RAFAEL GELOS -versus-COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated: May 8, 1992 G.R. No.

86186 Tenancy is
not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenantdoes upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162
SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a legalrelationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and asin this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contraryto law, are even more important.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER
RELATIONSHIP,DISTINGUISHED
1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agriculturallaborer as the lessor of
his services and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof;2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lesseeof agricultural
land;3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a salaryor wage
regardless of whether the employer makes a profit;
and4. the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.The requirements set by law for the
existence of a tenancy relationship, to
wit:1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;2. the subject is agricultural land;3. the purpose is agricultural produc
tion; and4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.In the absence of any of these
requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure
tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247)

Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC)vs Delia T.
Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton
G.R. No.162070

Facts : This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4,
2004,respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null
and void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian
reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as
theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its
coveragefarms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, the
Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition
of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
theyincluded livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents
filed withpetitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
devotedexclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate,
inspectedrespondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding.
Herecommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS
andrequested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.
Petitioner ignored such request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only
portionsof private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15,1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land
to beexcluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,
viz.
: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21
heads of cattle shall likewise be excludedfrom the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as
finaland irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their
entirelandholding is exempted from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order
partiallygranting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL.
Applying theretention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares
of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure.Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed
under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should
beexempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Said motion was denied.
Respondentsfiled a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the
reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land
and livestock indetermining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared
cattle-raising landsexcluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the
impugned order. On appealto CA, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9,
Series of 1993 as void.
Issue
:

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a
maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?

Held
:

The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulatelivestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximumretention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
ConstitutionalCommission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the
Luz Farms case that livestock, swine andpoultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall
within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine
and poultry is different from crop or treefarming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
A great portion of the investment in thisenterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such
as: animal housing structures andfacilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts andgenerators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds
and other supplies, anti-pollution equipmentlike bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevatedwater tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenance.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by
theConstitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing
theassailed A.O.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute

byCongress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of
theprevious law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an
earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No.
7881which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the
definitionof the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its
coverage landsthat are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this
significantmodification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with
the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage
of agrarianreform.

It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of
theConstitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform
toand be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order
andthe provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR
wasproperly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform
beyondthe scope intended by the 1987
Constitution.
CASTILLO v. TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009
Tolentino was the owner of two parcels of land and a caretaker of another. The said parcels
weretenanted by Castillo who promised to remit lease rentals to Tolentino. Castillo wrote the
PARO informingthe latter of his intention to construct a water reservoir. Tolentino also received
a copy of the letter andopposed the same. Despite this, Castillo proceeded with the construction
of the water dike. Tolentino fileda case for ejectment. PARAD ruled for the ejectment of
Castillo. DARAB initially affirmed the Decision butreversed itself in a Motion for
Reconsideration. CA reinstated the Decision of the PARAD since it held thatthe appeal was filed
out of time.
1. OBLIGATIONS OF A TENANT WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION OF IMPRO
VEMENTSON THE LANDHOLDING
Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to and consent of the agricultural
lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon the construction of a permanent irrigation
system.It is only when the former refuses to bear the expenses of construction that the latter may
chooseto shoulder the same. More importantly, any change in the use of tillable land in
theleasehold,
e.g.
through the construction of a sizeable water reservoir, impacts upon the agriculturallessor's share
in the harvest, which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian law.This being the
case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a purpose other thanwhat had been
agreed upon, the consent of the agricultural lessor must be obtained, lest he bedispossessed of his
leasehold. The law (Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 3844) does not give blanket authority to the agricultural
lessee toconstruct an irrigation system at anytime and for any reason; instead, it presupposes
primarily thatthe same is necessary.
2. IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF A TENANT
The fact that CASTILLO was convicted by final judgment of an offense against TOLENTINO's
son,George, demonstrates how relations between the two have deteriorated. While R.A. No.
3844authorizes termination by the agricultural lessee of the lease for a crime committed by
theagricultural lessor against the former or any member of his immediate farm household, the
sameprivilege is not granted to the agricultural lessor. Yet, this does not mean that the courts
should nottake into account the circumstance that the agricultural lessee committed a crime
against theagricultural lessor or any member of his immediate family. By committing a crime
againstTOLENTINO's son, CASTILLO violated his obligation to his lessor to act with justice,
giveeveryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, an obligation that is deemed included
in hisleasehold agreement. Provisions of existing laws form part of and are read into every
contractwithout need for the parties expressly making reference to them.
3. VIOLATION OF OBLIGATION OF A TENANT
—
GROUND FOR DISPOSSESSION
In sum, we hold that the construction of the reservoir constitutes a violation of Section 36 of
R.A.No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding for a purpose other than what had been
agreedupon, and a violation of the leasehold contract between CASTILLO and TOLENTINO,
for which theformer is hereby penalized with permanent dispossession of his leasehold.SEAHcT