PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

MARTIN CAGADAS, JR

Facts:

On June 6, 1973, at around 6:30 in the morning, Rex Ballena and his sister, Lucia Ballena-Tabo, left their residences to withdraw
some money with which to pay their farm laborers. In order to reach their destination, they had to pass through Sitio Rizal in Binancian,
Municipality of Asuncion, Davao, to take a jeepney ride to Tagum.

While waiting inside the jeep at the Sitio Rizal Terminal, some members of the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force (ICHDF),
including the accused, approached them and asked where they were bound for and why. Rex Ballena naively informed them that they
were on their way to Tagum to withdraw money from the bank with which to pay his farmhands. When asked if they would be returning
to Longganapan that day, Lucia replied that only her brother, Rex, would do so. One of the ICHDF members who approached them was
identified by Lucia Tabo as Martin Cagadas, Jr.

After withdrawing P800 from his Family Savings Bank,Rex purchased some necessities for his family, reserving P500 for his
workers' wages. Rex was found dead on the following day.

The accused was arrested and convicted by the RTC for the crime of murder.

Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura for he was not one of those indicted in the
information but "Jose" Cultura (his father's name), has no merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused.

Held:

No. The erroneous designation of his name in the information will not vitiate it, as it was clearly proven that the accused,
Roberto Cultura, was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and killed the victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise this question of his
identity during the arraignment. His acquiescence to be tried under the name "Jose" at that stage of the case is deemed to be a waiver
on his part to raise the question of his identity as one of the accused for the first time on appeal (People vs. Maravilla, 165 SCRA 392;
People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702).

WHEREFORE, the decision affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ROMEO PADICA y LORICA

Facts:

Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were
originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms before Military
Commission No. 27

However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for the transfer of the case to the civil courts.

On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an information for kidnapping for ransom with murder, before
Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Pasay City against the aforementioned accused, but with the exception of herein appellant
whose name was inadvertently not included therein.

A separate charge for illegal possession of firearms was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional Trial Court but the case
was later placed in the archives some time in 1985.

Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were both arraigned on January 15, 1982 and, with the assistance of their respective
counsel, both pleaded not guilty. It appears, however, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of
"Leonardo Marajas." 6 Trial thereafter ensued but, subsequently, the case was reraffled to Branch CXVI, Pasay City, of the Regional Trial
Court where it remained until the conclusion of the trial in 1990.

However, upon discovery of the omission of herein appellant's name in the original information, the prosecution filed a motion for
the admission of an amended information including appellant's name as one of the accused. The admitted the amended information.
Thereafter, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the amended information. On the
other hand, accused Padica was discharged from the information to be utilized as a state witness.

Appellant contended that the failure of the prosecution to charge him as an accused in the original information is a fatal defect.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to include him in the information is a fatal defect

Ruling:

No.

The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name of the accused, failing which the complaint or
information would be rendered invalid. The test of sufficiency is laid down in Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which states that
a complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or
is known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is
unknown.

If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is disclosed by him, or appears in some other manner to the court,
the true name of the accused shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the original information and that he entered thereto a
plea of not guilty under the name of "Leonardo Marajas."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINADOR SORIANO, SR., appellant.

FACTS:
The prosecution charged appellant with raping his then 12-year old daughter AAA, in an Information2 that reads:
“That sometime between October 2000 to December 11, 2001, at Barangay San Leonardo, Municipality of Bambang, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, threat,
intimidation and grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own daughter
AAA, 12 years old, against the latter’s will and consent, to her own damage and prejudice.”
The Information specified Article 266-A of Republic Act No. 8353, Section I, paragraphs (a) and (c) in relation to Republic Act No. 7659, as
the law violated.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.4Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the affidavit of desistance presented by appellant could not exonerate him especially since AAA
refused to validate the due execution and veracity of said affidavit in open court.

ISSUE:

Can the Appellant be guilty of multiple rape?

STATUTE: Sec. 13 Rule 110 — A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment
for various offenses

HELD:
Duplicity of Offenses: Where the accused did not seasonably object to the multiple offenses in the information, the court may convict him of as
many as are charged and proved.—The Court observes that the information charged more than one offense in violation of Section 13, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Considering that appellant did not seasonably object to the multiple offenses in the
information, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved.

We note, however, that both the trial court and the appellate court merely found the appellant guilty of “multiple rape” without
specifying the number of rapes that appellant is guilty of. While this may have been irrelevant considering that appellant would have been
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death even if only one count of rape was proven, the same is still important since this would have
bearing on appellant’s civil liability. Further, there is no such crime as “multiple rape.” In this case, appellant is guilty of two counts of rape
qualified by the circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the parent of the victim.

Malto v. People

Facts:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several
times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the
petitioner’s threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to
the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of “not guilty.” The trial court found the
evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. The trail court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty and
sentenced him to reclusion temporal and to pay an indemnity of Php. 75,000 and damages of Php. 50,000.
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. The CA modified the decision of the trial court. The appellate court affirmed his
conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for
rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse
was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart” relationship

Held:
No. The “sweetheart theory” cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610.
Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected to
sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse.

Licyayo vs. People- Sufficient Provocation and Intoxication

G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008

FACTS:

Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC when he stabbed Rufino in different parts of the body. The RTC convicted Licyayo guilty of the
crime Homicide there being no attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The petitioner appealed contending that sufficient provocation and intoxication should be taken as mitigating circumstances attendant in the
case. He insisted that there is sufficient provocation because it was the deceased who punched him first and when the incident ensued he
was intoxicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient provocation and intoxication should be considered as mitigating circumstances attendant in the case.

HELD:

The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by
petitioner. Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it is obvious that immediately he became the
underdog, literally even. He was easily overpowered by the bigger and sober Aron Licyayo. Sufficient provocation therefore cannot be
appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
As testified by the police officers, they said that petitioner indeed was drunk when the scuffle ensued. However, these testimonies alone do
not suffice as proof to appreciate intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the
quantity of liquor taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that petitioner could
recall the details that transpired during and after his drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during
the incident.

People v. Nocum

FACTS:

That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City,

REYNALDO MALLARI together with ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one Toyota Tamaraw FX valued at more or less Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the

damage and [prejudice] of its owner, Lourdes Eleccion. In the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said
vehicle, was killed. When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain
at-large. He pleaded “not guilty” to the charge.6 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a selfconfessed member of “FX gang,” a syndicate notorious for carjacking
Toyota FX vehicles. The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles, transport them to Mindanao, and have them
registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with
carnapping7 before the RTC of Parañaque City but was later on discharged to be a state witness.8 Consequently, Mahilac was placed
under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice (DOJ).9

Mahilac testified that the “FX gang” was active in Metro Manila and

Mindanao.10 Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land
Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte,11 led the Mindanao operations.12 Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.1

On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision44 finding Mallari

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated
in the theft of the FX taxi and the killing of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also found
that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the accused doing their assigned tasks to
ensure the consummation of their common criminal objective.45

On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision47 affirming with

modification the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification of Mallari as a member of the
“FX gang” and his participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its

sole witness is of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari,48 whose defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the straightforward testimony of the former

ISSUES:

WON there is a lack of material evidence to justify the accused’s conviction.

HELD:

The appeal is unmeritorious.

We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s

culpability.

The crime of carnapping with

homicide, as well as the identity of

Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the

crime, is duly established by

circumstantial evidence.

The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with

homicide is duly established by the confluence of circumstantial evidence.

Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all

members of the “FX Gang,” gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers in
Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two
other conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac
in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design
was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner.

In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with

homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven
by Medel and in killing him.

Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no

credence.

Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the

time the crime was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which,
taken in its entirety, leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime. Moreover, alibi is
inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.

Petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE vs EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602

FACTS:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai
betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of
her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party.

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan
was then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with
them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did
not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella
then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.”
Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground.
Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of
his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine. After
shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001).

The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of
murder.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.

In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their
testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of
the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend
to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent
on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or
particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the
accused sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated: For complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of
the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor,
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of
[their] death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It
should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how
the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might
make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve
the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
 To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details of the crime
and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of
the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands
charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the
Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim San: From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question
is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the
information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime
the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the
crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, “Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not “Did you commit a crime named murder.” If he performed the acts alleged,
in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court
alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration
against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate
analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged
is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the accusation.

People v. Feliciano

FACTS:

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at
the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several
masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and separate informations were also filed
against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members.

RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder. Others
were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the information against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
2. Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to enable him to prepare
his defense. The argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the
prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were
presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such

It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and
unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off
does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense
they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be
informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean
all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might
not have done so.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution. It was held that the trial court, in
weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in
their statements were immaterial considering the swiftness of the incident.

Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this case

According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him
that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part
of the res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that
the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given
in res gestae.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the
events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of
the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.

When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to
end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the commission of the crime

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on
guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was
with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help
them until after the incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO A. UBIÑA

G.R. No. 176349 July 10, 2007

FACTS: Appellant, Orlando Ubina, was charged with rape of his 15-year old niece. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After
trial, the RTC found him guilty of rape. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC. However, the appellate court disregarded the
aggravating circumstance of craft and the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship of the parties in the imposition
of penalty because it noted that they were not alleged in the information. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Did the court err in disregarding the qualifying circumstance of relationship and minority?

HELD: The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
are in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special
qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information; . . . If the offender is merely a
relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim — the specific relationship
must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree.
The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA's uncle, without specifically stating that he is a relative within the
third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved that the relationship was within the
third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would thereby be denied
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the
crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

However, the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the Information. When either one of the twin special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence
may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, complainant's minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
However, it may not serve to raise the penalty in the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
which is single and indivisible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUDY NUYOK

G.R. No. 195424 June 15, 2015

Facts:

The victim was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in June, July, August and September of 2005. She resided in the
house of her grandmother wherein the accused, her
paternal uncle, also lived. On June 25, 2005, as the victim was about to sleep, the accused laid down beside her. She tried to escape,
but he pulled her by the hair, slapped her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining
consciousness, she noticed that her panties had blood. The accused warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to
kill her and her family if she did so. The victim finally reported the four rapes to her mother in October 2005. The accused denied
having raped and imputed ill motives to the victim insisting that the victim’s mother had wanted to get back at him after he had told
his brother, the victim’s father, that he had caught the victim’s mother with a paramour. Both the RTC and CA found the accused
guilty of four counts of rape.
Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the minority of the offended party when the same was not indicated in
the information.

Ruling:

No, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party.
The Revised Penal Code provides that Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
(a) through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
(d) When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances above be present.

The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the information defective.
Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal
knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the
rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information
states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Secondly, the Prosecution
successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape against the accused. The victim positively identified the accused as
her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid, and her demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of
her testimony whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands. The testimony of a rape victim that is
consistent with the medical findings constitutes sufficient basis to conclude that carnal knowledge occurred.

Hence, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party.

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions of the
Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf
of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.

The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon
learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion
is opposed by the prosecution for the reason that petitioner should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner
simultaneously filed a motion to quash.

The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by petitioner and the prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution have waived their right to present evidence
in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the
conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being
deprived of his liberty.

Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where detention,
while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.

Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted?

Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. General rule applies.
“Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to
grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.”
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioner’s restraint of liberty did not become arbitrary. His application for bail
has yet to commence (to be heard).

The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution because he himself
is partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.

In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a
valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.

People vs Aure and Ferol

GR No. 180451
October 17, 2008

FACTS:

On January 20, 2000, two separate informations for rape were filed with the RTC charging appellants of rape. Both charges contained
therewith information that appellants have conspired and mutually helped each other with the act charged against them. Subsequently,
these cases were consolidated for joint trial. Both appellants, assisted by their own counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits thereafter followed.

The RTC rendered decision convicting appellant Aure and Ferol of rape in Criminal case C-58617 and Criminal Case C-58693 respectively.
Aure was acquitted from Criminal case C-58693 and Ferol was also acquitted from Criminal case C-58617, for failure of the prosecution
to prove that they conspired in their respective criminal charges.

ISSUE:

1. WON the ruling of the RTC are inconsistent with the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot
individually and separately convict them of rape because the information alleged conspiracy.

2. WON Ferol should be acquitted because the date and time in the allegation is inconsistent with that of the RTC's decision.

RULING

1. NO. The ruling of the RTC is correct in convicting the appellants individually and separately. Although the informations in the two
separate cases alleged that appellants conspired in raping AAA, it does not necessarily follow that RTC cannot convict them individually
and separately.

The rule is that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes
committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should
be held individually responsible for their own respective acts.

In the instant cases, the RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy between appellants in raping AAA. Nevertheless,
on the basis of AAAs credible testimony and documentary evidence for the prosecution, the RTC found that appellant Aure alone raped
AAA on 7 November 1999 and that appellant Ferol alone raped AAA on 8 November 1999. Thus, the RTC was correct in holding
appellants individually responsible for their respective acts of rape.

2. NO. It is also true that the information in Criminal case filed against Ferol alleged that appellants conspired in raping AAA on November
07, 1999, and the RTC convicted Ferol in the same criminal case for raping AAA on November 08, 1999, the discrepancy on the actual
date of rape does not constitute a serious error warranting the reversal of the latters conviction.

The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime, what matters is that the accused has carnal
knowledge of a woman and through force and intimidation such act was done. As such, the date or time need not be stated with
absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the
date of actual commission.

People v. Tampus
GR No. 181084, June 16, 2009

FACTS: The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked as a
waitress in a beer house. At the time of the commission of the crime, Ida and ABC was renting a room in a house owned by Tampus who
was a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995 ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They
forced her to drink beer and after consuming three and one-half glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC
was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse
with her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went
to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose
and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain all over her body and her private parts and noticed that her panties and short pants
were stained with blood which was coming from her private part. When her mother arrived home from work the following morning,
she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995, she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside
their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. He then forcibly removed her panties.
ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted. He undressed himself and consummated
the sexual act then he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.

Both defendants denied the allegation Tampus claiming that he went to the public market on April 1 and that he was at the Barangay
Outpost to perform his duties as barangay tanod on April 4. Ida alleged that she always brings her daughter with her when she works.

(Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical
Certification which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry
Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

The trial court convicter Tampus of two counts of rape and found Ida guilty as an accomplice in the first rape case. The mitigating
circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts was
appreciated in favor of Ida. Both were ordered jointly, and severally to indemnify ABC the sum of Php 50,000.00

Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed. The appeal dealt
only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was
completely deprived of intelligence on On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s
schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though
it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The appeal was dismissed, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
but modified the award of damages ordering Ida to pay moral damages in the amount of fifty Php 50,000.00 and exemplary damages
in the amount of Php 25,000.00

ISSUES:
Whether the mitigating circumstance must be appreciated in favor of Ida
Whether or not Ida can be considered as an accomplice.
Whether or not the trial court and appellate court was correct in their Imposition of the indemnities that
Ida has to pay

RULING:

1. The conviction of Ida as accomplice in the crime

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an
accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in
his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
 (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.48

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by
Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show
that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows
that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus’
intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC
alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual intercourse with her
daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the
commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts
of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced
ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have
consummated the act even without Ida’s consent. The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus.

Circumstances affecting the liability of ida

Schizophrenia may be considered as a mitigating circumstance if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused.
The testimony shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her
judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few
months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise
of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.

The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time of the incident—could have been
considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death. However, although the
victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the
Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be
given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending
the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the did not state that
Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as
an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant

It is necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of
the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. The victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, Tampus’ civil indemnity ex
delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of
responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each
one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of the crime are
liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.

The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the
commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a
consummated felony. he accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime
committed and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees. However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly
liable. Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the
damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in which the Revised Penal
Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory—the share of each accused in
the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil
indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the
allotment.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall
determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged
in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within
their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other
persons liable."

If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the
court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though
the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00,
while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends
up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still divided
among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the civil
indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the
difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of
cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even
without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater
liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states
that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within
their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide
for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lTaking into consideration the difference
in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple
rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus
and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33
(which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67.
However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto
is extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment. His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to
the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. However, since Tampus’ civil liability ex delicto
is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows
the principal.

Exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals. In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on
the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Also known as
"punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and
proved during the trial. In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority
of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the
presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida,
to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information. The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must both
be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance. While
the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent.
Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.

Appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-
seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos
(P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is deleted.

MENDEZ vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS:
1. Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different businesses
a. 1. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
i. Registered with Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 39 – South Quezon City
b. 2. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
i. Registered with RDO No. 39 – South Quezon City
c. 3. Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa
i. Registered with RDO No. 40 – Cubao
d. 4. Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic
i. Registered with RDO No. 47 – East Makati
e. 5. Weigh Less Center
i. Registered with RDO No. 21
f. 6. Mendez Weigh Less Center
i. Registered with RDO No. 4 – Calasiao Pangasinan
2. Petitioner failed to file an income tax return on those businesses during the taxable years 2001 to 2013.
3. When a complaint was filed against him by the BIR for failure to file an income tax return, petitioner admitted that he has
been operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando.
a. But he countered that these businesses were registered only in 2003, and thus were not yet in existence.
4. An information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, which
reads
a. That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above
named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of "Weigh Less Center" with principal office at No. 31
Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of
P1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest.
i. to which he plead not guilty.
5. After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information, which would read:
a. That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above
named accused, doing business under the name and style of "Weigh Less Center"/Mendez Medical Group", with
several branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for income
earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount
ofP1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest
i. change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002;
ii. ) the addition of the phrase "for income earned."
iii. Business name was changed to “WEIGH LESS CENTER/MENDEZ MEDICAL GROUP”
iv. DAGUPAN, SAN FERNANDO omitted, MANDALUYONG, MUNTINLUPA added
6. Petitioner failed to file a comment on the motion.
a. The motion was granted.
7. Petitioner now assails the validity of the amended information. (PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION)
a. He contends that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
i. It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense.
ii. Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: WON the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be
denied?

HELD: NO SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT

1. The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income earned"
 a. petitioner still baselessly belaboured the point in its present petition by citing the erroneous content of the
prosecution’s motion to amend instead of the original information itself
b. That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with the allegation
in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year 2001. Since the information alleges that
petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be
committed when petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the due date of filing, which is on April of the
succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the addition of the phrase "for the income earned" before the phrase "for the
taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional
precision something that is already contained in the original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be
filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable year.
2. The addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group and the change and/or addition
of the branches of petitioner’s operation
a. Under the National Internal Revenue Code, a person practicing his profession must file an income tax return on his
INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES
b. Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should have filed a
consolidated return IN HIS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS, regardless of the number and location of his other
branches.
i. Consequently, the change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information
does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the
petitioner failed to file his income tax return.
1. PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO FILE HIS RETURN and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes.
Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
c. “doing business”
i. Merely an added description of the business operastions of the petitioner
1. Because his businesses are not separate juridical entities
a. A sole proprietorship is a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof, like the petitioner-accused, to
secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national
government without acquiring juridical or legal personality of its own

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES II G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas
stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of
money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.

Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as,
though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and
swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Parulan vs Director of Prisons

Facts: Petitioner Parulan was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinlupa serving life sentence but commuted to 20 years by the
President. In 1964, he was transferred to Fort Santiago but later escaped. He was rearrested in Manila and sentenced for evasion of
sentence.

Issue: Did the trial court in Manila acquire jurisdiction in his case? Also, is the warrantless arrest proper?

Held: Yes, it did. The act of the prisoner is a continuous crime. Hence, the court of any province that may be first to take cognizance of
the case acquires jurisdiction.

The arrest is proper for it is one of the instances in Rule 113 of the revised Rules of Court when a warrantless arrest may be effected.