UKOOA Telecoms Guidelines PDF

Guidelines for Safety Related
Telecommunication Systems on
Fixed Offshore Installations
Issue 1
August 2005
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neither UKOOA, nor any of its members will assume liability for any use made thereof.
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Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Copyright  2005 UK Offshore Operators Association Limited

Acknowledgements:
In publishing these guidelines, the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) acknowledges the
assistance given to their preparation by Dave Magwood.
ISBN: 1 903003 30X
PUBLISHED BY UK OFFSHORE OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
London Office:
2nd Floor, 232-242 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1AU.
Tel: 020 7802 2400 Fax: 020 7802 2401
Aberdeen Office:
3rd Floor, The Exchange 2, 62 Market Street, Aberdeen, AB11 5PJ.
Tel: 01224 577250 Fax: 01224 577251
Email: info@ukooa.co.uk
Website: www.oilandgas.org.uk
Guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems
on Fixed Offshore Installations
Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Purpose of Publication 1
1.2 Aims 1
1.3 Scope 1
1.4 Method 1
2 Summary of Regulations 2
2.1 Regulations for Safety Related Communications 2
2.2 The MAR Regulations 2
2.3 The PFEER Regulations 3
3 Prevention, Detection and Control 5

3.1 Measures for Protecting People and Plant 5
3.2 Communication Protective Measures 6
4 Emergency Response 7
4.1 Communications for Emergency Response 7
5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI 8

5.1 Overview of Requirements on NAI 8
5.2 Overview of Requirements on NUI During
Maintenance Visits 9
5.3 Communication Objectives for NAI and NUI 10
5.4 Communication Provisions 11
Issue 1 August 2005 i

Contents (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
6 General Provisions 13
6.1 Equipment Resilience 13
6.2 Power Supplies 14
6.3 Equipment Location 14
6.4 Telecommunications Cabling 15
6.5 Shutdown of Telecommunication Systems 15
7 Installation and Maintenance 17

7.1 Summary of Regulations 17
7.2 Regulations for Audible Alarm Systems 18
8 Training and Operations 18

8.1 Competencies 18
8.2 Operational Considerations for NUI Visits 18
Addendum
1 Recommended Practice for Fixed
Offshore Installations
ii Issue 1 August 2005

Preface
These guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Fixed Offshore

Installations have been prepared in consultation with representatives of offshore
operators, contractors and other organisations, who have interest or responsibilities in
the provision of such systems.
It replaces two previous UKOOA publications – ‘Safety Related Telecommunication
Systems on Normally Attended Fixed Offshore Installations’ and ‘Safety Related
Telecommunication Systems on Normally Unattended Fixed Offshore Installations’.
Much of the guidance contained in these two publications has been incorporated into
the latest revision.
The main changes involve new opening sections that summarise the regulatory
requirements that govern the provision of telecommunication safety systems.
In updating the guidelines, the choice of MF/HF radiotelephone, as a means of onshore
communications, has been omitted in favour of more modern methods, and GMDSS
VHF facilities have been introduced as the primary means of calling and
communication with nearby ships and vessels during emergency situations.
Issue 1 August 2005 iii/iv

List of Abbreviations
ATS Air Traffic Services

BS British Standard
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAP Civil Aviation Publications
DSC Digital Selective Calling
ECC Emergency Control Centre
ECP Emergency Control Point
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
GA General Alarm
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
HF High Frequency
HLO Helicopter Landing Officer
ISDX Integrated Services Digital Switch
LOS Line of Sight
MAR Management and Administration
MF Medium Frequency
NAI Normally Attended Installation
NDB Non-directional Beacon
NUI Normally Unattended Installation
OCC Operation Control Centre
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
PA Public Address
PABX Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
RF Radio Frequency
RO Radio Operator
ROC Restricted Operator’s Certificate
SARTS Search and Rescue Transponders
SI Statutory Instrument(s)
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TR Temporary Refuge
Issue 1 August 2005 v

UHF Ultra High Frequency

UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
UKOOA UK Offshore Operators Association Limited
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VHF Very High Frequency
VOX Voice Operated Switch
vi Issue 1 August 2005

1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of Publication
The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance on the provision of
telecommunication systems that are required for safety purposes on Fixed
Offshore Installations associated with Oil and Gas production in United
Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) waters.
1.2 Aims
It aims to assist those who are responsible for the design of such systems to
confirm their compliance with the various Statutory Instruments (SI), Approved
Codes of Practice (ACOPS) and associated guidance that govern the provision
of protective and emergency communications on fixed offshore installations.
It describes what is considered in the industry to be good practice and will also
prove useful to those who need to confirm that existing systems remain
compliant with current legislation.
1.3 Scope
The document relates to fixed installations, which may be either Normally
Attended Installations (NAI), or Normally Unattended Installations (NUI).
PFEER regulations apply equally to both, to ensure that during maintenance
visits to NUI appropriate emergency communications are provided. Due to the
commonality of legislation that exists between all types of fixed installation,
it has been decided that the former UKOOA documents for safety related
telecommunications on NAI and NUI be amalgamated into a single publication
in this revision.
1.4 Method
The document will summarise the principal elements of the statutory
requirements and outline their application, first in the provision of appropriate
protective measures and secondly in the provision of emergency
communications. The requirements for securing effective emergency response
are then considered in more detail. A list of communication objectives is
provided together with descriptions of the equipments that may be employed to
meet these objectives.
Issue 1 August 2005 1

The choice of equipment is not mandatory and Operators may adopt different
solutions, in particular situations, provided they remain compliant with
the legislation and maintain an equivalent level of safety. The guidance will
also consider telecommunications that are normally provided on offshore
installations, for operational purposes, which may enhance safety
in emergencies. It will also address the methods commonly employed to
ensure the inherent resilience of these ‘safety-critical’ systems together with
their installation and maintenance requirements. The effectiveness of
communications in an emergency is heavily dependent on the ability of those
who operate the equipment provided. The standards of competency will also
be outlined.
2 Summary of Regulations
2.1 Regulations for Safety Related Communications
The principal regulations that govern the provision of safety communications for
offshore installations are contained in:
• Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration)
Regulations, SI 1995/738, referred to in later text as MAR
• Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency
Response) Regulations, SI 1995/743, referred to in later text as PFEER
These regulations recognise that communications have an important role, not
only in securing an effective emergency response, but also in providing a range
of measures to assist in detecting emergencies and mitigating their effects.
2.2 The MAR Regulations

The MAR regulations specify a number of requirements to ensure the health
and safety of personnel on offshore installations and those close by.
The following table summarises the two regulations that will require the
provision of communication systems.
2 Issue 1 August 2005

Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration)

Regulations 1995 (MAR), SI 1995/738
1 Regulation 12 requires arrangements, appropriate for health and
safety purposes, for effective communications: between the offshore
installation, the shore, vessels, aircraft and other installations; and
when helicopters land on, or take off from, unmanned installations,
for effective communications between the aircraft and either a
suitable attended offshore installation or suitable onshore premises.
Regulation 14 requires arrangements for the collection and storage
of meteorological and oceanographic information; and such
information relating to the motions of the offshore installation as is
necessary for securing, as far as is reasonably practicable, the safe
operation of the installation and the safety of persons on or near it.
2.3 The PFEER Regulations

The PFEER regulations have two objectives. The first is to provide preventive
and protective measures, to manage fire and explosions, which will require
systems for monitoring, detection and control. The solutions provided will
generally require systems for the collection, transport and manipulation of data.
The second goal is to secure effective emergency response, to make provision
for safe and systematic evacuation and to facilitate rescue. These will generally
require the provision of a range of voice communication systems.
The following table summarises the salient parts of the PFEER regulations for
which communications have a particular role or have relevance in this
document.

Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency

Response) Regulations 1995 (PFEER), SI 1995/743
2 Regulation 5 (Assessment) requires a systematic identification of
major hazards with the potential to require evacuation, escape or
rescue. Their likelihood and consequences, the measures needed to
manage the consequences effectively and in the establishment of
auditable performance standards for such measures.
Regulation 8 (Emergency Response Plan) requires the preparation
of an emergency response plan that will include the organisational
structure chosen to manage emergencies on the installation.
The structure will show the chain of command, the roles and
responsibilities of key personnel, the communication arrangements
between them and the external agencies that may need to be
involved.
Regulation 10 (Detection of Incidents) requires appropriate
measures – for the detection of events that may require emergency
response – or to enable information regarding such incidents to be
conveyed forthwith to places from which control can be instigated.
Regulation 11 (Communications) requires appropriate arrangements;
for giving warning of an emergency by audible and, where necessary,
visual alarms, to all personnel onboard and for purposes of
emergency response, for communication between persons on the
installation, to those beyond engaged in activities associated with it,
and between the installation and those beyond with a support or
rescue role. It also specifies the characteristics of the audible and
visual alarms that must be employed.
Regulation 12 (Control of Emergencies) requires appropriate
measures with a view to limiting the extent of an emergency –
including measures for the remote operation of plant – such
measures being capable of remaining effective in an emergency.
Regulation 19 (Suitability and Condition of Plant) concerns the
suitability of the emergency equipment provided to meet PFEER
regulations, their construction and installation, and the maintenance
required throughout their service life.
Regulation 20 (Life-saving Appliances) deals with survival craft
(TEMPSC) communications and their radio location at sea.
In order to reflect the twin purposes of the PFEER regulations, and to aid
clarity, the two objectives will initially be treated separately in the sections that
follow. Those regulations that are common to both will be mentioned wherever
it is appropriate.

3 Prevention, Detection and Control

3.1 Measures for Protecting People and Plant
One of the goals of the PFEER regulations is to prevent fire and explosions,
and to protect persons from the effects of any which do occur. At the heart of
the legislation is PFEER Regulation 5 that requires a systematic assessment to
identify potential major accident hazards, their likelihood and consequences,
and the measures needed to moderate their effects.
The diagram below aims to summarise the assessment cycle in order to
highlight the measures where communications can play a part. The application
of performance standards to such measures has been indicated on the
diagram, since they are integral to the regulation, but they will not be discussed
further in this document.
• Functionality
• Survivability
• Reliabilty Standards
• Availability
e
nc
ma
Ha
or
erf
za
Measures P Measures
rd
s
• Emergency Shutdown Mitigate • Condition Monitoring

Systems PFEER 5 Systems
Assessment Prevent
Co
• Remote Control • Collision Avoidance

ns
Systems od • Navigation Beacons

eq
PFEER 12 ho
ue
eli
nc
• Internal Comms (A5) Lik

e
Detect
PFEER 11
Measures
• Man Overboard Devices

• Status Monitoring
• Intruder Alarms
PFEER 10
The measures identified during the assessment will fall into one of the three
categories indicated. Where there is a likelihood of an accident happening,
which would potentially require an emergency response, detection measures
must be considered. Ideally, detection systems should be automatic, and not
require manual intervention, and remain operational during the emergency to
the extent necessary to do the job required of them. The remaining measures
are those that serve to control and mitigate the consequences of major
accident events. Equipment used to control the extent of an emergency should
be designed, as far as is reasonably practicable, to fail safe and should remain
operational for as long as is needed to fulfil its function, taking into account the
conditions to which it may be exposed.
Appropriate measures should be adequate to achieve the objectives set out in
the regulations but not require expenditure which is completely out of
proportion to the risk that their implementation seeks to avoid.

3.2 Communication Protective Measures

The measures listed below combine those that must be provided with those
that may be appropriate according to the level of risk established during
PFEER Regulation 5 assessment:
M1 Condition Monitoring: Systems employed to monitor platform stability
over extended timescales. (The collection of meteorological and
oceanographic data, and information relating to the motions of the
offshore installation, is a specific requirement of SI 1995/738 (MAR)
Regulation 14.)
M2 Aircraft Navigation Beacons: Non-directional Beacons (NDBs) to aid
helicopter navigation during periods of poor visibility. (Offshore MF NDBs
must conform to the engineering standards given in CAP 670 NAV02.)
M3 Collision Avoidance Systems: Installations close to sea lanes,
particularly those that are unattended, will be at greater risk of collision.
Radar systems can be employed to give early warning of potential
collisions. Systems may be distributed amongst a group of installations
and relay warnings via telemetry to a central control centre.
M4 Man Overboard Systems: Personal locator devices that are worn
during overside work. The devices can be triggered manually, but will
activate automatically when in contact with the sea, and incorporate
search and rescue transponders to aid location.
M5 Intruder Alarm Systems: Detection devices that can be arranged to
raise remote intruder alarms for the purpose of protecting safety critical
systems.
M6 Emergency Shutdown Systems: Arrangements to remotely shut down
plant during emergencies. They may be either manual or automatic
according to particular requirements. In keeping with the fail-safe
requirement, loss of any associated telemetry links will need to initiate an
ESD condition after a predetermined time interval. Such systems may be
used for safety purposes when drilling rigs or vessels are stationed
above remote subsea wellheads.
M7 Remote Control and Monitoring Systems: Data based management
systems to remotely monitor and control plant. These may be used to
remotely operate other safety systems such as helideck lights and
directional beacons on NUI. Systems used for remote control are
required to be fail-safe.
M8 Status Monitoring Systems: Such as pipeline integrity systems that are
needed to ensure the safe and environmentally secure transport of oil
and gas in subsea pipelines. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.3.
The resilience of the protective measures employed should be determined as
part of the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment. The guidance supplied in
Paragraph 6 being adapted as appropriate. Equipments that radiate RF energy
should meet the requirements described in Paragraph 6.5.

4 Emergency Response
4.1 Communications for Emergency Response
The second objective of the PFEER regulations is to secure an effective
emergency response. The diagram below summarises the prominent parts of
PFEER Regulation 11 that specify the communications that are required during
an emergency. It requires the duty holder to make appropriate arrangements to
rapidly alert all personnel onboard the installation that an emergency has
occurred, or is occurring, and to alert those beyond who may be affected or can
render assistance.
To ensure standardisation throughout the industry, the regulations specify the
acoustic characteristics of the audible warnings that can be given and the
colours of the visual flashing signs that may be needed.
Alert Emergency Alert

External Agencies Ongoing Operations
Warn
All Personnel onboard
by Audible (and where necessary
Visual) Alarms
External External
Communications Internal Communications Communications
Onshore Support & for emergency response Ships, Aircraft &
Emergency Services Nearby Installations
The regulations then focus on the communications needed for emergency

response. This requires provision of internal communications between
personnel on the installation, either between those engaged in controlling the
emergency and conducting rescue operations, or those mustering personnel
and arranging their safe evacuation. Additional to these requirements is the
provision of external communications with those beyond the installation who
have a supporting role in managing the emergency or in the evacuation of
personnel to a place of safety.
The provision of emergency communications required by Regulation 11 and
the associated Approved Code of Practice, ACOP 114, should be based on the
Regulation 5 assessment and may be affected by the Regulation 8 Emergency
Response Plan. Due to differences in size and function, the requirements for
an NAI will invariably be somewhat different to those required for an NUI during
maintenance visits. These plans and assessments should be taken into
account to ensure that the communications being provided correspond to the
communication arrangements required.

5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI

5.1 Overview of Requirements on NAI
The diagram below shows the principal elements of a typical emergency
response organisation needed to manage an emergency on NAIs.
An organisation such as this will form part of the Operator’s Emergency
Response Plan as outlined in Paragraph 2.3. At the centre of the diagram is the
installation Emergency Control Centre (ECC) where the person in overall
charge will muster (OIM). A Radio Operator (RO), who will be competent to
operate the communications facilities provided, will normally assist him.
Onshore Onshore
Emergency Emergency
Support Services
Vessels Ongoing
in Vicinity Operations
Local Offshore Aircraft

Installations in Vicinity
E.C.C
Muster Control Process Control
Team Team
P.O.B Drilling/Well
Helideck Team
Response Team
Emergency Medical Support

Response Team Team
The arrows that link the various elements represent the communication
facilities that are needed and it is evident that these facilities play a crucial role
in the effective management of an emergency. To this end, such facilities are
deemed ‘safety critical’ and particular care is required in their design and
maintenance to ensure they remain operational throughout the emergency,
until either the situation has been resolved or the installation has been
evacuated by air or sea. These considerations will be examined in more detail
in Paragraph 6.
The diagram above is not definitive and is intended merely to illustrate the
range of facilities that will generally be needed. Additional elements, such as a
diving response team, or those identified during the assessment carried out
under PFEER Regulation 5, may also need to be included.

5.2 Overview of Requirements on NUI During

Maintenance Visits
Normally Unattended Installations will generally be monitored and controlled by
a remote Operations Control Centre (OCC). This may be located on a nearby
NAI or based at an onshore location.
If the OCC is located offshore, then the installation’s ECC will be provided with
all the external communications facilities needed for effective emergency
response. These would then become available in the event of an emergency
on the associated NUI.
If the OCC is located onshore, it may not have the entire emergency facilities
needed for emergency response. In such a case, the ECC will need to be
located elsewhere to a place that is suitably equipped. Ideally, the OCC should
be co-located with the ECC, wherever it is practicable to do so. The diagram
below indicates a typical emergency response organisation that could be
adopted when personnel visit an NUI.
Onshore Onshore
Emergency Emergency
Support Services
Local Offshore Ongoing

Installations Operations
ECC - OCC
Vessels in
Aircraft in vicinity
Vicinity
ECP
Person in
Charge
Muster Control Emergency Response Medical Support

(Coxswain) & Rescue (FirstAider)
One member of the visiting work party will be nominated to take overall charge
in the event of an emergency and will muster at the installation’s Emergency
Control Point (ECP), with the remote ECC providing close support. There will
need to be sufficient communications facilities on hand for the ECP to alert
vessels in the vicinity, to alert those involved with any associated ongoing
operations, and to alert those beyond who have a role in the emergency
response plan. The size and composition of the work party will need to be
sufficient to mount an effective emergency response commensurate with the
types of emergency that are foreseeable. On small installations that have no
overnight accommodation, procedures will need to be in place to ensure that
the work party is evacuated well before deteriorating weather conditions
prevent it.

5.3 Communication Objectives for NAI and NUI

The list of objectives given below is based upon the requirements outlined in
previous paragraphs. It represents the fundamental provision that will generally
be needed, on NAI and manned NUI, to conform to PFEER regulations
governing emergency communications.
Objectives for Internal (Onboard) Communications:
A1 An Installation Alarm System: An acoustic alarm that is audible
throughout the installation, to warn of danger, signal assembly at muster
stations or to prepare for evacuation.
A2 A Public Address System: To enable those managing the emergency
to broadcast messages to all personnel onboard, to warn of hazards,
issue instructions, and inform of incident status.
A3 Muster Station Communications: To provide communications between
muster stations and the ECC/ECP.
A4 Emergency Response/Support Teams Communications: To provide
communications between members of emergency response teams and
with the ECC/ECP from all areas of the installation.
A5 Other Communications: The provision of other communications for the
purpose of emergency response, between persons on the installation, as
identified by the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment.
Objectives for External Communications:
A6 Ongoing Operations: To enable the ECC/ECP to communicate with
any ongoing associated operations eg pipeline, heavy lifts, supply or
diving operations.
A7 Onshore Emergency Services and Support: To enable the ECC/ECP
to inform or call for external assistance or support.
A8 Nearby Offshore Installations: To enable the ECC/ECP to
communicate with nearby offshore installations that may be able to
provide assistance or to advise of changes in pipeline status that could
have an effect on the safety of their operations.
A9 Vessels in Vicinity: To enable the ECC/ECP to alert and communicate
with any ships in the vicinity, including standby boats or any other
vessels that may be able to provide assistance during an emergency.
A10 Aircraft Communications: To enable the ECC/ECP and Helicopter
Landing Officer (HLO) to communicate with helicopters involved in
evacuation and rescue operations.
A11 TEMPSC Communications: To enable persons in survival craft to
communicate with ships and helicopters in the vicinity.
It is recommended that, wherever it is practicable, two independent means of
communication should be available to meet each objective, so that in the event
of a complete failure of one system the objective can still be achieved.

5.4 Communication Provisions

5.4.1 Installation Alarm System: Objective (A1)
Due to the commonality of function and overall coverage, the acoustic alarm
system will usually be integrated into the Public Address (PA) system. This will
incorporate alarm tone generators producing signals that conform to the
necessary characteristics. In noisy areas, where it is difficult to hear the alarms,
supplementary visual ‘attention-getting’ alarm lights must be provided.
The alarms will normally be initiated by the installation’s fire and gas detection
system but manual initiation from control points and from distributed
‘break-glass’ points will generally be required. On small NUI, a stand-alone
system may be more suitable to meet this requirement.
5.4.2 Public Address System: Objective (A2)

The PA system will generally be integrated with the alarm system as outlined
above. The system should be duplicated, each part being physically and
electrically separate and capable of providing full coverage. As a minimum, PA
access stations will be needed in the ECC/ECP and any secondary command
points provided. More detailed information for PA and alarm systems is
provided in Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.1. On NUI, portable equipment may be
employed for this purpose.
5.4.3 Muster station Communications: Objective (A3)

The requirement may be met either by the use of a fixed intercom system or
telephones located at each muster station. Due to the mobility that is often
needed when mustering personnel, fixed systems can be supplemented by the
provision of IS hand-portable radios. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.3.
5.4.4 Emergency Response/Support Teams Communications:

Objective (A4)
Due to the particular need for mobility, emergency response teams will
invariably use IS hand-portable radios. To ensure good coverage throughout
the installation, talk-through base stations with aerial distribution systems will
generally be needed. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.4.
5.4.5 Other Communications: Objective (A5)

The equipment chosen to fulfil this objective will be dependent on the
requirements established by the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment.

5.4.6 Communications with On-Going Operations:

Objective (A6)
Such operations will usually be in close proximity to the installation eg heavy
lifts or diving operations. Communications will normally employ marine VHF
fixed transceivers or IS hand-portable radios. Pipeline operations will generally
be controlled by a remote operations centre that will usually require a dedicated
‘hotline’ via the main communications link. Such facilities are invariably
supplemented by telephone systems. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraphs A3.3
and A3.4.
5.4.7 Communications with Onshore Emergency and Support:

Objective (A7)
To be effective, good quality direct communications should be provided.
The requirement is best served by telephone services with Inmarsat or
Iridium telephone systems employed as backup (refer to Addendum 1,
Paragraph A3.1). On NUI, onshore communications may need to be indirect via
the ECC. In these cases, good quality communications will be needed to the
ECC. Ideally, the host ECC should have onward call routing to provide effective
onshore communications.
5.4.8 Communications with Nearby Offshore Installations:

Objective (A8)
Most installations will be equipped with inter-platform telephone services.
Alternatively, marine VHF radios can also be employed. Inmarsat/Iridium
telephone services can be used as backup. Refer to Addendum 1,
Paragraphs A3.1 and A3.4.
5.4.9 Communications to Ships: Objective (A9)

Communications with ships is primarily achieved using marine GMDSS (DSC
Channel 70) fixed station transceivers. These can be supplemented by fixed
station transceivers that normally use the installation’s routine working
channels. IS hand-portable radios can also provide backup. Platform UHF
hand-portable radio system may be employed where vessels are equipped with
fixed or hand-portable units on the frequencies assigned to the installation.
Omnidirectional radio links that interface with the installation’s telephone
system may be employed to enhance communications with standby vessels.
The Inmarsat service can be used for vessels beyond VHF range. Refer to
Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.4.

5.4.10 Communications to Helicopters: Objective (A10)

Airband VHF fixed transceivers should be provided in ECC/ECP, operating on
the frequencies assigned by the CAA for the installation. Hand-portable airband
radios will be required by the HLO. Marine VHF fixed base stations or
hand-portable transceivers may be employed if aircraft are suitably equipped.
Vessels in the vicinity not equipped with aeronautical VHF equipment may also
need to communicate with helicopters on marine VHF frequencies. Refer to
Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.6.
5.4.11 TEMPSC Communications: Objective (A11)

TEMPSC should be equipped with GMDSS approved VHF marine band
transceivers. The equipment can be either fixed or portable and have sufficient
battery reserves to remain operational until the personnel onboard are rescued.
TEMPSC should also be equipped with radio beacons to assist search and
rescue operations. Consideration should also be given to the provision of
transponders or similar devices, which operate on emergency search and
rescue frequencies, which can be attached to individual lifejackets to enable
persons in the water to be located quickly. Refer to Addendum 1,
Paragraph A3.5.
6 General Provisions
6.1 Equipment Resilience
During an emergency, communications have a vital role; accordingly,
regulations require that Operators should ensure, as far as is reasonably
practicable, that the communication arrangements employed remain effective
throughout the emergency. To meet this requirement, designers need to give
due consideration to the operational impact that foreseeable emergencies may
have upon the communication systems provided. These considerations should
include:
• Loss of Power – due to the shutdown of main and emergency power
generators
• Fire or Explosion – causing physical damage to equipment located in or
close to process modules or other areas potentially exposed to smoke and
flames
• Gas Release – the presence of flammable gas in any area of the installation
normally classified as non-hazardous
The following paragraphs outline the strategies normally employed to minimise
the effects that each of these events may have on safety critical communication
systems.

6.2 Power Supplies

The power to all communications equipment, provided or used for emergency
purposes, should be fed from independent Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
systems; each supplied with primary power from the emergency distribution
board.
In the event that normal or emergency generators fail, or are inhibited for safety
or other reasons, each UPS should be capable of supplying all of the safety
critical equipment provided until such time as the emergency is resolved or the
installation is evacuated. The duration of the UPS reserve should be sufficient
to allow time for the mustering of personnel, time to assess and control the
incident and time to carry out a safe and systematic evacuation should the
need arise. The overall time duration should be evaluated for each installation.
For the purpose of sizing the UPS, it should be assumed that equipment will be
operated at 25% full load and 75% standby basis.
Each UPS system, and its reserve batteries, should be within or close to the
ECC/ECP to which it is supplying power.
6.3 Equipment Location

In an emergency, particularly if fire or explosion is involved, some of the
communication facilities provided may be rendered inoperative. The failure of
essential equipment at such a time could have serious consequences and
suitable contingency arrangements should be provided. The principal strategy
to guard against such failures is to duplicate and physically separate essential
equipment wherever possible.
On NAI, the primary command and control point is the ECC in the Temporary
Refuge (TR). Usually, other locations within the TR, such as Admin/HLO
offices, will be well equipped to fulfil their daily function. The provision of
additional communications facilities, in places such as this, would enable a
secondary ECC to be established in the event of the primary ECC becoming
inoperative or uninhabitable. The need for an alternative location should be
determined as part of the formal Safety Assessment. ECCs should have
access to all necessary communications systems needed to manage a major
consequence or catastrophic emergency, as defined below, and meet the
objectives set out in Paragraph 5.3. The communications systems associated
with ECCs should be maintained in an operational state and, as far as
practicable, be independent of each other.

Telecommunications equipment which is permanently installed on NUIs should

be located in a non-hazardous area, preferably within or adjacent to the
designated ECP. Wherever possible, consideration should be given to locating
some standby or alternative systems in a separate area. Equipment locations
should be determined as part of the formal Safety Assessment. Where there is
no alternative equipment location for the ECP, backup systems should be
based on the use of portable equipment. The communications systems at the
ECP should be tested on arrival and remain operational until the work party
leaves.
A ‘major consequence’ – an event or combination of events that leads to
shutdown of the main and emergency generators, or prevents the emergency
generator from starting when shutdown of the main generator occurs, but which
allows the personnel to remain onboard.
A ‘catastrophic consequence’ – an event or combination of events that requires
the main and emergency generators to be shut down and the personnel to be
taken off the installation to a place of safety.
6.4 Telecommunications Cabling

Cabling outside equipment rooms for all telecommunications systems required
to remain operational in an emergency situation should be fire resistant.
This includes power cabling between these systems and their associated UPS
(if the UPS is not in the same room as the telecommunications equipment).
Other cables and waveguides used for telecommunications, including
associated power cables, should be flame retardant, with low halogen content.
In general, cables outside equipment rooms should also be protected against
physical damage. Cables from secondary ECCs to field equipment should be
carried on widely separated routes to those employed by the primary ECC.
Consideration should also be given to safety critical equipment mounted
externally to the TR. In the event of fire, hot smoke and flame may cause
damage to items such as aerial feeders and aerials which are often mounted in
exposed elevated positions. Wherever possible, cable routes and aerial
locations should be chosen to minimise potential exposure.
6.5 Shutdown of Telecommunication Systems

A theoretical analysis, as described in BS 6656 ‘Guide to the prevention of
induced ignition of flammable gases by radio-frequency radiation’ (or the
equivalent European standard when issued), should be carried out for each
installation to ensure that, in normal operation, electromagnetic fields from
telecommunications equipment are below the specified threshold level in any
part of the installation with a hazardous classification.

In the event of flammable gas being detected in any area of the installation
normally classified as non-hazardous, the following actions should be
implemented:
(a) All radio transmissions should be restricted to a safe level appropriate to
the installation, as defined in BS 6656, and assuming that all the
available RF power is delivered into a spark. (Where this restriction would
render the system unusable, it should be shut down.)
(b) All non-Ex certified equipment which is required to continue in operation
should be protected by a gas detection system so that it may be shut
down before an explosive concentration of gas is reached in the vicinity
of the equipment.
(c) Non-Ex certified equipment in areas not protected by gas detection
should be shut down immediately, preferably automatically, and isolated
from equipment in other areas which may still be operational, except for
antenna systems associated with equipment covered by (a) above.
In an accident emergency it is assumed that normal gas detection systems
may not be operating, or may be covering only a restricted area. The same
shutdown actions should therefore be taken as specified for a flammable gas
release above. In addition, any communications systems normally fed from
UPS systems, but which are not required in meeting the emergency
communications objectives, should be shut down to conserve battery power.
In the design of the installation’s fire and gas detection system, it should be
arranged that those communications facilities which are required to operate
under all shutdown conditions are enabled to do so, up to the point at which
flammable gas is detected in the vicinity of non-Ex certified equipment or
batteries. The ECCs and associated telecommunications equipment rooms,
battery rooms and UPS rooms should be protected by a local gas detection
system, activated by the shutdown command or by the failure of the main gas
detection system.
In the event of flammable gas being detected in any equipment room, the
equipment in that area should be automatically shut down by disconnection of
the power supply at the UPS. If flammable gas is detected in a UPS or battery
room, the system should be shut down by disconnection of the battery using
approved Exd switchgear.
Consideration should be given to the provision of a system by which any
telecommunications systems remaining operational when the installation is
evacuated in an emergency would be shut down automatically by a timer
circuit, or by a manual shutdown button at the embarkation point.

7 Installation and Maintenance

7.1 Summary of Regulations
The equipment chosen in compliance with PFEER regulations needs to
be properly installed and maintained in good working order throughout its
service life.
The diagram below summarises the key parts of PFEER Regulation 19
(Suitability and Condition of Plant) that govern the installation and maintenance
of the equipment provided for protective or emergency purposes.
Constructed as to be fit
for purpose
In efficient working
Maintained in efficient PFEER order and in good
state Reg 19 repair
Alarm System
Independently
examined
It requires that all equipment provided in compliance with PFEER regulations

be so constructed or adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it used
or provided; and be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order
and in good repair.
The equipment selected and its installation and maintenance standards should
comply with the Offshore Electricity and Noise Regulations, SI 1997/1993.
In general, the maintenance required will be met by conducting auditable
periodic tests and inspections and by carrying out timely and effective repairs.
Over longer timescales, a periodic assessment of the equipment should be
carried out with the objective of replacing the equipment if it is subject to
increasing breakdowns or facing obsolescence.
It is expected that several of the safety-related telecommunication systems
(or sub-systems) will be identified by the duty holder as safety critical elements.
It is then necessary to include these elements in the verification scheme for the
installation, as required by the Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations, SI 1992/2885 Regulation 15.

7.2 Regulations for Audible Alarm Systems

Particular regulations apply to the installation’s audible alarm system. For this
equipment, a written scheme for the systematic examination by a competent
and independent person is required. This should be conducted when the
equipment is initially commissioned and then subsequently at the intervals
advised in the scheme. Examination is also required when first used following
modification or significant overhaul. In this context, examination will entail
careful and critical scrutiny to assess its suitability for purpose, its actual
condition and the reporting of any remedial measures that may need to
be taken.
8 Training and Operations

8.1 Competencies
All persons operating VHF aeronautical radio stations, including hand-held
portable radio equipment, on a fixed offshore installation must hold an Offshore
Aeronautical Radio Station Operator’s Certificate of Competence, issued by the
Civil Aviation Authority, ATS Standards Department, ATS Licensing Section
(refer to CAA Publication CAP 452).
The minimum operator’s qualification for use of the international marine VHF
band is the GMDSS Restricted Operator’s Certificate (ROC).
Regular periodic exercise of the emergency communications systems
associated with ECCs should be carried out to ensure their satisfactory
operation, and the familiarity of personnel with their use. In particular, training
should be given in the disciplined use of hand-portable radio equipment in an
emergency situation, taking into account the practical restrictions and limited
number of radio channels available.
8.2 Operational Considerations for NUI Visits

MAR Regulation 12 requires that aircraft landing on or taking off from an
offshore installation, where there are no persons onboard before landing or
after take-off, have effective communication between the helicopter and a
suitable offshore manned installation. Where there is no suitable installation,
then to suitable premises onshore.
In order that the HLO can communicate with the helicopter pilot during landing
and take-off, they should carry an aeronautical-band VHF hand-portable radio
with them during the journey to and from the installation.

As soon as practicable, after arrival on an NUI, personnel should ensure that all
communications systems are operational. These checks should cover both
equipment permanently located on the installation and any temporary portable
equipment brought onto the installation. Where the helicopter transporting
personnel to the installation does not wait on the installation for the duration of
the visit, these checks should be completed before the helicopter departs.
When selecting telecommunications equipment to be installed on NUI, the
desirability of minimising the number and duration of visits required for
maintenance should be taken into consideration. Equipment should be simple
but highly reliable, and, in the event of failure, should be capable of being
quickly replaced.
Issue 1 August 2005 19/20

Addendum 1
Recommended Practice for Fixed
Offshore Installations
Paragraph Page
A1 Introduction 1
A2 Internal (Onboard) Communications 1

A2.1 Public Address/General Alarm System 1
A2.2 Telephone System 2
A2.3 Muster Stations Communications 3
A2.4 Hand-portable Radio Systems 3
A3 External Communications 4
A3.1 Links to Shore and Other Installations 4
A3.2 NUI Communications to ECC/OCC 4
A3.3 Pipeline Supervision 5
A3.4 Marine Communications 5
A3.5 TEMPSC Communications 6
A3.6 Aeronautical Communications 6
A3.7 Crane Communications 7
A4 References 8
Recommended Practice for Fixed Offshore Installations

Issue 1 August 2005 Add 1-i/ii
A1 Introduction
This Addendum sets out the recommended methods of meeting the objectives
listed in Paragraph 5.3. The recommendations are based on the facilities that
are normally provided on NAIs. The provision of suitable emergency
communications on NUIs may sometimes present particular challenges due to
the lack of normal operations equipment that will be available. The balance
between the use of fixed and portable equipment will therefore need due
consideration. The communication objectives need to be met, but the solutions
will need to be practical and the contingency arrangements in accord with the
kind of hazards that may be encountered. The recommended practice given
here may sometimes need to be adapted to suit the circumstances of a
particular case. Alternative methods of meeting the objectives may be
considered, provided they comply with the statutory requirements and maintain
an equivalent level of safety.
A2 Internal (Onboard) Communications

A2.1 Public Address/General Alarm System
Two independent acoustic alarm/public address systems should be provided.
The usual method of meeting these requirements is the provision of a fully
duplicated integrated Public Address/General Alarm (PA/GA) system as
described below. Other systems giving equivalent facilities may also be
considered.
The central equipment for each half of the PA/GA system should be installed in
locations as widely separated as is practicable, preferably in different modules.
These locations should be within, or close to, the designated ECC/ECP. If the
two locations are unavoidably in the same module, they should be separated
by at least an A60 wall.
Each PA/GA system should be capable of sounding the appropriate audible
alarms, and broadcasting announcements, to all parts of the installation where
persons may be present during normal operations and ambient noise levels
permit. The coverage must be such that the audible alarms are unmissable and
broadcasts clear and distinct and provide good coverage of muster stations,
evacuation routes and embarkation points. Each half of the PA/GA system
alone should give complete coverage of these areas. Emergency messages
may be preceded by an ‘alert’ signal (eg a pre-announcement chime) to attract
the attention of personnel.
Visual warnings in the form of high-intensity flashing beacons (xenon or
rotating mirror halogen lamp types) should be provided, in areas subject to high
ambient noise, to supplement the acoustic alarm signals.
All loudspeakers and flashing beacons used as part of the PA/GA systems
should be Ex certified, even where installed in areas normally classified
non-hazardous.

Issue 1 August 2005 Add 1-1
Access to the PA system, to initiate the alarms or make announcements,

should be provided in the ECC and any secondary ECCs. Operators may
designate additional access locations as required. If access is provided at
muster/evacuation points, the access units in these locations should be
Ex certified to ensure that they can remain operational under all shutdown
conditions.
Distribution zoning should not be used for GA signals or emergency PA
announcements. Zoning may be used for routine PA announcements, but if
used it is recommended that the number of zones should be kept to a
minimum.
All PA/GA equipment, including the flashing beacons, should be fed from the
ECC/ECP UPS systems. All cabling which distributes alarm signals should be
continually monitored by automatic line monitoring systems capable of reliably
detecting short-circuit and open-circuit conditions. Consideration should be
given to providing systems which enable the integrity of the entire system,
including loudspeakers and sounders, to be checked.
During alarm conditions, entertainment systems should be automatically muted
so that alarms and broadcasts can be clearly heard in cabins and recreation
areas. Alarm signals should be attenuated or muted during the transmission of
emergency PA announcements to ensure that the instructions are intelligible.
Consideration should also be given to the attenuation of the audible alarms
once all personnel have been mustered.
On NUI, where there is limited deck space, the provision of fixed audible alarm
and broadcast systems may not be practical and portable equipment would
need to be employed with suitable backup arrangements by way of
contingency. Portable alarm signalling equipment could be employed,
supplemented on small NUI by loudhailers, adapted to sound the necessary
alarm signals and provide a means for broadcasting emergency speech. Alarm
paging systems and hand-portable radios could also be considered.
All portable equipment would need to be suitably certified and particular
precautions would be needed to ensure that the failure of any personal warning
and messaging devices would not place persons at risk.
A2.2 Telephone System

Telephone services provide good quality communications and are invariably
installed for day-to-day operational purposes. Their use during emergencies
will enhance the effectiveness of emergency management in general and play
a useful role in providing alternative means of internal communication and
thereby improve resilience. Whenever a telephone system is provided for
operational reasons, they should be considered to be an integral part of the
internal communications provision for managing an emergency. The system
should therefore be designed to continue to operate after loss of generated
power from both normal and emergency generators, and at all levels of
shutdown and flammable gas release, up to the point at which flammable gas
penetrates the area housing the central exchange equipment.

Add 1-2 Issue 1 August 2005
As a completely Ex-certified system is not generally feasible, the design should

include facilities to isolate any non-Ex certified elements in the event of
flammable gas being detected in their vicinity. However, it should be arranged
that some Ex-certified telephone instruments be provided in all areas.
The locations of Ex telephones throughout the installation should be clearly
marked, using the standard European symbol. Further assistance in enabling
personnel to locate the nearest telephone quickly in an emergency should be
provided by the use of a distinctive bright colour for acoustic hoods, or large
fluorescent signs adjacent to the instruments. The number to call in an
emergency should be clearly marked by every telephone instrument. The main
central PABX equipment should be installed within, or adjacent to, the main
ECC. Consideration should be given to the provision of a secondary smaller
emergency PABX in the other ECC, for use if the main PABX fails or is
disabled.
On NUI, telephone facilities should be provided to enable direct communication
from the ECP to the ECC and OCC.
A2.3 Muster Stations Communications

At least one permanently installed Ex-certified system should be available up to
the point at which the installation is evacuated to provide communications
between the ECC/ECP and muster stations. This facility may be provided by a
dedicated voice intercom system, or by the use of the hand-portable radios.
If hand-portable radios are used, the radios should be available at each muster
point together with arrangements to ensure that their batteries are kept fully
charged. Battery chargers should be shut down at the appropriate stage
specified in Paragraph 6.5.
A2.4 Hand-portable Radio Systems

A system of intrinsically safe hand-portable radios should be provided. On large
installations, to obtain adequate coverage of all areas where personnel may go,
it will normally be necessary to operate via a base talk-through repeater, using
two-frequency simplex operation. Other measures, such as radiating feeder
cables or feed-through aerial couplers, will usually be necessary to ensure that
signals can penetrate enclosed areas. The system should be designed to
continue to operate after loss of generated power from both normal and
emergency generators, and have the appropriate base-repeater shutdown
arrangements that are described in Paragraph 6.5. Hand-portable units should
be equipped with one or more single-frequency simplex channels for use in the
event of base-repeater failure or shutdown.
Access to the system should be provided in both primary and alternate ECCs.
Consideration should be given to installing a base-repeater in each ECC
location, interlocked to ensure that both cannot be operational simultaneously.

Hand-portable radios should be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and
temperature classification appropriate for individual installations. Accessories
such as remote hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets, etc, if provided,
should be included in the certification. Units should be specified as being
capable of operating in rain showers, and should preferably be fully waterproof
(Ingress Protection Level IP66). Batteries for the hand-portable radios should
be capable of supporting 12 hours use without recharging, assuming a 10%
transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby duty cycle. For the protection of batteries,
battery chargers should preferably include a method of indicating battery
condition, and of automatic cutout when the battery is fully charged.
Operational procedures should take into account the practical restrictions on
the use of radio systems and the limited number of channels.
On small NUI the arrangements above should be adapted to suit the particular
installation. A radio base station or dedicated portable transceiver should be
permanently installed at the ECP with an aerial system sufficient to provide
coverage throughout the installation. If a permanently installed base station is
used, it should be fed from a UPS. If a dedicated hand-portable is used, a
battery multi-charger should be permanently installed in the ECP together with
spare batteries.
A3 External Communications
A3.1 Links to Shore and Other Installations
Each installation should have two independent means of communication to
shore using permanently installed equipment. The links may route via nearby
platforms and share their onshore traffic capacity or they may route directly to
sites onshore. In either case, the two systems should take different routes and
use independent equipment.
At least one of these links should be capable of safe operation for as long as
practicable in the shutdown sequence and with loss of generated power from
both normal and emergency generators. Access to this link should be provided
in both ECCs. The links will normally employ LOS radio, Satellite terminals or
subsea fibre and provide PABX or ISDX telephone services. Inmarsat or
Iridium terminals should be installed to provide telephone backup.
A3.2 NUI Communications to ECC/OCC

Equipment to provide a speech circuit between the installation and the ECC
and OCC should be permanently installed. This may be provided as a
stand-alone single-channel link, or integrated with the supervisory/control
communications system required for operational purposes. The circuit should
preferably be in the form of a dedicated ‘hotline’ point-to-point system, but
dial-up alternatives such as a long-line extension from the PABX at the
ECC/OCC is also acceptable.

Consideration should be given to ensuring that the speech circuit will remain
available for use in any reasonably foreseeable emergency situation, including
loss of the main generated power source and/or a release of flammable gas on
the installation, until all personnel are evacuated, or until flammable gas
penetrates the area in which the equipment is installed.
A backup means of contacting the ECC should also be available. Possible
alternatives include: Inmarsat or Iridium Services using either a fixed or
portable terminal; marine VHF if the ECC/OCC is on a nearby installation;
cellular radio if close to shore.
A3.3 Pipeline Supervision

Where products are exported by pipeline, as a minimum there should be a
continuously available dedicated voice ‘hotline’ system linking the installation to
the operational control rooms of other pipeline participants. A separate ‘hotline’
system should be provided for each pipeline system. To ensure the safety and
security of pipelines, supervisory systems will be needed to convey essential
data from participants to the pipeline control centre. Communication data links
that support pipeline supervision must be designed to meet the required level
of integrity.
A3.4 Marine Communications

Access to marine-band GMDSS (DSC Channel 70) VHF fixed transceivers
should be permanently available to each ECC. Operators may install further
marine-band transceivers in other locations as necessary for normal
operations. Those units in the ECCs should be fed from the ECC UPS, and
should incorporate facilities to restrict the transmitted power to a safe level
appropriate to the installation in the event of any confirmed flammable gas
release. Intrinsically safe marine band VHF hand-portable radios should also
be provided.
All marine-band radios should be equipped to operate on frequencies
appropriate for the operational requirements, ie for ship-to-ship or onboard use.
Private channels may be allocated for some operational requirements.
In an emergency situation, marine-band fixed stations and hand-portables may
be required for communication to nearby installations and helicopters.
Hand-portable radios should be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and
temperature classification appropriate for individual installations. Accessories
such as remote hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets, etc, if provided,
should be included in the certification. Units should be specified as being
(IP66).

Batteries for the hand-portable radios should be capable of supporting 12 hours

use without recharging, assuming a 10% transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby
duty cycle. For the protection of batteries, battery chargers should preferably
include a method of indicating battery condition, and of automatic cut-out when
the battery is fully charged.
On NUI, a GMDSS marine-band transceiver or a GMDSS approved
hand-portable fitted into an adapter should be installed in the ECP with at least
one additional hand-portable available for backup.
A3.5 TEMPSC Communications

TEMPSC should be equipped with GMDSS approved marine band VHF
transceivers and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) or
Search and Rescue Transponders (SARTs). Equipment that is battery
operated needs to have sufficient capacity to power the equipment until the
craft has been located and the occupants rescued. The minimum duration
required is 8 hours but should ideally be 24 hours. (Based upon operation at
the highest rated power of the equipment with a duty cycle of 1:9, the duty
cycle is defined as 6 seconds transmission, 6 seconds reception above squelch
opening level and 48 seconds below squelch opening level.)
A3.6 Aeronautical Communications

Access to aeronautical-band VHF fixed transceivers should be permanently
available in each ECC. Operators may also provide additional transceivers in
other locations, such as the Admin and HLO Offices, as necessary for normal
operations. The fixed stations in the ECCs should be fed from the ECC UPS,
and should incorporate facilities to restrict the transmitted power to a safe level
appropriate to the installation in the event of any confirmed flammable
gas release.
To provide extended coverage of air traffic or logistical control, to remote areas
of operation, remotely controlled aeronautical bases stations may be employed.
These may be individual base stations or groups using offset carrier
techniques.
VHF aeronautical-band hand-portable radios should be provided to meet
normal operational requirements. These hand-portable radios should preferably
be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and temperature classification
appropriate for individual installations. Accessories such as remote
hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets etc, where provided, should be
included in the certification. Where it is not possible to obtain intrinsically safe
aeronautical-band units, operational procedures should take this into account.
In these circumstances, communications from the helideck to helicopters in
emergency conditions where flammable gas may be present should use
intrinsically safe marine-band radios. Units should be specified as being
(IP66).

Batteries for the hand-portable radios should be capable of supporting 12 hours

use without recharging, assuming a 10% transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby
duty cycle. For the protection of batteries, battery chargers should preferably
include a method of indicating battery condition, and of automatic cut out when
the battery is fully charged.
The aeronautical communications equipment provided must comply with the
engineering standards given in CAA Publication CAP 670 COM 02 (Part C
Section 1).
To assist helicopter operators in the location and identification of the
installation, consideration should be given to the provision of an aeronautical
Non-directional Beacon (NDB) or weather radar transponders. Where an NDB
is installed, facilities for monitoring the transmissions should be provided.
Operation of NDBs should be automatically inhibited in the event of flammable
gas being detected anywhere on the installation.
Non-directional beacons must comply with the engineering standards given in
CAA Publication CAP 670 NAV 02 (Part C Section 2).
In addition to routine maintenance and inspections, periodic verification of NDB
radiation performance will also be needed to meet the requirements agreed
between the CAA Safety Regulations Group and Offshore Operators.
A3.7 Crane Communications

Cranes should be fitted with equipment to provide communications between
the crane operator and personnel working on the deck and to ships close to
the installation. Special care is needed to ensure that the crane
communications equipment is complaint with the operating conditions laid
down in the Safety Case. If cranes are to continue operation during a release of
flammable gas, then the equipment will require the appropriate level of
protection and the isolation of crane equipment would need to be included in
the installation shutdown philosophy. The communications equipment provided
should either be capable of hands-free operation or have suitable
arrangements to enable the safe use of the radios whilst the crane is in
operation. Cranes will generally have enclosed cabs and employ either VHF or
combined VHF/UHF transceivers (if the deck crew normally use UHF
hand-portables.) The installation alarms and broadcast system would need to
provide coverage of the crane cabs. On smaller installations, cranes may not
have enclosed cabs and fixed communications equipment may not be practical.
In these situations, the crane operator could employ intrinsically safe
hand-portable radios with suitable accessories to permit hands-free operation.
VOX operation with helmet mounted earpieces and microphones should be
considered.

A4 References
(1) Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and
Administration) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/738, The Stationery Office
ISBN 0 11 052735 6.
(2) Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency
Response) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/743, The Stationery Office
ISBN 0 11 052751 8.
(3) CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements, Second Issue,
12 June 2003, Civil Aviation Authority 2003, ISBN 0 86039 907 9.
(4) Assessment of Inadvertent Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres by Radio
Frequency Radiation, Guide BS 6656:2002, British Standards Institute.
(5) The Offshore Electricity and Noise Regulations 1997, SI 1997/1993,
The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 064828 5.
(6) Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2885,
The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 025869 X.
(7) CAP 452 Aeronautical Radio Station Operators Guide Twelfth Edition
January 2005, Civil Aviation Authority 2005, ISBN 0 86039 838 2.
Further Information:
Prevention of fire and explosion and emergency response on offshore
installations: Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosions, and
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995. Approved Code of Practice and
Guidance L65 HSE Books 1997, ISBN 0 7176 1386 0.


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Guidelines for Safety Related

Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of

Copyright  2005 UK Offshore Operators Association Limited

ISBN: 1 903003 30X

PUBLISHED BY UK OFFSHORE OPERATORS ASSOCIATION

3 Prevention, Detection and Control 5

5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI 8

Issue 1 August 2005 i

7 Installation and Maintenance 17

8 Training and Operations 18

ii Issue 1 August 2005

These guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Fixed Offshore

Issue 1 August 2005 iii/iv

ATS Air Traffic Services

Issue 1 August 2005 v

UHF Ultra High Frequency

vi Issue 1 August 2005

Issue 1 August 2005 1

2.2 The MAR Regulations

2 Issue 1 August 2005

Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration)

2.3 The PFEER Regulations

Issue 1 August 2005 3

Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency

4 Issue 1 August 2005

3 Prevention, Detection and Control

• Emergency Shutdown Mitigate • Condition Monitoring

• Remote Control • Collision Avoidance

Systems od • Navigation Beacons

• Internal Comms (A5) Lik

• Man Overboard Devices

Issue 1 August 2005 5

3.2 Communication Protective Measures

6 Issue 1 August 2005

Alert Emergency Alert

The regulations then focus on the communications needed for emergency

Issue 1 August 2005 7

5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI

Local Offshore Aircraft

Emergency Medical Support

8 Issue 1 August 2005

5.2 Overview of Requirements on NUI During

Local Offshore Ongoing

Muster Control Emergency Response Medical Support

Issue 1 August 2005 9

5.3 Communication Objectives for NAI and NUI

10 Issue 1 August 2005

5.4 Communication Provisions

5.4.2 Public Address System: Objective (A2)

5.4.3 Muster station Communications: Objective (A3)

5.4.4 Emergency Response/Support Teams Communications:

5.4.5 Other Communications: Objective (A5)

Issue 1 August 2005 11

5.4.6 Communications with On-Going Operations:

5.4.7 Communications with Onshore Emergency and Support:

5.4.8 Communications with Nearby Offshore Installations:

5.4.9 Communications to Ships: Objective (A9)

12 Issue 1 August 2005

5.4.10 Communications to Helicopters: Objective (A10)

5.4.11 TEMPSC Communications: Objective (A11)

Issue 1 August 2005 13

6.2 Power Supplies

6.3 Equipment Location