G.R. No.

L-29169 August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN
OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case with several others
for qualified theft. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness
to testify for the People during the first day of trial. Counsel of
petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. But
petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-
petitioner had to take the stand. As a result of which cases against his
co-accused were dropped. He was convicted of the crime charged by
reason of his testimony.He filed a petition before the CA. It dismissed
for failure of the counsel to file the required brief within the
reglemantary period despite the counsel1f’s explanation for her non-
compliance.MR was file but it was unavailing.
PETITONER: He was denied of his constitutional right not to be
compelled to testify against himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy for
petitioner.
RULING:The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus
is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is
the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson
vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is
at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused
Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends
the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to
restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless
in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it
may be responsible as trespassers. ... "
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered
directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the
Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of
petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311,
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et
al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless
he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other
than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the
discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or
reason ceases to exist. No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN
OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case with several others
for qualified theft. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness
to testify for the People during the first day of trial. Counsel of
petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. But
petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-
petitioner had to take the stand. As a result of which cases against his
co-accused were dropped. He was convicted of the crime charged by
reason of his testimony.He filed a petition before the CA. It dismissed
for failure of the counsel to file the required brief within the
reglemantary period despite the counsel’s explanation for her non-
compliance.MR was file but it was unavailing.
PETITONER:He was deniedof his constitutional right not to be
compelled to testify against himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy for
petitioner.
RULING:The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus
is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is
the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson
vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is
at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused
Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends
the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to
restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless
in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it
may be responsible as trespassers. ... "
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered
directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the
Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of
petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311,
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et
al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless
he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other
than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the
discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or
reason ceases to exist. No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner.
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the

Malaysian Internal Security Act. He was then turned over to the PNP-
IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with
four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
with said RTC. Petitioner was flown to the Philippines and brought to
the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
Atty. Danipog, Jr. informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that
Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. He requested for
Kunting’s temporary detention due to the high security risks involved
and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order
which was granted.
Consequently, Director Lomibao wrote a letter to DOJ, requesting for
transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig
City,for possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG(Abu
Sayaf Gropd) if he will be detained in Basilan.
Meanwhile, RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused
in the consolidated Criminal Cases but deniedhis Motion to Set Case
for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned him. The
trial court reiterated its Order, directing the Police Superintendent and
Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
Subsequently, Police Chief Superintendent Rafanan reiterated the
request to DOJ to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of
Kunting’s capse.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus stating that he has been restrained of his liberty. He
stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he
filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the
records as "for safekeeping purposes only."

ISSUE:The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can
prosper.

RULING: Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the
writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process
issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias
order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2,
Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-
1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the
last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and
Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a
criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner.
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the

Malaysian Internal Security Act. He was then turned over to the PNP-
IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with
four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
with said RTC. Petitioner was flown to the Philippines and brought to
the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
Atty. Danipog, Jr. informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that
Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. He requested for
Kunting’s temporary detention due to the high security risks involved
and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order
which was granted.
Consequently, Director Lomibao wrote a letter to DOJ, requesting for
transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig
City,for possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG(Abu
Sayaf Gropd) if he will be detained in Basilan. Meanwhile, RTC
rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the
consolidated Criminal Cases but deniedhis Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned him. The
trial court reiterated its Order, directing the Police Superintendent and
Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
Subsequently, Police Chief Superintendent Rafanan reiterated the
request to DOJ to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of
Kunting’s case.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus stating that he has been restrained of his liberty. He
stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he
filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the
records as "for safekeeping purposes only."

ISSUE:The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can
prosper.

RULING: Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the
writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process
issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias
order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2,
Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-
1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the
last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and
Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a
criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.