Caciquismo in Rural Mexico during the 1920s: The Case of Gabriel Barrios

Author(s): Keith Brewster

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 105-128
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/157989
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico during
the 1920s: The Case of Gabriel Barrios

KEITH BREWSTER

Abstract. This article focuses upon the cacicazgo of

Barrios Cabrera, who controlled the Sierra de Pueb
An analysis is made of the methods employed by B
following, and how his military potential gave him
regional political dominance and beneficial relationsh
and political superiors. It is argued that Barrios
influenced by the Sierra's singular history and socio
previously identified trends in post-revolutionary r
be applied to this isolated mountainous region.

Alluding to Madero's call to arms in autumn 91

remarked, 'Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now l
it.' For over a decade, events showed the animal's character to be so
unpredictable that neither Madero nor anyone else could achieve more
than a fleeting mastery. Even when contained, the tiger would periodically
lash out, perpetuating an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust. Two
decades would pass before the creature was finally returned to its cage.
The beast, whose anger sustained the Mexican Revolution, remained at
large because of its multi-faceted character. Its rage was both urban and
rural, popular and middle class. The Revolution was both a national and
a local struggle, ideological and personal. In the uncertain times that
characterised the violent years of the Revolution between 910o and 1920,
one of few constants in life was the personal bond between a rebel and his
leader. And leaders did rise above the chaos to provide direction. As
central authority crumbled, so power fell to those in the provinces with the
greatest military potential. Mexico had become, as Jose Vasconcelos later
lamented, a country in which, 'once more figures like Sarmiento's
Facundo walked the land'.1
Venustiano Carranza's assassination in May 1920 and the consequ
rise to power of the Sonorenses marked the beginning of a shift in t

1D. A. Brading, 'Introduction: national politics and the populist tradition', in D.

Brading (ed.), Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution (Cambridge, I980), p.

Keith Brewster is an Assistant Lecturer in Comparative American Studies at

University of Warwick.

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 28, 105-128 Copyright ? I996 Cambridge University Press Io5

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io6 Keith Brewster

balance of Mexican politics. With national caudillos assuming a ten

hold on central government, so began the slow, hazardous pro
reclaiming the political initiative from the provinces. Two underl
factors impeded the operation: the reluctance of provincial caudil
relinquish their influence, and the weakness of the Sonorenses to e
their will. Indeed, as Romana Falc6n comments: 'the efficienc
loyalty of those caciques possessing their own significant military pote
[...] was fundamental to the survival of the national leaders and f
integration and functioning of national political life'.2 Not until th
did central government feel sufficiently confident to complete the
expropriating the power of the remaining regional leaders. Betwee
two points in Mexican history, the process of subordination to the
varied in both pace and nature. The tiger of the Revolution w
capable of lashing out at those who tried to contain it.
Nowhere was post-revolutionary political chaos more evident th
the State of Puebla. Following the fall of the Carrancista, Alfonso C
in May 1920, the governorship changed hands no less than fifteen
in eight years: a statistic that highlights the inability of both sta
federal powers to control diverse local political interests. Througho
1920S Puebla politics often reached a stalemate: the federal gover
had no stable representative in Puebla to implement its policies, y
various factions in state politics were also unable to unite sufficien
sustain a credible defence of local autonomy against federal interve
Consequently, Puebla drifted in a state of limbo, temporarily affec
rarely controlled by the latest political initiative. Only in the lat
with the rise of the Avila Camacho family, did authoritarian rule
coherence and direction.3 In a state where political initiatives w
short-lived as the occupancy of the governor's seat, the cacica,go of
Barrios in the Sierra Norte de Puebla was conspicuous for its stab
Between 1917 and I930, the voice of federal military authority
Sierra belonged to the Barrios family. Serving both Carrancis
Sonorense administrations, Gabriel Barrios and his brothers, Bardo
and Demetrio (see Fig. I), used their military influence to esta
cacicaUgo that directed every important decision affecting public li
region containing over a third of the state's population.4 Their surv
such turbulent times demonstrated an acute political awarenes
remained aloof from the chaos in Puebla City, yet became an imp

2 R. Falc6n, Revolucidon caciquismo. San Luis Potosi, z919-I9j8 (Mexico, I984), p

3 For details of the nature of avilacamachismo in Puebla see: W. Pansters, Politics and
in Puebla: The Political History of a Mexican State, r937-1y87 (Amsterdam, I99
4 Bardomiano Barrios was killed in a battle against forces led by the Delahue
General Marcial Cavazos, in December 1923.

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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico 107

factor in Puebla's politics. While their ambitions were limited to the Sierra
and its environs, their actions attracted warm praise from national
politicians. The purpose of this article is to identify the nature of their
power structure in the Sierra de Puebla (see Fig. 2) and to place the
cacicavgo within the existing historiography of post-revolutionary regional
caudillismo. In doing so, the article considers the extent to which the ethnic,
social and political peculiarities of the Sierra de Puebla distinguished the
Barrios cacicaggo from its counterparts, more specifically those operating
in nearby regions.
The historical debate concerning post-revolutionary caudillismo concen-
trates upon the characteristics of military recruitment employed by
regional leaders.5 The lifeblood of a leader's autonomy was his ability to

Fig. I. The Barrios brothers, seated, and their Indian army (Cuacuila, Pue., i923). Bardomiano is
on the left, Gabriel in the centre, and Demetrio on the right.

5 For important contributions to the study of post-revolutionary caudillismo see:

I. Jacobs, 'Rancheros of Guerrero: The Figueroa Brothers and the Revolution', in
Brading, Caudillo and Peasant, pp. 76-9i; I. Jacobs, Ranchero Revolt. The Mexican
Revolution in Guerrero (Austin, I982); D. Ankerson, Agrarian Warlord, Saturnino Cedillo
and the Mexican Revolution in San Luis Potosi (DeKalb, 1984); D. Ankerson, 'Saturnino
Cedillo, a Traditional Caudillo in San Luis Potosi 1890-I938', in Brading, Caudillo and
Peasant, pp. I40-68; Falc6n, Revolucidny caciquismo; R. Falc6n, 'Military Caciques in
Magnificence and Decline: San Luis Potosi in the Mexican Revolution', in W. Pansters
and A. Ouweneel (eds.), Region, State and Capitalism in Mexico, Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries (Amsterdam, 1989), pp. 91-I09; F. J. Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores. The
History of a Peasant Bourgeoisie in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Toronto, I980); R. Buve and
R. Falc6n, 'Tlaxcala and San Luis Potosi under the Sonorenses (I920-1934): Regional
Revolutionary Power Groups and the National State', in Pansters and Ouweneel,
Regional, State and Capitalism in Mexico, pp. 1 10- 3 ; H. F. Salamini, Agrarian Radicalism
in Veracruz, 1920--8 (London, 1978); H. F. Salamini, 'Revolutionary Caudillos in the
I920's: Francisco Mugica and Adalberto Tejeda', in Brading, Caudillo and Peasant, pp.
169-92; G. M. Joseph, Revolution from Without. Yucatdn, Mexico, and the United States
1880-1924 (Cambridge, 1982).

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Io8 Keith Brewster

Fig. 2. Sierra de Puebla - electoral constituencies during the I20os.

retain the loyalty and discipline of his troops. Across the border
Barrios's cacica~go, Tlaxcala's post-revolutionary leaders failed to es
such a following.6 The elimination of agrarian rebel leaders left th
clear for Ignacio Mendoza and Rafael Apango to assume political c

6 Buve and Falc6n, 'Tlaxcala and San Luis Potosf under the Sonorenses (I92
pp. Io-33.

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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico o9

of that state. But they lacked a popular base of support and becam
increasingly reliant on federal backing.7 As a result, Mendoza and Apang
never enjoyed the degree of latitude allowed to their neighbours in the
Sierra de Puebla.

Provided a leader retained a military force independent of gover

interference, his chances of resisting the growing trend of p
subjugation to the centre remained alive. Two overlapping, bu
totally complementary, concepts emerge from the studies of revolu
leaders: one concerns the character of the rebel movement; the other
concentrates more upon the nature of a leader's relationship with his
followers. The former category can be subdivided according to a given
territory's specific social and political circumstances. Serrano rebel leaders,
frequently occupying remote regions on the periphery of governmental
jurisdiction, led their followers into combat to protect or reassert local
autonomy.8 Elsewhere, often in areas experiencing recent incorporation
into the broader economic and political environment, agrarian leaders had
more specific motives for rebelling; in particular, the recovery of land
from hacendados or caciques.
Studies reflecting the personal characteristics of leadership draw a
broad distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' caudillos. Some

leaders developed close ties of loyalty with their soldiers and

sensitive awareness of their specific anxieties. Such leaders w
concerned with broader ideological concepts; their ambitio
gain control of their own localities. In contrast, a new gen
regional figures demonstrated a greater willingness to become
the emerging modern political machinery.9 Alan Knight summ
development in regional politics as one that adopted 'new
authority, increasingly civilian and bureaucratic, with sound r
foundations'. 1 These leaders often came from the urban mid
rarely sharing the social background of their followers. This
them to use a more impersonal style of leadership that relied
organisation to rally support.
Attempts to merge these two concepts of regional leadersh
problematic. Serrano groups usually occupied remote location
the seat of state government. Often free from the agrari

7 For details of agrarismo in Tlaxcala, see R. Buve, El movimiento revoluciona

(Mexico, 1994).
8 A. Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge, I986), Vol. I, pp. 368-
9 D. Ankerson,' Saturnino Cedillo, a Traditional Caudillo in San Luis Poto
in Brading, Caudillo and Peasant, pp. I40-I.
10 A. Knight, 'Peasant and Caudillo in Revolutionary Mexico 1910-17'
Caudillo and Peasant, p. 58.

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I o0 Keith Brewster

witnessed in terrain more suited to large-scale agriculture, it is t

to see serrano leaders as more traditional, charismatic and po
ambivalent, who would adopt any stance likely to advan
underlying aim of local autonomy. Similarly, greater exposur
varying effects of government interference highlighted an
leader's need to gain access to, or preferably control over, the ma
of the state government to ensure the adoption of favourable ag
reform.

Such categorisation, however, threatens to impose an artificiall

structure upon what was, by nature, an indeterminate pheno
Knight qualifies his definition of the serrano movement by iden
variations within the movement according to region and chr
Agrarian leaders often saw local autonomy as the most effective
achieving land reform, while it was not uncommon for serranos t
agrarian elements within their ranks.11 Although agrarian c
occupied the governorships of both San Luis Potosi and Ver
Saturnino Cedillo and Adalberto Tejeda attracted popular sup
different ways. Cedillo's soldiers were loyally bound to their leade
strong personal ties that evolved from the dangers shared in nu
revolutionary battles.12 Tejeda's influence derived from a network
agrarian leagues which attracted campesinos by promising land re
By controlling the centralised bureaucratic system of state level p
to which all these leagues were linked, Tejeda established an imp
but nonetheless effective, influence upon the veracruZano campes
At a more local level, similar ambiguities exist concerning the n
caciquismo in the post-revolutionary period. The political opport
displayed by serrano caciques in their quest to establish local aut
allowed them to adopt ambivalent positions regarding issues
concern. Frans Schryer shows that in the Sierra Alta de Hidalgo
of rival factions rallied support by fomenting agrarian conflict in
which had been free of such tension throughout the Revolution
Villegas identified with the agrarian cause in order to attract ca
support, while his rival, Porfirio Rubio, preyed on the concerns
larger landowning farmers to gain his following.15 Although their ra
background and limited ideological ambitions suggest that Villeg
Rubio were fundamentally conservative and parochial in outl

11 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 368.

12 E. Marquez, 'Gonzalo N. Santos o la naturaleza del "tante6metro politi
Martinez Assad (ed.), Estadistas, caciquesy caudillos (Mexico, I988), pp. 369-
13 Salamini, Agrarian Radicalism; H. F. Salamini, 'Revolutionary Caudillos in
Francisco Mugica and Adalberto Tejeda', in Brading, Caudillo and Peasant, p
14 Ibid., p. 170. 15 Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores, pp. 76-7.
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico i i

paying lip service to the agrarian issue they nonetheless demonstrated an

appreciation of the changing political environment beyond their locality.
Whether it be the radicalism of Tejeda, the conservatism of Cedillo or
the opportunism displayed in the struggle for power in the Sierra Alta de
Hidalgo, mobilisation of campesinos in the areas adjoining the Sierra de
Puebla was frequently linked to the hopes and fears raised by the prospect
of agrarian reform. Schryer identifies those most likely to exchange their
fighting services for land as 'middle peasants', self-employed tenants
whose aspirations for social advancement had been thwarted by the local
elite.'6 Mass support often arose, therefore, where middle peasants had
been frustrated in attempts to attain their key to social improvement: land
ownership. Conversely, those whose interests were threatened by the
aspirations of the middle peasants were often willing to follow a leader
who purported to protect their interests. But such tactics were not easily
transferable to the nearby Sierra de Puebla as the region was largely free
from agrarian conflict. Although several families possessed significant
amounts of land, the region's topography and climate inhibited large-scale
agriculture. Furthermore, as Guy Thomson's work on nineteenth-century
liberalism indicates, campesinos in the Sierra had been largely successful
in protecting their interests from the worst excesses of desamortizacidn
during the Porfiriato.l7 The voluntary division and sale of land on larger
estates before and during the Revolution meant that many campesinos had
acquired their own plots and did not share the plight of campesinos in

16 Ibid., pp. 55-7.

17 That the absence of widespread friction was due more to poor prospects of profitable
agriculture than to any respect for land ownership was demonstrated in the
municipality of Cuetzalan during the I86o-7os. Coffee cultivation led to the swift
encroachment of Indian land and violent clashes between ethnic groups. See: G. P. C.
Thomson, 'Agrarian Conflict in the Municipality of Cuetzalan (Sierra de Puebla): The
Rise and Fall of "Pala" Agustin Dieguillo, i86I-1894', Hispanic American Historical
Review, vol. 71, no. 2 (1991), pp. 205-58; P. Valderrama Rouy and C. Ramirez Suarez,
'Resistencia etnica y defensa del territorio en el Totonacapan serrano: Cuetzalan en el
siglo XIX', in A. Escobar (ed.), Indio, nacidn y comunidad en el Mexico del siglo XIX
(Mexico, I993), pp. I89-206.
For nineteenth-century liberalism in the Sierra de Puebla see: G. P. C. Thomson,
'Popular Aspects of Liberalism in Mexico I848-I888', Bulletin of Latin American
Research, vol. io, no. 3 (i99I), pp. 265-92; G. P. C. Thomson, 'Bulwarks of Patriotic
Liberalism: the National Guard, Philharmonic Corps and Patriotic Juntas in Mexico,
1847-88', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 22, (1990), pp. 3 -68; G. P. C.
Thomson, 'Montafia and Llanura in the Politics of Central Mexico: The Case of
Puebla, 1820-1920', in Region, State and Capitalism in Mexico, pp. 59-78; G. P.
Thomson, 'Los indios y el servicio militar en el Mexico decimon6nico. dLeva
ciudadania?', in Escobar, Indio, nacidny comunidad en el Mexico de siglo XIX, pp. 207-
D. LaFrance and G. P. C. Thomson, 'Juan Francisco Lucas: Patriarch of the Sie
Norte de Puebla', in W. H. Beezley (ed.), The Human Tradition in Latin Ameri
(Wilmington, 1987), pp. 1-I3.

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I 2 Keith Brewster

other regions of the Republic. Such influences created a general a

of the sacrosanct nature of private ownership and in affirming such
the Barrios family were merely reflecting the sentiments of the ma
their fellow serranos. Only when the family's influence extende
the Sierra on to the altiplano did this conviction clash with the a
of agrarians with conflicting ambitions.'8
While the absence of agrarian conflict in the Sierra denied
Barrios a common method of attracting popular support, the s
may have worked to his advantage. Had agrarian discontent
Indian communities might have responded to the overtures of an
mestizo leader who promised social justice. In its absence, it
something special to mobilise the fighting potential of th
campesino. Gabriel Barrios's background prepared him to assum
that his local mestizo rivals could not match.

At first sight, his family's social position in the rural district of Za

appears similar to many who rose to prominence during the Rev
Born and raised in the Indian community of Cuacuila, the brother
years were heavily influenced by the cultural values of their
mother. Nevertheless, the family's activities in the breeding and
horses brought considerable contact with mestizo traders in T
Ocampo and Zacatlan, and provided the family with a measu
economic wealth in Cuacuila similar to that enjoyed by rancheros
areas. Before the Revolution, this relative wealth enabled the Bar
family to buy sufficient land to warrant the employment of sea
labourers.19 In short, the Barrios can be placed in Schryer's cate
'peasant bourgeoisie', although their Nahua origins would have
them entry to the Sierra's exclusively creole social elite.
As in other regions, the Revolution enabled the Barrios brothe
particular Gabriel, to convert local influence into military leader

18 Barrios's convictions on land ownership were expressed to me in an interview

son, Jose Maria Barrios, 6 Nov. 1993, Tonalapa, Tetela de Ocampo.
In this respect, Barrios falls neatly into the anti-agrarian role assumed b
federal officers during the 92zos. See H. W. Tobler, 'Peasants and the Shapi
Revolutionary State, 1910-40', in F. Katz (ed.), Riot, Rebellion and Homicide (P
1988), pp. 487-5 18.
During the latter period of the 1920S, Barrios and his men were involved in
violent clashes with agraristas in outlying areas of the districts of Zacatlan an
19 Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores, p. 7. Schryer defines rancheros in the
region as members within a peasant community who owned their own farms
actively engaged in local commerce. Rancheros often employed seasonal la
shared the dress, deportment and speech of their economic subordinates.
20 For details of Barrios's recruitment into the Brigada Serrana and his early
action, see: Archivo de la Defensa Nacional, cancelado (ADN, C), 2-II45, tom
1274, 1374-9; Archivo Privado de Arnulfo Barrios (APAB) - see declarations

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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico I I 3

Under the command of the Carrancista general, Juan Francisco Lucas,

Gabriel's tactical and leadership qualities were such that upon Lucas's
death, in 1917, he was confirmed as commander of his former leader's
troops. Using his newly acquired military position, Barrios wasted little
time in laying the foundations of a cacica,go that would eventually span the
entire Sierra. The new military leader remained a Carrancista until the
cause was lost, only to rise from the ashes as a loyal supporter of the
Sonorenses.

While military prowess partly accounted for Gabriel Barrios's la

successes as a federal army officer, it does not explain how, in March
he managed to convince i 20 of his neighbours to follow him into bat
In other regions, land, material and political reward were all us
attract support. While material reward might have attracted some, f
Barrios's followers held obvious political aspirations; even fewer
concerned with the fight for land. Clues to Barrios's success in recr
a fighting force lie in the ethnic composition of his troops; almost
his soldiers were Indian campesinos from Cuacuila and the surroun
communities. The region's recent history of Indian military mobilis
sheds light on the unique characteristics that facilitated Gabriel Bar
rise to regional domination.
A predominant theme that emerges from Thomson's work on
National Guard units in the Sierra during the latter half of the ninet
century is the interdependence between mestizo liberal politicians
local Indian leaders. Liberal mestizos in the Sierra had little direct

influence within many Indian communities and the only po

harnessing the fighting potential of the region's campesinos
a cultural intermediary. From the I85os this role was perfor
Francisco Lucas, an Indian leader who drove a hard bar
services that the mestizos required. 'Tata Juan Francisco
referred to by the Indian serranos, was seen as a benevolent
Indian autonomy; his image within the Indian communi
mythical proportions. Indian National guardsmen not only
material rewards that Lucas had negotiated for their servic
confident that Lucas would act swiftly to prevent them beco
of mestizo exploitation. The combination of respect for Luc
possibility of material reward persisted during the R
Campesinos, tired of being victims of the arbitrary revolutio

15 Nov. I920 by General M. Rojas and on 10 June 192I by Gener

regarding Barrios's early military service.
21 ADN, C, 2-I301, tomo i, f. i.

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I I4 Keith Brewster

often saw military recruitment as the best opportunity of gaining

protection for their families and communities. For others, it would take
much to dissuade them from heeding the call of the patriarch who had
protected the interests of themselves and their families for many decades.
Anthropological studies confirm this reverence for patriarchal figures
that existed within Indian communities. Doris Slade's study of social
organisation in the Nahua community of Chignautla identifies a
predominance of unilineal paternal ties, a phenomenon which she suggests
is common to many Nahua communities in the Sierra. Given such
tendencies, Slade argues, Nahua serranos are particularly receptive to the
approaches of patriarchal figures such as Juan Francisco Lucas or Gabriel
Barrios.22 As Moises Saenz, sub-Secretary for Education, noted in his tour
of the Sierra in 1926, Gabriel Barrios appeared to display 'a style of
benevolent feudalism, a strong and loving paternalism...'23 There is little
doubt that Barrios's form of leadership was influenced by the nineteenth-
century precedents set by Lucas.
The temptation for many serranos to draw parallels between the mystical
powers attributed to 'Tata Juan Francisco' and those inherited by his
successor has proved irresistible.24 Within the Sierra, stories persist of the
shadowy figure of Gabriel Barrios: a firm but fair man; a man who never
appeared to need sleep; who would rest at night in one village only to
appear early the next morning in another many miles away; who was
rarely seen by day and who conducted secret meetings with his local
commanders under cover of darkness; who was witnessed to have been
in two places at the same time; who sponsored a brass band that played
a strange blend of classical and traditional music from the ridge of
Cuacuila that echoed eerily throughout the mountain valleys at dusk.
Barrios realised the benefits that Lucas had received by retaining many of
his Indian characteristics. Just as mestizos such as Carrillo Puerto, Primo
Tapia and Juvencio Nochebuena received legitimacy within Indian
communities as a consequence of their sensitivity to cultural values, so
Gabriel Barrios capitalised upon his familiarity with Nahua traditions.25
Like Lucas before him, Barrios stepped beyond Indian society. Yet both
men remained firmly rooted in the cultural traditions of their fellow

22 D. L. Slade, 'Kinship in the Social Organisation of a Nahuat-Speaking Community in

the Central Highlands', in H. G. Nutini, P. Carrasco and J. M. Taggart (eds.), Essays
on Mexican Kinship (Pittsburgh, 1976), ch. 7, pp. I55-85.
23 M. Saenz, Escuelasfederales en la Sierra de Puebla (Mexico, 1927).
24 E. Mansferrer Kan, 'Religi6n y Politica en la Sierra Norte de Puebla', America Indzgena,
vol. 46, no. 3 (I986).
In this study, the author identifies the belief shared by many Nahua serranos that
Lucas possessed mystical powers.
25 For details of Juvencio Nochebuena's cacicazgo see F. J. Schryer, Ethnicity and Class
Conflict in Rural Mexico (Princeton, 1990), pp. 27-5 I.
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico I 5

Nahua neighbours and soldiers. This enabled both leaders to attain a level
of acceptance that no amount of benevolent words from a mestizo
politician could have achieved.
When Gabriel Barrios assumed command of the Brigada Serrana in
1917, senior Carrancista officers were relieved of a major problem.26
Although Lucas's estado mayor contained several trusted mestizo officers,
their authority over the Brigada Serrana depended upon the presence of
Lucas. These mestizo officers did not reflect the ethnic composition of
Lucas's army: orders were issued in nahuatl and troops went into battle
wearing the trajes de manta worn by campesinos throughout the region.
Without Lucas, it was far from certain that any of these mestizo officers
could command sufficient authority to deliver the services that Carrancista
senior officers required. More than any of his mestizo competitors,
Gabriel Barrios knew the Sierra: its changing climate; its topography and
mountain paths; its people, culture, language and traditions. He provided
the cultural link necessary to persuade communities to continue lending
material and physical support to a particular cause.
The very qualities that convinced Carrancista military officers that
Barrios was the appropriate successor to Lucas caused anxiety among
Obreg6n's generals who, following Carranza's death, sought to establish
terms of reference with local military leaders. Obregon was warned that
Barrios's influence in the Sierra might result in him enjoying an ominous
degree of local autonomy.27 Compounding these fears were rumours in
Puebla City that Barrios was colluding with the Carrancistas, Luis and
Alfonso Cabrera, to launch a rebellion against the Sonorense govern-
ment.28 On the other hand, Obreg6n's military advisers must have feared
the likely response of the Barrios brothers and their Indian soldiers should
they be ordered to demobilise or relocate beyond the Sierra. Imposing
mestizo officers from outside the region was equally risky, while local
military alternatives, such as the ex-Villista Salvador Vega Bernal,
appeared untrustworthy.29 Not only did the Barrios family possess the key

26 The Brigada Serrana was to undergo several metamorphoses before becoming the 46th
Battalion with which Barrios is most associated.
27 ADN, C, 2- 145, f. 223. General Viqueras's report, dated 3 June I920, conc
although Barrios and his men appeared to have accepted the aguaprietista
military potential, coupled with possible surviving loyalties to his compad
Cabrera, made it prudent to begin the task of dismantling Barrios's unit.
28 El Monitor, i6 Mar. i92 , No. 973, p. i; El Universal, 17 Mar. I921, No.
29 The other military forces operating in the Sierra were those led by Lindoro
in Huauchinango and Salvador Vega Bernal in Cuetzalan. Fideicomiso A
Plutarco Elfas Calles y Fernando Torreblanca (FAC y T), Gav. 41, Hern
(Gral.) Exp. 91, leg. i/2. Inv. 2727.
Correspondence between Gral. Hernandez and Calles reveals the deep suspic
existed concerning military officers who pledged loyalty to the government
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I 6 Keith Brewster

that could unlock the military potential of the serranos, but its i
within the region was most likely to provide the regional p
stability that the Sonorenses sought. The plain truth was that, as
other regions, Obreg6n had little option but to allow the br
remain in control of the Sierra. On various occasions du
Revolution, they had demonstrated their ability to mobilise an
over 2,000 men; the Guerra y Marina ignored this potential at i
Having attained the backing of the federal government,
Barrios's ability to strengthen his network of clients was enhan
several ways. In the absence of a credible civilian police force, h
extended beyond military duties to encompass the task of clear
Sierra of bandits and other miscreants who threatened social order.

Although Barrios's brutal suppression of alleged criminal activi

criticism, the majority of serranos were grateful that th
thoroughfares once again became free from banditry. Certai
ruthless in his determination to pacify the Sierra, although
evidence of such brutality suggests that his reputation was pe
much by anecdote as actual deeds. The result was the same
became apparent to all serranos that the source of real influence in
now resided in the mountain village of Cuacuila.
A second important aspect of federal support was that, pro
Barrios brothers remained loyal, the Guerra y Marina would
finer details of their recruitment policy. Although the brothe
federal funds to pay the wages of all those present at reviews,
proportion of this money ever reached the forces. Barrios's t
paid only for the days in which they were required for military d
the remainder of their time, these 'soldiers' returned to their
activities. During the more violent years of the Revolution, a s
acted as a considerable incentive. When widespread violence d
these veterans of the Revolution were often willing to resume
time agricultural activities, only reverting to military status
encies, or during visits from the Guerra y Marina inspectorat
Furthermore, as these 'soldiers' returned to their commun
were often formed into cuerpos voluntarios, charged with the resp
for keeping the peace in their localities.30 Jefes de armas were app

30 Biblioteca Luis Cabrera, Zacatlan. RHAM, late I, Barrios (BLC.RHAM

Letters sent/received April-June, 1923.
Correspondence between Bardomiano Barrios and variousjefes de armas
many of them were unsure of their status or whether their men were to be
peacekeeping role they perforned. Barrios confirmed that such services w
and should be seen as community initiatives that enabled serranos t
preserve order in their locality.

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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico 17

lead them and were responsible for keeping the cacique informed of any
serious incidents. In time, the network of cuerpos voluntarios extended
throughout the Sierra. Moreover, thanks to generous funding from the
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Ptiblicas, Barrios was able to
establish an extensive telephone network that connected eachjefe de armas
to the headquarters at Cuacuila.
It was this network that consolidated Gabriel Barrios's military
capability. Swift communications kept him aware of events in his region
and allowed him rapidly to deploy his forces. In contrast to the military
colonies of Cedillo or the agrarian leagues of Tejeda, the serrano
communities themselves formed the basis of the network. And it is in this

aspect of the cacicazgo, more than any else, that Barrios's India
background proved crucial. In choosing his jefes de armas, he rar
imposed an outsider but sought the 'natural' leader of the community;
person who commanded most local respect. As far as the majority
Indian communities was concerned, therefore, Barrios superimposed
cacicago network upon an existing social and cultural system. T
telephone system provided the element of modernity that converted
region of isolated communities into an efficient machine whose actio
were lubricated, coordinated and directed by the Barrios family.
Guerra y Marina viewed these cuerpos voluntarios as an auxiliary force
did not hesitate to provide Barrios with the necessary funds an
ammunition to mobilise these groups in times of emergency.31 The sw
mobilisation of these auxiliaries, their familiarity with the comm
structure and lines of communication, and their superior knowledge of
local terrain made Barrios's army an indispensable asset to the federa
government.
The laxity of the Guerra y Marina's control over its Indian officer in th
Sierra, together with the need to ensure regional stability, provided
Barrios brothers with the means to extend their control. Although i
impossible to prove the extent to which the brothers defrauded thei
paymasters, this cash enabled them to distribute favours and secure t
network of clients. In addition, Gabriel Barrios argued forcibly for fed
funds to aid regional reconstruction. In response, livestock and farm
implements were sent to Barrios for dispersal as 'gifts from the nation
Control over the distribution of such equipment further strengthened
image as the benevolent patron of the Sierra.

31 BLC.RHAM, Caja 1924, Telegrams sent/received Jan. 1924. BLC.RHAM, Caja 1

Telegrams Oct. 1927. During the Serrano rebellion, the Guerra y Marina author
Barrios to recruit 250 men as auxiliaries.
32 Archivo General de la Naci6n. Ramo Obreg6n y Calles, (AGN, O-C), 6o5-T-6.
letter from Obreg6n dated 21 Mar. I922.

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18 Keith Brewster

As the network expanded, and especially when military recr

became less of a priority, the selection of jefes de armas becam
measured. In communities where a particular mestizo family d
local society, for example, Barrios would incorporate the fam
the cacicaogo, appointing members of the family as jefes de a
enabling others to act as his political representatives as diputad
and federal congresses. In many mestizo communities, Barrios
adept at manipulating factional disputes. Local supremacy was
by Barrios's support and a faction's continued control of local p
commerce remained dependent upon compliance with his w
worth noting, however, that Barrios rarely allowed local powe
exclusively into the hands of any one group. Secretaries we
strangers to a community, while jefes de armas acted indep
municipal officials. Sufficient mutual mistrust was thereby created
any community from uniting in opposition to Barrios. Each gr
that its best interests lay in loyalty to the cuacuileno cacique.

Broader political considerations

As with other regional military leaders during the post-revol
period, political events during the 9z2os demanded that Gabri
regularly reaffirm his loyalty to the federal government. Yet t
fine line between active loyalty and tactical acquiescence, and it
difficult to maintain a balance. A combination of local and regio
determined that the Figueroa brothers of Guerrero, for exampl
fateful decision to join the Delahuerta rebellion. In the Sierra
the Barrios' decision to remain loyal to Obregon not only r
personal tragedy with the death of Bardomiano at the
Delahuertista rebels, but also carried regional, even nation
cussions.

The weakness of General Almazan's federal forces in Puebla Cit

exposed by their untimely withdrawal from the city when confron
the rebel forces of General Maycotte in early December I923. Tha
rebels did not consolidate their grip on Puebla City and use it as a
launch an attack on the national capital, was largely due to Al
successful counter-attack using vital reinforcements from Tlaxca
presence of these extra troops, therefore, was a crucial factor in preve
a Delahuertista military assault on Mexico City.
As had happened so many times in Mexico's history, the st
importance of the Sierra was revealed. Had Barrios led his me
rebellion, then Delahuerta's army in the East could have mou
broad, unbroken line of combat: from the borders of Oaxaca, where
Higinio Aguilar's forces lay, moving to Maycotte's troops pushing
through the Mexico/Veracruz corridor, and Barrios's forces uniting with
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico 11 9

others in the Sierra and Veracruz coast. From the Sierra, Barrios's forces,
only hours from Tlaxcala, could have mounted a challenge of such
strength as seriously to deplete the reinforcements upon whom Almazain's
counter-attack depended. By remaining loyal, Barrios considerably
reduced the chances of a successful Delahuerta assault on Mexico City.
The Delahuerta campaign forged a relationship of mutual under-
standing between Barrios and his military superior, General Juan A.
Almazan.33 The subsequent friendship of hisjefe de operaciones militares was
a valuable acquisition, as Almazan acted as a filter protecting Barrios from
criticism. Any charge presented to the President, the Guerra y Marina or
the governor, would eventually be relayed back to the jefatura in Puebla
for further investigation. The ties between Almazan and Barrios, fortified
by their mutual fight against Delahuertistas, considerably reduced the
chances of Almazan sending a critical report back to his superiors in
Mexico City.
The support that Barrios received from his regional military superiors
outlasted Almazan's tenure as regional military commander. General
Roberto Cruz took over from Almazan in I924 and Barrios wasted little
time in establishing good relations with his new commanding officer; so
much so that in November 1924, Cruz was happy to confirm to Obreg6n
that he considered Barrios a good friend and an officer who had always
carried out his duties in a loyal and obedient manner.34 Similar ties appear
to have developed between Barrios and General Donato Bravo Izquierdo
who, in 926, held the influential position of head of Infantry at the Guerra
y Marina. He was in regular contact with Barrios's headquarters in
Zacatlan and with Barrios's trusted representative, Ricardo Marquez
Galindo, who played a multiple role as political lobbyist, politician and
military requisitions officer.35 By June 1926, Bravo Izquierdo regarded
both Barrios and Marquez Galindo as close friends upon whom he could
rely to help him with the most trivial of personal dilemmas.36 Only a year

33 BLC.RHAM, Caja I923. Correspondence for Jan. 1923. Almazan took over asjefe de
operaciones militares in Puebla on I Jan. 1923.
34 AGN, O-C, IoI-B-Io. Letter from Cruz to Obreg6n dated 26 Nov. 1924. ADN, C, 2-
II45, if. II9-203. Correspondence between May-July I925. In answer to complaints
that Barrios was impeding agrarian reform, Cruz defended Barrios, describing the case
as a boundary dispute between neighbouring settlements.
35 BLC.RHAM, Caja 1926. Letters for June 1926. On 8 June 1926, Bravo Izquierdo
addressed a letter to his 'Estimado amigo y compaiero', Gabriel Barrios, advising that
he had recently handed over military supplies to 'nuestro buen amigo', Marquez
Galindo. The warmth of the letter suggests a friendship which exceeded the bounds of
military fraternity.
36 BLC.RHAM, Caja I926. Letters for June 1926. In a letter dated 9 June 1926, Bravo
Izquierdo asked Barrios to procure four songbirds of a type that inhabited the Sierra.
Bravo Izquierdo hoped that such a request was not too great an abuse of the friendship
that he and Barrios enjoyed.
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i20 Keith Brewster

later, this friendship assumed even greater significance when

Izquierdo became governor of Puebla.
The service that Barrios provided for the Sonorense administra
during the Delahuerta rebellion also reaped a political reward. Thr
out the campaign, he and Marquez Galindo maintained frequent co
with both Obreg6n and Calles. As Barrios's loyalty became increas
apparent, the consequent trust and goodwill enabled him to prolo
period during which his actions in the Sierra remained free from
scrutiny of his military and political superiors. By maintaining a n
position as a loyal federal officer, he avoided the risk of being emb
in subsequent struggles for supremacy within the Sonorense leade
His interests in state and national politics were strictly limited to
ambitions in the Sierra de Puebla. It was at this regional level that
Barrios's friendship with military and political leaders proved to be
valuable asset.

Enemies from within: political opposition in the Sierra

It was not long before Barrios's sphere of influence outgrew its orig
the municipalities of Tetela and Zacatlan in the western Sierra. Exp
of the cacicago into less familiar territories inevitably produce
challenges, and nowhere were these stronger than in the eastern S
district of Zacapoaxtla. There, the minority creole elite, represented
Alcantara, Macip and Molina families, had monopolised politica
economic control of the municipality since the sixteenth century.
late nineteenth century, these families had developed person
political ties with leading mestizo families in nearby Cuetzalan, cur
enjoying a coffee boom. Influence in the district, therefore, w
prerogative of the non-Indian, wealthy minority. Although fa
rivalry within this elite group existed, competition had normally re
peaceful. In the decades preceding the Revolution, however, the st
were raised as less favoured members of the elite, and a recent inf
mestizos into the region, brought fresh challenges for politic
economic control.

During the 920zos local factionalism became influenced by a b

clash. Little is known of the social and economic background of
Nabor Tirado; the absence of the Tirado name in the annals of
Zacapoaxtla's colonial history suggests that he did not belong to the
landed elite. Yet by 1920 Claudio Tirado had obtained sufficient pr
in the district to become federal diputado, the most prominent po
representative of a Zacapoaxtla faction led by the brothers, Wencesla
Ignacio Macip and their close ally, Rufino A. Landero. The expansio
Barrios's cacicazgo into the region was a direct threat to the re
acquired control of Tirado and his Zacapoaxtla allies.
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico 121

Following the July 1922 electoral campaign, Tirado sent a letter to the
Jefe de operaciones militares in Puebla, complaining of the tyranny and abuses
perpetrated in the Sierra by Barrios and his men.37 In reply, Barrios
suggested that Tirado's false accusations were motivated by his desire to
acquire political domination of the region.38 A Guerra y Marina
investigation in May 1923 found no substantial evidence to support
complaints against Barrios.39 As he would often do in the future, the
investigating officer, General Almazan, expressed full support for his
friend in the Sierra. Almazan concluded that the complaints were based
upon a local factional dispute in which Barrios was seen to support a
group who dared to challenge the 'political hegemony' enjoyed in
Zacapoaxtla by the Macip family and their patron, senator Tirado.40
The political battle between Gabriel Barrios and Tirado intensified
during Tirado's governorship. In August I925 Tirado used his executive
powers to replace the ayuntamiento of Cuetzalan, on the pretext that the
previous incumbent had fraudulently taken possession of the ayun-
tamiento, aided and abetted by Barrios and a local cacique, Jose Maria
Flores. In replacing the local authorities, Tirado was honouring his debt
of gratitude to his political allies in Zacapoaxtla: the new officials in
Cuetzalan were members of the local faction supported by Wenceslao and
Ignacio Macip.
For his part, Gabriel Barrios flexed every political muscle he possessed
to impede Tirado's efforts to strengthen his grip on the region. In a letter
to Demetrio Barrios, Flores relayed details of the attacks he and his friends
had been launching against Tirado in the federal congress. Flores added
that a short-list of candidates to replace Tirado as governor had already
been drawn up, only to be delayed by a disagreement between the
President and [Gilberto] Valenzuela.41 In the following months, Barrios's
representatives in congress continually lobbied the President and

37 ADN, C, 2- I45, ff. 9I 3-I4. Letter sent to thejefe de operaciones militares on 2I July I922.
38 ADN, C, 2-I 45, f. 922. Letter sent by Barrios on 14 Aug. 1922 to thejefe de la Brigada,
Puebla.

39 The enquiry was commissioned by the Jefatura in Puebla and was instru
specifically to investigate a number of charges made against Barrios and his for
Tirado and two federal diputados, Gonzalo Gonzalez (Zacatlan) and Wenceslao
(Zacapoaxtla).
40 AGN, O-C, 8i6-P-45. See the military report dated I May 1923 by Gral. Juan A.
Almazan.

Interview with Francisco Landero Alamo (son of Rufino Landero), Io Dec. 1

Zacapoaxtla. Seiior Landero confirms that Rufino Landero, Claudio N. Tirad
other political allies made a concerted effort to destroy the Barrios cacicazgo. He
that this was not for any personal reasons, but because his father and Tirado obj
to the way in which Barrios's actions were 'extra-legal'.
41 BLC.RHAM, Caja I925. Letters July/Aug. 1925. Letters from Flores to Dem
Barrios dated 24 Aug. 1925 and 28 Aug. 1925. Although Flores does not specif
was probably referring to Gilberto Valenzuela, Secretary of Gobernaci6n.
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I22 Keith Brewster

government officials to provoke a favourable response in their

with Tirado.42 Among his supporters in the federal congre
Constantino Molina, a diputado of the Zacapoaxtla faction that o
the local Tirado clique. In pledging his loyalty, Molina suggested
to fifteen other Puebla diputados were willing to support Barrio
battle against Tirado. Molina assured his patron that no opportu
expose the intrigues and political ambitions of Tirado would be m
Such support was a measure of the degree of political influence
Barrios family had managed to accumulate in the few short years
held military power in the Sierra.
In August 1926, Governor Tirado, now fighting for his politic
unleashed one final assault. He forwarded to President Calles a li
incidents which, he claimed, gave proof of Barrios's abuses
serranos. Tirado accused his adversary of issuing death threat
compliant local officials and of being 'in open rebellion against t
government'.44 So extreme were the accusations, that Calles ord
immediate investigation. The subsequent report was a damni
roboration of Tirado's charges. While some cases were unproven, i
to the more serious charge of violent intimidation of local offic
Sierra cabeceras, the report confirmed that Barrios's men had enc
a political battle between 'groups of armed Indians' and groups l
the State government. The report did add, however, that apart fr
mentioned case, the rest of the Sierra enjoyed 'a situation of tota
with complete security for all those using the roads within the r
The report astutely identified the nature of the struggle for
control of strategic cabeceras between two irreconcilable groups.
existed in the majority of Indian communities primarily because
already been incorporated into the network of the cacicaggo. Ho
potential resistance to Barrios existed wherever the local p
community was sufficiently large to sustain a credible, iden
opposition. These groups were forced to seek alternative patrona
they found by pledging support for governor Tirado. With B
cuerpos voluntarios actively encouraging the endeavours of their
local representatives, the battle lines were drawn, as the report co
between those supporting Barrios and those upholding the constit
powers of the governor.

42 BLC.RHAM, Caja I925. Letters Oct. 92z5. See letter from Marquez Galindo
dated i Oct. I925, and letter from Flores to Demetrio Barrios dated 2 Oct
43 BLC.RHAM, Caja 1926. Letters received/sent for Sep. I926. See letter from
Barrios dated 4 Sep. 1926.
44 AGN, O-C, 4o8-P-2o, leg. 3. See telegram from Tirado to Calles dated i6 A
together with extracts of telegrams detailing alleged abuses by Barrios.
45 Ibid. no. 8844. Report from Francisco Heredia to Calles dated I Sep. 1926.

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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico i 23

While the replacement of Tirado as governor in November 1926

indicated Barrios's victory over his rival in the Sierra, the injuries
sustained in battle arguably weakened the cacique's position in a much
broader war. Firstly, the explicit nature of Tirado's claims that Barrios was
declaring a rebellion against Puebla's government would have alarm bells
ringing through the corridors of power in Mexico City. The Delahuerta
and Serrano rebellions made federal authorities highly sensitive to the
antics of their federal military officers. It is little wonder, therefore, that
despite the measure of confidence that Barrios enjoyed with central
government, Calles reacted swiftly to Tirado's allegations by sending a
commission to investigate the claims.
Secondly, the fact that the subsequent report largely substantiated
Tirado's claims had serious implications. While Calles eventually accepted
the argument that Tirado was an ineffective governor, he must have noted
Barrios's expansionist policy in the Sierra with some anxiety. Barrios had
rarely been free from controversy, but the report presented Calles with the
first independent evidence confirming the extent of the military cacicaggo
in the Sierra de Puebla.

Furthermore, in drawing upon all his reserves to defeat Tirado, Ba

exposed the full extent of his network: up to fifteen diputados in f
congress, favourable national and regional press coverage, the back
the Guerra y Marina's most senior officers in Puebla. In 1926, such
impressive armoury may not have caused immediate panic, bu
exercise marked Barrios's card for future consideration.

The turning point in Gabriel Barrios's political fortunes ca

September I928, in Calles's speech before the federal congress. Oste
aimed at destroying speculation that he might retain the presidency
used the opportunity to explain to the nation why it was imperative
the country of local rule by caudillos. This policy had been br
demonstrated a year earlier in Puebla with the assassination of the a
caudillo, Manuel Montes. Attention now focused upon the cacique
Sierra.

More than ever before, Barrios's political enemies were encouraged to

express their grievances. At the Laborista convention in Puebla in i928,
Vicente Lombardo Toledano reflected the changing political mood. In the
past, Barrios had helped Lombardo attain political prominence. But now
Lombardo openly attacked his former patron, alleging that he so
controlled the lives of serranos that he had become the legal, executive and
military chief of all serrano communities.46 A Cuetzalan delegate spoke of
the persecution of Confederaci6n Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM)

4 La Opinion, 6 Oct. I928, No. I625, pp. I, 6.

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124 Keith Brewster

members and of large-scale fraud in which Bravo Izquierdo's state

government had allowed funds destined for road projects to reach the
pockets of Barrios and his cronies. Press coverage of this attack on Barrios
was part of a mounting campaign against the cacique. The Puebla daily,
La Opinidn, devoted considerable editorial space to distancing itself from
its previous praise of Barrios as the impulse for revolutionary progress in
the Sierra. In acknowledging his beneficial influences, La Opinion now
argued that the price of regional domination that Barrios demanded for
such services was too high for post-revolutionary Mexico to pay.
The increasing subjugation of the federal army to the will of the
government meant that Barrios could no longer rely upon the protection
of his military superiors. Rather, he began to receive orders instructing
him to desist from actions likely to prompt complaint. His network of
prominent army and congressional allies began to crumble under federal
pressure. Moreover, those who had previously seen their complaints
against him ignored were suddenly given encouragement: the time was
ripe for his many political enemies to round upon the cacique and jostle
into positions ready for the skirmish for local power that would follow his
removal. In the past, Barrios had been able to shrug off the opposition.
But in this changed environment, every charge acted further to jeopardise
his control of the Sierra.

Selected at the Laborista convention that had so directly atta

Barrios, the new governor, Leonides A. Almazan, wasted little time
pursuing these attacks to their logical conclusion. With federal gov
ment temporarily in control of Puebla politics, the new governor wa
to attack the cacicazgo, secure in the knowledge that he possesse
support of his political superiors in Mexico City.47 During his first m
in office, Almazan attacked the cornerstone of the cacicago by dec
void the elections for Zacatlan and Teziutlan, and imposing his
juntas to take over the ayuntamientos.48 In an equally crucial m
Almazan took steps to reduce the cacique's grassroot support by repl
Barrios's cuerpos voluntarios with new, state-sponsored security force

4The political eclipse of Barrios closely resembled events of the past. Juan N. M
and the Montafia Liberals were pushed aside as federal intervention assur
imposition of an outside governor, Rosendo Marquez. See Thomson, 'Mont
Llanura in the Politics of Central Mexico: the Case of Puebla, I820-1920', in Pa
and Ouweneel, Region, State and Capitalism in Mexico, pp. 59-78.
48 Archivo Municipal de Libres (AML) Gobernaci6n, Exp. 10, i929. See letter
15 Feb. I929 from the State government to the municipal president of L
BLC.RHAM, Caja I929. Documents Feb. I929. Letters from the provisional mu
president to Demetrio Barrios dated 25 Feb. 1929, inform him of the S
government's move. BLC.RHAM, Caja 1929. Letters May 1929. A letter from
W. Dominguez to Demetrio Barrios dated 8 May I929 refers to some of the v
irregularities in the Sierra. These included the substitution of one name for anoth
alteration all the more easily detected by the use of different coloured ink).
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico I2 5

Even after a decade of smooth coexistence, the Sonorense adminis-

tration was anxious that Barrios might react violently to save his cacicaggo
and lead his Indian troops into rebellion. Indeed, early reports from the
Sierra suggested that Barrios had instructed his followers to resist all
attempts to impose state-sponsored security forces, and to ignore
municipal authorities imposed by the state government. President Portes
Gil responded by asking the Guerra y Marina to take measures to ensure
that stability was restored and, if all else failed, to remove Barrios's forces
from the affected regions.49 Troops from the 45th Battalion were deployed
in Zacatlan, Teziutlan and Libres to monitor the peaceful installation of
provisional ayuntamientos following the nullification of the 1929 elections.
Now acting as the state government's official soap-box, La Opinion
published a lengthy article heralding the deployment of the 45th Battalion
as a victory for democracy over caciquismo, while a further article
commented upon the strength of federal support for the governor's
initiative.50 Meanwhile, the governor continued to enlist security forces in
the communities deemed to be most badly affected by Barrios's abuses.51
One of Barrios's remaining representatives in Mexico City, diputado
Salustio Cabrera, endeavoured to enlist the help of the previous governor,
General Bravo Izquierdo, in diluting Guerra y Marina hostility towards
Barrios.52 Bravo Izquierdo, then commander-in-chief of the Infantry,
pledged his support and promised to try to gain the backing of the
Ministry's chief, General Amaro.53 But times had changed, influential
friends in the Ministry could no longer provide assistance. Governor
Almazan held firm, and the 45th Battalion remained in the Sierra long
after Barrios's battalion had left.

Conclusion

Serrano folklore sustains the notion that in February i917, as J

Francisco Lucas lay close to death, he handed command of his Br
Serrana to Gabriel Barrios with one simple piece of advice: 'In all yo
actions as commander, remain loyal to the federal government.' As m
as his political opponents might try to argue the contrary, in all Barr

49 BLC.RHAM, Caja 1930. Correspondence received Jan. 1930. See letter dated 26
I930 from the Jefatura in Puebla to Barrios. ADN, C, 2-II45, f. 344.
50 BLC.RHAM, Caja I930. See correspondence date 18 Feb. 1930 between Jose M
Flores and Barrios regarding adverse press coverage in Mexico City. A series of ar
relating to Barrios's cacicazgo was published in La Opinion, particularly between 19
1930 and 28 Feb. 1930.
51 BLC.RHAM, Caja I930. Correspondence for Jan. I930. See letters dated 22 Jan
and 23 Jan. I930 from the Jefatura to Barrios giving notice of the governor's ac
in various communities within the ex-district of Huauchinango.
52 Salustio Cabrera was cousin to Barrios's compadre, ex-governor Alfonso Cabrer
53 BLC.RHAM, Caja I930. See letter from Bravo Izquierdo to Barrios dated 6 Mar.
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26 Keith Brewster

subsequent actions, he appeared to follow this advice to the let

in Spring 1930, Barrios finally received orders to muster his
deployment in Mexico City, there was no serious danger
disobeying. It was this underlying respect for the orders of hi
that ultimately saved him from the fate that leaders like Prim
Manuel Montes had already suffered, and that would later befal
Cedillo.

Certainly, Barrios vacillated a little, asking for further time to prep

his troops for the transfer. This was nothing new, he had always soug
room for manoeuvre while remaining within the bounds of fed
tolerance. In fact, the delay exposed the true nature of his military suppor
In the precious little time before re-deployment, he hastily contacted
jefes de armas and cuerpos voluntarios, ordering them to regroup in Zacatla
Chaotic days followed, as old soldiers pleaded dispensation from milita
duty. Occasional campaigns in the vicinity of the Sierra had caused f
problems, but transfer to Mexico City and unknown destinatio
thereafter was too much for many. Conversely, many younger serr
rushed to take the places of veterans, viewing this as an opportunity
broaden their horizons. The few regular officers of the battalion eng
in several days of intense training. Barrios had always sustained the im
that he commanded a disciplined, professional unit; he had only a fe
days to transform his assembly of casual auxiliaries into a semblance of
efficient fighting force he had professed to lead.
The link between Gabriel Barrios and the Indian troops under
command was the secret of the cacica-go's success during the I92os. Th
who went to Mexico City, and later to Chiapas and Oaxaca, were alm
all Indians recruited from the mountain villages of the Sierra. T
decades later, following the assassination attempt on President A
Camacho, it was to Demetrio Barrios and the Indian soldiers of the
renamed 37th Battalion that the poblano president turned to provide a
trustworthy presidential bodyguard. For many of the Indian soldiers wh
fought in the Brigada Serrana during the Revolution, Gabriel Barrio
represented continuity with the past. Barrios took over Lucas's
patriarchal role and was careful to maintain close cultural ties with his
men. More so than his surviving brother Demetrio, who chose the relative
civility of life in Zacatlan, Gabriel preferred the rugged rural life of the
mountains, and upon his retirement returned to the village of Cuacuila
until the final weeks before his death in May 964. He never fully mastere
the Spanish language nor the refined manners of his superiors. Yet the
singular influence he held over his men forced his superior officers an
politicians to respect his chosen way of life.
Certainly, Barrios would not have felt out of place in the ranks of thos
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 Caciquismo in Rural Mexico I27

charismatic leaders fighting the civil and patriotic wars of Mexico's first
century of Independence. Like many ranchero caudillos of his time, his
political ambitions were limited to the complete control of his locality. He
sought no change in serrano society. Juarista liberalism had already
brought enough change. And this is where the Sierra was exceptional.
Although Barrios was deeply committed to the liberal ethics of self-
determination and independence, his popular base did not possess any
ideological slogan. His power derived from the Indian serranos who
followed him into battle, and only an Indian patriarchal figure such as
Barrios could fulfil the role expected of such a leader. Many mestizo
caudillos occupied similar intermediary roles elsewhere. But in the Sierra
de Puebla, ethnic considerations and historic precedents narrowed the
options available.
Once secure in his military position, Barrios's understanding of serrano
society enabled him to construct a strong network of clients. By
acknowledging a community's pre-existing social structure, whether it be
mestizo or Indian, he sought to implant his authority while causing
minimum disruption. Reflecting the diversity of ethnic and social
circumstances in the Sierra, no two communities were approached in the
same manner. The cacicazgo was both pragmatic and flexible in its
application. Rigidity and unity relied more upon external factors such as
efficient communications than on an overbearing imposition at the grass-
roots.

It was this readiness to embrace new methods of control that defied

Gabriel Barrios's categorisation as one of a dying breed of tra

caudillos. The extensive system of telephonic communications
established throughout the Sierra was a sign of a much more am
project to open up the Sierra by the construction and mainten
roads and mountain tracks. Such projects sustained the flow of f
goodwill long after the pacification of the country had diminish
need for Barrios's military services. Through his contacts, B
penetrated the corridors of bureaucracy in Mexico City and conv
successive government departments that his presence in the Sier
vital to post-revolutionary reconstruction. His initiatives helped
his venerated image of the patriarch, 'a firm man who did much g
his people'.54 Freedom to develop this subsidiary aspect of his ca
demanded total political control of the Sierra. Successful road bu
projects required direct control over village manpower throu
mobilisation of communityfaenas, a prerogative hitherto jealously

54 In the many interviews conducted in the Sierra de Puebla with former al

enemies of the Barrios family, almost all expressed this as the characteristic th
accurately described Gabriel Barrios.

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z 8 Keith Brewster

by Sierra's creole elite. The battle against Tirado was concerned l

clashing political ideologies than with Barrios's right to extend his
into an area previously occupied by his opponent.
In turn, his initiatives broadened the nature of Barrios's remit as
regional military commander. Municipal authorities realised that the only
realistic prospect of attracting government funds for local public works
was by channelling their requests through Cuacuila. Those with proven
loyalty fared better than those who had previously resisted the cacique's
domination. While many mestizos may not have been totally happy with
the prospect of showing subordination to an Indian, all knew that this
particular Indian was an astute man with influential contacts.
The image of Gabriel Barrios, therefore, varied in accordance with the
perspective of those who knew him. For many gente de radon, he was a
necessary evil in their ambitions for political advancement: for many
Nahuas, he was a benevolent patriarch possessing mystical qualities. He
was both a charismatic, traditional military cacique and a modernising
bureaucrat who used his contacts to his advantage. In this respect, the
Barrios cacicazgo was not unique. In Pansters's study of Puebla politics in
the late 1930S and 1940s, he concludes by describing avilacamachismo as a
personalistic system shored up by the institutional structure.55 In San Luis
Potosi during the same period, Enrique Marquez describes the pragmatism
of Gonzalo Santos: a cacique who moved in to claim the political space
left unoccupied by others.56 A decade earlier in the Sierra de Puebla,
similar space existed between the need to respect Indian traditions while
demonstrating loyalty to the federal government. Within the broad
spectrum of post-revolutionary caudillismo there was room for oppor-
tunists, for hombres liquidos57 who possessed sufficient foresight to adapt
their style of leadership to reflect changing environments.
55 Pansters, Politics and Power in Puebla, p. I68.
56 Marquez, 'Gonzalo N. Santos', p. 391. 57 Ibid., p. 389.

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