Republic of the Philippines plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial
SUPREME COURT Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC.,
and DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12,
1985 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting
private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the
issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift
attachment filed by petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order
of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In
the Resolution of September 25, 1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without
necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.
The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in
turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.
On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED, and judgment is rendered in favor of the
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal
obligation with 12% interest per annum from the date of
default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated
damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal
obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court.
Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties
of Varian in respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none
was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the
execution pending appeal as prayed for. 6 However, the writ of execution was
returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
properties upon demand. In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with
respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to
pay the value of its bond. 7 In compliance with the Resolution of August 23, 1985
of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. 8 In the Resolution
of September 12, 1985, 9 the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this
action.
It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion
for reconsideration of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While
as a general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a
condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not
apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It
has been held further that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in
cases like this where execution had been ordered and the need for relief was
extremely urgent. 11
The counterbond provides:
WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV,
Quezon City, an order of Attachment was issued against
abovenamed Defendant;
WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or
dissolving the order of attachment issued against them in the
above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the
sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY
(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section
5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as
Principal and the PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration
of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of
attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor
of the above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine
Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers
judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-
deliver the attached property so released to the Officer of the
Court and the same shall be applied to the payment of the
judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will,
on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property
released.
EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June,
1984. 12
Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing
the order shall without delay attach, to await judgment and
execution in the action, all the properties of the party against
whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from
execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit
with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an
amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an
amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be
attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement
ment which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also
forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and
of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found
within the province.
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. —
At any time after an order of attachment has been granted, the
party whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the
applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the
judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security
given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the
attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the
adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the
application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the
property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may
recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond,
copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor
or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in
accordance with the provisions of this section the property
attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered
to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond
aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should
such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become,
insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an
additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a
new order of attachment.
 SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had
upon bond. — If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole
or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given
pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of
the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and
bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the
amount due under the judgment, which amount may be
recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and
summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the
counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it
provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it
is only then that "payment of the judgment shall become charged on such
counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is
deemed reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also
stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the
judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its
application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies
to the payment of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only
logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending
appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in
a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance. 14 The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be
reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its
exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts
are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should
instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences. 17
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is
compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants
a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right
to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any
land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or
mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended
to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged
against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and
executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.
All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as
outlined in the case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20
Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might
recover from the surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1)
that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor
and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for
the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be
given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to
his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall
be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It
covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a
judgment pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
restraining order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13,
1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-
0065 (Rollo, p. 14).
Republic of the Philippines
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the
SUPREME COURT
petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Manila

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

EN BANC

We dismiss the petition.

II
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
vs.
Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure

to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political
party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election,
QUIASON, J.:
file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true
and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.
 No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement
required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the
statements or reports in connection with electoral
contributions and expenditures as required herein shall
constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders
shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar
to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail,
within five (5) days from the date of election all
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and
expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under
this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition,
the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to
hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and
expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No.
2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and
expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements.
Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law
Department of the Commission, the regional election director
of the National Capital Region, the provincial election
supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by
personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and
expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election
registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his
jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures
herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement
required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file
statements or reports in connection with the electoral
contributions and expenditures as required herein shall
constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders
shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000),
in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under
this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be
subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits
that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine
British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No
distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
"every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued
his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art.
IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the
use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and
imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of
this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and
ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such
objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly,
contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the
results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus,
laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881,
Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and
what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13;
Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices
acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes,
expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of
expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate.
Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur
2d, Elections § 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to
matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the
improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their
ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutes also enable voters to
evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and
to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v.
Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the
requirement of filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d
826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign.
The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation
where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any
expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in
fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution
No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has
received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the
statement shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881
or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the
fine. withdrawal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Padilla, J., concurs.
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No.
Separate Opinions 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must
concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the
implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.

MELO, J., dissenting: But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak,
still considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not
and is thus not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of
actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35
contributions and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No.
Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his
concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the
certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an
implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.
election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to
the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as
But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to
indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to
speak, still considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is
raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the
not and is thus not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the withdrawal.
simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who
actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his
certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an Padilla, J., concurs.
election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to
 This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision* of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto
Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the

Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati,
Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality

of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value
a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March
31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount of
Republic of the Philippines U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well
SUPREME COURT knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in
Manila or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment which check when presented to the
SECOND DIVISION drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS"
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused
G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991
failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of
P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
vs.
receiving said notice.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE
JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct
examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value
of Philippine Coin and Currency).

PARAS, J.: On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders
stating:
 Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for
lack of merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof, or made payable and
dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside
thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise
applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign
currency.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently
denied by respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and
which reads:
Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988,
which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of
merit.1âwphi1
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against
current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the
Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati
RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The
Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo,
Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted
orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated
extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in
connection with a private transaction between petitioner and
private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in
dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the
questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable with
the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such
premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the
questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the
petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989
(Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this
Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of
Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs.
Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the
subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues
framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force
at the time of commencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160
SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not
be questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide
that:
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint
or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom
that the offense was committed or some of the essential
ingredients thereof occured at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it
was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to
existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in
the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court
ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the
information."
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense
was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is
controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over
the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information
in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA
191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the
Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe,
157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining
venue) is the place of the issuance of the check."
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the
Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624
[1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No.
4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was
executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was
written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place
where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980,
Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The
Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero,
Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-
December, 1983, p. 14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered
by the petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn
against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is
therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency
involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated
July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of
said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does
not make any exception, courts may not except something unless MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs.
IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). xxx xxx xxx

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves (p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).
of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining
the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted
(Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention
of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the
subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang
Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the

Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be involved,
like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our
country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our currency,
and many others.

THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.

MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and
this check may be a check in whatever currency. This would not
even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in
French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn,
then this bill will apply.

MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet
preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium
saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every
importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of
the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications
for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of
P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601,
which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the
Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under
the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the Exchange
Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of
the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13
representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import
irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its
claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of
the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and
flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958
affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term
"stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers
only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products.
Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present
petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by
petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act
No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as
follows:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other
charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned
milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt
syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer,
poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers
approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private
educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use
in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers;
book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of
supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be
supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the
approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director
of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films,
laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical
drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital
supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by
the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying
therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other
drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from
time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the
 Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and
therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
(Emphasis supplied.) Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the
other questions raised by the parties.
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in
the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of hereby ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved
statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount
with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language of P23,958.13.
which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by
Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon,
only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration JJ., concur.
belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term Labrador, J., reserves his vote.
"stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified
as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately
following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry
feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products because they are
used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate"
appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of
fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs
appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle",
which is among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only
those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes. Again, it is
noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section
of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food
for human consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer
and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot
validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-
quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle
"Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does
not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does
not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food
and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general
sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained
and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not
require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG
and PETER T. TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila and TROADIO
TECSON, Respondents.
The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.
Pacifico B. Advincula for Private Respondent.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), through the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft
Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to investigate and cause the
prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379.
Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order are the orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No.
57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated
June 23, 1989, denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2)
dated June 26, 1989, granting private respondent’s application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeks the annulment of the
two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before
the trial court.
The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, dated May 13, 1986, which created the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to "investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in
active service." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily
charged with the task of investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and shall make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and
instrumentalities with respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its
findings."cralaw virtua1aw library
Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of
wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson
(ret.) was required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together
with his supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition]. Private
respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable
to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of
his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.
Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its
resolution, dated June 30, 1988, recommending that private respondent be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act
No. 1379, as amended.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent
moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no
jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No.
1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his
case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now
beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board opposed the motion to
dismiss.
In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but this was
denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989. Private respondent was
directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on
March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The
case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch 151, respondent
judge’s court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v.
Peña, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556. Private respondent opposed
the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.
On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. On
June 26, 1989, respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or
prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the
filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Hence, the instant petition.
On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent
judge from enforcing his orders dated June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A
rejoinder to the reply was filed by private Respondent. The Court gave due course
to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted.
The issues raised in the petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION
OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.
II.
WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING
AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE
OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in
PCGG v. Peña the Board, being a creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the second issue,
petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case falls within the
jurisdiction of the PCGG.
The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondent’s position is
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 ,
14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged
amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine
Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony,
business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the
procedure laid down by Rep. Act 1379 as already pointed out before be applied.
And since, he has been separated from the government more than four years
ago, the action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.
2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379
for recovery of unexplained wealth for the reason that he has retired more than
four years ago.
3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and
void. Nowhere in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given
to the commission, its chairman and members, to create Boards or bodies to be
invested with powers similar to the powers invested with the commission ..
[Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].
1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not
private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the
Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.
According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos. They cite the PCGG’s jurisdiction over —
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the
administration of Pres. Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether
or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos within the
contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly
unlawfully acquired the properties.
A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what
is contemplated within the term "subordinate."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former
President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have
any interest or participation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is —
[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation
of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who
enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife,
similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No.
1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O.
No. 2.
Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG,
G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.
The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and
E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are self-evident, these being:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of
the previous regime" ;
a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and
close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad, xx (and) business
enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . .
(the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship;"
b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly,
through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned
by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their
office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines" ;
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits,
trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums,
mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in
the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and.
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the
government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to
former President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There
must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated
wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondent’s case will fall under
existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of any public
officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State
Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired
[Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition and prosecute the case in
behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city
prosecutor [Ibid].
Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for
unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP
Anti-Graft Board it would have been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. But the record itself
belies this presumption:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent,
dated October 16, 1987, states: "This letter is in connection with the alleged
information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Board indicating your acquisition of
wealth beyond legal means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].
(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged
unexplained wealth pursuant to R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as
the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].
The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
taking advantage of his office as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary.
No attempt is made in the Board’s resolution to link him or his accumulation of
wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28,
1988, is clear:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan
is the case folder of COLONEL TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary
investigation of the case by the Board, found a prima facie evidence against
subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379,
otherwise known as an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property."
[Rollo, p. 46].
Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear
that private respondent accumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner
quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC sergeant, to General Fidel
Ramos, the material portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same
signed a cash advance voucher, let us say in the amount of P5,000.00. Without
much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount. The official concerned was also
made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which was left
blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas,
clerk of Col. Tecson and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the
face of the cash advance voucher is altered or superimposed. The original
amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the
amount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of
P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.
. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecson’s office took care of the work.
. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons
found in the Metropolitan Manila Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses
appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got their shares on commission
basis of the looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo, pp.
184-185.].
Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986,
creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support
the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent.
The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are
limited. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman,
grant itself additional powers — powers not contemplated in its enabling law.
3. Petitioner assails the trial court’s cognizance of the petition filed by
private Respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the trial court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Peña,
supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the
PCGG’s acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested
with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan’s decisions and final
orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. [Ibid, at
pp. 564-565].
The ruling in Peña was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988,
163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August
10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385,
February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial
courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.
Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he
took cognizance of Civil Case No. 57092 and issued the writ of preliminary
injunction against the PCGG.
4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and, hence, may be enjoined from doing so, but the court that
issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been vested by law with
jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.
The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction is therefore in order. Likewise, respondent judge must be
enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause
the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without
prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The
rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only
the powers granted it.
5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the
PCGG’s creation of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no
authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of members and former
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active
and retired members of the AFP for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar as they involve the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and
"cronies." But the PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, as in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutor of all unlawful
accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited
purpose, as we have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be
construed with this in mind.
6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be
prosecuted because of prescription. He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379
which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition [for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,
dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee
concerned." He retired on May 9, 1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However,
it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 should be deemed
amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that" [t]he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel." Considering
that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the
prescriptive period provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is
concerned, we cannot say that he had already acquired a vested right that may
not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.
Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result
in the validation or legitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a consequence at
variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No. 1379, which provides:chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. — The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and
limitation of actions cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent,
in respect to any property unlawfully acquired by him.
Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or
provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379,
may still investigate the case and file the petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the other
hand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who
are still in the government service, the agency granted the power to investigate
and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman [Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the
prosecution of private respondent under the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No.
57092 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil
Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on August
29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the
investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37, without
prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory
agency.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.