1

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES V. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

G.R. NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 342

FACTS:

The following are consolidated cases:

a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition
are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s
power.

b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131
and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

HELD:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary.

The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
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WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORP., G.R. NO. 194239, JUNE
16, 2015

Facts:

Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which
covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet
fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil.

Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in
Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of
the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within
the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its
inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City,
which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.
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What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump
pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water
into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.

Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010
and the condo’s power was shut down.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the
surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corporation also alleged that it is joined
by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups
who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.

On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their
respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL
until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while
implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the
pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint
Compliance submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own
nor operate the pipelines, adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines,
much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over
the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently
performed, as to them.

On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on Pipeline Integrity
Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”

Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has
ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of
the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL
System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.

To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By
this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14] the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and,
thereafter, submit a report and recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’ memoranda.

On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the CA’s Report praying that (a)
instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and
Development Center; (b) a trust fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers
of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.

On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and
Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may
resume its operations.

Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of
the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties during the March
21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for... adjudication

Issues:
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I. Whether or not petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and
whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real
parties-in-interest;

II. Whether or not a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to
perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected
environment;

III. Whether or not a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies;
and

IV. Whether or FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
environmental protection order.

Ruling:

I. Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law,
possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit
owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of
July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents
of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
West Tower are real parties-in-interest.

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and
residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has
limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in
behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and
deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc.
– San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the
adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court,
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
 5

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to
state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other
recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.

II. Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability

To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent
Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place,
will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning
scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line
inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;

(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook the
following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment
pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and
reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement. Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak
hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through magnetic flux
leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes
of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of
assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA
recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial
operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC
of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions
of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the
adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from
the DOE considering that the core issue of this case requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the
DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant
to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho I.
Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL
operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the
activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed
with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the
results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the...
operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for
continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the
closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence
presented by the parties on the WOPL’s actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and
recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited
pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
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Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of
the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable,
is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and
continued commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the
DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form
integrity audit, that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s
structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.

Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of
kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

III. Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the
creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered.
Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim
for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.

The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however,
is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners
arising from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.

IV. Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC
not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC,
Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are
not liable in their individual capacities.

The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition
for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e)
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint
filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability
of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire
environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City.

Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
7
 8

OPOSA V. FACTORAN, G.R. NO. 101083, JULY 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests
of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

II. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

III. Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion
the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject
matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of
an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
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2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.

3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
 10

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
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MMDA V. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. NO. 171947, DEC. 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 661

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,

Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

*APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. –– Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where
its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet th
e prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations. ––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove
and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
 12

water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 &
20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation
of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing
mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

MEAD V. ARGEL, G.R. NO. L-41958, JULY 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 256

FACTS:

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him
for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the
said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING:

The filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the
matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal)(Sec 9).
The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not ‘pollution’ did exist is vested in the
Commission, who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical
 13

and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of
justice (Sec 8).

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the Commission on
the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had been
violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.
 14

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA, G.R. NO. 93891, MARCH 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112

FACTS:

The Pollution Adjudication Board filed a petition for review on the decision of the CA in favoring the Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation. petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and
desist from utilizing its waste water pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater
directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No.
984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when
there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of
which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends
that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand,
contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life.” In the
instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar’s waste water
discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due
process by the Board.

HELD:

The Supreme Court note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” On the one hand, it is not essential that
the Board prove that an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists
before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do
exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable
standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there
is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or
discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may
act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since the applicable standards
set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent
 15

or waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life” remains necessary.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since the SC have concluded that the Order and Writ of
Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed
Solar’s petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS INC. V. CA, G.R. NO. 94759, JANUARY 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 147

Facts:

Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16,
1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation
of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the
mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required
documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively
causing stoppage of its operation.Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition,
mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse
of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES.
 16

2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO.

Ruling:

1) No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determiningwhether there is a pollution
of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed
to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,and by
virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2) The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its
plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the
following:

a. Building permit;

b. Mayor's permit; and

c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

3) This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4) The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made.It found that the fumes
emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.

5) Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati.

6) While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted
any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent
any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
 17

FELIPE YSMAEL JR. & CO. INC. V. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 79538, OCTOBER
18, 1990