RRARER EM TREE ET 19S 1999% — 127~159 An Annotated Translation of Madhyamakahrdayakarika/Tarkajvala V. 1-7 Paul HoorNaertT Introduction agarjuna (c. 150-250 A.D.) is generally regarded as the first Mahayana philosopher and as the founder of the Madhyamaka school, because he was the first to develop philosophical arguments to substantiate the truth of the Mahayana teaching on the absence of inherent existence (nihsvabhavata) or the emptiness (siinyata) of all things as taught in the Prajfaparamita sutras and other early Mahayana sutras. It is however important to keep in mind that Nagarjuna only stated the fundamental principles of Madhyamaka thought without elaborating a systematic doctrine. In particular, the doctrine of the two truths, namely the conventional truth (samwrtisatya) and the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), is one of the important Madhyamaka tenets which Nagarjuna has not discussed systematically. Nagarjuna briefly refers to the two truths (Milamadhyamakakarika, XXIV.8-10), but he does not define them. And although the distinction between the two truths is always present at the background of his arguments, it is not explicated and therefore remains vague and liable to ‘nihilistic’ misinterpretations. The same should be said about the two main post-Nagarjuna Madhyamikas, Aryadeva (3rd ct.) and Buddhapalita (c. 5th-6th ct.), because neither of them has formulated a systematic Madhyamaka doctrine. Bhavaviveka (6th ct.) was the first to elaborate Madhyamaka thought into a system- atic soteriology. He did so by formulating a systematic two-truths doctrine as the cornerstone of his Madhyamaka thought. The transmitted texts give us indications as to why Bhavaviveka committed himself to the task of systemat tion. There is indeed textual evidence that the lack of an elaborated Madhyamaka doctrine, and especially the ambiguity of the two-truths tenet, had resulted in nihilistic interpreta: tions of Madhyamaka thought and had thus discredited Madhyamaka thought to the extent that it had become the target of criticism by the Yogacara. It was no doubt in order to silence this criticism that Bhavaviveka took it upon himself to systematize the =127-Madhyamaka teachings, Bhavaviveka not only systematized Madhyamaka thought, but he also used this newly developed thought as the basis of an incessant and detailed refutation of other systems of thought, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, His main target was the Yogacara school which he criticizes in each of his works. The Yogacarins had succeeded in integrating the major tenets of Abhidharmic scholasticism, their own interpretation of ‘emptiness in terms of the ‘three natures’ tenet, and the original Youacara tenets of ‘eight kinds of consciousness’ and ‘mind only’ into a coherent Mahayana soteriology. As a result, the Yogacara school had established itself as the main representative of Mahayana Buddhism in Bhavaviveka’s day. Rivalry, envy, an attempt to counter the dominancy of the Yogacara school and the urge to vindicate Madhyamaka thought against the critique by the Yogacai 1s were no doubt important factors that fueled Bhavaviveka’s aversion for the Yogacara school, The main reason for his sustained critique must however have been his sincere conviction, as a Mahayana Buddhist and teacher, that the Yogéicara doctrine was based on a mistaken interpretation of Reality ({attvam), of the knowledge of Reality (talteajtana), and of the path (marga) leading to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood. In short, Bhavaviveka must have been convinced that the Yogacara soteriology did not teach the true way to Buddhahood. Bhavaviveka’s most extensive critique of the Yogacara is found in the Fifth Chapter of his Verses on the Essence of the Middle Way (Madhyamakatqdayakarika, abbreviated as MHK hereafter) with the commentary called The Flame of Reason (Tarkajvata, abbreviated as TJ hereafter). The central chapter of MHK/T) is the third chapter in which Bhavaviveka sets forth his own view of Reality in terms of his two-truths doctrine and explains the Madhyamaka path of reasoning (vicara) that needs to be followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality. Based on his own view of Reality, Bhavaviveka in the subsequent chapters discusses and refutes the views of the Sravakayana (Chapter 4), the Yogacara (Chapter 5), the Samkhya (Chapter 6), the Va isa (Chapter 9) There present the edited Tibetan text and an annotated English translation of vers esika (Chapter 7), the Vedanta (Chapter 8) and the Mimary 1-7 of Chapter Five of MHK/TJ. These verses constitute the parvapaksa or the introductory part in which Bhavaviveka briefly presents the basic Yogacara tenets. ‘The remainder of Chapter Five (verses 8-114) consists of a detailed refutation of these tenets.Up to date, only one comprehensive study of the entire Fifth Chapter of MHK/TJ has been made, namely Bukkvo ni okerw 1 to mu to no taivon by Susumu Yamaguchi, This excellent study (considering that it was made more than fifty years ago!) contains a Japanese translation of all the verses of Chapter Five and of large portions of the commentary, accompanied by explanatory comment and references to the relevant Madhyamaka and Yogacara literature. Yamaguchi’s work remains an indis- pensable instrument for the study of Chapter Five of MHK/TJ and of the Madhyamaka-versus-Yogacara dispute in general. I have therefore made extensive use of this work in my notes to the translation. In addition, I have made special efforts to explain the background and to identify the exact text sources of the Yogacara tenets as they are presented and criticized by Bhavaviveka. The following brief outline of the content of the pitrvapaksa shows that Bhavaviveka’s presentation of the Yogacara tenets is focused on the following three interrelated themes, which are also the central themes in Bhavaviveka’s own thought : (1) What Reality (Jattvam)?, (2) What is the knowledge of Reality (tattuajtana)? (3) Which path (marga) should be followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality and thus achieve Buddhahood? Bhavavi then be summarized as follows eka’s main contention throughout Chapter Five can he Yogacara understanding of Reality is wrong. Hence, the Yogacara understanding of the knowledge of Reality is also wrong. Hence, the Yogacara path is not a true means to attain the knowledge of Reality (or Buddhahood). In sum, the Yo: ‘a soteriology is not Mahayana Buddhism.” Synopsis of the Yogacara Doctrine (MHK/TJ Chapter Five, vv. 1-7): ‘The basic assertion of the Yogacara : “Our doctrine is the only true means to lead people to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood.” (v. 1) 1, Definition and synonyms of Reality (vv. 2-3) 2. The path leading to the knowledge of Reality (vv. 4-5) 2.1 The path leading to the non-apprehension of imagined entities (v. 4) 2.2 From the non-apprehension of imagined entities to the knowledge of Reality (v. 5) 3. The Yogacara doctrine agrees with reason (yukti) and scripture (agama) (vv. 6-7) 3.1 Rational arguments for the existence of the dependent nature (v. 6) 3.2 Only the Yogacara doctrine is in accordance with the teachings of the Pra: Japaramita sutras, (v. 7) = 129—List of abbreviations used in the footnotes to the translation AK L’Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, traduit en annoté par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris-Louvain, 1923-1931. BBh Bodhisattvabhiimi (U. Wogihara ed., Tokyo 1936, repr. 1971). DDVV Dharmadharmatavibhangavrtti (J. Nozawa ed., Studies in Indology and Bud- dhology, Kyoto 1955, pp. 9-49.) Eckel M. David Eckel, “Bhavaviveka's Critique of Yogacara Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the Prajaapradipa,” in Chr. Lindtner ed., Indiske Studier V, Miscellanea Buddhica, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 25-75. MHK = Madhyamakahrdayakarika (Y. Ejima ed.) MS, Lamotte Mahayanasemgraha, E. Lamotte ed. and trsl., La Somme du Grand Vehicule d’Asaiga, Louvain 1938. MSA Mahayanasitralamkara, S. Lévi ed., Paris 1907. MVBh = Madhyantavibhagabhasya, G. M. Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964 MVK Madhyantavibhagakarika, G. M. Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964 MVT Madhyantavibhagatika, S. Yamaguchi ed., Nagoya 1934. PP Prajnapradipamalamadhyamakavrtti, Tib. D. Nr. 3853, Tsha 45b4-259b3 (DBU MA 2); P. Nr. 5253, Tsha 53b3-326a6 (vol. 95, pp. 153-262). Schmithausen Lambert Schmithausen, Alavavijnana, On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1987 Siddhi Vijnaptimatratasiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et Annotée par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris 1928. SNS, Lamotte Samndhinirmocanasatra, E. Lamotte ed., Louvain 1935 T. Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe ed., Tokyo 1924-1936. TI Tarkajvala, Tib. D. Nr. 3856, Dsa 40b7-329b4 (DBU MA 3); P. Nr. 5256, Dsa 43b7-380a7 (vol. 96, pp. 19-154), ‘TrK Trimsikavijnaptikarika, S. Lévi ed., Paris 1925. ‘TrBh Trimsikabhasya, S. Lévi ed., Paris 1926. Yamaguchi Susumu Yamaguchi, Bukkyo ni okerw u to mu to no tairon, Tokyo 1941, rev. ed. 1964. YBh Yogacarabhami, T. D. Nrs, 4035-4042, Tshi bl - Hi 68b7 (GEMS TSAM 5-10); P. Nrs, 5536-5543, Dsi la - Yi 70bl (vols. 109-111). ~ 1301, Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V. 1-7 (Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 19926-202b4; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 199a6- 202b4; Peking (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 218b8-223a2] de nas da ni rnal 'byor spyod pa’i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la ‘jug pas le'u Inga pa brtsam par bya ste/ rang gi lugs kyi nga rgyal gyis// mkhas par rlom gzhan ‘di skad smra// de nyid bdud rtsir ‘jug pa yang// ral ‘byor spyod pas legs bstan zer'// (1) {anye pracaksate dhirah svanitav abhimaninah/ tattvamrtavataro 'pi yogacaraib sudesital//(1)) theg pa chen po* nyid kyi slob dpon thogs* med dang/ dbyig' gnyen la sogs pa gzhan dag ni de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan cing/ sa rab tu brnyes pa’i ‘phags pa klu sgrub kyis yang dag par rtogs pa'i theg pa chen po'i don gyi lugs gzhan du ‘dren par byed cing ngo tsha dang khrel med pa don rnam par mi shes pa de bzhin du rnam par* shes shing mkhas par nga rgyal byed pa dag ‘di skad smra ste/ de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsir ‘jug pa ste/ rab tu ‘jug pa de ni bdag cag kho nas legs par bstan pa yin gyi/ dbu mar smra ba pa mams kyis ni ma yin zhes zer ro// dei mtshan nyid ni ‘di yin te/ dngos po gnyis po med pa’i phyir// gnyis dngos med pa’i yod pa ni// yod la sogs pa’i® blo vi yul// dam pa'i don du ‘dod do lo// (2) [dvayabhavasya sadbhavad abhavad va dvayasya ca/ * Based on the Tibetan version of MHK (verses only) which accords with the Sanskrit (ngacavail, ‘The MHK/T] version reads: ral "byor spyod par legs par bstan, * P: theg pa chen po pa * P: thog * P: abyigs °C.D,P: pa "Pipa ~131—uddhivigayah paramartho matab kila//(2)] [D. 199b2, C. 1992, P. 219: gnyis ni gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba dang/ mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa ‘dzin pa'o// de gnyis kyi med pa’ ngo bo nyid med pa’o// med pai dagos po de’i ngo bo nyid du rtag tu yod pa nyid kyi phyir dang/ gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa zhes bya ba gnyis su ni med pa nyid kyi phyir na/ ji Itar gnyis kyi dngos por med pa’i ngo bo yin pa de’i phyir ni yod pa’i blo yul yin la/ gang gi phyir enyis kyi ngo bor med pa yin pa de’i phyir na’ med pa'i blo'i yul yin te/ mam pa de Ita bu'i don dam pa ni bdag cag rnal ‘byor spyod pa pa rams ‘dod do zhes bya ba ni de’i bsam pa bstan pa yin no// lo zhes bya ba'i sgra ni bstan beos byed pa bdag nyid kyis mi 'dod pa bstan pa yin te/ de Ita bu’i don dam pa ni phyis "byung ba’i dpyad pa dag gis bsgrub par dka’ ba yin pa’i phyir ro// de dag gi don dam pa de’i grangs kyi tshig ni ‘di yin te/ ‘med pa'i dngos po bdag med pa// de bzhin nyid dang chos gnas dang// ram par mi rtog blo’i gzung ste’// de shes par ni bya ba yang// (3) [abhavabhavo nairatmyam tathata ca tathasthitih/ nirvikalpamatigrahyam tasyaivadhigamah punab//(3)] [D. 199b6, C. 199b5, P. 219b2) zhes bya ba la med pa’i dngos po zhes bya ba ni gaung ba dang ‘dzin par btags pa gnyis med pa nyid’ kyi dngos po'o// bdag med pa zhes bya ba ni chos dang gang zag bdag med pa nyid do// de bzhin nyid ces bya ba ni phyin ci ma log pa nyid do// chos gas zhes bya ba ni rtag par de Ita bu’i tshul nyid du gnas pa nyid dot// rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo'i gzung ba ste/ zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa ni rnam par rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba’i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo gros kyi gzung ba yin te/ de nyid don dam pa’o// de shes par ni? bya ba yang zhes bya ba ni/ dmigs pa la ni brten byas nas// 'P: gang gi phyir dngos por med pa yin pa de'i phyir ni 2 Based on the Tibetan version of MHK The MHK/TY version has ‘de’ + P+ "med pa nyid’ omitted “P+ ‘chos gas zhes . gnas pa nyid do! omitted oP mi 132mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye// mi dmigs pa la brten byas nas// mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye// (4) (upalabdhim samasritya nopalabdhih prajayate/ nopalabdhim samasritya nopalabdhih prajayate//(4)] {D. 20021, C. 200a1, P. 219b5] zhes bya ba ste/ ‘di la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba de ni thog ma med pa’i dus nas zhugs pa/ thog ma med pa'i dus kyi spros pa’ bag chags kyi gzhir gyur pa/ dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa yongs su dzin pa/ rgyun ma chad pa dang! rdzas dpag tu med pa/ rigs du ma dang Ihan cig skye zhing 'gag pa dang Idan pa/ nus pa'i bye brag mthar thug pa med pa thob pa/ sngon po la sogs pa'i yul dpag tu med pa snang ba’i cha dang ‘brel ba'i rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug bskyed nus pa’i mthu dang Idan pa/ nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyis* skye ba dang ‘jig pa dang bral ba'i gnas pa’i* rnam pas bdag tu yongs su btags pa/_bsod nams dang/ bsod nams ma yin pa dang/ mi gyo ba’i sa bon yod pa’i phyir/ khams dang ‘gro ba dang/ skye gnas thams cad kyi sa bon dang Idan pa/ nam par smin pa dang/ ngar sems pa dang/ rnam par rig pa gsum yongs su 'gyur ba’i rjes su ‘gro ba de a dngos po skye ba dang Idan pa rams "bras bu'i dngos por kun du sbyor bar byed pa ste/ len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin te/ reg pa dang/ yid la byed pa dang/ tshor ba dang/ sems pa dang/ ‘du shes btang snyoms kyi ram pa dang Idan pa ‘di'i zhe’am/ ‘di na‘o zhes ‘jig rten pa’i mkhas pa rnams kyi yul yang ma yin pas rnam pa yang dag par mi rig pa’o// (D. 200a6, C. 200a5, P. 220a3] de yang rnam pa gnyis te/ ‘phen pa dang ’bras bur gyur pa’o// de la ‘phen pa ni rnam par shes pa’i dbang gis‘ ‘phen pa’o// bras bur gyur pa ni rnam par smin pa’i ‘bras bur mngon par grub pa ste/ dper na chu'i yan lag gzhan dang gzhan gyi rgyun las chu bo'i klung "bab pa de bzhin du bsod nams dang/ bsod nams ma yin pa dang/ mi gyo ba'i bag chags kyis bsgos* pa’i kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i rgyun kyang ‘khor ba ji srid pa'i bar du ‘jug par 'gyur ro// de la gnas pa’i las kyi bag chags dang/_gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa’i bag chags dang/ Ihan gcig tu’ tha dang mii S D: ‘dang’ omitted yi "gnas pa'i’ omitted ast ai bgos D, P: tha dang geig tu 133 —lus la sogs pa’i rnam par smin pa’ ci rigs pa dag skyed par byed pa’o// len pa’i mam par shes pa'i rgyun de yang dgra bom pa nyid thob pa na nyon mongs p: ‘a bon thams cad spangs pas Idog par ‘gyur te/ de Itar de ni re zhig nam par smin pa zhes bya ba dang/ de'i yongs? su ‘gyur ba ste gcig g0// [D. 20062, C. 200b1, P. 220b1] gzhan yang sems can rams de la bdag tu sbyor bar byed pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ste/ bdag dang bdag gi zhes bya bar dmigs pa’i phyir ro// rtag tu bdag tu rmongs pa dang/ bdag tu Ita ba dang/ bdag tu nga rgyal ba dang/ bdag la chags pa zhes bya ba nyon mongs pa bzhi po dag dang/ rang gi sa nas skyes pa’i reg pa dang yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag dang Idan pa yin no// nyon mongs pa can gyi yid de de yang dgra® bom pa la med de/_nyon mongs pa thams cad spangs pa’i phyir ro// de Itar de ni ngar sems dang zhes bya ba dang/ de’i* yongs su ‘gyur ba ste/ gnyis pa’o// [D. 200b4, C. 20003, P. 220b4] gzhan yang de ni ‘jug pa'i ram par shes pa thams cad kyi nus pa ‘dun pa dang mos pa la sogs pa sems las byung ba thams cad dang beas pa kun gzhi yin pas kun gzhi nam par shes pa zhes bya ste/ rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin no// de las mig dang/ gzugs dang/ snang ba dang/ nam mkha’ dang/_yid la byed pa la sogs pa’i rkyen ji Itar nye bar gyur pa na/ ‘jug pa'i ram par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag “byung ste/ dper na rgya mtsho las chu’i rlabs dag rlung dang chu srin gyis bskyod pa la sogs pa’i rkyen gyis ‘byung ba bzhin no// kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de yang ‘jug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag dang gcig pa nyid kyang ma yin la/ tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin te/ rgya mtsho dang chu rlabs bzhin no// yul la nye bar dmigs pa de dag kyang ‘du shes med pa dang/ ‘du shes med pa pa dang/ ‘gog pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa dang/ gnyid log pa dang/ myos pa dang/ brgyal ba dag gi gnas skabs na ni med do// de Itar de ni rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba dang/ de’i yongs su ‘gyur ba ste/ gsum pa’o// {D. 201a1, C. 20067, P, 221a1] sems de nyid rnal 'byor pa de la rab tu snang ba ‘dzin pa'i rnam pa dang/ yul du snang ba gzung ba'i rnam par yongs su gyur cing snang ba ste/ phyi rol gyi don med pas* sems tsam du dmigs pa la brten nas* yul mi dmigs pa rab tu skye la/ gzung ba med na de’ ‘dzin pa dag kyang med pas gzung ba mi dmigs "C, Dz mam par shes pa °C, D, P: phyogs *D: dag. * CDP. de °C,D: pa "C.D: dmigs pa pa 7 Ps ‘de’ omitted — 134pa la brten nas/ ‘dzin pa’i rnam par shes pa rnam pa drug po dag mi dmigs pa rab tu skye te/ ji srid du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rang gi sems kyi chos nyid rnam par rig. pa zhes bya ba nyid la mi gnas shing dmigs pa la gnas pa de srid du gzung ba'i sa bon mi Idog cing/ mtshan mar Ita ba’i sa bon ma spangs pa’i phyir gnyis kyi bag chags mi spong ngo// gang gi tshe geugs la sogs pa dmigs pa dag sems las phyi rol du mi dmigs a deii tshe na/ rang gi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa yin te/ gnas gyur pas sgrib pa thams cad bsal ba’i phyir dang/ chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nyid kyis' mam par mi rtog pa’i chos nyid thob bo// [D. 201a4, C. 201a4, P, 221a5] rnam par rig pa tsam nyid ces bya ba de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes don thams cad la rnam par mi rtog pa de ni ngo bo nyid gsum yongs su mi shes na mi rtogs pas* de'i phyi brtags pa nye bar mi dmigs shing// gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pas// de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa’i// ngo bo nyid la Ita ba yin// (6) (kalpitanupalabdhis ca paratantrasya cagrahab/ svabhavam parinispannam ikgante tattvadarsinah//(5)] [D. 20126, C. 201a6, P. 221a7] zhes bya ba smras te/ ‘di la kun brtags? pa dang/ gzhan gyi dbang dang/ yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gsum po dag ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid kyi khongs su ‘dus te/ de Ja nang dang" phyi rol gyi dbye bas tha dad pa'i rnam par rtog pa gang dang gang gis gzugs dang byang chub kyi bar gyi dngos po gang dang gang rnam par brtag par bya ba de ni de bzhin du yod pa ma yin te/ yod pa ma yin par sgro ‘dogs pas brtags pa yin pa’i phyir te/ de ni kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid do// khams gsum nas skyes nas* sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa dge ba la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa ni gzhan gyis bskyed cing dbang bya ba yin pa’i phyir gzhan gyi dbang ngo// yang na gzhan skyes pa la dbang byed pas gzhan gyi dbang ste/ kun brtags pa dang/ yongs su grub pa gnyis de'i gzhi las kun brtags pa dang/ yongs su grub par ‘gyur ba'i phyir te/ de ni gzhan gyi dbang P: ‘dang’ omitted P: ‘nas’ omittedgi ngo bo nyid do// gzhan gyi dbang de nyid gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa’i ngo bo nyid du kun brtags pa dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid do// de yang gzhan gi dbang dang! geig pa nyid kyang ma yin la tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin te/ gal te tha dad par gyur na ni chos nyid tha dad par ‘gyur ro// ci ste gcig pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pas rnam par byang ba'i rgyur mi ‘gyur ro// [D. 201b3, C. 201b3, P. 221b5] gal te ngo bo nyid gsum po dag yod na ji tar dngos po thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhe na/ kun brtags pa ni rang gi mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas nye bar mi dmigs shing gzhan gyi dang yang de la rang gi bdag nyid kyis skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas gzung du med do// yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni kun brtags pa’i chos rnams kyi don dam pa yang yin la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin te/ ’phags pai ye shes dam pa’i spyod yul gyi don yin pas don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa yin te/ de nyid mthong ba don dam par shes pa dag yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de la dmigs par bya ba dang/ dmigs pa'i dngos po mnyam pa nyid kyis® Ita ba yin te/ ‘jig rten las ‘das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skyes pa’i phyir ro zhes bya bar sbyar ro// gnas gyur pa'i mtshan nyid de yang nyan thos rnams kyi ni rnam par grol ba’i lus yin te/ zag pa thams cad dang bral zhing nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir ro// de nyid de bzhin gshegs pa’i ni chos kyi sku yin te/ las dang gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa'i bag chags thams cad dang bral zhing shes bya’i serib pa spangs pa'i phyir ro// [D. 2017, C. 201b7, P. 222a2 gal te kha cig ‘di skad ces kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid ni ‘jig rten dang thun mong pa’i shes pa’ yul yin Ja yongs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid ni so so rang rig pa ste/ thub pa ‘jig rten las ‘das pa'i ye shes kyi yul yin na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de shes pa gang gi yul yin zhing de’ yod par ji Itar shes zhes zer na dei phyir/ btags pa rgyu mtshan beas phyir dang// gzhan du gnyis po med phyir dang// kun nas nyon mongs dmigs pa’i phyir// gzhan dbang yod pa nyid du ‘dod// (6) P: ‘dang’ omitted 2B kyl +B: ‘de omitted — 136 —[prajtapteh sanimittatvad anyatha dvayanasatah/ samkleSasyopalabdhes ca paratantrastita mata//(6) } ces bya ba smras te/ ‘di Itar sems dang sems las byung ba dag yod pa nyid du btags pa gang yin pa de ni phyin ci log gi rgyu mtshan dang beas pa snang ba’i phyir te/ mtshan nyid des gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du rjes su dpag go// gzhan du gal te gzhan gyi dbang med par gyur na btags pa dang rgyu mtshan nam kun brtags dang yongs su grub pa gnyis po med par thal bar ‘gyur ba’i phyir te/ de gnyis ni gzhan gyi dbang la rag lus pa’i phyir ro//_gzhan yang gal te gehan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid med par gyur na kun nas nyon mongs pa dmigs par mi ‘gyur ba zhig na de dmigs pa’i phyir te/ kun nas nyon mongs pa ni sems dang sems las byung ba dag la brten pa yin la/ de dang bral ba nyid ni thar pa yin pa’i phyir ro// de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du ‘dod do// (D. 20285, C. 20225, P, 222a8] de yang ‘jig rten las ‘das pa'i shes pa ram par mi rtog pa’i yul yin pas yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid mngon sum du byas nas mthong ste/ gzhan gyi dbang ni de’i rjes la thob pa dag pa ‘jig rten pa’i ye shes kyis rtogs par bya ba yin pa’i phyir ro// shes rab pha rol phyin tshul ‘di// thams cad mkhyen nyid thob pa yin// skye dang ‘gag la sogs pa dag'// dgag pa thur len ma yin no// (7) [prajaparamitanitir iyam sarvajfiataptaye/ na tiitpadanirodhadipratisedhaparo nayah//(7)) zhes bya ba ni chos ‘di dag nyid kyis chos ams mngon par rlan par byed/ yongs su rdzogs par byed/ yongs su gsal bar byed/ yongs su dpyod par byed kyang* 'di la bdag gam bdag gir bya ba med do zhes gsungs pa des ni bdag dang bdag gi nam par ‘dzin pa dang/ de la mngon par zhen pa med pa'i sgo nas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i yongs su ‘gyur ba bstan to// sems de ni sems ma yin no zhes gsungs pa des ni gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa med par bstan to// sems med pa nyid gang yin pa de ni bsam gyis mi khyab © C,D: dang *P: kyis - 137 -bo zhes gsungs pa des ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid bstan to// de bzhin du gugs ni mtshan ma’o// byang chub kyi bar du yang mtshan ma’o zhes gsungs pa des ni ming dang brdar btags pas kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan to// skur pa gdab pa dang/ nye bar blang ba dang/ gdags pa'i chos dang/ byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos bstan pas ni gzhan gyi dbang bstan to// de bzhin nyid dang/ yang dag pa'i mtha’ dang/ dben pa dang/ ‘bras bu dang/ rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid la sogs pa brjod pas mgs su grub pa’i ngo bo nyid bstan to// de Itar kho bo cag gis’ bstan pa'i shes rab yi pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul ‘di ni thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob pa’i thabs yin gyi dbu ma smra ba rams kyi skye ba dang ‘gag pa la sogs pa dag dgag pa Ihur len pa ni med pa nyid du Ita ba dang mthun pa nyid du 'gyur bas thams cad mkhyen pa nyid ‘thob pa'i thabs ma yin no zhes zer te/ de ni rnal 'byor spyod pa pa dag gis sbyar ba’ phyogs snga ma yin no// [D. 202b4, C. 202b4, P. 223a2] Prai 138 —2. Translation Let us now begin the Fifth Chapter in which the Yogacara [doctrine of] Reality (tattvam) will be closely examined in order to ascertain its truth or falsity." Others, proud of their own doctrine and boasting of their erudition, say : “The entrance into the nectar of Reality is surely explained well by the Yogacarins [only].” (1) Others, such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, and so forth’, who are teachers of the same Great Vehicle, erroneously (azyatha) interpret the meaning of the Great Vehicle, which was correctly understood by the noble Nagarjuna whose future enlightenment was predict- ed (vyakyta) by the Tathagata and who entered the [first] bodhisattva-stage* They know neither shame nor embarrassment.‘ Although they do not know the [true] meaning [of the Great Vehicle], they nevertheless boast that they are experts who "The Sanskrit title of Chapter 5 (YogdcaratatioaviniScayavatara) means “Entrance into (avatava) an ascertained and hence conclusive judgment (viniSeaya) (on the truth or falsity) of the Yogacara doctrine of) Reality.” “attoam’, here translated as ‘Reality’, literally means "being just that? (de kho na nyid). Sthiramati explains the etymology of this term as follows: ”[The abstract term] fattuam is construed as follows. Since this is just that, it is ‘that’ (fat). The being (biava) of "Gust) that’ is being just that’ (tattoam).” (MVT 7.89: fatteam iti tad evedam tat, tasya bhacas tattvam ity arthal; de ko na 2hes bya ba ni ‘ai nyid de yin pas de'o/ de't dngos po ni de kho na ste ...). See also Candrakirti’s explanation of "Yattoam’ in Yuktisasitaoytti (CA. Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktiastikanyti, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. 25, Bruxelles 1991, pp. 237-238) Reality. or the true nature of things, is misunderstood when one apprehends the unreal as real and asserts that things are ‘more than just that’ or more than what they really are (= saméropa), or when one apprehends the real as unreal and asserts that things are ‘less than just that’ (= apavida), * Yamaguchi (pp. 86-88) remarks that Bhavaviveka here does not mention Maitreya among the Yogacara teachers, although he quotes from MVK further in the text (for example, MVK L6 is quoted as MHK V.4). This indicates that Bhavaviveka, unlike the later Tibetan tradition, did not recognize Maitreya as the historical Yogacara author of MVK, etc. It also indicates that Bhavaviveka, unlike his contemporary Sthiramati (cf. MV, 23.9), did not regard MVK as a work of which Maitreya was the heavenly promulgator (pranetr) or creator (hart) and Asanga the human transmitter (vakfy). It must have been unacceptable to Bhavaviveka that Maitreya, a tenth-stage bodhisattva and future buddha, would have been the creator, or even the inspirator, of ‘Yogacara treatises which Bhavaviveka vehemently rejected as heterodox. » According to the Lankavaterasatra (v. 165-166), Nagarjuna entered the first bodhisattva-stage called “the stage of joy’ (muditabharmi) * Shame (Iv) and embarrassment (apatrapya) are two good mental factors (kuSalacaitta) that keep a Person from evil actions either out of self-respect or because of fear of being blamed by others. ‘They are therefore necessary accompaniments of all good states of mind (cf. AK Il. 25). Their counteragents, non-shame and non-embarrassment, are secondary defilements (wpaklesa) which accompany all bad states of mind (cf. AK IL 26cd, Il. 32ab). Bhavaviveka thus passes a severe judgment upon the Yogacarins: they lack the restraints of shame and embarrassment and are therefore unable to control their impulses to do evil, —139—know [its true meaning] and say: “The full entrance into the nectar of Reality is correctly taught by us alone, not by the Madhyamikas.” The definition of Reality [as understood by them] is as follows Because [for them, Reality is] the nonexistence of the two and is also the existence of the nonexistence of the two', they think that the Ultimate? is the object of a mind [that perceives] existence, and so forth. (2) "The two’ refers to the objects apprehended by consciousness (graliya), such as visible form (rmpa) and so forth, and to the apprehending consciousnesses (grihaka), such as visual perception and so forth. 'Nonexistence’ is the inherent nonexistence of these two.’ [Reality is) the permanent existence consisting in the inherent existence of this nonexis tence (abhavabhavasvabhava), and [Reality is also] the nonexistence of the duality of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses. Therefore, inas much as [Reality] is the inherent existence of the nonexistence of the two (dvavabhava- bhavasvabhiva), [Reality] is the object of a mind [that perceives] existence. And because [Reality] is [also] the inherent nonexistence of the two, it is [also] the object of a mind [that perceives] nonexistence. The purport [of the verse] is: “We Yogacar ins assert that the Ultimate is like that.” The word “lo” (Kila) [in the verse] indicates that I [Bhavaviveka], the author of this treatise, do not assert this. The Ultimate as understood in that way is indeed difficult to be established, as will be shown by means of the reasonings that will be adduced later. ‘The synonyms of the Ultimate, as understood by them, are the following : “Existence of nonexistence’, ‘absence of self-existence’, ‘[always] being thus’, ‘remaining as it is", and ‘what is apprehended by the [transworldly] Based on the definition of “emptiness in MVK I 1Sabe (cf Yamaguchi, p. 81): “Emptiness is indeed defined as the nonexistence of the two and as the existence of this nonexistence. It is neither [simply] existence nor [simply] nonexistence” (deavabhavo hy abhavaswa btoah simvasia laksa. nam) na bhavo naps abhaval) ‘paramartha’ or Tabject of the highest knowledge’. Here used as a synonym of ‘Reality’ (atfvm Literally : "Nonexstence is that these two have the nature of nonexistence Nonexistence by nature is absolute, inherent nonexistence (afyentabhava) or nonexistence through ‘out the three periods of time. It is to be distinguished from relative nonexistence, which is either nonexistence prior to existence (= the nonexistence of future things) or nonexistence after having existed (= the nonexistence of past things) (See MVT, 47. 13-20.) According to the Yogacara theory of the three natures, the imagined nature is absolutely or inherently nonexistent and therefore lacks all individuating properties (laksayanihseabhava) , the dependent nature exists, with its individuat ing properties, in the present only, and the perfectly established nature exists permanently (See verse 5 below.) version). The Tibetan version reads dliarmasthiti —140—nonconceptual awareness’! Further, as for the realization of that same [Reality]*, (3) “Existence of nonexistence’ (ablidvabhdva) is the existence of the nonexistence of the two which are conventionally designated as ‘apprehended object’ and ‘apprehending. consciousness’, "Absence of self-existence’ (naizdbmyam) is the absence of self- established existence in things and persons. '[Always] being thus’ (tathata) is irrever- sibility (aviparttata)’, "Remaining as it is! means ‘permanently existing in that way’. "What is apprehended by nonconceptual awareness’ means that the nonexistence of the two is the object apprehended by the [transworldly] nonconceptual awareness, because is inaccessible to conceptual cognitions (wikalpa). As such it is [also] the object of the highest awareness (paramadrtha). ‘That [Reality] is also to be realized, as follows: The non-apprehension [of objects) arises as a result of perceiving [everything as phenomena appearing only in the mind]. And the non-apprehension [of the mind as an apprehender of objects] arises as a result of the non-apprehension [of "To be compared with MVK 114-15 (cf. Yamaguchi, p. 81) where the following synonyms of ‘Emptiness’ (= Reality) are listed and explained : tathata (always being thus) , bhivtakoti (that which is fully real and can therefore never be the cause of erroneous knowledge or vipenydsa) ; animittam (without apprehendable properties) , paramarthata (object of the ultimate awareness of the aryas) dharmadhatw (that which, when realized, functions as the base or cause (dhatu = hetu) of all the supreme qualities of the aryas] ‘The term nirvikalpamatigraiyam suggests that the Youcara conceives Reality as a hyposthatized entity with apprehendable properties (nimittam). It then follows that the awareness of Reality lattoajnana), although nonconceptual, will still be an apprehending (grahaka) or objectifying (upalambha) cognition of Reality and will in that sense not differ at all from any ordinary perceptual cognition. This Yogacara understanding of Reality and of the awareness of Reality is the ultimate target of Bhavaviveka’s criticism throughout Chapter 5 of MHK/TI. * An alternative interpretation would be that the last member of this verse mentions another synonym of the Ultimate according to the Yogacara. The meaning would then be that the realiza- tion of Reality is nondistinguishable from Reality itself and is in that sense also the Ultimate (paramartha). [here follow the commentary in TJ where the last member of verse 3 is interpreted as an introduction to verse 4 which explains the basic steps to be followed in order to realize Reality ‘athata’ is usually glossed as 'unchangeability” (ananyatha, ‘never being otherwise’) or ‘always being thus’ (TrK 25¢: sarvakalam tathabhava), Because Reality is unchangeable, it is also irreversible (aviparsta) in that it always manifests itself exactly the way it is, and never as other than what it is, Only changeable things are apt to manifest themselves in different ways at different times, Reality is therefore by definition nondeceptive (avitatha, amrsa): itis never the cause of misappre- hensions (viparsasa) that would mistake it as something else than what it is. Also, whether it is realized or not, Reality (the mind’s being empty of the apprehended-apprehending duality) always remains the same Reality, be it at the level of the unlearned (prthagiana), the learners (Saiks2) or the fully learned (asaitsa) (cf. TrBh 41.29 ad TrK 25¢). Reality is therefore ‘absolute’ in the sense that it is absolved from and unaffected by its being realized or not being realized, 11 —‘objects).' (4) In this world (iha), the so-called 'store-consciousness’ (dlayavijtana) has been active from time immemorial’ This consciousness is the receptacle-support (gzhif) of the residual impressions (vdsand) of the conceptual and verbal differentiations (prapaitca) [that people have been making] from time immemorial? Both its object (alambana) Quotation of MVK 16 (ef Yamaguchi, pp 85-86). This verse explains the major steps of Yogacara-path by which the nonexistence of the apprehended-apprehending duality can be realized (niblakgenapravese-upava), provided one reasons correctly (voaSomanasikara) in accordance with the fundamental Yo 2 tenets of the three natures, the corresponding three absences of intrinsic existence (nwisvabliaea), and the nondval nature of the mind (cettamatra) As will be shown in the notes that follow, the presentation of the Yogacara tenets n the TY commentary on verses 4 and 5 (the eight kinds of consciousness, the ultimate nature of the mind as {ree from the apprehended-apprehending duality, the three natures, the three absences uf intrinsic existence) is almost entirely based on TrK/TrBh Yamaguchi (pp 122-134) points out that Bhavaviveka’s presentation of the Yogiicara tenets mainly draws upon the Dignaga-Dharmapala line of chought (emphasis on the substantial exi consciousness, ete) Yamaguchi therefore exchides any direct dependence on Sthiramati’s Tr Sthablutgva, This may be true, but it 1s also true that the focus of Yogacara thought in Bhavaviveka's day was the Trimsika, as tence of consciousness, the ‘sian nature of evident from the 10 commentaries that were reportedly written on subandhu's treatise, two of which were written by Bhavaviveka’s contemporaries Dharmapala ‘and Sthiramati It is of course possible th form at the time when TJ was composed, but the ideas and even the phrases of TrBh were certainly Sthiramati's haga was not yet available in written well known to the author of TJ, as is evident from the parallel wording of many passages (see the notes below) * Compare with the characterization of the store-consciousness as “the beginningless element and the support of all dharmas” in the Mahavanabiudharmasatra (quoted in MS. Lamotte Hl, p.12, TrBh 37 1213, Siddhi, p 169) See also Yamaguchi, p90 he TJcommentary starts with @ not very systematic explanation of the store-consciousness in general This is followed by a more systematic explanation of the eight kinds of consciousness based on Vasubandhu's theory of the ‘three transformations’ of the store-consefousness in TrK and on Sthiramat’s commentary in TrBh * SNS defines the mental impressions or traces which are appropriated by the store-consciousness 2s ‘the impressions of the conceptual and verbal differentiations (prapartca) which are the habitual way (eyavwhdra) of [identifying] the characteristic properties (nimitta) of things and [associating them mishan ma swith] names (naman) and concepts (vikalpa) (Lamotte, SNS V 2, p 184, Tib text p dung ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad ‘dogs pa’ spros par bag chags). ‘prapaitca” thus refers to the habitual construction or superimposition of the differentiated world of everyday experience , all the perceptions, emotions and cognitions of ordinary people are affected by the ingrained habit of conceiving the world as consisting of separate, enc and separate, enduring objects (ef TrBh 19 12 atmadivnhalpavasand rapadudharmavikalpacdsand ca) These same impressions are called “impressions of attachment to the imagined nature of things” (parikalprtasvabhava-abhinivesa-vasana) in YBb Vin Samgr-(D. Sems Tsai 8, Shi 4al , cf. also TrBh 197, Schmithausen, p 73 and notes) The mental habit of conceptual and verbal differentiation not only constructs @ nonexistent world, but is always accompanied by attachment to the reality and ultimate value of the thus constructed, differentiated world ng subjects (f versus others) 142 —and its mode of apprehending its object (akara) are indistinct (aparichinna). It is an uninterrupted stream and an unfathomable (aprameya) real entity (dvavya). It originates and perishes simultaneously with [the birth and death of sentient beings] in the manifold forms of existence (jati). It acquires an endless variety of potencies (Sakti) and has the power to produce the six consciousnesses which apprehend? the innumerable objects of perception that [uninterruptedly] appear in it, such as blue and so forth. The defiled mind (klistamanas) conceives it as a self (atman) in the sense of a [mental] basis (aSraya) [of personal existence] which is free from birth and annihilation.‘ Because (this store-consciousness] exists as [the support of] the seeds (bija) of virtuous (punya), nonvirtuous (@punya) and immovable (anijya) actions, it contains the seeds of [rebirth in] all the [three] realms of samsaric existence (dhaiu), the [five] states of migration " Literally : “It comprises (yongs sw ‘dzin pa, parigrhita) an indistinet object and (an indistinct) mode of apprehending.” On. ‘parigrhtta’ as used in the active sense, see Schmithausen, note 147. The term ‘parigrhita’ indicates that ‘having its own object and its own, unique mode of apprehending that object’ is an intrinsic property of the store-consciousness (cf. TrBh 193-4: na hi nivalambanaon nirakaram va vijmanane yujsate). The store-consciousness is therefore a genuine consciousness on its own, different from the traditional six consciousnesses. ‘The object of the store-consciousness is defined in various ways in the Yogacara texts (see Schmithausen, pp. 89 ff). According to the fully developed theory (eg. TrBh ad TrK Sab), the store-consciousness is aware of the following objects () An internal object consisting of (a) the impressions of one’s attachment to the imagined nature Of things, (b) the sense organs (subtle matter) and their support (gross matter = the body), (c) the four non-material aggregates (= naman, only in TrBh 198, 19.18-20;; cf. Schmithausen, p. 105). (2) An external object : the surrounding external world (bhaianaloka ~ sthana). Because the internal objects of the store-consciousness are extremely subtle (atisakgma), its awareness (vijnapti) of these objects is indistinct (asamuidita = aparichinna); that is, these internal objects are not known by a mode of apprehension (akava) that discerns them as "this is that” (TrBh 19.1415: so ‘sminn ida tad iti pratisanwedanakarena asamvidita), As for the extern al world, its vastness excludes any distinct awareness by the store-consciousness (cf. YBh, D. Shi 367). In sum, the store-consciousness is the uninterrupted but dim awareness of one’s habitual propensities (vasana), one's body, one’s mental states and one’s Umwelt * Yamaguchi (p, 90) refers to SNS where the store-consciousness is said to be "profound (gamblira) and subtle (sizksma)" (zab cing phra ba) and “an uninterrupted stream." (SNS, T. vol. 16, 692c21-23 ; Lamotte V.7; quoted in TrBh 343-4, Siddhi p. 173); also TrK 4d: tac ca vartate srotasa oghavat) Asvabhava quotes this passage from SNS in his commentary on MS (T. vol. 31, 383629-c9 ; D. Ri 196al ; MS, Lamotte 14, p. 14) and explains ‘profound’ as “difficult to fathom by the intelligence of learned people,” and ‘subtle’ as “difficult to know even by the Sravakas.” Bhavaviveka here emphasizes that the Yogacarins view the store-consciousness as a separate, real consciousness (dravya). His own position is that only the instantaneous occurrences of consciousness are real and that ‘citta’ is just a name or designation of the uninterrupted stream (samatava) of these instantaneous occurrences (see MHK V.46 ff) * Literally : ‘which are connected or joined with’ (dang ‘bret pa). The meaning seems to be that the six consciousnesses (the five sense perceptions plus the sixth mental perception) are produced as distinct apprehensions of some of the innumerable images of the external world which continuously appear and reappear in the store-consciousness but are only indistinctly apprehended by the store-consciousness itself (cf. note I abovel. * On the store-consciousness conceived as ‘atman' in the sense of 'dsvaja’, see Schmithausen p. 119-120. —143—(gati) and the [four] modes of birth (yori) Its actualization [consists of eight different kinds of consciousness] in accordance with? the following three transformations (parinama) the transformation into [the consciousness that is the result of the] maturation (vipaka) [of previous actions], the transformation into the 'ego’ thinking [consciousness] (manana), and the transformation into the [six] object-manifesting [consciousnesses] (vijitapti).? All the things that originate stick to that [store-con: jusness) in the sense that they {continue to] exist there as results [in the form of stored impressions] (phalabhavena), the store-consciousness is therefore also called ‘the appropriating consciousness’ (adanavijnana).* It is accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors, namely,] "Compare with TrBh 1826-19. (Yamaguchi, p. 90): sarcadhatugativonsjatiste kusalakuSalakarmavipa- katvad vipakal: cf also MS, Lamotte 121 with Asvabhava’s commentary ‘The three realms and the five states of migration are: (1) The realm of desire or of impure matter (eamadhatu) which includes hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals and human beings, (2) the realm of pure, subtle matter irupadhatu) and (3) the immaterial realm (arapyadhatu) where the gods dwell (cf AK IIL, p.11 ff). The four modes of birth are: (1) birth from an egg, (2) birth from a womb, (3) birth from exudation and (4) sudden apparitional birth (ef AK II, p. 26 ff) Virtuous and nonvirtuous actions accomplished in the realm of desire are the causes of rebirth in respectively a good migration (either in the realm of desire or in the realm of pure matter) or a bad migration. ‘Immovable actions’ are virtuous actions accomplished in the realm of pure matter or in the immaterial realm; they are called ‘immovable’ because their retribution is always a rebirth in the same samsaric realm. (See AK IV, pp. 106-108.) ® Literally : ‘Tt moves on (or attains different actualizations) (gam) in accordance with (anu) > Based on TrK 1d2ab: parmamah sa ca tndha// vipiko mananakhyasce vijiaptir viseyasya ce (CE Yamaguchi, p 1) Although the Tibetan text continues without a paragraph break here (rjes su ‘gro ba de la . ) it is better to insert a break between ries sw ‘gro a and de la “All the actual instances of consciousness produce impressions or traces (vdsand) by which their seeds for potencies in the store-conseiousness are reinforced. After these instances of consciousness have perished, they ‘stick’ (lum di shsor bar byed fa = a-li) to the store-consciousness in the sense that their impressions (= their result) remain stored there. When the store-consciousness functions as the ‘cause of actual instances of consciousness, the store-consciousness is said to stick’ to them as their cause, On the etymological explanation of ‘alaya’ as sticking’, see Schmithausen, notes 181-183 The textual sources of this etymology are the following (see Schmithausen, notes 136-137) U1) A verse from the Abjiidharmasitra (quoted in MS, Lamotte 12 and [27 Sanskrit text in MVT. ‘34.1.2, Siddhi p 172) saying that this consciousness is the ‘store’ (laye) of all dharmas because “all ‘dharmas always stick to this consciousness (clos kun rmam par shes la sbyor, sarvadharma hi lina vijmane) and in its turn this consciousness sticks to them, because they alway’ exist as the result and as the cause of each other.” (2) MS, Lamotte L3- "Its called ‘@layavijnana’ because all the impure dharmas that originate (skye ‘ba can) stick (sbyor a) to it in the sense that they [continue to] exist there as results, and it sticks to them as their cause.” See also MV'T 338.9: alivante sarve sasravd dharma talra phalabhtvena tax ca tesu hetubhavencty alayah (3) TrBh 1824-25 (ad TrK 2cd).. "It is called ‘alaya' because all dharmas ‘stick’ (alpunte, “ug cing) to it or are closely united with it (upanibadiante, “bret ba) in the sense that they [continue to) exist there as results (karyabhavena), or because it itself sticks to all dharmas or is closely united with them in the sense that it is their cause (karanabhavena).” (8) YBh-Vyakhva (based on MS 13; ef. Schmithausen, note 817) explains ‘alaya’ as follows : "byunge tba dang Idan puri ‘dw byed rnams de la ‘bras bu'i dngos por shyor bar byed pa ‘an/de dag la de rant dngos por sbvor bar byed pa't phyir kun ahi ahes bya ba ‘The store-consciousness was originally also called ‘appropriating consciousness’ because it appro- priates corporeal matter at the moment of conception (pratisandiri) and keeps it appropriated throughout lifetime, especially also during unconscious states (Schmithausen, p. 49). The account of the ‘appropriating consciousness’ here in TJ follows SNS V.2 [the store-consciousness also appro- ates the impressions of all the instances of conceptual and verbal differentiation (/rapanca), or ‘rBh 19.11 ff. [the impressions are the appropriated content (upddi} of the store-consciousness| — 144contact (sparsa), attention (manaskara), feeling (vedana), volition (cetana) and concep- tualization (samjita) which are all neither painful nor pleasant (upeksa).’ The way in which [these mental factors] apprehend (akara) [their objects] is not distinctly known (asamvidita) (through clear cognitions] such as “it belongs to this” or “it exists there,” because it is beyond the scope of [the knowledge of] even learned people? Further, that [store-consciousness] is twofold : it is the projection (aksepa) [of a new existence] and it is the transformation into the result [of the maturation of previous actions) (phalaparinama)s ‘Projection’ is the projection [of a new existence] through the power of the [store-]consciousness.‘ "Transformation into the result’ is actualization "CE YBh Vin. Samgr.,. D. Shi 4b2 ff.; TrK Sed (the store-consciousness is always accompanied by spars, manaskitra, vil, sajna and cetand); TrK 4abe (the feeling that accompanies the store- consciousness is neither painful nor pleasant, and the same is true of the other four omnipresent mental factors). Sthiramati (TrBh 21.15 ff.) explains that the feeling associated with the store-consciousness is neither painful nor pleasant because it is an indistinct (aparichinna) feeling, just like the awareness proper to the store-consciousness itself, and is therefore unable to discern the favorable and disfavorable characteristics of its object. Moreover, painful or pleasant feelings are accompanied by dislike (deesa) or desire (raga). These two roat-defilements cannot possibly accompany the store-consciousness and its mental factors, because the latter are morally neutral (avdkyta). They are morally neutral because they originate exclusively as the spontaneous and uninterrupted result of the maturation (uipakaphala) of actions that were performed during one's previous lifetime. Painful or pleasant feelings only occur in association with the six consciousnesses, because these originate or do not originate depending on the presence or absence of agreeable or disagreeable objects during one's present lifetime * Since the author of TJ has already mentioned that the “dkdra’ of the store-consciousness is not clearly discernible (see p 143 above), the present statement is best understood as relating to the ‘akara’ of the five mental factors that accompany the store-consciousness, Compare for example with YBh Vin, Samgr.,D. Shi 4b3-4: chos de dag kyang mam par smin par bsdus pa dang ig rten gi mkhas pa rams kyis kang riogs par dka bai phyir phra ba ... ("These mental factors are also subtle, because they are fully included in maturation (orpakasamgrhita) and because even learned people can hardly know them.”] * The explanation of the first of the earlier mentioned ‘three transformations’ starts here, ‘ The store-consciousness is the projecting cause (akscpa, phen pa) of a new, future existence because it stores and preserves the newly produced impressions of all one's actions accomplished during one's present lifetime. It is also the projected (aksipta, ‘phangs pa) result of the maturation (vipakaphala) of the actions accomplished during one’s previous lifetime. ‘aksepa’ and 'vipaka’ are explained together in MS (Lamotte 159) as follows : (1) “aksepa’ stands for the newly produced vipakavasand ; if these impressions were not stored in the store-consciousness, there could be no future rebirth of a new store-consciousness (= viftana as the third member of the twelve- membered chain of dependent origination) as conditioned by one’s, present actions (= samskant as the second member) (2) ‘vipaka’ is the uninterrupted present existence of the store-consciousness in one of the states of migration (gati); this present existence is the result of the maturation of the actions accom: plished during a previous lifetime. ‘The Yogacara texts interpret the twelve members of dependent origination as a single process of rebirth consisting in the projection (aksepa) and actualization (abkinireytti) of karmie impressions, For further details, see the papers by R. Kritzer in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 42.2 (1994), pp. (28)(83) and 45.1 (1996), pp. (15)-(20) 145 —(abhinirvrlti) as the result of the maturation [of previous actions] (vipakaphala).' Just as a river continuously flows because of the contiguity of the different parts of the water, just so the continuous flow of the store-consciousness —permeated (paribhavita) by the impressions of virtuous, nonvirtuous and immovable actions— continues to exist as long as samsara lasts.* The impressions of [previous, not yet retributed] actions (karmavasand) and the impressions of [the erroneous notions} of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses (grahvagrahakavasana) together produce a [new retribution in the form of a corporeal existence (lus = atmabhava) as a god, a human being, and so forth, as it convenes in each case.’ This continuous flow of the appropriating consciousness ceases to exist when one obtains arhatship, because all the seeds of the defilements are then destroyed. much for the so-called ‘maturation’ and the way it develops [from the store-consciousness]. This is the first [transformation of the store-consciousness | Further, [the store-consciousness] is also called ‘alayavijtana’ in the sense that sentient beings stick or cling to it (a-11, sbyor bar byed pa) as their self (atman), because ‘Yamaguchi (p. 93) refers to TrBh 187-8 (ad TrK 1d): phalaparinamah (bras bur gyur pa) punar vipakavasanavettilabhiad dlayavijAanasva pitrvakarmaksepaparisamaptan (snong gyi las kyis phangs pa yongs su rdzogs la) yt nokayasabhagantaresu abhiniroyttih (mgnon par ‘grub pa). ("The transforma tion into the result is the actualization of the store.consciousness in other homogeneous existences when the projective power of previous actions has been fully consumed and the impressions of maturation acquire their operational efficiency”) Compare also with TrBh 18.16-17 (ad TrK 2ab) tatra kuSalakusalakarmavasandparipakavasad vatha sebam (ji Itar ‘phangs pa) phalabhinerorttir (’bras bu mngon par ‘grub pa) vipakalk ‘The store-consciousness is not a unitary, nondiscrete entity (ekam, abliamn), but is @ continuum (sandana) of discrete, momentary (Asapika) mental events (cf TrBh 21 25-26). ‘The comparison with a river is found in TrK 4d (tacca vartate srotasa oghaval) There are close parallels between the text of TJ here and Sthiramati's commentary on TrK 4d: fatra sroto (rgyun) hetuphalayor navrantaryeya pravrttib. udakasamahasya (chu'i tshogs) pitreaparabhagavicchedena pravtha (bab pa) aha (chu bo) ity ueyate yatha hy oghas trnakasthagomavadin akersayan gacchati evam Alayaviftanam api punydpunyanenivakarmavdsananngaten sparsamanaskaradin akaryevat srotasa say saram avyuparatam pravartala iti. (PeBh 221-5) * Compare with TrK 19, TrBh 3623-373 (ef Yamaguchi. p. 94): The impressions of the erroneous notions of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses (grahmrahakagraha) (= the mistaken idea that the objects of consciousness exist in their own right separately from conscious: ness and that consciousness apprehends such separately existing objects) cooperate with (sehakarin, than cig byed pa) the impressions of previous actions (karmavasand) in the production of a new existence (atmabhava, lus), just as water ia necessary condition for the origination of a sprout from its seed, The impressions of previous actions cannot produce their result, unless they are assisted (anugrhita, 2in pa) by the impressions of the two erroneous notions (graiadvayavisand), “Compare with TK 5a tasya wyavattiv arhatee. — 146 —[their defiled mind (klisfamanas)] objectifies it as 'T’ (aham) and 'mine’ (mama).! [That defiled mind] is always accompanied by the following four defilements : the ignorance that the regarding the [nonexistence of the] self (4lmamoha), the erroneous view store-consciousness is] the self (atmadysti), the pride of self (atmamana) and the love of self (atmasneha).* It is [also] accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors, namely,] contact, attention, and so forth, which originate from the same stage (bhami) as that where the defiled mind itself exists.’ The defiled mind also does not exist in an arhat, because [in an arhat] all the defilements are eradicated.* So much for the so-called ‘ego’ thinking [consciousness] and the way it develops [from the store- consciousness]. This is the second [transformation of the store-consciousness].° Further, that [store-consciousness] is also called ‘alayavijnana’ because it is the receptacle (gzii, alaya) of everything in the sense that it contains the potencies of all the forthcoming consciousnesses (pravrftivijadna) and [hence also the potencies] of all the mental factors such as aspiration (chanda), determination (adhimoksa) and so "Compare with TK Sbed:: fadasritya pravartate tadalambanans manondma vijitdnam manandmakam. ("The consciousness which is called ‘thinker’ (manas) comes forth with that [store-consciousness] as its support and has it as its object. It has ‘thinking’ as its nature.") ‘TrBh 22.23.24: sathavadrstyadibhih sampravogad aham mama ity alavavijaanclambanatiat ... ( being [constantly] accompanied by the view of self and so forth, [the defiled mind] objectifies the store-consciousness as '’ or ‘mine On the etymological meaning of ‘alaya’ as that to which one sticks or clings, see Schmithausen, pp. 2426, 57. According to Schmithausen (note 137), the oldest text source in which the store- consciousness is explained this way is MS (Lamotte 1.3): "Or it is called ‘alayavijaana’ because sentient beings stick to it (sbyor ba, altyante) as their self.” * Compare with TrK 6, Sthiramati (TrBh 2314-17) comments that these four defilements are interre- lated as follows, First, the ignorance of the true nature of the store-consciousness is the cause of viewing the store-consciousness as the self. This misconception of the self leads to self-pride (= to consider oneself superior to others). Finally, these three defilements produce attachment to what is imagined to be one’s self. * Compare with TrK 7a: the four defilements belong to the same samsaric realm (dhatu) or stage (bhami) as that where the defiled mind originates (There are nine samsaric stages: the realm of desire, the four meditations of the realm of pure matter, and the four meditations of the immaterial realm, The same is true of the five mental factors of the defiled mind (TrBh 24.5: efair (= sparse, etc.) api yatra jatas lanmavair eva samprayujvate nanyadhatubhamikaih; Siddhi, p. 266). Note that the realm or stage in which the defiled mind originates is the same as that in which the store: consciousness presently exists, because the defiled mind is produced from its seeds in the store: consciousness (TrBh 22.2021), * Compare with TrK 7b: arhato na tat ; TrBh 24.14: avhatas tavad asesablesaprahanat klistam mano naivasti. * Compare with TrK 8a: dvitivah parinamo yam. —M7—forth.' It is [therefore] also called ‘the root-consciousness’ (milavijtana). The six forthcoming consciousnesses originate from it [either successively or simultaneously] depending on the presence of [cooperating] conditions such as the visual sense organ, visible form, light, s ‘ace, mental attention, and so forth, just as waves arise from the ocean depending on conditions such as the wind, the stirring up of the water by the seamonster, and so forth. The store-consciousness is neither identical with nor sepa- rate from these forthcoming consciousnesses, just as the ocean and the waves [are neither identical nor apart from each other]°. These [six] apprehensions of objects (visayasra upalabdhayah) do not exist in the following special states (avastha) [of the store-consciousness] : existence divine being without conception (asaminika), the meditative state of non-conception (asanjfisamapatti), the meditative state of cessation [of all conceptions and sensations] (nirodhasamapatti), deep {dreamless] sleep (midd- "On the etymology of “lava Schmithausen, notes 138-140 rmeaning ‘receptacle’ or ‘abode’ (its standard Sanskrit meaning), see Compare with Tr 9-14: Depending on the conditions, the six forthcoming consciousnesses can be accompanied by any of all the existent mental factors. the five omnipresent mental factors, the ‘mental factors which are determined (vrata) as to their specific object (chanda, adhimoksa, etc ) the eleven virtuous mental factors, the six fundamental defilements, the twenty secondary defile ments (upaklefa), and the four morally indetermined (aniyata) mental factors, Note that the store-consciousness is here explained as the ‘basis of everything’ in the sense that 1t contains the seeds of all the instances of mind and of all the mental factors only, and not also the seeds of the material sense-faculties and their corporeal basis (the body) nor the seeds of the surrounding world According to Schmithausen (pp. 62:65), the store-consciousness was originally conceived as the ‘seed of mind’ only , the idea that it also contains the seeds of corporeal matter and of the external world is a later development. ® Compare with TrK 15 (the store-consctousness is the root of the five sense consciousnesses) and ‘TrBh 23.20 ff, (cf Yamaguchi, pp 100-101) The store-consciousness is the ‘root’ in the sense that it is the seed or the ever-present cause (hetuprafyaya) of the sxx forthcoming consciousnesses Depend ing on the conditions, the latter arise either successively or simultaneously (in the case of two or more heterogeneous consciousnesses). For the comparison of store-consciousness/ forthcoming consciousnesses with ocean/waves, see also Laikavatarasntra as quoted in Siddhi, p. 175 (T. vol 31, 14et3) The neither-one-nor-different relationship between the store.consciousness and the forthcoming, consciousnesses is not mentioned in TrK/TrBh, It 1s however discussed in Siddhn, p. 414 (T vol 31 38c1 ad TrK 16) as an application of the ocean/waves comp: ‘Yamaguchi. p. 101) * Compare with TrK 8c (the six forthcoming conseiousnesses are “ogavasva upalabdhit) Sthiramati losses ‘upalabdh' as ‘grahanam’ ('dzin pa) or ‘pratipatti” (rtog pa) (TrBh 252-3) The six are also on in the Lankavatarasatra (cf defined as ‘ewsauvsftaptr’ (TrK 2b) because each of them lets its own specific object appear in the mind (vivnaprahavabhasatuat, TeBh 18 18) 148 —hia), insanity (mada?) and swoon (miircha). So much for the so-called ‘object manifesting consciousnesses’ (vijtapti) and the way they develop [from the store- consciousness]. This is the third [transformation of the store-consciousness] * In the practitioner of yoga, these six consciousnesses* [habitually] manifest themselves as transformed into [two] aspects (4kava): that of an illuminating" apprehender of objects (grahaka) and that of an apprehended object (grahya) or object-appearance (visayabhasa). Now, because external objects (bahyartha) do not exist, the non-apprehension of objects arises [in the yogin] as a result of (samdsritya) apprehending [everything] as mind only (cittamatra). And if the apprehended objects do not exist, then the [consciousnesses as] apprehenders of these objects do not exist either. Hence, the non-apprehension of the six kinds of apprehending consciousness arises as a result of the non-apprehension of objects. ‘TrK 16 mentions five of these six states (except insanity) as states in which only the sixth mental consciousness does not originate. Note that the T} commentator is very unprecise here, because it is only in the state of asamrika and in the two samdpatti states that all the six consciousnesses do not exist anymore (see Siddhi, pp. 400, 403). DDVV (Nozawa ed., 37.13-16) mentions ‘myas pa’, together with deep sleep and swoon, as one of the states where conceptual thought (vikalpa) is absent, but which should not be identified with the highest nonconceptual awareness (nirvikalpajiana). See also YBh Vin. Samgr. XV, T. 30, 706626 (D. Zi 2ial, P. Hi 2995): deep sleep, madness (mys pa) and intoxication (rab tv myos pa) are states ‘where mental attention (manasikava) is absent, but which are not nirvikalpainana, According to the Yogacara, asamjitika and the two kinds of samapatti are states which qualify the store-consciousness; they are not separately existing factors dissociated from the mind (cittavi- prayuktasamskara) as the Sarvastivadins hold. ‘The commentary has thus far explained the Yogacara theory of eight kinds of consciousness in terms of the three transformations of the store-consciousness. As Yamaguchi (pp, 102-103) observes and as has been shown in the notes, the entire account thus far was based on Tr I-16. The next section of the commentary goes on to explain mind-only (v#jfaptimatra) as the theoretical basis of the process of reasoning and meditation to be followed in order to realize Reality as it is, This section corresponds to the content of TrK 17-19 (establishing the principle of vijaptimatra) and TrK 26-30 (explaining the major steps of the Yogacara path as based on the guiding principle of vijitaptimatra), The text has “that same mind (ci#fa)”, but the context shows that ‘mind’ here refers to the six forthcoming consciousnesses that were discussed in the previous paragraph. rab tw snang ba (Prabha). Its also possible that, ‘rub tw snang ba” needs to be corrected into ‘yang dw snang ba’ (seabhasa) in parallel with ‘visayabhasa’ © This paragraph summarizes TrK 26-2. (1) The yogin, whose mind does not yet dwell in its true non-dual nature (vijnaptimatrateam), has not yet removed the propensities (anusaya) of the two mistaken conceptions (graha) (TrK 26), ‘TrBh (42.16) says that such a yogin still has ‘grdliyagrahaka-upalambha’. Not having abandoned (aprahana) the perception of external things (dahir-upalambha), he has also not abandoned the objectification of his own mind as a perceiver (adiydimika-upalambha) of external things. He therefore thinks: "I perceive color with my eves, etc.” (TrBh 42.21-23). This stage corresponds to the "Stage of Accumulation’ (sembharauastha) of the Yogacara path, (2)In the next stage, the yogin abandons the perception of external objects, but he still objectifies ‘mind-only (vijmaptimatra), that is, he still thinks that the mind really exists as an apprehender of objects (grahaka) (TrK 27), This corresponds to the first substages of the "Path of Sustained Effort’ (prayogamanga) during which the yogin engages in correct reasoning. (yoniSomanasikitra) and as a result acquires the certain knowledge that external objects (including the self) do not exist and that all the object-images that appear in his mind are the result of an internal development of the mind itself (3) During the later substages of the "Path of Sustained Effort’, the yogin realizes that "when the ‘apprehended objects do not exist, then consciousness as an apprehender of objects does not exist either.” He consequently abandons the apprehension of the mind as an apprehender of objects (cijnanagraha) (TK 28). Not apprehending any object at all, he then dwells in the true nature of his own mind (cijtaptimatratoam, svacittadharmata). He then for the first time obtains the highest nondual awareness (nirvitalpajiiana) in the Path of Seeing’ (darSanamarga) 149 —As long as the store-consciousness does not stand firm in its own true nature which is called "[merely] letting appear’ (vijaapti [matra)), but still dwells in the perception (of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses)', just as long are the impressions of the [apprehended-apprehending| duality (dvavavasana) not destroyed, because the seeds [of the appearance of] apprehended objects are then not yet removed and the seeds of the perception of the characteristics (mimitladarsana = grahaka) [of these objects] are consequently also not yet destroyed.* But when [the mind] no longer apprehends objects, such as visible form and so forth, as existing outside the mind, then it stands firm in its own true nature (svadharmata)? All the obstructions (Zearana) are then indeed removed because of the fundamental change of the mental basis (asrauparavrtt). The mind then obtains its true nonconceptual nature (nirvikalpadharmata) together with the mastery (vibhutvam) over all dharmas.‘ [The mind’s true nature of] merely letting appear [the apprehended-apprehending duality] (vijAaptimatratay’, or the awareness of the Tathagata which is free from dual apprehension (vrirvikalpa) with respect to all things, cannot be realized unless one fully understands the three natures. Therefore, [the Youacarins] say : When the imagined [nature] is not perceived at all and the dependent [nature] is not [erroneously] apprehended, then the seers of Reality see the perfectly established nature [of the mind]. (5) Compare with TrK 26ab: savad vimaptimatratve vxjnanam na avatis(hati. TJ here follows TrBh almost word by word: yvae cittadharmatayay: viynaptimatrasamssabditayin viptanam nacatisphats kim tarhi grahyagrahakopalambhe carati .. (TrBh 42.16-18 ad TrK 26ab). Since the true nature of the mind consists in ’merely letting appear’ a nonexistent apprehended: apprehending duality, the meaning here is that the mind as vijAaptimatva is intrinsically empty of this duality (cf. the expression ‘advavalaksane vijtaptimatre" in the following note) Compare with TeK 26cd: grahadeavasva anwsavas tavan na ernivartale ‘The text again closely follows TrBh. yaad advayalaksane vijtaptimatre soginas cittam na pratisthitam bhavatt, favad grahyagrahakanusaso na vinivartate (mi dog) na prakiyata (mi spong) ity arthal, (TrBh 42.1921 ad TeK 26ed) Compare with TrBh 43 1215 (ad TrK 28). sasonin kale... rpasabdadyalambanans pana bahisettat nopalabhate na paSyati na grind nabhinivisate .. tasmin kale vifAanagrthasya prakinam svacitta dharmatavane ca pratisthito bhavati Compare with TrK 29:30 and the commentary in TrBh ‘TrK 29° The supreme (ainultara) change of the store-consciousness i its change mto nondual awareness, which is fully realized in the Buddhas ; this change is attained when all the seeds (bia = dausthulva) of the twa obstructions (the obstruction consisting in the defilements and the obstruc: tion of the attainment of omniseience) are removed TrK 30: To obtain the nondual nature of the mind is to ‘obtain the mastery over all dharmas' (TrBh 45.1 sarvadharmaviblutvalabhatas). This is also called ‘the dharmakaya of the Buddhas’ See note I above. Also TrK 25d: ‘viiaptimatrata’ is used as a synonym of “tathata’ (the unchange: able nature of the mind) and of ‘parinispannasvablitea’ (the fully accomplished nature of the mind) 150 —The three natures that are mentioned here —the imagined, the dependent, and the perfectly established— are all included in the store-consciousness.” Any thing (vastu) whatsoever, from visible form up to enlightenment (bodhi), which is apprehended by any of the dual apprehensions (vikalpa) of either internal or external things, does not exist the way it is apprehended. This is because it is [merely] a construct (kalpita), produced by superimposing (saméropa) a nonexistent [on that which really exists]. That is the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhava).? ‘The erroneous apprehensions (abhittaparikalpa)’ —that is to say, [all] the instances of mind and [all] the mental factors which originate from [the store-consciousness in] the three samsaric realms and which vary (bhinna) according to the distinction (bheda) into good, [bad, morally neutral] and so forth— are dependent on others (paratantra) ‘This idea is most probably borrowed from Asanga’s Mahayanasamgraha (MS) in which the major ‘Yogacara tenets (the eight kinds of consciousness, the vijaptimatra principle and the three natures) are for the first time integrated into a systematic soteriology. Chapter 1 of MS discusses the store-consciousness as the “basis of everything that can be known’ (jeyaSraya), that is, as the producing cause of all the dependently originated instances of consciousness. Chapter 2 discusses the three natures as three ‘characteristics’ of everything that can be known (jevalakgeua), It is probably in that sense that the three natures are here said to be ‘included in the store-consciousness’ * The explanation of the three natures here and in the following paragraphs is based on TrK 20-25 ‘The present passage is based on TrK 20 and on the commentary in TrBh (cf. Yamaguchi, p. 113), ‘TrK 20: yena yena vikalpena yad yad vaste vikalpyate/ parikalpita eva asau svabhavo na sa vidvate//. ‘TrBh 39.10.12: adlnatmikabahyavitalpyavastubhedena vikalpyindm anantyam pradarSayannaha, yena vena vikalpena iti, yad yad vastu prakalpyate, adhyatmikam bahyam vd antaso yadvad buddhadharma api ‘The compound ‘abhtaparikalpa’ can be interpreted in two ways. (4) First, when it is interpreted as a descriptive compound (armadharaya), it means ‘consciousness which is erroneous’. In this interpretation, ‘abhafa” does not mean ‘nonexistent, nothing’, but means ‘untrue, false, deceptive’ (abhita, attatva, vitatha). Consciousness is not true to reality (vitatha) because it does not exist the way it appears (yatha pratibhasate tatha na vidyate). The Tibetan translators have followed this interpretation (sang dag a ma yin pa kun vlog pu. One problem on which the Yogdcara school eventually got divided, concerns the exact nature of the falsity of consciousness. Is consciousness intrinsically nondual (nirakara) and does its falsity consist in the fact that it appears as a duality (= as a consciousness of something)? Or is consciousness intrinsically dual and does its falsity consist in the fact that its subjective aspect falsely appears as a self-identical knower while its objective aspect falsely appears as the image of an external world that seems to exist independently of consciousness? According to the first theory, liberation is achieved when consciousness has rejected its erroneous, but adventitious, appearance as a duality and has recovered its true nondual nature. According to the second theory, liberation is attained when consciousness has rejected its false duality (or its false akara). (2) When ‘abhitaparikalpa’ is interpreted as a dependent compound (latpuengz), it means'the conscious. ness in which nonexistent duality (abhidtam) appears or by which nonexistent duality is imagined toexist’. See eg. MVT 22.10-11: abhintam asmin dvayam parikalpyate ‘nena vd ity ablataparibalpals; MVT 46.20.22: deavasye grahyasya grahakasya ca. abhataparikalpe ‘shataparikalpena va parikalpitat ‘makatodd vasturtpenabhivah. In this interpretation, “ablutta’ means ‘nonexistent’ (abhdva, asat) (eg. Trisvabhavanirdesa verse 5: asatkalpa) —181-because they are under the power (dbang bya ba) of others in the sense that they are produced by others.' Or, [the samsaric mind and its mental factors] are ‘paratantra’ in the sense that they exert power with respect to the origination of others, because they are the basis (gzlti) from which the [other] two [nature the imagined and the perfectly established— come into existence as the imagined and the perfectly estab- lished [natures of the mind]. That is the dependent nature (pavatantrasvabhava). ‘The fact that the dependent [nature of the mind] is devoid of (rahitata) what is imagined (parikalpita) to be its apprehended object and its nature as apprehender, is the perfectly established nature [of the mind] (parinisbannasvabhava).* This perfectly established nature is neither identical with (ckateam) nor separate from (pythaktoam) the dependent [nature of the mind]." If it existed separately, it would follow that the true nature (dharmata) [of the dependently originated mind] exists separately [from the mind itself].° On the other hand, if the perfectly established nature were identical [with the dependent nature], the former could not be the cause of the purification (vyavadana) [of the mind] because it would then have defilement as its nature (san kleSatmakatvat).® Compare with TrK 2lab. paratantrasoabhavas tw vikalpal pratyayodbhaval TrBh 39.23-26: tatra parivalpal kuSalakusalavvakrtabhedabhinnas traidhatukascitacaittah (..) paraiy —hetupratyayats tantryate itt paratantra utpadvata ity arthah. (- raya dang rkyen gzhan gy: dbang bya bas gzhan gyi dbang ste/ skyed ces bya ba'i tha tshig ste) (CI Yamaguchi, pp. 114-115) As Yamaguchi (p. 115) points out, this etymological explanation of ‘paratantra’ is not found in any extant Yogacara text. The idea that the dependent nature of the mind is the basis of the other two natures 15 however one of the central ideas in for example the Mahayanasumgraha (MS). Asanga there explains that the dependent nature is the basis of defilement (saukfesa as the appearance of the imagined nature in the dependently originated mind or as attachment to the imagined nature by the dependently originated mind , see note 3 on the previous page) and of purification (vyavadana as the non-attachment to and the non-appearance of the imagined nature in the dependently ‘originated mind or as the realization of the fully established nature of the mind) There is no doubt that the commentator of TJ here refers to this central idea of MS Compare with TrK 2led. nignannas lasve parnena sada rahulala tu si, TrBh 40.2-5: tasmin vikalpe grahyagrahakabhava parikalpitah ( .) tena grahyagrahakeya paratanivasya sada sarvakilane alyontara: hhitad ya sa parintspannaseabhacah Compare with TrK 22ab: ata eva sa naiva anyo ndnanvah paratantratah. The neither identical-nor- different relation between the dependent and fully established natures is also taught in the following passages: SNS, T. vol. 16, 690a27-691b9, MVK Tl, 113d, V.18, MSA VIL, X177; YBh Vin Samgr , T. vol. 30, 696c10-697a4 , DDVV 24.25 (VI); Siddhi, T. vol 31, 46b14-25 * Compare with TrBh 408-10. rahitata ca dharmeta dharmuan nanyt nananya yusyate. parmnispannasea pardantradharmata ily alah paratantrat parmispanno nanyo nananya ati boddiavyes, MVBh 238 pethaktve sati dharmad anya dharmata iti na yujvate Compare with TrBh 40.11-12: atha anansa exam apt parinispanno na visuddhyalambanal sytt Paratantravat samklesatmakatvat ; MNBh 239-10 ekatve sati visuddlytlambanam (jAanan) na svat Sthiramati (MV'T 48.24.25) explains ‘iSudéhi” as ‘that which purifies’ and identifies it with the manga, Accordingly, ‘cause of purification’ in this context means the following: If the perfectly established nature were identical with the dependent nature, the former could not be the cause (in the sense of functioning as che object) of the purifying consciousnesses that arise during the marga. —152--You may ask: "If the three natures exist, what then about [the Prajtaparamitasiitra teaching that] all things lack inherent existence (sarvabhavanifsvabhavay?”” [We answer :] The imagined [nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to individual characteristics (laksayanifsvabhava), because it has no characteristics of its own (svalak- sanasimnyata). It is therefore not perceived at all (anupalabdhi)? ‘The dependent [nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to its origination (spattinihsvabhava) because it does not originate as a nature which is its very own (svatmana) [but as a nature produced by others]. It does therefore not exist the way it is apprehended? Because the perfectly established nature is the ultimate nature (paramartha) of all the dharmas that are erroneously imagined (parikalpita) and is also the absence of intrinsic existence (nifisvabhavata),* and because it is the object (artha) of the supreme (arama) awareness of the Superiors (aryajiiana),’ it lacks inherent existence in the sense of being the ultimate absence of inherent existence (paramarthanihsvabhavata). Those who see Reality and know the ultimate nature [of the mind] are those who see that perfectly established nature [of the mind] by means of [an awareness in which] the perceived (alambya) and the perceiving (alambaka) are exactly the same (samata). The reason [why they see it that way] is that the transworldly nondual awareness (/okottaranirvikalpajnana) originates [in them].° This [transworldly nondual ‘Compare with TrBh 412-3: yadi drauyam eva paratantrah katham satve sarvadharma nifscabhacd anutpannd aninuddha iti nirdisyante, * Compare with TrK 24a: prathamo lakseyena eva niksvabhavo, * Compare with TrK 24bc; TrBh 41.17.19: na svayara bhdva etasya mdyieat parapratyayena utpatteh. atasea yatha prakiyati tatha asya utpattir nasti iti ‘ya uipattinihsoabhavata ity weyate, The meaning, here is that the dependent nature of the mind conceals its own dependency on other conditions by appearing as if it existed in its own right. This is one of the reasons why ignorant people misapprehend it as an inherent existence, “ Compare with TrK 24d-25a: apard niksvabhavata// dharmanam paramarthasca sal ; TrBh 41.22-24 sa yasmat parinispannah soabhavas sarvadharmanam paratantratmakanam paramarthah taddharmata itt kxtua tasmat parinispanna eva svabhdvak paramarthanilsvabhavata parinispannasya abhavasta bhavateat, Whereas TrBh says that the perfectly established nature is the ultimate nature (/paramartha’ or ‘dharmata’) of all paratantra-dharmas and consists in their nonexistence (abhdvasoabhva) as imagined (parikalpita) dharmas, the commentary in TJ instead says that the perfectly established ‘nature is the ultimate nature of all parikalpitacdharmas. The meaning is however the same, because the dharmas that are imagined (parikaipita) to exist as apprehended objects and apprehending cconsciousnesses are the dependently originated (pantéantya) instances of mind. Compare with TrBh 41.19-20: paramam hi lokottavajnanam niruttaratuat tasyarthab paramarthah, Compare with TrBh 43.17-18 (ad TrK 28): grahsabhave grahakabhavam api pratipadvate, na kevalam grahsabhavam, evam hi samasamalambyalambakam nirvikalpam lokottarars janam utpadyate, S. Levi's text reads ‘samam andlambydlambakam jAanam ...”, but the manuscript suggests ‘semasame-aiambya...’ as an alternative reading [S, Lévi, TrBh, note (5) p 43: correct 'samamama: alambya...’ into ‘samasama-alambya...’}. Compare with the expression ‘samasamalambyalamba [ka]. Jnana’ in Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya 854, p. 76 (T. vol. 31, 682c8-9), See also Siddhi, T vol. 31, 49¢21, —153—awareness is] the defining characteristic of the fundamental change of the [mental] basis (asrayaparavrtti) [and] is also the state of liberation (vinuktikaya) of the Srava- kas, because they are free from all the contaminations (sarvasravavigata) (produced by the defilements] and have thus removed the obstruction of the defilements (klestivarana), This very same (s¢ eva) is also the ‘body that is the cause of all the supreme dharmas’ (dharmakaya) of the Tathagata because the Tahagata is free from all the impressions of samsaric actions (karmavasana) and of the [grasping of] apprehended [objects] and apprehending [consciousnesses] (grahyagrahakavasana) and has thus removed the cognitive obstructions (jAeyavarana). Some may ask: "If the imagined nature is the object of worldly knowledge and the perfectly established nature is the object of a personal realization (pratyatmavid), namely the transworldly awareness of the Muni, of which knowledge is the dependent nature then the object, and [if it is not the object of any knowledge] how can its existence be ascertained?”* To answer this question, [the Yor: There are valid reasons to think that the dependent [nature] exists, because conventional designations have a cause, because otherwise the two will not exist, and because [the existence of] defilements is observed.* (6) The conventional designations (prajtapti) of existence [of the self or of consciousness as an apprehender of external objects, and so forth] with respect to the mind and the mental factors,' do not occur without having [the mind and its mental factors] as the causal base of erroneous imputation (viparyasa).? Because [conventional designations] have this property (Jaksana) [of necessarily having the mind as their causal base], it is © Compare with TrK 29-30 and the following passages in TrBh, ‘TeBh 44.24.27 : AleSivaranaprahanat Sravakanam vimuktikayah. sa eva asrayparavrttilaksayo dharma: kyo ‘py wcyate, mahamuner bhioniparamitadibhavanayd leSajnexdvaranaprahandt aSrayapavavrti samudaganat mahdmuner dharmakava ity ueyate TrBh 4419.21> enasravo dhatur ity ucyate, nirdausthubvatodl sa to asravavigata ity anasraval Gryadharmahetutvat dhatuh hetvartho by atra dhatusabdah, TrK/TrBh distinguishes between the surpassable (sotlara) change of the mental basis of the Sravakas and the unsurpassable (niruttara) one of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas ‘andsrava’ applies to both the Sravakas and the Tathagatas ‘dhat’ in the sense of ‘cause of all supreme dharmas’ applies to the dliarmakava of the Tathagata on * Compare with TrBh 4018-20. yadi grahyagrahakabhavarahital paratantrah katham asaw gxhyate, agrhyamano va katham astli vijtayate. (cf. Yamaguchi, p. 146) Quotation of a verse from Asanga's Xian sang-sheng-iao-lun (T. vol. 31, 558¢25-26). See Yamaguchi, 137 This verse is also quoted in PP (D. Tsha 243a1, P. Tsha 304b2:3), see Eckel, p. 52, Yamaguchi (p 136) refers to TrK 1 and translates this sentence as follows: "The designations [of the nonexistent self and things! which are superimposed on the existent mind and mental factors" Literally” .. appear [only] together with [or as the result produced by] the causal base of erroneous imputationinferred that the dependent [nature of the mind] exists.’ Otherwise, if the dependent [nature] did not exist, it would follow that the two, that is to say conventional designations and their causal base, or the imagined [nature] and the perfectly esta- blished [nature], do not exist either, because these two depend on the dependent [nature].? Further, if the dependent nature not exist, the existence of defilements "This argument is stated more explicitly in MHK V.82-83ab, Bhavaviveka refutes it in MHK 83cd-84. His own account of ‘conventional designation’ (prajnapti) is found in MHK V.74 and 80ab. ‘The same argument is formulated as an inference (anwnana) in PP (see Eckel, pp 53-54). L interpret ‘mishan nyid des’ (because of [having] this property’) as a predicate of ‘conventional designations’, This interpretation agrees with the formulation of this argument by Asanga him. self: “It should not be taught that all things are only conventional existences (prajtaptisat). Why? Because conventional existences necessarily have a causal base (nimita) If there exist no real entities (vast), conventional existences cannot exist either.” (T. vol $1, 558¢27-28) PP presents the argument in the same way: "The dependent nature exists, because conventional designations have a cause.” Bhavaviveka replies that the argument is invalid as it stands, because the logical reason (having a cause’) is 2 property of ‘conventional designation’, and not of the subject of the inference (‘the dependent nature’, as it should be. (See Eekel, p. 53) When ‘mishan nyid des’ is construed as a predicate of ‘the dependent nature’ ['Because the dependent nature has this property (of being the causal base of erroneous imputation) ..J, the argument becomes the following ‘prasaiga’ : "Conventional designation cannot exist if its cause does not exist. The dependent nature [of the mind] is the cause of conventional designation Hence, the dependent nature necessarily exists.” wur different interpretations of 'the two’ are found in the texts (MHK, TJ, PP, PPpika). (1) The first interpretation of ‘the two’ (= conventional designations and their causal base) in TJ is based on Asanga’s Xiaw-yang-sheng jiao-lun (T. vol. 31, 558¢28-29), Bhavaviveka refutes this argument in MHK V.84 (2) The second interpretation of ‘the two’ (= parikalpita and parinispanna) is based on the idea that the dependent nature functions as the base of the other two natures. This idea occurs already in embryonic form in the Bodhisattuabhami (BBh 46.14-21 ; Tib. D. Wi 26a4-b3; Chin, T. vol. 30, 4883-10): eastumatra (= paratantra) necessarily exists; otherwise the nihilistic view of the nonexistence of prajitapti (= parikalpita) and of tattoam (= parinispanna) will follow. The clearest statement of the central role of the dependent nature is found in the opening verse of the Madhyantavibhagakarika (MVK 1.1): False consciousness (abhitaparikalpa = paratantra) exists as the substratum in which imagined duality (= parikalpita) appears and in which emptiness parinispanna) exists. Similarly, the Yogacdvabltmi (T. vol. 30, 705c8:9) and the Xian-yang-sheng Jiao-lun (1. vol 31, 508D16-17) define the function (las) of the dependent nature as ‘acting as the support of the imagined and perfectly established natures.” The pivotal role assigned to the dependent nature is moreover one of the characteristic features of the three-natures tenet in the Mahayanasamgraha Bhavaviveka does not explicitly refute this argument in his reply (utlarapatsa) in MHK//TJ Strictly speaking, this is not a real argument, because it is based on the premise that the Yogacara doctrine of the three natures is a sound doctrine, We can therefore assume that Bhavaviveka refutes this argument indirectly in his refutation of the three natures in MHK V. 55-112 155 —should not be observed. But their existence is observed. And since defilements have the mind and the mental factors as their base, and since liberation consists in the absence of defilements, the dependent nature is thought to exist.” (G) A third interpretation of “the two’ as referring to “defilement (smélese) and purification (eyanadana)” is found in PP (see Eckel, pp 54-56) The idea that the dependent nature of the mind is the substratum of both defilement and purification is not found in the early Yogacara texts (YBh, SNS. MVK, MSA, DDV) According to these early texts, the dependent nature is the basis of defilement only as opposed to the perfect nature (Sunveld, tathatd, dharmadhat) which is identified with intrinsic purity (prukytivisuddha, prakytiprabhasoarn) . the intrinsically pure and perfect nature of the mind is then seen as the locus of both adventitious (Zgantuka} defilement and adventitious re-punification , in this view, liberation is attained by’ the elimination of the depen: SNS. T vol 16, 6931-2: eavaddna is realized by the elimination of panatantra; MVK LA: mokya 1s achieved through the elimination (gaya) of ablintapankalpa) The Mahavinasongraha maugurates a mayor shift in the Yogacara doctrine by assigning the central role in the process of deftlement and purification to the dependent nature of the mind which is now said to have two aspects, namely a defiled aspect and a pure aspect ov purification) of the perfect nature of the mind, but as a transformation (pevavyiti) of ts dependent dent nature and not by its purification [see eg. ‘T vol 31, Lael ff) Liberation 1s then primarily seen not as a transformation (extrinsic nature. Asanga defines this transformation as follows. "When the counteragents [uf the defile ments) (pratipalya = lokottaramarga) arise, the dependent nature of the nnd rejects its defiled T vol 31, 18c17-18) Bhavaviveka refutes this argument and states his own view regarding the existence of defilement and purification in MIK V 80cd-81 U) Avalokitavrata’s commentary on PP adds a fourth interpretation of “the two" which is based on MVK [1: The dependent nature exists because, although the erroneously (aswHha) imagined ‘apprehended apprehending duality does not exist, ablemtapurikaipa should exist as the basis of the appearance of this duality See Eckel, p 53, note 1 ‘The prose commentary in the Xiang-yang-shens-fiao-tun connects this third argument with the al base) do not exist, defilement also will not exist. But the existence of defilement is clearly perceived a2) As mentioned in the previous note, this argument is typical of the early Yogacara texts. It is for pect and appropriates its pure aspect ” (MS. second argument, as follows “If the two (that is, conventional designations and their e¢ Hence, the dependent nature necessarily exists” (T_ vol. 31, 338028 example found in the Yagacavabhami (Vin Somgr. 15) where it is asked what the undesirable consequence would be if the dependent nature did not exist The sastra answers that no effort would then be needed to eradicate defilement, simply because the latter would then not exist. and if defilement does not exist, purification will not exist either (YBh, T vol 30, 703b28.c1, Tib D Zi 2al-5) Another example is Vasubandhu’s commentary on MVK [4. Vasubandhu there argues that the erroneous consciousness (ablittaparikalpa), although nonexistent in the way in which it appears. nevertheless exists as a mere deceptive appearance (blirdutindtiva). The existence of the mind as a mere deceptive appearance cannot be denied because ‘liberation is attained by the ehmination of this erronous consciousness’ (MVK 1.4). If the erroneous consciousness did not exist, there would be no bondage (dandha ~ samblesa) and hence also no liberation (moltsa = evaeudana) (MVBh 19.7.12 idem in MS, T vol. 31, 138b26-c4). For the refutation of this argument in PP, see Eckel pp 37-59 MHK V Siicd-81 (treated together with the refutation of argument two) ‘he refutation in MHK i found at — 156 —‘The [dependent nature] is seen (drsyate) [as it is] after one has directly realized (saksatky) the perfectly established nature which is the object of the transworldly nondual awareness (lokotfaranirvikalpajfana).!' This is because the dependent (nature) is adequately known by the subsequently attained pure worldly knowledge (latprsthalabdhasuddhalaukikajnana)* ‘This doctrine of the Prajiaparami {sutras}, [as set forth by us] is the means to achieve omniscience. Not so the [Madhyamaka] doctrine which is intent on negating the [real] origination, cessation, and so forth [of things]. (7) “Compare with TrK 22d: na adrste ‘smin sa drSyate// (cf. Yamaguchi, pp. 144-145). To see the dependent nature of the mind as it is, is to see it as similar to a magical creation (ma), a fata morgana (martci), a dream (svapna), an echo (pratiSrutha), etc, (TrBh 40.27-28), that is, as empty of the apprehended-apprehending duality which appears in it, follow Yamaguchi (p. 144) who reads '.. which is the object of the transworldly nondual awareness’ as a qualification of the perfectly established nature, and not of the dependent nature as the Tibetan text suggests. The latter reading can however not be excluded in view of the Tibetan translation of the commentary in TrBh (see the following note) * Compare with TrBh 40.23.25 : nirvitalpalokottarajnanadySve parinispanne svabhave adrse apratividdhe ma rtogs pa) asaksitkrte, atprsthalahdhasuddhalaukikajnanagamyatoat pavatantro ‘nyena jAd@nena na grhyate. The underlined portion differs in the Tibetan translation: 'de'i rjes la thob pa dag pa ‘jig rten pa dang ‘jig rten las ‘das pa’i ye shes kyi spyod yul yin pas’ (D. 1686) ° The terms ‘nifi” and ‘haya’, here translated as ‘doctrine’, derive from the root wf (lead, guide) and thus have the connotation of 'a doctrine intended to lead people towards liberation’. In the present context, another possible connotation might be ’a doctrine that has been faithfully extracted from (nta) the authoritative Scriptures” In addition, ‘ntti’ and ‘naya' are closely related to 'neyartha’ and ‘nilartha’. As is known from the famous passage on the 'Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma’ in the Sandhinirmocanasatra (SNS, T. vol. 16, 697a23-b9; Lamotte, VII.30), the Yogacara interprets the Prajitaparamitasatra teaching that all things lack inherent existence as a non-definitive teaching which requires explica: tion (neytrtha), and claims that its explicated or definitive meaning (ntlartha) is provided by the ‘Yogacara tenets of the three natures and the three absences of inherent existence. The Yogacara thus claims that its own doctrine is not only in agreement with the teaching on emptiness in the Prajnaparamitasatras but also reveals the true, definitive meaning of that teaching, (See also note 4 on p. 159 and the commentary to MHK V.28cd in TJ.) In a related passage (SNS, T. vol. 16, 695c12-696a2; Lamotte, VII20), the sutra criticizes certain Mahayana followers in the following vein: Some Mahayanists cling to the literal meaning (jathd- ruta) of the Prajfaparamita teaching on emptiness and assert that all things lack inherent existence in every respect and do not originate or perish at all; they adhere to the nihilistic view that nothing really exists and that all things are deprived of individuating characteristics (niblakyaa) ; they deny the existence of the dependent and the perfectly established natures of things and can therefore not explain why the imagined nature is erroneously taken for real by the ignorant. Parallel passages are found in the Bodhisattuabhami (BBh 45.22 ff.) and the corresponding commentary in Viniseava- samgrahayt 15 (T. vol. 30, 713b2-18 ; Tib. D. Zi 42b5-13a4). As H. Ui (Yugaron Kenkyu, Tokyo 1958, pp. 60 f.) has argued, there are strong reasons to believe that these passages against the ‘nihilists’ are not intended as a criticism of Nagarjuna’s thought or of Madhyamaka thought in general, but are aimed at the nihilistic interpretation of emptiness by some post-Nagarjuna or post-Aryadeva ‘Madhyamikas. 157 —[The Yogacara here asserts the following] The transformation’ of the store: consciousness [which is accomplished] by not apprehending anything as 'T (aham) or ‘mine’ (ama) and by the [resultant] absence of attachment to 'T’ and ‘mine’, is taught the following words from scripture; "Although these very dharmas moisten, fully develop (paripirayanti), make manifest and set in motion (paricaravanti) all kinds of dharmas, there exists not! ng in them that can be conceived as ‘I’ or ‘mine’."* The scriptural statement "That mind is a non-mind” (lac citfam acittam)? teaches the nonexistence of the apprehended (gvithya) and the apprehending (grahaka) [aspects of the mind] he scriptural statement "The state of non-mind (aciffata) is inaccessible to thought (acintya)" teaches that only the mind [as empty of duality] exists (vijaptimatvateam).> ‘The scriptural statement "Just so, visible form is an apprehendable property (nimitta) and [all things] up to enlightenment (dodhi) are also apprehendable properties "* teaches about the nature which is imagined (pavikalpitasvabhava) by designating (btags pa, prajitapti) [these apprehendable properties] by means of names and semantic conventions (sanketa) "The Tibetan jongs su ‘gwar ba’ suggests purrydma” as the original Sanskrit equivalent (cf Yamaguchi, p. 148), but the meaning here seems to be closer to /pardoytti” (fundamental change) £ { could not identify this quotation, but it is no doubt taken from one of the Prajaparamita sutras, Here and in the following paragraphs, the Yogacarins quote six scriptural statements to show that the six tenets explained thus far (the store consciousness and its transformations ; the nonexistence of the apprehended-apprehending duality , the existence of the mind as empty of duality; the three natures) are all in agreement with teachings found in the Prajtaparumita sutras Yamaguchi (pp. 153-155) explains the meaning of the present quotation as follows. Dharmas (or instances of consciousness), which habitually function as apprehenders of apprehended objects. moisten the store-consciousness by leaving their impressions there. These impressions mature and develop into seeds From these seeds new dharmas (= instances of consciousness} originate which again produce impressions, and so forth. This whole process is however only the cause-effect transformation of the momentary instances of the mind and no substantial self nor things possessed by the self exist in it Found for example in the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamitasatva (ed. PL Vaidya, p 318): tatha hr tac itlam acitiam prakris citasya prabhaseara Found in Satasahasrika and Pahcavinsatsahasrika tsee E Conze, The Large Sutra of Perfect Wisdom, Motilal, Delhi 1979, p 97 note 8) According to the Sutra, ‘not access sble to thought’ means that the true nondual nature of the mind cannot be conceived as either ‘existent’ or ‘nonexistent’ (see E, Conze, ibidem). The Yogacara interpretation, as presented here by Bhavaviveka, clearly deviates from the original intent of the Sutra For the Yogacara, “inaccessible to thought’ means that the true nature of the mind is not conceivable aS an apprehended-apprehending duality The Yogacara affirms however that the mind, as empty of that duality, exists and is indeed the only fully established (parinispanna) reality From the Parcavinsatisahasrika (see E Conze, a. p. 101) 158 —The dependent [nature] is taught in the teachings about "the [real of which the existence is] mistakenly negated” (apavadita?), “the [real] substratum [of superimposition]" (upddana)', "dharmas which are [bases of] designation” (edags pa’i chos, prajnaptidharmay? and "dharmas which are members of enlightenment” (bodhipaksadharma), The perfectly established nature is taught in terms such as "being thus” (tathata), “limit of Reality” (bhittakoti), "void of” (vivikta), "the fruit [of the Path]” (phalam), "omniscience” (sarvakrajaata), and so forth.’ ‘Thus, the doctrine of the Prajfaparamita [sutras], as set forth by us, is the means (upaya) to achieve omniscience. But [the doctrine of] the Madhyamikas which is intent on negating the origination, cessation, and so forth (of things], is equal to a nihilistic view (vdstitadys{i) and is therefore not a means to achieve omniscience.* So much for the viewpoints and objections (parvapaksa) of the Yogacarins. "CE Yamaguchi, p. 159: Just as a rope is the substratum or material cause of the illusive appearance of a snake, just so the dependent nature of the mind is the real substratum of the illusive appearance of the apprehended-apprehending duality. * Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 159. The mind and the mental factors are erroneously hypostatized and designated as ‘self’ or as enduring subjects apprehending enduring objects, ® All these terms are frequently used in the Prajtaparamita sutras, «There is textual evidence that the Yogacarins actually claimed that their doctrine was in conformity with the teachings of the Prajnaparamita sutras. The main texts are the following (see also Yamaguchi, pp. 150-153) (1) In his commentary on MS, Asvabhava quotes two passages from the Maitreyaparipyecha chapter of the Partcavimatisahasrika as a scriptural source or endorsement of the ‘three natures’ doctrine (T. vol. 31, 383c2-10 and 399628.c13). See also the TJ commentary on MHK V.28ed. (2) In his commentary on MVK 1.1.2, Vasubandhu states that the Yogacara teaching that everything is neither empty (because the dependent and perfectly established natures exist) nor non-empty (because the imagined nature does not exist), is in conformity with the Prajtaparamita teachings, (3) In verse 27 of his Prajnaparamitapindarthasamgraha, Dignaga says that the Prajnaparamita teachings are based (samasritya) on the tenet of the three natures (cf. G, Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajfiaparamita,” JRAS 1947, p. 57). (4) Sthiramati remarks that, according to some Yogacarins, the three natures are taught to convey the essence of the Prajtaparamita without error. (MVT, 1125-7) 5) In the concluding lines of MV'T (263.3-4 ; not found in the Tibetan translation), Sthiramati writes that the core of the Paitcavimsatisahasrika is taught in MVT. According to Yamaguchi (p. 152), the reason why the Yogacarins traced their doctrine back to the Prajaparamita sutras (the main scriptures of the Madhyamikas), was probably that they wanted or needed to show that their doctrine had a broader scriptural basis than just the Samp dhinirmocanasatra, and that they wanted to convince the Madhyamikas that the Yogacara doctrine was a true Mahayana doctrine. —159—