CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 79956, G.R. No. 82217, January 29, 1990, EN BANC

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the
Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2.] It was created to accelerate economic and social
growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras [sec. 3.] Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units
as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field
offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region [sec. 5.] It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region [sec. 20.]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing
arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10.] The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such
time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17.]

Petitioner’s arguments:

1. By issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to
the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras.

2. The President contravened the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision: a power that is lodged with the Congress alone.

3. The creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for
the Cordillera provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province; and
Baguio which compose the CAR.

ISSUES:

1. Whether EO 220 is unconstitutional

 2. Whether CAR is a territorial and political subdivision

3. Whether CAR contravenes the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for the
Cordillera provinces.

RULING:

1. NO.
A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of
the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution.
It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions.
The process of creating autonomous regions are complex. This will take no short
time. The President, in1987 still exercising legislative powers as the first Congress had not
yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous
region created. CAR (Administrative) is merely transitory and temporary. E.O. No. 220 had
been in force and effect for more than two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners'
assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.

2. NO.
CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the
Constitution. It did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing
ones into a larger subdivision.
First: the CAR is NOT a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its
own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate
the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. This concept
is not new and was in place in the Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made
as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11)
regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field
offices.
 Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and
the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14.]

3. NO.
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2]
refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in
each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18.]
The CAR being a mere transitory coordinating agency, it merely fills the gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.

JOSE MONDANO versus FERNANDO SILVOSA,

DOCTRINE:

The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.

FACTS:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent
provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the
complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the
Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
 The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a
declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and
without legal effect.

On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. was issued after filing and approval of a
bond for P500.

The respondents invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised Administrative Code
which clothes the department head with "direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may
appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations; . . ."and the
rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 452, which upheld "the power of the Secretary
of Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of charges against local elective municipal
officials and to suspend them preventively," on the board proposition "that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Assistant Executive Secretary has direct control and supervision over local
governments so he can validly indorsed the complaint against Mondano to the respondent provincial
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.

RULING:

The Assistant Executive Secretary has no direct control and supervision over local governments.

Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional
provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of
general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c)
of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be
provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution.

Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does
and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c)
of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated
by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.

RODOLFO T. GANZON v CA G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991, EN BANC

FACTS:

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension
orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing
about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor
any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports
local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

BASCO V PAGCOR

Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation

G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991
Paras, J.:

Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A
dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 “to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.”

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes
and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They
must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local.”

“(2)Income and other taxes.—(a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national government authority” (Section 13 [2]).

Issue:

Whether the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy.

Held:

No. It is not violative of the principle of local autonomy.

> The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until “amended, repealed or
revoked” (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its “exemption clause” remains as an exception to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but
rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization” (III
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an “imperium in imperio.”

As to what state powers should be “decentralized” and what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance
for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

> The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v.
City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan,
7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the
municipality cannot assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its “power to tax” therefore must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has
the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

> Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO

Province of Batangas v Romulo

GR 152774 May 27, 2007
Callejo, SR, J.:

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy and Fiscal Autonomy

Local Autonomy; automatic release of funds of Local Government Units, particularly the IRA.

Facts:
The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General Appropriations Act of 1999, 2000 and
2001 insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for
the release thereof.

Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled “Establishing a Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization “ with the purpose of facilitating the process of enhancing the
capacities of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the national
government agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether the said provisos violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy.

Ruling:
Yes. The Constitution (Sec. 6, Art X) and the LGC 1991 (Sec. 18) explicitly provides that LGUs shall have
a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released
to them without need of further action. Hence, the provisos imposing conditions for the release of LGU
funds are unconstitutional.

The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they encroach on the
fiscal autonomy of the local government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is
already moot and academic because said provisions have been implemented, there is a possibility that
the same be incorporated in the future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided
before another GAA is enacted. It behooves the Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive
issue now to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.

Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because it amounts to
control to local government units when the President’s power over local government units is confined to
general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs.
Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have any discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner of doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except
to see to it that the rules are followed.

Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides that the share of each local
government unit shall be released without need of any further action, DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCIAL,
CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case may be on a quarterly basis…and which
may not be the subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.

Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the local government units shall
enjoy local autonomy as well as Section 25, Art. II of the Constitution.

2. Section 3.. there shall be a LGC which shall provide a more responsive and accountable local
government with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 79956, No. 82217, January 29, 1990 EN BANC - LOCAL AUTONOMY

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL G.R. No. L-9657,

November 29, 1956, EN BANC

PIMENTEL, JR. vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

G.R. NO. 132988. JULY 19, 2000, EN BANC

FACTS:

On December 27, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 372
re: ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998.

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state

universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and
local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that
will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items.

SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget

Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent
to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be
withheld.

Subsequently, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by

reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld
from the LGUs.

Argument of the Petitioner

Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of
control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention
of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal
revenue.

Argument of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was
issued to alleviate the “economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation” and
constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify
measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25
percent.

Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.

ISSUE:

A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all
LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU’s fiscal
autonomy.

B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA.

RULING:

Preliminary but Crucial Concepts

Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. x x x"

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,
the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with
that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent.
The Court distinguished them as follows:

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to

see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.

He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the
heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are
subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments
is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. The
grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x."
Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the
purpose of enhancing self-government.

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and
accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the
local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units
are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country
still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.

Main Issue
A. No. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUs
to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in relation to the LGU’s fiscal autonomy.

Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative

autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities.

Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals.

Moreover, the Court accepted the Solicitor General's assurance that the directive to
"identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at
least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and
does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy.
The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates
from a boss to a subaltern.

B. Yes. The president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the

withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution:

Article X, Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as

determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.

The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly
to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of

10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the
country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although
temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or
withheld, often temporarily."

Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government

does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. In sum, while Section 1 of AO
 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4
thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the
President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’
IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried
out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

Cruz, J.:

Facts:

In this case, several complaints and letters has been filed and sent to the Court due to the following:

1) Confiscation of their driver’s license by a Traffic Enforcer in QC and Mandaluyong;

2) Confiscation of driver’s license by a Makati Police Force officer; and

3) Removal of front license plate by a Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations

Center officer and confiscation of driver’s license by a Metropolitan Police Command-
Western Police District officer.

The Traffic Enforcer in Mandaluyong invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong,
authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations.

The Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District officer contends that he confiscates
the license in pursuant to a memorandum issued from their PNP District Commander, authorizing such
sanction under certain conditions. However, the Director General of the PNP assured the Court that his
office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

The Makati Police Force officer invokes the Gonong case wherein it prohibited only the removal
of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself under
Sec 2, "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision in the Gonong case and to properly
resolve it the Court requires the MMA and SolGen to submit separate comments.

MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers
conferred upon it by EO 392 and argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance
because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself
said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which
was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.

The SolGen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law,
specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and
the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. We also note the
disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as
"wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top."
However, no one from the complainants has filed a formal challenge against the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a valid exercise of the delegated power.

Ruling:

No.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their
principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with
public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to
impose such sanctions.

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the
removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the
Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority
and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares
the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same
time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such
sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is
that there is no statutory authority for — and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against — the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and

(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of
motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic
violations within the said area.

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 146319

FACTS:

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating
The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on
December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted
the matter for ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite on the following
grounds:............................................................................................................................................................
...........................

1. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

2. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of
R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that
only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b)
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

"Section 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)”

Section 10 Art. 10 of Constituion. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected

ISSUES:

1. WON RA 8806 is unconstitutional as it violates sec. 450 of LGC in relation to sec 10 art10 of
constitution.

2. WON RA 8806 violates its own sec. 54 on the conduct of plebiscite.

3. WON it violates the “one subject-one bill” rule as prescribed by sec. 26 art 6 of constitution.

RULING:

1. No. Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806
complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is
its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created
only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what
R.A. No. 8806 has done. This contention is devoid of merit. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section
450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay
in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

"Section 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division
shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income
classification prior to such division.

2. No.

"Sec. 54. Plebiscite. - The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the
ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to
be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x." (Emphasis ours)

"Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general and local circulation."

In Tanada v Tuvera, acts shall take effect 15 days after the publication in the official gazette or 2
newspaper of general circulation.

The court said that the approval mentioned in sec 54 is the effectivity of the law, which is 15 days after its
last publication in Sept. 1,2000, thus Dec 16,2000 is well within the 120 days period.

3.No. There is only one subject in the bill that is to create the City of sorsogon . The abolition/cessation
of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a
subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the
logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger.

Note: Yung Issue at ruling no.1 lang ang related sa topic natin.

MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

TOPIC: Plebiscite Requirement

FACTS:
 Petitioner Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao
del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of its second legislative
district, a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental which was signed into law as
Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided
for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the
affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.

The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be borne by the
COMELEC.

R.A. No. 10360 was approved by then Pres. Aquino and was later on published.

Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all
plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013
National and Local Elections which was extended until after the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections.

During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite
for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections to save on expenses. The COMELEC, in Minute Resolution No. 13-0926, approved
the conduct of the Concept of Execution for the conduct of the plebiscite on 6 August
2013.On 14 August 2013, Bartolome J. Sinocruz, Jr., the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations of the COMELEC, issued a memorandum furnishing a copy of Minute Resolution
No. 13-0926 to Atty. Remlane M. Tambuang, Regional Election Director of Region XI; Atty.
Ma. Febes M. Barlaan, Provincial Election Supervisor of Davao del Sur; and to all election
officers of Davao del Sur. On 6 September 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution Nos.
9771 and 9772. Resolution No. 9771 provided for the following calendar of activities:

Resolution No. 9772, on the other hand, provided that copies of R.A. No. 10360 be
posted and that information campaigns be conducted prior to the plebiscite.

On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites three
causes of action:

1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of

Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who
can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic] act in suspending
the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional;
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming
October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of
Republic Act No. 10360 has already lapsed; and

3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from holding
the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental
except through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
because COMELEC had already commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for
the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay
and SK elections this coming October 28, 2013.

On 17 October 2013, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring Respondents

COMELEC, represented by its Chairperson, Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., and the Provincial
Election Officer of Davao del Sur, represented by Atty. Ma. Febes Barlaan, to file their
comment to Cagas’ petition not later than 21 October 2013.

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their
comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises the following arguments:

1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the creation
of a local government unit;
2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice;
3. Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be implemented;
4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and
5. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Comelec acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to
hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Provide of Davao Occidental simultaneously with
the Barangay Elections.

RULING:

NO.

The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a

plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.

The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province as provided

under Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution.

The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This
is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8,
Article VI and of the President and Vice-President in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution
recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown
by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the
election of local government officials.

Section 10 of the R.A. No. 7160 “LGC” furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite
may be held:
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of
the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
 Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the plebiscite for
the creation of the province of Davao Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity
of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6 April 2013.

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections." The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections."

Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus Election
Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set elections to another date.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No.
10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local
Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding
of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013
as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. The Court took judicial notice of the COMELEC’s burden in
the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections. The logistic and
financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is
unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative
mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act
with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay
Elections.

To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted,
petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks. If COMELEC abandoned any of
its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks then it
could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local
Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower and
other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local Elections, and to
ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including
that of R.A. No. 10360.

Parenthetically, for the COMELEC to hold the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No.
10360 within the fixed period, it would have to reconfigure for said purpose some of the
PCOS machines that were already configured for the May 2013 National and Local Elections;
or in the alternative, conduct the plebiscite manually.

However, conducting the plebiscite manually would require another set of ballots and
other election paraphernalia. Besides, another set of election materials would also require
additional logistics for printing, checking, packing, and deployment thereof. Lest it be
forgotten, that all of these things should undergo public bidding.

Since the plebiscite would be a separate undertaking, the COMELEC would have to appoint
separate sets of boards of election inspectors, tellers, and other personnel to canvass the
result of the plebiscite – all of which would have entailed further cost for the COMELEC
whose budget had already been overly stretched to cover the May 2013 National and Local
Elections.
 More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a special
budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC had to take ₱11 million
from its savings and from the Barangay Elections budget to finance the plebiscite to ratify
R.A. No. 10360 on October 28, 2013.

The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the plebiscite for
the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the Barangay Elections was not an
abuse of its discretion, as alleged, but simply an exercise of prudence, because as the
COMELEC itself noted, doing so "will entail less expense than holding it separately." [p. 9,
Resolution No. 13-0926, Annex B, Petition.]

The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is within

the competence and discretion of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot therefore simply insist
that the COMELEC should have complied with the period specified in the law when doing so
would be virtually impossible under the circumstances.

In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of
election laws in favor of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the
special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of
elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the
challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the
COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a
total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were "dates reasonably close"
thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the
exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its
discretion to resolve election disputes.

It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or authority
to fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise
their right of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even
beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The date 28 October 2013 is reasonably close to 6
April 2013, and there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by
the COMELEC. The OSG points out that public interest demands that the plebiscite be
conducted.

At this point, there is nothing more for the COMELEC to do except to hold the
plebiscite as scheduled on October 18, 2013. In fact, the COMELEC already scheduled the
shipment and deployment of the election paraphernalia to all the precincts in Davao del Sur,
except Davao City.

Furthermore, in election law, the right of suffrage should prevail over mere
scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas insistence that only
Congress can cure the alleged legal infirmity in the date of holding the plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental fails in light of the absence of abuse of
discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, the Court finds it unacceptable to utilize more of our
taxpayers time and money by preventing the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite as now
scheduled.
 MOISES S. SAMSON vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COMELEC

Topic: Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities

Facts: President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law RA. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of
Quezon City, is challenging the constitutionality of RA 8535.

Issue: WON R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code
particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat
of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City,

Held: Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly
and unmistakably. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were
submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by
Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban had complied with all the requisites therefor.

On Sec 11.-Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed
City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code:

Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and Facilities. — (a) The law
or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government
from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors
relating to geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication
facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant
considerations shall be taken into account.

Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide for a seat of government.
However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it
to be. We agree with respondents that under Section 12 of the Local Government Code, which applies to
the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches can still
establish a seat of government after its creation. For said Code already provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Government Centers. — Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish
a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, local
government units, or government-owned or-controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be
located. In designating such a center, the local government unit concerned shall take into account
the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the
government center as contemplated under this Section. The National Government, local
government unit or government-owned or-controlled corporation concerned shall bear the
expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.

While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of
government, "from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered."
Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to
defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to
convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.

ALFREDO TANO, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES

FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a
several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan
waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right”
of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision, promulgated by the Court of Appeals, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health
Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and
Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,"
which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.

FACTS:

The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the Department of Health (DOH) in
1999, which provided five areas of general reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal
autonomy to government hospitals that implements the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners alleged that the implementation of
the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for
violating the following constitutional provisions: Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II, Section
1 of Article III, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII, and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV.

On May 24, 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the functions and Operations of the Department of Health”, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. The petitioners contented
that a law, such as E.O. No. 120, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that E.O. No. 102 is void, as this
was enacted ultra vires on the part of the President.

The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved
fatal. The CA also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the various sections of
Article II, III, XIII and XV of the 1987 Constitution. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was
filed by the petitioners but the same was denied in a resolution dated March 7, 2005. Hence this
petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution

2. Whether or not the issuance of Executive Order No. 102 was above the authority of the President

HELD:

No. As a general rule, the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions have already been
categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.

In Tañada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987
Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments
before they can be implemented. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this
Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
No. Petitioners claimed that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of
legislative functions, which the president usurped when he issued E.O. No. 102. This line of
argument is without basis.This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may,
by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the
Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “The president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Therefore, the president is within his authority for
issuing E.O No. 102.

DECISION:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA
and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI) vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,
BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARANAQUE CITY

“A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or

temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction”

Fact:

1. The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued BSV

Resolution No. 98-096 on 13 October 1998.
2. The said Resolution is entitled “Directing the New Sun Valley
Homeowners’ Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to
Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic”
3. The New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Association, Inc., represented by its
President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO with the
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City.
4. The New Sun Valley contended that the opening of the roads for public use
is a violation of the rights and interest to a secure, peaceful, and healthful
environment.
5. Based on the New Sun Valley, their properties there are strictly for
residential purposes only, thus, the passage of the said resolution would
destroy the character of the subdivision.
 6. The New Sun Valley also claimed that they paid proportionately for the
roads and the park in the subdivision, hence, they have an existing equity
on the said roads.
7. Furthermore, according to the New Sun Valley, a Barangay Resolution
cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the
law, an ordinance is required to effect such an act.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the New Sun Valley is correct in claiming that a Barangay
Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads?

Ruling:

1. The New Sun Valley is incorrect.

2. The requirement of having an ordinance to effect the opening the subject
roads is not applicable in this case.
3. The issuance of the Barangay Resolution in this case is not for the purpose
of opening a private road but merely a directive or reminder to the New
Sun Valley to cause the opening of the public roads to the general public.
4. The subject roads in this case have been donated already to the City of
Paranaque since 1964.
5. Hence, the roads in question are not private roads but public roads which
are not within the commerce of man.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 121920, August 9, 2005

Doctrine: For liability to arise under Art 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other pubic works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that
a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.

The municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation
of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of
whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the
same is within its territorial jurisdiction.

Facts: MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks
System Construction. Part of this project was to excavate a portion of the corner of M. Paterno
and Santolan Road in San Juan (a national road). By the end of the day, only ¾ of the job was
finished. Between 10 to 11PM that same day, Priscilla Chan was driving her car with a speed of
30 kph on the right side of Santolan Road, towards Pinaglabanan, San Juan. With her in the car
was private respondent Asst. City Prosec. Laura Biglang-awa. It was raining, and the road was
flooded. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole which the KC workers
excavated earlier. Biglang-awa fractured her right humerus (bone extending from shoulder to
elbow) on her right arm due to this. Hence, she filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against MWSS, KC, the Municipality of San Juan as well as a number of San Juan municipal
officials.

In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner essentially anchored its defense on two
provisions of laws, namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1983; and (2) Section 8, Ordinance 82-01, of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.

Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] LGC, it is obliged to provide for the
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since Santolan Road is concededly a
national and not a municipal road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-
awa on account of the accident that occurred on said road.

Additionally, petitioner contends that under Section 8, Ordinance No. 82-01, of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission, which reads:

In the event of death, injury and/or damages caused by the non-completion of such works
and/or failure of one undertaking the work to adopt the required precautionary measures for the
protection of the general public or violation of any of the terms or conditions of the permit, the
permittee/excavator shall assume fully all liabilities for such death, injury or damage arising
therefrom. For this purpose, the excavator/permittee shall purchase insurance coverage to
answer for third party liability, only the Project Engineer of KC and MWSS can be held liable for
the same accident.

The RTC ruled in favor of Biglang-awa and held MWSS and the Municipality of San Juan
solidarily liable to her. On appeal, such decision was upheld by the CA and the SC.

Issue: Whether San Juan’s is correct in saying that it is only responsible for municipal roads.
Santolan, being a national road is therefore beyond its responsibility.

Held: No. Article 2189 of the Civil Code states that it is sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control of a road for it to be liable.

San Juan failed to take note of Section 149 par (1)(bb) of the same Code which states that it
can "regulate" the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and
other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction.

The municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation
of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of
whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the
same is within its territorial jurisdiction.

Therefore, Petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least,
supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its
territory.

Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the permittee/excavator liable for death, injury and/or
damages caused by the non-completion of works and/or failure of the one undertaking the
works to adopt the required precautionary measures for the protection of the general public.
Significantly, however, nowhere can it be found in said Ordinance any provision exempting
municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities caused by their own negligent acts.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR. and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON
PAO, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

Facts:

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Cataquiz (Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna) for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508:

ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG

LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA.

As a result of this resolution of denial, Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the RTC for the following reliefs:
(1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor
Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

RTC promulgated a decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Petitioners filed for a reconsideration but was denied.

Thus, the petition to SC.

Contention of the petitioners: Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 is a valid exercise of the provincial
government’s police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160. They also maintain
that respondent’s lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local
government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of R.A. 7160.
 Contention of respondent: argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country.

As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this (Section 2(c) of the LGC) is not mandatory
since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision. He
also states that his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the
PCSO, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.

OSG, for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit
a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government. He argues that this is based on
the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents
of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have
been conferred on them by Congress.

Issues:

(1) Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial
of a mayors permit based thereon are valid; and

(2) Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a given local government unit.

Ruling:

On the validity of the ordinance:

SC noted that the questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to lotto. It is but
a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as
a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna.

Therefore, as a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary
to that of the national governments. However, such freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean
that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.

While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to
permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, an LGU, cannot issue a resolution or an
ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly
allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.
 Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

On prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian

SC finds that Sections 2(c) and 27 of the LGC apply only to national programs and/or projects
which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of
the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national
government, it is far-fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the
Local Government Code.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects
and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable
resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal
or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. RTC decision is affirmed.

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 175457, July 6, 2011

ZONSAYDA L. ALINSUG vs. RTC, Branch 58, San Carlos City G.R. No. 108232, August 23, 1993,
EN BANC

New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI) vs. SANGGUNIANG

BARANGAY, BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY - SEC. 32

FACTS:

Respondent BSV Sangguniang Barangay issued Resolution No. 98-096, directing the opening of
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Petitioner NSVHAI filed a
Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of
TRO with the RTC of Paranaque City. Petitioner claimed therein that the implementation of
BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would cause grave injustice and irreparable injury as the affected
homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes. Executive Judge Helen
Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a TRO.
 In the Amended Petition, Petitioner argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly
cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect
such an act. The RTC dismissed the Petition. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Orders
of the RTC.

Petitioner alleged that the CA should not have relied on respondent’s claim of ownership,
as this led to the erroneous conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner
also argued that the supposed titles to the subject roads were never submitted to the RTC. On the
other hand, Respondents alleged that the issuance of the titles in favor of Paranaque over all the
roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was an official act by the land registration office of the City of
Paranaque, and was perfectly within the judicial notice of the Courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle it to
injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096.

RULING:

It bears stressing that due process simply means giving every contending party the
opportunity to be heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor
(Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos. 137934 &
137936[)]. In the instant case, Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due process. As
borne by the records, while Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for the hearing of
the motion, the day set therefore was the same date set for the hearing of Appellant’s prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction—that is, November 20, 1998, with the precise
purpose of presenting evidence in support of the motion to dismiss on the same said scheduled
hearing date and time when Appellant and its counsel would be present. Moreover, Appellant’s
predication of lack of due hearing is belied by the fact that the hearing held on November 20,
1999 took up not only the matter of whether or not to grant the injunction, but also tackled the
jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in
both incidents.”

We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s recourse in
questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City, as clearly
stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays.—The city or

municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over
component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.”

We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case,
wherein we held:
 “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale
for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed.”

It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within
the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the
local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible
error in dismissing the case for petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement
under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an
ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the
City Government of Parañaque.

Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to
show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do.

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them
by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.

Petitioner dared to question the barangay’s ownership over the subject roads when it should have
been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not
submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted
of closing the subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of Parañaque and were already being
used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the subdivision’s homeowners, and collecting fees
from delivery vans that would pass through the gates that they themselves had built. It is petitioner’s
authority to put up the road blocks in the first place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof of
ownership.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011

Topic: Essential Requisites before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain.

FACTS:

The petitioner spouses owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 sqm situated between Nueve de
Febrero St. and Fernandez Street in Brgy. Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they
used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to 9 other families. On Oct. 2, 1997, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, s. 1997, authorizing
Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the said land
for converting it to low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, and without force and effect. The RTC dismissed the petition, opining that certiorari did
not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari
was only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SB acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in passing
the assailed Resolution.

RULING:

No. The Sangguniang Panglungsod did not abuse its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To
demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution and
an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that
is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which
is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances.

Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not
adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. In this regard, Section
19 of The Local Government Code clearly provides, viz:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in
Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of
Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled
so.

The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

*The Court dismissed the petition.