CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

File No. 5

III. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial Review – the power of the courts to test the validity of

executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the
Constitution.

CASES

This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.
That means that the Court has the right to review acts of Congress
and, by extension, actions of the President. If the Court finds that
the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. Marshall argued
that the Constitution is the “supreme law” of the land and that the
Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of the
Constitution. He wrote, “it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison, 5
US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60).”


In the regular course, the regional trial courts and the Supreme
Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and
a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important
reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the
present case, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to this
doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House have been
recognized as exceptions to this rule. In this country the judicial
supremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political
questions as well (Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998).

The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003).

1. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

 Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as

the weakest of the three departments of the government, the
Judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of
either the Legislative or the Executive department or both when
not conformable to the fundamental law (Asso. Of Small Landowners of
the Philippines vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

 When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries,

it neither asserts superiority, non-nullifies an act of the legislative,
it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them (Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

  If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law
or contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purpose is null and void and without any force or effect.

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 That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual

and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an
assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but
merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution (Angara vs.
Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139).

2. POLITICAL VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Political Question - has two (2) aspects:

1. Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by

the people in their sovereign capacity, or

2. In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to

the legislature or executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco,
100 Phil 1101).

Justiciable Question – a definite and concrete dispute touching on the

legal interest which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law (Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001).

CASES

 Justice William J. Brennan reformulated the political question

doctrine, proposing a six-part test for determining which questions
were "political" in nature. Cases which are political in nature are
marked by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of this,
 Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers,
arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political
questions"

2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

for resolving it;"

3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"

4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent

resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government;"

5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

decision already made;"

6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question (Baker vs.
Carr, 396 US 186).”


The Court held that the question whether or not the Senate rule
violated the US Constitution was nonjusticiable since the
impeachment clause expressly granted that the “Senate shall have
sole Power to try any impeachment.” The clause laid out specific
regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines
were observed the court would not rule upon the validity of other
senate procedures regarding impeachment. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the “ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution,” a matter would be deemed
nonjusticiable when there was “a constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department (Nixon vs. US, 506 US 224).”

Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case
was not justiciable. Rehnquist lead a group of four (4) others who
believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the
President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs.
Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. Congress
had not formally challenged the Carter's authority, technically there
was no conflict for the Court to resolve (Goldwater vs. Carter, 444 US 996,
62 L.Ed.2d 428).


It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute —
Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The
interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that
personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said
funds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a

judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of
the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly,
the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033
to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the
validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by
the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or
law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers
 to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not
the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may
be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.

Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or

not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review,
but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that
power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether
the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not.
And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before
the submission to and ratification by the people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose

amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of such
constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If
the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA
333).


The Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held
that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
 government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync
and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987
Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of
these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this
Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." (Estrada vs.
Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001).


Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the
concept of judicial review by providing that:

SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent
COMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a political
question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As the
leading case of Tañada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are
concerned with “issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.” The issue raised in the present petition does not
merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on
its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional
provisions. In other words, that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention are questioning the legality of the respondent
COMELEC’s administrative issuance will not preclude this Court
from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing
Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not
override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent
with the law they intend to carry out. When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether
 the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable – the problem being one of legality
or validity, not its wisdom. In the present petition, the Court must
pass upon the petitioner’s contention that Resolution No. 6712 does
not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.

An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does

not have the legal power to determine the matter before it; there is
excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the
power to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined
by law. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of
the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
(Brillantes vs. Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004).

3. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
o

Laws are presumed constitutional. To nullify nullification of law, there

must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The theory
is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law
is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted.

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 The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are
presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by
this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution
states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,

letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771

has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative
powers (Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995).

4. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversy
a. ripeness
b. mootness
2. Proper party
3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible time
4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very “Lis Mota” of the Case

a. Actual Case or Controversy

Actual case or controversy – a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination.

CASES

 An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or
controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one
hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to
rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet,
GR 122241, July 30, 1996).


The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The

petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig
(except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction (Mariano vs.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is
that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the
courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:

(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;

(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal
and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;
(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable
opportunity; and
(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be
indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 3

Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoing

requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does
not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed
prematurely:

". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not

previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the
coverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Said
provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or
absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no
allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought
exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the
Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition
must fail for prematurity."

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General (Fernandez vs. Torres, 215
SCRA 489).


An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to
hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.

“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
 the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing (La Bugal B'laa, Tribal Assn. vs. DENR Secretary, GR 127882, Jan.
27, 2004).


In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this
Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set
out in the 1987 Constitution which emphasizes the judicial
department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty
and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of
the government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion
and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that
this petition should be given due course and the vital questions
raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, in
deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions,
and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
 on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its
three annexes (Tanada, et. al. vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997).

i) Ripeness

CASES

Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds
meet the threshold requirements imposed by Article III of the
Constitution? The Court held that federal courts were without
jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact
that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and
immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who
would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that
in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to
show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked
citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered
or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus
limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.

Lyons’ case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his claim.
Predictions of future behavior are beyond the court’s functions. The
rule is that, ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or
matured into a controversy worthy of adjudication. (City of Los Angeles
vs. Lyons, 449 US 934).

ii) Mootness

CASES

 A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP
1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?
Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues
that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed
 that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative.”

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006).


After being denied admission to a state-operated law school,
petitioner brought this suit on behalf of himself alone for injunctive
relief, claiming that the school's admissions policy racially
discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that because
petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he
has registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on
the merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art.
III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues,
and the case is moot.

(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of

the school's admissions practices but upon the simple fact that
petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit
him to complete the term.

(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet

evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through
the school's admissions process, and since it does not follow that the
issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because
this case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's
graduation (DeFunis vs. Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343).

b. Proper Party

Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party – one who

has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result
of the act complained of.
 i)

Conventional Standing

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
The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should
be considered part of the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of
the Constitution or, apart from that, if the court can hear cases on
"generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where none
of the complaintants have standing. The court found that as none of
the plaintiffs could demonstrate any injury actually done to them by
the defendants, the plaintiffs were third parties to the issue and had
no standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own meager
financial situations and subsequent inability to live in Penfield were
found by the Court to be the consequence of the economics and
housing market of the area rather than any wrong doing by the
defendants (Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343).

Tanada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997, supra.

ii) Representative
Standing

iii) Jus Tertii

standing

CASES


The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a
statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age
based on their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Additionally, the Supreme Court examined jus tertii (third party
rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer. The Court held that
the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were
unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were
insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute
and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court
found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had
 not been changed. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on
the doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be
economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to
males between 18 and 20. To have standing, one must show a
"nexus" of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of
the statute. In this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff
Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third
party. The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other vendors
have standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function" (Craig vs Boren, 429 US 190,
50 L.Ed.2d. 343).

iv) Transcendental importance to the

public

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
Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to
initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the
action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as
taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly
in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only
municipal contracts are involved. For as long as the ruling in
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to
follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
institute the present action (Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436).

On the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue
in their favor. A party's standing before the Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in
view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicality
because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had
declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to
entertain the same or not (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110).”

Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file
the instant petition. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some
cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have
for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial
interest in the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) as would entitle
them to bring this suit (Kilosabayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).

It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to
taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount
public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators
have indeed been allowed to sue but then only

(1) in cases involving constitutional issues and

(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these
requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of

illegal disbursement of public funds, or where a tax measure is
assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the
validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the
validity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the
constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance"
which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes
their prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the same
kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an
interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95
SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of

public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that
their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power", or that
there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per
se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.
Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief
 Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fall
under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs. Morato
(Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995).

v) Standing of
members of Congress

CASES

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess
of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue
of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides a
mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on
policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to
be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to
draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and
the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin (Philconsa vs. Enriquez, 235
SCRA 506).


PETRON questions the locus standi of petitioners to file the action
(Rollo, pp. 479-484). Petitioners however, countered that they filed
the action in their capacity as members of Congress.
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress
have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of
Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be
questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp.
353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question
violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the
domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to
institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as
taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers may
question contracts entered into by the national government or
government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in
 contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus
standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold
the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present
action (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995).

vi) Standing of Integrated Bar of the

Philippines

CASES

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing
on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court

has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,
 because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the
petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face
again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issue now, rather than later (IBP vs Zamora, GR
141284, Aug. 15, 2000).

vii) Standing of the

Government to
question its own laws

CASES

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present
case. The Court held that the People of the Philippines, represented
by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule
that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws (People vs. Vera,
65 Phil. 56).

viii) Taxpayer’s Suits

Two (2) requisites of Taxpayer’s suits:

1. Public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality, and

2. A law is violated or some irregularity is committed and that the

petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act.

CASES

In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction
of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point,
it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the

constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this
Court, in- the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the
procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have
done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20 where we had
occasion to rule:

". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the

constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President
Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure (Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10, 2000).”

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR). In other
words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest — that
he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings
does petitioner presume to make such a representation. If at all, it is
only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this
case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached
upon the legislature's powers to create a public office and to propose
amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer is
deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer's
action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14,
2000).
 c. Question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.

General Rule : must be raised in the pleadings.

Exceptions :
a. criminal cases – at any time at the discretion of
the court;
b. civil cases – at any stage of the proceedings if
necessary for the determination of the case itself;
c. every case (except where there is estoppel) – at
any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

d. Constitutional question must the very "lis

mota" of
the case

lis mota – a controversy begun.

Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a

final determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).

Therefore, the following must be avoided:

Political questions;
Advisory opinions;
Moot and academic issues;
No standing.

4. DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

CASES

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act
with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of
a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is
usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,
or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence
of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.
 It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is
charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a
law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first
carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments
and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and
only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may
the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,
that the challenged act must be struck down (Drilon vs. Lim, GR 112497,
Aug. 04, 1994).

5. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

The law is either:

1. void – if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validity

because it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces no
effect creates no office and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95
SCRA 392).

2. voidable – if on its face it enjoys the presumption of

constitutionality. The law becomes inoperative only upon the
judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces no
retroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429).

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness
and resulting unfairness must be avoided.

CASES

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared
unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total
nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, we
refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is
not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per
se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import, but invalid in its
application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise
valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to
operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates
 contractually vested rights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is
also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.
Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been
constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their
declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been
unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.
So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be
described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry,
let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a
governing statute (Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993).

6. RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY

CASES

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed
by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the
light of changed conditions (Central Bank Employee Assn, Inc. vs. BSP, GR
148208, Dec. 15, 2004).