FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE.

The fundamental powers of the state are the police power, the power of eminent domain
and the power of taxation. These powers are inherent and do not need to expressly conferred by
constitutional provision on the State. They are supposed to co- exist with the State. The moment
the State comes into being, it is deemed invested with these three powers as its innate attributes.

They are not only necessary but indispensable. The State cannot continue or be effective unless it
is able to exercise them. They are methods by which the State interferes with private rights. They
all presuppose an equivalent compensation for the private rights interfered with. They are
exercised primarily by the legislature.

Although inherent and indispensable, the fundamental powers of the state are not without
restrictions. As ours is a government of limited powers, even these prerogatives may not be
exercised arbitrarily, to the prejudice of the Bill of Rights. The presumption in libertarian societies
is in favor of priate rights and against attempts on the part of the State to interfere with them.
Hence, the exercise of these fundamental powers is subject at all times to the limitations and
requirements of the Constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice.

POLICE POWER

The police power is considered the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three powers. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the property sought
to be regulated has some relevance to the public welfare. The reach is virtually limitless. The
person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power. The justification is found in the
ancient Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which
call for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.

The question of validity of legislative enactments as determination is essentially justiciable

and may be validly decided by the courts fo justice. As laid down in a number of cases, the tests
to determine the validity of a police measure are, first, the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power and the
means employees are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well
as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. A particular statute in the case of MMDA vs. Garin, granted the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, was thereby declared violating the due process
clause of the Constitution. Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. Similarly, in MMDA vs Bel- Air Village the Court held that the
MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in
the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner
herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of
the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila.
There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

In the field of education, police powers has been being exercised as well. The court
concluded in the case of Tablarin vs Gutierrez that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The government is entitled to prescribe an admission
test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into medical schools" and of "improve the quality of medical education in the country.
The court held that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. The state exercises this power in the admission of
professionals as well, in the case of PRC vs. De Guzman, the Board observed that the grades of
the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in
the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-
Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable
passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that
the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.” The Court has upheld the
constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would
practice medicine.
In cases of banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is declared a valid exercise
of police power by the courts. It was laid in Chavez vs Romulo, just like ordinary licenses in other
regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only
a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject
to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this
license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege. In Southeast Midanao mining vs Balite Portal Mining Coorp, it was
held that the challenged memorandum not consclusively adopt direct state utilization as policy in
resolving Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that was directed
thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. It did not grant any management/
operating profit- sharing agreement to small scale miners or to any party but it simply instructed
DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. Another mining case
is Miners Associative vs Factoran where the president in her legislative power issued EO No. 211
prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court said that that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by
the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining
leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Lastly, one of the many environmental cases also is
Pollution Education Board vs. CA., in here the court said that relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power
to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant
and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

In this agricultural case of Ynot vs IAC, the supreme court said that The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The
executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the
instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas
bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
An act granting all senior citizens 20% discount from all establishments restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens or the Sec. 4(a) of the
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” was assailed to be deprivation of private property and compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital. But it
was held constitutional as it was laid in the case of Carlos Superdrug Corp vs DSWD. It was said that
the law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. The State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can
impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Senior
Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and
to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them
an integral part of our society.
In Camarines Norte Electric vs. Torres, neither can police power be invoked to clothe with
validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
society. It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay. Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely,
R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the
President or any other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative. The
Supreme Court does not hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no constitutional and statutory
basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives
are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in
a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-interference in the
management and operation of cooperatives.

The Court notes in the case of Francisco v Fernando, Flag Scheme’s alleged of disregards
the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and violates
“pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. lack of legal basis, we
note that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela
City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes
with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’
implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and
similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-
jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof
that respondents implemented the FlagScheme in that city.

Another notable case of Ermita Malate Motel vs City of Manila lead us to the concept
of a municipal government exercising police power through the use of issuing an ordinance. The
court said that ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. There is no violation on constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face.
Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and
injunction lifted. In relation to public corporations in Matajas vs Pryce Properties local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and
void.

Another way of exercising of police power was manifested in the case of Taxicab Operators vs
Boards of Transportation. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded”. It was also said in Republic vs Meralco that the regulation of rates to be charged by
public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control
and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn
by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to
public regulation.

In terms of treaty and exercise of police power through statutes, a law may supersede a
treaty or a generally accepted principle. In the case of Inchong vs. Hernandez, there is no conflict
at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.” For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate
his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

the Supreme Court held in Lutz v Araneta that the fact that sugar production is one of the
greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that
it gives employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of
the state's wealth, is one of the important source of foreign exchange needed by our government
and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its
promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence
it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar
industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could
provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable
it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain. The subject tax is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.
 It was assailed in the case of Tio vs VRB that there is an undue delegation of power to an
administrative body in order to exercise police power to give broad powers to the VRB to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy.
However the Supreme Court said that there is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB
is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek
assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with
the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the VRB.”

Matters involving criminal laws, in Lozano vs Martinez it was declared that the enactment of BP
22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.