, Cottbus, Germany
e-mail: graf@tu-cottbus.de

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_20
368 A. Daniel and P. Graf
government and to share the struggle for gender equality. Indeed, in some respects
the situation of women did improve under the Lula government, however in other
areas gender inequalities remain. Needless to say that the present state of gender
relations in Brazil is certainly not only the result of processes of change and the
failures of the Lula government, nor of unfulfilled promises made by the current
government that is led by Dilma Rousseff, but are historically determined.
The understanding, that gender relations are socially constructed is the under-
lying assumption of gender research. Differences between the genders can be
ascribed to social practices in the respective cultural, social and political environ-
ment, rather than being considered a biological determination. However, these
gender roles can be quite stable, as the Brazilian example shows in two ways:
firstly, the notions of gender that developed during the colonial period have been
maintained and socially cemented, for example through the glorification of the
woman as mother and the devaluation of her role in public life. This trend is
strengthened by machismo, which places the man at the center of social life. The
dominance and recognition of males is based on their control of women and their
successes in the public, political and economic spheres (Caldeira, 1998:75; Lebon,
2003:94). Such gender models are supported by the Catholic Church and by many
civil society organizations (Soares, Costa, Buarque, Dora, & Sant’Anna, 1994:304)
and continue to noticeably influence government policy, as is particularly clear in
the discourse surrounding abortion (see Sect. 3.2). A further socio-structural aspect
that manifests gender inequality is that of the slave society formed by colonialism
and the later massive acquisition of African slaves. The regions with the largest
proportion of Afro-Brazilians among the population also have the weakest social
and economic indicators. These disparities, established through colonialism, over-
lap with gender-specific discrimination (Soares et al., 1994:304) (see Sect. 3.5).
In contrast to these persistent gender disparities, a number of changes can be
noted: since the end of the nineteenth century, women have campaigned for gender
equality, above all those from the white middle and upper classes. They demanded
access to educational institutions and the right to vote. Women’s suffrage was first
introduced in 1928 in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and was anchored in the
Constitution in 1934. While this first wave of feminism campaigned primarily for
the equal participation of women in politics and society, the second wave of
feminism questioned supposed traditional role models. This wave of feminism
achieved its greatest successes during the democratization process that followed
the military regime (1964–1985). Public discussion of gender issues and changes in
legal status considerably influenced the situation of women (see Sect. 2.1). For
example, access to education, the labor market and the improvement of the health
care system. Through demonstrations, female activists also contributed to increas-
ing the recognition of gender disparities and raising women’s awareness of their
rights (Teles, 2006:486). Nevertheless it is still possible to identify specific
disadvantages for women in the labor market, in political participation and with
regard to legal rights (see Sects. 2.2 and 3).
Both Lula and Dilma were confronted with these historical processes when they
entered office, however even under their governments gender disparity was set on a
20 Gender and Politics in Brazil Between Continuity and Change 369
continuum between continuity and change. The following will analyze both the
aspects in which gender disparity has changed and those in which the situation of
women has remained precarious. The focus is on Lula’s period of office; however
this will be supplemented by a discussion of the current tendencies of the Dilma
government. Chapter 2 will first determine the social and political margins for
action under the Lula government by examining the successes and limitations of the
women’s movements (see Sect. 2.1) and the political participation of women (see
Sect. 2.2) from an actor’s perspective. It will also clarify the extent to which the
Lula government restricted or expanded the margins for action. Chapter 3 will
discuss Lula’s gender policy in the context of historical processes. This is followed
by an illustration of the situation of women with regard to poverty, health, edu-
cation and the labor market, including Dilma’s engagement in these fields (see
Sects. 3.1–3.4).2 The stagnation and solidification of preconceived gender roles will
be brought into focus. Finally it will become evident that gender disparity in Brazil
must be considered in a more differentiated manner according to the categories
north and south, poor and rich, black and white (see Sect. 3.5).
2 Women as Actors of Social Change
2.1 Women’s Movements: Achievements in Historical Context
Women’s self-organization has a long tradition in Brazil, dating to the nineteenth

century. Women’s movements3 formed in response to socio-economic and political
grievances. Today the movements are composed of numerous actors with different
social, cultural and ethnic backgrounds (Soares et al., 1994:309–310). They include
feminist organizations, neighborhood associations, female workers, as well as
professional non-governmental organizations from highly varied backgrounds and
from different social classes (Caldeira, 1998:76). While some organizations pri-
marily campaign in order to secure the welfare of their target group, others aim
towards overall societal change. There is certainly a level of conflict and disagree-
ment between activists from the different women’s movements, such as for exam-
ple between Afro-Brazilian and white feminists. These conflicts can be overcome
when a strong, female identity or shared objectives bind different actors together.
This was the case during the protests against the military regime in the 1970s and
1980s (McCallum, 2007:63).
2
We approach gender disparities in Brazil from the perspective of gender studies. Given that
relations of power and dominance between the sexes are little to be found in studies of gender
disparities in Brazil. We will focus on the position of women (cf. Krause, 2003; Rosenberger &
Sauer, 2004).
3
A women’s movement is composed of different actors such as women’s organizations, groups or
individuals, is based on a shared identity and aims to create, prevent or reverse social change with
regard to gender roles and disparities (Chen, 2005:28).
The women’s movements revived in the context of the democratic protests

against the military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. As civil society organ-
izations were strongly oppressed under the military dictatorship, particularly in the
beginning, the number of activists diminished constantly. Only conservative
women’s movements continued to exist, such as the Marches with God for the
Fatherland and the Family (Marchas com Deus pela P atria e pela Famı́lia), which
were founded on the image of the woman as mother and nurturer of the nation and
which partially supported the regime (Soares et al., 1994:306). As the regime
increasingly lost legitimacy due to a deep economic and political crisis, the
women’s movements gained new spaces for their action. New social problems
were articulated by the women’s movements, such as the rising cost of living
(Lebon, 2003:104) and the overall marginalization of women (Pitanguy,
2002:807; Soares et al., 1994:306–307). This engagement was supported by the
Catholic Church as well as by left-wing parties and organizations (Alvarez,
1994:15–19; Soares et al., 1994:311).4 The women’s movements developed an
ideological proximity with the latter that remains until today. The women’s move-
ments drew public attention to subjects such as domestic violence, abortion rights,
discrimination in the workplace, or the political participation of women. In the
run-up to the democratic elections women’s issues were at the forefront of the
parties’ programs (Baldez, 2003:260–261). The women’s movements also contri-
buted to the 1988 Constitution (Caldeira, 1998:76ff).5 Their joint engagement
brought together women from all social classes, including activists from the
emerging Afro-Brazilian women’s movement and from lesbian groups (Alvarez,
1994:50–54; Soares et al., 1994:312).
While the women’s movements actively participated in shaping the democrati-
zation process, the first conflicts emerged within the movement in the run-up to the
1989 elections. Many parties mobilized women for their cause, strengthening
divisions along ideological and party-political programs. Party-political lines
became more important than a shared female identity. While some actors from
the women’s movements moved into the government or were co-opted by the state,
others remained in opposition. In addition, the women’s movements’ importance
was weakened as institutions and parties took over the claim of representing
women’s social issues. As a result of these processes the women’s movements
lost members, credibility and the ability to mobilize—some even splintered
completely (Alvarez, 1994:33–44; Caldeira, 1998:79; Fontoura & Hofmeister,
2008:239). As the socio-economic position of women worsened in the 1990s as a
result of neo-liberal reforms, the women’s movements revived. State spending cuts
led to reductions in or the cancelling of social programs. Furthermore, the labor
4
Women gained further impulses from the 1975 UN World Conference on Women in Mexico or
through the return of exiled female Brazilians who brought with them experiences from North
American and European women’s movements.
5
The engagement of the women’s movements meant that several women’s issues were included in
the Constitution, such as discrimination on the labor market (Article 7), maternity leave as a social
right (Article 6), or family planning as a free right of the couple (Article 226).
market was made more flexible, causing unemployment.6 In this context the
women’s movements increasingly searched for a solution to existing social
conflicts and offered numerous social services.
The characteristics of the contemporary movements differ from those of their
predecessors: The newly forming movements are usually temporary, make only
little use of confrontational and oppositional forms of protest, and increasingly
attempt to influence policy processes through lobbying and advocacy (Fontoura &
Hofmeister, 2008:239–241). Because of the long-lasting cooperation between the
women’s movements and the political left wing parties, many women’s movements
had hoped for more intensive dialogue with the Lula government. In fact, the Lula
government promoted and solidified cooperation between the women’s movements
and state institutions. The government continuously integrated women activists into
its decision-making processes, opening up new space for action. An example of this
is the National Conference for Women’s Policy (Conferência Nacional de Polı́ticas
para as Mulheres, CNPM) (see Sect. 3). This process of integration is linked to the
danger of the co-optation of the women’s movements and a restriction of their
autonomy (Friedman, 2009:418). As a result of supporting the governing party,
some activists have become part of the institutional framework. On the other hand,
some women’s movements have refused to cooperate with the government, have
turned their backs to the party and taken an oppositional position with regard to the
government. The government’s neo-liberal stance was also a reason for protest:
“For many organizations this led to frustration and disappointment, they therefore
protested repeatedly against the supposedly leftist government” (Fontoura &
Hofmeister, 2008:242,TL).
In this respect the government caused a re-configuration among the women’s
movements and broadened the gap between different groups. This raises the
question of the extent to which Dilma will be able to overcome existing divisions
between feminist activists. On the one hand the possibility of a woman being
elected president was considered by some activists to be an opportunity to
re-introduce the gender debate into the political decision making processes. On
the other hand, although Dilma was supported during the election campaign by the
majority of activists from the women’s movements; she was also criticized for her
maneuvering on the subject of abortion (see chapter 3.2, Savarese, 2011). At least,
the appointment of Eleonora Menicucci as the Minister of the Secretariat for
Women’s Policy (SPM) was seen as an indication of a change in gender policy.
Appointing a militant feminist to this post has been interpreted by feminist activists
as a change in gender policy and an impetus for the abortion debate: Nalu Faria
from Sempreviva Feminist Organization (SOF) clarifies: “We have high
expectations. For us, it is important that SPM is in the hands of a militant feminist
who knows the feminist agenda and above all the health of women. This reference
is not only important on the symbolic level, but also with regard to the strength
which she represents” (cited from Passos da Carta Maior 2012:TL). Placing a
6
For the gender-specific effects of neo-liberal reforms cf. Klingebiel and Randeria (1998).
feminist in charge of SPM has provided an impulse for a reconfiguration of the

relationship between the state and the women’s movements. At the same time
cooperation between the women’s movements and the state has been institutional-
ized and consolidated as a result of the National Conference for Women’s Policy
(Conferência Nacional de Polı́ticas para as Mulheres, CNPM) (CEDAW 2012,
see chapter 3).
Despite the fact changes and innovation can be observed under Dilma, it is not
yet evident to what extent the relationship between the women’s movements and
the SPM will change. Moreover, the question of whether Dilma will succeed in
bridging the gap between the different women’s movements will depend on her
symbolic power of integration. The diversity of the women’s movement is a
challenge: it remains questionable whether Dilma will be able to unify the different
positions in the movement in order to facilitate cooperation with the state or
whether she will foster existing divisions. Occasionally, the integration and
representation of Afro-Brazilians has its limits (see Fernandes, 2012).
2.2 Women and Political Participation
As we have seen, campaigning by the women’s movements has been decisive in

overcoming gender disparity. However, we will make notice, that if one considers
the political participation of women it becomes clear that Brazil is a country of
contradictions: although women are the main actors within the social movements
they are underrepresented in the political system: “Brazil has the dubious distinc-
tion of being the Latin American country with the lowest level of women’s
representation in national politics” (Htun, 2002:733).
Women’s suffrage was introduced as early as 1935 and in the first year the first
female elected representatives entered the Congress. Until today, however, women
in leading political positions remain the exception. It took until 2000 for the first
women to be elected to the Supreme Court, although at this time 29 % of lawyers
were female (Htun, 2002:734). Under Lula’s predecessor, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995–2002), only two women were appointed to the cabinet (ibid.).
Lula’s cabinet was also male dominated and white; there were only two women
in key positions: Nicléa Freire, the Minister of SPM and Renata Lúcia Medeiros de
Albuquerque Emerenciano, the Executive Secretary of the Commission for Public
Ethics (Comissão de E´tica Pública). Until 2010, Edson Santos of the Secretariat for
Promoting Racial Equality (Secretaria de Polı́ticas de Promoção da Igualdade
Racial, SEPIR) was the only Afro-Brazilian minister.7 Under Dilma the number of
female ministers was raised to seven of the 39 available positions, which was
enough for the foreign press to announce a new wave of “amazons” (Der Spiegel,
16/01/2012). Key positions, such as the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense
and the Ministry of Finance are still male dominated.
7
He was replaced by Eloi Ferreira de Araujo in 2010.
The low proportion of women in positions of political leadership can be

explained by the institutional structure: besides the quotas for female candidates
to the House of Representatives, which were introduced in 1996, there are few
quotas for political positions. Furthermore women are disadvantaged by the elec-
toral legislation in combination with clientelistic and un-programmatic parties. This
is particularly obvious in the Brazilian Senate: despite an increase of the number of
women from 12.3 % in the 2006 elections to 16.1 % in the 2010 elections, the
percentage of women is far behind the average number of women in other senates in
North, Central and South America, which is 19.9 % (dos Santos, 2012:50).
The first quota regulation, introduced in 1996, determined that 20 % of the
candidates for the House of Representatives should be women; this number was
raised to 30 % in 1997 (Araújo, 2001). No quota was introduced for the Senate.
These quotas have only had a limited effect on the political representation of
women for several reasons: first, the introduction of the quota was accompanied
by an increase in the overall number of candidates from each party. This also
increased the number of male candidates, relativizing the impact of the quota for
women. Secondly, parties are not obliged to fill the places on the list that are
reserved for women. According to Miguel (2008:199), this reduces the influence
of the quota. The open list system (among other variables) also results in female
candidates having fewer chances in the election process. Open lists are often
detrimental to female candidates as the voter does not select from an already
numbered list of candidates, but can distribute his or her votes, moving candidates
up or down the list as he or she wishes. With this kind of list it is primarily the
personality and prominence of the candidate that determines his or her place. As
female candidates are often not the center of attention, the success of a female
candidate is often determined by the prominence of her partner or father.8 Further-
more, open lists afford candidates who have previously held office a higher chance
of winning. This is particularly beneficial to male candidates as there are more male
politicians on the state and local levels (Bohn, 2007, cf. Table 1). If one only
considers the absolute number of female representatives, the introduction of the
quota has not been effective. However, this has resulted in parties becoming more
interested in winning female representatives, which has meant that the number of
female candidates from the PT, Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the
Liberal Front Party are becoming increasingly similar (Miguel, 2008:211), although
there was a slight decrease from 8.9 % to 8.6 % in the 2010 elections (dos Santos,
2012:50).
Over the last years a number of suggestions for reform have been made in order
to improve the representation of women in leadership positions, including the
removal of the open list, the introduction of a quota for the Senate, the transform-
ation of the quota for candidates for the House of Representatives into a quota for
8
MacCaulay reports that this phenomenon is slowly becoming less prominent and that the profile
of female representatives and senators is slowly changing (2010:281).
actual seats in the House.9 Under the Lula government none of these recommend-
ations were implemented. The demands made by female politicians and the
women’s movements such as media advertising or campaign financing for aspiring
female candidates, have entered the agenda: in 2008 the Congress passed a law that
obliges parties to commit 5 % of their party funds to support female candidates.
Non-compliance with this regulation is sanctioned by an increase of 2.5 % to the
required support. Furthermore, parties are obliged to reserve 10 % of their allocated
TV transmission time for female candidates. The paragraph regarding the quota for
women was reformulated, although there are still no sanctions for failure to comply:
the paragraph now contains tougher wording and requires parties to field a mini-
mum of 30 % and a maximum of 70 % of female candidates (Rangel n.d.). This had
little effect on the 2010 elections, perhaps due to the fact that the parties had little
time to adapt to the new legislation: “They added more female candidates without
providing them with increased support” (dos Santos, 2012:75,76). Although this
reform remained far behind their demands, it can still be considered a partial victory
for the women’s movements, among them the so-called women’s faction (bancada
feminina),10 also called the lipstick faction, which was created by female
representatives in order to promote gender-sensitive legislation.
Campaigning by female politicians is essential in order draw attention to gender
inequality and in order to influence political decision-making in favor of women’s
rights. The above has shown the role female politicians and the women’s
movements have played in the formulation of gender policy from an actor perspec-
tive. It is clear that feminist activities have strongly influenced gender policy. At the
same time the government has increasingly integrated the women’s movement and
has created interfaces for cooperation between the feminist movements and the
state (also see Sect. 3). Although the women’s movements were cooperating more
strongly with the government, there were only limited changes with regard to the
political representation of women. Thus, while some activists and female
politicians are making more frequent use of state-led cooperation, other parts of
the women’s movements are organizing themselves in opposition to the govern-
ment in order to campaign for women’s rights.
Alongside initiatives created by female activists and politicians, gender policy
and state programs are one of the key strategies by which to achieve gender
equality. The following will therefore concentrate on the Lula government’s
policies, drawing attention to the situation of women with regards to poverty,
health, education and the labor market.
9
These suggested reforms should be carefully examined in terms of their reciprocal effects on the
Brazilian electoral system and electoral behavior. Cf. Gray (2003) for a comprehensive study of
the effects of different quota regulations in combination with different electoral systems in
Latin America.
10
The recommended quotas were reduced by Congress: 10 % of the party funds for female
politicians, 20 % of the air time, as well as a sanction for failing to respect the quota were
originally proposed.
3 Gender Relations and Gender Policy
In 1985, during the transition from the military to the democratic regime, the
National Council for Women’s Rights (Conseho National dos Direitos da Mulher)
was created; it was the first state institution aiming at strengthening gender equality.
The Council was an institutional novelty in Latin America at this time. The
National Council was part of the Ministry of Justice. The National Council was
complemented by councils on the state level (Soares et al., 1994:314). Furthermore,
at this time the first women’s police stations (Comissarias de Mulheres) were
created in order to deal with gender-based violence. The women’s police stations
remain a model to this day. The guiding principle of the women’s police stations is
to simplify the detection and reporting of cases of sexual and domestic violence and
to offer charitable support (Htun, 2002:738).11
In 2002, under the Cardoso government, the institutional structure was expanded
through the creation of the Secretariat for Women’s Rights (Secretaria dos Direitos
da Mulher, SEDIM), which was subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (Monta~no,
Pitanguy, & Lobo, 2003:15). The Lula government also restructured these
institutions: overall, between 2003 and 2005 the number of institutions working
in the field of gender equality grew from 13 to 125 institutions on the local and
national level (Abramo, 2008:102). Furthermore, in 2003 the Secretariat for
Women’s Policy (SPM) replaced SEDIM. The National Council was subordinated
to the SPM and served civil society consultation. The Secretariat itself is directly
beneath the president and has the status of a ministry. This strengthened the SPM’s
position and increased the visibility of gender issues (Monta~no et al., 2003:16). The
Secretariat has the task of advising the president and of participating in the
formulation of gender policy. The strengthening of the SPM was accompanied by
an increase of its financial resources from US$21 million (2003) to US$50 million
(2010) (SPM, 2010:10). However, according to Friedman (2009:423), the
Secretariat’s effect on gender equality remains minimal, as it is poorly financed
in comparison to other ministries and its work is loosely linked to other ministries.
Dilma responded to this criticism by increasing SPM’s budget (CEDAW, 2012:5).
Further innovations under Lula were the National Conferences for Women’s
Policy (Conferêcia Nacional de Polı́ticas para as Mulheres, CNPM) in 2004 and
2007. The conferences were created in order to strengthen the interfaces between
the government and the women’s movements. One result of the conferences,
amongst others, were the National Plan for Women’s Policy 2004–2007 (Plano
Nacional de Polı́ticas para as Mulheres 2004–2007, PNPM) and the National Plan
for Women’s Policy 2008–2011 (Plano Nacional de Polı́ticas para as Mulheres
2008–2011) (Friedman, 2009:423; SPM, 2007:6–7). Under Dilma this institutional-
ized cooperation continued and a third conference was organized, resulting in a
11
Despite this innovative attempt to deal with violence against women on an institutional basis, the
financial and regional equipment of police stations remains inadequate. The justice system also
lacks the necessary capacity to pursue domestic violence (Lebon, 2003:108; Teles, 2006:489).
further plan for the years 2012–2015 (CEDAW, 2012:4). According to the PNPM,
all state institutions should be obliged to contribute to realize gender equality. The
Multi-Year Government Plans (Plano Plurianual, PPA) 2004–2007 and 2008–2011
addressed this, aiming to reduce discrimination based on gender, race and ethnicity
and to support women in the labor market by raising income and the number of jobs,
reducing regional inequalities, encouraging political participation of women
(Abramo, 2008:104; SPM, 2007:4).
These government plans consider the relationship between gender and race/
ethnicity for the first time, taking inter-sectionality into account: the “PPA [. . .]
introduced a new, integrative perspective, as for the first time a government created
an own political platform that challenged inequality through measures for social
integration and through the creation of equal opportunities (with regard to sex, race,
ethnic belonging, sexual orientation and people with disabilities), as well as through
the granting of citizenship” (Bandeira, 2005:31,TL). For the first time the diversity
of women’s realities has also been recognized, including regional differences,
differences between urban and rural life, between young and old, or due to sexual
orientation and ethnic belongings. The significance of gender-based violence is also
a focal point within policy formulation (CFEMEA, 2010:80). At least, the PPA also
focuses on the following areas: (1) integrating gender aspects in policy formulation
and the gender-mainstreaming of all institutions; (2) strengthening cooperation
with civil society and increasing the involvement of female activists in the formu-
lation, implementation and supervision of government programs on the federal and
district levels; and (3) the promotion of women’s rights, equal opportunities for
women and changing cultural values in the long-term (Bandeira, 2005:4–8). For the
first time the PPAs take into consideration gender mainstreaming on the federal and
district levels. The plans thereby provide an important basis for the formulation of
national policy and serve as an orientation for institutions on the federal and district
levels, as well as providing an important basis of legitimacy with regard to access to
financial resources (CFEMEA, 2010:64f).
It is remarkable, that women activists have been included in the policy formu-
lation. The strong cooperation between the women’s movement and the state is a
novelty in Brazil. There were 27 regional representatives that discussed the PPA
and provided 200 recommendations. Women’s movements, such as the Articulation
of Brazilian Women (Articulação de Mulheres Brasilieras) or organizations such as
the Feminist Center for Studies and Policy Advice (CFEMEA) played an important
role in introducing suggestions for the PPA (Bandeira, 2005:28–29). In order to
realize the PPA the government implemented 374 state programs between 2004 and
2007 and supported them with US$9.6 billion (CFEMEA, 2010:82). Five of these
programs directly aim at supporting women and four programs concern the double
discrimination of race/ethnicity and gender (see Table 20.1).
In all further programs, women are considered in the economic, social or
political programs (Bandeira, 2005:25–28). As these often make little or no contri-
bution to overcome gender disparities, their effectiveness should be assessed as
low. Moreover, the previous programs were without context, partly isolated, and
had little continuity (Abramo, 2008:103; Bandeira, 2005:29–40; Teles, 2006:489).
Table 20.1 Gender programs: PPA 2004–2007

Program Aim Target group
Programs with a special focus on gender or women
Health of the Providing comprehensive, Disadvantaged population
population with regard human and qualitative health groups with special diseases
to special diseases care in the case of special
diseases
Fight against gender- Prevention and avoidance of Women and potential victims
based violence violence against women
(physical violence, sexual
violence, domestic violence,
physical and symbolic violence)
Gender-mainstreaming Coordinating the planning and State
policy formulation of policies in
different policy fields as well as
the evaluation and control of
programs in the field of gender
equality
Gender equality in the Providing the integration of Economically active women
work place women into all areas of the labor
market with regard to access,
promotion and workplace rights
Social protection of Promoting the social integration Homeless people, migrants, drug
adults in situations that of individuals or population addicts, victims of gender-based
require special groups in special social and violence and poverty
protection vulnerable situations
Programs with a special focus on gender or women linked to race or ethnicity
Comprehensive family Promoting the emancipation and Families in socially vulnerable
welfare social inclusion of families from situations and poverty
socially vulnerable situations,
with special consideration of
gender and ethnicity
Evaluation of the Contributing to an increase in Ministries that work in the field
federal government’s the effectiveness of the federal of social policy
social policies government’s social policies,
with consideration of ethnicity
and gender
Management of Coordinating of the planning Government
agricultural and formulation of sectorial
development policy policy as well as the evaluation
and control of programs in the
field of agricultural development
Entry into the Integrating young people into Young people between 16 and
workforce the workforce through easier 24 years of age, the unemployed
access to a primary occupation or precariously employed, or job
seekers with special
consideration of economically
disadvantaged groups of the
population, people with low
education, sex, race, and special
needs
Source: Bandeira (2005:26–27)
State spending cuts have also had a negative effect on the realization of the
programs: for example in 2007 only half of the money set aside for programs
preventing domestic violence was actually provided (Friedman, 2009:427). Last but
not least, existing patriarchal attitudes within the administration opposed to the
realization of these programs and to the gender mainstreaming process. Thus a
study by Bandeira (2005:41) shows that the institutions’ hostile attitude is slowing
down the reform process. Consequently, institutional developments over the last
years have led to gender issues entering the public agenda. At the same time the
process is blocked by little financial support and by refusing to change the patri-
archal behavior. How this is reflected in gender relations and specifically in the
situation of women will be discussed in the following.
3.1 The Feminization of Poverty
Although Brazil has demonstrated economic strength for years with an average
GDP growth GDP of 4 % between 2007 and 2011 (CEPALSTAT), poverty remains
a sensitive topic. Women, in particular Afro-Brazilian women, are strongly affected
by poverty (Santos, Rosycler, & Monsueto, 2008:142). According to Costa,
Pinheiro, Medeiros, and Queiroz (2005:15) the absolute number of women at all
levels of poverty has risen since the 1980s (cf. Table 20.2),12 as have the differences
between women and men with regard to the frequency and intensity of poverty.
This is even more surprising when one considers the life expectancy of women,
which has continually risen over the last years and is now greater than that of men
(cf. Table 20.3).13
Certain aspects—such as the functional logic of the Brazilian labor market—
increase the feminization of poverty in Brazil (Costa et al., 2005):
Table 20.2 Share of the population living in poverty in % in 2011

Women Men
Population over the age of 15 without an own income living in poverty 29.9 % 16.5 %
Source: CEPALSTAT
12
The author measures three levels of poverty: Level A: less than 30 % of the average income;
Level B: less than 40 % of the average income; Level C: less than 50 % of the average income.
13
In many countries, however, women have a lower life expectancy than men due to poor hygienic
conditions, regular abuse, systematic malnutrition, maternal mortality, etc. In these countries they
are also usually more likely to suffer poverty than men. If the correlation between life expectancy
and poverty does not appear in this way in Brazil, this could mean that health care is generally
better in Brazil. This correlation could, however, not be tested here.
20
Table 20.3 Comparative average life expectancy of men and women

1995–2000 2000–2005 2005–2010 2010–2015
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Argentina 73.2 69.7 77.0 74.3 70.6 78.1 75.2 71.6 79.1 76.2 72.5 80.0
Bolivia 62.0 60.1 64.0 63.8 61.8 66.0 65.5 63.4 67.7 67.2 65.0 69.4
Brazil 69.4 65.7 73.3 71.0 67.3 74.9 72.4 68.9 76.1 73.5 70.0 77.2
Chile 75.7 72.8 78.8 77.7 74.8 80.8 78.5 75.5 81.5 79.1 76.1 82.2
Source: CEPAL (2010:32)
Gender and Politics in Brazil Between Continuity and Change
379
• Unequal participation in the labor market: women’s work is attributed with a

lower level of economic and social value, which leads to lower remuneration and
to women often being forced into the informal sector;
• Unequal access to the means of production, such as credit or land;
• Unequal access to leadership positions (see Chap. 3.4).
Alongside the situation on the labor market, the number of women-led house-
holds has increased. The high number of these households is another reason for the
feminization of poverty (Santos et al. 2008:142). Between 1995 and 2007 such
households increased from 22.1 % to 33.7 %. The number of single parent house-
holds led by women is especially high; in 2011 it was 88.9 % (CEPAL, 2012:36).
According to Costa et al. (2005:15), women are more often a household’s primary
income earner, which means that discrimination against women on the labor market
has a more dramatic effect on the whole family. Families that rely primarily on a
female breadwinner suffer more intense poverty. This further strengthens the
differences between households with male and female primary breadwinners. The
rise in the number of households led by women can be attributed to the fact that
women today live together with their partners prior to marriage and often remain
unmarried. This was strongly influenced by the legalization of divorce in 1977 and
the increasing economic independence of women.
One program with which the government counteracts the feminization of pov-
erty is the Family Program (Bolsa Famı́lia). According to the state institutions the
subsidies have a positive influence on the financial situation of women and their
families: the fact that women often administer these subsidies also strengthens their
autonomy and capacity (SPM, 2010:23). However the program’s effect is restricted
through limitations in its implementation, for example through the irregular pay-
ment of the subsidies (Friedman, 2009:419). With the plan ‘Brazil without Misery’,
Dilma expanded the family program to 407,000 families in 2011 (previously
325,000 families) and focused the subsidies on women in rural areas (CEDAW,
2012:3).
3.2 Reproductive Health and Gender-Based Violence
In the field of reproductive health a complex picture arises, which includes numer-
ous improvements to women’s health and living situation, but also continuing
negative aspects: for example, since the 1960s the birth rate has diminished from
6 children to 2.52 children per woman, however the number of young mothers
between 15 and 19 years of age has increased, particularly in rural areas (Lebon,
2003:97; Shadow Report, 2007:32).14 The high rate of young mothers reflects a
14
According to a study by the Ministry of Health almost 26 % of babies have a mother between
15 and 19 years of age.
taboo talking about sex and uncertainties in dealing with contraception (Lebon,
2003:97–98).
If one considers the general medical care provided to women, it is possible to
recognize a strong social discrepancy: while women from the upper classes enjoy
considerable private health care, the majority of female Brazilians rely on lower
quality care from the public health care system. As a result, 36.4 % of women over
25 years have never had a medical examination. This rises to 46.3 % among Afro-
Brazilians (Antunes Martins, 2009:8–9; Lebon, 2003:99). The lack of public health
care also influences the high rate of maternal mortality. Almost 2000 Brazilian
women die each year in childbirth, although 92 % of these cases are preventable
(Shadow Report, 2007:35). Inadequate knowledge of sexuality and reproductive
health also causes high rates of HIV and AIDS infections. Half of all persons
infected by HIV and AIDS are women.15 In São Paulo, for example, HIV and
AIDS has been the primary cause of death for women between 20 and 44 since 1994
(Lebon, 2003:100). Furthermore, insufficient sexual education and medical advice
also leads to a high rate of illegal abortions. In Brazil more than 1.4 million
pregnancies are aborted each year, which represents 31 % of all pregnancies
(Shadow Report, 2007:33). A lack of knowledge surrounding abortion, as well as
illegal methods, threaten the health of women and in many cases lead to their death.
These methods are used, in particular, by young women and Afro-Brazilian women
(Htun, 2002:738–739). Abortion is legal under the Civic Code in the case of rape,
incest or a life-threatening situation (Shadow Report, 2007:33). Abortion rights are
frequently discussed in Brazilian society: Brazilian feminists continuously cam-
paign for the expansion of abortion rights in order to guarantee legal abortions in all
cases and to offer social services for legal abortions. As a result, 16 public hospitals
have introduced facilities for legal abortions since 1999 (Htun, 2002:738). In
contrast, conservative political elites and the churches are resisting an expansion
of abortion rights. Lula has positioned himself against abortion (Friedman,
2009:427–428). During the 2010 electoral campaign the discourse surrounding
abortion rights again became important: on the one hand the women’s movements
campaigned for a decriminalization of abortion, on the other hand the conservative
elite, represented by the churches and politicians, condemned abortion. In contrast
to the widespread negative attitude amongst candidates towards the decriminal-
ization of abortion, Dilma’s position was more contradictory. Dilma argued that she
was personally against abortion, but that it is necessary to have sufficient medical
treatment for women who have undergone an abortion in order to decrease the death
rates amongst women. She thus distanced herself from her initial initiatives that
supported the further decriminalization of abortion (Correa, 2010:6).
A further problem alongside the rising HIV and AIDS rate and illegal abortions
is gender-based violence: domestic violence against women is strongly anchored in
15
According to the Ministry of Health, in 2012 around 656,701 million people have HIV and
AIDS. Regarding gender disparities, in 2011 1.7 men are infected for every woman (see http://
www.aids.gov.br/pagina/aids-no-brasil. Accessed 30/10/2013).
society, regardless of the social class, region or ethnic background of the woman.
Several scholars and studies estimate that every 15 seconds a woman is abused by a
member of her family (Shadow Report, 2007:7; Soares, 2009:2; Teles, 2006:487).
More precise data can be found in a study of domestic violence by the World Health
Organization (WHO) that was carried out between 2000 and 200316 with 1,172
women from São Paulo and 1,473 from Pernambuco between the ages of 15 and 49.
According to the study, 29 % of the women in São Paulo and 37 % of the women in
Pernambuco have suffered physical or sexual violence (Pires Lucas d’Oliveira &
Blima Schraiber, 2005:6). While this violence has long been socially tolerated,
awareness of the problem has risen: a survey by the United Nations (UN) states that
94 % of Brazilian women and 88 % of Brazilian men consider this kind of violence
a serious problem (UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 2005:6).
The state reacted to the high rate of gender-based violence with legal steps: for
example, Brazil signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1966 and has ratified a number of
international human rights agreements since the 1990s.17 Nevertheless, these legal
initiatives have had little effect on national laws and on the situation of women. The
changes to the Constitution in 198818 are notable, although they fail to sufficiently
recognize violence against women. A milestone was achieved under Lula: in 2006 a
law against domestic violence (Maria da Penha’s Law) was enacted with the aim of
better punishing domestic violence and protecting victims. In passing the law the
Lula government was reacting to demands made by feminists since the 1980s and to
pressure from the UN and the Inter-American Commission (MacDowell Santos,
2007:47). However, the effect of the law is restricted due to the lack of prosecution
of domestic violence and women’s lack of knowledge of the law (Shadow Report,
2007:9). Under Dilma’s government the law was expanded in order to introduce a
provision that a domestic violence prosecution can be initiated even in the absence
of the affected woman. This means that regardless of the victim’s intentions, the
state is obliged to prosecute gender-based violence (CEDAW, 2012:6).
On a positive note it should be emphasized that due to state support the number
of women’s shelters has risen from 43 (2003) to 68 (2009) and the number of drop-
in centers for women affected by violence has increased from 36 (2003) to
16
This study was carried out in Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, Serbia
and Montenegro, Thailand and Tanzania.
17
Amongst others, in 1995 the so-called Bélem do Pará Convention, the Inter American Conven-
tion to Prevent, Punish and Eradicate Violence Against Women was ratified (MacDowell Santos,
2007:36).
18
The 1988 Constitution provides for the equality of man and woman in the family, as well as the
right to equally inherit land (Lebon, 2003:93). Since 2003 the Civil Code guarantees men and
women equality within marriage, thus also with regard to the rights and duties of marriage. In
addition references to honest women and virgins were removed from a series of laws, as well as
removing a law that allowed a man to annul a marriage if the women was not a virgin and which
allowed parents to reject their daughter as dishonored (Htun & Power, 2006:84; Shadow Report,
2007:8).
146 (2009) (SPM, 2010:147). Furthermore, a national telephone service (Central

Atendimento à Mulher–Ligue 180) has been introduced in order to support women
affected by gender-based violence: numerous SPM campaigns, such as the cam-
paign “16 Days of Activism for an End to Violence against Women” (Campanha
16 dias de ativismo pelo fim da violência contra as mulheres), also raised awareness
of violence against women. In part these campaigns were carried out together with
the women’s movements (SPM, 2010:148ff).
The measures implemented by the Lula government against sexual discrimi-
nation and the promotion of the rights of homosexuals are also remarkable. For
example, in opposition to the conservative political elite and the churches, in 2007
the world’s largest parade for homosexuals, with over two million participants, was
organized in São Paulo with the support of the government. Additionally, in 2008
the first National Conference for Homosexual, Bisexual, Transvestites and
Transsexuals was established (Friedman, 2009:429). Although it was not possible
to legally cement sexual rights, social awareness was raised regarding sexual
discrimination. Brazil is thus “at the forefront, with Lula calling for criminalization
of homophobia and his government taking action both domestically and inter-
nationally” (Friedman, 2009:430).
3.3 Educational Opportunities
Reforming the public education system was high on Lula’s agenda during his
period in office. For example, between 2000 and 2005 the illiteracy rate was
reduced by 2 %; the illiteracy rate of women between 15 and 24 years is slightly
lower than that of men of the same age (cf. Table 20.4). In addition women are
better represented than men at the higher levels of education. Also, in 2011 the
number of women with a secondary education degree (65.7 %) was considerably
higher than that of men (53.5 %) (CEPALSTAT).
Women are also slightly overrepresented amongst university students. This,
however, is qualified if one examines the students according to discipline. Thus,
in 2003 only 30 % of engineering students were female (Shadow Report, 2007:27).
In academic leadership positions women are also underrepresented, although the
glass ceiling becomes more impermeable as female academics age.
There are, however, differences in the quality of the state education system
depending on the geographical origin and sex of the students (Shadow Report,
2007:43). The government has addressed these issues through several projects: on
Table 20.4 Illiteracy in the population ages 15 years and over, by sexes
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 (est.)
Total 31.6 24.0 18.0 15.3 13.1 11.2 9.6 8.2
Men 27.9 22.0 17.1 14.9 13.0 11.3 10.0 8.8
Women 35.2 25.9 18.8 15.7 13.2 11.0 9.3 7.6
the one hand, the SPM and the Technology Council advertise the Women and
Science prize (Mulher e ciência). This rewards school projects and research within
the field of gender relations. On the other hand, the National Plan for Women’s
Policy provides for the education of 120,000 primary school teachers on the
subjects of gender, sexual orientation and discriminating overlaps according to
ethnic background. This is a small step, but certainly one in the right direction
(SPM, 2008:13).
The Brazilian government’s low interest in enhancing equality within academia
is clearly not only through the absence of political measures, but also in the public
data on the subjects of gender and innovation. While the Brazilian government
publishes data according to race and sex in many other areas, such as primary
school education, health and the labor market, there is no data regarding the higher
education system. This removes an importance source for applying pressure for
gender reform in all spheres of the educational system.
3.4 The Labor Market
As has been set out above, Brazilian women are increasingly well educated. This
has also affected their position in the labor market. For example, over the last years
the number of women in the labor market has risen (cf. Table 20.5).
Regarding the distribution of income between the sexes, women earn far less
than men despite having the same qualifications. Although income disparities have
decreased by 10 % between 1996 and 2009, the differences between salaries are still
present. The difference is particularly blatant with regard to well-educated women.
Thus, women who have completed training or study for over 13 years earn on
average 64.2 % of a man’s wage (Table 20.6).
One of the reasons for the wage differences between men and women is the
division of labor: in 2005, 75.4 % of women were employed in the fields of
education, health and social services (Shadow Report, 2007:29). The fields in
which women work are usually receive lower wages than male-dominated fields
such as trade, technical professions or science. Furthermore, a huge number of
lesser-educated women, primarily Afro-Brazilians, work as domestic employees.
Domestic workers occupy a particularly poor position on the labor market as they
usually work in the informal sector and thus have no social security. Some progress
was made in this area under the Lula government. In 2006 a law was passed to
secure pregnant women’s jobs. A further law was enacted to guarantee unemploy-
ment insurance for domestic workers. This unemployment insurance is, however,
not obligatory. Consequently many domestic workers remain excluded. In the 2008
National Plan for Women’s Policy the government again concerned itself with the
position of domestic workers; and at least intended to increase the number of
domestic workers with a Social Security Card by 30 % (SPM, 2008:10).
Women’s situation on the labor market is also challenging as the previously
dominant model of the man as main breadwinner has changed and women are
increasingly earning their household’s main income. This de facto creates a double
20
Table 20.5 Economic participation in % according to sex (from 15 years)

Both sexes Men Women
2000 2005 2010 2020 2000 2005 2010 2020 2000 2005 2010 2020
Argentina 58.7 61.2 62.6 65.2 73.9 74.2 74.6 75.3 44.5 49 51.4 55.8
Bolivia 70.6 71.3 72 74.3 81.8 81.7 81.7 82.4 59.7 61.2 62.7 66.3
Brazil 69.1 69.8 70.3 70.3 82.9 82.6 82.2 80.3 56 57.7 58.9 60.9
Chile 55.8 56.9 58.3 61.2 74.3 73.8 73.8 74.2 38 40.6 43.4 48.6
Gender and Politics in Brazil Between Continuity and Change
385
Table 20.6 Gender wage ratio, by years of education in Brazil

Year Total 0–5 years 6–9 years 10–12 years 13+ years
1995 66.7 59.2 57.3 60.6 53.6
2007 78.0 70.8 66.6 67.5 66.8
2009 76.6 71.8 68.8 67.9 64.2
2011 81.6 73.2 71.3 67.9 70.5
burden for women. On average, women perform 20.8 hours of unpaid work in the
family; men perform only 9.1 hours (Salvador, 2007:46). Public support such as the
Bolsa Famı́lia hardly contributes to overcome this double burden. However, there
are large differences between women with regard to the double burden: well-
educated women usually escape the double burden and remain in the labor market
as they can afford a domestic worker to relieve them of domestic tasks so that they
might maintain a full-time job. In contrast there is a large group of lesser-educated
women who are only periodically active within the labor market and who are not
able to pay a domestic worker to relieve them of household work. They thus do not
have the resources to arrange for paid support with household tasks (Salvador,
2007:11). Consequently it can be stated that the less educated the woman, the
higher the number of hours of unpaid work and the greater the double burden. For
several years the Brazilian government has been working on policies to promote a
better work-life balance. In the National Plan for Women’s Policy, for example, the
government provides for a 12 % expansion of kindergarten places for children
between 1 and 12 years of age. Companies with more than 30 female employees
over the age of 16 are also required to provide childcare for the period during which
a baby is breast-feeding.19 As an alternative, the company must pay the childcare
costs for children up to the age of 6 months. As these must be paid exclusively by
the company this also leads in part to discrimination against women when hiring.
Overall it can be stated that even under Lula, sex and race remained decisive factors
with regard to access to and the situation on the labor market for people with an
otherwise similar level of education and experience (Marquez Garcia, Ñopo, &
Salardi, 2009:4). Current economic data indicates that the goal of gender equality
on the labor market remains an unfulfilled one under Dilma: women are still less
represented on the labor market than men and have a lower income (de Sá, 2012).
As has been shown above, Brazilian women primarily work in less paid fields
such as education, health and social services. Despite this, Brazilian women also
occupy mid-level positions in the economy. Thus, in 2004, 31 % of management
positions in the formal sector were occupied by women (Zoeller Veras, 2008:691).
Increasing numbers of women also start their own companies, although these new
businesses carry greater risk than those founded by men: the Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor shows that only 7.24 % of companies founded by women reach the
19
Brazilian mothers have a right to 1 hour of breastfeeding twice daily. The maternity period
begins 6 weeks before the birth and ends 12 weeks later.
stage of an established company, in contrast to 12.7 % of companies founded by

men (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2007:12). One reason is, that women have
less access to seed capital. Venture capital is particularly important during the
founding phase of a company. A study by Weeks and Seiler (2001:8) shows that in
Brazil a gender gap of 8 % with regard to access to capital exists. Women are also
more likely to found companies than men. This is to a lesser extent due to good
opportunities than to a lack of alternatives.20 Although the Brazilian government
does not have any specific policies for supporting businesswomen, since 2004 it has
established the organization Brazilian Service for the Support of Small and Micro
Companies (Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas,
SEBRAE), a service provider for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs),
and a regional and federal prize for businesswomen.21
3.5 Gender, Race and Regional Differences
The situation for Brazilian women described above must be differentiated

according to regional disparities and race. Brazil is a country of strong contrasts
between rich and poor, north and south, black and white, men and women. These
contrasts are in part due to regional differences that are expressed on the socio-
economic level: the south and central regions have higher social-economic perfor-
mance and are industrialized, while the socio-economic performance of the primar-
ily agricultural north-east is comparatively lower. In addition, Afro-Brazilians
primarily live in the northeast, while the population of the south is primarily
white.22 These social inequalities intersect with ethnic background and are reflected
in the indices of poverty, education, unemployment, access to the labor market and
income. This social divide is further deepened with regard to gender (Lebon,
2003:87–88; Lovell, 2000:90–98). While this link has been addressed in previous
sections, it will now be clarified and illustrated through a number of examples.
Santos et al.’s (2008:149) analysis shows that in Recife and Salvador, in Brazil’s
northeast, around 42 % of people live under the poverty line. In these areas
reduction of gender inequality alone would reduce poverty by 9 %. Racial discrimi-
nation and gender disparities also interrelate with disadvantages in education, the
labor market or access to the health care system. In 2007, for example, Afro-
Brazilian women attended school for an average of 6.5 years, in comparison to
20
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor provides a ratio of 1.50 describing the reason for women
founding a company between necessity and opportunity. The lower the ratio, the more likely it is
that the reason for founding a company was a necessity and not opportunity. The ratio for male
entrepreneurs is 2.0. In comparison, in Denmark the ratio for women is 17.69, although the
difference between the genders is even higher as the ratio for men is 28 % in Denmark (Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2007:20).
21
http://www.mulherdenegocios.sebrae.com.br/site/premio. Accessed 30/11/2014.
22
In 2007, 49.4 % of the population identified themselves as black, 48.8 % identified themselves as
white (Silva et al. 2009:89).
8.18 years for white women, 6.12 for Afro-Brazilian men and 8.4 for white men
(Werneck, 2009:113).
A similar picture arises with regard to the situation on the labor market: in 2006
the unemployment rate for white men was 5.6 %, for Afro-Brazilian men 7.1 %, for
white women 9.6 %, and for Afro-Brazilian women 12.5 %. Thus Afro-Brazilian
women are more strongly affected by unemployment than men. The percentage of
unemployed white women is even higher than that of Afro-Brazilian men (Abramo,
2008:92). Data from the Ministry of Health illustrate the disadvantages experienced
by Afro-Brazilian women within the health system: according to the data only
44.7 % of pregnant Afro-Brazilians attend a pre-natal medical examination in
comparison with 67.1 % of white women (Werneck, 2009:115). A further problem
with which Afro-Brazilian women are confronted with is the large amount of sexual
violence against women, which affects Afro-Brazilian women (55 % in 2007)
considerably more than white women (32 % in 2007) (Werneck, 2009:117).
Consequently, disadvantages based on an ethnic background overlap with gender
discrimination.
Since the 1930s Brazilian presidents have described Brazil as a democracia
racial, claiming equality for all Brazilians regardless of their skin color or race and
promoting a national identity among people with different ethnical backgrounds
(Silva, Luiz, Jaccoud, & Silva, 2009:22). Under the umbrella of the national
identity discourse, however, discussion of ethnic differences and racism was hardly
permitted. As a result of the 1970s and 1980s black movement, amongst others,
social awareness of racism increased (MacDowell Santos, 2007:36; McCallum,
2007:58). The 1988 Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or sex
(Abramo, 2008:88; Silva et al. 2009:27). In the 1990s a discussion developed
regarding the introduction of quotas for Afro-Brazilians in political and educational
institutions, which remains current until today (McCallum, 2007:58,62).23 Under
the Cardoso government, awareness of racial discrimination and inequality
increased. While during this period discrimination was discussed indirectly, under
the Lula government it became a specific part of the political agenda. Lula consid-
ered the interrelation of race and sex with poverty, social inequality and discrimi-
nation on the labor market as a basis of his policy (Abramo, 2008:88–89). In 2003
the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality (Secretaria Especial de
Polı́ticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial, SEPPIR) was finally created
(Bandeira, 2005:6).
23
Not all actors from Afro-Brazilian movements were in favor of the introduction of quotas. Those
in opposition argued that it ought not to be a primary goal to enable access to institutions through
quotas, but rather to overcome social and geographical inequality due to targeted measures
(McCallum, 2007:77).
4 Conclusion
“For the first time in the history of the United Nations, a female voice opens the
General Debate. It is the voice of democracy and equality reverberating from this,
which has the commitment of being the most representative podium in the world. It
is with personal humility, but with my justified pride as a woman, that I meet this
historic moment”.
With her opening speech on the United Nations General Debate Dilma posi-
tioned herself as the first female president of Brazil. She thereby expressed the
hopes of women’s movements that the existing gender disparities in Brazil will
change. This article has shown that a process of change has indeed taken place
under both Lula and Dilma. Historically, the long-lasting interaction between left-
wing parties and the women’s movements symbolizes shared ideological goals and
cooperation. This interrelation has positively influenced the interaction between the
government and the women’s movements. Besides this, the Lula government
introduced several institutional changes and expanded the political agenda. Partic-
ularly the issue of inter-sectionality—the interaction between the categories of sex
and race/ethnicity—was introduced to the political agenda; this can be considered
an important achievement. However, many issues have remained on a symbolic
level and few substantial changes can be observed. It is not yet possible to speak of
comprehensive gender mainstreaming in all areas of government activity. Thus,
gender politics remain on a continuum between change and continuity.
In the fields of economy, education, health and welfare, Lula and Dilma built on
the policies and successes of the previous government. While women are on the
way towards gender equality in education and on the labor market, gender dispar-
ities continue to exist. There are particular contradictions between reform and the
continuation of gender disparities with regard to welfare and reproductive health.
While health care is slowly improving, Afro-Brazilian women remain excluded.
Moreover, the high degree of domestic violence restricts women’s lives. Violence
against women remains a sensitive topic, although the Lula government
counteracted such violence with numerous initiatives. Furthermore, conservative
opponents have limited the decriminalization of abortion. A similar conclusion can
be drawn with regard to the political participation of women. Despite the large
number of feminist activists, few women hold political positions. The fact that the
new president is a woman does represent a breakthrough in politics, but overall
political participation by women is still low. In contrast, the relationship between
the women’s movements and the government has been strengthened by the intro-
duction of institutionalized interfaces and consultations. In fact, the women’s
movements have achieved many small successes. They have thereby demonstrated
that they are an important force for holding the government accountable.
Generally it seems that the policies, state programs and laws that were initiated
under the Lula government are cosmetic. Partly, they do not even represent recent
innovations, but rather are implementations or reformulations of laws that had been
initiated previously. Likewise, it should be considered that overcoming gender
disparities is a long-term process as it implies changing norms, values and the
behavior of men and women. The introduction of gender politics and measures thus
denote a deeper change in politics and society. A comprehensive evaluation of the
policies under Dilma is yet to occur. The discourse of the abortion debate
demonstrates, however, that even under Dilma, the rigid fronts between the
women’s movements and conservative social and political voices have not been
dissolved in regards to gender policy.
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Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Between Self-
Determination and Dependency 21
Dana de la Fontaine
Abstract
Dana de la Fontaine investigates the continuities and ruptures in Brazilian
foreign policy since the 1980s. On the basis of a historical analysis, she states
that Brazil has always been in a conflictive relationship between its external
dependence and the search for international autonomy. Since the development of
modern Brazilian foreign policy in the 1930s, through its cooperation with, as
well as its opposition to, the United States, the country was trying to establish
itself as a sovereign power in South America and pursue its ambition of
becoming a superpower at the international level. The transition to democracy
in the 1980s marks the strengthening of a liberal foreign policy, which had
reached its peak under Cardoso, before it diversified under Lula and Rousseff. It
remains to be seen whether the relationship with China, promoted by Lula as an
alternative international partner to the USA and the EU, will create new room for
maneuver or rather mark the beginning of new dependencies.
1 Introduction1
The former foreign minister of Brazil, Amorim (2010: 215), has stated that Presi-
dent Lula da Silva (2003–2010) aspired to a new international role for Brazil. It
cannot be denied that over the last years Brazil has been recognized more strongly
on the international stage. Factors contributing to this include, amongst others, the
rapid internationalization of the Brazilian economy, its steadfastness in the face of
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, its pro-active role in international forums
1
D. de la Fontaine (*)
GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Maputo, Mozambique
e-mail: danadlf@yahoo.com

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_21
394 D. de la Fontaine
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), as well as in the foundation of new international South-South alliances such
as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, G20+, BRICS, etc. Lula’s successful commitment to
attracting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games has also assured
international attention. In this context the front page of The Economist (2009)
showed Rio de Janeiro’s statue of Christ—the cristo redentor—as a rocket in take-
off. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent Brazil under the administrations
of Lula and Dilma Rousseff took on a new international role, and how this role
might be characterized.
From the theoretical perspective of foreign policy research, the question arises as
to how to fundamentally classify Brazilian foreign policy over the last 25 years and
whether it is possible to detect a change in this foreign policy. Braveboy-Wagner
and Snarr (2003: 23ff.) assert that three models have been established with regard to
the foreign policy analysis of countries in the global South: the compliance model
uses a realistic perspective to explain the behavior of a state which is seen as
dependent towards another dominant state as bargaining, or as an attempt to achieve
relative gains of political power. Based on dependency-theory considerations, the
consensus model argues that the foreign policy behavior of states in the global
South can be attributed to the effects of foreign policy elites in the periphery and
semi-periphery (i.e. in developing and emerging countries) and in the center (in the
industrialized countries). Finally, the statist approach to counter-dependence model
draws on a state-centered explanation in arguing that developing and emerging
countries, despite their relative weakness in relation to dominant states, still possess
sufficient autonomy to be able to make independent foreign policy decisions and
even take up anti-hegemony positions.
Observing Brazil’s foreign policy behavior since its independence from Portugal
in 1822, it becomes clear that a constant is formed by its strategic positioning, or
more precisely its oscillation, between the great powers—i.e. first Portugal and
Great Britain, then the USA and the USSR (Cervo & Bueno, 2008). Thus Brazil
either strengthened or weakened its political cooperation with the great powers
according to internal interests and external forces. Due to its territorial size, large
population, natural resources, and agricultural export economy, Brazil was able to
secure a relative amount of foreign policy independence. To boost national devel-
opment—which was first agricultural, but from the twentieth century onwards also
industrial—Brazil was always dependent on cooperation with the respective world
powers and leading economic states which provided key markets for Brazilian
exports, as well as being sources of financial and technological goods.
In the context of the end of the Lula government, the question arises as to the
relationship between the country’s external dependence and its self-determination
in the field of foreign policy. In view of the rise of China as a political and economic
world power, this question is of central importance, as the Asian economic market
has ousted the USA as Brazil’s most important trade partner since 2009–2010.
Under the circumstances, the extent to which the oscillation of Brazil’s foreign and
trade policy, described above, will continue today between China and the USA
stands to debate.
21 Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Between Self-Determination and Dependency 395
Regarding the structure of the chapter: To begin with, Sect. 2 provides a brief
review of the history of Brazilian foreign policy until the 1980s. Section 3 considers
the significant reforms that accompanied the end of the military dictatorship (1964–
1985) and the return to democracy. Following this, Sects. 4 and 5 compare the
foreign policy orientation of the governments of Henrique Cardoso (PSDB, 1995–
2002) and Inácio Lula da Silva (PT, 2003–2010). The conclusion outlines the extent
to which the current President, Dilma Rousseff (PT), in power since 2011, has
maintained Lula’s foreign policy guidelines, or whether she is setting new accents.
2 The Development of Modern Brazilian Foreign Policy
One of the central foundations of modern Brazilian foreign policy was laid in the
1930s with the establishment of the developing state (Estado Novo) and the
introduction of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) under President Getúlio
Vargas. The Estado Novo was constitutionally established in 1937 (Barrios, 1999:
118). The role of the developing state became clearer through its business-like
demeanor, which with its aim of national industrialization had a structuring effect
on both domestic and foreign trade and policy (Cervo & Bueno, 2008: 457ff.). This
step initiated the end of the liberal-conservative foreign policy paradigm of the
republican period (1889–1933), which was primarily focused on the export of
primary goods (see Chap. 2 and Cervo, 2008: 44ff.).
The main reason for this politico-economic change and thus also the change in
foreign policy orientation was a shift in social and political power in the context of
the global financial crisis of the 1920s–1930s and its devastating impact on the
Brazilian economy. On the one hand the loss of the terms of trade on the world
market had negative consequences for agricultural exports, and on the other there
was no quick recovery due to the increased protectionism of the industrial nations in
reaction to the global recession. While until the 1930s the country’s economic and
political development was determined by the major land owners of the coffee and
sugar plantations and by livestock breeders, the advent of industrialization in the
twentieth century strengthened the position of urban businessmen and the urban
workforce, who advocated national industrialization or the modernization of the
economy and the political system. The ISI was intended to garner greater scope of
action for domestic companies, in order to create long-term economic and political
independence, or a reduction of externally induced susceptibility to crises (Barrios,
1999: 119, cf. Chap. 15).
Foreign policy played an important role in the ISI system, although the following
division of labor was established (Cason & Power, 2009: 122ff.; Lima & Hirst,
2006): The task of managing ISI foreign policy fell to the Foreign Ministry
(Itamaraty). This meant that Itamaraty concerned itself with the best conditions
for the ISI’s development, which included the input of foreign currency and the
securing of international markets for Brazilian products. The most important export
products in the 1930s were still from the primary sector (coffee, sugar, minerals,
metals, etc.), but over the course of the following decades this came to include
products from the secondary sector (i.e. manufactured and semi-manufactured

products from the agricultural and livestock sectors; the steel, iron and automobile
industries; and the aerospace industry). Foreign currencies (primarily the US$)
were indispensable for the purchase of capital, industry and consumer goods on
the world market, without which the industrialization project could not have been
realized. While directing foreign policy was left to Itamaraty, the President (i.e. the
leader of the executive) was responsible for domestic policy. Thus, important
international negotiations were generally led by the Foreign Minister, the senior
representatives in Itamaraty and important embassies overseas. The president did
not usually take part in international negotiations or played only a representative
role (Cason & Power, 2009: 121ff.). With regard to the instrumental use of foreign
policy for the interests of the ISI, the notion was coined that Brazilian foreign policy
was primarily foreign trade policy (see Lima, 2005: 5).
As the ISI development strategy was maintained until the 1990s, so was the
concomitant foreign policy orientation described above, although variations can be
observed (Almeida, 2007). Differing positions arose with regard to the question of
what the respective governments or existing power relations considered to be the
optimal international alliance for the realization of national industrialization (Costa
Vaz & Inoue, 2007: 4). A constant source of disagreement was the question of how
Brazil should position itself in relation to the global power of the USA (Barrios,
1999: 116ff.; Boeckh, 2003). The literature (see Cervo, 1998 and Saraiva, 2008)
generally identifies two camps: The liberal camp sought to maintain proximity to
the USA with regard to foreign policy. The most important sectors that supported
this camp were parts of the armed forces, the agricultural oligarchy, and the state
apparatus (above all from the Trade and Finance Ministries). The armed forces and
its representative, the Ministry of Defense, played an important role in foreign
policy, primarily during the military dictatorship (1964–1985). Thus during this
period the fundamental aim of foreign policy (development or industrialization)
was expanded to include components of national security policy.2 The second
position with regard to the question of Brazil’s relation to the USA was held by
the Universalist camp, which spoke out for independent foreign policy and against a
too great proximity to the USA. Of particular importance to the Universalists was
the diversification of trade relations with non-traditional trade partners in the global
South and Brazil’s further development from peripheral supplier of primary
resources to an industrial country (Ibid.). This position was supported by aspiring
and usually not yet competitive industrial sectors and by parts of the state apparatus,
which were strong in the Foreign Ministry (Burges, 2009; Moniz-Bandeira, 2006).
It is possible to observe strong fluctuations between these two foreign policy
positions, particularly in the context of the East-West conflict. The autonomous
2
This was based, on the one hand, on defense against communist influences in the South American
region, and on the other—in keeping with Brazilian ambitions to become a superpower—on the
attempt to achieve national independence from the import of technology, energy, financial and
military products (Costa Vaz, 2008: 3).
strand was essentially dominant in the 1960s (with the exception of 1964–1967 and
1969–1974), the 1970s and 1980s; the liberal position was dominant in the 1950s
and again from the 1990s.
Drawing on the autonomous position, Brazil’s political leadership profiled itself
internationally, at times, as a developing country and a part of the global South.
This favored cooperation with the USSR, China and other developing countries, as
well as a pragmatic distancing from the USA (Lima & Hirst, 2006). This approach
was prominent until 1964 under the Quadros and Goulart government and in the
context of the energy crises under General Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) (Barrios,
1999: 94ff., 101ff.). Thus Brazil in the 1960s under Quadros and Goulart engaged in
regional integration, with the entry to the Latin American Free Trade Association
(ALALC), but also became more open towards Asia and Africa. For example, the
Costa e Silva government (1967–1973) expanded cooperation with Africa in search
of new markets and new sources of natural resources (de la Fontaine & Seifert,
2010a, 2010b). In the process the concept of South-South alliances was consciously
used as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy.
In contrast, during other phases, Brazil considered itself to be an aspiring
industrial nation, which sought to be integrated into the world market in close
cooperation with the USA. The cooperation with the USA was also hoped to
provide preferential access to the US market for exports from the primary sector,
to external financial aid, and to credit for industrialization and military equipment.
On this basis Brazil intended to strengthen its ambitions of power and its role as a
sub-imperial power, that is, as the USA’s representative in the South American
region (Barrios, 1999: 85, 97ff.). In periods when this liberal position was dominant
Brazil reduced its cooperation with socialist states, worked actively to prevent the
spread of communism on the Latin American continent, and took a neutral position
with regard to the Third World Movement.
Despite the formation of these rival camps, however, Brazil’s foreign policy
demonstrated relative constancy, although this was admittedly fractured at the end
of the 1980s as a result of deep structural and political changes in the country. Thus
in the 1980s and 1990s, according to Barrios (1999: 12), three changes took place in
the national and international context that had a considerable impact on Brazilian
foreign policy:
1. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy brought with it a regime

change on the political level, which meant an end of the “doctrine of national
security” (doutrina da segurança nacional) propagated by the armed forces, and
a renunciation of its conflict-laden neighborhood policy towards, for example,
Argentina (Grabendorff, 2010: 18).
2. As a result of the energy and debt crisis and the stagnation of industrial
development in the 1980s, the ISI entered a deep crisis, which led to market
liberalization and a change of economic system under President Collor de Mello
(PRN, 1990–1992) (MRE, 1996: 340). For foreign policy this meant an even
stronger focus on foreign trade and on promoting Brazilian competitiveness in
the regional and global context.
3. The collapse of the USSR and the end of the East-West conflict, the global-
ization of market liberalism, and the establishment of US American unipolarity
all affected Brazilian foreign policy.
It is thus possible to observe that as part of a repositioning of foreign policy the

strategies of both the Universalists and the liberals were followed. Cooperation was
intensified both within the South American region (including the founding of
Mercosul in 1994) and with the USA. The collapse of the USSR caused a brief
pause in Brazil’s oscillation between world powers in the 1990s under the Collor,
Franco and Cardoso governments. This first changed again under the Lula govern-
ment (see Sects. 4 and 5).
3 The Institutional Structure of Brazilian Foreign Policy

Since 1985
According to Article 84 of the Brazilian Constitution (1988) there should be a

relative balance between the executive and the legislature with regard to the
shaping of foreign policy. In this area, however, there is a discrepancy between
the de jure specified and the de facto existing division of power.3 De facto the
president’s influence grew substantially under the Cardoso and Lula governments,
which led to a relative loss of power for the traditionally strong Itamaraty and the
legislative, as well as to a new distribution of foreign policy powers from the
mid-1990s. Cason and Power Cason and Power (2009: 119ff.) and Vigevani and
Oliveira Vigevani and Oliveira (2007), amongst others, have used the term presi-
dential diplomacy to describe the strengthening of the president’s role in foreign
policy.
Castro Neves (2008: 376) attributes the fact that the legislative (Congresso
Nacional) does not concern itself with foreign policy in general—with the excep-
tion of the foreign policy committees in both chambers—on the one hand to the fact
that foreign policy was previously directed, above all, by Itamaraty, and on the
other that the representatives and senators on the federal level have not demon-
strated great interest in foreign policy. Thus, the legislative generally only concerns
itself in retrospect with decisions made by the executive regarding foreign policy,
as in the case of the ratification or rejection of international agreements. The
legislature only involves itself in foreign policy decision-making in exceptional
cases. Examples of such exceptions include the negotiations surrounding the
foundation of Mercosul at the beginning of the 1990s, regarding the ALCA/
FTAA, in conjunction with the discussions on the creation of a US military base
in Brazil in 2000–2001, as well as during the negotiations surrounding Venezuela’s
entry into Mercosul. In that case, for example, conservative majorities in the
3
Regarding foreign policy competencies according to the Constitution see (Sanchez, Silva,
Spécie, & Cardoso, 2006).
Brazilian congress under Lula’s government blocked the ratification of Venezuela’s

2006 Accession Treaty to Mercosul until the end of 2009, as they were suspicious of
Hugo Chávez’s populist government (Burges, 2007: 1346). The judicial branch
plays an even smaller role in foreign policy, its interventions take place—if at all—
in an ad-hoc manner. Moreover, Cason and Power (2009) indicate that there was an
increase in the influence of institutional and social actors (such as trade associ-
ations, NGOs and social movements, amongst others) on foreign policy during
this period.
4 The Opening of Foreign Policy Under Fernando Henrique

Cardoso
Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007a, 2007b) differentiate between two paradigms in their
study of the Cardoso and Lula governments’ foreign policy orientations. Cardoso’s
foreign policy (PSDB, 1995–2002) is identified with the paradigm “foreign policy
autonomy through integration” (autonomia pela integração), as it focused primar-
ily on raising Brazil’s economic competitiveness through regional or international
integration. To this effect Cardoso pursued so-called open regionalism with a focus
on Mercosul in the South American region, although it is the authors’ opinion that
this was primarily related to economic expansion and the maintenance of Brazil’s
position as a regional leader. In contrast, foreign policy under Lula’s government,
which will be examined in more detail below, is identified with the paradigm
“foreign policy autonomy through diversification” (autonomia pela diversificação).
Cardoso’s strategy of open regionalism followed neo-structuralism or
neo-cepalism as a middle way between structuralism, one the one hand, which
was favored by CEPAL and which drew on Raul Prebisch’s dependency theory
(1949, amongst others), and neo-liberalism on the other (Burges, 2007: 9). While
structuralism envisaged a strong developing state and the pursuit of industrial-
ization independent of industrialized nations by means of the ISI, the neo-liberal
concept sought a strong market, the reduction of protectionist measures and inte-
gration into the world market.
As a result of the mix of these two concepts, the so-called neo-liberal turn was
not as extreme in Brazil as in other countries in the region, such as Chile. Ulti-
mately, trade and financial policy was still determined by the state. Nevertheless,
foreign trade was gradually liberalized and companies were given a strong role in
foreign relations and their international expansion and search for new markets was
supported by the state. Cardoso encouraged Brazil’s regional integration into
Mercosul and the gradual involvement of the country in the world market. In
addition, cooperation was intensified with the most important trade partners: the
USA, the EU and Japan. Admission to the WTO in its founding year (1995) was an
important step for Brazil’s opening to the world market (Barrios, 1999).
In particular, cooperation with the USA played a central role in Cardoso’s
foreign policy: Brazil recognized and subordinated itself to the USA’s
uni-polarity. Thus Cardoso did not—in contrast to Lula later on—formulate
criticism regarding the US-driven project of a Pan-American free trade area FTAA/
ALCA or the Washington Consensus4. The South American Free Trade Area
ALCSA (Associação de Livre Comércio Sul Americana), a project developed
under the preceding government of Itamar Franco (1992–1994), was not further
developed by Cardoso’s government (Bernal-Meza, 2006). At the same time,
however, cooperation with other emerging nations such as China, India and
South Africa, which was also initiated under Itamar Franco, was raised to a new
institutional level under the leitmotif of strategic partnership (MRE, 1996, 1997;
Saraiva, 2008: 136). Cardoso was also committed to cooperation with other devel-
oping countries, although cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa
and Asia was emphasized. This was institutionalized with the foundation of the
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade de Paı́ses de Lı́ngua
Portuguesa, CPLP) in 1996 (Ribeiro, 2007).
5 Foreign Policy Differentiation Under Luiz Inácio Lula da

Silva
As noted above, according to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007a, 2007b), Lula—in

contrast to Cardoso—followed the paradigm “foreign policy autonomy through
diversification”. Lula thereby freed himself from the Cardoso government’s foreign
policy focus on the South American region and on industrial nations. This broad-
ened Brazil’s scope for action to include a stronger focus on other emerging and
developing countries under the name of South-South alliances. In this way Lula
signaled that under his presidency Brazil would not allow regional or global alli-
ances and trade policy to be determined by the USA or the EU. Important
milestones in this regard were Brazil’s blockade during the free trade round of
the WTO (Doha Development Round) in 2003 in Cancun and of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA) in 2005. In neither of these forums was Brazil
able to assert access to markets for Brazilian export goods (above all from the
agricultural sector) in the face of the US and EU’s protectionist stances and thus
decided to boycott the FTAA and, in the context of the WTO, to lead opposition by
forming South-South alliances such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum with India and
South Africa (de la Fontaine, 2007; de la Fontaine & Stehnken, 2013).
According to Saraiva, with this strategy Lula pursued a foreign policy pragma-
tism, which cannot be clearly attributed to either the foreign policy wing of the
Autonomistas or that of the liberals, but is rather a mix of both. However the author
recognizes parallels to the foreign policy of the so-called responsible pragmatism,
4
According to Williamson (2000: 251), the so called Washington Consensus refers to the
agreement between international financial institutions with their seat in Washington DC in the
1990s, such as the World Bank or the IMF, which held that credit to indebted countries in Latin
America should only be provided on the basis of restructuring measures (such as reductions in
public spending, fighting inflation, privatization of state companies, deregulation of the trade and
finance sectors, and the international opening of domestic markets).
which under General Geisel in the 1970s attempted to free Brazil from external
dependency on the USA and expand its scope for foreign policy action in the
context of the energy crises. Key to this, for example, is the fact that Lula
maintained the Cardoso government macro-economic guidelines, although—in
contrast to Cardoso—Lula encouraged trade and export growth more strongly
than the financial sector (Mineiro, 2008).
By taking this position Lula did not oppose integration into the world market or
cooperation with industrial countries, or even the establishment of international
institutions such as the United Nations. On the contrary, Lula’s government
strongly advocated the recreation of the mechanisms of the world market and of
international politics according to its own interests. On the one hand Lula advocated
liberalization of agricultural trade and resisted unfair subsidies in industrial states.
On the other hand, however, Lula was not able to achieve other important elements
of his foreign policy agenda, such as the reform of the United Nations and Brazil’s
candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council (which failed primarily as a
result of blockades by the USA and China).
With regard to the relationship with the USA it is notable that a rapprochement
between Brazil and the USA can only be observed from 2009, when US President
Obama sought closer cooperation with emerging economies, including Brazil. This
saw the end of the attitude of critical distance which the Lula government held
towards the Bush Jr. government and which denounced the Washington Consensus,
trade protectionism in the context of the WTO, the negotiations surrounding the
FTAA/ALCA, as well as the unilateral international approach of the world and
military power since September 11, 2001 (which was partially based on violence)—
such as the Iraq war from 2003. Brazil was particularly displeased with the USA’s
undermining of South or Latin American autonomy with regard to security through
the reactivation of the IV Fleet and the opening of seven military bases on
Columbian territory during the Bush administration (Cervo, 2010: 16). For the
Obama administration, Brazil was now no longer merely the leader of the “rebel-
lious South” but rather a strategic partner, which allowed Brazil to present itself as
the speaker for the moderate, progressive governments in Latin America
(Pecequilo, 2010: 142). With regard to foreign trade, trade between the USA and
Brazil grew strongly between 2003 and 2008 from US$26 billion to US$52 billion,
however this fell to US$47 billion in 2010 as a result of the global financial crisis.
Of key significance in this area is the historic fact that from 2010 China replaced the
USA as Brazil’s most important bilateral trade partner (see Table 21.2). Neverthe-
less in 2010 the USA took Argentina’s place as the most important location for
Brazilian direct investment. Direct investments by Brazilian companies in the USA
grew from 13 % in 2001 to 37 % in 2010 (Cervo, 2010: 20).
Brazil’s relations with the states of the European Union (EU) have developed
hesitantly under Lula (Cervo, 2010: 26). On the one hand there was the failed
implementation of the free trade agreement (Acuerdo Marco Interregional de
Cooperaci on Economica y Comercial) between Mercosul and the EU, in existence
since 1995. This was primarily a result of the fact that Brazil accused the EU of
unfair behavior, as EU agricultural subsidies or tariff and non-tariff trade barriers
Table 21.1 Brazilian foreign trade with main EU countries from 2006 (US$ billion)
2006 Export to Netherlands 5.7 Germany 5.6 Italy 3.8
Import from Germany 6.5 France 2.8 Italy 2.5
2008 Export to Netherlands 10.4 Germany 8.8 Italy 4.7
Import from Germany 12.0 France 4.6 Italy 4.6
2010 Export to Netherlands 10.2 Germany 8.1 England 4.6
Import from Germany 12.5 Italy 4.8 France 4.8
Source: http://www.mdic.gov.br/
were not removed, while at the same time the Mercosul states were not granted any
generous protective measures in the industrial and service sectors. In the face of the
Brazilian blockade the EU did change its strategy, focusing more strongly on Brazil
and less on the sub-region—in 2007 the EU named Brazil a strategic partner, along
with seven other states.5 After all, Brazil makes up 80 % of the economic power of
Mercosul and the EU ca. 22 % of Brazilian foreign trade (however trade with Brazil
only makes up 1.8 % of total EU foreign trade). The subsequent EU-Brazil
summits, which take place at the ministerial level, have not been able to resolve
the existing points of conflict (Ibid.). Moreover, the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009 has slowed economic relations: foreign trade between the EU states and Brazil
in 2006–2008 grew much more strongly than in 2008–2010. Brazil’s important
trade partners in Europe remain Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy (see
Table 21.1).
5.1 Brazil’s Traditional and New South-South Alliances
Saraiva, drawing on Lima (2005), differentiates between Brazil’s traditional and

new South-South alliances. Previous and traditional South-South alliances were
focused on expanding cooperation on the sub-regional level through, for example,
Mercosul. The new South-South alliances are far broader and supra regional. It is
possible to differentiate between new (bi- and multilateral) South-South alliances
with (a) system affecting states6 and (b) structurally weak developing states.
With regard to traditional South-South alliances, i.e. regional integration
projects, Brazil under Lula advocated a consolidation of Mercosul as the most
important foreign market for Brazilian manufactured products (cf. Baumann, 2010:
41), but also gradually sought to free itself from the focus on Mercosul in order to
intensify cooperation with the South or Latin American region overall (Saraiva,
2010b: 152). Significant advances in this respect include the summit of South
5
USA, Canada, Japan, China, Russia, India and South Africa.
6
The term system affecting state, originally coined by Keohane (1969), describes states, which
despite their relative lack of resources and negotiation power vis-à-vis the world powers attempt to
exercise international influence through alliances with similar countries.
American presidents which has taken place since 2000, the 2004 foundation of a
union of South American nations under the name CASA or its further development
into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) from 2008, as well as the
regional infrastructure and integration project (IIRSA)7 (Burges, 2009).
In the early stages of the Lula government, CASA was primarily a regional
alternative to the Pan-American free trade area FTAA/ALCA, which was conceived
as part of the Plan Colombia and promoted by the USA. UNASUL was more self-
centered and geared towards the integration of the Andean community and of
Mercosul. UNASUL’s founding agreement was signed in Brasilia in 2008 and
came into force in 2011. From the Brazilian perspective, UNASUL was promoted
as an alternative to the Venezuelan integration project (ALBA) and as a platform
for the South American Defense Council, the latter intended to avert the influence
of foreign powers (Cervo, 2010: 18). The IIRSA project, which has been concreti-
zing since 2002, was geared towards the development of regional infrastructure
between twelve Latin American countries in the areas of transportation, communi-
cation and electricity, amongst others. An important IIRSA project, for example, is
the development of hydroelectric power stations on the borders between Brazil,
Uruguay, Argentina and Peru, as well as the road network in the Amazon region
between Brazil and neighboring states. With loans and credit from the national
development bank (BNDES) Brazil has distinguished itself as the most important
financier of the IIRSA: until 2008, US$56 billion were spent on IIRSA investment
projects (Flemes & Westermann, 2009: 5).
This expansion of economic and political cooperation with structurally weak
states certainly strengthened disparities in the region. For example, the smaller
members of Mercosul, who are dependent on trade with Brazil—Argentina,
Uruguay and Paraguay—generally had to bear the greatest costs of integration, a
fact which became especially visible during the financial crisis of 1998–1999 and
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Cervo, 2010: 24). In this context, Flynn
(2007) drawing on Marini (1972), speaks of a Brazilian sub-imperial attitude;
Visentini (2007) speaks of “soft imperialism”. Burges (2008, 2009) understands
the way that Brazil exercises its power as consensual hegemony, according to which
Brazil attempts to gain acceptance for its regional leadership through incentives
rather than through force.
In this context, Lula’s government initiated two regional redistributive
mechanisms—Mercosul’s structural fund FOCEM and the Bank of the South—
which were intended to contribute to a reduction of disparity in the region. FOCEM
was established in 2005 in order to reduce the economic asymmetry between
member states of Mercosul. Brazil contributes 70 %, Argentina 27 %, Uruguay
2 % and Paraguay 1 % to the total budget of US$100 million per annum. The Bank
of the South—originally initiated by the Venezuelan president Chávez—was
drafted as a multilateral financing mechanism for South American countries in
order to provide an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank group. It was to
7
see www.iirsa.org
encompass a development bank, a stabilization fund and a South American cur-

rency. The Bank of the South was intended to develop South America’s inde-
pendence of the IMF and the World Bank. The bank was launched in 2009 and
today forms part of UNASUL’s structures. To date it has had a total volume of
ca. US$7 billion (Ugarteche, 2007, 2008, 2009). Although there was strong political
resistance to participation in the Bank of the South—opponents advocated the
regional expansion of the Brazilian development bank BNDES—Lula pushed
through Brazil’s participation in order to prevent Venezuela from taking the leading
role, amongst other reasons (Burges, 2007: 1344).
With regard to alliances with system affecting states from outside the region, the
Lula administration distinguished itself through intensive cooperation with China,
India, Russia and South Africa. According to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, trade
between Brazil and the other BRIC states grew from ca. US$10 billion to US$50
billion between 2003 and 2008, a fact which can be attributed to the growth of trade
with China from US$7 billion to US$56 billion between 2003 and 2010. In contrast,
Brazilian trade with Russia between 2003 and 2008 grew from US$2 billion to
US$8 billion and trade with India from US$1 billion to US$5 billion (see
Table 21.2).
The fact that since 2010 the People’s Republic of China and not the USA has
been Brazil’s most important trade partner is evidence of the success of Lula’s
strategy of foreign policy diversification. An important step in this direction was
Chinese president Hu Jintao’s state visit to Brazil in 2004 and Lula’s subsequent
state visit to China, accompanied by the largest Brazilian trade delegation to date
(Lessa, 2010: 124). As does the USA and EU, China considers Brazil a strategic
partner, a fact which was emphasized by Lula and Hu Jintao’s signing of the Brazil
and China Joint Action Plan in 2010. The expansion of cooperation with China,
which is focused on foreign trade, has markedly changed the structures of Brazilian
foreign policy. In 2010 it became clear that China is above all an important market
for Brazilian primary resources (iron ore and derivatives 40 %, soya and derivatives
25 %, crude oil products 13 %, cellulose 3 % and sugar 2 %) and only minimally for
manufactured and semi-manufactured products for example from the aerospace
sector (1 %).8 Brazil, on the other hand, imports 70 % of its manufactured and semi-
Table 21.2 Brazil’s foreign trade in US$ billion (2003/2008/2010)

Asia China LACa Mercosul USA EU Africa
2003 - 7 - 11 26 26 12
2008 98 37 79 35 52 82 26
2010 112 56 79 38 47 87 21
a
Latin America and the Caribbean including Mercosul
Sources: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria
e Comércio Exterior, Banco Central do Brasil
8
Data from the Brazil China Trade Chamber of Commerce, see: www.ccibc.com.br
manufactured products such as electronic equipment and chemical products from

China (Oliveira, 2010: 102). Moreover, China is an important source of credit and
foreign investment. For example, according to CEPAL (2009: 37), the Brazilian oil
company Petrobras has received over US$10 billion in credit from the Chinese
development bank for the expansion of new deep-sea oil fields. In return, Brazil has
delivered over 150,000 barrels of oil daily to China since 2009. The question
remains unanswered as to what extent Brazil is dependent on China with regard
to the export of raw materials and the import of consumer goods, and whether its
domestic economic development is thus highly susceptible to crisis as a result of
fluctuations in supply and demand, and also whether Brazil’s competitiveness in the
manufactured goods sector has been reduced (Baumann, 2010: 43).
With regard to Brazil’s multilateral networks with other emerging countries the
following South-South alliances are also significant: the India, Brazil, South Africa
Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and BRICS. These alliances have strengthened Brazil’s
position on the international level, above all within multilateral organizations such
as the WTO or the United Nations. Under Lula, these alliances generally had the
character of forums which decision-making processes were largely concentrated on
the heads of government of participating countries and which had a very low degree
of institutionalization. This meant that the foundational agreements were followed
by regular meetings, without great expense, of different levels of the executive
(heads of government, as well as Foreign, Trade and Defense Ministers, etc.) to
discuss the realization of shared projects. Thus the IBSA Trust Fund, with its US$6
million annually, has more of a symbolic character. With respect to multilateral
alliances with states from outside the region, cooperation was intensified with
African, Arab and South-East Asian states, which led to a trade agreement between
Mercosul and the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 2004, as well as to the
first Summit of South American-Arab Countries in 2005, and to the foundation of
the Africa-South American Cooperation Forum in 2006.
In view of this intensified cooperation with African countries, there is talk of a
rebirth of Brazil’s transatlantic relations (Saraiva, 2010a). As with China and India,
both political and economic relations with Africa were expanded. Lula made a
significant contribution to this development; he was the first Brazilian president to
travel annually to Africa, usually accompanied by a local trade delegation (de la
Fontaine & Seifert, 2010a, 2010b). Lula opened numerous diplomatic missions on
the African continent and recognized Brazil’s historic debt to the African region
due to the practice of slavery which was carried on for centuries (Maihold, 2007).
Under Lula, Brazilian-African trade rose between 2003 and 2008 by ca. 400 %,
from US$12 billion to US$26 billion; this represents ca. 8–9 % of Brazilian foreign
trade (MRE, 2009a, 2009b). While Brazil exports primarily sugar and sugar
derivatives, meat and manufactured products and services to Africa, it imports oil
and further primary resources such as animal and plant products (Lechini, 2008:
69).
Overall, with regard to the development of Brazilian foreign trade, Baumann
(2010: 37ff.) has established that its share of GDP rose from 18 % in the 1990s to
ca. 26 % in the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2009 exports rose around 180 % and
imports around 130 %. Significant for Brazil’s overall economic development is the
fact that due to the rising share of primary goods, a re-primarization of the export
economy is taking place. In 2000 Brazil exported 20 % primary goods, 15 % semi-
manufactured goods and 60 % manufactured goods. In 2009 however this was 40 %
primary goods, 15 % semi-manufactured goods and 43 % manufactured goods.
Overall Brazil’s share in world trade is still relatively small, with 1.06 % (2002–
2008). Due to the constant internationalization (promoted by BNDES) of Brazilian
banks and large companies—such as Petrobras in the energy sector, Embraer in the
aerospace sector, Vale de Rio Doce and Gerdau in mining, or Camargo Correa and
Odebrecht in the construction industry—Brazil’s role in the world market will
certainly continue to grow. Further evidence of this is the growing volume of
foreign investment by these companies, which grew from practically zero in 1990
to US$25 billion in 2006 (Baumann, 2010: 45; Stolte & de la Fontaine, 2012).
During the global financial crisis 2008–2009 Brazil considerably expanded its
international role through, amongst other things, its pro-active attitude in the G-20
Finance (an association of the 20 most important economies, responsible for 90 %
of the world’s economic production). Strengthened by having amortized its foreign
debt,9 robust economic growth and a surprising resistance to the effects of the
global financial crisis (see Pecequilo, 2010: 143), Lula’s government, together with
other emerging countries, advocated for a re-orientation of international financial
structures. This was, for example, expressed through the provision of US$10 billion
in the form of special drawing rights to the IMF. Lula celebrated this act as a
historic moment in Brazilian history and the then finance minister Guido Mantega
explained that it was the first time that Brazil lent money to the IMF and thus moved
from the role of debtor to creditor.10
5.2 Foreign Policy Solidarity and Brazil’s Emerging Role as Donor
In similarity to his economic and welfare-oriented domestic policy guidelines, Lula

pursued a foreign policy that was both pragmatic and internationally formed. This
meant that Lula’s foreign policy pursued national development goals on a prag-
matic level (including the development of domestic agriculture and industry,
economic growth, expansion of foreign trade, integration into the regional and
world markets, regional stability etc.). It also sought, however, to combine this
with the postulate of international solidarity (MRE, 2009b: 262). This international
solidarity can be identified on the ideological-programmatic level, above all, in the
program of the PT from its opposition period (Almeida, 2009: 173).
According to Stehnken (2007) the typically “leftist” elements of Lula’s foreign
policy were considerably less strong than the economic-pragmatic interests. This is
9
In 2005 Brazil settled its foreign debt of US$15.57 bn. with the IMF.
10
“Brasil confirma compra de US$10 bilhões em tı́tulos do FMI”, in: O Globo Online
(05.10.2009).
not remarkable if one considers that Lula did not belong to the left wing of the PT
but rather to the moderate middle (campo majorit ario) (Schmalz, 2008: 93). Thus
Lula’s foreign policy did not merely reproduce the “third world discourse” of the
1960s,11 but—according to Lima (2005: 10) and Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007a,
2007b: 290)—rather demonstrated analogies to the Geisel government (1974–
1979) and to the “responsible pragmatism” foreign policy paradigm (see above).
The ideological contradiction between a liberal foreign trade policy and the inter-
nationalist goals was strengthened by the fact that Lula’s ability to govern depended
on a coalition with the conservative Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, which
generally supported liberal foreign policy. This led to strong conflict within the PT,
which involved a shift to the right within the party (Hunter, 2008: 23ff.).
However, the fact ought not to be ignored that alongside the fight against
extreme poverty and hunger within Brazil itself, a key foreign policy objective of
Lula’s government was also the pursuit of a more just and peaceful world order
through the expansion of Brazilian development cooperation with countries in
Latin America, the Caribbean and on the African continent (IPEA, 2010). Ayllon
Pino and Costa Leite (2010) describe this foreign policy dimension as “diplomatic
solidarity” which—according to the official discourse—aimed at reducing eco-
nomic disparity between Brazil and other developing countries, as well as reducing
resentment towards Brazil’s aspirations to power.
Brazil’s transformation from recipient to donor country was especially promi-
nent during Lula’s government. While the UN Economic and Social Council
ECOSOC (2008: 11) states that in 2008 Brazil provided ca. US$350 million for
donor activities, in 2010—according to The Economist (2010)—the budget for
technical, financial and humanitarian aid grew to over US$4 billion, of which
credits and loans made up the greatest part. 52 % of these bilateral, technical
services went to Africa, 37 % to Latin America and the Caribbean, and 10 % to
Asia and Oceania (Costa Vaz, 2008). Brazil’s multilateral donor activity also grew
considerably under Lula, for example through regional funds or the United Nations
and its agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO etc.). For example in 2010 Brazil
donated food products to the value of US$300 million to the World Food Program
(The Economist, 2010).
Brazil’s efforts in the context of UN international peacekeeping missions
presented a new dimension of Brazilian development cooperation. In 2004 Brazil
led the military component of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH (Mission
des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haı̈ti) in Haiti, which Brazil also
accompanied with a development program. With contributions of US$350 million
in 2010, Brazil was the second greatest contributor to the fund for the reconstruction
11
The Quadros (1961) and Goulart (1961–1964) governments took a cautious position with regard
to the USA under the paradigm of “independent foreign policy”, which involved closer coopera-
tion with the USSR, China and other states in the socialist block, such as China (Cervo, 1998:
69ff.).
of Haiti, after Saudi Arabia (Costa Leite, Suyama, Trajber Waisbich, Pomeroy
et al., 2014; Valler Filho, 2007).
Although the official discourse maintained that there are no conditions attached
to Brazilian donor activity, it cannot be overlooked that political and economic
interests played an important role in the allocation of development aid. The fact that
it was not technical but above all financial aid that grew most strongly under Lula
indicates the economic priorities of the Brazilian government. Thus loans and
credits from BNDES were provided for the construction of large infrastructure
projects such as hydroelectric power stations, roads, etc. in other countries, which in
turn were carried out by Brazilian companies or from which Brazil also experienced
a direct benefit—such as the possibility of importing energy through supporting
hydroelectric projects at the Itaipú dam on the border between Brazil and Paraguay,
or the search for new markets for Brazilian bio-fuels on the African continent (de la
Fontaine, 2013).
5.3 The Foreign Policy Role of Itamaraty Under Lula
In Brazil since the 1930s, the Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty, has occupied a central
position, which according to Cason and Power (2009: 119ff.), can be attributed to
its high level of professionalism, constancy, political autonomy and ability to form
domestic and foreign trade policy within the state apparatus—as well as its distinct
institutional culture. However, since the mid-1990s the Foreign Ministry’s strong
role has been rolled back under Cardoso and Lula due to the increasing presence of
the president in foreign policy (known as presidential diplomacy). Thus the
Ministry’s foreign policy orientation has since depended on how the head of
government fills the leading positions in the Foreign Ministry, whereby a new
balance has been found between the two central ideological factions, the
Autonomistas and the liberals.
Roughly speaking, the wing which emerged in the 1930s in the context of the
ISI, the Autonomistas, considers Brazil to be a developing country; following
neo-structural logic they believe that Brazil’s international economic and political
autonomy and freedom of action should be strengthened through increased regional
integration and South-South alliances. The liberal wing views Brazil as an
emerging country which ought to focus primarily on cooperation with industrial
and emerging countries, or on integration into the world market. The Autonomistas
advocate a benevolent regional and international leadership role for Brazil, while
the liberals value cooperation with developing countries primarily when it
contributes to the expansion of the Brazilian economy and strengthens Brazil’s
international role (Cervo, 1998: 82; Saraiva, 2008: 127ff.).
Under Cardoso’s government foreign policy was guided by the liberal wing,
under Lula the Autonomistas defined the foreign policy guidelines of Itamaraty.
Thus two of the most important representatives of the Autonomistas under Lula
were the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (2003–2010) and the General Secretary of
Itamaraty from 2003 to 2009 Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães. Both advocated the
diversification of Brazilian foreign relations and the development of South-South

alliances (MRE, 2009b: 261; Pecequilo, 2008). According to Lima (2005), how-
ever, these positions should not be understood as a return to the “third world
ideology” of the 1960s and 1970s; Lima recognizes in Amorim’s pragmatic foreign
policy—for example in the context of the WTO in 2003—a de-ideologization of
foreign policy, which focused primarily on trade and power strategy. In this
context, South-South alliances above all served the aim of improving Brazil’s
negotiating position with regard to industrial countries.
6 Conclusion and Implications
At the outset, following Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr (2003: 23ff.) and in keeping
with the theoretical perspective of foreign policy research, the question was posed
as to how Brazil’s foreign policy over the last 25 years can be evaluated and
whether a change in foreign policy has taken place. The historical analysis showed
that Brazil’s foreign policy has constantly oscillated between world powers. In the
twentieth century these were above all Great Britain, the USA, Germany and the
USSR. Securing and expanding Brazil’s international scope of action was impor-
tant. Due to the relatively early determination of Brazil’s national borders and the
absence of larger border conflicts, foreign trade rather than defense policy played a
central role in defining foreign policy guidelines. Until the 1930s securing agri-
cultural exports and the import of manufactured and semi-manufactured products
was important. From the 1930s onward, in the context of the ISI, it became increas-
ingly important to stimulate the export of domestically produced manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods and the import of capital and production goods. Following
a relatively long period of international separation, Brazil became increasingly open
on the regional level over the course of the 1990s and sought gradual integration into
the world market. In this context the Cardoso and Lula governments were of key
significance as they pro-actively encouraged Brazil’s international integration. While
Cardoso expanded cooperation with Mercosul and the industrialized countries, Lula
intensified cooperation with other emerging countries—thus China has since 2010
been Brazil’s most important trade partner.
Particularly through his pro-active encouragement of trade relations with China
(but also with Russia, India and other emerging economies), Lula has contributed to
the diversification of Brazil’s foreign policy and to the reduction of its dependence
on the USA and the EU, or the expansion of Brazil’s freedom to act in the field of
foreign policy due to new bargaining possibilities. In this way Lula’s foreign policy
follows the logic of what Vigevani and Cepaluni call “foreign policy autonomy
through diversification”, which increasingly distanced itself from the compliance
model of the Cardoso government and oriented itself more strongly to a statist
approach to counter-dependence model. Although Brazil remains relatively weak
in comparison with internationally dominant states such as the USA and China it
has created sufficient autonomy—as the ninth largest economy in the world—to be
able to make independent foreign policy decisions and to adopt anti-hegemony
positions. Lula was thus connected to policy traditions from the Vargas era in the
1930s and 1940s, to the independent foreign policy of Quadros and Goulart (1961–
1964), and to Geisel’s pragmatic foreign policy (1974–1979). Overall Brazil’s new
foreign policy approach means a return to the oscillation between world powers,
which had ceased with the collapse of the USSR and the uni-polar supremacy of the
USA from the 1990s onwards.
It can be seen that Lula’s pragmatic foreign policy guidelines have been
maintained under the current administration of Dilma Rousseff, being mainly
shaped by former Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (2011–2013), the
current Foreign Minister Luis Alberto Figueiredo Machado (2013–2014), and
foreign policy advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, who already served under Lula
since 2003. The cooperation triad with the South American region, the USA and
China was thus further expanded. The first bilateral meetings held by the new
President were concentrated on Brazil’s three most important trade partners:
Argentina, the USA and China: On January 2011, Rousseff made a state visit to
Argentina. On March 2011, Barack Obama made his first official state visit to
Brazil, during which ten bilateral agreements were created and the U.S.—Brazil
Commission on Economic and Trade Relations was founded, with a focus on
Brazil’s oil and ethanol exports.12 On April 2011, Rousseff travelled to Beijing
and signed 20 bilateral trade agreements with a focus on the Brazilian export of
natural resources and Chinese investments in Brazilian infrastructure (e.g. airports,
major sporting infrastructure and energy transport), as well as the technology
sector. Whilst in China, Rousseff took part in a BRICS summit, which, amongst
other topics, dealt with South Africa’s integration into the group.13
Alongside these constants, certain changes are of course identifiable. Thus
Stünkel and Fischer-Bollin (2011) point out that Rousseff could no longer afford
to maintain Lula’s critical position with regard to international financial institutions
such as the IMF—after all, since 2010 Brazil is itself an IMF creditor, playing an
increasingly important role in the international financial architecture through, for
example, G-20 Finance. Furthermore, since 2013 Brazil has been given the chal-
lenging task of heading the WTO, as the Brazilian diplomat Roberto Azevêdo has
been appointed as Director-General, replacing Pascal Lamy.
Another change was Brazil’s position vis-à-vis authoritarian states. Marco
Aurélio Garcia indicated in 2011 that Brazil’s accommodation of authoritarian
regimes would be reduced. Under Lula, regimes such as Iran or Libya were not
denounced in a spirit of non-interference. Thus Rousseff, in contrast to Lula,
supported a resolution by the UN Human Rights Council for the sending of a
special rapporteur to examine the human rights situation in Iran.14 According to
Marco Aurélio Garcia, this is related to the President’s personal biography, as she
was imprisoned and tortured during the military dictatorship in Brazil.
12
Boletim OPSA (1-2011): http://observatorio.iesp.uerj.br/
13
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/president-rousseff-visits-china/
14
Boletim OPSA (1-2011): http://observatorio.iesp.uerj.br/
These measures, however, represent only minor changes. In view of the fact that
both Rousseff, in her former role as Minister of Energy and Mining (2003–2005)
and as Chief of Staff (2005–2010), as well as foreign policy advisor Marco Aurélio
Garcia mostly helped shape the Lula government’s foreign policy, it is mainly
continuity that can be observed in Rousseff’s foreign policy during her first and
second term of office. Meanwhile, Lula has somehow left the stage although many
voices in Brazil (wrongly) assumed that he would present himself as a candidate for
the presidential elections in October 2014 and would thus once again direct
Brazilian foreign policy. But although Brazil is witnessing the strongest social
unrest15 it has seen for the last decades and even though the PT is going through
a deep crisis primarily due to innumerous corruption processes concerning PT party
members, Rousseff still has been achieving very high support rates. This certainly
has backed her in running for a second term in office and for being named as the
official candidate by her party in June 2014, being supported by the strong coalition
partner PMDB. So for now, Lula will keep on concentrating on his NGO Instituto
Lula,16 which has developed from the Instituto Cidadania. The aim of Instituto Lula
is to transfer Brazil’s successes in the field of social and economic development to
countries in Latin America and to the African continent. This, once again, shows his
strong commitment with South-South Cooperation.
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About the Authors
Amado Luiz Cervo is Professor Emeritus for History of International Relations at

the University of Brası́lia and Senior Researcher at CNPq (Conselho Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico e Tecnologico). Among his publications are Hist oria
da polı́tica exterior do Brasil, Brasilia (with Cloloaldo Bueno, 2008) and Inserção
internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros, São Paulo (2014). Contact:
alcervo@unb.br
Ana Galvão is a Brazilian freelance journalist and author. She studied journal-
ism in Brazil and worked for journals and radio. Her themes are focused on culture,
media and people. Later she studied political sciences with focus on Latin America
at the University of Tuebingen, Germany. After her studies, she worked for the
Green Party at the Parliamentary Chamber of Baden-Württemberg in Stuttgart.
Contact: ana.galvao@gmx.net
Andrea Zellhuber studied Landscape Planning at the Technical University
Munich and did her PhD on participatory approaches in environmental planning
in Porto Alegre, South Brazil. From 2006 to 2009 she worked as an environmental
consultant for the Brazilian organization Comissão Pastoral da Terra in Northeast
Brazil. Currently she is thematic advisor and program coordinator at terre des
hommes schweiz. Contact: andreazellhuber@hotmail.com
Antje Daniel is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of
African Studies at the University of Bayreuth. She is also researcher at the Depart-
ment of Development Sociology at the same University. Her research interests
include political sociology, social movements and gender with focus on Kenya and
Brazil. Contact: antje.daniel@uni-bayreuth.de
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo is professor of Political Science at the Instituto
de Estudos Sociais e Polı́ticos at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP/
UERJ), Senior Researcher at Cebrap (Centro Brasileiro de An alise e Planejamento),
and Researcher IA of CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico
e Tecnol ogico). Contact: argelina@iesp.uerj.br
Arim Soares do Bem studied Communications at the University of São Paulo
and holds a PhD from the Free University Berlin. Currently he is at the Instituto de
Ciências Sociais at the Federal University of Alagoas. His research focuses on
theory, methodology and epistemology in social science, violence and social

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0
416 About the Authors
movements. He coordinates research groups within CNPq (Conselho Nacional de

Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico e Tecnol ogico). Contact: arimdobem@yahoo.com.br
Bernhard Leubolt is a political economist currently working at the Department
Socio-Economics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Adminis-
tration. He is editor of the Austrian Journal of Development Studies (Journal f€ ur
Entwicklungspolitik). His research focuses on development and governance in a
multi-scalar perspective, social and distributive policies, and social inequalities.
Contact: bernhard.leubolt@wu.ac.at
Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva is president of Projor, Institute for the Develop-
ment of Journalism in Brazil (www.projor.org.br). Before he was Ombudsmann
with the Brazilian Newspaper Folha de São Paulo and university teacher. He holds
a masters degree in Communication from Michigan State University and a PhD in
Communication from the University of São Paulo. Contact: linsdasilva@uol.com.
br
Dana de la Fontaine holds a Magister Degree from the University Tuebingen,
Germany with a major in Political Science focused on Latin America and Develop-
ment Theory and minors in Spanish and Portuguese. PhD at the University of
Kassel in International Relations as member of the PhD Program Global Social
Policies and Governance with a scholarship from Heinrich Boell Foundation.
Thesis on the role of India, Brazil and South Africa as Emerging Donors. 2011–
2014 with the German Development Cooperation GIZ in Bolivia. Today based in
Tanzania as independent researcher and consultant. Contact: danadlf@yahoo.com
Eli Diniz is Professor at the Institute for Economy at the Federal University of
Rio de Janeiro and researcher at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Polı́ticos of the
State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP/UERJ—former IUPERJ). Contact:
dinizeli@terra.com.br
Fernando Limongi is Professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), Senior
Researcher at Cebrap (Centro Brasileiro de An alise e Planejamento), Visiting
Professor at Yale University (2009/2020) and Researcher of the CNPq—the
Brazilian Council for the Development of Science and Technology (Conselho
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientı́fico e Tecnol ogico). Contact:
fdmplimo@usp.br
Gilberto Calcagnotto is a Sociologist and worked at the Institute for Ibero-
American Studies in Hamburg from 1981 to 2008 focusing on Brazilian Studies. He
was as well Lecturer at the University of Bremen and at the University of Hamburg.
Contact: CalcagnottoGilb@aol.com
Jairo Nicolau is professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He is
author of Eleições no Brasil: do Império aos dias Atuais (2012) and Sistemas
Eleitorais (2012) and several articles about Brazilian politics, elections, political
parties and electoral systems. Contact: jaironicolau@gmail.com
Jochen Steinhilber studied Political Science and Economics at the University of
Marburg, Germany. Between 2008 and 2010 Director of the Country Office of
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FES) in São Paulo, Brazil. Now head of the Depart-
ment Global Politics and Development within FES, focusing on foreign and
development policy. Contact: Jochen.Steinhilber@fes.de
About the Authors 417
Juan Albarracı́n is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science of

the University of Notre Dame, where he is a Kellogg Institute PhD Fellow, as well
as the recipient of a J. William Fulbright scholarship. He holds an M.A. in Political
Science from the University of Notre Dame, as well as an M.A. in Comparative
Politics and B.A. in Political Science (with a minor in Economics) from the
University of Tuebingen. His research interests include political and criminal
violence, political order and citizenship in areas of limited statehood, as well as
political parties and electoral competition in Colombia and Brazil. Contact:
jalbarra@nd.edu
Julia Stadler is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Social and Political Studies
at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. Her thesis approaches the diversity of rules
that compose institutionalized voting. She holds a Masters Degree in Political
Science and Contemporary History from the University of Tuebingen, Germany.
She was engaged in promoting the studies of peer-to-peer theories and experiences
and co-editing the international Brazilian Journal of P2P studies. Contact: julia.
stadler@yahoo.de
Leonardo Martins graduated in Law from the Universidade de São Paulo
(1994), Master (LL.M.) in Constitutional Jurisdiction from the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin (1997), Germany, and Doctor Juris in Constitutional Law
from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (2001), Germany. Post-doctorates at the
Hans-Bredow-Institut (Regulation of Research in Social Communication) along
with the Universität Hamburg (2004), Germany, and at Erich Pommer Institut (Law
and Economics of Social Communication) as a Fellow of the Alexander
v. Humboldt Foundation (2010), and twice at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
(2011 and 2013–2014). Currently Professor at the Universidade Federal do Rio
Grande do Norte. Has been visiting Professor at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
(2001–2012). Has experience in the area of Constitutional Law, with an emphasis
on Fundamental Rights, mainly acting on the following topics: compared law and
constitutional justice, the principle of proportionality, collision among fundamental
rights, media regulation and general theory of fundamental rights. Contact:
leonardomartins1@yahoo.de
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira is Emeritus Professor of Getulio Vargas Founda-
tion where he teaches and researches since 1959. His PhD and Habilitation in
economics are by the University of São Paulo. He is doctor honoris causa by the
University of Buenos Aires, and received the James Street Scholar 2012 from the
Association for Evolutionary Economics—AFEE. He was Brazilian finance minis-
ter (1987) and minister of federal administration (1995–1998). Among his books in
English: Democracy and Public Management Reform (2004), Developing Brazil
(2009) and Globalization and Competition (2010) and A Construção Polı́tica do
Brasil (2014). Fore more information see: www.bresserpereira.org.br. Contact:
bresserpereira@gmail.com
Marcelo Lopes de Souza is a professor of socio-spatial development and urban
studies at the Department of Geography of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro/
UFRJ, where he co-ordinates the Research Centre on Socio-Spatial Development).
He studied geography and urban sociology in Brazil in the 1980s, and received his
418 About the Authors
PhD degree in geography (minor: political science) from the University of

Tuebingen, Germany, in 1993. He has published ten books and more than one
hundred papers and book chapters in different languages (Portuguese, English,
German, French, Spanish and Turkish) covering subjects such as spatial theory,
popular participation in urban planning, social movements theory, urban ‘utopias’/
alternative visions, urban problems, and the ‘spatiality of left-libertarian thought’
(classical anarchism, neo-anarchism, libertarian autonomism). Contact: mlopesde-
souza@terra.com.br
Martin Coy is Professor of Applied Geography and Sustainability Research at
the Institute of Geography of the University of Innsbruck, Austria. His main
research interests concern men-environment-relations, sustainable regional devel-
opment and megacities. Regionally, his research focuses on Brazil and Argentina.
Contact: Martin.Coy@uibk.ac.at.
Patricia Graf is a researcher at the Chair for Economic and Industrial Sociology
at the University Cottbus Senftenberg. Her work focuses on the comparative
analysis of innovation systems, as well as gender studies and policy analysis.
After studying political science at the Universidad Complutense, Madrid and the
Institute of Political Science at the University of Tuebingen, she worked as a
researcher at the Universities of Tuebingen and Potsdam, completing her PhD
thesis: “Innovation policy in Mexico: Paradigms, actors and interactions” in
2010. Contact: graf@tu-cottbus.de
Renato Raul Boschi, PhD in Political Science (The University of Michigan
1978) is full professor of Political Science at IESP/UERJ (Institute for Social and
Political Studies of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, formerly IUPERJ).
He is also retired full professor at UFMG (Federal University of Minas Gerais). He
was Senior Fulbright/CAPES visiting professor at CUNY (2006), visiting professor
at the Institut d’E´tudes Politiques de Toulouse (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and
Directeur de Recherche Associé at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris
(2009), in addition to Stanford, Duke and Michigan in previous years. He is the
author of several books on entrepreneurs, interest representation, the state and
capitalist development in Brazil. He is 1A top researcher and has a research grant
from CNPQ (Brazilian National Research Council) and coordinates the research
network INCT/PPED dedicated to studying varieties of capitalism and development
perspectives in Brazil. Some of his latest books include Variedades de Capitalismo,
Polı́tica e Desenvolvimento na América Latina, Belo Horizonte, UFMG Editora,
2011, and Post-neoliberal Trajectories in South America and Central Eastern
Europe, Anthem Press 2012. Contact: rboschi@iesp.uerj.br
Stefan Schmalz holds a PhD from the University of Marburg (Germany) with a
focus on Brazilian Foreign Economic Policy 2007 under the Administration Lula.
Currently he works as Researcher (Akademischer Rat) at the Institute for Sociology
at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany. Contact: s.schmalz@uni-
jena.de
Thomas Stehnken studied Political Science as well as Economics and Public
Law at the University of Tübingen and the Universidade Federal de Fluminense
(UFF), Niter oi, Brazil. After completing his doctoral thesis on Brazilian innovation
About the Authors 419
policy at the University of Tübingen he joined the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems
and Innovation Research (ISI) in 2009 as project manager in the Competence
Center Policy and Regions. He currently works for acatech, the German National
Academy of Science and Engineering in Brussels and is private consultant for
international innovation policy. Contact: thomas.stehnken@gmail.com
Waldeli Melleiro studied history and archival science at the University of São
Paulo. She currently works as project manager in the office of the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation (FES) in Brazil and is responsible for labor and trade union issues.
Contact: waldeli@fes.org.br

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Dana de la Fontaine · Thomas Stehnken

The Political System

Translation from German language edition:

ISBN 978-3-642-40022-3 ISBN 978-3-642-40023-0 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015951718

Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg is part of Springer Science+Business Media

ABDI Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial

CFP Comissão de Financiamento da Produção

GDP Gross Domestic Product

PDC Partido Democrata Cristão

TST Tribunal Superior do Trabalho

Part I Historical Legacies and Socio-economic Inequalities

Part II Checks and Balances in the Political System Since 1988

Part III Institutions of Interest Representation

10 Lobby Groups, the State and the Relationships Between

Part IV Policy Fields

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 1

1 Objective and Approach of This Book

Table 1.1 Brazilian Presidents since 1985

2 Organization of This Collection

transformations triggered by the State apparatus generated changes in the relation

deficits. The Brazilian innovation system is still characterized by a strong State

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 15

2 The Opening of the Ports and the Foundation

market because of an existing 15 % ad valorem tax. This regulation practically

3 Independence: Liberal Treaties and Deindustrialization

(d) The success of the state as promoter of the industrialization process is

4 The Return of the Industrialist Current and Its Effects

5 A Century of Primary Economy

5.1 Industrialization with the Opening of the Production

remains present in the government’s development strategies. The following three

1. Among other measures, in 1931, Getúlio Vargas (Presidencies: 1930–1934,

6 The Opening of the Market in the 1990s

7 Multilateral Reciprocity and Economic

developing countries, while at the same time it demanded disproportionate

8 South American Economy: A Brazilian Project

9 Latest Developments Under Dilma Rousseff

Arim Soares do Bem

Translated from Portuguese by Janine Deselaers and Nicole Nucinkis.

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 27

2 Constitutional Continuities and Discontinuities (1824–

The construction and institutional transformation of Brazilian politics cannot be

2.1 The Constitution of the Brazilian Empire of 1824

2.2 The Constitution of 1891

2.3 The Constitutions of 1934 and 1937

The Constitution of 1934 (Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1964) analyzed the industrial bourgeoisie’s inabil-

2.4 The Constitution of 1946

The Constitution of 1946 (Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil 1946) is

2.5 The Constitution of 1967

amended by Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (Emenda Constitucional nr. 1,

2.6 The Constitution of 1988

Commemorated as the “‘Citizens’ Constitution” (Carvalho, 2001: 199), the Consti-

3 The Negotiated Democratic Transition

It is a common position among scholars of democratic transitions that the models of

The main characteristic of the liberal democratic regime’s consolidation period

4 Discontinuities and Continuities of the Governments

A “strong and independent” government was required to implement the series of

regional oligarchies, and thereby enabled a “new conservative pact”7 (Lenardão,

program in the areas of telecommunications, mining, iron and steel industry,

1. autonomy through distance (autonomia pela distância), pre-dominant up until