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Beyond definition. Art as an open concept

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Dominik Jarczewski
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Dominik Jarczewski o.p.
BEYOND DEFINITION. ART AS AN OPEN CONCEPT

One of the most important subjects of 20th century aesthetics was how to formulate a
consistent theory of art, beginning from its very definition. There has been many theories,
questioning and neglecting one another. Though they evolved and were elaborated in their
following formulations, neither neo-representationalism, nor formalism, expression and
aesthetic experience theory occurred to be adequate. That provoked some philosophers,
especially those inspired by late Wittgenstein to an anty-essential theory of art as an open
concept. In this essay I shall present their views and, inspired by them, I shall propose some
modifications that could better clarify the concept of art and would miss the critic.
Morris Weitz, a representative of neo-Wittgensteinianism rejects the very problem of
defining art. The effort to formulate any consistent theory of art, i.e. to discover a set of
necessary and sufficient properties of any work of art, is hopeless since no such set does
exist1. Not only was no previous theory of art satisfactory but also no such a theory can ever
appear. The nature of impossibility of definition isn’t, hence, factual only, but primarily –
logical. How to prove a statement like that? What we have at the departure point, is the fact
that, using the term “art”, we have some concept of it. We cannot precise so forth its content.
However, since it is used in comprehensible conversations, it has some meaning, though not
defined yet. To exclude the possibility of any future definition of art, Weitz will begin by
asking what sort of concept art is. He has to show that it’s the sort that cannot be closed in any
definition. The solution is found in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
In the point 65 Wittgenstein, having formulated his theory of language-games, quotes an
objection to it: he was talking about all sorts of language-games, but he hasn’t anywhere
specified what is the common essence of a language-game2. He responds that there is nothing
common to all that can be called “language” but all these phenomena are related to one
another in many different ways. What enables us to use the same word for them are just these
various relationships. Wittgenstein gives here an example of games. There is some set of
properties which repeat in different games but there is no subset of properties that would be
necessary and sufficient. What we have is “a complicated network of similarities overlapping

1
M. Weitz, The Role of Theory in Aesthetics”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), p. 27.
2
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford 1986, p. 31.

1
and crisscrossing”3. Wittgenstein calls it “family resemblances”. We cannot give any
definition of its members but, pointing some paradigm cases, we can teach how to recognize
them.
According to Weitz that is also the nature of the concept of art 4.We cannot find any
common properties but we can show some strands of similarities. This kind of concept has
one crucial feature: it is an open concept, i.e. its conditions of application are amendable and
corrigible. Weitz explains it at the example of art’s sub-concept, a novel. Let’s imagine that
we are to decide whether N+1 is a novel. What we have is a strand of novels A, B, C, …, N.
Let’s say that N+1 has some traditionally enumerated features of a novel. It’s narrative,
fictional, contains character delineation and dialogues. However, it differs in some respects,
e.g. there’s no linear time-sequence and it’s interlaced with cuttings. So, in some respects it’s
like recognized novels and in some – not. Were these respects considered as necessary and
sufficient conditions of a novel, we couldn’t treat N+1 as a novel. But, as we’ve seen, it’s not
the case. In fact, a novel N wasn’t in some respects like A, B, C, …, N-1 as well as even B
and C in regard to A. What has to be done, is to decide to extend the concept of a novel. Of
course, that’s not the point in every situation. There are some new “typical” novels, whose
features are enclosed as a subset of a set of previous novels’ features. However, the very
important characteristic of art and its sub-concepts is the constant evolution. There are always
new conditions to arise and new art forms and movements to appear5. The question whether
N+1 is a novel (resp. a work of art) isn’t a factual problem. It’s a decision problem: whether
to enlarge our set of conditions for applying the concept6. We would neglect the very nature
of art if we ensured any set of defining properties. The decision to close the concept of art
would mean the cease of its creativity.
It is worth to evoke here an article by Paul Ziff7, dated from the year of publishing
Philosophical Investigations, which expresses similar views, though seems to be independent
from Wittgenstein’s work. Just like Wittgenstein he asks how do we teach children the

3
Ibidem, p. 32.
4
M. Weitz, op. cit., p. 31.
5
In response to M. Mandelbaum’s critic it has to be add that the evolution of art about which we’re speaking is
not a question of new means of expression but new understanding of what the functions and tasks of art are.
Were it like so, it would be possible to close the concept of art by enumerating just all the previous paradigms of
art, which would constituted a finite strand. In fact such an “alternative definition” of art was formulated by
Władysław Tatarkiewicz. However, it served only as a report on historical attempts to define art. What’s
changing is in fact the art itself. We cannot either enlist an infinite strand of properties or predict those that
haven’t appeared yet. Conf. M. Mandelbaum, “Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts”,
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 226-227; W. Tatarkiewicz, A history of six ideas,
Warszawa 1980, pp. 36-41.
6
M. Weitz, op. cit., p. 32.
7
P. Ziff, “The Task of Defining a Work of Art”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 62 (1953), pp. 58-78.

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meaning of words. He suspends for a while the problem of a definition and chooses an
indication on the examples. To explain what’s a book, you should just show one. He goes
further and adds that it won’t be probably any book but a “clear-cut case”. Then, you can
continue to show less typical ones. The problem with art is that there are probably no
unquestionable examples of works of art. However, we always start from some unspoken set
of “typical” works of art that we can a posteriori analyze to enumerate their characteristics.
This set of characteristics shouldn’t be treated as necessary and sufficient conditions of being
a piece of art. It’s rather an a posteriori clarification of what I mean by “work of art” in this
concrete case. The question whether N+1 is a work of art is, as it was with Weitz, tantamount
to comparing it with characteristic cases. Finally, the question arises whether the noted
similarities are sufficient to warrant the claim of being a work of art. Instead of talking about
sufficient properties, we are to consider sufficient degree of similarity. However, no rule
determining that degree does exist.
Ziff develops his theory by analyzing the dispute on modern art at the beginning of the
20th century8. Traditional critics considered new movements as breaking with tradition. Even
if what they had been calling “art” had been art indeed, it could have been art only in some
new, unfamiliar meaning. Ziff explains in his categories why traditional critics refuted
modern art. The degree of similarity between traditional and modern works of art was
insufficient to warrant the status of the latter. The author agrees that the modern and
traditional use of “art” are different ones. However, it doesn’t mean that one of them is more
legitimate than the other one. Each of them, as well as any conceivable concept of art, plays
its role in its proper context. The question of whether something is a work of art or not should
be then raised in regard to some context. A context that founds and legitimate a concept of art.
Decision (both on the concept of art and about a concrete candidate to the status of work of
art) cannot be either true or false. What we can and should ask is whether it’s reasonable. And
that question can be answered only within a particular context9.
I believe that what differs various concepts of art is foremost the purposes of art that is
proposed in each of them. The meaning of art is strictly correlated with the function art is to
perform. The artistic means considered as acceptable are derivates of the function. There is no
universal concept of art and, consequently, there is no universal work of art. Whether
something is or not a work of art cannot be determined without the context given. An object X
may be considered as a work of art in paradigm A and B but not in paradigm C. What must be

8
Ibidem, p. 67.
9
Ibidem, p. 71.

3
underlined here is that if A and B are different paradigms, to be a work of art in A and to be a
work of art in B means something different. The meaning of “X in A” and “X in B” are
dissimilar.
So far we’ve come to distinct, possibly independent notions of art. One may ask what is
then the base of the dispute among various paradigms, e.g. these represented by traditional
and modern critics. If the concepts were totally independent, what would make their
representatives quarrel about art? Is the matter of the dispute merely verbal? I think that the
answer given by Ziff is worth mentioning here10. We should notice that the spoken debate is a
public one, not private. Though the contents of both the concepts are different the
consequences of decision whether X is a work of art are the same. The consequences don’t
belong to the meaning of art. They are enclosed in a broader geographical and temporal
context in which debate takes place. For example, in context Φ(p1, t1) 11 it is true that if X is a
work of art, it can be exhibited in a museum, its price doesn’t tantamount only to the costs of
material and work, and is duty-free. The reason why critics are arguing is linked to the
function and status of art in society. That aspect provoked George Dickie to create his
institutional definition of art12. It omits the problem of definitive properties of art since it
concerns extrinsic features – social consequences. In the contemporary western context this
definition plays its role very well and that’s why it’s so popular among the critics. However,
that is not an universal context. If this context were different, e.g. in context Φ(p2, t2) works of
art were reduced to subjectively chosen decorative objects, there would be no point in any
such a discussion. Moreover, we can think of a context Φ(p3, t3) where “a work of art” is
reduced to “an artifact”. There would be no theory of art to dispute about. What would rest,
would be an evaluation of these artifacts from pragmatic point of view.
Preceding considerations aren’t hypothetical only. I think that the deficiency in the debate
about the nature of art is that it has focused on contemporary evolution of art and artistic
experiments so much that it has virtually overlooked the history of the concept of art. In fact,
in the 16th century, the age when the widely recognized classical masterpieces were created,
the very works were treated no more but just as “subjectively chosen decorative objects”. It’s
not an accident that painters were taking such a care in reproducing the textures of fabrics. It
were the fabrics, not paintings, that were considered as more valuable. The way to satisfy the
customers’ taste and raise the value of pictures, was to paint something that was “trendy” at

10
Ibidem, p. 72.
11
Where pi refers to place i and ti to time period i.
12
G. Dickie, “Defining Art”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 253-256.

4
the time. And let we not forget that originally and throughout the centuries “art” (greek
techne) was nothing but a craft, a capacity of performing something, according to the rules.
The architects of gothic cathedrals, the designers of stained glasses, the Romanesque sculptors
and creators of Byzantine mosaics weren’t considered as artists but craftsmen. Their works, if
evaluated, were referred to the extrinsic ideas, e.g. religious ones, on which they were
intended to point.
The concept of art is a cultural idea, determined by its geographical and historical
context. Within each context, we can distinguish some paradigms which are the bases of
giving X a status of a work of art. There is no universal concept of art. What we can do, is to
build some local theories of art. However, if they are to refer to the everyday context, none of
them would be complete. It’s impossible to compose a closed list of criteria for art, even
within one context. That shouldn’t worry us since it’s not a definition that teaches us what is
art. That directs us to Wittgenstein’s life forms. The knowledge of what is art, is not
theoretical but practical. We can transform our question from “What is art?” to: “How to use a
word «art»?”. And we learn that by practice, within our proper life form. We can enlist some
clues but we shouldn’t believe that would close the problem.
What is the role of theories then? Let’s refer once more to Morris Weitz13. According to
him, we use the concept of art both descriptively and evaluatively. The criteria of recognition
and evaluation are often mistaken. Particularly, one takes the latter for the former. In effect,
he’s not reluctant to give a status of art to what isn’t for him its successful realization.
However, passing over the fact that an evaluation like that is often very subjective, there are
bad works of art as well. The good theory should cover them. According to Weitz the role of a
theory of art is not to define it but to teach us how to perceive it. It attracts our attention on
certain aspects of a work of art. This is not the only legitimate point of view – just a
proposition how we could perceive a work of art. In that way, it prepares us to evaluation,
pointing out what should we take in consideration.
This role of a theory looks more clear when we evoke the fact that the first theory of art
(Baumgarten’s) is dated in 18th century. It corresponds with a transition from understanding a
work of art as a mere mean to focusing on art in itself. Art loses, in some way, its referential
role (at least as its dominant) and becomes interesting in itself. Every theory is made ex post.
It bases on what has already been recognized as art. However, it is inspiring as well and may
provoke some new works of art which, transgressing that definition, would lead to

13
M. Weitz, op.cit., pp. 33nn.

5
 formulating a new theory. It’s also interesting, in this context, how new works can rehabilitate
the old ones. For example, the works of El Greco weren’t widely recognized as valuable
works of art till the 20th century when a new theory, provoked by modern art, was formulated.
The paintings of El Greco had to wait four centuries for an appropriate context. It is even
more extreme when we take artifacts that were never intended as artworks by its creators (e.g.
ethnic cultic figures) but, changing their cultural context, were spontaneously treated by West
as examples of primitive art. Seeing art as ambiguous and cultural determined concept enables
us to give a broader look at what is considered as a work of art: to notice the diversity of its
dimensions and alternative roles it could play within other societies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
CARROLL N., Philosophy of Art. A contemporary introduction, London 2002.
DICKIE G., “Defining Art”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 253-256.
MANDELBAUM M., “Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts”,
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 219-228.
TATARKIEWICZ W., A history of six ideas, Warszawa 1980.
WEITZ M., “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.
15 (1956), pp. 27-35.
WITTGENSTEIN L., Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe G.E.M., Oxford 1986.
ZIFF P., “The Task of Defining a Work of Art”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 62 (1953), pp.
58-78.

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