Tolentino v CA (1988)

Tolentino v CA (1988)

Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The

marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the
Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of
desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the
marriage. After that, Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945
and they had 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of
Arturo Tolentino.
Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and
up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname
Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and
sisters).
In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of
Tolentino. The CA decision reversed that of the RTC’s.

ISSUES:
WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed
WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the
surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

HELD:
Yes
In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in
no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day
they may be brought.
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April
21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge
that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo
David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November
23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.
No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use
the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under
Philippine law.
On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC. The wife cannot
claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it.
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present
case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage
ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the spouse where the
deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even
if he has remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems
because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third
persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the
surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal
injury or deprivation of right.
There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation
implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the
possibility of confusion of identity. The elements of usurpation were 1. Actual
use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identity of a person. None of these elements were
present in the case because public knowledge referred to Constancia as the
legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce as
Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.
Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In
Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the
defendant’s representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was
usurpation of the status of the wife.
Silverio vs Republic
G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]

FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery,
sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from
male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal
filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court
decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either
name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first
name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the
Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article
412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed
by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy
consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in
statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of

Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court
the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the
Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be

changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionatecalls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That
is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences
that will follow.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 March 22, 2001

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE

CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of

First Name or Nickname – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

Section 2. Definition of Terms – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

"City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of the local civil
registry office of the city or municipality, as the case may be, who is
appointed as such by the city or municipal mayor in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws.

"Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has
direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or
typographical error in an entry or change of first name or nickname in
the civil register.

"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
 an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner.

"Civil Register" refers to the various registry books and related

certificates and documents kept in the archives of the local civil registry
offices, Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General.

"Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of the National

Statistics Office which is the agency mandated to carry out and
administer the provision of laws on civil registration.

"First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may

consist of one or more names in addition to the middle and last names.

Section 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct
and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in
person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is
kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and
it would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses,
time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the
documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person,
with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently
residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign
countries may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first
names or nicknames may be availed of only once.

Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:

The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted

with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that
first name or nickname in the community: or

The change will avoid confusion.

Section 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the
form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by
the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to
establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the
petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall
state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be
corrected and/or the change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry
book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.

At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or
entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and

Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or
the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the
petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be

supported with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore,
the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.

The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be
distributed as follows: first copy to the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General; and third copy to the petitioner.

Section 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General.
– The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the
petition is presented shall examine the petition and its supporting documents.
He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for
ten (10) consecutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting
documents sufficient in form and substance.

The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall act on the
petition and shall render a decision not later than five (5) working days after
the completion of the posting and/or publication requirement. He shall
transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to
the Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5) working days from the
date of the decision.

Section 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – The civil registrar
general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision
granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an
objection based on the following grounds:

The error is not clerical or typographical;

The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or

controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; or

The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall
under Section 4.

The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general of the action taken on the decision. Upon
receipt of the notice thereof, the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general shall notify the petitioner of such action.

The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar general or file
the appropriate petition with the proper court.

If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to impugn the decision
of the city or municipal civil registrar or of the consul general within the period
prescribed herein, such decision shall become final and executory.

Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

Section 8. Payment of Fees. – The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general shall be authorized to collect reasonable fees as a condition for
accepting the petition. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt from the
payment of the said fee.

Section 9. Penalty Clause. - A person who violates any of the provisions of this
Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.

In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee he shall suffer

the penalties provided under civil service laws, rules and regulations.

Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The civil registrar general
shall, in consultation with the Department of Justice, the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the University
of the Philippines Law Center and the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars,
issue the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of
this Act not later than three (3) months from the effectivity of this law.

Section 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code and other laws.

Section 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is

declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof
shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 13. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 14. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved: March 22, 2001

(Sgd.)

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Case Doctrines:

● A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s
surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name
but only her civil status.

● Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her

passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases
of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.

● The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the

passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also
mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport
and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at
all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of
the passport as long as it is valid.

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco

R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000,
showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
“Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she
applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name
and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she
made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a
married woman to use her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of
Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the
Secretary’s ruling. The CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine
Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370
of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name
upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

Issues:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her
marriage subsists.
Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin
vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an
option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage.
She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when
a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status.
RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a
married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a
married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do
so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in

her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the
following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband,
(2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to
her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the
use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.

Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a
Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman,
Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to
resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to
resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail
over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the
use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law
prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an
implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or
two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be
effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous

passport application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing
prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her
husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in
a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot
be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the
records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the

passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also
mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport
and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at
all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of
the passport as long as it is valid. (Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R.
No. 169202, March 5, 2010).

Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in
August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying
the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979
and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only
issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be
secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However,
SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of
the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to

the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless
complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact,
that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To
grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband
pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared
valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

Rivero (Jose, Jessie, and Amalia) v. CA, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-de Guzman, and
Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., as represented by his uncle Henry Dy Chiao (2005)

Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts:

Aug 27, 1996: Benedick Arevalo filed a complaint against the Dy Chiaos (Mary
Jane, Benito Jr., and Benson) for compulsory recognition as
the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao Sr. and for the
administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate (so he left

his P100mil estate up for grabs). At that time, Benedick Arevalo was a minor so
his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed

the complaint on his behalf. Their counsel was Atty Simando.

Benedick Arevalo alleges that his parents (Benito Sr and Shirley) were lovers
who cohabited in a house provided by Benito Sr. in Camarines

Sur. He was born 4 yrs into this relationship. He also alleges that the Dy Chiao
siblings recognized him as Benito Sr.’s illegit son.

In their answer, Mary Jane (for herself and in behalf of her brothers) denied
the story of Benedick (that he was the illegitimate son and that

they recognized him).

At this time, the brothers were confined in a mental hospital. Benedick filed a
motion praying that the court order a mental exam for them and

to appoint their sister (Mary Jane) as their guardian ad litem. That same day,
Benedick filed a “compromise agreement” with the following

signatiories: Shirley, Atty. Simando, and Mary Jane (assisted by counsel, Atty.
Botor), for and in behalf of her brothers.

The compromise agreement:

That Mary Jane recognizes Benedick as the illegitimate son of Benito Sr

That they agree to pay Benecik P6mil

That they waive claims and counterclaims against each other

Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) – Sept 20, 1995 (almost a yr before the complaint filed by

Benedick) – notarized and certified by Atty. Simando, signed by the brothers,

who were then still in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein

appointed to be their attorney-in-fact. Her powers were:

To represent them and be the representative with power to sign

Agreements involving property

To file the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate

RTC approved the compromise agreement.

11 days after the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for
the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Sr., this time as counsel of

Mary Jane.

Benedick terminated Atty. Simando since he was Mary Jane’s counsel in the
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate.

Later on, the Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their Uncle (Henry) filed with
the CA to annul the decision of RTC alleging that they had no

legal capacity to be sued because they were of unsound mind and that they
did not authorize their sister to execute any compromise

agreement and that she did this in confabulation with Atty. Simando. This
impelled their Uncle to file a petition for guardianship in Naga.

The CA issued a status quo order but before the order was served on Benedick,
several lots have already been sold at public auction (to the

Riveros). The CA nullified the RTC decision, including the public sale of the lots.
The petitioners (the Riveros) insist that the public auction sale was valid.

Issue/Held: Public auction valid? NO.

Ratio:

RE: whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for Benito, Jr.

CA needs only to determine whether the individual was so incapable of

handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for a

temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear and
convincing evidence, Benito, Jr. is incompetent and that it is

likely that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary

guardian. (A finding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is

proposed is incapable of managing his own personal and financial affairs by

reason of his mental illness is enough.)

Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and
the office of such guardian is to represent the interest of the

incompetent or the minor.

Whether or not to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed

to the sound discretion of the court where the petition was filed,

taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the minor.

RE: the SPA

NCC 1878 provides that an SPA is required for a compromise.

The power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is
drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf

of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has
no legal effect, and the judgment based on such compromise

agreement is null and void. The judgment may be impugned and its execution
may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it

is sought to be enforced.

It is conceded that Mary Jane agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick to be
taken from the estate of their father. However, a cursory

reading of the SPA will show that the brothers did not authorize their sister to
recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son. They could not have

agreed to pay P6mil because they had denied that Benedick was the
illegitimate son of their father in their answer.

On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on
September 20, 1995, a cursory reading of the compromise agreement

will show that they did not empower their sister to enter into a compromise
agreement with Benedick. It bears stressing that the SPA was

executed as early as September 1995, while the complaint was filed with the
RTC almost a year after, August 1996.

Barely 2 wks earlier (November 1996), Mary Jane (whom Benedick branded as
a spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise
agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers, who were
confined in the hospital and whom Benedick considered as

mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem. The trial court ignored
all the foregoing proceedings and approved the compromise

agreement without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the brothers

were indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need to appoint

a guardian ad litem for them.

RE: Atty Simando

SC is convinced that the compromise agreement was the work of Atty.

Simando, because he was the one who notarized the SPA then he later

became the counsel of Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings.

He signed the compromise agreement as Benedick's counsel, despite his

incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed

a guardian ad litem. And after 11 days after the compromise agreement, he

became Mary Jane’s counsel.
 41 SCRA 548 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of teachers/heads of
establishments of arts and trades
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute
(a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman.
This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two.
Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the
school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner
(Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only
liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as
per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for
the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or
other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Casestill applies.
HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in
the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case.
Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly
and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the
fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability,
in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the
factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption
from liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a
student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and
teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
Jose Amadora vs Court of Appeals
March 5, 2015 @ 3:10 am

ADVERTISEMENTS

Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 2180 – Liability of Schools of

Arts and Trades and Academic Schools – Liability of Teachers and
Heads of School

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired
a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of
Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code because of the school’s negligence.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the
principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all
civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident
happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that
even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in
school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under
the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades
(vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic

school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous
act of its students.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the

provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of

the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a
distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools.
That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic
or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.

The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether

academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only
subsidiary.

For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school

who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is
because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school
exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of
academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would

be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean
or the head of school.

The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when
the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies
whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can
be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the
student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject
to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and
for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the
teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus
pater familias.

In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly
named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the
said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held
subsidiarily liable too.