MERLIN MAGALLONA VS SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional

FACTS:

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also
known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased
the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to
the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in international
law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a
“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood
of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty
and the baseline law have nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact, it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522
(RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square
nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

The Philippine Baselines

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom
line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our
observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish
our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine
Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:

a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty

b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. VS. TESDA,

FACTS:

In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under R.A. No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached
to the DOLE to develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.

To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees
who have passed the certification process.

Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreement Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system
and equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a specified sum
of money after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged that TESDA has still an outstanding
balance and still remains unpaid.

TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its governmental function to
develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the performance of this
governmental function, TESDA is immune from suit.

ISSUE:

Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

RULING:

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates
this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from
the jurisdiction of another state.

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy. That public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the
instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government.

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by
name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with
respect to the agency’s performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer,
but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against
a government agency covered by its own charter.

As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function
of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the
perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that
the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and
disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL
COOPERATION, (GTZ). V HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning
Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries’ common interest in
promoting the technical and economic development of their States and recognized the benefits to be derived by both States
from closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of "arrangements concerning individual projects of
technical co-operation." While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effective of five (5) years, it nonetheless was
stated that "the Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting
Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry," and that even upon the Agreement’s expiry, its provisions
would "continue to apply to any projects agreed until their completion."

On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German
government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement, which affirmed the common commitment
of both governments to promote jointly a project called Social Health Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE)
which was designed to "enable Philippine families especially poor ones and to maintain their health and secure health care
of sustainable quality." The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program while
the Philippines designated the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Private
respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. But in September of 1999, Anne Nicolay
(Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Private respondents had a misunderstanding with
the Project Manager of SHINE. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to
facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening
local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and
local government unit schemes were not sustainable a philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolay’s lack of understanding
of the purpose of the project. This lead to an exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private
respondents. Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ, through counsel, filed
a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in
the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune
from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German government which had
implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment. The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying
the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an
employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status. GTZ did not
file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ
opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZs petition, finding that judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for, the
appropriate remedy of the petitioners being an appeal to the NLRC. Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45,
assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:

1. WON GTZ can invoke State immunity from suit.

HELD:

NO, GTZ cannot invoke State immunity from suit even if their activities performed pertaining to SHINE project are
government in nature. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in
Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. In this case, GTZ’s
counsel described GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, however it does
not automatically mean that it has the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. They had failed to adduce evidence, a
certification from Department of Foreign Affairs which could have been their factual basis for its claim of immunity. At the
same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the
same way that Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine
government. The apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code
but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) without original
charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that every corporation incorporated under this
Code has the power and capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ
consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its
parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains
the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time,
our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and
circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain
relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating
the instrumentality or agency
LOCKHEED VS. UP

FACTS:

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for security services with
respondent UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual
Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be garnished?

RULING:

We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as this was
never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated in the proceedings below. What UP
questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA
case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be
sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES DAVID* ELISEA RAMOS, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, was used for Loakan Airport being
operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to
convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO
failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO. In their answer, the ATO and its co-
defendants invoked as defense the issuance of President Marcos that had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport, that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without
the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. After the
RTC likewise denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration on December 10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special civil action
for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that
the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Subsequently, February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the spouses Ramos.

Hence, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

RULING:

The petition for review has no merit.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Moreover, a
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State
is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety
endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against.

According to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit: [A] continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit
because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot
prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.

The need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; It has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit
of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.

Contrary to appellants’ conclusions, it was not merely the collection of landing and parking fees which was declared as
proprietary in nature by the High Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport operations as a whole, as
well. Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme
Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not
immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It went on to explain in this wise:

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience
of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more
than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p.
207.]

in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25), it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-governmental functions
which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the
Teodoro case states:

Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-governmental
capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and
by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp.
206-207]

Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary
functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental
functions.

Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.

With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by
virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.
SHELL PHILIPPINES VS. JALOS

FACTS:

Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the
exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the
Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed
the construction and installation of a pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea, from Shell’s
production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals, claiming that
they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a complaint for damages
against Shell on the ground that their livelihood was adversely affected the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas
pipeline. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), not the trial court,
has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages and that it could not be sued pursuant to the
doctrine of state immunity without the State’s consent on the basis that it merely serves as an agent of the Philippine
government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves through Service Contract 38.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the PAB. CA reversed RTC’s order upon respondent’s
petition for certiorari. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but the same was denied. Hence, Shell filed this
petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Can Shell invoke state immunity, as agent of the Republic of the Philippines?

RULING:

No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is just a service
contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed
Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control
and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law.

An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another,
with the consent or authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his principal and bring
about business relations between the latter and third persons.

Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of
transacting business with third persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations
on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government but a provider of services, technology and
financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project; it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for claims even without the
State’s consent. And as evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38, the Phil.
Government recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.
Vigilar v. Aquino

FACTS

 Angelito M. Twaño, petitioner, then the OIC District Engr. of DPWH 2nd Engineering District of Pampanga sent an
Invitation to bid to respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino (owner of A.D. Aquino Construction and supplies). The bidding
was for the construction of a dike by bull-dozing a part of the Porac River at Brgy. Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua,
Pampanga.
 On July 7, 1992, the project was awarded to respondent, and a "Contract Agreement" has been executed between
him and petitioners for the amount of Php 1,873,790.69 to cover the project cost. On July 9, 1992, the project was
completed, and respondent was issued a Certificate of Project Completion on July 16 (signed by Yumul, Supan and
Twaño).
 Respondent Aquino, however claimed that Php 1,262,696.20 was still due to him, but petitioners refused to pay.
He thus filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before the RTC of Guagua.
 Petitioners has the following contentions: that the Complaint was a suit against the State; that respondent failed
to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the Contract of Agreement was void for violating PD 1445
(Government Auditing Code)- absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.
 On November 28,2003, lower court ruled in favor of the respondent. The lower court ordered DPWH to play Aquino
the amount for the completion of the project (Php 1,873,790.69- Take note Aquino said 1.2 M na lng kulang),
Php 50,000 attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
 On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said that Contract Agreement is declared null and void ab
initio. CA ordered COA to determine the total obligation due to Aquino on a quantum meruit basis. [[quantum
meruit definition fr. net= When a person employs another to do work for him, without any agreement as to his
compensation, the law implies a promise from, the employer to the workman that he will pay him for his services,
as much as he may deserve or merit]]

ISSUES

WON the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure of respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies

RULING

NO. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. There are
numerous exceptions, and the pertinent ones in this case are 1.) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 2.) Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by courts of justice. Also, the issues of the present case involve the validity and enforceability of the Contract of
Agreement entered into by the parties which are questions of law and clearly beyond the expertise of COA.

The Final Decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of Administrative remedies
does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.

1. WON the CA erred in ordering the COA to allow payment to respondent on a quantum meruit basis despite the
latter’s failure to comply with the requirements of PD 1445

NO. The Court has held that contracts which involved government projects undertaken in violation ofn the relevant laws,
rules etc. covering public bidding , budge appropriations and release of funds were VOID for failing to meet the requirements
mandated by law. However, THE CONTRACTOR SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR SERVICES RENDERED AND WORK DONE.

The government project was completed almost two decades ago, and the public has benefitted from the work done by the
respondent. The contractor should be duly compensated. Not doing so would unjustly enrich the government. Justice and
equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.

2. WON the CA erred in holding that the doctrine of non-suability of the State has no application in this case

NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating injustice to a citizen.
This rule is not absolute anyway.